<p>This looks like a contest. There is a large economic literature on contests. Have a look at <a href="https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788112772/9781788112772.00013.xml" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this survey by Corchón and Serena</a>. Often these papers use a Tullock contest success function or model the contest as an all-pay auction, see, e.g., <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA7537" rel="nofollow noreferrer">papers by Ron Siegel</a>.
There are papers that analyze given contests (research contests, lobbying, etc) and papers that look at contest design. I believe you are looking for the latter, i.e., some paper in which the contest arises as an optimal allocation mechanism maximizing the effort input of participants.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-07-19T09:11:52.337Z
2021-07-19T09:11:52.337Z
Bayesian
<p>I am trying to find one specific model from organizational economics that I encountered in one of my past  classes, but I cant remember the name of the model and google scholar search based on some of the information below was not helpful, and I can't find my notes from that class either.</p>
<ul>
<li>The model was model of principal agent relationship where principal cannot observe agents ability.</li>
<li>I recall that the feature of the model was that there was large pool of agents.</li>
<li>The model was about setting up some incentive structure to exert agent put optimal level of effort.</li>
<li>The outcome is supposed to be some mechanism that looks like sport competition, where you have one big prize for the 'winner(s)', but everyone else gets nothing.</li>
</ul>
<p>I am also looking not just for the model name but also some reference that has some rigorous treatment of the model.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-07-17T11:59:00.457Z
There is a large literature on "contests" which combines the ingredients above. Sometimes those are Tullock contests, sometimes contests similar to an all-pay auction.
Bayesian
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-07-17T12:32:32.240Z
@Bayesian thanks for pointers I will check it out, those terms sound vaguely familiar so I think that might be it, I will check it later, maybe consider posting it as an answer
1muflon1
<microeconomics><reference-request><mechanism-design><principal-agent><incentives>
locating specific model from organizational economics
1muflon1
# locating specific model from organizational economics

(Asked by: username_0 on 2021-07-17)

I am trying to find one specific model from organizational economics that I encountered in one of my past classes, but I cant remember the name of the model and google scholar search based on some of the information below was not helpful, and I can't find my notes from that class either.

* The model was model of principal agent relationship where principal cannot observe agents ability.
* I recall that the feature of the model was that there was large pool of agents.
* The model was about setting up some incentive structure to exert agent put optimal level of effort.
* The outcome is supposed to be some mechanism that looks like sport competition, where you have one big prize for the 'winner(s)', but everyone else gets nothing.

I am also looking not just for the model name but also some reference that has some rigorous treatment of the model.

**Tags:** microeconomics, reference-request, mechanism-design, principal-agent, incentives
> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: There is a large literature on "contests" which combines the ingredients above. Sometimes those are Tullock contests, sometimes contests similar to an all-pay auction.  
> **username_0**: @Bayesian thanks for pointers I will check it out, those terms sound vaguely familiar so I think that might be it, I will check it later, maybe consider posting it as an answer  

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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2021-07-19. Score: 3 | Accepted answer

This looks like a contest. There is a large economic literature on contests. Have a look at [this survey by Corchón and Serena](https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788112772/9781788112772.00013.xml). Often these papers use a Tullock contest success function or model the contest as an all-pay auction, see, e.g., [papers by Ron Siegel](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA7537).
There are papers that analyze given contests (research contests, lobbying, etc) and papers that look at contest design. I believe you are looking for the latter, i.e., some paper in which the contest arises as an optimal allocation mechanism maximizing the effort input of participants.


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