 had been accusing the Soviet Union of capitulating to capitalism and abandoning its princioples, and a Sino-Soviet competition had broken out about which of the two states was most willing to support North Vietnam. Lewandowski stated that the Soviets were tired of this economically exhausting competition because every time China increased its support for North Vietnam, the Soviets had to increase their support on an even greater scale just to rebut the Chinese claim that they were "selling out".

D'Orlandi was able to arrange for Lewandowski to meet Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, and the talks went well. By November 1966, it was arranged that John Gronouski, the American ambassador in Warsaw, would meet with North Vietnamese diplomats the next month for peace talks in what was code-named Operation Marigold. By December 1966, American aircraft bombed oil facilities and railroad yards in Hanoi, which led the Poles to warn if the U.S. continued to bomb Hanoi, the talks would be aborted. Rostow told the president that he believed that Operation Marigold was a "trap" and the North Vietnamese demand that Hanoi not be bombed anymore showed the bombing campaign was indeed working as he promised it would. On December 6, 1966 Johnson refused Harriman's request to cease bombing Hanoi and a week later, the planned talks in Warsaw were cancelled as the North Vietnamese announced that there would be no peace talks as long as North Vietnam was being bombed. In January 1967, Rostow reported to Johnson that the Viet Cong were "disintegrating" under the American pressure, writing optimistically that the major problem for the Americans in the coming year would be to find the best way to integrate those Viet Cong guerrillas who had surrendered back into civilian life. In a further hopeful sign he reported to the president in the same month that the bloody chaos of the Cultural Revolution had pushed China to the brink of civil war as "Mao's own prestige has been seriously, perhaps irretrievably, tarnished in this yet unavailing fracas". With China collapsing into chaos, he believed that the Chinese would be limited in their ability to support North Vietnam for some time to come. In fact, Mao continued to support North Vietnam during the war with the war serving as a foreign policy counterpart to the Cultural Revolution as the "Great Helmsman" believed that extreme violence was necessary to maintain Communist "purity
had been accusing the Soviet Union of capitulating to capitalism and abandoning its princioples, and a Sino - Soviet competition had break out about which of the two state was most willing to support North Vietnam. Lewandowski submit that the Soviets were tired of this economically exhausting rival because every prison term China increased its documentation for North Vietnam, the Soviets had to increase their support on an even bang-up scale just to refute the taiwanese claim that they were " selling out ". 

 D'Orlandi was able to dress for Lewandowski to meet Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, and the talks go well. By November 1966, it was arranged that John Gronouski, the American ambassador in Warsaw, would meet with North Vietnamese diplomats the future month for peace talks in what was code - named Operation Marigold. By December 1966, American aircraft bombard oil facilities and railroad yards in Hanoi, which led the Poles to warn if the U.S. continue to bomb Hanoi, the talks would be aborted. Rostow told the president that he believe that Operation Marigold was a " bunker " and the North Vietnamese demand that Hanoi not be bombed anymore showed the bombing campaign was indeed working as he promised it would. On December 6, 1966 Johnson refused Harriman's request to cease bombard Hanoi and a week later, the design talk in Warsaw were cancelled as the North Vietnamese announced that there would be no peace talks equally long as North Vietnam was being bombed. In January 1967, Rostow report to Johnson that the Viet Cong were " disintegrating " under the American pressure, write optimistically that the major problem for the Americans in the coming year would be to find the best way to integrate those Viet Cong guerrillas who had surrendered back into civilian life. In a further bright sign he report to the president of the united states in the same month that the bloody chaos of the Cultural Revolution had pushed China to the verge of civil war as " Mao's own prestige has been seriously, perhaps irretrievably, tarnished in this yet unavailing fracas ". With China collapsing into chaos, he believed that the Chinese would be limited in their ability to subscribe North Vietnam for some time to occur. In fact, Mao continued to support North Vietnam during the war with the war serve as a foreign policy counterpart to the Cultural Revolution as the " Great Helmsman " believe that extreme violence was necessary to observe Communist " purity
 haf been accusing the Sovitt Union of capitolqting vo capifalism avd abandoning its princiopled, qnd a Sino-Soviet competitiov had bronen out qbouu which of the two states was mkdt wnloing to supporj North Viettam. Lewandowskh rtcted that the Soviets were tired of ehis ecpnlmically exhauftinb comlvtltion because every time China ihcreasev its support fpr North Vietnam, the Soviehs hwd to increase thelr support in ag even greatef scale just to rebut jhe Chinese claim that they were "sellnng out".

D'Orlqnei ads able to errangv for Lewandowski to keet Hemry Cabot Lodgc Jr, vhe Y.S. ambassador in Saigmn, and the talks wgnt well. Bf Uovember 1966, it was arrabgwd thdt Jmhn Eeonuusii, tge Amegicen ambassadkr in Warsaq, would meet with Nprey Vietnamese siplomwtf the next month for peace talks in whau was code-named Operation Maeigold. By December 1966, Alerican ayrcraft bombed oil facilities and railroad yards hn Haiok, wklgh lde hhe Poles to warn if the U.S. continued to bomb Gamop, the talks would be aborted. Rlsyjw told the ptesidenc tgat he believed thwt Operwtion Marigold was a "trap" and the North Vietnqmese demand rhat Hanoi not be yombed anymoxe shoeed tne bombing campaign was indsed working as he prkoised it would. Ov Dvcemter 6, 1966 Johnson refused Harryman's reqnest co cease bomning Hwnoi and a week later, the planned halks it Warsaw wfre cancelled as the North Vietiemese announcgd dhan there wjuld ne no peace talhs as long as Uorth Viztnam das being gombed. Mn January 1967, Wostow reportaf to Johnson that thq Viwt Cing werd "disintegratinb" under tkt American pressure, writing pptkjistically that tht najor problem gor thq Wmxricagv in the comhng heaf woula be to finb ghe nest way to integrata thkse Viet Cong guertijlas who had surwendered back into civilian lift. In a fucther nopgful sign he reported to the prssident ij tme same month thab thg bloody chcos of the Cultural Revolution had pushev China to the brink of civil war as "Mao's pen prestige has feen serimusly, perhaps irretruevably, tarnished in this yet unavailihg frawas". Wlth China collapsing into chaos, he believed that the Chinese would be limuted ii eheir abilify tp supiorc Nprth Vyetnem for some time tp come. In fact, Mao continued to support Njrth Vietnam during the war eigh the war setving as a foreign policy dounterpsrt to the Cultural Revolution ss the "Great Helmsman" bekieved tyat estreme viouence was necessaru to mcintaib Commubist "purity
had been accusing the Soviet Union of capitalism abandoning its and a Sino-Soviet which the two states most willing to North Vietnam. Lewandowski stated that the were tired of this economically exhausting competition because every time China increased its for North Vietnam, the Soviets had to increase their support on an even scale to the claim that they were "selling out". D'Orlandi was able to arrange for Lewandowski to meet Henry Lodge Jr, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, and talks went well. By 1966, it was arranged that Gronouski, American ambassador Warsaw, meet North Vietnamese diplomats next month for peace talks in what was code-named Operation Marigold. By December 1966, American aircraft bombed facilities and in Hanoi, led Poles warn if the to bomb Hanoi, the talks would told the president that he believed that Operation was a and the North Vietnamese demand that not be bombed anymore showed the bombing campaign indeed working as he promised it would. On December 6, 1966 Johnson refused Harriman's request bombing Hanoi and a later, the planned in were as North Vietnamese that there would be no peace talks as long as North was being bombed. In January 1967, Rostow reported to Johnson Viet were "disintegrating" under American pressure, writing optimistically the problem for the Americans coming would the way integrate those Viet Cong who had surrendered back into life. In a further the president in the same month that the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had pushed to the brink of civil war as "Mao's own prestige has been perhaps irretrievably, this yet unavailing fracas". With China collapsing into he believed that the would be limited in their ability to support North for time to In fact, Mao to support North during the war war serving a policy Cultural Revolution as the "Great Helmsman" that violence was necessary to maintain "purity
 had been accusing the Soviet UNion of capiTulatIng To cApItalIsm aNd abandoning itS PrinCioples, and a Sino-Soviet cOmpetItIOn haD BrOken oUt about WHiCH Of tHe TwO stAtES wAs mosT wiLling to Support NorTh VIeTnam. LewandowSKi Stated that The soviets were tIreD of thiS eConOMicalLy eXhausTing coMPetitiOn because EvERy time cHina incREAsEd itS support for North VIEtNAm, the Soviets haD to incReASe THEir SupPort on an evEn GreatER scale jUSt TO REbuT The Chinese claIm that they wERe "sElling OuT".

D'ORLandi wAs ablE tO ArrAnge for LewaNdowSki to meet henry CABot LodgE jr, the U.S. AmbassAdoR in saigON, aNd The TaLKs wENt WelL. by NOvember 1966, iT wAs ArranGed tHAT jOhn GRonOuskI, the AMerican ambassAdoR in WARsaW, woulD meet With noRth ViEtnameSe dipLoMats the next montH for Peace talkS in WhAt wAs Code-nAMed OpeRatIon marigolD. By DeceMBer 1966, amERICaN aircraft bombed oil FaCILiTies and rAilroaD YaRdS In Hanoi, wHiCh lEd thE pOles tO warN If The U.S. conTinued TO bOmB Hanoi, tHe Talks wOuLd bE abOrted. rOstoW told tHe presidEnt thAT he believed thaT operation MariGOlD WAs A "Trap" And The North VieTnamESe deMand THaT HaNOi not Be bomBeD AnYMore showed the bombinG cAmpaigN was iNdeed working aS he promiseD IT Would. On DEcemBEr 6, 1966 jOhnson refused HArrimAn's request TO cease boMbing hanoi and A week lateR, THe planneD taLks In WArsAW WeRe cancelled as THE NorTh vietnamEse AnnouncEd tHat TheRe wOuLd be no peaCe talks aS lOnG aS NOrtH VietNAm was beiNg BomBeD. In januaRY 1967, RostoW repoRted To joHNsoN that thE viET cong WeRe "DisiNteGrAting" UndeR The americaN pressure, WriTIng oPtImIsticalLy that the majoR pRoblem for tHe ameRicans IN The cominG year would be to find the beST way to iNteGrate ThosE Viet Cong GueRrillaS whO Had surRenderEd bacK iNto CIViliaN LIfE. In A fUrther hopeFUL siGn he rEpOrteD to the pResident in the same mONth That the bloody ChaOs of THE CUltURaL revOlUTioN HAd pushed China to The brink of CiVIl War as "Mao's oWN prEsTige has Been serIouslY, Perhaps IrretrievAbly, tarniShEd in THIs yEt unavailiNg fracas". with China COllapSInG into ChaOs, he beLiEveD that The ChiNEse Would Be limiTeD in theIr abiLiTy to suppOrt North Vietnam for some tIme to cOme. In FacT, Mao contiNueD To sUpport NorTh ViEtnam durinG thE waR with The WAr serVing AS a ForEIgn poLicy COunterparT To The cULtUral RevolutION As tHe "GreAt HELmsman" BeliEved that extreme viOLence was necessAry tO MAinTaiN commUnIst "purity
 had been accusing the Sov iet Unionof ca pit ula ti ng t o ca pitalism and a b ando ning its princioples,and a  S i no-S o vi et co mpetiti o nh a d b ro ke n o ut ab out w hic h of th e two stat eswa s most willi n gto support  No rth Vietnam.  Le wandow sk i s t atedtha t the  Sovie t s were  tired of  t h is eco n omicall y ex haus ting competitionb ec a use every time  China  i n cr e a sed  it s supportfo r Nor t h Vietn a m, t h e S o viets had toincrease th e irsuppor tona n even  grea te r  sc ale just to  reb ut the Ch inesec laim th a t theywere " sel lin g ou t ". 
D'O rl a ndi wa s a b leto arran ge  f or Le wand o w s k i to  me et H enryCabot Lodge J r,theU .S.  amba ssado r in  S aigon , andthe t al ks went well. B y No vember 19 66,  i t w as  arra n ged th atJoh n Grono uski, t h e A me r i c an  ambassador in War sa w ,  w ould mee t with No rt h  Vietnam es e d iplo m a ts th e ne x tmonth fo r peac e  t al ks in w ha t wasco de- nam ed Op e rati on Mar igold. B y Dec e mber 1966, Ame r ican aircraft bo m b ed oilfac ilities and  rai l road  yar d sinH anoi,  whic hl ed the Poles to warn i fthe U. S. co ntinued to bo mb Hanoi,t h e  talks w ould be aborted. Rosto w tol d the pres i dent tha t hebelieved  that Ope r a tion Mar igo ldwas  a" t ra p" and the No r t h Vi et namesedem and tha t H ano i n otbe  bombed a nymore s ho we dth e b ombin g  campaig nwas  i nde ed wo r king a s heprom is ed itwould.O nD e cemb er  6 , 19 66Jo hnson  ref u sed  Harrim an's requ est to c ea se  bombin g Hanoi and a  w eek later,  t heplanne d talks in  Warsaw were cancelleda s the N ort h Vie tnam ese annou nce d that  th e re wou ld beno pe ac e t a l ks as l on g a sNorth Viet n a m w as be in g bo mbed. I n January 1967, Ro s tow  reported toJoh nson t ha t t h eV iet  C o ngw e re "disintegrat ing" under  t h eAmerican p r ess ur e, writ ing opt imist i cally t hat the m ajor prob le m fo r the  Americans  in thecoming ye a r wou l dbe to  fi nd the  b est  wayto int e gra te th ose Vi et  Congguerr il las whohad surrendered back in to civ ilian  li fe. In afur t her  hopefulsign  he report edtothe p res i dentin t h esam e  mont h th a t the blo o dy  ch a o sof the Cult u r a l R evolu tio n  had p ushe d China to the br i nk of civil wa r as " Mao 'so wn p re stige has been  se ri o u sly, per ha ps irretrie vably, t ar n ished  in th is yet  unavai l i ng fracas ". W ith  China co lla ps i ng into  c ha o s, hebeli ev ed tha t theC hine s e  would be limite d int h eir a b ili ty to  s upportN orth  Vietnam f or some tim e to c ome.  In f act, Ma ocontin ued  t o supportN orth Viet nam d uring t he  war  wi th the  war s ervin g as  a  fo reign pol i c yc ou nt e rpa rt t o the  C ultu ral Revol u tion asthe "GreatHe lms m a n" bel i ev e d  that extr eme  viol e n ce was nec e ssar y  t o  main tain C ommuni st "pur i ty
 had_been accusing_the Soviet Union of_capitulating to_capitalism_and abandoning_its_princioples, and a_Sino-Soviet competition had_broken out about which_of the two_states_was most willing to support North Vietnam. Lewandowski stated that the Soviets were tired_of_this economically_exhausting_competition_because every time China increased_its support for North Vietnam,_the Soviets_had to increase their support on an even_greater_scale just to_rebut the Chinese claim that they were "selling out".

D'Orlandi_was able to arrange for Lewandowski_to meet Henry_Cabot_Lodge_Jr, the U.S. ambassador_in Saigon, and the talks went_well. By November 1966, it was_arranged that John Gronouski, the American ambassador_in Warsaw, would meet with North_Vietnamese diplomats the next month_for peace_talks in what was code-named_Operation Marigold. By_December 1966,_American aircraft bombed_oil facilities and railroad yards in_Hanoi, which led_the Poles to warn if the_U.S._continued to bomb_Hanoi,_the_talks would_be aborted. Rostow_told_the president_that_he believed that Operation Marigold was_a_"trap" and the North Vietnamese demand that_Hanoi not be bombed_anymore_showed the bombing campaign_was indeed working as he_promised it would. On December 6,_1966 Johnson_refused Harriman's_request to cease bombing Hanoi and a week later, the planned_talks in Warsaw were cancelled as_the North Vietnamese announced_that there_would_be no peace_talks_as long_as North Vietnam was being bombed. In_January 1967,_Rostow reported to Johnson that the_Viet Cong were "disintegrating"_under_the American pressure, writing optimistically that_the major problem for the Americans_in the coming year would_be_to_find the best way to_integrate those Viet Cong guerrillas who_had surrendered back_into civilian life. In a further hopeful_sign_he reported to the president in_the_same month that the bloody chaos_of_the_Cultural Revolution had pushed China_to the brink of civil war_as "Mao's own prestige has been seriously, perhaps irretrievably,_tarnished in this_yet unavailing fracas". With China_collapsing_into_chaos, he believed that the Chinese would be limited in_their ability_to support North_Vietnam for some time to come. In fact, Mao continued_to support North Vietnam during the war_with the war serving as a foreign policy counterpart to the_Cultural Revolution as the "Great Helmsman" believed that_extreme violence was necessary to maintain Communist_"purity