Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Last Round Convergence and No-Instant Regret in Repeated Games with
  Asymmetric Information   This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information
about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated
two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix
A of the game. Suppose that while repeatedly playing this game, the row player
chooses her strategy at each round by using a no-regret algorithm to minimize
her (pseudo) regret. We develop a no-instant-regret algorithm for the column
player to exhibit last round convergence to a minimax equilibrium. We show that
our algorithm is efficient against a large set of popular no-regret algorithms
of the row player, including the multiplicative weight update algorithm, the
online mirror descent method/follow-the-regularized-leader, the linear
multiplicative weight update algorithm, and the optimistic multiplicative
weight update.

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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
9
The categories of this paper are: nlin
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: econ
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
33
The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: eess
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con