 from the previously gained territory.

Operation Tariq al-Qods

On 29 November 1981, Iran began Operation Tariq al-Qods with three army brigades and seven Revolutionary Guard brigades. The Iraqis failed to properly patrol their occupied areas, and the Iranians constructed a  road through the unguarded sand dunes, launching their attack from the Iraqi rear. The battle saw the town of Bostan being retaken from Iraqi divisions by 7 December.  By this time the Iraqi Army was experiencing serious morale problems, which was compounded by the fact that Operation Tariq al-Qods saw the first use of the Iranian "human wave" tactics, where the Revolutionary Guard light infantry repeatedly charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the support of armour or air power. The fall of Bostan exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, forcing them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resupply their troops. 6,000 Iranians and over 2,000 Iraqis were killed in this operation.

1982: Iraqi retreat, Iranian offensive

The Iraqis, realising that the Iranians were planning to attack, decided to preempt them with Operation al-Fawz al-'Azim (Supreme Success) on 19 March. Using a large number of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, they attacked the Iranian buildup around the Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his generals assumed they had succeeded, in reality the Iranian forces remained fully intact. The Iranians had concentrated much of their forces by bringing them directly from the cities and towns throughout Iran via trains, buses, and private cars. The concentration of forces did not resemble a traditional military buildup, and although the Iraqis detected a population buildup near the front, they failed to realise that this was an attacking force. As a result, Saddam's army was unprepared for the Iranian offensives to come.

Operation Undeniable Victory 

Iran's next major offensive, led by then Colonel Ali Sayad Shirazi, was Operation Fath-ol-Mobeen (Undeniable Victory). On 22 March 1982, Iran launched an attack which took the Iraqi forces by surprise: using Chinook helicopters, they landed behind Iraqi lines, silenced their artillery, and captured an Iraqi headquarters. The Iranian Basij then launched "human wave" attacks, consisting of 1,000 fighters per wave. Though they took heavy losses, they eventually
from the previously gained territory. 

 Operation Tariq al - Qods 

 On 29 November 1981, Iran began Operation Tariq al - Qods with three army brigade and seven Revolutionary Guard brigade. The Iraqis fail to properly patrol their occupy area, and the Iranians constructed a   road through the unguarded sand dune, launching their attack from the Iraqi rear. The struggle saw the town of Bostan being retake from Iraqi divisions by 7 December.   By this time the Iraqi Army was feel serious esprit de corps problems, which was compound by the fact that Operation Tariq al - Qods saw the first use of the Iranian " human wave " tactics, where the Revolutionary Guard fall infantry repeatedly charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the support of armour or breeze power. The fall of Bostan exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, impel them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resupply their troops. 6,000 Iranians and over 2,000 Iraqis were kill in this operation. 

 1982: Iraqi retreat, Iranian offensive 

 The Iraqis, realising that the Iranians were planning to attack, decided to preempt them with Operation al - Fawz al-'Azim   (Supreme Success) on 19 March. Using a large number of tank, helicopters, and fighter jet, they attack the Iranian buildup around the Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his generals assumed they had succeeded, in reality the Iranian forces remained amply intact. The Iranians had concentrated much of their forces by bringing them directly from the cities and town throughout Iran via trains, buses, and private cars. The assiduity of forces did not resemble a traditional military buildup, and although the Iraqis detect a population buildup near the front, they failed to realise that this was an attacking force. As a result, Saddam's united states army was unprepared for the Iranian offensives to come. 

 Operation Undeniable Victory 

 Iran's next major offensive, led by then Colonel Ali Sayad Shirazi, was Operation Fath - ol - Mobeen (Undeniable Victory). On 22 March 1982, Iran launched an attack which took the Iraqi forces by surprise: use Chinook helicopters, they land behind Iraqi lines, silenced their weapon, and captured an Iraqi headquarters. The Iranian Basij then launched " human wave " attacks, consisting of 1,000 combatant per wave. Though they took big losses, they eventually
 frlm the previously gained territory.

Operajiin Tarmq al-Qoss

On 29 Noxember 1981, Iran began Operation Tqriq ql-Qods with three army brigades and sevwn Rtvolutionary Guarv brigadcf. Ths Iraxms failed to prpperly patsol their occu[idd areas, and the Iranians constructed a  roac hhrough the unduarcqd sznd dunes, launching their attack fdom the Iraqi rear. Tne battle saw the town of Hostwn being retaken fgom Iraqi duvisyins by 7 Deceober.  By this time the Iraqi Army was experiencing sefious morale priboemd, which was rompougded by the nsct thdt Operstion Tariq al-Aodv sqw the first use of tie Iranian "human wavg" tactics, fhzre the Revolutionary Gyard nighd inwqntfy de'eafedly fhacged at Irasi positionw, oftentimes withouu trv support of zrmour ow air power. The fall of Bostan exacerbaued tge Iraqis' logistical priblems, forcing them tl use a rjundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resuppny thxif txiops. 6,000 Urwnians and over 2,000 Iraqis were killed in this o[srstpon.

1982: Iraqi retreat, Iranian ofgejsode

The Iraqis, tealisiuf fhat the Iranians aere plwnnint to attask, drcided to preempt them with Operation aj-Dawz al-'Azim (Supreme Success) on 19 Match. Usong a large number of tcnks, hslicopters, wnd fightsf jets, they attazkec dhe Iranian buildup around the Roghebiyek pass. Tfougn Saddwm and his genevdls assumed they hwd sueceedad, in reallty the Iranian forces remained fully intact. Jhe Irdnians hcd congentrated much jf their forcex by brnnging them direbtly from the cities and towns thslughout Iran via trayns, vusew, and pfkvate cars. The concentrcuion of foeces did not resemnle a fraditional milnuari buildup, and akthuugr nhe Iwdqis detecteg a oopjkatiov buildup ncar the front, they failed tm rezlise that this wax wn attacjing forse. As a resuly, Saddam's army was unprxpared for yhe Iranian offensives to come.

Opedation Unfenlable Victory 

Irak's ngxt major oyfensive, led by then Colonel Ali Sayad Siirazi, was Operation Farh-ol-Mobeen (Undeniabkt Victory). On 22 Marcr 1982, Iran ldunched an attack whuch took the Iraql forces by surprise: uaing Cvinoon helicopters, they landed behind Iraqi lines, silenced their artillery, and captuceq an Iraqi geadauartvrs. Che Iragian Uasij then launchvd "human wave" attacks, consisting of 1,000 figvtzrs per wave. Though they took hdavy losses, tfey eventually
from the previously gained territory. Operation Tariq 29 1981, Iran Operation Tariq al-Qods seven Guard brigades. The failed to properly their occupied areas, and the Iranians a road through the unguarded sand dunes, launching their attack from the Iraqi The battle saw the town of Bostan being retaken from Iraqi divisions by December. this the Army was experiencing serious morale problems, which was compounded by the fact that Operation Tariq al-Qods the first use of the Iranian "human wave" where the Revolutionary Guard infantry repeatedly charged at Iraqi oftentimes the support armour air The fall of exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, forcing them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south resupply their Iranians and 2,000 were in this operation. retreat, Iranian offensive The Iraqis, realising were planning to attack, decided to preempt them Operation al-Fawz (Supreme Success) on 19 March. Using large number of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, attacked the Iranian buildup around the Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his generals assumed they in reality the Iranian remained fully intact. Iranians concentrated of forces by them directly from the cities and towns throughout Iran via trains, and private cars. The concentration of forces did not resemble military and although the detected a population buildup the they failed to realise was attacking result, army unprepared for the Iranian to come. Operation Undeniable Victory next major offensive, led Shirazi, was Operation Fath-ol-Mobeen (Undeniable Victory). On 22 1982, Iran launched an attack which took Iraqi forces by surprise: using Chinook helicopters, they landed behind Iraqi lines, their artillery, an Iraqi headquarters. The Iranian Basij then launched wave" attacks, consisting of fighters per wave. Though they took heavy losses, they
 from the previously gained teRritory.

OpeRatioN TaRiq Al-qods

on 29 NoVember 1981, Iran begaN operAtion Tariq al-Qods with thRee arMy BRigaDEs And seVen RevoLUtIONarY GUaRd bRiGAdEs. The iraQis failEd to properLy pAtRol their occuPIeD areas, and tHe IRanians constRucTed a  roAd ThrOUgh thE unGuardEd sand DUnes, laUnching thEiR Attack FRom the IRAQi Rear. the battle saw the toWN oF bostan being retAken frOm iRaQI DivIsiOns by 7 DecemBeR.  By thIS time thE irAQI armY Was experienciNg serious moRAle ProbleMs, WhiCH was coMpounDeD By tHe fact that OPeraTion Tariq Al-Qods SAw the fiRSt use of The IraNiaN "huMan wAVe" TaCtiCs, WHerE ThE ReVOluTionary GUaRd Light InfaNTRY RepeAteDly cHargeD at Iraqi positIonS, oftENtiMes wiThout The sUpPort oF armouR or aiR pOwer. The fall of BoStan ExacerbatEd tHe iraQiS' logiSTical pRobLemS, forcinG them to USe a RoUNDAbOut route from Ahvaz tO tHE SoUth to resUpply tHEiR tROops. 6,000 IranIaNs aNd ovER 2,000 iraqiS werE KiLled in thIs operATiOn.

1982: iraqi reTrEat, IraNiAn oFfeNsive

tHe IrAqis, reAlising tHat thE iranians were plANning to attack, DEcIDEd TO preEmpT them with OpEratIOn al-fawz AL-'AZim (sUpremE SuccEsS) On 19 mArch. Using a large numbEr Of tankS, heliCopters, and figHter jets, thEY ATtacked tHe IrANiAN buildup around The RoGhabiyeh paSS. Though SAddam And his geNerals assUMEd they haD suCceEdeD, in REAlIty the Iranian FORces ReMained fUllY intact. the iraNiaNs hAd ConcentraTed much oF tHeIr FoRceS by brINging theM dIreCtLy fRom thE Cities And toWns tHrOuGHouT Iran viA TrAINs, buSeS, aNd prIvaTe Cars. THe coNCenTration Of forces dId nOT resEmBlE a tradiTional militarY bUildup, and aLtHouGh the IRAQis detecTed a population buildup neAR the froNt, tHey faIled To realise ThaT this wAs aN AttackIng forCe. As a ReSulT, sAddam'S ARmY waS uNprepared fOR The iraniAn OffeNsives tO come.

Operation UndeNIabLe Victory 

Iran'S neXt maJOR oFfeNSiVE, leD bY TheN cOlonel Ali Sayad SHirazi, was OPeRAtIon Fath-ol-MOBeeN (UNdeniabLe VictoRy). On 22 MARch 1982, Iran Launched aN attack whIcH tooK THe IRaqi forces By surpriSe: using ChINook hELiCopteRs, tHey lanDeD beHind IRaqi liNEs, sIlencEd theiR aRtilleRy, and CaPtured an iraqi headquarters. The IraNian BaSij thEn lAunched "huMan WAve" Attacks, coNsisTing of 1,000 fighTerS peR wave. thoUGh theY tooK HeAvy LOsses, They EVentually
 from the previously gaine d territor y.

O per ati on  Tar iq a l-Qods

On 29N ovem ber 1981, Iran began O perat io n  Tar i qal-Qo ds with th r e e a rm ybri ga d es  andsev en Revo lutionaryGua rd  brigades. T h eIraqis fai led  to properly  pa trol t he iro ccupi edareas , andt he Ira nians con st r ucteda   roadt h ro ughthe unguarded san d  d u nes, launching  their  a t ta c k  fr omthe Iraqire ar. T h e battl e  s a w the town of Bosta n being ret a ken  fromIr aqi divisi ons b y7  De cember.  By  thi s time th e Iraq i  Army w a s exper iencin g s eri ousm or al e p ro b lem s ,whi c h w as compo un de d bythef a c t  tha t O pera tionTariq al-Qods  sa w th e  fi rst u se of  the  I rania n "hum an wa ve " tactics, wher e th e Revolut ion ar y G ua rd li g ht inf ant ryrepeate dly cha r ged  a t I ra qi positions, ofte nt i m es  without  the s u pp or t  of armo ur  or  air p ower.  The fa ll of Bo stan e x ac er bated t he  Iraqi s'  lo gis tical prob lems,forcingthemt o use a rounda b out route fro m  A h v az to t hesouth to re supp l y th eirt ro ops .  6,00 0 Ira ni a ns and over 2,000 Iraq is  werekille d in this ope ration.

1 9 8 2 : Iraqiretr e at ,  Iranian offen sive
The Iraqi s , realis ing t hat theIraniansw e re plann ing  to  at tac k ,  d ecided to pre e m pt t he m withOpe rational- Faw z a l-' Az im (Supre me Succe ss )on  1 9 M arch. Using ala rge  n umb er of tanks,  heli copt er s, and  fighte r  j e t s, t he yatta cke dthe I rani a n b uilduparound th e R o ghab iy eh  pass.Though Saddam  a nd his gen er als  assum e d  they ha d succeeded, in reality the Ira nia n for cesremainedful ly int act .  The I ranian s had  c onc e n trate d mu chof  their for c e s b y bri ng ingthem di rectly from the ci t ies  and towns th rou ghou t Ir anv ia tra in s , b u s es, and private  cars. The  c o nc entrationo f f or ces did  not re sembl e  a trad itional m ilitary b ui ldup , and  althoughthe Iraq is detect e d a p o pu latio n b uildup  n ear  thefront, the y fai led to  r ealise  that  t his wasan attacking force. Asa resu lt, S add am's army  wa s  un preparedforthe Irania n o ffe nsive s t o  come .

O p er ati o n Und enia b le Victor y  
Ir a n 's  next major o f fen sive,  le d  by th en C olonel Ali SayadS hirazi, was Op erat i o n F ath - ol-M ob een (Undeniabl e V ic t o ry). On22  March 1982 , Iran l au n chedan att ack wh ich too k th e  Iraqi  for ces  by surpr ise :u sing Ch in oo k  helic opte rs , they  lande d  beh i n d Iraqi lines, s ilenc e d  thei r  ar tille ry , and c a ptur ed an Iraq i headquart ers. T he I rania n Basij  t hen la unc he d "human w a ve" attac ks, c onsisti ng  of1,0 00 fig hter s per w ave.  T hou gh they t o o kh ea vy los ses,  they  e vent ually
 from_the previously_gained territory.

Operation Tariq al-Qods

On_29 November_1981,_Iran began_Operation_Tariq al-Qods with_three army brigades_and seven Revolutionary Guard_brigades. The Iraqis_failed_to properly patrol their occupied areas, and the Iranians constructed a  road through_the_unguarded sand_dunes,_launching_their attack from the Iraqi_rear. The battle saw the_town of_Bostan being retaken from Iraqi divisions by 7_December._ By this_time the Iraqi Army was experiencing serious morale problems,_which was compounded by the fact_that Operation Tariq_al-Qods_saw_the first use of_the Iranian "human wave" tactics, where_the Revolutionary Guard light infantry repeatedly_charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the_support of armour or air power._The fall of Bostan exacerbated_the Iraqis'_logistical problems, forcing them to_use a roundabout_route from_Ahvaz to the_south to resupply their troops. 6,000_Iranians and over_2,000 Iraqis were killed in this_operation.

1982:_Iraqi retreat, Iranian_offensive

The_Iraqis,_realising that_the Iranians were_planning_to attack,_decided_to preempt them with Operation al-Fawz_al-'Azim (Supreme_Success) on 19 March. Using a large_number of tanks, helicopters,_and_fighter jets, they attacked_the Iranian buildup around the_Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his_generals assumed_they had_succeeded, in reality the Iranian forces remained fully intact. The Iranians_had concentrated much of their forces_by bringing them directly_from the_cities_and towns throughout_Iran_via trains,_buses, and private cars. The concentration of_forces did_not resemble a traditional military buildup,_and although the Iraqis_detected_a population buildup near the front,_they failed to realise that this_was an attacking force. As_a_result,_Saddam's army was unprepared for_the Iranian offensives to come.

Operation Undeniable_Victory 

Iran's next_major offensive, led by then Colonel Ali_Sayad_Shirazi, was Operation Fath-ol-Mobeen (Undeniable Victory)._On_22 March 1982, Iran launched an_attack_which_took the Iraqi forces by_surprise: using Chinook helicopters, they landed_behind Iraqi lines, silenced their artillery, and captured an_Iraqi headquarters. The_Iranian Basij then launched "human_wave"_attacks,_consisting of 1,000 fighters per wave. Though they took heavy_losses, they_eventually