question: Without getting too political, why is the President able to remove and appoint people in completely separate organizations than his own cabinet?
comment: The President is the head of the Executive branch of the government. A lot of the organizations in the government are part of that branch, it isn't just the cabinet.
passages: The U.S. Constitution establishes an Executive Branch of government, but only names one of its officers, the President. It is, therefore, left to normal statute law to establish inferior offices and agencies, under the President, by which the government can operate.
   In reality, the high turnover rate among these commissioners or board members means that most presidents have the opportunity to fill enough vacancies to constitute a voting majority on each independent agency commission within the first two years of the first term as president. In some famous instances, presidents have found the independent agencies more loyal and in lockstep with the president's wishes and policy objectives than some dissenters among the executive agency political appointments. Presidential attempts to remove independent agency officials have generated most of the important Supreme Court legal opinions in this area. Presidents normally do have the authority to remove heads of independent agencies, but they must meet the statutory requirements for removal, such as demonstrating that the individual has committed malfeasance. In contrast, the president can remove regular executive agency heads at will.
   Despite the broad authority granted by the United States Constitution to the president, he does not have "unilateral and unrestrained authority over the Executive Branch" and "congressional action is required to create Executive Branch departments, to fund them, to determine the nature and scope of their duties and to confirm the appointment of their top leaders". While the president manages the conduct of executive branch offices, "it is Congress, not the President, that establishes departments and agencies, and to whatever degree it chooses, the internal organization of agencies".
  
  Section::::Legal basis.:Delegation of legislative authority.
   A unicameral legislative veto has been a feature of the oversight authority built into several instances of presidential reorganization authority. United States Attorney-General William D. Mitchell early expressed concern that the Economy Act of 1932, the first instance of presidential reorganization authority, was unconstitutional on the basis of it allowing the exercise of the so-called "legislative veto" by only one chamber of Congress. The act provided that either the Senate or the House of Representatives could annul an executive order issued by the president under the reorganization authority. In Mitchell's view, a single chamber of Congress was constitutionally incompetent to act by itself; the legislative power could only be exercised by the two chambers jointly, he argued. The question was not immediately tested in court. However, in the 1983 case of "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha" the U.S. Supreme Court essentially affirmed Mitchell's earlier opinion that a one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional. The decision in "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha" created the possibility that every previous reorganization was effectively null and void; to avoid the potential administrative chaos that might have ensued, Congress enacted legislation retroactively approving all previous reorganizations.
   BULLET::::- A range of new advisory bodies developed around the presidency, many of which complemented the main cabinet departments, and the cabinet declined in influence. The National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget are prime examples.
  
  BULLET::::- The Senate does not "advise and consent to" appointments to the Executive Office of the President (with only a handful of exceptions), as it does with cabinet appointments. A corollary is that EOP personnel may act independently of, without regard for, and without accountability to Congress.
   Such problems existed as well in World War II, during which two independent lines of command flowed from the president, one through the secretary of the navy to naval forces, and the other through the secretary of war to land and air forces. In 1947, the military restructuring placed all military forces, including the newly independent Air Force, under a single civilian secretary of defense.
   The president's Cabinet and the selection of cabinet members is also not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Washington understood the importance of receiving counsel and thus established the practice of appointing secretaries of the Executive Departments. Article II Section 2 of the Constitution gives him the power to do so and states the President, "with the advice and consent of the senate... shall appoint... all other officers of the United States."
   The Constitution had established the basic layout of the federal government, but much of the structure of the government was established during the Federalist Era. The Constitution empowers the president to appoint the heads of the federal executive departments with the advice and consent of the Senate. President Washington and the Senate established a precedent whereby the president alone would make executive and judicial nominations, but these nominees would not hold their positions in a permanent capacity until they won Senate confirmation. President Washington organized his principal officers into the Cabinet of the United States, which served as a major advisory body to the president. The heads of the Department of War, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury each served in the Cabinet. After the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Attorney General also served in the Cabinet as the president's chief legal adviser.
   During the convention that established the present U.S. constitution, attention was primarily given to designing a federal government with branches that would be able operate independently of each other and free of undesirable foreign influence, which resulted in the aforementioned prohibitions. Barring state and local officials from federal office was not seriously debated. If it had been, it would likely have been fiercely opposed especially by the nascent anti-Federalist movement, many of whose members were keen to ensure that state officials with a vested interest in defending states' rights would be allowed to also serve simultaneously at the federal level, especially in Congress.
   If the independent agency exercises any executive powers like enforcement, and most of them do, Congress cannot participate in the regular removal process of commissioners. Constitutionally, Congress can only participate directly in impeachment proceedings. Congress can, however, pass statutes limiting the circumstances under which the president can remove commissioners of independent agencies. Members of Congress cannot serve as commissioners on independent agencies that have executive powers, nor can Congress itself appoint the commissioners – the Appointments Clause of the Constitution vests that power in the president. The Senate does participate, however, in appointments through "advice and consent", which occurs through confirmation hearings and votes on the president's nominees.
   To enforce the merit system and the judicial system, the law also created the United States Civil Service Commission. In the modern American meritocracy, the president may hand out only a certain number of jobs, which must be approved by the United States Senate.
   In the past, presidents could appoint members of the United States civil service. This use of the spoils system allowed presidents to reward political supporters with jobs. Following the assassination of President James Garfield by Charles J. Guiteau, a disgruntled office seeker, Congress instituted a merit-based civil service in which positions are filled on a nonpartisan basis. The Office of Personnel Management now oversees the staffing of 2.8 million federal jobs in the federal bureaucracy.
   The United States Constitution prohibits members of the Senate or House from holding positions within the Executive Branch (Art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 2), and limits the president to his salary as chief executive, saying he may not "receive... any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them" (Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 7). However, the Constitution places no restrictions that would prevent state or local office holders from simultaneously holding office in any branch of the federal government.
   Article II, Section 2 gives Congress the discretion to vest the appointment of "inferior officers" in either the President alone, the heads of departments, or the lower federal courts. Congress may not appropriate this role for itself, and Senate confirmation is not required for these positions.
  
  The President has the authority to remove most high-level executive officers at will. Congress, however, may place limitations on the removal of certain executive appointees serving in positions where independence from the presidency is considered desirable, such as stipulating that removal may only be for cause.
   The power of a president to fire executive officials has long been a contentious political issue. Generally, a president may remove executive officials purely at will. However, Congress can curtail and constrain a president's authority to fire commissioners of independent regulatory agencies and certain inferior executive officers by statute.
  
  To manage the growing federal bureaucracy, presidents have gradually surrounded themselves with many layers of staff, who were eventually organized into the Executive Office of the President of the United States. Within the Executive Office, the president's innermost layer of aides (and their assistants) are located in the White House Office.
   One of the additional requirements of the Act was to mandate that federal department and agencies create lines of succession plan in case of disaster or emergency. Though the Act was passed in 1998, many agencies didn't fulfill that requirement until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
  
  President George W. Bush signed executive orders designating lines of succession in seven key departments within months after the attack. These succession plans do not affect the presidential line of succession, which is governed by the United States Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act.
   In June 1945, two months after becoming president upon Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, Harry Truman recommended to Congress that the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate be restored to and given priority in the presidential line of succession over members of the Cabinet. The arrangement reflected Truman's belief that the president should not have the power to appoint to office "the person who would be my immediate successor in the event of my own death or inability to act," and that the presidency should, whenever possible, "be filled by an elective officer." Cabinet officials are appointed by the president, whereas the Speaker and the President pro tempore are elected officials. He also recommended that a provision be made for election of a new president and vice president should vacancies in both of those offices occur more than three months before the midterm congressional elections.
   Finally, it should be pointed out the office of non-suitcase minister, an infrequent position and intimately linked to the person appointed for it, who does not hold the title of any Ministry, but whose presence in the Council of Ministers is necessary, either because he is a figure of trust for the President, or because it is a government fruit of an alliance between different parties, and for that reason, has to go to this position as a way for the minority party to accede to the Government.
  
  Section::::Structure.:Central Organization.:Secretaries of State.
   Scholars consider presidents active in the affairs of "independent" bureaucracies. Presidential nominations are sometimes considered a check on bureaucracies because it ensures reliable agent performance. However, presidents can use appointments for political gain. A president may wish to maintain bureaucratic drift if it lies in his or her favor. An administrative agency can be captured by a president when he or she appoints a bureaucratic head that reaffirms bureaucratic drift that is favorable to the president's policies. In cases where bureaucratic drift is present, scholars believe that the president can change policy more rapidly than in a zero-drift scenario.
  
  Section::::Checks.
   The tradition of the Cabinet arose out of the debates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention regarding whether the president would exercise executive authority singly or collaboratively with a cabinet of ministers or a privy council. As a result of the debates, the Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 1) vests "all executive power" in the president singly, and authorizes—but does not compel—the president (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1) to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices". The Constitution does not specify what the executive departments will be, how many there will be, or what their duties should be.
   Cabinet-level officials have positions that are considered to be of Cabinet level, but which are not part of the Cabinet. Which exact positions "are" considered part of the presidential cabinet, can vary with the president. The CIA and FEMA were cabinet-level agencies under Bill Clinton, but not George W. Bush. The head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (aka the drug czar) was a cabinet-level position under both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, but not under Barack Obama. (Not to be confused with the head of the DEA, who has remained in the org chart underneath the cabinet position held by the Attorney General.) Designation of an agency as being cabinet-level requires that Congress enact legislation, although executive orders unilaterally created by the president can be used to create many other types of position inside the executive branch. Members of the cabinet proper, as well as cabinet-level officials, meet with the president in a room adjacent to the Oval Office.
   The people with the power to appoint agency heads and senior administrative positions can have a direct effect on the direction an agency is taken in under its head.
  
  Section::::U.S. levels of government.:Federal.
   The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.
   The president may require the "principal officer" of any executive department to tender his advice in writing. While the Constitution nowhere requires a formal Cabinet, it does authorize the president to seek advice from the principal officers of the various departments as he (or she) performs their official duties. George Washington found it prudent to organize his principal officers into a Cabinet, and it has been part of the executive branch structure ever since. Presidents have used Cabinet meetings of selected principal officers but to widely differing extents and for different purposes. Secretary of State William H. Seward advocated the use of a parliamentary-style Cabinet government to President Abraham Lincoln, but was rebuffed. Later, Woodrow Wilson advocated use of a parliamentary-style Cabinet while he was a professor, but as president he would have none of it in his administration. In recent administrations, cabinets have grown to include key White House staff in addition to department and agency heads. President Ronald Reagan formed seven subcabinet councils to review many policy issues, and subsequent presidents have followed that practice.
   In the United States, many government agencies are organized under the executive branch of government, although a few are part of the judicial or legislative branches.
  
  In the federal government, the executive branch, led by the president, controls the federal executive departments, which are led by secretaries who are members of the United States Cabinet. The many independent agencies of the United States government created by statutes enacted by Congress exist outside of the federal executive departments but are still part of the executive branch.
  
presuppositions: The President should not be able to appoint people in completely separate organizations than his own cabinet.
corrections: Due to the President being the head of the Executive branch of the government, many organizations are actually within the same branch as the President.
raw_presuppositions: The President should not be able to appoint people in completely separate organizations than his own cabinet. Only the President's cabinet is part of the executive branch.
raw_corrections: Due to the President being the head of the Executive branch of the government, many organizations are actually within the same branch as the President. Many parts of government are in the executive branch.