Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions   We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the
first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding
space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs
about the value distributions of the other bidders, computing an
$\varepsilon$-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an
exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete.

23
The categories of this paper are: solv-int
4
The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
33
The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
14
The categories of this paper are: math-ph
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg