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(id. 32). Defendant Muench used his daughter's drug abuse history as an

example to assert that he did not think that someone could recover without being
in rehabilitation. (Id. \| 33-34). Per Spak, Muench disclosed that his daughter

was in and out of rehabilitation and she was stealing from him. (Id. {] 33). In

response, Spak offered to take a drug test on the spot to prove that he was

“clean and sober.” (Id. 35). At first, Muench agreed, but he later changed his

mind and reiterated that he did not want Spak working for him. (Id. {] 36).
Based on the above events, Spak’s complaint maintains several causes of

action. Count \| advances claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA
against Oscar Smith. Count !\| asserts claims for discrimination and retaliation

under the PHRA against Oscar Smith. Count Ill alleges that Defendant Muench
aided and abetted Oscar Smith in engaging in unlawful and discriminatory
employment practices in violation of the PHRA.
Defendants seek to dismiss all causes of action asserted in Spak’s
complaint, that is, his various ADA and PHRA claims on the ground that they fail

to comply with the federal pleading standards.
Jurisdiction
Because Spak asserts claims pursuant to the ADA, the court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (‘The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
PHRA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367{a). (“In any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplementa
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article lil of the United States Constitution.”).
Legal Standard
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations
when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘a short and plair
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Doe v.
Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). That means, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pled that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233
(citations omitted).

Analysis
The court will first address Spak’s ADA and PHRA claims for disability
discrimination and retaliation before moving on to his PHRA claims for aiding anc
abetting.*

1. Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA Discrimination Claims
Counts \| and II of plaintiff's complaint allege disability discrimination
pursuant to the ADA/PHRA.? (Doc. 1, J] 48-60). Defendants argue that Spak
failed to present sufficient factual allegations in his complaint to allow his
disability discrimination claims to proceed under a disparate treatment theory.
(Doc. 8, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 710).
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide civil rights protections for persons
with disabilities.” Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990
US.C.C.A.N. 267, 471). Inthe employment context, the ADA prevents covered

2 Counts \| and II of plaintiffs complaint assert ADA and PHRA claims using the same legal
theories. The court will address plaintiffs ADA and PHRA claims collectively under the same
legal standard. See Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220, n. 21 (2d Cir.
2024) (“federal courts should continue to interpret the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.”);
Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 500, n. 2 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he same jegal standard
that applies to the ADA applies equally to disability discrimination claims under the PHRA.”).
° Spak alleges that defendants terminated his employment due to his actual disability, his
record of disability, and because they regarded him as being disabled. (Doc. 1, Compl. J] 52,
54, 59). At this stage of the proceedings, the court will not address Spak’s disability
discrimination claim under each individual definition of disability. Rather, the court will take a
holistic approach.

entities from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disabilit)
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination based upon disparate treatment.
To recover under this theory of liability, plaintiff must establish that: 1) he is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by
the employer; and 3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse decision as a result
of discrimination. See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).
Prior to addressing defendants’ arguments, Spak’s complaint alleges that
his history of drug addiction qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the
ADA and PHRA. (Doc. 1, Compl. 41).4 Per Spak, his alleged disability

4 Recovering drug addicts who are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been
rehabilitated successfully are protected by the ADA from discrimination on the basis of past

(id. 32). Defendant Muench used his daughter's drug abuse history as an

example to assert that he did not think that someone could recover without being

in rehabilitation. (Id. | 33-34). Per Spak, Muench disclosed that his daughter

was in and out of rehabilitation and she was stealing from him. (Id. {] 33). In

response, Spak offered to take a drug test on the spot to prove that he was

“clean and sober.” (Id. 35). At first, Muench agreed, but he later changed his

mind and reiterated that he did not want Spak working for him. (Id. {] 36).

Based on the above events, Spak’s complaint maintains several causes of

action. Count | advances claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA

against Oscar Smith. Count !| asserts claims for discrimination and retaliation

under the PHRA against Oscar Smith. Count Ill alleges that Defendant Muench

aided and abetted Oscar Smith in engaging in unlawful and discriminatory

employment practices in violation of the PHRA.

Defendants seek to dismiss all causes of action asserted in Spak’s

complaint, that is, his various ADA and PHRA claims on the ground that they fail

to comply with the federal pleading standards.

Jurisdiction

Because Spak asserts claims pursuant to the ADA, the court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (‘The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's

PHRA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367{a). (“In any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplementa

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article lil of the United States Constitution.”).

Legal Standard

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations

when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘a short and plair

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Doe v.

Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). That means, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pled that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233

(citations omitted).

Analysis

The court will first address Spak’s ADA and PHRA claims for disability

discrimination and retaliation before moving on to his PHRA claims for aiding anc

abetting.*

1. Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA Discrimination Claims

Counts | and II of plaintiff's complaint allege disability discrimination

pursuant to the ADA/PHRA.? (Doc. 1, J] 48-60). Defendants argue that Spak

failed to present sufficient factual allegations in his complaint to allow his

disability discrimination claims to proceed under a disparate treatment theory.

(Doc. 8, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 710).

Congress enacted the ADA “to provide civil rights protections for persons

with disabilities.” Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir.

1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990

US.C.C.A.N. 267, 471). Inthe employment context, the ADA prevents covered

2 Counts | and II of plaintiffs complaint assert ADA and PHRA claims using the same legal

theories. The court will address plaintiffs ADA and PHRA claims collectively under the same

legal standard. See Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220, n. 21 (2d Cir.

2024) (“federal courts should continue to interpret the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.”);

Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 500, n. 2 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he same jegal standard

that applies to the ADA applies equally to disability discrimination claims under the PHRA.”).

° Spak alleges that defendants terminated his employment due to his actual disability, his

record of disability, and because they regarded him as being disabled. (Doc. 1, Compl. J] 52,

54, 59). At this stage of the proceedings, the court will not address Spak’s disability

discrimination claim under each individual definition of disability. Rather, the court will take a

holistic approach.

entities from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disabilit)

in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions,

and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination based upon disparate treatment.

To recover under this theory of liability, plaintiff must establish that: 1) he is

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform

the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by

the employer; and 3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse decision as a result

of discrimination. See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).

Prior to addressing defendants’ arguments, Spak’s complaint alleges that

his history of drug addiction qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the

ADA and PHRA. (Doc. 1, Compl. 41).4 Per Spak, his alleged disability

4 Recovering drug addicts who are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been

rehabilitated successfully are protected by the ADA from discrimination on the basis of past