<p>I don't know if you refer to the extensive margin (some borrowers not being able to get credit) or to the intensive margin (one borrower not being able to get as much credit as (s)he wants). If you are referring to the former, one of the theoretical papers for borrowing constraints on markets with asymmetric information is the following one:</p>

<p>Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) AER's paper on Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.
<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1802787?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" rel="nofollow">http://www.jstor.org/stable/1802787?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents</a></p>

<p>The argument is very interesting. If lenders cannot distinguish between high risk and low risk borrowers, then the ''market-clearing'' (loosely speaking) equilibrium interest rates will be such that identical (to the observer) consumers can be rationed out.</p>

<p>Other good papers are Bester's (1985) AER's paper on Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1821362?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents" rel="nofollow">http://www.jstor.org/stable/1821362?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents</a></p>

<p>Finally Chapter 16 on the Handbook of Monetary Economics by Jaffee and Stiglitz may help you.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-24T19:33:07.357Z
Hello, if anyone feels that something is missing please let me know.
MathUser
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-21T18:51:46.000Z
2015-05-21T18:51:46.000Z
MathUser
<p>In reading the Wikipedia article about the "financial accelerator," I read this</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Firms’ ability to borrow depends essentially on the market value of
  their net worth. The reason for this is the familiar story of
  asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Lenders are
  likely to have little information about the reliability of any given
  borrower. As such, they usually require borrowers to set forth their
  ability to repay, often in the form of collateralized assets.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>So, I believe that models with a financial accelerator, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), assume a credit constraint. I am looking form papers that derive these credit constraints. That is, where do they come from? Could someone provide the reference?</p>

<p>Papers that I can think of are, for example, Hart and Moore (1994), which derives constraints that are driven by asymmetric information and the inalienability of human capital, or Myers and Rajan (1998), which derives debt capacity from inefficient liquidation and the ability of the manager to engage in asset substitution. What are the classic papers on this topic? </p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-20T22:23:30.013Z
The papers that come to my mind are mentioned in the section "A simple theoretical framework?" Are you looking for something in addition to this? 
Mentioned in that section include: Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
cc7768
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-05-21T04:24:50.003Z
Sorry, I was unclear. I have edited the question to clarify.
jmbejara
<reference-request><corporate-finance><asymmetric-information>
What is the classic paper that derives borrowing constraints from asymmetric information?
jmbejara
# What is the classic paper that derives borrowing constraints from asymmetric information?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2015-05-20)

In reading the Wikipedia article about the "financial accelerator," I read this

> Firms’ ability to borrow depends essentially on the market value of
> their net worth. The reason for this is the familiar story of
> asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Lenders are
> likely to have little information about the reliability of any given
> borrower. As such, they usually require borrowers to set forth their
> ability to repay, often in the form of collateralized assets.

So, I believe that models with a financial accelerator, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), assume a credit constraint. I am looking form papers that derive these credit constraints. That is, where do they come from? Could someone provide the reference?

Papers that I can think of are, for example, Hart and Moore (1994), which derives constraints that are driven by asymmetric information and the inalienability of human capital, or Myers and Rajan (1998), which derives debt capacity from inefficient liquidation and the ability of the manager to engage in asset substitution. What are the classic papers on this topic?

**Tags:** reference-request, corporate-finance, asymmetric-information
> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: The papers that come to my mind are mentioned in the section "A simple theoretical framework?" Are you looking for something in addition to this?  Mentioned in that section include: Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  
> **username_0**: Sorry, I was unclear. I have edited the question to clarify.  

---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2015-05-21. Score: 4

I don't know if you refer to the extensive margin (some borrowers not being able to get credit) or to the intensive margin (one borrower not being able to get as much credit as (s)he wants). If you are referring to the former, one of the theoretical papers for borrowing constraints on markets with asymmetric information is the following one:

Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) AER's paper on Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1802787?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>

The argument is very interesting. If lenders cannot distinguish between high risk and low risk borrowers, then the ''market-clearing'' (loosely speaking) equilibrium interest rates will be such that identical (to the observer) consumers can be rationed out.

Other good papers are Bester's (1985) AER's paper on Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1821362?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>

Finally Chapter 16 on the Handbook of Monetary Economics by Jaffee and Stiglitz may help you.

> **Comments:**
> **username_2**: Hello, if anyone feels that something is missing please let me know.  

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