<p>Can we (is it reasonable to) apply auction theory and the various incentive compatible mechanisms to elections and guarantee cardinal voting?</p>
<p>I am thinking specifically of VCG auctions and particularly the Clarke Tax.</p>
<p>I am interested in weighted (inverse of wwealth) voting (a person who holds twice the wealth can easiliy pay twice the tax so I would expect him to pay twice as much for his vote to have the same effect).</p>
<p>First scenario where the N persons with the highest score (the most cardinal votes weighted with the inverse of wealth) are elected.</p>
<p>People all vote and assign their subjective value for each candidate who the gets divided by their wealth given that if their vote causes a person who would otherwise be elected not to be or causes a person who would otherwise not be to be pays the difference multiplied by their weatlth (he is a pivotal agent and pays the clarke tax)</p>
<p>Second scenario with Parties and Proportional Representation</p>
<p>People all vote for parties who then get seats proportionally to their score and anyone who makes a party lose or win a seat pays the difference (this is more complicated so it can be weighted or not).</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T12:50:17.350Z
This seems to be in your spirit: https://www.uibk.ac.at/economics/bbl/bbl-papiere-ss-13/goeree-and-zhang.pdf
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T13:01:17.723Z
@MichaelGreinecker please post answers as answers
1muflon1
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T14:52:17.330Z
@1muflon1 Are you sure this is an answer? I'm not.
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T14:59:07.243Z
@MichaelGreinecker I think it has solid basis for an answer, the OP asked if it is reasonable to do so. If there are published papers on the topic that seems to me to clear the minimum bar of reasonableness
1muflon1
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T15:59:32.163Z
Hi George! Before moving on to this new topic, how about [accepting one of the four answers to your other question](https://economics.stackexchange.com/q/50137/1601)?
Giskard
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T19:07:11.267Z
@Giskard I would accept https://economics.stackexchange.com/a/50138/23287 but I am not sure I understood what he said is the market price (I would also like reference on that regarding what is a market price). Is the market price the same as the agreed exchange rate for a single transaction (considering that all goods are unique). If that is so I would like references on that and I want to understand why that is objective (maybe it would be deep on the philosophy of economics) i.e why the single agreement (the single particular price agreed) exists independently of human consciousness.
George Ntoulos
CC BY-SA 4.0
2022-01-20T19:29:13.677Z
@GeorgeNtoulos So why are you writing this here? Go comment under the answer?
Giskard
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-09-06T23:57:40.893Z
@MichaelGreinecker If you can elaborate this can well be an answer.
George Ntoulos
<microeconomics><mathematical-economics><game-theory><decision-theory><mechanism-design>
Auction Theory and Elections
George Ntoulos
# Auction Theory and Elections

(Asked by: username_0 on 2022-01-20)

Can we (is it reasonable to) apply auction theory and the various incentive compatible mechanisms to elections and guarantee cardinal voting?

I am thinking specifically of VCG auctions and particularly the Clarke Tax.

I am interested in weighted (inverse of wwealth) voting (a person who holds twice the wealth can easiliy pay twice the tax so I would expect him to pay twice as much for his vote to have the same effect).

First scenario where the N persons with the highest score (the most cardinal votes weighted with the inverse of wealth) are elected.

People all vote and assign their subjective value for each candidate who the gets divided by their wealth given that if their vote causes a person who would otherwise be elected not to be or causes a person who would otherwise not be to be pays the difference multiplied by their weatlth (he is a pivotal agent and pays the clarke tax)

Second scenario with Parties and Proportional Representation

People all vote for parties who then get seats proportionally to their score and anyone who makes a party lose or win a seat pays the difference (this is more complicated so it can be weighted or not).

**Tags:** microeconomics, mathematical-economics, game-theory, decision-theory, mechanism-design
> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: This seems to be in your spirit: https://www.uibk.ac.at/economics/bbl/bbl-papiere-ss-13/goeree-and-zhang.pdf  
> **username_2**: @MichaelGreinecker please post answers as answers  
> **username_1**: @1muflon1 Are you sure this is an answer? I'm not.  
> **username_2**: @MichaelGreinecker I think it has solid basis for an answer, the OP asked if it is reasonable to do so. If there are published papers on the topic that seems to me to clear the minimum bar of reasonableness  
> **username_3**: Hi George! Before moving on to this new topic, how about [accepting one of the four answers to your other question](https://economics.stackexchange.com/q/50137/1601)?  
> **username_0**: @Giskard I would accept https://economics.stackexchange.com/a/50138/23287 but I am not sure I understood what he said is the market price (I would also like reference on that regarding what is a market price). Is the market price the same as the agreed exchange rate for a single transaction (considering that all goods are unique). If that is so I would like references on that and I want to understand why that is objective (maybe it would be deep on the philosophy of economics) i.e why the single agreement (the single particular price agreed) exists independently of human consciousness.  
> **username_3**: @GeorgeNtoulos So why are you writing this here? Go comment under the answer?  
> **username_0**: @MichaelGreinecker If you can elaborate this can well be an answer.  

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## 0 answers

