Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training

The Navy and Marine Corps have identified a need to improve their ability to conduct amphibious operations—an operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force.

Senate and House reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions for GAO to review Navy and Marine Corps training. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Navy and Marine Corps have completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to mitigate any training shortfalls, (2) these services' efforts to improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading collaboration practices, and (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected virtual training devices into operational training. GAO analyzed training initiatives; interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of officials from 23 units that were selected based on their training plans; analyzed training completion data; and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six virtual training devices to review based on factors such as target audience.

This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2017. Information that DOD deemed classified has been omitted.

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations–related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services—naval integration—for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.

The Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.

GAO recommends that the Navy and Marine Corps develop an approach for amphibious operations training and define and articulate common outcomes for naval integration; and that the Marine Corps develop guidance for the development and use of its virtual training devices. The Department of Defense concurred.

The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps (collectively referred to as U.S.  naval forces) maintain forces that are capable of conducting an  amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea  by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft, with the primary  purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned  mission. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the future  security environment will require forces to train across the full range of  military operations—including types of operations that have not been  prioritized in recent years, such as amphibious operations. However, over  the last 15 years, deployments to the Middle East and Afghanistan have  required U.S. naval forces to focus training on preparing for success in  stability and counterinsurgency operations, while limiting training in  amphibious operations, among other areas. To reinvigorate the ability of  U.S. naval forces to fight effectively in an amphibious environment,  among other areas, strategic guidance such as the Navy’s A Design for  Maintaining Maritime Superiority and the Marine Corps Operating  Concept has established goals to better integrate and sufficiently train  forces for amphibious operations.

Preparing to train forces for amphibious operations requires integration  between the Navy and Marine Corps, and significant resources. For  example, the services must schedule amphibious ships to be used for  training, develop operational concepts, and design and execute  exercises. Training for amphibious operations also requires resources,  including access to Navy ships and support craft, as well as an adequate  amount of range space to realistically portray force movements and to  conduct live-fire training exercises. However, certain resources for  amphibious training are constrained. For example, the number of  amphibious ships in the Navy’s fleet has been in decline, dropping from  62 in 1990 to 31 today.

The Marine Corps has stated that the use of live, virtual, and constructive  training could help overcome some of the limitations of training in a live- only environment, while sufficiently replicating a complex operational  environment. However, we have previously reported on several factors  that have affected DOD’s ability to efficiently and effectively integrate  virtual training devices into training plans. In 2013, for example, we found  that the Marine Corps lacked key performance and cost information that  would enhance its ability to determine the optimal mix of live and virtual  training and prioritize related investments. We recommended that the  Marine Corps develop metrics and a methodology to compare the costs  of live versus virtual training. In response, the Marine Corps conducted an  assessment to identify which of its virtual training devices could support  unit-level training. We discuss this and other actions the Marine Corps  has taken related to virtual training later in this report.

Additionally, in 2016 we reported that the Army and the Air Force had not  fully integrated the development and sustainment of their respective  virtual training devices with service-wide training requirements and  strategies because their management approaches are fragmented. We  recommended that the Army update its policies for virtual training devices  to conduct additional front-end planning; define the process for analyzing  the effectiveness of its devices; and better integrate the devices into  training strategies. We also recommended that the Air Force develop a  risk-based investment strategy that identifies and prioritizes capability  needs and includes a timeline for addressing them. In response, DOD  has identified some actions the Army and Air Force are taking that would  improve the management of virtual training programs and address our  recommendations once fully implemented.

Both the Senate and House reports accompanying bills for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions for us  to review Navy and Marine Corps training requirements. This report  examines the extent to which (1) the Navy and Marine Corps have  completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to  mitigate any training shortfalls, (2) the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to  improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading  collaboration practices, and (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected  virtual training devices into its operational training.

This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued in  August 2017. DOD deemed some of the information in our August report  to be classified, which must be protected from loss, compromise, or  inadvertent disclosure. Therefore, this report omits classified information  on select Marine Corps units’ ability to complete training for amphibious  operations. Although the information provided in this report is more  limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the classified report  and uses the same methodology.

To determine the extent to which the Navy and Marine Corps have  completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to  mitigate any training shortfalls, we analyzed unit-level readiness data and  deployment certification reports over the most recent 3-year period—from  fiscal years 2014 through 2016—and compared those data against the  services’ training requirements. We analyzed 3 years of training data  because training requirements for Marine Corps units are reviewed and  updated on a 3-year cycle. We performed data-reliability procedures on  the unit-level readiness data by comparing the data against related  documentation and surveying knowledgeable officials on controls over  reporting systems, and determined that the data presented in our findings  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We interviewed  Navy and Marine Corps officials to discuss amphibious operations  training priorities and any factors that limited training for amphibious  operations. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of Marine Corps  units to speak with in order to interview geographically dispersed units.  We analyzed data on requests for amphibious ships to support Marine  Corps training and assessed the reliability of data by speaking with  knowledgeable officials, and determined they were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of presenting the number of actual requests submitted and  fulfilled. In addition, we reviewed processes and initiatives established by  the Navy and Marine Corps to identify and assess training shortfalls for  amphibious operations and evaluated these processes and initiatives  against practices identified in our prior work on strategic training, such as  the need to prioritize available resources to support an agency’s mission  and goals; and risk management, such as evaluating and selecting  alternatives, and monitoring the progress made and the results achieved,  in an effort to address operational capability gaps.

To determine the extent to which the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to  improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading  collaboration practices, we reviewed Navy and Marine Corps documents,  including A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the  Marine Corps Operating Concept, that discuss the goal of improving  naval integration. We also reviewed mechanisms that have been  established to coordinate training, observed a working group focused on  amphibious operations, and interviewed officials across both services to  discuss efforts to improve naval integration. We assessed the extent to  which the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to improve naval integration  have followed applicable leading practices for collaboration that we have  identified in our prior work. Specifically, we have identified eight practices  described in our prior work that can help enhance and sustain  collaboration. We selected seven of the eight practices most relevant to  the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ collaborative efforts to improve naval  integration.

To determine the extent to which the Marine Corps has integrated  selected virtual training devices into its operational training, we collected  information on the development, use, and evaluation of virtual training  devices and their integration into training strategies. We focused on the  Marine Corps’ integration of virtual training devices into operational  training because the Navy does not have virtual training devices that  simulate amphibious operations, including ship-to-shore movement,  according to Navy officials. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of  six virtual training devices that support command and ground-based units  based on factors such as the device’s applicability to amphibious  operations training, location, and type of training tasks (individual or  collective training) for which the devices are used. We reviewed  documentation on actions the Marine Corps has taken to incorporate the  selected devices into operational training and assessed the extent to  which these actions followed DOD training strategy and our leading  practices for managing strategic training. Further details on our scope  and methodology can be found in appendix I.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from May 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DOD from August 2017 to September 2017 to  prepare this unclassified version of the original classified report for public  release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these  standards.

Naval Forces Involved in Amphibious Operations

An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by  an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft, with the primary purpose  of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish an assigned  mission. An amphibious force is comprised of an (1) amphibious task  force and (2) landing force together with other forces that are trained,  organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. The amphibious task  force is a group of Navy amphibious ships, most frequently deployed as  an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The landing force is a Marine Air- Ground Task Force—which includes certain elements, such as command,  aviation, ground, and logistics—embarked aboard the Navy amphibious  ships. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the most-commonly  deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Together, this amphibious force  is referred to as an ARG-MEU.

The Navy’s amphibious ships are part of its surface force. An ARG  consists of a minimum of three amphibious ships, typically an amphibious  assault ship, an amphibious transport dock ship, and an amphibious dock  landing ship. Figure 1 shows the current number of amphibious ships by  class and a description of their capabilities.

The primary function of amphibious ships is to provide transport to  Marines and their equipment and supplies. The ARG includes an  amphibious squadron that is comprised of a squadron staff, tactical air  control squadron detachment, and fleet surgical team. This task  organization also includes a naval support element that is comprised of a  helicopter squadron for search and rescue and antisurface warfare, two  landing craft detachments for cargo lift, and a beachmaster unit  detachment to control beach traffic.

An MEU consists of around 2,000 Marines, their aircraft, their landing  craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days’ worth of supplies. The  MEU includes a standing command element; a ground element  consisting of a battalion landing team; an aviation element consisting of a  composite aviation squadron of multiple types of aircraft; and a logistics  element consisting of a combat logistics battalion. Figure 2 provides an  overview of the components of a standard ARG-MEU.

An amphibious force can be scaled to include a larger amphibious task  force, such as an Expeditionary Strike Group, and a larger landing force,  such as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for larger operations. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade is comprised  of 3,000 to 20,000 personnel and is organized to respond to a full range  of crises, such as forcible entry and humanitarian assistance. A MEF is  the largest standing Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the principal  Marine Corps warfighting organization. Each MEF consists of 20,000 to  90,000 Marines. MEFs are used in major theater war and other missions  across the range of military operations. There are three standing MEFs—I  MEF at Camp Pendleton, California; II MEF at Camp Lejeune, North  Carolina; and III MEF in Okinawa, Japan.

Navy and Marine Corps Training for Amphibious Operations

Navy ships train to a list of mission-essential tasks that are assigned  based on the ship’s required operational capabilities and projected  operational environments. Most surface combatants, including cruisers,  destroyers, and all amphibious ships, have mission-essential tasks  related to amphibious operations. The Navy uses a phased approach to  training, known as the Fleet Response Training Plan. The training plan  for amphibious ships is broken up into five phases: maintenance, basic,  advanced, integrated, and sustainment. The maintenance phase is  focused on the completion of ship maintenance, with a secondary focus  on individual and team training. The basic phase focuses on development  of core capabilities and skills through the completion of basic-level  inspections, assessments, and training requirements, among other things.  This phase can include certification in areas such as mobility,  communications, amphibious well-deck operations, aviation operations,  and warfare training. The basic phase of training requires limited Marine  Corps involvement—mainly to certify amphibious ships for well-deck and  flight-deck operations. The advanced phase focuses on advanced  tactical training, including amphibious planning. The integrated phase is  where individual units and staffs are aggregated into an Amphibious  Ready Group (ARG) and train with an embarked MEU or other combat  units. The sustainment phase includes training to sustain core skills and  provides an additional opportunity for training with Marine Corps units,  when possible.

Marine Corps units train to accomplish a set of mission-essential tasks for  the designed capabilities of the unit. For example, the mission-essential  tasks for a Marine Corps infantry battalion include amphibious operations,  offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations. Many  Marine Corps units within the command, aviation, ground, and logistics  elements have an amphibious-related mission-essential task. The Marine  Corps uses a building-block approach to accomplish training, progressing  from individual through collective training. For example, an assault  amphibian vehicle battalion will progress through foundational, individual,  and basic amphibious training—such as waterborne movement and ship  familiarization—to advanced amphibious training, such as live training  involving ship-to-shore movement conducted under realistic conditions.

Marine Corps unit commanders use Training and Readiness manuals to  help develop their training plans. Training and Readiness manuals  describe the training events, frequency of training required to sustain  skills, and the conditions and standards that a unit must accomplish to be  certified in a mission-essential task. To be certified in the mission- essential task of amphibious operations, Marine Corps units must train to  a standard that may require the use of amphibious ships. For example,  ground units with amphibious-related mission-essential tasks will not be  certified until live training involving sea-based operations and ship-to- shore movement has been conducted under realistic conditions. Similarly,  for aviation squadrons, training for amphibious operations (called sea- based aviation operations) will not be certified until live training involving  sea-based operations has been conducted under realistic conditions,  including aviation operations from an amphibious platform. Similar types  of units, such as all infantry battalions, may train on the same mission- essential tasks. However, unit commanders are ultimately responsible for  their units’ training, and a variety of factors can lead commanders to  adopt different approaches to training, such as the units’ assigned  missions or deployment locations.

Marine Corps units that are scheduled to deploy as part of an ARG-MEU  will follow a standardized 6-month predeployment training program that  gradually builds collective skill sets over three phases, as depicted in  figure 3.

Marine Corps’ Use of Virtual Training Devices

The Marine Corps’ use of virtual training devices has increased over time.  Virtual training devices were first incorporated into training for the aviation  community, which has used simulators for more than half a century. The  Marine Corps’ ground units did not begin using simulators and  simulations until later. Specifically, until the 1980s, training in the ground  community was primarily live training. Further advances in technology  resulted in the acquisition of simulators and simulations with additional  capabilities designed to help individual Marines and units acquire and  refine skills through more concentrated and repetitive training. For  example, the Marine Corps began using devices that allowed individual  Marines to conduct training in basic and advanced marksmanship and  weapons employment tactics. More recently, during operations in Iraq  and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps introduced a number of new virtual  training devices to prepare Marines for conditions on the ground and for  emerging threats. For example, to provide initial and sustainment driver  training, the Marine Corps began using simulators that can be  reconfigured to replicate a variety of vehicles. In addition, in response to  an increase in vehicle rollovers, the Marine Corps began using egress  trainers to train Marines to safely evacuate their vehicles. The Marine  Corps has also developed virtual training devices that can be used to  train Marines in collective training, such as amphibious operations. For  example, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation  is a constructive simulation that provides training on planning and tactical  decision making for the Marine Corps’ command element. See figure 4 for  a description of examples of Marine Corps devices that can be used for  individual through collective training.

Navy and Marine Corps Units Completed Training for Certain Amphibious Operations Priorities but Not Others, and Efforts to Mitigate Training Shortfalls Are Incomplete

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an ARG-MEU  completed their required training for amphibious operations, but several  factors have limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training  for other amphibious operations–related priorities. The Navy and Marine  Corps have taken steps to identify and address amphibious training  shortfalls, but their efforts to mitigate these shortfalls have not prioritized  available training resources, systematically evaluated among potential  training resource alternatives to accomplish the services’ amphibious  operations training priorities, or monitored progress toward achieving the  priorities.

Navy and Marine Corps ARG-MEU Deploying Units Completed Required Training for Amphibious Operations, but Several Factors Have Limited Training for Other Marine Corps Amphibious Operations Priorities

Navy and Marine Corps units deploying as part of ARG-MEUs have  completed required training for amphibious operations, but the Marine  Corps has been unable to consistently accomplish training for other  service amphibious operations priorities. We found that Navy amphibious  ships have completed training for amphibious operations. Specifically,  based on our review of deployment certification messages from 2014  through 2016, we found that each deploying Navy ARG completed  training for the amphibious operations mission in accordance with training  standards. Similarly, we found that each MEU completed all of its  mission-essential tasks that are required during the predeployment  training program. These mission-essential tasks cover areas such as  amphibious raid, amphibious assault, and noncombatant evacuation  operations, among other operations.

However, while the Marine Corps has completed amphibious operations  training for the MEU, based on our review of unit-level readiness data  from fiscal year 2014 through 2016 we found that the service has been  unable to fully accomplish training for its other amphibious operations  priorities, which include home-station unit training to support contingency  requirements, service-level exercises, and experimentation and concept  development for amphibious operations. Specific details of these  shortfalls were omitted because the information is classified.

Additionally, Marine Corps officials cited shortfalls in their ability to  conduct service-level exercises that train individuals and units on  amphibious operations-related skills, as well as provide opportunities to  conduct experimentation and concept development for amphibious  operations. In particular, officials responsible for planning and executing  these exercises told us that one of the biggest challenges is aligning  enough training resources, such as amphibious ships, to accurately  replicate a large-scale amphibious operation. For example, officials from  III MEF told us that the large-scale amphibious exercise Ssang Yong is  planned to be conducted every other year, but that the exercise requires  the availability and alignment of two ARG-MEUs in order to have enough  forces to conduct the exercise. These officials stated that this alignment  may only happen every 3 years, instead of every other year, as planned.  In addition, officials from I MEF and II MEF told us that their large-scale  amphibious exercises are intended to be a Marine Expeditionary  Brigade–level training exercise, however, these exercises are typically  only able to include enough amphibious ships to support a MEU, while  the other forces must be simulated. Despite these limitations, Navy and  Marine Corps officials have identified these service-level exercises as a  critical training venue to support training for the Marine Expeditionary  Brigade command element and to rebuild the capability to command and  control forces participating in amphibious operations.

Based on our analysis of interviews with 23 Marine Corps units, we found  that all 23 units cited the lack of available amphibious ships as the  primary factor limiting training for home-station units. The Navy’s fleet of  amphibious ships has declined by half in the last 25 years, from 62 in  1990 to 31 today, with current shipbuilding plans calling for four additional  amphibious ships to be added by fiscal year 2024, increasing the total  number of amphibious ships to 35 (see fig. 5).

Navy and Marine Corps officials noted a number of issues that can affect  the amount of training time that is available with the current amphibious  fleet. In particular, the current fleet of ships is in a continuous cycle of  maintenance, ARG-MEU predeployment training, and sustainment  periods, leaving little additional time for training with home-station units  and participation in service-level exercises. Navy officials told us that the  Optimized Fleet Response Plan may provide additional training  opportunities for Marine Corps units during the amphibious ships’  sustainment periods. Given the availability of the current inventory of  amphibious ships, Marine Corps requests to the Navy for amphibious  ships and other craft have been difficult to fulfill. For example, data from I  MEF showed that the Navy was unable to fulfill 293 of 314 (93 percent) of  I MEF requests for Navy ship support for training in fiscal year 2016.  Similarly, data from II MEF showed that in fiscal year 2016 the Navy was  unable to fulfill 19 of 40 requests for ship services. We identified issues  with the completeness of this request data. Specifically, we found that the  data may not fully capture the Marine Corps’ demand for amphibious  ships. As a result, this information may overstate the ability of the Navy to  fulfill these requests. We discuss these data-reliability issues further  below.

Marine Corps officials from the 23 units we interviewed also cited other  factors that limit opportunities for amphibious operations training, such as  the following:

Access to range space: Seventeen of 23 Marine Corps units we  interviewed identified access to range space as a factor that can limit  their ability to conduct amphibious operations training. Unit officials  told us that priority for training resources, including range access, is  given to units that will be part of a MEU deployment, leaving little  range time available for other units. In addition, unit officials told us  that the amount of range space available can affect the scope and  realism of the training that they are able to conduct. Training for  amphibious operations can require a large amount of range space,  because the operational area extends from the offshore waters onto  the landing beach and further inland. A complete range capability  requires maneuver space, tactical approaches, and air routes that  allow for maneuverability and evasive actions. However, officials from  II MEF told us that the size of the landing beach near Camp Lejeune,  North Carolina makes conducting beach-clearing operations  infeasible. Adequate ranges have been identified as a challenge  across DOD. For example, according to DOD’s 2016 Report to  Congress on Sustainable Ranges, some Marine Corps installations  lack fully developed maneuver corridors, training areas, and airspace  to adequately support ground and air maneuver inland from landing  beaches.

Maintenance delays, bad weather, and transit time: Ten of 23  Marine Corps units told us that changes to an amphibious ship’s  schedule resulting from maintenance overruns or bad weather can  also reduce the time available for a ship to be used for training. In  addition, the transit time a ship needs to reach Marine Corps units can  further reduce the time available for training. This is a particular  challenge for II MEF units stationed in North Carolina and South  Carolina that train with amphibious ships stationed in Virginia and  Florida. According to II MEF officials, transit time to Marine Corps  units can take up to 18 hours in good weather, using up almost a full  day of available training time for transit.

High pace of deployments: Five of 23 Marine Corps units told us  that the high pace of deployments and need to prepare for upcoming  deployments limited their opportunity to conduct training for  amphibious operations. For example, II MEF officials told us that an  infantry battalion that is scheduled to deploy as part of a Special  Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force to Africa generally does not  embark on an amphibious ship or have amphibious operations as part  of its assigned missions. As a result, the unit will likely not conduct  amphibious operations during its predeployment training.

Efforts to Identify and Address Amphibious Training Shortfalls Lack Strategic Training and Risk-Management Practices

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to mitigate the  training shortfall for their amphibious operations priorities, but these  efforts are incomplete because they have not prioritized available training  resources, systematically evaluated among potential training resource  alternatives to accomplish the services’ amphibious operations training  priorities, or monitored progress toward achieving the priorities. The Navy  and Marine Corps are in the process of identifying (1) the amount of  amphibious operations capabilities and capacity that are needed to  achieve the services’ wartime requirements, and (2) the training  resources and funding required to meet the amphibious operations- related training priorities. First, in December 2016, the Navy conducted a  force structure assessment that established a need for a fleet of 38  amphibious ships. Based on the assessment, the Chief of Naval  Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps determined that  increasing the Navy’s amphibious fleet from a 31-ship to a 38-ship  amphibious fleet would allow the Marine Corps to meet its wartime needs  of having enough combined capacity to transport two Marine  Expeditionary Brigades. Specifically, a 38-ship fleet would provide 17  amphibious ships for each Marine Expeditionary Brigade, plus four  additional ships to account for ships that are unavailable due to  maintenance. According to Navy and Marine Corps officials, an increase  in the number of amphibious ships should create additional opportunities  for the Navy and Marine Corps to accomplish amphibious operations  training.

Second, the Marine Corps has also recognized a need to improve the  capacity and experience of its forces to conduct amphibious operations  and is taking steps to identify the training resources and funding required  to meet its amphibious operations–related training priorities. To  accomplish this task, in 2016 the Marine Corps initiated the Amphibious  Operations Training Requirements review. As a part of this review, the  Marine Corps has comprehensively determined units that require  amphibious operations training and is in the process of refining the  training and readiness manuals for each type of Marine Corps unit to  include an amphibious-related mission-essential task as appropriate, and  better emphasizing the types of conditions and standards for amphibious  training in the manuals. According to officials, as of May 2017, Marine  Corps Forces Command has reviewed the mission-essential tasks for 60  unit types and found 31 unit types already had a mission-essential task  for amphibious operations, while another 5 unit types required that an  amphibious-related mission-essential task be added. The review further  found that the other 24 unit types do not require a mission-essential task  for amphibious operations. In addition, the Marine Corps Training and  Education Command noted in its review that certain training standards  within the training manuals are being refined in order to distinguish  between levels of training accomplished. For example, for ground-based  units, such as infantry battalions, an additional training standard was  added for all amphibious-related mission-essential tasks that a unit would  not be considered both trained and certified unless live training using  amphibious ships has been conducted under realistic conditions.

The Amphibious Operations Training Requirements review is also  intended to accomplish other actions to better define the services’  amphibious operations training priorities, but these actions were  incomplete at the time of our review. Specifically, the review will also  establish an objective for the number of Marine Corps forces that must be  trained and ready to conduct amphibious operations at a given point in  time, and the amount of funding for ship steaming days that is required to  provide training for the services’ amphibious operations priorities.  According to officials responsible for the Amphibious Operations Training  Requirements review, an outcome of the review is expected to be a  combined Navy and Marine Corps directive signed by the Chief of Naval  Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that should provide  guidance to better define a naval objective for amphibious readiness and  required ship steaming days. Marine Corps officials estimated that the  issuance of the directive will be in the summer of 2017.

With these two efforts, the Navy and Marine Corps have been proactive in  identifying the underlying problems with training for amphibious  operations, and their ongoing efforts indicate that addressing this training  shortfall is a key priority for the two services. In particular, the proposed  Navy and Marine Corps directive that will result from the Amphibious  Operation Training Requirements review should help establish a naval  objective for amphibious readiness with the corresponding units that need  to be trained and ready in amphibious operations, as well as a basis for  estimating the required amount of training resources, such as ship  steaming days, to meet amphibious operations training priorities. When  completed, the development of this directive is an important first step to  clearly identify the total resources needed for amphibious operations  training.

However, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ current approach for amphibious  operations training does not incorporate strategic training and leading  risk-management practices. Specifically, we found the following:

The Marine Corps does not prioritize all available training  resources: Based on our prior work on strategic training, we found  that agencies need to align their training processes and available  resources to support outcomes related to the agency’s missions and  goals, and that those resources should be prioritized so that the most- important training needs are addressed first. For certain units that  are scheduled to deploy as part of an ARG-MEU, the Navy and  Marine Corps have a formal training program that specifies the timing  and resource needs across all phases of the training, including the  number of days embarked on amphibious ships that the Navy and  Marine Corps need to complete their training events. Officials stated  that available training resources, including access to amphibious  ships for training, are prioritized for these units.

However, for other Marine Corps units not scheduled for a MEU  deployment, officials described an ad hoc process to allocate any  remaining availabilities of amphibious ship training time among home- station units. Specifically, officials stated that the current process  identifies units that are available for training when an amphibious ship  becomes available rather than a process that aligns the next highest- priority units with available training resources. For example, officials at  Headquarters Marine Corps told us that the Navy will identify training  opportunities with amphibious ships at quarterly scheduling  conferences. The Marine Corps will fill these training opportunities  with units that are available to accomplish training during that period,  but not based on a process that identifies its highest-priority home- station units for training. Similarly, a senior officer with First Marine  Division told us that he would prioritize home-station units that have  gone the longest without conducting amphibious-related training,  which may not be the units with the highest priority for amphibious  operations training.

The Navy and Marine Corps have recognized the need for  reinstituting a recurring training program for home-station units, but  efforts to implement such a program have not been started at the time  of our review. According to Navy officials, the Navy and Marine Corps  have had a recurring training program in the past to provide home- station units with amphibious operations training called the Type  Commander Amphibious Training series, or TCAT, but this program  was phased out 15 years ago with the implementation of the Fleet  Response Training Plan that is more focused on ARG-MEU training.  Navy and Marine Corps officials told us that reinstituting a similar  training program would allow the services to better prioritize training  resources and align units to achieve the services’ proposed naval  objective for amphibious readiness. Without establishing a process to  prioritize available training resources for home-station units, the Navy  and Marine Corps cannot be certain that scarce training opportunities  are being aligned with their highest-priority needs.

The Navy and Marine Corps do not systematically evaluate a full  range of training resource alternatives to achieve amphibious  operations training priorities: Our prior work on risk management  has found that evaluating and selecting alternatives are critical steps  for addressing operational capability gaps. Based on our interviews  with officials across the Marine Expeditionary Forces and review of  documentation, we identified a number of alternatives that could help  mitigate the risk to the services’ amphibious capability due to limited  training opportunities. These alternatives include utilizing additional  training opportunities during an amphibious ship’s basic phase of  training; using alternative platforms for training, such as Marine  Prepositioning Force ships, or the amphibious ships of allies; utilizing  smaller Navy craft or pier-side ships to meet training requirements;  and leveraging developmental and operational test events.

However, the Navy and Marine Corps have not developed a  systematic approach to explore and incorporate selected training  resource alternatives into home-station training plans. Specifically,  officials told us that the combined Navy and Marine Corps directive  that is expected to be completed later this year will better define a  naval objective for amphibious readiness and the required training  resources to achieve it, and will provide guidance to the two services  to better identify training resource alternatives for home-station  training. Based on our review of briefing materials on the Amphibious  Operations Training Requirements review, however, we found that the  services have discussed using some training resource alternatives to  mitigate amphibious operations training shortfalls, such as pier-side  ships to minimize the required number of ship steaming days, but the  services have not systematically evaluated potential alternatives.  Marine Corps officials told us that fully evaluating resource  alternatives, particularly the use of simulated training and pier-side  ships, could allow for more amphibious training without the need for  additional steaming days. Fully exploring alternatives, such as utilizing  alterative platforms and pier-side ships, and incorporating a broader  range of training resource alternatives into training will be important as  the Navy and Marine Corps try to achieve their training priorities and  could help bridge the time gap until more amphibious ships are  introduced into the fleet.

The Navy and Marine Corps have not developed a process or set  of metrics to monitor progress toward achieving its amphibious  operations training priorities and mitigating existing shortfalls:  Our prior work on risk management has found that monitoring the  progress made and results achieved are other critical steps for  addressing operational capability gaps. Marine Corps officials told  us that the service uses the readiness reporting system (Defense  Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps) to measure the  capabilities and capacity of its units to perform amphibious  operations. While this reporting system allows the Marine Corps to  assess the current readiness of units to perform the amphibious  operations mission-essential task—an important measure—the  system does not provide other information. For example, it does not  allow officials to assess the status of service-wide progress in  achieving its amphibious operations priorities or monitor efforts by the  Marine Expeditionary Forces in establishing comprehensive  amphibious operations training programs.

Marine Corps officials told us that they may need to capture and track  additional information, such as the number of amphibious training  events scheduled and completed. However, as noted above, we  found that the Marine Corps does not capture complete data that  could be used for these assessments, such as demand for training  time with amphibious ships. For example, officials from I MEF told us  they do not capture the full demand for training time with Navy ships  because unit commanders will not always submit a request that they  believe is unlikely to be filled. In addition, these officials stated that  their requests are prescreened before being submitted to the Navy to  ensure that the requests align with known periods of available ship  time. As a result, requests for amphibious ships and crafts are supply- driven, instead of demand-driven, which could affect the services’  ability to monitor progress in accomplishing unit training because an  underlying metric is incomplete. Establishing a process to monitor  progress in achieving amphibious operations training priorities will  better enable the Navy and Marine Corps to ensure that their efforts  are accomplishing the intended results and help assess the extent to  which the services have mitigated any amphibious operations training  shortfalls.

More Comprehensively Incorporating Collaboration Practices Would Further Naval Integration Efforts for Amphibious Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  coordination between the two services, but the services have not fully  incorporated leading collaboration practices that would help drive efforts  to improve naval integration for amphibious operations. Our prior work on  interagency collaboration has found that certain practices can help  enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. These key  practices include (1) defining and articulating a common outcome; (2)  establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identifying and  addressing needs by leveraging resources; (4) agreeing on roles and  responsibilities; (5) establishing compatible policies, procedures, systems,  and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) developing  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and (7)  reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through plans  and reports, among others.

Common outcomes and joint strategy: The Navy and Marine Corps  have issued strategic documents that discuss the importance of  improving naval integration, but the services have not developed a joint  strategy that defines and articulates common outcomes to achieve naval  integration. We have found that collaborative efforts require agency staff  working across agency lines to define and articulate the common  outcome or purpose they are seeking to achieve that is consistent with  their respective agency goals and mission. In addition, collaborating  agencies need to develop strategies that work in concert with those of  their partners. These strategies can help in aligning the partner agencies’  activities, processes, and resources to accomplish common outcomes.  Further, joint strategies can benefit from establishing specific objectives,  related actions, and subtasks with measurable outcomes, target  audiences, and agency leads.

Based on our review of Navy and Marine Corps strategic-level  documents, both services identify the importance of improving naval  integration, but these documents do not define and articulate outcomes  that are common among the services or identify actions and time frames  to achieve common outcomes that would be included a joint strategy.  Instead, the documents describe naval integration in varying ways,  including as a means to improve the capabilities of naval forces to  perform essential functions, such as sea control and maritime security;  exercise command and control for large-scale operations, including  amphibious operations; and establish concepts to conduct naval  operations in contested environments, among other areas. For example,  strategic documents developed by the Navy only broadly discuss naval  integration. In March 2015, the Department of the Navy issued an  updated version of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  This document discusses building the future naval force, including the  need to organize and equip the Marine Expeditionary Brigade to exercise  command and control of joint and multinational task forces for larger  operations and enable the MEF for larger operations. In January 2016,  the Department of the Navy published A Design for Maintaining Maritime  Superiority, stating the need to deepen operational relationships with  other services to include current and future planning, concept and  capability development, and assessment.

Marine Corps strategic documents provide a more-detailed and  expansive list of areas for improved integration with the Navy, but do not  provide guidance on how to achieve those areas. For example, in March  2014, the Marine Corps issued Expeditionary Force 21, which describes  the need to increase naval integration, including operational integration  between the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the Navy’s Expeditionary  Strike Group. Further, in September 2016 the Marine Corps issued a  Marine Corps Operating Concept that establishes five tasks needed for  the Marine Corps to build its future force, including integrating the naval  force to fight at and from the sea.

According to Navy and Marine Corps officials, naval integration is a broad  term, has different meanings across various service organizations, and is  not commonly understood. For example, officials told us that the services  have identified the need to develop more-precise language around the  term naval integration and articulate common outcomes to create a more- integrated approach to develop naval capabilities. Another senior Marine  Corps training official told us that clear guidance is needed on how to  define outcomes for naval integration for Navy and Marine Corps  command-level staff. In particular, the official stated that without guidance  it is unclear how an integrated staff should be composed—whether as two  separate Navy and Marine Corps command staffs that should work  together, or as one staff composed of both Navy and Marine Corps  personnel. The continuing lack of common outcomes and a joint strategy  could limit the Navy and Marine Corps ability to achieve their goals for  naval integration. Further, joint strategies for improving naval integration  could help ensure that services efforts are aligned to maximize available  training opportunities and resources.

Compatible policies, procedures, and systems: The Navy and Marine  Corps have established several mechanisms to better coordinate their  respective capabilities for amphibious operations training, but have not  fully established compatible policies, procedures, and systems to foster  and build naval integration. We have found that agencies need to address  the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data systems  that will be used in the collaborative effort. These policies can be used  to provide clarity about roles and responsibilities, including how the  collaborative effort will be led.

The Marine Corps has established a working group that provides a forum  for collaboration for amphibious operations. Specifically, Marine Corps  Forces Command established a Maritime Working Group to develop and  manage a continuing Navy–Marine Corps quarterly collaborative process  that is comprised of officials from the services’ headquarters,  components, and operating forces. According to its mission statement,  the Maritime Working Group is intended to align naval amphibious  exercise planning to inform force development, war games,  experimentation, and coalition participation in order to advance concepts;  influence doctrine; inform naval exercise design and sourcing; inform  capabilities development; and increase naval warfighting readiness.  Based on our observation of the Maritime Working Group in September  2016, we found that the forum covered a broad range of topics including  exercise prioritization, experimentation, and planning for future Navy  exercises. Following the meeting, a summary of the topics discussed was  provided to all participants as well as follow-on actions to be completed.

However, we found that the Navy and Marine Corps have not fully  established compatible policies and procedures, such as common training  tasks and standards and agreed-upon roles and responsibilities, to  ensure their efforts to achieve improved naval integration are consistent  and sustained. For example, on the West Coast, the Navy and Marine  Corps organizations 3rd Fleet and I MEF have issued guidance that  formalizes policies that assign 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and  Expeditionary Strike Group 3 with the responsibilities to conduct joint  training. This guidance addresses the importance of Navy and Marine  Corps interoperability by formalizing procedures, assigning responsibility,  and providing general policy regarding training certification standards for  these units. Officials from Fleet Forces Command noted that there is not  similar guidance for East Coast–based units for the 2nd Marine  Expeditionary Brigade and Expeditionary Strike Group 2. According to a  Navy inspection report, Fleet Forces Command officials stated that they  did not institute a deployment certification program for Expeditionary  Strike Group 2 because of changing priorities at the command. As a  result, the services lack clarity on the roles and responsibilities for these  organizations—another key collaboration practice—that is needed to  ensure these improvements are prioritized to further and sustain the  collaborative effort.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have also identified areas where more- compatible training is needed to improve the skills and abilities of naval  forces to perform certain missions. For example, Marine Corps training  guidance from III MEF identifies a number of areas where Marine Corps  units could improve collective naval capabilities by expanding training  with the Navy, including areas such as joint maneuver, seizure and  defense of forward naval bases, and facilitating maritime maneuver,  among others. The Marine Corps Operating Concept also identifies other  areas where integration with the Navy should be enhanced, including for  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; operating in a distributed  or disaggregated environment; and employment of fifth-generation  aviation, such as the F-35. However, the services have been limited in  their efforts to improve naval integration in these areas because they  have not established compatible training tasks and standards that would  institutionalize Navy and Marine Corps unit-level training requirements.  Marine Corps officials told us that without compatible training tasks and  standards, there is not a mechanism to force continued integration  between the services outside of forces deploying as part of an ARG-MEU  to help develop integrated naval capabilities.

We also found that some of the Navy and Marine Corps’ systems for  managing and conducting integrated training are incompatible, leading to  inefficiencies in the process to manage training events involving Navy and  Marine Corps units. For example, the Marine Corps has developed a  system called Playbook to help align Navy and Marine Corps resources  for training exercises that have been scheduled through the Force  Synchronization process. At the time of our review, the Marine Corps  was in the process of inputting data for all of its scheduled training  exercises, including experiments and war games, into the system in order  to align training resources and capabilities to its highest priority exercises  and help build a training and exercise plan through 2020. However, the  Navy uses several other data systems to track and capture its training  resource requirements, and these systems are incompatible with  Playbook. The lack of interface requires the Marine Corps to manually  input and reconcile Navy information into its system. This can cause  certain inefficiencies in arranging training. For example, officials from III  MEF told us that adjustments to the Navy’s maintenance schedule for  amphibious ships are not always communicated in advance, which can  create a misalignment in the availability of amphibious ships and Marine  Corps units to conduct training exercises. The Marine Corps has  identified the need to define the Navy’s use of Playbook and explore a  potential interface with Navy systems, but, as of May 2017, officials said  that any evaluation, including potential cost-benefit analyses for  addressing the interoperability issues, had not yet taken place. By having  incompatible systems to schedule training, the services remain at risk of  missing opportunities to maximize training opportunities for amphibious  operations.

Leverage resources to maximize training opportunities: The Navy  and Marine Corps have identified certain opportunities where the two  services can better leverage resources to conduct additional amphibious  operations training together, but these opportunities have not been fully  maximized. We have found that collaborating agencies should look for  opportunities to address needs by leveraging each other’s resources,  thus obtaining additional benefits that would not be available if they were  working separately. Marine Corps Forces Command and Fleet Forces  Command, as well as Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Pacific Fleet,  have each established a Campaign Plan for Amphibious Operations  Training. The purpose of these plans is to align resources for larger,  service-level exercises for amphibious operations over a 5-year period.  The goal of these exercises is to develop operational proficiency for a  Marine Expeditionary Brigade–level contingency or crisis, but the specific  focus of the exercise can change from year to year. For example, in 2017  the Bold Alligator exercise will focus on joint forcible entry operations and  anti-access / area denial, whereas in prior years the focus has been on  other operational areas, such as crisis response. We found that the Navy  and Marine Corps also use mechanisms, such as scheduling  conferences, to coordinate and prioritize requests for ship services for  these exercises, as well as for other training events.

The services are looking to better leverage available training resources  for amphibious operations, but enhancing their collaborative efforts could  take greater advantage of potential training opportunities. For example,  Navy officials have stated that the Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical  Training initiative could provide an additional training opportunity for  Marine Corps units to train with Navy ships. This initiative is intended to  provide amphibious ships with a period of training focused on advanced  tactical training, such as defense of the amphibious task force, and  multiunit ship-to-shore movement, among other objectives. According to a  Navy official responsible for the development of this initiative, its primary  focus is on advanced tactical training for Navy personnel, but greater  integration with the Marine Corps may be needed to accomplish certain  training objectives, such as air defense. Further, it would provide an  opportunity for the Marine Corps to achieve additional amphibious  operations training. However, according to this official, the Marine Corps  did not provide input into how its capabilities could be fully incorporated  into the Navy’s advanced tactics training or identify potential opportunities  to maximize amphibious operations training for both services.

Further, the Marine Corps officials told us that there are opportunities to  use transit time during Navy community-relations events, such as port  visits, to conduct amphibious training for home-station units, but these  events are not always identified with enough lead time to take full  advantage of the training opportunity. According to officials at II MEF,  Marine Corps units typically need at least 6 months of advance notice to  align their forces and equipment for the potential training opportunity.  Further, Marine Corps officials told us that the Navy does not always have  a fully trained staff with the amphibious ship during these events, which  can limit the comprehensiveness of the training that Marine Corps units  are able to accomplish. These officials also stated that the flight deck or  well deck may not be certified for use at the time of these community- relations events, further limiting their utility for Marine Corps training.  Despite these limitations, Marine Corps officials have told us that these  events can still provide training benefits, such as ship familiarization for  Marines, but that these opportunities still require advanced notice. By  improving coordination over its training resources, the services will be  better positioned to take full advantage of these scarce training  opportunities.

Mechanisms to monitor results and reinforce accountability: The  Navy and Marine Corps have processes to evaluate and report on the  results of specific training exercises, but have not developed mechanisms  to monitor, evaluate, and report on results nor jointly reinforced  accountability for their naval integration efforts through agency plans and  reports. We have found that agencies need to monitor and evaluate their  efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement and help decision  makers obtain feedback for improving operational effectiveness.  Further, agency plans and reports can reinforce accountability by aligning  goals and strategies with the collaborative effort.

For large-scale exercises, such as Bold Alligator, the Marine Corps  conducts reviews that identify actions that should be sustained moving  forward, as well as areas that should be improved in future exercises,  including issues related to naval integration. However, the services have  not established other processes or mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report on results that are needed to measure progress in achieving  service-level goals for naval integration and to align efforts to maximize  training opportunities for amphibious operations. For example, the Marine  Corps does not have a process to monitor and report on results for the  critical tasks identified in its Marine Corps Operating Concept, including  those tasks related to naval integration, such as integrating command  structures, developing concepts for littoral operations in a contested  environment, and conducting expeditionary advanced base operations.  Monitoring progress against these tasks, as well as common outcomes,  once defined, should help the Navy and Marine Corps track progress  toward achieving improved naval integration.

While the Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  naval integration in recent years, these efforts are still in the early stages.  In particular, Navy and Marine Corps officials stated that the services  have not yet defined or articulated common outcomes needed to achieve  naval integration because they have not determined who would be  responsible for this effort or when to begin its development. Defining and  articulating common outcomes for naval integration would allow the  services to more effectively incorporate other leading collaboration  practices aimed at those common outcomes, to the extent deemed  appropriate, such as developing a joint strategy, establishing compatible  policies, leveraging resources, and monitoring results.

The Marine Corps Has Not Fully Integrated Its Virtual Training Devices into Operational Training

The Marine Corps has taken some steps to better integrate virtual training  devices into its operational training. However, the Marine Corps’ process  to manage the development and use of its virtual training devices in  operational training plans has gaps.

The Marine Corps Has Taken Some Steps to Integrate Virtual Training Devices into Operational Training

The Marine Corps has taken some steps to integrate virtual training  devices into operational training and has other efforts under way. In 2013,  we reported that the Marine Corps did not have information on the  performance and cost of virtual training that would assist the service in  assessing and comparing the benefits of virtual training as it sought to  optimize the mix of live and virtual training to meet requirements and  prioritize training investments. We also found that the Marine Corps had  not developed overall metrics or indicators to measure how the use of  virtual training devices had contributed to improving the effectiveness of  training, or identified a methodology to identify the costs associated with  using virtual training. We recommended that the Marine Corps develop  outcome-oriented performance metrics for assessing the effect of virtual  training on improving performance or proficiency and develop a  methodology to identify the costs of virtual training in order to compare  the costs of using live and virtual training. Further, in 2015 the  Commandant of the Marine Corps issued guidance that stated the service  will focus on better leveraging virtual training technology and that all types  of Marine Corps forces should make extensive use of virtual training  where appropriate.

In response to our recommendations and the Commandant’s guidance, in  2015 the Marine Corps Training and Education Command created a  Simulation Assessment Working Group with stakeholders from across the  Marine Corps to identify training events that could be supported by virtual  training devices and incorporate those devices into Training and  Readiness manuals. The working group found that over 7,000 of the  12,000 training events reviewed could use a virtual training device to  either fully or partially meet the training standard of that event. The group  also identified 135 events that may only be performed using the virtual  training device or must be performed with the device as a prerequisite to  live training. Based on the results of the working group, Training and  Education Command updated the corresponding unit-specific Training  and Readiness manuals to identify where a training event could be  completed using a virtual training device. While this action represents  some progress toward better incorporating virtual training devices into  operational training, our recommendations remain open because the  Marine Corps’ efforts to develop specific outcome-oriented performance  metrics to assess virtual training or a methodology to make more- informed comparisons between the costs of live and virtual training are  not yet complete. According to a senior Training and Education  Command official, the Marine Corps is working to update its training  information management system to better capture this information.

In 2015, the Marine Corps also issued a Concept of Operations  (CONOPS) for the United States Marine Corps Live, Virtual, and  Constructive – Training Environment (LVC-TE) (hereafter referred to as  Concept of Operations) that is intended to describe the live, virtual, and  constructive training environment based on operational requirements in  sufficient detail to continue the development of this training capability.  According to the Concept of Operations, the goal in implementing the live,  virtual, and constructive training environment is to expand training  opportunities, reduce training costs, improve safety, and maintain high  levels of proficiency and readiness. The Concept of Operations estimates  that the live, virtual, and constructive training environment will be  implemented in 2022.

Lastly, the Marine Corps has an ongoing effort to better inform users of  the availability of virtual training devices that support ground-based units.  Specifically, the Marine Corps Training and Education Command is  developing a Ground Training Simulations Implementation Plan that is  intended to provide a framework for the use of current and future virtual  training devices for ground units. The Ground Training Simulations  Implementation Plan is modeled after the processes used by the Marine  Corps’ aviation community to integrate simulators into aviation training.  The Marine Corps estimates that the plan will be finalized in the summer  of 2017. According to a Training and Education Command official  involved in the plan’s development, the plan will help address a challenge  the Marine Corps has faced in educating commanders on the availability  and capabilities of available virtual training devices. This challenge is  consistent with information we gathered during our visit to selected  Marine Corps installations. Officials at the two Battle Simulation Centers  we visited, for example, told us that unit commanders do not always know  what virtual training devices are available and how they can be used to  meet training requirements.

Marine Corps Process to Manage the Development and Use of Virtual Training Devices in Operational Training Plans Has Gaps

The Marine Corps process to manage the development and use of virtual  training devices in operational training plans has gaps due to a lack of  guidance. Specifically, the Marine Corps does not (1) include  consideration of critical factors for integrating virtual training devices into  operational training in its front-end planning to support the acquisition of  its virtual training devices, (2) consistently consider expected and actual  usage data for virtual training devices to support its investment decisions,  or (3) consistently evaluate the effectiveness of its virtual training devices  for operational training.

The Marine Corps’ process for conducting front-end planning and  analysis to support the acquisition of its virtual training devices does not  include consideration of critical factors for integrating virtual training  devices into operational training, such as the specific training tasks the  device is intended to address, how the device would be used to meet  proficiency goals, or available time for units to train with the device.  DOD’s Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the  Department of Defense states that the right mix of live, virtual, and  constructive training capabilities will depend on training tasks and  objectives, required proficiency, and available training time, among other  factors. In addition, we have previously found that part of the front-end  analysis process for training and development programs should include a  determination of the skills and competencies in need of training and how  training will build proficiency for those skills and competencies.

Based on our analysis of the Marine Corps’ front-end planning documents  (called system development documents) for the six virtual training devices  included in our review, we found that documentation for five of the six  devices did not include specific training tasks. In addition, the  documentation for two devices specified that specific training tasks would  be identified during the verification and validation phase, which is a type  of analysis that typically takes place after the device has already been  acquired, according to a senior Training and Education Command  official. While the documentation for all of the devices included a high- level discussion of relevant mission areas, documentation for five out of  six devices did not identify specific training tasks, such as specific training  events in a unit’s Training and Readiness manual, that the device was  intended to address. For example, documentation for the Combined Arms  Command and Control Training Upgrade System includes a high-level  discussion of mission areas that the device supports, such as force  application, command and control, and battlespace awareness. It also  states that the device is to support training events, but it does not specify  what those events are. In addition, none of the system development  documents we reviewed identified proficiency goals or considered  available training time for the units to use the device.

According to officials at Training and Education Command, many virtual  training devices in the Marine Corps’ inventory were developed based on  urgent needs to meet capability gaps identified by warfighters and were  not based on training requirements. Of the six devices included in our  review, three of the devices were acquired to meet urgent warfighter  needs—the Family of Egress Trainers—Modular Amphibious Egress  Trainer, the Operator Driver Simulator, and the Supporting Arms Virtual  Trainer. However, the system development documents we reviewed for  those three devices were completed after the devices had been fielded to  meet the urgent needs, but still did not identify specific training tasks or  proficiency goals, or consider available training time for the units to use  the device. Moreover, the system development documents for two of the  remaining three devices we reviewed did not contain this information.

While the Marine Corps did not identify and assess these factors in the  front-end planning process, the Marine Corps has begun taking steps to  identify these factors through efforts such as the Simulation Assessment  Working Group. However, these efforts are occurring after the devices  have already been acquired and fielded, leading to decisions that have  potential cost implications. For example, in its analysis, the Simulation  Assessment Working Group did not fully consider alternative devices that  could be used to achieve specific training tasks because its methodology  was to identify the one virtual training device that was considered the  “best in breed” simulator for conducting each training event rather than  considering all devices that could be used for the event, including those  that might be more cost-effective. Officials at II MEF told us that this  methodology did not include an evaluation of the device’s cost compared  to other devices that could achieve similar training outcomes. For  example, these officials told us that the Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer  was identified as a “best in breed” device for a number of training events,  including calls for fire and close air support. However, these officials  stated that the Deployable Virtual Training Environment device is a lower- cost alternative that could achieve similar outcomes for many of the  training events that do not require the level of realism provided by the  Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer. Based on information provided by  Training and Education Command, the acquisition cost for the Supporting  Arms Virtual Trainer is about $4.5 million per system while the acquisition  cost for the Deployable Virtual Training Environment laptop is around  $3,700 (see fig. 6).

The Marine Corps’ front-end planning process to support the acquisition  of virtual training devices has gaps because the service does not have  specific policies to ensure the process considers key factors. Specifically,  Navy and Marine Corps acquisition policies we reviewed do not require  that front-end planning consider specific training tasks the device is  intended to address, how the device would be used to meet proficiency  goals, or available time for units to train with the device. Training and  Education Command officials acknowledged the gaps in the Marine  Corps’ process and stated that the front-end process for future device  acquisitions would identify specific training tasks that a device will  address. However, without guidance that specifically addresses these  factors, the Marine Corps does not have a reasonable basis to ensure  that it is acquiring the right number and type of virtual training devices to  meet its operational training needs.

The Marine Corps does not consistently consider expected and actual  usage data for virtual training devices to support its investment decisions.  Our prior work has found that agencies should establish measures that  they can use in assessing training programs, such as expected training  hours, which reflect the usage rates of the training program. However,  the Marine Corps did not establish expected usage rates in its system  development documents for five of the six virtual training devices included  in our review, and a senior Training and Education Command official said  it also has not established expected usage rates since acquiring the  devices. For example, the system development document for the  Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer stated that the usage of the device could  replace up to 33 percent of the live-fire missions required to retain annual  currency, but the document does not specify that units are expected to  use the device to replace that high of a percentage of the live-fire  missions. As a result, the Marine Corps does not have a baseline against  which to assess actual usage of the device. Only the system development  document for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare  Simulation included usage targets, stating that usage is expected to be  extensive and estimates that the device will be used for 700 hours per  system per year. However, the system development documents for the  other four devices we reviewed did not include any information on  expected usage rates.

Additionally, the Marine Corps has not consistently collected actual usage  data for its virtual training devices, which could be used to inform  continued investments in existing virtual training devices. During our  review, a senior Marine Corps Training and Education Command official  told us that Training and Education Command collects data for about two- thirds of the Marine Corps’ total inventory of virtual training devices, but usage data are not available for certain devices. More specifically, the  Marine Corps provided usage data for three of the six devices that were  included in our review, but it was unable to provide usage data for certain  systems, such as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare  Simulation and the Combined Arms Command and Control Training  Upgrade System. This official stated that contractors collect data on these  devices, but there is no Marine Corps’ system to collect data on the  number of Marines or hours trained. Specifically, contractors submit  spreadsheets on a monthly basis showing the number of Marines who  have used the device, but these data are not included in any formal  reports and there is no standard database for collecting or evaluating  them.

The Marine Corps has not considered actual usage data in its decision  making for additional investments in certain virtual training devices,  despite low usage rates for a number of those devices. For example,  according to available contractor data, actual usage for the Operator  Driver Simulator was significantly lower than the current available hours.  Based on data provided by Training and Education Command, the  Operator Driver Simulator was used for approximately 7,600 hours in  fiscal year 2015 and 5,600 hours in fiscal year 2016, but was available for  use for approximately 192,000 hours. However, based on the results of  the Simulation Assessment Working Group, Training and Education  Command estimated that to accomplish all training events linked to the  Operator Driver Simulator would require about 570,000 available training  hours. As a result, the Simulator Assessment Working Group  recommended various investment options for the Operator Driver  Simulator that ranged from $56 million to $121 million, despite the current  low utilization and excess capacity. Officials from Training and Education  Command told us that they anticipate an increase in user demand for the  Operator Driver Simulator based on guidance from the Commandant of  the Marine Corps to make driver certification more rigorous. However,  officials from Marine Corps Systems Command stated that current  Operator Driver Simulators have deficiencies in supporting driver training  and, therefore, Marines choose to drive live vehicles instead.

The Marine Corps has not considered expected and actual usage of its  virtual training devices to support investment decisions due to a lack of  guidance on establishing and collecting usage data. Marine Corps  training guidance for ground units states that virtual training devices shall  be used, as applicable, when constraints limit the use of realistic training  conditions, but it does not identify the extent to which virtual training  devices are expected to be used. Without guidance on setting usage- rate expectations and assessing actual usage, the Marine Corps risks  sustained investment in virtual training devices that do not meet  operational training needs.

We also found that the Marine Corps was not consistently evaluating the  effectiveness of its virtual training devices to accomplish operational  training. Our prior work has shown that agencies need to develop  processes that systematically plan for and evaluate the effectiveness of  their training and development efforts. These evaluations should include  data measures, both quantitative and qualitative, to assess training  results in areas such as increased user proficiency. Further, evaluations  of training effectiveness should be used to make decisions on whether  resources should be reallocated or redirected.

The Marine Corps uses the verification and validation report process as  its primary assessment of a virtual training device after it has been  fielded, according to the senior Training and Education Command official  with whom we spoke. However, based on our review of postfielding  analyses for the virtual training devices included in our review, we found  that the Marine Corps does not have a consistent process for selecting  devices for which to complete these analyses or how the analysis should  be conducted. More specifically, we were provided with verification and  validation reports for only three of the six devices in our review—the  Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer, the Family of Egress Trainers—Modular  Amphibious Egress Trainer, and the Operator Driver Simulator—as well  as plans to complete these reports for two other devices. According to a  senior Training and Education Command official, Training and Education  Command considers certain factors to prioritize the completion of verification and validation reports, such as planned investments for major  upgrades on a device. The official also stated that Training and Education  Command prioritized completing reports for these virtual training devices  to specifically align with recommendations made by the Simulation  Assessment Working Group. However, the Simulation Assessment  Working Group does not take place on a recurrent basis, and therefore  the recommendations from the group do not establish a process for  prioritizing future verification and validation reports. Officials from Marine  Corps Systems Command told us that program managers are now trying  to perform verification and validation reports for future acquisitions prior to  full acceptance of the training systems, but that this step is not  mandatory.

Additionally, there is not a consistent process to include training  effectiveness evaluations within the verification and validation report itself.  The verification and validation process is not required to include an  evaluation of effectiveness based on current guidance, but as noted in  the verification and validation report for the Family of Egress Trainers— Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer, such an evaluation is essential to  determine whether the capabilities of a virtual training device satisfy  requirements to improve training performance and combat readiness. In  two instances, the verification and validation reports for the Operator  Driver Simulator and Family of Egress Trainers—Modular Amphibious  Egress Trainer both included evaluations of the effectiveness of the  devices in improving user proficiency, which concluded that the devices  enabled Marines to successfully pass related training courses. In another  instance, the Marine Corps did not conduct a training effectiveness  analysis as part of the verification and validation process. Specifically, for  the Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer, Marine Corps Systems Command  attempted to conduct a training effectiveness evaluation, but training  activity data for a statistically significant sampling of the target training  audience were unavailable, which suggests the need for improved data  on device usage.

We further found that the training effectiveness evaluations that the  Marine Corps did complete differed in how they were conducted, which  can affect the quality of the information the evaluations provide. For  example, the training effectiveness evaluation for the Operator Driver  Simulator was conducted to determine whether the device effectively  trained Marines to perform tasks required for one specific training and  readiness event. The methodology included collecting training activity  data from 1 fiscal year in one location and for one of the Operator Driver  Simulator vehicle variants. The report noted that conducting a more- complete evaluation, along with additional data collection, would better  identify opportunities to improve and enhance training. In contrast, the  training effectiveness evaluation for the Family of Egress Trainers— Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer also collected training activity data,  but collected data from multiple training sites and for all training courses  conducted during the 1-year period used for the evaluation. According to  officials from Marine Corps Systems Command, the effectiveness  evaluation methods may vary based on the type of training being  executed and how well the training requirements are defined. These  officials stated that when the device’s training requirements have been  more thoroughly defined, the effectiveness evaluation can be more  targeted.

The Navy and Marine Corps acquisition policy and guidance documents  we reviewed do not establish a process to consistently evaluate the  training effectiveness of virtual training devices, including identifying the  devices to be evaluated and determining what data should be collected  and assessed. According to a senior Training and Education Command  official, evaluating effectiveness is not a required part of the verification  and validation process and is an area that needs to be addressed. The  Marine Corps’ Concept of Operations also identified a lack of guidance for  conducting effectiveness analyses. Specifically, the Concept of  Operations identifies a lack of policy guiding live, virtual, and constructive  training capabilities and benefits. It also identifies a training gap on the  linkages between live, virtual, and constructive training, as well as a  policy gap around the lack of guidance on analysis of virtual training  devices after they have been fielded. Without guidance establishing a  well-defined process to consistently evaluate the effectiveness of virtual  training devices for training—including the selection of devices, guidelines  on conducting the analysis, and the data that should be collected and  assessed—the Marine Corps risks investing in devices whose value to  operational training is undetermined.

The Navy and Marine Corps have identified the need to rebuild the  capability to conduct amphibious operations and to reinvigorate naval  integration between the services toward that end. However, the Navy and  Marine Corps have not completed efforts needed to mitigate their training  shortfalls for amphibious operations. Specifically, the services have not  developed an approach to prioritize available training resources,  systematically evaluate among training resource alternatives to achieve  amphibious operations priorities, and monitor progress toward achieving  them. Without such an approach, the services are not well positioned to  mitigate existing amphibious operations training shortfalls and begin to  rebuild their amphibious capability as the services await the arrival of  additional amphibious ships into the fleet. In addition, while the Navy and  Marine Corps have taken a number of positive steps to improve  coordination between the two services, they need to define and articulate  common outcomes for naval integration. This first critical step will enable  them to fully incorporate other leading collaboration practices aimed at a  common purpose, such as developing a joint strategy; more fully  establishing compatible policies, procedures, and systems; better  leveraging resources; and establishing mechanisms to monitor results  that are needed to achieve service-level goals for naval integration and to  align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.  Further, the Marine Corps’ process to integrate virtual training devices  into operational training has gaps. Developing guidance for the  development and use of virtual training devices would help close these  gaps, which is critical as virtual training will become increasingly  important to the development of the capability of Marines, including the  capability for conducting amphibious operations, among other mission  areas.

To better mitigate amphibious operations training shortfalls, we  recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, in  coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the  Marine Corps, to develop an approach, such as building upon the  Amphibious Operations Training Requirements review, to prioritize  available training resources, systematically evaluate among training  resource alternatives to achieve amphibious operations priorities, and  monitor progress toward achieving them.

To achieve desired goals and align efforts to maximize training  opportunities for amphibious operations, we recommend the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Chief of  Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, to clarify the  organizations responsible and time frames to define and articulate  common outcomes for naval integration, and use those outcomes to develop a joint strategy; more fully establish compatible policies, procedures, and systems; better leverage training resources; and establish mechanisms to monitor results.

To more effectively and efficiently integrate virtual training devices into  operational training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance for the  development and use of virtual training devices that includes developing requirements for virtual training devices that consider and  document training tasks and objectives, required proficiency, and  available training time;  setting target usage rates and collecting usage data; and  conducting effectiveness analysis of virtual training devices that  defines a consistent process for performing the analysis, including the  selection of the devices to be evaluated, guidelines on conducting the  analysis, and the data that should be collected and assessed.

We provided a draft of the classified report to DOD for review and  comment. The department’s comments on the classified report are  reprinted in Appendix II. In its comments, DOD concurred with all three  recommendations. DOD stated that it will review the status of actions the  Navy and Marine Corps plan to take in response to all three  recommendations within the next twelve months.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Secretary of the Navy, and  the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information,  please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report are to determine the extent to which (1) the  Navy and Marine Corps have completed training for amphibious  operations priorities and taken steps to mitigate any training shortfalls, (2)  the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to improve naval integration for  amphibious operations incorporate leading collaborative practices, and  (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected virtual training devices into  its operational training.

This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued in  August 2017. DOD deemed some of the information in our August report  to be classified, which must be protected from loss, compromise, or  inadvertent disclosure. Therefore, this report omits classified information  on select Marine Corps units’ ability to complete training for amphibious  operations. Although the information provided in this report is more  limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the classified report  and uses the same methodology.

We focused our review on Navy and Marine Corps organizations and  units that have a role in the development and execution of training  requirements for amphibious operations. For the Navy, we focused on  the training requirements and accomplished training for amphibious ships.  For the Marine Corps, we focused on selected active-component units  that have identified training requirement for amphibious operations,  including Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and other units with a  mission-essential task for amphibious operations. We selected a  nongeneralizable sample of 23 Marine Corps units to speak with in order  to interview geographically dispersed units under each Marine  Expeditionary Force, as well as units across all elements of the Marine  Air-Ground Task Force (i.e., command, ground combat, aviation combat,  and logistics combat forces). See below for the list of 23 Marine Corps  units. We focused on the Marine Corps’ integration of virtual training  devices into operational training because the Navy does not have virtual  training devices that simulate amphibious operations, including ship-to- shore movement, according to Navy officials. In addition, we focused on  Marine Corps virtual training devices that are used to support the  command and ground elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. We  selected a nongeneralizable sample of six virtual training devices based  on the target training audience, applicability to amphibious operations  training, location, and type of training events (individual or collective  training) for which the devices are used. The devices included in our  review are the Combined Arms Command and Control Training Upgrade  System, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation,  Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer, Amphibious Assault Vehicle Turret  Trainer, Family of Egress Trainers—Modular Amphibious Egress Trainer,  and Operator Driver Simulator.

To determine the extent to which the Navy and Marine Corps have  completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to  mitigate any training shortfalls, we analyzed deployment certification  reports for all Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)—Marine Expeditionary  Unit (MEU) deployments over the most-recent 3-year period. We also  analyzed unit-level readiness data for all Marine Corps’ infantry  battalions, assault amphibian vehicle battalions, Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft  squadrons, and Marine Expeditionary Brigades over the most-recent 3- year period—from fiscal years 2014 through 2016—and compared those  data against unit-level training requirements for amphibious operations.  We analyzed 3 years of training data because training requirements for  Marine Corps units are reviewed and updated on a 3-year cycle. We  performed data-reliability procedures on the unit-level readiness data by  comparing the data against related documentation and surveying  knowledgeable officials on controls over reporting systems and  determined that the data presented in our findings were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report. We interviewed Navy and Marine  Corps officials to discuss any factors that limited their ability to conduct  training for amphibious operations. We assessed the reliability of data on  amphibious ship requests by speaking with knowledgeable officials and  determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of  presenting the number of actual requests submitted and fulfilled. In  addition, we reviewed processes and initiatives established by the Navy  and Marine Corps to identify and assess training shortfalls for amphibious  operations, including the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Operations Training  Requirements review, and evaluated these processes and initiatives  against our prior work on strategic training and risk management.

To determine the extent to which the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to  improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading  collaboration practices, we reviewed the Navy and Marine Corps  documents, including A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower  and the Marine Corps Operating Concept, that discuss the goal of  improving naval integration. We also reviewed mechanisms that have  been established to coordinate training, including campaign plans for  amphibious operations; observed a working group focused on amphibious  operations; and interviewed officials with both services to discuss efforts  to improve naval integration. We assessed the extent to which the Navy’s  and Marine Corps’ efforts toward improving naval integration have  followed leading practices for collaboration that we have identified in our  prior work. Specifically, we have identified eight practices described in  our prior work that can help enhance and sustain collaboration. We  selected seven of the eight practices most relevant to issues we identified  in our prior work on collaboration to assess the status of Navy and Marine  Corps collaborative efforts to improve naval integration. Based on our  analysis, we selected the following seven practices: define and articulate  a common outcome; establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies;  identify and address needs by leveraging resources; agree on roles and  responsibilities; establish compatible policies, procedures, and other  means to operate across agency boundaries; develop mechanisms to  monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and reinforce agency  accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.

To determine the extent to which the Marine Corps has integrated  selected virtual training devices into its operational training, we collected  information on the development, usage, and evaluation of virtual training  devices, and their integration into operational training plans. We reviewed  documentation on actions the Marine Corps has taken to integrate its  virtual training devices into operational training, including documentation  on the Simulation Assessment Working Groups and the Ground Training  Systems Plan. We reviewed DOD and Marine Corps acquisition policies  and interviewed Marine Corps officials responsible for the acquisition and  oversight of virtual training devices at Training and Education Command  and Marine Corps Systems Command and officials responsible for  management of the virtual training devices at the Battle Simulation  Centers at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Camp Pendleton,  California. We reviewed acquisition documents for each of the selected  devices, including Capability Production Documents and Capability  Development Documents, and assessed the extent to which these  documents included key information as identified in leading practices for  managing strategic training and DOD’s Strategic Plan for the Next  Generation of Training for the Department of Defense. We also reviewed  documentation on the Marine Corps process to include expected and  actual usage data for virtual training devices to support investment  decisions. Further, we reviewed analyses conducted after the selected  devices had been fielded through Verification and Validation Reports and  evaluated the extent these documents assessed the effectiveness of the  virtual training devices for improving user proficiency.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from May 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  subsequently worked with DOD from August 2017 to September 2017 to  prepare this unclassified version of the original classified report for public  release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these  standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact name above, Matthew Ullengren, Assistant  Director; Russell Bryan; William Carpluk; Ron La Due Lake; Joanne  Landesman; Kelly Liptan; Shahrzad Nikoo; and Roxanna Sun made key  contributions to this report.