question: When a company commits a gross violation that affects people (physically/mentally/financially, etc.), why is the company forced to pay the government, instead of the people they hurt?
comment: Usually they'll have to pay both. Fines levyed by the state is not meant to replace money companies have to pay for the damages they cause a person. Let's say a company causes you to lose a leg because of negligence, they might be fined by the state if they broke the law, but *in addition to that* they have to pay you money for the damages they caused you specifically.
passages: Out of concern to avoid vagueness in application of the term "public policy" in evaluating discharge claims, the court explained that:
  
  BULLET::::- "Courts should proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations. No employer should be subject to suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may have derived some benefit from it." (quoting Brockmeyer)
   Line-drawing would be impossible to do in a principled way. "Public policy comes in many variations, is implicated in many contexts, and is carried out by many people, both publicly and privately. Once expanded in the manner argued here, the public policy exception would no longer be subject to any discernable limiting principles. It would arguably apply to retaliatory discharges based upon the conduct of any non-employee relative, for the fulfillment of or refusal to violate public policy in a wide variety of ways and in a manner completely unconnected to the employment relationship. The public policy exception cannot be stretched that far and still be recognizable under Brockmeyer's limited formulation."
   Section::::Concurrence.
   In unusual cases measures of compensation other than fair market value can be employed; United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (increased operational loss of a coal company during its temporary seizure by the government deemed to be the measure of compensation).
   The Court found that the differential treatments of industrial victims did not constitute a violation of equal protection, based on the reasons Congress gave for liability limitations: "There is no equal protection violation, since the general rationality of the Act's liability limitation, particularly with reference to the congressional purpose of encouraging private participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy, is ample justification for the difference in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries are derived from other causes."
  
  The court summarised the circumstances leading up to the act:
   Neuberger LJ held that protective payments under TULRCA 1992 s 189 are not payable in priority to administration expenses. He noted that if a broad interpretation to ‘wages and salary’ is given under then it could hurt the purpose of rescuing insolvent companies, which was inspired by the Cork Report and underpinned the Insolvency Act 1986. This accorded with the natural meaning of IA 1986 para 99(5) and the list of payments in para 99(6), and accorded with the policy considerations surrounding rescue. In particular, many administrators would not decide that a rescue is possible if they know damages for failure to consult the workers who are retained and have their contracts adopted get super-priority for more than the work they do.
   In "Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.", , the Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply "when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded". While punitive damages in civil cases are not covered by the Excessive Fines Clause, such damages were held to be covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, notably in "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell", .
  
  Section::::Excessive fines.:"Austin v. United States".
   I am thinking this morning of the men in the mills and factories; I am thinking of the women who, for a paltry wage, are compelled to work out their lives; of the little children who, in this system, are robbed of their childhood, and in their early, tender years, are seized in the remorseless grasp of Mammon, and forced into the industrial dungeons, there to feed the machines while they themselves are being starved body and soul...
   Workers for the Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. (IBP, Inc.) (now Tyson Foods, Inc.) filed a class-action lawsuit for unpaid wage reparations. Workers were not being paid for time spent putting on and taking off protective gear, nor for time walking to and from the changing area. IBP, Inc. argued that changing into protective gear did not constitute a “principal activity” of the job, and thus was not compensable by law.
  
  Section::::Judgment.
   BULLET::::- "Employers will be held liable for those terminations that effectuate an unlawful end," as "evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision". ("To say that the employer could be prosecuted for criminal involvement as a result of the activities would be little solace for the discharged employee.") (quoting Brockmeyer)
   BULLET::::- "We view the congressional assurance of a [then] $560 million fund for recovery, accompanied by an express statutory commitment, to 'take whatever action is deemed necessary [438 U.S. 59, 91] and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of' a nuclear accident, 42 U.S.C. 2210(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), to be a fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain recovery of damages of this magnitude from a utility or component manufacturer, whose resources might well be exhausted at an early stage."
   BULLET::::- The Bammert court wrote: "a plaintiff must identify a constitutional, statutory, or administrative provision that clearly articulates a fundamental and well-defined public policy", i.e. justify that the public policy is "sufficiently fundamental and well-defined" by reference to the content of the provision. To shift the burden to the employer to show just cause for the termination, the plaintiff must identify a public policy sufficient to trigger the exception, and demonstrate that the termination violated that public policy.
  
  Discharges for others' actions not actionable. According to the court, Bammert adduced two public policies through two statutes:
   BULLET::::5. It does not create new causes of action, but merely accepts for the Government liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence.
  
  BULLET::::6. There is no analogous liability of a "private individual" growing out of "like circumstances" when the relationship of the wronged to the wrongdoers in these cases is considered.
   "Steward" marked the beginning of the recognition that Congress could use the Spending Clause, under the umbrella of general welfare, to regulate state laws through incentives and encouragement but not coercion. The national government may induce the states, tempt them, or seduce them but not coerce them into passing legislation considered desirable to meet national needs. Before "Steward", Congress could regulate only commercial economic activity; after "Steward", Congress could regulate the actions of state governments.
   The court also concluded:
  
  BULLET::::- "...it is clear that Congress' purpose was to remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private development of electric energy by nuclear power while simultaneously providing the public compensation in the event of a catastrophic nuclear incident."
  
  BULLET::::- "The record supports the need for the imposition of a statutory limit on liability to encourage private industry participation and hence bears a rational relationship to Congress' concern for stimulating private industry's involvement in the production of nuclear electric energy."
   In that regard, four principles can be discerned from the jurisprudence:
  
  BULLET::::1. the oppression remedy request must in itself be a fair way of dealing with the situation;
  
  BULLET::::2. any order should go no further than necessary to rectify the oppression;
  
  BULLET::::3. such orders may serve only to vindicate the reasonable expectations of security holders, creditors, directors or officers in their capacity as corporate stakeholders; and
  
  BULLET::::4. director liability cannot be a surrogate for other forms of statutory or common law relief, particularly where such other relief may be more fitting in the circumstances.
   Cors argued that this clause varied the understanding of just compensation in the 5th amendment's taking's clause, and was unconstitutional. Cors relied on "Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States", 148 U.S. 312 for this proposition.
  
  Section::::Decision.
   Viewed in this light, the state's purported primary purpose of securing the health of its citizens was equally untenable. Intervention due to health concerns could not be sustained if it adversely affected the economic well-being of the nation. Exemptions made for protectionist measures each time a state experienced discomfiture would soon bring an end to union identity:
   BULLET::::4. The first prong of the test was met, but not the second. While federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping "encompasses those aspects of navigation and shipping that engage national concerns which must be uniformly regulated across the country, regardless of their territorial scope", it has been acknowledged since 1919 that workers' compensation schemes apply to the maritime context.
   Lamer further noted that internationally practices of regulating nuclear plants have included supervising employees.
  
  Lamer held that it is not possible to make a distinction between what is considered part of the "undertaking" and the "integrated activities related to" it. There must be a "prima facie" presumption that jurisdiction of labour relations is held by the federal government. The "normal and habitual" activities of the employees are intimately related to control of the facilities.
   BULLET::::4. director liability cannot be a surrogate for other forms of statutory or common law relief, particularly where such other relief may be more fitting in the circumstances.
  
  Section::::Jurisprudence.
  
  In "BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders", the Supreme Court of Canada stated that, in assessing a claim of oppression, a court must answer two questions:
   The standard of 'fair and reasonable' must therefore be something else, and I cannot think of any other standard appropriate than the normal needs of an average employee, regarded as a human being in a civilised community. If, instead of individual bargaining, one can conceive of a collective agreement – an agreement between all the employers in a given trade on the one side, and all the employees on the other – it seems to me that the framers of the agreement would have to take as the first and dominant factor the cost of living as a civilised being. If A lets B have the use of his horses on the terms that he gives them fair and reasonable treatment, I have no doubt that it is B's duty to give them proper food and water, and such shelter and rest as they need; and, as wages are the means of obtaining commodities, surely the State in stipulating for fair and reasonable remuneration for the employees means that the wages shall be sufficient to provide these things, and clothing and a condition of frugal comfort estimated by current human standards.
   A taxpayer may receive taxable income from the taxpayer's employer when the employer pays the taxpayer's taxes. In 1929, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of "Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner". The employer paid incomes taxes on behalf of an employee, and the Court questioned whether that payment constituted additional taxable income to the employee. The Court decided that the payment constituted income to the employee because "the discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed." Thus, even when a taxpayer does not directly receive compensation for services, the compensation may be considered gross income if the payment releases the taxpayer from an obligation.
   wrongdoing. [...] There should not be a higher burden of taxation imposed on those whose business activities are unlawful than that imposed in relation to lawful business activities. Punishment of those who engage in unlawful activities is imposed by the criminal law, and not by the laws in relation to income tax.
   In risk management activities such as in the areas of workplace safety, and insurance, it is often useful to put a precise economic value on a given life. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration under the Department of Labor sets penalties and regulations for companies to comply with safety standards to prevent workplace injuries and deaths. It can be argued that these high penalties are intended to act as a deterrent so that companies have an incentive to avoid them. As such, the price of the fines would have to be roughly equivalent to the value of a human life. Although some studies of the effectiveness of fines as a deterrent have found mixed results.
  
presuppositions: The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people are only forced to pay the government, not the people they hurt. The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people don’t pay the people they hurt.
corrections: The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people usually have to pay both the government and the people they hurt. The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people usually have to pay the government and the people they hurt.
raw_presuppositions: The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people are only forced to pay the government, not the people they hurt. The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people don’t pay the people they hurt.
raw_corrections: The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people usually have to pay both the government and the people they hurt. The company that commits a gross violation that affects the people usually have to pay the government and the people they hurt.