<p>For models of the informational role/effects of third-party certifiers on an industry, you might like to look at</p>

<p>Lizzeri, Alessandro (1999). “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2556078.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" rel="noreferrer">Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries</a>”. RAND Journal of Economics 30.2, pp. 214–231.</p>

<p>Albano, Gian Luigi and Alessandro Lizzeri (2001). “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2354.00110" rel="noreferrer">Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality</a>”. International Economic Review 42.1, pp. 267–283.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-21T08:56:08.723Z
Thank you, Ubiquitous.I'm interested in the strategic action  firms with and without certification take when only some  firms can get certified and the changes that may  happen in the industry afterwards. Do you know any literature on this topic.
WU Long
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-21T09:35:09.327Z
@WULong Not directly. There is a working paper by de Corniere and Taylor (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~inet0118/pdf/Taylor_14-06.pdf) that addresses the question of what happens when an intermediary is biased towards a seller: how does its behavior and that of its rivals respond? I think the way they model bias could be interpreted as one firm getting certified and the other not. They cite other papers this might also be relevant.
Ubiquitous
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-21T12:01:03.130Z
Nice! this paper may help. THX!
WU Long
CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-16T16:34:17.920Z
2018-09-16T16:34:17.920Z
Ubiquitous
<p>This is also a big theme in agriculturaland environmental economics given the amount of nutritional, healthy, organic and other labels that we see on food these days.</p>

<p>Here are a few references to start:</p>

<p>Hamilton, Stephen F., and David Zilberman. "Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud." <em>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</em> 52.3 (2006): 627-644.</p>

<p>Zilberman, David, Scott Kaplan, and Ben Gordon. "The political economy of labeling." <em>Food Policy</em> (2018).</p>

<p>Ibanez, Lisette, and Gilles Grolleau. "Can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment?." <em>Environmental and Resource Economics</em> 40.2 (2008): 233-249.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-09-17T08:23:26.257Z
2018-09-17T08:23:26.257Z
Maarten Punt
<p>Is there any comprehensive theoretical studies on how third-party certification adoption may affect industrial performance/dynamics of an industry? </p>

<reference-request><industrial-organisation>
Literature on the effects of third-party certification on industrial dynamics?
WU Long
# Literature on the effects of third-party certification on industrial dynamics?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2018-09-16)

Is there any comprehensive theoretical studies on how third-party certification adoption may affect industrial performance/dynamics of an industry?

**Tags:** reference-request, industrial-organisation

---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2018-09-17. Score: 4 | Accepted answer

This is also a big theme in agriculturaland environmental economics given the amount of nutritional, healthy, organic and other labels that we see on food these days.

Here are a few references to start:

Hamilton, Stephen F., and David Zilberman. "Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 52.3 (2006): 627-644.

Zilberman, David, Scott Kaplan, and Ben Gordon. "The political economy of labeling." *Food Policy* (2018).

Ibanez, Lisette, and Gilles Grolleau. "Can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment?." *Environmental and Resource Economics* 40.2 (2008): 233-249.


---

### Answer by username_1 on 2018-09-16. Score: 5

For models of the informational role/effects of third-party certifiers on an industry, you might like to look at

Lizzeri, Alessandro (1999). “[Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2556078.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)”. RAND Journal of Economics 30.2, pp. 214–231.

Albano, Gian Luigi and Alessandro Lizzeri (2001). “[Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2354.00110)”. International Economic Review 42.1, pp. 267–283.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Thank you, Ubiquitous.I'm interested in the strategic action  firms with and without certification take when only some  firms can get certified and the changes that may  happen in the industry afterwards. Do you know any literature on this topic.  
> **username_1**: @WULong Not directly. There is a working paper by de Corniere and Taylor (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~inet0118/pdf/Taylor_14-06.pdf) that addresses the question of what happens when an intermediary is biased towards a seller: how does its behavior and that of its rivals respond? I think the way they model bias could be interpreted as one firm getting certified and the other not. They cite other papers this might also be relevant.  
> **username_0**: Nice! this paper may help. THX!  

---

