Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Does randomization matter in dynamic games?   This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect
information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher
payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper
shows that every two-player dynamic zero-sum game with nature has the no-mixing
property, which implies that mixed strategy is useless in this most classical
class of games. As for applications, we show the existence of pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibria in two-player zero-sum games with nature. Based on
the main result, we also prove the existence of a universal subgame-perfect
equilibrium that can induce all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in
such games. A generalization of the main result for multiple players and some
further results are also discussed.

0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg
33
The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
23
The categories of this paper are: solv-int
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
14
The categories of this paper are: math-ph
7
The categories of this paper are: hep-th
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
22
The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con