Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future

The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment. Air Force readiness has steadily declined primarily due to the persistent demand on a fleet that has aged and decreased in size since the 1990s. The Air Force is working to both rebuild the readiness of its forces and modernize its aging fleet to meet future threats. However, according to the Air Force, its readiness goals will take years to achieve as it continues to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands.

This statement provides information on Air Force (1) readiness and management challenges including personnel, equipment, training, and organization and utilization, and (2) plans to grow and modernize its force in the context of readiness recovery across DOD. Also, GAO summarizes recommendations to address these challenges and actions taken by the Air Force.

This statement is based on previously published work since 2016 related to Air Force readiness challenges, fighter pilot workforce requirements, weapon sustainment, aviation training, and force structure.

GAO's prior work has highlighted that the Air Force faces management and readiness challenges in four interrelated areas:

Personnel: The Air Force has reported that pilot and aircraft maintainer shortfalls are a key challenge to rebuilding readiness. GAO found in April 2018 that the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for 11 of 12 years, from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. Even as unmanned aerial systems had become more prevalent and fighter pilot workloads had increased, the Air Force had not reevaluated fighter squadron requirements. GAO recommended that the Air Force reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements to ensure it has the pilots necessary for all missions.

Equipment: Air Force aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support. GAO reported in September 2018 that, from fiscal year 2011 through 2016, the Air Force generally did not meet availability goals for key aircraft. Further, in October 2017 GAO found F-35 availability was below service expectations and sustainment plans did not include key requirements. GAO recommended that DOD revise F-35 sustainment plans to include requirements and decision points needed to implement the F-35 sustainment strategy.

Training: The Air Force has identified the need to ensure its forces can successfully achieve missions to address a broad range of current and emerging threats. However, GAO reported in September 2016 that Air Force combat fighter squadrons did not complete annual training requirements due to aircraft availability and training range limitations, and had used the same underlying assumptions for its annual training requirements from 2012 to 2016. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its annual training requirements to ensure its forces can accomplish a full range of missions.

Organization and Utilization: Air Force management of its force structure can also exacerbate readiness challenges. GAO found in July 2018 that the Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet had not maximized aircraft availability, and that its utilization of F-22s reduced opportunities for pilots to train for missions in high-threat environments. GAO found that unless the Air Force assesses the organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training rates that are below what they could be. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to reduce risk to future operations.

Looking to the future, the Air Force will have to balance the rebuilding of its existing force with its desire to grow and modernize. To meet current and future demands, the Air Force has stated that it needs to have more squadrons. However, the costs of such growth are as yet unknown, and will have to compete with other military services looking to increase their force structure and recapitalize their forces. Even with growth, the Air Force would be dependent on the force of today for decades to come and will need to stay focused on rebuilding the readiness of existing forces. Addressing GAO's recommendations are necessary steps to meet current and future needs and can assist the Air Force moving forward.

GAO has made 14 recommendations in prior unclassified work described in this statement. DOD generally concurred with most of them and has implemented 1. Continued attention to these recommendations can assist and guide the Air Force moving forward as it seeks to rebuild the readiness of its forces.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues related  to Air Force readiness.

In June 2017, we issued a report highlighting five key mission challenges  facing the Department of Defense (DOD). In that report, we noted that  the United States faces an extremely challenging national security  environment at the same time it is grappling with addressing an  unsustainable fiscal situation in which DOD accounts for approximately  half of the federal government’s discretionary spending. Within this  environment, DOD is working to both rebuild the readiness of its current  forces and modernize to meet future threats. Since we issued that report,  the Department released a new National Defense Strategy in January  2018 that prioritizes the long-term challenges posed by highly capable  adversaries and emphasizes the need to rebuild readiness. Additionally,  Congress has passed appropriations to fund DOD’s effort to restore  military readiness.

This statement provides information on Air Force (1) readiness and  management challenges in four interrelated areas of personnel,  equipment, training, and organization and utilization, and (2) plans to  grow and modernize its force in the context of rebuilding readiness across  DOD. We also summarize our recommendations to address these Air  Force challenges and their actions taken.

This statement is based on our body of work issued from 2016 to 2018  examining Air Force readiness challenges, fighter pilot workforce  requirements, weapon system sustainment, aviation training, and force  structure. To perform our prior work, we analyzed Air Force readiness,  personnel, maintenance, and training data, and interviewed cognizant Air  Force officials involved in operations. The reports cited throughout this  statement contain more details on the scope of the work and the  methodology used to carry it out. We have also issued several classified  reports since 2016 examining these issues and made recommendations  to the Air Force; however this statement does not include that work.

We conducted the work on which this testimony is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget  uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded military  readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding the  readiness of the military forces a priority. The 2018 National Defense  Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the  entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security  environment. Nevertheless, DOD reported readiness of the total military  force remains low and has remained so since 2013. Our work has shown  that Air Force readiness, in particular, has steadily declined due to a  persistent demand for forces, a decline in equipment availability and  experienced maintenance personnel, the effect of high deployment rates  on units’ ability to conduct needed training, and a smaller inventory of  aircraft. DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan  to rebuild readiness of the military force. In August 2018, we reported  that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness  Recovery Framework that the Department is using to guide the military  services’ efforts and plans to regularly assess, validate, and monitor  readiness recovery. According to officials, the Office of the Secretary of  Defense and the military services are currently revising readiness goals  and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align  with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning  Guidance. However, additional work remains to ensure that the actions  DOD is taking will ultimately achieve overall readiness goals.

DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context  that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how  best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future  challenges. An important aspect of this, across all of the military services,  is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and  upgrading legacy weapon system platforms currently in operational use  and procuring platforms able to overcome rapidly advancing future  threats. Air Force leaders have stated that striking such a balance is  exceptionally difficult. While each of the military services, including the Air  Force, must grapple with these choices, senior leaders have called for  immediate readiness rebuilding with particular focus on aviation. In a  memorandum on September 17, 2018, the Secretary of Defense noted  that DOD faces shortfalls in aviation squadrons across the force with the  aviation inventory and supporting infrastructure suffering from systemic  underperformance and unrealized capacity. In order to focus on meeting  DOD’s most critical priorities first, the Secretary of Defense emphasized  the need to rebuild readiness. As such, the Secretary directed the Air  Force to achieve a minimum of 80 percent mission capable rates for fiscal  year 2019 for the F-35, F-22, and F-16, while simultaneously reducing  these platforms’ operating and maintenance costs every year starting in  fiscal year 2019.

Air Force Faces Several Interrelated Management and Readiness Challenges

Our prior work has identified management and readiness challenges in  four interrelated areas—personnel, equipment, training, and organization  and utilization, and we have made recommendations to help the Air Force  address rebuilding the readiness of its existing fleet.

Personnel: Pilot and Aircraft Maintainer Shortfalls Have Impeded Readiness Recovery

The Air Force has reported that manpower shortfalls, particularly among  skilled pilots and maintainers, are a primary challenge to rebuilding  readiness. As we have previously reported, developing fighter pilots  requires a significant investment of time and funding. According to Air  Force officials, a fighter pilot requires approximately 5 years of training to  be qualified to lead flights, at a cost of between about $3 million to $11  million depending on the specific type of aircraft. In April 2018, we  reported that according to Air Force pilot staffing level and authorizations  data for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Air Force had fewer fighter  pilots than authorizations for 11 of those 12 years (see fig. 1). This gap  grew from 192 fighter pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year  2006, to 1,005 (27 percent) in fiscal year 2017. According to briefing  documents prepared by the Air Force, this gap was concentrated among  fighter pilots with fewer than 8 years of experience. The Air Force  forecasted that the fighter pilot gap will persist over time, even as the Air  Force takes steps to train more fighter pilots and improve retention.

Air Force officials identified multiple factors that led to low numbers of  fighter pilots. For example, the military services trained fewer fighter pilots  than targeted over the last decade. In fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the  Air Force trained 12 percent fewer new fighter pilots than the targeted  amount. In our April 2018 report, we found that the military services had  not reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot  workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems. Fighter pilots  and squadron leaders from each of the military services we interviewed at  the time consistently told us that the fighter pilot occupation has  significantly changed in recent years due to changes in fighter aircraft  tactics and technology, additional training requirements, and the removal  of administrative support positions from squadrons. Without updating  squadron requirements to reflect this growing administrative burden on  fighter pilots, the currently identified differences between fighter pilot  numbers and authorizations may be understated. By contrast, without  updating future fighter pilot requirements to take into account changing  roles and missions—in particular the increasing role of unmanned aerial  systems in combat operations—forecasted fighter pilot gaps may be  overstated. In short, we concluded that reevaluating fighter pilot  requirements is a key first step to help the military services, including the  Air Force, clearly determine the magnitude of the gaps and target  strategies to meet their personnel needs. In our April 2018 report, we  recommended that the Air Force reevaluate fighter pilot squadron  requirements to ensure it has the pilots necessary for all missions. DOD  concurred with this recommendation.

The Air Force is also trying to manage a shortage of aircraft maintainer  personnel—both uniformed personnel and depot civilians. In September  2018, we found that the Air Force reported losing experienced  maintainers, either to retirement or to other programs such as the F-35  Lightning II (F-35). For example, we reported that the Air Force’s C-17,  which is a long-range, heavy logistics transport aircraft, requires depot  modifications to keep it viable, but there was a shortage of depot  maintainer personnel due to attrition, inability to retain skilled workers,  and hiring freezes. The Air Force has several initiatives underway,  including hiring additional maintainer personnel and temporarily  transitioning active-duty maintenance units from some legacy aircraft. As  of August 2018, the Air Force had requested an increased end strength of  8,000 personnel to fill critical personnel needs in maintenance and pilots.  Officials stated that progress was being made in increasing end strength  and hiring additional personnel, which should address these challenges.  However, according to Air Force officials, it may take several years before  newly hired maintainer personnel will have the training and experience  they need to improve aircraft availability rates. We have work underway to  examine the Air Force’s management of its aircraft maintainer workforce  and DOD depot skill gaps and plan to report on these issues over the  next 6 months.

Equipment: Aircraft Availability Has Been Limited by Aging Aircraft, Costly Maintenance, and Diminished Supply Support

Air Force aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated  with aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support. According to the Air  Force, the average age of the fleet is 28 years. The average ages of the  B-52 strategic bomber and the KC-135 tanker each exceed 50 years, and  the Air Force expects to continue to use these aircraft for decades. The  Air Force spends billions of dollars each year to sustain its fixed-wing  aircraft fleet—comprised of both legacy and new aircraft—which needs  expensive logistics support, including maintenance and repair, to meet its  availability goals. We reported in September 2018 that from fiscal year  2011 through 2016, the Air Force generally did not meet aircraft  availability goals while it continued to accrue increased maintenance  costs. Figure 2 summarizes the sustainment challenges we reported  that face selected Air Force aircraft.

Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but  represent an enduring challenge for the Air Force. The F-35—which is  intended to replace a variety of legacy fighter aircraft in the Air Force and  more broadly represents the future of tactical aviation for DOD—has  projected sustainment costs of over $1 trillion over a 60-year life cycle.  In October 2017, we reported that DOD’s projected operating and support  costs estimate for the F-35 rose by 24 percent from fiscal year 2012 to  fiscal year 2016 and are not fully transparent to the military services.

In October 2017, we also reported that the F-35 fleet faced sustainment  challenges that pose risks to its ability to meet current and future  warfighter readiness requirements. The Air Force planned to procure  more than 1,700 F-35 aircraft and, as the largest participant in the F-35  program, its readiness could be disproportionately affected by the  sustainment challenges facing this program. In particular, DOD’s  capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind  schedule, which resulted in average part repair times of 172 days—twice  that of the program’s objective. These repair backlogs have contributed to  significant F-35 spare parts shortages—from January to August 7, 2017,  F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts  shortages. As a result, the Air Force had generally not met its aircraft  availability goals for its fielded F-35 aircraft (See fig. 3 for Air Force  personnel performing maintenance on the F-35).

Our work has shown that these challenges are largely the result of  sustainment plans that do not fully include key requirements or timely and  sufficient funding. In our October 2017 report, we recommended, among  other things, that DOD revise sustainment plans to ensure that they  include the key requirements and decision points needed to fully  implement the F-35 sustainment strategy and align funding plans to meet  those requirements. DOD concurred with this recommendation and DOD  officials report that they are focusing actions and resources toward  achieving key production, development and sustainment objectives by  2025. In addition, the conference report accompanying a bill for fiscal  year 2019 defense appropriations directed a higher appropriation amount  for the Air Force’s aircraft procurement than DOD requested in its  budget. This appropriation may create more demand on the already  strained sustainment enterprise for which DOD has not always provided  timely funding (for example, funding for spare parts).

Training: Units Are Challenged To Achieve Full Spectrum Readiness

The Air Force has identified the need to ensure a full-spectrum capable  force that can successfully perform missions addressing a broad range of  current and emerging threats; however, the Air Force has had difficulty  training for full spectrum readiness. For more than a decade, the Air  Force focused its training on supporting operations in the Middle East,  including Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders established training  requirements that they deemed necessary to prepare aircrews to conduct  missions in these locations—such as close air support-to-ground forces— limiting training for other missions. In September 2016, based on our  analysis of data on the completion of annual training, we found that  combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission  training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, but were  unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of  missions. Wing and squadron commanders we interviewed at the time  cited several common limitations related to the challenges discussed in  this testimony that affected the ability of their squadrons to complete  training across the full range of missions including the maintenance unit’s  ability to provide adequate numbers of aircraft for training, adversary air  tasking, and manpower shortfalls in the squadrons.

We also reported in September 2016 that F-22 and F-35 squadrons faced  training range limitations. F-22 squadron commanders told us that the  airspace available limits their ability to train for their more complex  missions, including offensive counter air and defensive counter air  missions. Additionally, the commanders we interviewed at the time for  squadrons flying F-22 and F-35 aircraft told us that limits in training range  capabilities, such as threat replicators and targets, affected the training  completed at smaller regional training ranges, as well as at larger training  ranges such as the Utah Test and Training Range and the Nevada Test  and Training Range. According to these officials, the training ranges  lacked many of the more advanced threat replication systems that can  challenge F-35 and F-22 capabilities and provide effective training across  their full range of missions.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy cites, as the department’s principal  priority, the need to prepare for threats from advanced adversaries due to  the magnitude of the threat they pose. Further, the Air Force reports that  it will confront an increasingly complex security environment in the  coming years that will demand a wider range of skill sets and different  capabilities than are currently being employed. For example, aircrews  may be called upon to conduct missions that require freedom of  maneuver in highly-contested air spaces. However, in our September  2016 report, we found that the Air Force has used the same underlying  assumptions to establish its annual training requirements from 2012  through 2016, which may not reflect current and emerging training needs.  Specifically, the total annual live-fly training sorties by aircraft, the criteria  for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix  between live and simulator training remained the same from 2012 through  2016. We concluded that without fully reassessing the assumptions  underlying its training requirements, the Air Force could not be certain  that its annual training plans are aligned with its stated goals to ensure a  full-spectrum capable force that can successfully achieve missions across  a broad range of current and emerging threats. We recommended that  the Air Force reassess its annual training requirements and make any  appropriate adjustments to its future training plans to ensure that its  forces can accomplish a full range of missions. The Air Force has a  number of efforts under way to study or address some of the factors that  limit the ability of fighter squadrons to meet annual training requirements.

Organization and Utilization: Air Force Management of Its Forces Can Diminish Existing Capability

The Air Force’s management of its limited force structure can also  exacerbate some of the problems discussed above, as we found for the  F-22 fleet. The F-22, widely regarded as the best air superiority fighter  aircraft in the world, is an integral part of the U.S. military’s ability to  defeat high-end adversaries (See fig. 4 for an image of the F-22).

To meet its assigned air superiority responsibility, the Air Force is to  provide the combatant commanders with both mission capable aircraft  and pilots who are trained to fly those aircraft in the expected threat  environments. However, in July 2018, we found that Air Force  organization and utilization of its small fleet of F-22s has reduced its  ability to provide these two elements, thereby further limiting this  important capability.

Specifically, we found that the Air Force’s organization of its small F-22  fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability  was constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For  example, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the F-22  aircraft was time consuming and significantly reduced the aircraft’s  availability for missions. Maintenance availability challenges were  exacerbated by the Air Force’s decision to organize the F-22 fleet into  small units of 18 or 21 aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons  per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing, with 24  aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies  because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air  Force officials. Further, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to  operate from a single location. However, it generally deployed only a part  of a squadron, and the remaining part struggled to keep aircraft available  for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and  deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel,  according to service officials. The Air Force had not reassessed the  structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010 and may be foregoing opportunities  to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and better  support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat  environments.

Further, we found that the Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet limited  pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat  environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air  superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year.  However, F-22 pilots were not meeting their minimum yearly training  requirements for air superiority missions, according to Air Force training  reports and service officials. Moreover, using F-22s for exercises and  operational missions that do not require the F-22’s unique capabilities  interrupted pilot training and led to reduced proficiency. For example, F- 22 units were often directed to participate in partnership building  exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted  from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security  concerns about exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities. These  restrictions not only limited the value of the exercises, but also could  result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The  Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—that is, a mission  that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to  threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require  the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but we reported that because there  are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons based at the F-22  locations in Alaska and Hawaii, the alert mission fell on the F-22 units.  Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission could not be used for any  other purposes, limiting opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority  skills. Unless the Air Force takes steps to assess and make necessary  adjustments to the current organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units  are likely to continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training  rates that are below what they could be. As a result, the Air Force may  incur increased risks in future operations in high threat areas. In July  2018, we recommended that the Air Force reassess its F-22  organizational structure and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training  opportunities for high-end missions to reduce risk to future operations.  DOD concurred with both recommendations.

Air Force Will Need to Balance Near-term Readiness Recovery with Plans to Grow and Modernize the Force

In September 2018, the Secretary of the Air Force described the need to  grow the number of Air Force squadrons from 312 to 386—a 24 percent  increase—between fiscal years 2025 and 2030 in order to meet persistent  operational demands and address the challenges identified in the  National Defense Strategy. However, the details and costs of such  growth are as yet unknown and will have to compete with other military  services looking to increase their force structure and major defense  capabilities that require recapitalization. For example, over the next three  decades, the Navy plans to grow its fleet by nearly 25 percent—at an  estimated cost of about $800 billion—and modernizing and maintaining  the nation’s nuclear arsenal could cost $1.2 trillion over the same  timeframe. All of these investments would need to be made amid a  deteriorating national fiscal picture.

Even if it grows, the Air Force will be dependent on the force of today for  decades to come and will need to stay focused on rebuilding its  readiness. Many of the Air Force’s fourth generation fighters will be part  of the force structure for the next decade or more, and the Air Force plans  to retain the F-22 aircraft until 2060. In addition, the Air Force proposed  divesting the A-10 to make budgetary room for more modern aircraft.  However, as we reported in August 2016, the Air Force did not fully  examine the implications of this course of action and could not  demonstrate how it would meet the multiple missions being performed by  the aging A-10. Therefore, focusing on rebuilding the existing force will  be crucial to positioning the Air Force for the future. While these  challenges are particularly acute in the Air Force, the Air Force is not  alone among the military services. Given persistently low readiness levels  across the military, we have called for a comprehensive readiness  rebuilding plan for the entire Department of Defense to guide rebuilding  efforts, including setting clear goals and identifying resources required to  meet those goals for all services, including the Air Force.

In sum, as it plans for the future, the Air Force will need to balance the  rebuilding of its existing force with its desire to grow and modernize. We  have made a number of recommendations—with which the Air Force  have generally concurred with but most have not yet been implemented— that provide a partial roadmap to address important readiness challenges.  Implementing our recommendations to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron  requirements, revise F-35 sustainment plans, reassess annual training  requirements, and examine how the Air Force organizes and utilizes its F- 22 organizational structure are necessary steps to meet current and  future needs and can assist the Air Force moving forward. In addition,  sustained management attention and continued congressional oversight  will be needed to ensure that the Air Force demonstrates progress in  addressing its personnel, equipment, training, and organization and  utilization challenges.

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact  John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202)  512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who  made key contributions to this testimony are Chris Watson, Assistant  Director; Nick Cornelisse, Amie Lesser, Shari Nikoo, Michael Silver,  Nicole Volchko, and Lillian Yob.

Appendix I: Implementation Status of Key Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Air Force Readiness

Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Air Force  readiness that are cited in this statement. Table 1 summarizes the status  of our key recommendations related to Air Force readiness since 2016; a  total of 14 recommendations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has  implemented 1 of these recommendations. For each of the reports, the  specific recommendations and their implementation status are  summarized in tables 2 through 7.

Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified. Report numbers with  a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified. Classified and sensitive but  unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances  and need to know, upon request.

Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft  Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance  Need to Be Clarified. GAO-18-678. Washington, D.C.: September 10,  2018.

Military Readiness: Air Force Plans to Replace Aging Personnel  Recovery Helicopter Fleet. GAO-18-605. Washington, D.C.: August 16,  2018.

Military Aviation Mishaps: DOD Needs to Improve Its Approach for  Collecting and Analyzing Data to Manage Risks. GAO-18-586R.  Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2018.

Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a  Readiness Rebuilding Plan. GAO-18-441RC. Washington, D.C.: August  10, 2018. (SECRET)

Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could  Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training. GAO-18-190. Washington,  D.C.: July 19, 2018.

Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot  Retention Efforts. GAO-18-439. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2018.

Air Force Readiness: Changes to Readiness Reports Could Help  Stakeholders Take More Informed Actions. GAO-18-65C. Washington,  D.C.: June 18, 2018. (SECRET)

Force Structure: Changes to F-22 Organization and Utilization Could  Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training. GAO-18-120C.  Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2018. (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD  Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home. GAO-18-253.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons  Across the Military Services. GAO-18-464R. Washington, D.C.: April 25,  2018.

Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft  Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance  Need Clarification. GAO-18-146SU. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.

Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce  Requirements. GAO-18-113. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2018.

Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps  Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific.  GAO-18-79C. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2018. (SECRET)

F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting  Readiness and Cost Transparency. GAO-18-75. Washington, D.C.:  October 26, 2017.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission  Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve  Effectiveness. GAO-16-864. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2016.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk  without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 7, 2016.

Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10  and Other Future Divestment Decisions. GAO-16-816. Washington, D.C.:  August 24, 2016.

Air Force Training: Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve  Effectiveness. GAO-16-635SU. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2016.

Force Structure: Better Information Needed to Support Air Force A-10  and Other Future Divestment Decisions. GAO-16-525C. Washington,  D.C.: July 12, 2016. (SECRET//NOFORN)

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk  without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-534C. Washington, D.C.: June  30, 2016. (SECRET)

Air Force: Service Faces Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness.  GAO-16-482RC. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016. (SECRET)

Force Structure: Performance Measures Needed to Better Implement the  Recommendations of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air  Force. GAO-16-405. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2016.

F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its  Central Logistics System. GAO-16-439. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016.

F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to  Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates. GAO-14-778. Washington, D.C.:  September 23, 2014.

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To be ready to carry out its operations, the Air Force needs to have well-maintained equipment and trained personnel. However, Air Force readiness has declined steadily since the 1990s.

Today, the Air Force is working to rebuild readiness and modernize its fleet to meet future threats. This testimony discusses challenges in these 4 areas:

Addressing shortfalls of skilled pilots and maintenance professionals

Ensuring aircraft can be used for missions