<p>Voting mechanisms would seem to be a good example.  So are matching mechanisms such as those used to assign students to public schools. </p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2018-08-13T19:16:41.847Z
2018-08-13T19:16:41.847Z
present
<p>Here is an example of a mechanism "out in the wild". I take "the wild" literary, but I won't be specific because I am not a biologist and I am making this up from the top of my head.</p>

<p>Suppose two predators spotted some easy to get food source, and their value for the prey is their private information, i.e., a random variable <span class="math-container">$v_i$</span>. It would be efficient to auction off the food with an appropriately designed auction. Instead the predators could fight and the one who exerts more effort in the fight wins the food as a price.</p>

<p>Each player <span class="math-container">$i$</span> maximizes his payoff
<span class="math-container">$$G(e_i)v_i - e_i - \delta(e_j),$$</span>
where <span class="math-container">$e_i$</span> is the effort of player <span class="math-container">$i$</span>, and this player wins the fight with probability <span class="math-container">$G(e_i)$</span>, the probability that he put in more effort than player <span class="math-container">$j$</span>. The (by assumption) linear cost of effort has to be incurred independent of winning or losing the fight. On top, some damage <span class="math-container">$\delta(e_j)$</span> from the opponent is incurred.
To solve for the optimal effort as a function of the value <span class="math-container">$v_i$</span>, you can approach the problem like an all-pay auction.</p>

<p>An all-pay auction can also be interpreted as other forms of contests. It can also be used to model political lobbying activity. You can use insights from auction theory to solve for the optimal strategy in a plethora of allocation mechanisms. Think about queeuing or wars of attrition and so on.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2019-03-17T18:31:00.797Z
2019-03-17T18:31:00.797Z
Bayesian
<p>I'd like to know if there are any examples of indirect mechanisms that are not auctions. Auctions seem like a very controlled environment. I'd like to see some examples of indirect mechanisms "out in the wild".</p>

<mechanism-design>
What are some examples of indirect mechanisms that are not auctions?
Joebevo
# What are some examples of indirect mechanisms that are not auctions?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2018-08-11)

I'd like to know if there are any examples of indirect mechanisms that are not auctions. Auctions seem like a very controlled environment. I'd like to see some examples of indirect mechanisms "out in the wild".

**Tags:** mechanism-design

---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2018-08-13. Score: 2

Voting mechanisms would seem to be a good example. So are matching mechanisms such as those used to assign students to public schools.


---

### Answer by username_2 on 2019-03-17. Score: 0

Here is an example of a mechanism "out in the wild". I take "the wild" literary, but I won't be specific because I am not a biologist and I am making this up from the top of my head.

Suppose two predators spotted some easy to get food source, and their value for the prey is their private information, i.e., a random variable $v\_i$. It would be efficient to auction off the food with an appropriately designed auction. Instead the predators could fight and the one who exerts more effort in the fight wins the food as a price.

Each player $i$ maximizes his payoff
$$G(e\_i)v\_i - e\_i - \delta(e\_j),$$
where $e\_i$ is the effort of player $i$, and this player wins the fight with probability $G(e\_i)$, the probability that he put in more effort than player $j$. The (by assumption) linear cost of effort has to be incurred independent of winning or losing the fight. On top, some damage $\delta(e\_j)$ from the opponent is incurred.
To solve for the optimal effort as a function of the value $v\_i$, you can approach the problem like an all-pay auction.

An all-pay auction can also be interpreted as other forms of contests. It can also be used to model political lobbying activity. You can use insights from auction theory to solve for the optimal strategy in a plethora of allocation mechanisms. Think about queeuing or wars of attrition and so on.


---

