Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated
  punishment and within-group enforcement   Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert
freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public
cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated
punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a
coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite
well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group
enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However,
although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective
action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative
behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate
group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and
within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus
clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human
societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that
facilitate prosocial collective action.

18
The categories of this paper are: econ
14
The categories of this paper are: math-ph
34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
16
The categories of this paper are: stat
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
20
The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
35
The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
2
The categories of this paper are: math
13
The categories of this paper are: quant-ph
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg
23
The categories of this paper are: solv-int
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg