<p>Many papers on Bayesian persuasion adopt SPE as a solution, by arguing that the sender has no private information.
This does not make sense to me: Regardless of whether the sender has private information, we need to restrict the belief of the receiver about the state of the world after the receive observes an off-path disclosure policy, which SPE has no bite. Should we understand SPE in Bayesian persuasion literature as something that does not really mean subgame perfect equilibrium?</p>

<game-theory><information>
Why is a solution concept of Bayesian Persuasion a subgame perfect equilibrium?
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# Why is a solution concept of Bayesian Persuasion a subgame perfect equilibrium?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2020-06-20)

Many papers on Bayesian persuasion adopt SPE as a solution, by arguing that the sender has no private information.
This does not make sense to me: Regardless of whether the sender has private information, we need to restrict the belief of the receiver about the state of the world after the receive observes an off-path disclosure policy, which SPE has no bite. Should we understand SPE in Bayesian persuasion literature as something that does not really mean subgame perfect equilibrium?

**Tags:** game-theory, information

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## 0 answers

