Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions   The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a
single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction
achieves a higher revenue than the optimal auction's revenue on the original
set of bidders, when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. We
give a version of Bulow and Klemperer's result in settings where bidders'
values are drawn from non-i.i.d. irregular distributions. We do this by
modeling irregular distributions as some convex combination of regular
distributions. The regular distributions that constitute the irregular
distribution correspond to different population groups in the bidder
population. Drawing a bidder from this collection of population groups is
equivalent to drawing from some convex combination of these regular
distributions. We show that recruiting one extra bidder from each underlying
population group and running the Vickrey auction gives at least half of the
optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders.

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The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nlin