question: Why is to dangerous to connect to an insecure network and how would they access my information?
comment: Dangerous is an exaggeration, an insecure network means that anyone within range can see or manipulate your internet traffic. Depending on the type of traffic it may or may not be secured in other ways. For instance most websites use HTTPS and these would be fine. Other apps like e-mail may not be secured and completely readable. A secure wireless network in a coffee shop where everyone knows the password is basically the same as an insecure network. From a security stand point you are better off using an insecure wireless network to connect to an HTTPS website, then a secure one to connect to an HTTP website. tl;dr Security is a multi-faceted thing, and secure wireless networks are better than unsecured ones.
passages: Within the vast cyber-ecosystem, these end nodes often attach transiently to one or more clouds/networks, some trustworthy and others not. A few examples: a corporate desktop browsing the Internet, a corporate laptop checking company webmail via a coffee shop's open Wi-Fi access point, a personal computer used to telecommute during the day and gaming at night, or app within a smartphone/tablet (or any of the previous use/device combinations). Even if fully updated and tightly locked down, these nodes may ferry malware from one network (e.g. a corrupted webpage or an infected email message) into another, sensitive network. Likewise, the end nodes may exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g. log keystrokes or screen-capture). Assuming the device is fully trustworthy, the end node must provide the means to properly authenticate the user. Other nodes may impersonate trusted computers, thus requiring device authentication. The device and user may be trusted but within an untrustworthy environment (as determined by inboard sensors' feedback). Collectively, these risks are called the end node problem. There are several remedies but all require instilling trust in the end node and conveying that trust to the network/cloud.
   From 2005 to 2009, the greatest and growing threats to personal and corporate data derived from exploits of users' personal computers. Organized cyber-criminals have found it more profitable to internally exploit the many weak personal and work computers than to attack through heavily fortified perimeters. One common example is stealing small business's online banking account access.
  
  Section::::Solutions.
  
  To eliminate the end node problem, only allow authenticated users on trusted remote computers in safe environments to connect to your network/cloud. There are many ways to accomplish this with existing technology, each with different levels of trust.
   While dealing with the issue of internet privacy, one must first be concerned with not only the technological implications such as damaged property, corrupted files, and the like, but also with the potential for implications on their real lives. One such implication, which is rather commonly viewed as being one of the most daunting fears risks of the Internet, is the potential for identity theft. Although it is a typical belief that larger companies and enterprises are the usual focus of identity thefts, rather than individuals, recent reports seem to show a trend opposing this belief. Specifically, it was found in a 2007 “Internet Security Threat Report” that roughly ninety-three percent of “gateway” attacks were targeted at unprepared home users. The term “gateway” attack was used to refer to attack which aimed not at stealing data immediately, but rather at gaining access for future attacks.
   If an attacker installs an access point they are able to run various types of vulnerability scanners, and rather than having to be physically inside the organization, can attack remotely - perhaps from a reception area, adjacent building, car park, or with a high gain antenna, even from several miles away.
  
  Section::::Prevention and detection.
  
  To prevent the installation of rogue access points, organizations can install wireless intrusion prevention systems to monitor the radio spectrum for unauthorized access points.
   The end-to-end encryption paradigm does not directly address risks at the communications endpoints themselves, such as the technical exploitation of clients, poor quality random number generators, or key escrow. E2EE also does not address traffic analysis, which relates to things such as the identities of the end points and the times and quantities of messages that are sent.
  
  Section::::Security.:SSL/TLS.
   Anonymity networks have been developed and many have introduced methods of proving the anonymity guarantees that are possible, originally with simple Chaum Mixes and Pool Mixes the size of the set of users was seen as the security that the system could provide to a user. This had a number of problems; intuitively if the network is international then it is unlikely that a message that contains only Urdu came from the United States, and vice versa. Information like this and via methods like the predecessor attack and intersection attack helps an attacker increase the probability that a user sent the message.
   Poor configuration causes many vulnerabilities. Wireless networks are often put into use with no or insufficient security settings. With no security settings – the default configuration – access is obtained simply by association. Without sufficient security settings, networks can easily be defeated by cloaking and/or MAC address filtering.
  
  Poor encryption causes the remaining vulnerabilities. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is defective and can be defeated in several ways. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and Cisco's Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP) are vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
  
  Section::::Penetration of a wireless network.:Encryption types and their attacks.
   BULLET::::- For commercial providers, hotspots, and large organizations, the preferred solution is often to have an open and unencrypted, but completely isolated wireless network. The users will at first have no access to the Internet nor to any local network resources. Commercial providers usually forward all web traffic to a captive portal which provides for payment and/or authorization. Another solution is to require the users to connect securely to a privileged network using VPN.
   The attacker snoops on Internet traffic using a bogus wireless access point. Unwitting web users may be invited to log into the attacker's server, prompting them to enter sensitive information such as usernames and passwords. Often, users are unaware they have been duped until well after the incident has occurred.
  
  When users log into unsecured (non-HTTPS) bank or e-mail accounts, the attacker intercepts the transaction, since it is sent through their equipment. The attacker is also able to connect to other networks associated with the users' credentials.
   Preventing hidden node attacks requires a network tool such as NetEqualizer. Such a tool monitors access point traffic and develops a baseline level of traffic. Any spikes in CTS/RTS signals are assumed to be the result of a hidden node attack and are subsequently blocked.
  
  Section::::Vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies.:Wireless networks.:De-auth (de-authentication) attack.
   A [[Web search engine|search engine]] is the key for finding as much information as possible about a target. In many cases, organizations do not want to protect all their resources from internet access. For instance, a [[web server]] must be accessible. Many organizations additionally have [[Message transfer agent|email servers]], [[File Transfer Protocol|FTP]] servers, and other systems that must be accessible over the internet. The IP addresses of an organization are often grouped together. "If one IP address has been found, the rest probably can be found around it."
   Strong authentication requires providing more than one type of authentication information (two-factor authentication). The username is the most common form of identification on computer systems today and the password is the most common form of authentication. Usernames and passwords have served their purpose, but they are increasingly inadequate. Usernames and passwords are slowly being replaced or supplemented with more sophisticated authentication mechanisms such as Time-based One-time Password algorithms.
  
  Section::::Risk management.:Access control.:Authorization.
   Information technology risk assessment can be performed by a qualitative or quantitative approach, following different methodologies. One important difference in risk assessments in information security is modifying the threat model to account for the fact that any adversarial system connected to the Internet has access to threaten any other connected system. Risk assessments may therefore need to be modified to account for the threats from all adversaries, instead of just those with reasonable access as is done in other fields.
  
  Section::::Fields of application.:Megaprojects.
   If an employee (trusted entity) brings in a wireless router and plugs it into an unsecured switchport, the entire network can be exposed to anyone within range of the signals. Similarly, if an employee adds a wireless interface to a networked computer using an open USB port, they may create a breach in network security that would allow access to confidential materials. However, there are effective countermeasures (like disabling open switchports during switch configuration and VLAN configuration to limit network access) that are available to protect both the network and the information it contains, but such countermeasures must be applied uniformly to all network devices.
   Section::::Tools used to obtain security.:Identity based networks.
  
  Unwanted or malicious behavior is possible on the web since the internet is inherently anonymous. True identity based networks replace the ability to remain anonymous and are inherently more trustworthy since the identity of the sender and recipient are known. (The telephone system is an example of an identity based network.)
  
  Section::::Tools used to obtain security.:Anonymized networks.
   Keeping a web server safe from intrusion is often called "Server Port Hardening". Many technologies come into play to keep information on the internet safe when it is transmitted from one location to another. For instance TLS certificates (or "SSL certificates") are issued by certificate authorities to help prevent internet fraud. Many developers often employ different forms of encryption when transmitting and storing sensitive information. A basic understanding of information technology security concerns is often part of a web developer's knowledge.
   Each of the three is important, and depending on the circumstances any of these may be critical. For example, if a communication is not readily identifiable, then it is unlikely to attract attention for identification of parties, and the mere fact a communication has taken place (regardless of content) is often enough by itself to establish an evidential link in legal prosecutions. It is also important with computers, to be sure where the security is applied, and what is covered.
  
  Section::::Borderline cases.
   p1: Given a node, ci ∈ Cnew, that is attempting to join a TD, then, if the value of OSi  OST, then ci is not allowed to join TD br
  
  p2: Given a node, ci ∈ Cnew, that is attempting to join a TD, then, if the value of SAFEi  SAFET, then ci is not allowed to join TD br
  
  p3: Given a node, ci ∈ Cnew, that is attempting to join a TD, and a node cx in the TD, then, if the value of responsei,x = responsec, then opinioni,x = compromised br
   The capability of the attacker is determined by several characteristics, e.g., the location of the attacker related to the system (insider attacker vs. outsider attacker). An insider is an entity who has legitimate access to the system and can participate according to the system specifications, while an outsider is any unauthorized entity in the system who may or may not be identifiable.
   Identification is an assertion of who someone is or what something is. If a person makes the statement "Hello, my name is John Doe" they are making a claim of who they are. However, their claim may or may not be true. Before John Doe can be granted access to protected information it will be necessary to verify that the person claiming to be John Doe really is John Doe. Typically the claim is in the form of a username. By entering that username you are claiming "I am the person the username belongs to".
  
  Section::::Risk management.:Access control.:Authentication.
   Using a third party system of any kind (payphone, Internet cafe) is often quite secure, however if that system is used to access known locations (a known email account or 3rd party) then it may be tapped at the far end, or noted, and this will remove any security benefit obtained. Some countries also impose mandatory registration of Internet cafe users.
   Section::::Modes of unauthorized access.:Non-traditional networks.
  
  Non-traditional networks such as personal network Bluetooth devices are not safe from hacking and should be regarded as a security risk. Even barcode readers, handheld PDAs, and wireless printers and copiers should be secured. These non-traditional networks can be easily overlooked by IT personnel who have narrowly focused on laptops and access points.
  
  Section::::Modes of unauthorized access.:Identity theft (MAC spoofing).
   Detecting other vulnerabilities may come from things that are simply good management. If someone is constantly clashing with colleagues, it is good people management, not uniquely security management, for a manager to talk with the individual, or have them talk to an Employee Assistance Program. It is not considered a disqualification to seek mental health assistance; it may be considered excellent judgement. For people with especially high security access, it may be requested that they see a therapist from a list of professionals with security clearance, so there is not a problem if something sensitive slips or they need to discuss a conflict.
   In a wireless network many hosts or nodes are sharing a common medium. If nodes A and B are both wireless laptop computers communicating in an office environment their physical separation may require that they communicate through a wireless access point. But only one device can transmit at a time in order to avoid packet collisions. Prior to transmitting, Node A sends out a Ready to Send (RTS) signal. If it is not receiving any other traffic the access point will broadcast a Clear to Send (CTS) signal over the network. Node A will then begin transmitting while Node B knows to hold off transmitting its data for the time being. Even though it cannot directly communicate with Node A, i.e. Node A is hidden, it knows to wait based on its communication with the access point. An attacker can exploit this functionality by flooding the network with CTS messages. Then every node assumes there is a hidden node trying to transmit and will hold its own transmissions, resulting in a denial of service.
   Many companies issue typical laptops and only allow those specific computers to remotely connect. For example, the US Department of Defense only allows its remote computers to connect via VPN to its network (no direct Internet browsing) and uses two-factor authentication. Some organizations use server-side tools to scan and/or validate the end node's computer, such as communicating with the node's Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
  
raw_presuppositions: It is dangerous to connect to an insecure network.
raw_corrections: It is not necessarily dangerous to connect to an insecure network though someone would be able to see one's internet traffic.