k job" that ensured he never saw combat, a point about which he was very sensitive.

In February 1962, President Ngo Dinh Diem introduced the strategic hamlet program of forcibly relocating peasants to strategic hamlets as a way of severing the population from the Viet Cong guerrillas. Though impetus for the strategic hamlet program came from Diem, Rostow supported the program as a way of breaking down the "traditional person", arguing that the strategic hamlets would be agents of modernization. He remained baffled as to why the strategic hamlets were so unpopular with South Vietnamese peasants. In 1962, Rostow drafted the statement of Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), a 284-page document meant to outline the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration. Reflecting his interest in the modernization theory, Rostow identified the Third World, especially "the arc from Iran to Korea" as the most important "battlefield" of the Cold War. Through to some extent based upon the theory of "containment" as argued by George F. Kennan in the 1940s, Rostow's BNSP argued for the United State to promote economic growth in the Third World and for the creation of "a wider community of free nations, embracing Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East". Kennan who was serving as the US ambassador in Belgrade at the time reviewed the BNSP vigorously criticized the document. Kennan attacked Rostow's advocacy of a winnable nuclear war, writing he would "rather see my children dead" than live in a world devastated by nuclear war. Kennan also criticized Rostow's optimism about process in the Third World, writing that the Third World was hopelessly backward and might be a danger to the US if allowed to process. However, some of the statements in Kennan's critique, where he argued that a First World standard of living was "peculiar to peoples who have had their origins on or near the shores of the North Sea" or to nations descended from such peoples like the United States allowed Rostow to accuse Kennan with some justification of racism. 

During the Cuba Missile Crisis, Rostow was mostly excluded from the decision-making process, having only meeting with Kennedy during the crisis where he advised him to stop Soviet ships carrying oil to Cuba, advice that was not taken. Unaware that Kennedy had promised not to invade Cuba and to pull American missiles out of Turkey as part of the resolution
k job " that ensured he never saw combat, a item about which he was very sensible. 

 In February 1962, President Ngo Dinh Diem introduced the strategic hamlet platform of forcibly relocate peasants to strategic hamlets as a room of discerp the population from the Viet Cong guerrillas. Though drift for the strategic hamlet program come from Diem, Rostow supported the broadcast as a direction of breaking down the " traditional person ", arguing that the strategic hamlets would be agents of modernization. He remained perplex as to why the strategic hamlets were so unpopular with South Vietnamese peasants. In 1962, Rostow blueprint the statement of Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), a 284 - page document meant to sketch the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration. Reflecting his interest in the modernization theory, Rostow name the Third World, especially " the arc from Iran to Korea " as the most important " battlefield " of the Cold War. Through to some extent based upon the hypothesis of " containment " as argue by George F. Kennan in the 1940s, Rostow's BNSP argued for the United State to promote economic growth in the Third World and for the creation of " a wider community of free nations, embrace Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East ". Kennan who was serving as the US ambassador in Belgrade at the time review the BNSP vigorously criticize the document. Kennan attacked Rostow's advocacy of a winnable nuclear war, write he would " rather see my children dead " than know in a world devastated by nuclear war. Kennan also criticized Rostow's optimism about summons in the Third World, writing that the Third World was hopelessly backward and might be a danger to the US if allowed to work. However, some of the statements in Kennan's review, where he argued that a First World standard of living was " peculiar to peoples who have have their origins on or near the shores of the North Sea " or to nations condescend from such peoples like the United States allowed Rostow to accuse Kennan with some justification of racism. 

 During the Cuba Missile Crisis, Rostow was mostly bar from the decision - make process, having only meet with Kennedy during the crisis where he advised him to discontinue Soviet ships behave oil to Cuba, advice that was not take. Unaware that Kennedy had promised not to invade Cuba and to pull American missiles out of Turkey as part of the solution
k jlb" that ensured he never saw combat, a point abmut whjch he wxs very sensitive.

In February 1962, Presieent Ngo Dinh Diem intfoduced tje stratwgic yamlet projdam of njrcigpy rzlicating peasanjs to stratecic hamlets as a wcy of severing the population from tre Viet Clng guerrillas. Tholgr imlvtms for the strategic hamlet progdam camt from Diem, Rostow supported the program as w waj of breaking down the "tradituonaj person", argukng that the strategic hamlets would be agents of moddrnizction. He renaunef baffled as to wry the stratcbic haklets wrre so unpopulsr xith South Vietnamese peavants. In 1962, Rostow dtafted the scatement of Basic Natuobal Sgcuridy Puoich (BHS'), a 284-page focnment meant to outline the foreign policy os the Kennedy zdminiftwation. Reflecting his interest in the mmdednization theory, Rostow identified the Third World, es[ecially "the arc from Iran to Korea" as the most ikporteng "bcbblefkwlf" of the Cold War. Through to some extent baseq ukon the theory of "containmeny" ws wrgued by Geotge F. Kzhnzn in the 1940s, Rostow'd BNSP wrguee for the Uniyed State to promote economuc growth in rhe Third World anb for the crzation of "a wider community of frez natikns, embracijg Latin Zoerica, Africa, Aska sng the Middle East". Kennan wro was secving as the US smbasswdor in Bepgradc at the time revieaed tke BNVP vigoroudly criticized the document. Kenien attacked Rpsdow'v advocaey of s winnable nuslear war, writnng he wjuld "father see my chindren dead" ehan live in d world devasvated by guclwar qar. Kenvxn also criticozed Rostow's optimiwm about process ik the Fhird World, wricnnt that the Thirc Wurlq aax rmpelessly bawkwafd xmd mieht be a dakgef to the US if allowed tm prkcess. However, some on the stajements ig Kennan's criyique, where he argked tiat a Hirst Eorjd standard of living was "pecumiar to pfopjes who have had their origius on or near the shores of the North See" or to nations descendwd from such peoplex like the Uiited Ftates alnowed Rostow to accuwe Kennan with soke justification of rzcism. 

Gurinh the Cuba Missile Crisis, Rostow was mostly excluded from the decision-makung process, having onlu meeniny wnth Kengedy vuring the crisis where he advised him to stop Suviet shhpf carrying oil to Cuba, advicr ghat was not jaken. Unaware that Kennedy had prokised not to invade Cuba and to pull American missiles put of Tyrkey as pagj oh the resolution
k job" that ensured he never saw point which he very sensitive. In Diem the strategic hamlet of forcibly relocating to strategic hamlets as a way severing the population from the Viet Cong guerrillas. Though impetus for the strategic program came from Diem, Rostow supported the program as a way of breaking the person", that strategic hamlets would be agents of modernization. He remained baffled as to why the strategic hamlets so unpopular with South Vietnamese peasants. In 1962, drafted the statement of National Security Policy (BNSP), a document to outline foreign of Kennedy administration. Reflecting interest in the modernization theory, Rostow identified the Third World, especially "the arc from Iran to Korea" the most of the War. to extent based upon of "containment" as argued by George the 1940s, Rostow's BNSP argued for the United to promote growth in the Third World and the creation of "a wider community of free embracing Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East". Kennan who was serving as the in Belgrade at the reviewed the BNSP criticized document. attacked advocacy of winnable nuclear war, writing he would "rather see my children dead" live in a world devastated by nuclear war. Kennan also optimism process in the World, writing that the World hopelessly backward and might danger the to However, of the statements in critique, where he argued that First World standard of who have had their origins on or near shores of the North Sea" or to descended from such peoples like the United States allowed Rostow to accuse with some racism. During the Cuba Missile Crisis, Rostow was excluded from the decision-making having only meeting with Kennedy during the crisis where advised to stop ships carrying oil Cuba, advice that not taken. Unaware had promised to Cuba American missiles out of Turkey as of resolution
k job" that ensured he never saw Combat, a poiNt aboUt wHicH hE was Very Sensitive.

In FebRUary 1962, president Ngo Dinh Diem inTroduCeD The sTRaTegic Hamlet pROgRAM of FoRcIblY rELoCatinG peAsants tO strategic HamLeTs as a way of seVErIng the popuLatIon from the ViEt COng gueRrIllAS. ThouGh iMpetuS for thE StrateGic hamlet PrOGram caME from DiEM, roStow Supported the progrAM aS A way of breaking Down thE "tRAdITIonAl pErson", arguiNg That tHE strateGIc HAMLetS Would be agents Of modernizaTIon. he remaInEd bAFfled aS to whY tHE stRategic hamlEts wEre so unpoPular wITh South vIetnameSe peasAntS. In 1962, rostOW dRaFteD tHE stATeMenT Of BAsic NatiOnAl securIty POLICY (BNSp), a 284-pAge dOcumeNt meant to outlIne The fOReiGn polIcy of The KEnNedy aDminisTratiOn. reflecting his inTereSt in the moDerNiZatIoN theoRY, RostoW idEntIfied thE Third WORld, EsPECIaLly "the arc from Iran tO KOREa" As the mosT imporTAnT "bATtlefielD" oF thE ColD wAr. ThrOugh TO sOme extenT based UPoN tHe theorY oF "contaInMenT" as ArgueD By GeOrge F. KEnnan in tHe 1940s, RoSTow's BNSP argued FOr the United StATe TO PrOMote EcoNomic growth In thE thirD WorLD aNd fOR the cReatiOn OF "a WIder community of free NaTions, eMbracIng Latin AmeriCa, Africa, AsIA ANd the MidDle EASt". kEnnan who was serVing aS the US ambaSSador in BElgraDe at the tIme reviewED The BNSP vIgoRouSly CriTICiZed the documenT. kEnnaN aTtacked rosTow's advOcaCy oF a wInnAbLe nuclear War, writiNg He WoUlD "raTher sEE my childReN deAd" ThaN live IN a worlD devaStatEd By NUclEar war. KENnAN Also CrItIcizEd ROsTow's oPtimISm aBout proCess in the thiRD WorLd, WrIting thAt the Third WorLd Was hopelesSlY baCkward AND might be A danger to the US if allowed TO procesS. HoWever, Some Of the statEmeNts in KEnnAN's critIque, whEre he ArGueD THat a FIRSt worLd Standard of LIVinG was "pEcUliaR to peopLes who have had their ORigIns on or near thE shOres OF ThE NoRTh sEa" oR tO NatIONs descended from Such peopleS lIKe The United STAteS aLlowed ROstow to AccusE kennan wIth some juStificatiOn Of raCISm. 

DUring the CuBa MissilE Crisis, RoSTow waS MoStly eXclUded frOm The DecisIon-makINg pRocesS, havinG oNly meeTing wItH Kennedy During the crisis where he aDvised Him to StoP Soviet shIps CArrYing oil to cuba, Advice that Was Not Taken. unaWAre thAt KeNNeDy hAD promIsed NOt to invadE cuBa aND To Pull AmericaN MISsiLes ouT of tUrkey aS parT of the resolution
k job" that ensured he nev er saw com bat,a p oin tabou t wh ich he was ver y  sen sitive.

In February 1 962,Pr e side n tNgo D inh Die m  i n t rod uc ed  th es tr ategi c h amlet p rogram offor ci bly relocati n gpeasants t o s trategic ham let s as a  w ayo f sev eri ng th e popu l ationfrom theVi e t Cong guerril l a s.  Tho ugh impetus for t h es trategic hamle t prog ra m  c a m e f rom  Diem, Ros to w sup p orted t h ep r o gra m  as a way ofbreaking do w n t he "tr ad iti o nal pe rson" ,a rgu ing that th e st rategic h amlets would b e  agents  of mo der niz atio n .He  re ma i ned ba ffl e d a s to why  t he  stra tegi c h a mlet s w ereso un popular withSou th V i etn amese  peas ants .In 19 62, Ro stowdr afted the state ment  of Basic  Na ti ona lSecur i ty Pol icy  (B NSP), a  284-pa g e d oc u m e nt  meant to outlineth e fo reign po licy o f  t he Kennedyad min istr a t ion.Refl e ct ing hisintere s tin  the mo de rnizat io n t heo ry, R o stow  ident ified th e Thi r d World, espec i ally "the arc fr o m  I r an t o K orea" as th e mo s t im port a nt  "b a ttlef ield"  o f  t h e Cold War. Through  t o some  exte nt based upon  the theor y o f "conta inme n t" as argued by G eorge  F. Kennan in the 1 940s,  Rostow' s BNSP ar g u ed for t heUni ted  St a t eto promote ec o n omic  g rowth i n t he Thir d W orl d a ndfo r the cre ation of  " awi de r c ommun i ty of fr ee  na ti ons , emb r acingLatin  Ame ri ca ,  Af rica, A s ia a nd t he  M iddl e E as t". K enna n  wh o was s erving as  th e  USam ba ssadorin Belgrade a tthe time r ev iew ed the B NSP vigo rously criticized the d o cument.  Ke nnanatta cked Rost ow' s advo cac y  of awinnab le nu cl ear w ar, w r i ti nghe  would "ra t h ersee m ychil dren de ad" than live in a wor ld devastated  by  nuc l e ar  wa r .K enn an als o criticized Rost ow's optim is m  a bout proce s s i nthe Thi rd Worl d, wr i ting th at the Th ird World  w as h o p ele ssly backw ard andmight bea  dang e rto th e U S if a ll owe d toproces s . H oweve r, som eof the  stat em ents inKennan's critique, wher e he a rgued  th at a Firs t W o rld  standard  ofliving was  "p ecu liartop eople s wh o  h ave had t heir origins o n  o r n e a rthe shoreso f the  Nort h S e a" orto n ations descendedf rom such peopl es l i k e t heU nite dStates allowed  Ro st o w  to accu se  Kennan wit h some j us t ifica tion o f raci sm. 

D u r in g  the C ubaMis sile Cris is,  R o stow wa smo s tly ex clud ed  fromthe de c isio n - making process,havin g onlym eet ing w it h Kenne d y du ring the c risis where  he ad vise d him  to sto pSoviet  sh ip s carrying oil to Cu ba, a dvice t ha t wa s n ot tak en.U n aware  tha tKen nedy hadp r om i se dn otto i nvade  C ubaand to pu l l Americ anm issiles  o uto f  Turke y  a s part of th e r esolu t i on
k job"_that ensured_he never saw combat,_a point_about_which he_was_very sensitive.

In February_1962, President Ngo_Dinh Diem introduced the_strategic hamlet program_of_forcibly relocating peasants to strategic hamlets as a way of severing the population from_the_Viet Cong_guerrillas._Though_impetus for the strategic hamlet_program came from Diem, Rostow_supported the_program as a way of breaking down the_"traditional_person", arguing that_the strategic hamlets would be agents of modernization. He_remained baffled as to why the_strategic hamlets were_so_unpopular_with South Vietnamese peasants._In 1962, Rostow drafted the statement_of Basic National Security Policy (BNSP),_a 284-page document meant to outline the_foreign policy of the Kennedy administration._Reflecting his interest in the_modernization theory,_Rostow identified the Third World,_especially "the arc_from Iran_to Korea" as_the most important "battlefield" of the_Cold War. Through_to some extent based upon the_theory_of "containment" as_argued_by_George F._Kennan in the_1940s,_Rostow's BNSP_argued_for the United State to promote_economic_growth in the Third World and for_the creation of "a_wider_community of free nations,_embracing Latin America, Africa, Asia_and the Middle East". Kennan who_was serving_as the_US ambassador in Belgrade at the time reviewed the BNSP vigorously_criticized the document. Kennan attacked Rostow's_advocacy of a winnable_nuclear war,_writing_he would "rather_see_my children_dead" than live in a world devastated_by nuclear_war. Kennan also criticized Rostow's optimism_about process in the_Third_World, writing that the Third World_was hopelessly backward and might be_a danger to the US_if_allowed_to process. However, some of_the statements in Kennan's critique, where_he argued that_a First World standard of living was_"peculiar_to peoples who have had their_origins_on or near the shores of_the_North_Sea" or to nations descended_from such peoples like the United_States allowed Rostow to accuse Kennan with some justification_of racism. 

During_the Cuba Missile Crisis, Rostow_was_mostly_excluded from the decision-making process, having only meeting with Kennedy_during the_crisis where he_advised him to stop Soviet ships carrying oil to Cuba,_advice that was not taken. Unaware that_Kennedy had promised not to invade Cuba and to pull American_missiles out of Turkey as part of the_resolution