<p>Why did <a href="https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20160487" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bergemann and Morris </a> choose a different setting with respect to <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.6.2590" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Kamenica and Gentzkow</a> only to reach to the same results? However none of both approaches seem to present the problem in a perfect way. Is there any critique on the literature or any other paper that follows a third road to model Bayesian persuasion problem?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-18T18:36:08.673Z
I'm not sure what you mean by "same results." Nor what "none of both approaches seem to present the problem in a perfect way" means.
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T10:32:47.520Z
Their conclusion is the same, no matter the approch. Namely, the celebrated outcome is the optimal information strucutre is the partial revelation of information (from my understanding) either with the one sender- receiver or the one sender - many receivers. They use different approachs, KG with the geometric approach of the concavyfication of the senders value function and BM with the linear programming and the analytical solution of the problem. The ``none of them presents the problem in a perfect way" has to do with the limitation in applications of both models
Oliver Queen
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T11:13:24.923Z
I would say the central result of BG is to characterize the possible Bayes.Nash equilibria of a game in which the players might have information the analyst is unaware of. The central results of KG (already obtained by Aumann & Maschler) are the characterization of posterior distributions and concavification. These are very different results. If you want to know about tools that work better for some applications, you should mention these applications. I would not criticize hammers for being bad at screwing in screws.
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T13:08:52.653Z
To my opinion they both result to the same conclusion, that is that the optimal information structure is the partial revelation of information. I am in search of the tools I need, I do not know them. I am just coming to an conclusion, this does not mean that I do not understand the work of the authors, but yet it remains imperfect. A persuasion problem is more than just characterizing posterior beliefs or equilibrium concepts. Everything in economics and finance could be seen as a persuasion aspect, but still most of the literature turns around the same schematics. So this seems a bit odd.
Oliver Queen
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T13:16:02.290Z
Your issue is that what these papers do does not correspond to the usual usage of "persuasion?"
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T14:16:23.127Z
ok...this is interesting.....what do you mean by the usual usage of persusasion? I mean what is the difference here?
Oliver Queen
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T14:56:24.247Z
It is a much broader area, usually discussed in linguistics. There are also some papers by Ariel Rubinstein and Jacob Glazer, that focus more on the linguistic connection.
Michael Greinecker
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T15:29:32.070Z
Can you cite here, one or two of them? Thanks in advance!
Oliver Queen
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-02-19T16:00:16.177Z
[Here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/70.pdf), [here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/75.pdf), and [here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/91.pdf).
Michael Greinecker
<microeconomics><mathematical-economics><game-theory><bayesian-game><information>
Why did Bergemann and Morris chose a different setting with respect to Kamenica and Gentzkow only to reach to the same results?
Oliver Queen
# Why did Bergemann and Morris chose a different setting with respect to Kamenica and Gentzkow only to reach to the same results?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2024-02-18)

Why did [Bergemann and Morris](https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20160487)  choose a different setting with respect to [Kamenica and Gentzkow](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.6.2590) only to reach to the same results? However none of both approaches seem to present the problem in a perfect way. Is there any critique on the literature or any other paper that follows a third road to model Bayesian persuasion problem?

**Tags:** microeconomics, mathematical-economics, game-theory, bayesian-game, information
> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: I'm not sure what you mean by "same results." Nor what "none of both approaches seem to present the problem in a perfect way" means.  
> **username_0**: Their conclusion is the same, no matter the approch. Namely, the celebrated outcome is the optimal information strucutre is the partial revelation of information (from my understanding) either with the one sender- receiver or the one sender - many receivers. They use different approachs, KG with the geometric approach of the concavyfication of the senders value function and BM with the linear programming and the analytical solution of the problem. The ``none of them presents the problem in a perfect way" has to do with the limitation in applications of both models  
> **username_1**: I would say the central result of BG is to characterize the possible Bayes.Nash equilibria of a game in which the players might have information the analyst is unaware of. The central results of KG (already obtained by Aumann & Maschler) are the characterization of posterior distributions and concavification. These are very different results. If you want to know about tools that work better for some applications, you should mention these applications. I would not criticize hammers for being bad at screwing in screws.  
> **username_0**: To my opinion they both result to the same conclusion, that is that the optimal information structure is the partial revelation of information. I am in search of the tools I need, I do not know them. I am just coming to an conclusion, this does not mean that I do not understand the work of the authors, but yet it remains imperfect. A persuasion problem is more than just characterizing posterior beliefs or equilibrium concepts. Everything in economics and finance could be seen as a persuasion aspect, but still most of the literature turns around the same schematics. So this seems a bit odd.  
> **username_1**: Your issue is that what these papers do does not correspond to the usual usage of "persuasion?"  
> **username_0**: ok...this is interesting.....what do you mean by the usual usage of persusasion? I mean what is the difference here?  
> **username_1**: It is a much broader area, usually discussed in linguistics. There are also some papers by Ariel Rubinstein and Jacob Glazer, that focus more on the linguistic connection.  
> **username_0**: Can you cite here, one or two of them? Thanks in advance!  
> **username_1**: [Here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/70.pdf), [here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/75.pdf), and [here](https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/91.pdf).  

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## 0 answers

