 during the festival of Carneia, a sacrosanct period of peace, and was informed that the Spartan army could not march to war until the full moon rose; Athens could not expect reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would have to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they were reinforced by the full muster of 1,000 hoplites from the small city of Plataea; a gesture which did much to steady the nerves of the Athenians, and won unending Athenian gratitude to Plataea.

For approximately five days the armies therefore confronted each other across the plain of Marathon in stalemate. The flanks of the Athenian camp were protected either by a grove of trees, or an abbatis of stakes (depending on the exact reading). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked in favor of the Athenians. There were ten Athenian strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elected by each of the ten tribes that the Athenians were divided into; Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in overall charge, was the War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been elected by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that command rotated between the strategoi, each taking in turn a day to command the army. He further suggests that each strategos, on his day in command, instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's account, Miltiades is keen to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming to aid the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his actual day of command to attack. This passage is undoubtedly problematic; the Athenians had little to gain by attacking before the Spartans arrived, and there is no real evidence of this rotating generalship. There does, however, seem to have been a delay between the Athenian arrival at Marathon, and the battle; Herodotus, who evidently believed that Miltiades was eager to attack, may have made a mistake whilst seeking to explain this delay.

As is discussed below, the reason for the delay was probably simply that neither the Athenians nor the Persians were willing to risk battle initially. This then raises the question of why the battle occurred when it did. Herodotus explicitly tells us that the Greeks attacked the Persians (and the other sources confirm this), but it is not clear why they
during the festival of Carneia, a sacrosanct period of peace, and was informed that the Spartan united states army could not border to war until the full moon arise; Athens could not have a bun in the oven reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would hold to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they were reinforce by the full muster of 1,000 hoplites from the little city of Plataea; a gesture which did much to steady the nerve of the Athenians, and gain unending Athenian gratitude to Plataea. 

 For approximately five days the armies therefore confronted each other across the knit of Marathon in stalemate. The flanks of the Athenian camp were protect either by a grove of trees, or an abbatis of stakes (depend on the exact interpretation). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked in favor of the Athenians. There be ten Athenian strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elected by each of the ten tribes that the Athenians were divided into; Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in overall bang, was the War - Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been elect by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that command rotated between the strategoi, each taking in turn a day to dominate the army. He further suggest that each strategos, on his sidereal day in command, instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's account, Miltiades is keen to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming to help the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his actual day of command to attack. This passing is undoubtedly problematic; the Athenians had little to gain by attack before the Spartans arrive, and there is no real evidence of this rotating generalship. There does, however, seem to have been a delay between the Athenian arrival at Marathon, and the battle; Herodotus, who obviously believed that Miltiades was eager to attack, may have made a mistake whilst seeking to explain this delay. 

 As is discussed below, the reason for the delay was credibly simply that neither the Athenians nor the Persians were willing to risk battle initially. This then raises the doubt of why the battle happen when it did. Herodotus explicitly tell us that the Greeks attacked the Persians (and the early sources confirm this), but it is not clear why they
 duging the festival of Carkeia, a sacrosancj period of pezce, and das informed that the Spartai arny coyld not march to war uvtil the vull moob roww; Athens could not expecf reiufircement for aj least ten gays. The Athenhavs would have to hold out at Marathon for thr hime being, altrougn theg were reinforced by the full mustsr of 1,000 ioplites from tne small city of Plataea; a geshure which did mucj to steady the berves of thd Athenians, and won ungnding Athenian gratitude to Plagaea.

Fpr approxinarelj five days vhe ariies therefovv confrmnted esch other acroxs vhe plain of Marathon in vtalemate. The flanhs of the Achenian camp were prorexted githes by q gfovt oh tdees, og ai abbatis or stakes (depending on the exacu rqqding). Since ebery dwy brought the arrival of the Spartans clmsed, the delay worked in fqvor of the Athenians. There wewe ten Athenian strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elacted cy tagm of rhf ten tribes that the Athenians were divided yhtp; Kiltiades was jne of thesr. Ln wddition, in oxerall chzrge, was the War-Arfhon (pojemarxh), Callimwchux, who had been elected by tye whole citpzen body. Herodotus suygests that eommanc rotsted between the strateyoi, eadh taking ij turn a sxy to command thd agmy. Ve furthtf suggests that ewch stratxgos, pn his aay on comiand, instewd denarred to Miltiades. In Hgrodotgs's accounh, Miltiades is keen to attack tix Persians (dexphte knowing that the Spartans are coming to aid thz Athevians), but atrangeny, chooses eo wait until jis actual dey of comiand to qttack. Gfis passage is undoubtebjy peoblematic; the Athcnianr had little to ycib by attacking nefure tje S[drtans arrivad, avd gnere ks no rtcl cviaencr of this rotating ganerzlship. There does, norever, segm to havq been a delau between the Athejian errivau at Karwthon, and the battle; Herodotus, who evidfntjy believed ehat Miltiades wcs eager to attack, may have made a mistaje whilst seeking ro explain this delcy.

Ss is discuxsed felow, the reason for the delat was probably sikply that neither the Athenhans jor the Persians were willing to risk battle initially. This then raises tye question of why the battne pccurrqd wiei it did. Herodotux explicitly tells us that the Jreeks attdched the Persians (and the othrr sources confkrm this), but it is not cmear why they
during the festival of Carneia, a sacrosanct peace, was informed the Spartan army until full moon rose; could not expect for at least ten days. The would have to hold out at Marathon for the time being, although they reinforced by the full muster of 1,000 hoplites from the small city of a which much steady the nerves of the Athenians, and won unending Athenian gratitude to Plataea. For approximately five the armies therefore confronted each other across the of Marathon in stalemate. flanks of the Athenian camp protected by a of or abbatis of stakes on the exact reading). Since every day brought the arrival of the Spartans closer, the delay worked favor of There were Athenian (generals) Marathon, elected by the ten tribes that the Athenians Miltiades was one of these. In addition, in charge, was War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been by the whole citizen body. Herodotus suggests that rotated between the strategoi, each taking in turn a day to command the army. He that each strategos, on day in command, deferred Miltiades. Herodotus's Miltiades is to attack the Persians (despite knowing that the Spartans are coming aid the Athenians), but strangely, chooses to wait until his of to attack. This is undoubtedly problematic; the had to gain by attacking Spartans and real of rotating generalship. There does, seem to have been a between the Athenian arrival Herodotus, who evidently believed that Miltiades was eager attack, may have made a mistake whilst to explain this delay. As is discussed below, the reason for the was probably neither the Athenians nor the Persians were willing risk battle initially. This raises the question of why the battle occurred when did. explicitly tells that the Greeks the Persians (and other sources confirm it is clear they
 during the festival of CarneiA, a sacrosanCt perIod Of pEaCe, anD was Informed that thE sparTan army could not march to War unTiL The fULl Moon rOse; AtheNS cOULd nOt ExPecT rEInForceMenT for at lEast ten dayS. ThE AThenians woulD HaVe to hold ouT at marathon for tHe tIme beiNg, AltHOugh tHey Were rEinforCEd by thE full mustEr OF 1,000 hopliTEs from tHE SmAll cIty of Plataea; a gestURe WHich did much to sTeady tHe NErVES of The athenians, aNd Won unENding AtHEnIAN GraTItude to PlataeA.

For approxiMAteLy five DaYs tHE armieS therEfORe cOnfronted eaCh otHer across The plaIN of MaraTHon in stAlematE. ThE flAnks OF tHe athEnIAn cAMp WerE ProTected eiThEr By a grOve oF TREEs, or An aBbatIs of sTakes (dependinG on The eXAct ReadiNg). SinCe evErY day bRought The arRiVal of the SpartanS cloSer, the delAy wOrKed In Favor OF the AtHenIanS. There wEre ten ATHenIaN STRaTegoi (generals) at MarAtHON, eLected by Each of THe TeN Tribes thAt The atheNIAns weRe diVIdEd into; MiLtiadeS WaS oNe of theSe. in addiTiOn, iN ovErall CHargE, was thE War-ArchOn (polEMarch), CallimachUS, who had been elECtED By THe whOle Citizen body. heroDOtus SuggEStS thAT commAnd roTaTEd BEtween the strategoi, eAcH takinG in tuRn a day to commaNd the army. HE FURther sugGestS ThAT each strategos, On his Day in commaND, instead DeferRed to MilTiades. In HEROdotus's aCcoUnt, milTiaDES iS keen to attack THE PerSiAns (despIte Knowing ThaT thE SpArtAnS are cominG to aid thE AThEnIaNs), bUt strANgely, choOsEs tO wAit Until HIs actuAl day Of coMmAnD To aTtack. ThIS pASSage Is UnDoubTedLy ProblEmatIC; thE AtheniAns had litTle TO gaiN bY aTtackinG before the SpaRtAns arrived, AnD thEre is nO REal evideNce of this rotating generaLShip. TheRe dOes, hoWeveR, seem to haVe bEen a deLay BEtween The AthEnian ArRivAL At MarATHoN, anD tHe battle; HeRODotUs, who EvIdenTly beliEved that Miltiades wAS eaGer to attack, maY haVe maDE A mIstAKe WHilSt SEekING to explain this dElay.

As is diScUSsEd below, the REasOn For the dElay was ProbaBLy simplY that neitHer the AthEnIans NOR thE Persians wEre williNg to risk bATtle iNItIally. thiS then rAiSes The quEstion OF whY the bAttle oCcUrred wHen it DiD. HerodotUs explicitly tells us that The GreEks atTacKed the PerSiaNS (anD the other SourCes confirm ThiS), buT it is Not CLear wHy thEY
 during the festival of Ca rneia, a s acros anc t p er iodof p eace, and wasi nfor med that the Spartan a rmy c ou l d no t  m archto waru nt i l  th efu llmo o nrose;  At hens co uld not ex pec treinforcemen t  f or at leas t t en days. The  At henian swou l d hav e t o hol d outa t Mara thon forth e  timeb eing, a l t ho ughthey were reinfor c ed by the full mu ster o f1 ,0 0 0  ho pli tes from t he  smal l  city o f  P l a t aea ;  a gesture wh ich did muc h  to  stead ythe nerves  of t he Ath enians, and  won  unending  Athen i an grat i tude to  Plata ea. 

F or a p pr ox ima te l y f i ve  da y s t he armie sth erefo re c o n f r onte d e achother  across the p lai n of Mar athon  in s tale ma te. T he fla nks o fthe Athenian ca mp w ere prote cte deit he r bya  grove  of  tr ees, or  an abb a tis  o f s ta kes (depending onth e ex act read ing).S in ce every da ybro ught t he ar riva l  o f the Sp artans cl os er, the  d elay w or ked  in  favo r  ofthe At henians.  Ther e  were ten Athe n ian strategoi (g e n er a ls)atMarathon, e lect e d by  eac h  o f t h e ten  trib es th a t the Athenians wer edivide d int o; Miltiadeswas one of t h ese. Inaddi t io n , in overall c harge , was theW ar-Archo n (po lemarch) , Callima c h us, whohad  be enele c t ed  by the whole c itiz en  body.Her odotussug ges tstha tcommand r otated b et we en  t hestrat e goi, eac htak in g i n tur n  a day  to c omma nd  t h e a rmy. He fu r t hersu gg ests  th at  each  str a teg os, onhis day i n c o mman d,  i nsteaddeferred to M il tiades. In  H ero dotus' s account,  Miltiades is keen to a t tack th e P ersia ns ( despite k now ing th att he Spa rtansare c om ing t o aid t he  At he nians), bu t str angel y,  cho oses to  wait until his ac t ual  day of comma ndto a t t ac k.T hi s  pa ss a gei s  undoubtedly pr oblematic;  t h eAtheniansh adli ttle to  gain b y att a cking b efore the  Spartans  a rriv e d , a nd there i s no rea l evidenc e  of t h is  rota tin g gene ra lsh ip. T here d o es,  howe ver, s ee m to h ave b ee n a dela y between the Athenianarriva l atMar athon, an d t h e b attle; He rodo tus, who e vid ent ly be lie v ed th at M i lt iad e s was  eag e r to atta c k,  ma y ha ve made a m i s t ake  whil sts eeking  toexplain this dela y .

As is discu ssed b elo w,t he r ea son for the de lay  w a s  probabl ysimply that  neither  t h e Ath enians  nor t he Pers i a ns were w illi ngto risk b att le initial ly .T his th en r ai ses th e ques t iono f  why the battleoccur r e d whe n  it  did.  H erodotu s  exp licitly te lls us that  the G reek s att acked t he  Persi ans  ( and the ot h er source s con firm th is ), b utit isnotc l ear w hy t he y
 during_the festival_of Carneia, a sacrosanct_period of_peace,_and was_informed_that the Spartan_army could not_march to war until_the full moon_rose;_Athens could not expect reinforcement for at least ten days. The Athenians would have_to_hold out_at_Marathon_for the time being, although_they were reinforced by the_full muster_of 1,000 hoplites from the small city of_Plataea;_a gesture which_did much to steady the nerves of the Athenians,_and won unending Athenian gratitude to_Plataea.

For approximately five_days_the_armies therefore confronted each_other across the plain of Marathon_in stalemate. The flanks of the_Athenian camp were protected either by a_grove of trees, or an abbatis_of stakes (depending on the_exact reading)._Since every day brought the_arrival of the_Spartans closer,_the delay worked_in favor of the Athenians. There_were ten Athenian_strategoi (generals) at Marathon, elected by_each_of the ten_tribes_that_the Athenians_were divided into;_Miltiades_was one_of_these. In addition, in overall charge,_was_the War-Archon (polemarch), Callimachus, who had been_elected by the whole_citizen_body. Herodotus suggests that_command rotated between the strategoi,_each taking in turn a day_to command_the army._He further suggests that each strategos, on his day in command,_instead deferred to Miltiades. In Herodotus's_account, Miltiades is keen_to attack_the_Persians (despite knowing_that_the Spartans_are coming to aid the Athenians), but_strangely, chooses_to wait until his actual day_of command to attack._This_passage is undoubtedly problematic; the Athenians_had little to gain by attacking_before the Spartans arrived, and_there_is_no real evidence of this_rotating generalship. There does, however, seem_to have been_a delay between the Athenian arrival at_Marathon,_and the battle; Herodotus, who evidently_believed_that Miltiades was eager to attack,_may_have_made a mistake whilst seeking_to explain this delay.

As is discussed_below, the reason for the delay was probably simply_that neither the_Athenians nor the Persians were_willing_to_risk battle initially. This then raises the question of why_the battle_occurred when it_did. Herodotus explicitly tells us that the Greeks attacked the_Persians (and the other sources confirm this),_but it is not clear why they