<p>I have recently started studying mechanism design (after having taken a basic graduate micro course) through Borgers' 'Introduction to the theory of mechanism design'.</p>

<p>I was wondering if people are aware of any books/papers that explore how to actually construct real-world indirect mechanisms that implement the optimal allocations/transfer rules that are characterized throughout the text. So far I have not detected some methodology underlying going from drms to indirect mechanisms, just scattered examples. Am I missing something here?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-09-02T19:08:07.253Z
There is no one-fits-all solution here. The "best" indirect mechanism always depends on the setting at hand. You often start looking for mechanisms in which the true type report is a weakly dominant strategy. For instance, a second-price auction with bid-subsidies and individual reserve prices.
Bayesian
CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-09-03T17:46:59.440Z
Perhaps [market design](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_design) is what you're looking for? [Al Roth's page](https://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/) is a good place to start.
Herr K.
<reference-request><mechanism-design>
Going from DRMs to Indirect Mechanisms
Manos Perdikakis
# Going from DRMs to Indirect Mechanisms

(Asked by: username_0 on 2019-09-02)

I have recently started studying mechanism design (after having taken a basic graduate micro course) through Borgers' 'Introduction to the theory of mechanism design'.

I was wondering if people are aware of any books/papers that explore how to actually construct real-world indirect mechanisms that implement the optimal allocations/transfer rules that are characterized throughout the text. So far I have not detected some methodology underlying going from drms to indirect mechanisms, just scattered examples. Am I missing something here?

**Tags:** reference-request, mechanism-design
> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: There is no one-fits-all solution here. The "best" indirect mechanism always depends on the setting at hand. You often start looking for mechanisms in which the true type report is a weakly dominant strategy. For instance, a second-price auction with bid-subsidies and individual reserve prices.  
> **username_2**: Perhaps [market design](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_design) is what you're looking for? [Al Roth's page](https://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/) is a good place to start.  

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## 0 answers

