<p>No, it is not sufficient proof.</p>

<p>There are a host of possible drivers of "vehicle miles per-capita" that are not causally connected to the price of fuel.  You would need to make a good-faith effort to identify them and assess their relative impact before coming to the conclusion you've done.</p>

<p>This is in addition to the fact that the graphs you shared indicate that total miles travelled have been flat since 2005, and miles per-capita have dropped since 2005 even as gas prices roughly doubled.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-17T21:17:41.117Z
I have a whole separate price elasticity of demand question also posted https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/32186/how-high-of-a-carbon-fee-would-reduce-global-emissions-by-50-in-15-years/32197?noredirect=1#comment48681_32197  and the big issue there was which of two different formulas is more appropriate.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T14:20:00.787Z
The thing is, the moment affordable substitutes go live, your elasticity estimates will be worthless. The other issue with this analysis is that it's only looking at half the question.  An appropriately administered levy will recycle revenue into reducing other taxes and incenting investment in the development and deployment of substitutes for fossil fueled transport.

This is part of what I was getting at by pointing out the trend break in your graph.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T16:52:13.640Z
I am only really looking at a carbon fee and dividend program that gives ALL of the untaxed money directly back to the people on some strictly per capita basis. I am looking at this as the economic driving force to make alternatives more cost-effective. With an insufficiently steep carbon fee this cannot work. By giving ALL of the untaxed money back to the people those with average carbon consumption would most often break even throughout the whole transition away form fossil fuel dependence.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T17:14:07.720Z
To first-order, yes, but the world doesn't work at first-order.  One of many things well-designed plans take into account is the fact that, e.g, elasticity of consumption for fossil fuels varies broadly by economic class, industrial sector, etc.

Anyway, the point is that the initial question is ill-posed.  You're leaving out a lot of complications that matter at the policy level and to be quite frank, this should be obvious just by looking at the graphs you posted.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T17:18:01.870Z
I just rewrote everything. I am proposing that we have (Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard) flexibility in carbon pricing as a backup plan in case our predictions prove to be incorrect. When we are examining the need for a backup plan it is best to look at worst case scenarios. The -0.1 PED value using the PED point formula seems to provide an excellent estimate of the worst case scenario.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T17:29:02.693Z
I honestly don't understand the premise or proposed solution around your question. Are you now suggesting that we somehow monitor PED in real-time and (also in real time) impose a varying carbon price in response to PED? To what end? Is there a "socially optimum PED"?

Of *course* carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector.  This is why the lion's share of efforts are around developing substitutes (biofuels, EVs, hydrogen fuel cell freight), and why a lot of carbon tax revenue is directed toward innovation and not toward tax offsets.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T17:30:19.603Z
To put it another way, price elasticity of demand can be interpreted as a measure of the availability of substitutes. If you have measured it and find it disconcerting, the best way to change it is to introduce more substitutes.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T17:45:39.170Z
"Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector" Then we need to have annual readjustment of the carbon price increment based on how far we are behind our carbon reduction goals. If we "lock in" carbon prices that cannot be adjusted then this "locks in" failing to meet the carbon reduction goals.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T18:29:32.380Z
Let us [continue this discussion in chat](https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/100121/discussion-between-heh-and-polcott).
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T20:23:23.550Z
I am ONLY looking at the PED for the transportation sector to prove that the fixed pricing of all of the carbon fee and dividend programs must have much more flexibility that kicks in if we fail to meet carbon reduction targets. We don't simply increase the fee by \$15 per year when we fail to reach a target. We increase the fee by (number-of-years-behind-schedule * \$15). WE CAN'T RISK LOCKING IN A CARBON PRICE THAT IS FAR TOO LOW.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-17T21:05:46.670Z
2019-10-17T21:05:46.670Z
heh
<p>No, it was moved to chat because Stack Exchange is getting tired of this nonsense and asked me to "please avoid extended discussions in comments".</p>

<p>You're not cracking open a vault with the realization that existing carbon pricing is inadequate to impact behavior on the scale necessary to meaningfully drop emissions from transportation enough to move us to a more favorable warming scenario.</p>

<p>What you're suggesting is untenable strictly from an information flow standpoint. It's also untenable economically until the root cause of the elasticity problem you've identified is addressed through the development of affordable substitutes to fossil-fueled transportation.</p>

<p>Why are you so sure that $15 is some kind of magic scale factor?  Why do you think climate damages scale linearly with time delay? Maybe they rise exponentially.  In fact, guessing based on physical first-principles, they likely do.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T21:42:03.813Z
All of the current legislation and most all of the projections indicate that HR 763 carbon pricing will reduce current emissions to 10%. EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW THIS IS NOT TRUE. You agreed that this is not true as if this is common knowledge that everyone already knows. The \$15 comes from HR 763. I would start with \$100 and raise it by \$100, skipping years that we are ahead of schedule.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T21:55:48.530Z
I think it's time to admit that you came here not looking for an answer, but for an audience.

I don't disagree with you that existing carbon pricing schemes are woefully out of date.  I definitely disagree pretty much completely about whether PED can provide a useful signal that would trigger carbon price changes in a timely way, especially PED for such a volatile product as transportation fuel.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T21:58:44.253Z
You've got people voting entirely based on whether they like a \$30/ton carbon tax, and polls showing that while 60% of Canadians want to see action on climate change, about half of Canadians wouldn't pay a red cent more to see that action.

What do you think a $30/gallon gas price will do first: finance clean tech solutions to GHG emissions, or bankrupt the entire working class?

For a preview, look at Chile.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T22:49:02.253Z
NOT A CARBON TAX. A carbon fee and dividend program with a sufficiently steep carbon fee that gives ALL of the untaxed money back to the people on a per capita basis could have essentially everyone with average carbon usage break even throughout the whole transition away from dependence on fossil fuel.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T22:53:00.150Z
"I definitely disagree pretty much completely about whether PED can provide a useful signal"  I have explained this to you about five times now. We totally ignore the PED. Instead we increase the carbon fee based on how many years we are behind schedule with atmospheric carbon reductions.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T14:37:20.563Z
1. Your plan is or was already in effect at several levels of government here in Canada, and the tax/fee distinction is politically meaningless. It operates as a tax, people view it as a tax, and they vote as if it is a tax. That genie is forever out of the bottle.

2. Your entire post revolves around the PED. You're using it to prove something people already know, and you're not doing it correctly besides that, for all the reasons I've tried to impress upon you.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T14:38:55.433Z
3.  There's a *lot* of research activity suggesting that current carbon accounting is woefully inadequate.  The issue of fugitive methane emissions is just one aspect of this, but recent concerns around fugitive sulfur hexafluoride emissions have come to bear now that distributed energy systems are becoming more popular.

You need to address the information challenges present in your "solution" to the problem you've "identified".  How would you know when to slam the brakes if you don't know how fast you're going?
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T14:51:42.677Z
I am walking away from this topic now.  I tried to do the right thing and move it into chat, but you are clearly someone who sees conspiracy wherever they look.  Good luck with whatever it is that you think you are trying to do.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T16:05:27.793Z
"the tax/fee distinction is politically meaningless." So people don't notice the difference between getting ALL of the money back right away and never getting any of the money back?
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T16:10:44.697Z
When you moved this to chat it had the effect of making this key insight: "Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector" invisible. I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT IS VISIBLE FOR ALL TO SEE !!! With a sufficient carbon fee for the transportation sector people would switch to electric cars much sooner even without any technological improvements.
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T16:40:09.213Z
"So people don't notice the difference between getting ALL of the money back right away and never getting any of the money back?"

Unfortunately, they literally do not.  I don't like this any more than you do, but 70% of households in Alberta were getting money back and it didn't matter.  This debate is purely political, and facts have minimal ability to change minds.
heh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-22T17:00:08.983Z
Were they getting ALL of the money back so that typical people and families having average carbon consumption would nearly exactly break even, or did the government skim taxes and or fees off the top?
polcott
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-10-21T21:04:46.797Z
2019-10-21T21:04:46.797Z
heh
<p><strong>Does recent gasoline price sensitivity data show that HR 763 Carbon pricing insufficient for the transportation sector?</strong></p>

<h1>This answer provided by: "Heh" moved to chat so it can't be seen:<br>"Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector"</h1>

<p>Recent data show a price elasticity of demand for gasoline of -0.1
The following graph showing the change in price is mirrored by change in vehicle miles traveled seems to provide strong evidence that the price elasticity of demand for fuel in the transport sector -0.1. </p>

<p>By dividing the maximum range of vehicles miles traveled 8.6% by the maximum range gasoline price 89.2% we estimate the price elasticity of demand for gasoline = -0.0964</p>

<p><a href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline</a> </p>

<p><a href="https://i.sstatic.net/2w5qX.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/2w5qX.png" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>

<p>Here is the corresponding data:
<a href="https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/fotw_1024_web.xlsx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/fotw_1024_web.xlsx</a>  </p>

<p>Point Price Elasticity of Demand formula: PED=((Q1-Q0)/Q1)/((P1-P0)/P0)    </p>

<p>-0.1=((50-100)/100)/((P-2.66)/2.66)  // Q0=100, Q1=50, P0=2.66, P1=\$15.96<br>
<strong>\$16 per gallon to reduce quantity demanded to 50%</strong><br>
Corresponding <strong>\$1330 carbon price is 3-fold greater than HR 763 maximum \$430</strong><br></p>

<p>-0.1=((10-100)/100)/((P-2.66)/2.66)  // Q0=100, Q1=10, P0=2.66, P1=\$26.60<br>
<strong>\$27 per gallon to reduce quantity demanded to 10%</strong><br>
Corresponding <strong>\$2394 carbon price is 5.5-fold greater than HR 763 maximum \$430</strong><br></p>

<p>Any legislators that are very confident of their own carbon fee estimates would have no legitimate basis for rejecting a Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard that only takes effect if their estimates are proved to be incorrect. </p>

<h1>Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard</h1>

<p><strong>Every Year once a year:</strong><br>
<strong>if</strong> (Years_Behind Schedule > 1.0)    // <strong>Carbon Fee FAIL_SAFE</strong><br>
  Carbon_Fee = (Years_Behind Schedule * $15); <br></p>

<p><strong>else if</strong> (Years_Behind Schedule > 0.0)  <br>
  Carbon_Fee = Carbon_Fee + $15;    // HR 763 Trigger<br></p>

<p><strong>else if</strong> (Years_Behind Schedule > -1.0)  // <strong>Carbon Fee SAFE_GUARD</strong><br>
  Carbon_Fee = Carbon_Fee + $10;    // HR 763 Default  <br></p>

<h1>I am ONLY looking at the PED for the transportation sector to prove that the fixed pricing of all of the carbon fee and dividend programs must have much more flexibility that kicks in if we fail to meet carbon reduction targets.<br> <br>WE CAN'T RISK LOCKING IN A CARBON PRICE THAT IS FAR TOO LOW.</h1>

<p>A US law (and every other similar US law) that is currently backed by the Citizen Climate Lobby is based on the premise that raising the price of gasoline a tiny little bit each year until at the end of 30 years total prices have increased by 100% to 150% will cause a 90% drop in emissions from gasoline. </p>

<p><strong>These two links seems to show that these expectations are totally unrealistic:</strong> </p>

<p><a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19191" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19191</a> </p>

<p><a href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline</a></p>

<elasticity>
Does recent gasoline price sensitivity data show that HR 763 Carbon pricing insufficient for the transportation sector?
polcott
# Does recent gasoline price sensitivity data show that HR 763 Carbon pricing insufficient for the transportation sector?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2019-10-17)

**Does recent gasoline price sensitivity data show that HR 763 Carbon pricing insufficient for the transportation sector?**

# This answer provided by: "Heh" moved to chat so it can't be seen: "Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector"

Recent data show a price elasticity of demand for gasoline of -0.1
The following graph showing the change in price is mirrored by change in vehicle miles traveled seems to provide strong evidence that the price elasticity of demand for fuel in the transport sector -0.1.

By dividing the maximum range of vehicles miles traveled 8.6% by the maximum range gasoline price 89.2% we estimate the price elasticity of demand for gasoline = -0.0964

<https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline>

[![enter image description here](https://i.sstatic.net/2w5qX.png)](https://i.sstatic.net/2w5qX.png)

Here is the corresponding data:
<https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/fotw_1024_web.xlsx>

Point Price Elasticity of Demand formula: PED=((Q1-Q0)/Q1)/((P1-P0)/P0)

-0.1=((50-100)/100)/((P-2.66)/2.66) // Q0=100, Q1=50, P0=2.66, P1=\$15.96  
**\$16 per gallon to reduce quantity demanded to 50%**  
Corresponding **\$1330 carbon price is 3-fold greater than HR 763 maximum \$430**

-0.1=((10-100)/100)/((P-2.66)/2.66) // Q0=100, Q1=10, P0=2.66, P1=\$26.60  
**\$27 per gallon to reduce quantity demanded to 10%**  
Corresponding **\$2394 carbon price is 5.5-fold greater than HR 763 maximum \$430**

Any legislators that are very confident of their own carbon fee estimates would have no legitimate basis for rejecting a Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard that only takes effect if their estimates are proved to be incorrect.

# Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard

**Every Year once a year:**  
**if** (Years\_Behind Schedule > 1.0) // **Carbon Fee FAIL\_SAFE**  
Carbon\_Fee = (Years\_Behind Schedule \* $15);

**else if** (Years\_Behind Schedule > 0.0)   
Carbon\_Fee = Carbon\_Fee + $15; // HR 763 Trigger

**else if** (Years\_Behind Schedule > -1.0) // **Carbon Fee SAFE\_GUARD**  
Carbon\_Fee = Carbon\_Fee + $10; // HR 763 Default

# I am ONLY looking at the PED for the transportation sector to prove that the fixed pricing of all of the carbon fee and dividend programs must have much more flexibility that kicks in if we fail to meet carbon reduction targets. WE CAN'T RISK LOCKING IN A CARBON PRICE THAT IS FAR TOO LOW.

A US law (and every other similar US law) that is currently backed by the Citizen Climate Lobby is based on the premise that raising the price of gasoline a tiny little bit each year until at the end of 30 years total prices have increased by 100% to 150% will cause a 90% drop in emissions from gasoline.

**These two links seems to show that these expectations are totally unrealistic:**

<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19191>

<https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1024-april-9-2018-changes-vehicle-miles-travel-often-mirror-gasoline>

**Tags:** elasticity

---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2019-10-17. Score: 2

No, it is not sufficient proof.

There are a host of possible drivers of "vehicle miles per-capita" that are not causally connected to the price of fuel. You would need to make a good-faith effort to identify them and assess their relative impact before coming to the conclusion you've done.

This is in addition to the fact that the graphs you shared indicate that total miles travelled have been flat since 2005, and miles per-capita have dropped since 2005 even as gas prices roughly doubled.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: I have a whole separate price elasticity of demand question also posted https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/32186/how-high-of-a-carbon-fee-would-reduce-global-emissions-by-50-in-15-years/32197?noredirect=1#comment48681_32197  and the big issue there was which of two different formulas is more appropriate.  
> **username_1**: The thing is, the moment affordable substitutes go live, your elasticity estimates will be worthless. The other issue with this analysis is that it's only looking at half the question.  An appropriately administered levy will recycle revenue into reducing other taxes and incenting investment in the development and deployment of substitutes for fossil fueled transport.  This is part of what I was getting at by pointing out the trend break in your graph.  
> **username_0**: I am only really looking at a carbon fee and dividend program that gives ALL of the untaxed money directly back to the people on some strictly per capita basis. I am looking at this as the economic driving force to make alternatives more cost-effective. With an insufficiently steep carbon fee this cannot work. By giving ALL of the untaxed money back to the people those with average carbon consumption would most often break even throughout the whole transition away form fossil fuel dependence.  
> **username_1**: To first-order, yes, but the world doesn't work at first-order.  One of many things well-designed plans take into account is the fact that, e.g, elasticity of consumption for fossil fuels varies broadly by economic class, industrial sector, etc.  Anyway, the point is that the initial question is ill-posed.  You're leaving out a lot of complications that matter at the policy level and to be quite frank, this should be obvious just by looking at the graphs you posted.  
> **username_0**: I just rewrote everything. I am proposing that we have (Carbon Fee Fail-safe and Safeguard) flexibility in carbon pricing as a backup plan in case our predictions prove to be incorrect. When we are examining the need for a backup plan it is best to look at worst case scenarios. The -0.1 PED value using the PED point formula seems to provide an excellent estimate of the worst case scenario.  
> **username_1**: I honestly don't understand the premise or proposed solution around your question. Are you now suggesting that we somehow monitor PED in real-time and (also in real time) impose a varying carbon price in response to PED? To what end? Is there a "socially optimum PED"?  Of *course* carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector.  This is why the lion's share of efforts are around developing substitutes (biofuels, EVs, hydrogen fuel cell freight), and why a lot of carbon tax revenue is directed toward innovation and not toward tax offsets.  
> **username_1**: To put it another way, price elasticity of demand can be interpreted as a measure of the availability of substitutes. If you have measured it and find it disconcerting, the best way to change it is to introduce more substitutes.  
> **username_0**: "Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector" Then we need to have annual readjustment of the carbon price increment based on how far we are behind our carbon reduction goals. If we "lock in" carbon prices that cannot be adjusted then this "locks in" failing to meet the carbon reduction goals.  
> **username_1**: Let us [continue this discussion in chat](https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/100121/discussion-between-heh-and-polcott).  
> **username_0**: I am ONLY looking at the PED for the transportation sector to prove that the fixed pricing of all of the carbon fee and dividend programs must have much more flexibility that kicks in if we fail to meet carbon reduction targets. We don't simply increase the fee by \$15 per year when we fail to reach a target. We increase the fee by (number-of-years-behind-schedule * \$15). WE CAN'T RISK LOCKING IN A CARBON PRICE THAT IS FAR TOO LOW.  

---

### Answer by username_1 on 2019-10-21. Score: 0

No, it was moved to chat because Stack Exchange is getting tired of this nonsense and asked me to "please avoid extended discussions in comments".

You're not cracking open a vault with the realization that existing carbon pricing is inadequate to impact behavior on the scale necessary to meaningfully drop emissions from transportation enough to move us to a more favorable warming scenario.

What you're suggesting is untenable strictly from an information flow standpoint. It's also untenable economically until the root cause of the elasticity problem you've identified is addressed through the development of affordable substitutes to fossil-fueled transportation.

Why are you so sure that $15 is some kind of magic scale factor? Why do you think climate damages scale linearly with time delay? Maybe they rise exponentially. In fact, guessing based on physical first-principles, they likely do.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: All of the current legislation and most all of the projections indicate that HR 763 carbon pricing will reduce current emissions to 10%. EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW THIS IS NOT TRUE. You agreed that this is not true as if this is common knowledge that everyone already knows. The \$15 comes from HR 763. I would start with \$100 and raise it by \$100, skipping years that we are ahead of schedule.  
> **username_1**: I think it's time to admit that you came here not looking for an answer, but for an audience.  I don't disagree with you that existing carbon pricing schemes are woefully out of date.  I definitely disagree pretty much completely about whether PED can provide a useful signal that would trigger carbon price changes in a timely way, especially PED for such a volatile product as transportation fuel.  
> **username_1**: You've got people voting entirely based on whether they like a \$30/ton carbon tax, and polls showing that while 60% of Canadians want to see action on climate change, about half of Canadians wouldn't pay a red cent more to see that action.  What do you think a $30/gallon gas price will do first: finance clean tech solutions to GHG emissions, or bankrupt the entire working class?  For a preview, look at Chile.  
> **username_0**: NOT A CARBON TAX. A carbon fee and dividend program with a sufficiently steep carbon fee that gives ALL of the untaxed money back to the people on a per capita basis could have essentially everyone with average carbon usage break even throughout the whole transition away from dependence on fossil fuel.  
> **username_0**: "I definitely disagree pretty much completely about whether PED can provide a useful signal"  I have explained this to you about five times now. We totally ignore the PED. Instead we increase the carbon fee based on how many years we are behind schedule with atmospheric carbon reductions.  
> **username_1**: 1. Your plan is or was already in effect at several levels of government here in Canada, and the tax/fee distinction is politically meaningless. It operates as a tax, people view it as a tax, and they vote as if it is a tax. That genie is forever out of the bottle.  2. Your entire post revolves around the PED. You're using it to prove something people already know, and you're not doing it correctly besides that, for all the reasons I've tried to impress upon you.  
> **username_1**: 3.  There's a *lot* of research activity suggesting that current carbon accounting is woefully inadequate.  The issue of fugitive methane emissions is just one aspect of this, but recent concerns around fugitive sulfur hexafluoride emissions have come to bear now that distributed energy systems are becoming more popular.  You need to address the information challenges present in your "solution" to the problem you've "identified".  How would you know when to slam the brakes if you don't know how fast you're going?  
> **username_1**: I am walking away from this topic now.  I tried to do the right thing and move it into chat, but you are clearly someone who sees conspiracy wherever they look.  Good luck with whatever it is that you think you are trying to do.  
> **username_0**: "the tax/fee distinction is politically meaningless." So people don't notice the difference between getting ALL of the money back right away and never getting any of the money back?  
> **username_0**: When you moved this to chat it had the effect of making this key insight: "Of course carbon pricing is insufficient for the transportation sector" invisible. I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT IS VISIBLE FOR ALL TO SEE !!! With a sufficient carbon fee for the transportation sector people would switch to electric cars much sooner even without any technological improvements.  
> **username_1**: "So people don't notice the difference between getting ALL of the money back right away and never getting any of the money back?"  Unfortunately, they literally do not.  I don't like this any more than you do, but 70% of households in Alberta were getting money back and it didn't matter.  This debate is purely political, and facts have minimal ability to change minds.  
> **username_0**: Were they getting ALL of the money back so that typical people and families having average carbon consumption would nearly exactly break even, or did the government skim taxes and or fees off the top?  

---

