Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Position the Navy and the Marine Corps to Support Expanding Unmanned Systems Operations

The Department of the Navy has committed to rapidly grow its unmanned systems portfolio. It currently has at least 24 types of systems and has budgeted nearly $10 billion for their development and procurement for fiscal years 2018-2022. Personnel who launch, navigate, and recover the systems are integral to effective operations. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's and the Marine Corps' strategies for unmanned system operators. GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which the Navy and the Marine Corps have (1) evaluated workforce alternatives (such as the use of civilians and contractors) for unmanned system operators and (2) developed and updated personnel requirements and related policies and goals for selected unmanned systems. GAO compared documentation on unmanned systems with DOD policies and conducted discussion groups with unmanned system operators.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are rapidly growing their portfolios of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and unmanned maritime systems and have opted to use military personnel as operators without evaluating alternatives, such as federal civilian employees and private sector contractors. Service officials stated that civilians or contractors are not viable alternatives and policies are unclear about when and how to use them. However, a June 2016 Department of Defense-commissioned study found that alternative staffing strategies could meet the UAS mission more cost-effectively. Military personnel may be the most appropriate option for unmanned systems, but without clarifying policies to identify circumstances in which civilians and contractors may serve in operational roles, the services could continue to make workforce decisions that do not consider all available resources.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have sufficient personnel requirements or efforts underway to develop personnel requirements for seven unmanned systems that GAO reviewed (see fig.), but requirements for one system (i.e., the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS) have not been updated. That system's requirements have not been updated because service entities disagree about whether they are sufficient. Since 2015, units have deployed with about two to three times the personnel that headquarters and command officials expected they would need. Marine Corps officials stated that the Blackjack's personnel requirements were based on an outdated concept of operations and are insufficient for supporting workloads. Without updating the personnel requirements for the Blackjack UAS, the services will lack current information about the number of personnel needed.

The Department of the Navy has taken positive steps but has not fully evaluated and updated aviation policies that affect personnel requirements for certain UAS and lacks clear goals for informing future requirements for all of its UASs. GAO found that the policies do not fully account for differences between UASs of varying sizes and capabilities. These policies require, for example, that the Blackjack UAS be held to the same maintenance standards designed for larger aircraft and UAS, which in turn affects personnel requirements. Until the Department of the Navy evaluates and updates such policies and clarifies related goals, the services will be hampered in developing and updating future requirements as unmanned system inventories grow and operations expand.

GAO is making ten recommendations, including that the Navy and the Marine Corps clarify policies to identify circumstances in which civilians and contractors may serve in operational roles and apply the policies to future evaluations; update personnel requirements for one UAS; and evaluate and update policies and goals to inform future personnel requirements. DOD concurred with eight recommendations and partially concurred with two. As discussed in the report, GAO continues to believe that all ten are warranted.

The Navy’s top senior leaders have emphasized the growing importance  of unmanned systems to future fleet operations. In 2015, for example, the  Secretary of the Navy established a Deputy Assistant Secretary for  Unmanned Systems and announced that the F-35 Lightning II will likely  be the last manned strike fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will  buy or fly. The Chief of Naval Operations announced in 2017 that the  future of the Navy includes unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater  systems as an integral part of the future fleet and that these systems  must be purchased in large numbers in order to expand the Navy’s  presence in key areas. To fulfill its commitment to rapidly grow its  portfolio of unmanned systems, the Department of the Navy included  nearly $10 billion in its budget for fiscal years 2018 through 2022 for  unmanned aerial systems (UAS), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and  unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). The Navy also committed to  tailoring policies to support expeditious acquisition processes. The  Department of the Navy has at least 24 different types of unmanned  systems in various stages of development, testing, and fielding to units.

Despite their name, “unmanned” systems require personnel who are  integral to performing their missions. Operator personnel are needed to  transit, launch, navigate, and recover unmanned systems and control and  monitor their payloads (e.g., sensors for identifying terrain or targets);  maintainers are needed to perform preventive and corrective  maintenance tasks; and other support personnel are needed for post- mission analyses of data the systems gather. According to DOD policy,  the initial steps in planning for personnel requirements include  determining categories of eligible personnel (i.e., military servicemembers  or the other two workforce alternatives of federal civilian employees and  private sector contractors) based on whether the activities to be  performed are “inherently governmental” or “commercial.” The next step  involves the identification of the appropriate and cost-effective  combination of eligible personnel categories (i.e., workforce mix). Military  servicemembers and federal civilians must be considered before the  services may consider using private sector contractors as a workforce  alternative to perform a function. Following that step are analyses of the  numbers of personnel required and the staffing approaches needed to fill  personnel requirements.

Since 2001, we have identified the strategic management of human  capital as a high-risk area across the government in part because of the  mission-critical skills gaps within the federal workforce that pose a high  risk to the nation by impeding the government from cost-effectively  serving the public and achieving results. Related to the UAS workforces,  we issued multiple reports from 2014 through 2017 on the Army’s and the  Air Force’s personnel strategies for UAS operators. For example, in  January 2017 we reported that neither the Air Force nor the Army had  evaluated its UAS operator workforce mix to determine an effective and  efficient mix of personnel for meeting mission needs. We recommended  that the Air Force and the Army evaluate their workforce mix and the use  of federal civilians for UAS pilot positions and conduct cost analyses  consistent with Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. DOD concurred  with both recommendations but has not yet implemented them. A list of  related products is included at the end of this report.

A Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying a proposed  bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017  includes a provision for us to review the Department of the Navy’s  personnel strategies for unmanned systems, including UASs, USVs, and  UUVs. This report addresses the extent to which the Navy and the  Marine Corps have (1) evaluated workforce alternatives for their  unmanned system operators, including the use of federal civilian  employees and private sector contractors; (2) developed and updated  personnel requirements and related policies and goals that affect  requirements for operators, maintainers, and other support personnel for  selected unmanned systems; and (3) developed approaches for staffing  unmanned system operators to meet personnel requirements.

For these objectives, we used a case study approach to review the  Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ evaluations of workforce alternatives,  development and updates of personnel requirements and related policies  and goals, and staffing approaches for selected unmanned systems. Of  24 Navy and the Marine Corps unmanned systems in development as  programs of record in calendar year 2016, we selected: four UASs—the  Navy’s MQ-4 Triton, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-25 Stingray, and the Marine  Corps’ RQ-21 Blackjack; two USVs—the Unmanned Influence Sweep  System and the Mine Countermeasures USV—associated with the  Navy’s littoral combat ships; and two types of Navy UUVs—the MK 18  family of UUV systems and the Snakehead Large Displacement UUV— based on their size and missions. While the UUV case study findings  are not generalizable, they provide illustrative examples for each  objective. In appendix I, we provide additional information on each of  these eight unmanned systems.

For objective one, we compared any Navy and Marine Corps efforts to  evaluate workforce alternatives—specifically the use of federal civilian  employees and private security contractors—for operators of unmanned  systems with two DOD policies: (1) DOD Directive 1100.4, Guidance for  Manpower Management and (2) DOD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and  Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix. DOD Directive 1100.4  directs that authorities should consider all available sources when  determining workforce mix. DOD Instruction 1100.22 directs the steps  that workforce planning authorities must take in planning for personnel  requirements. We analyzed documentation on the services’ efforts to  evaluate alternative workforces for unmanned system operator positions,  and interviewed knowledgeable officials about such evaluations and any  reasons for not evaluating workforce alternatives. We also compared the  services’ respective policies on workforce planning with DOD policies and  with federal internal controls standards that emphasize the importance of  having clear, updated policies that align with an organization’s mission  and goals. Finally, we reviewed DOD-commissioned workforce mix  studies and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) to identify benefits  and limitations of the different personnel categories as workforce  alternatives.

For objective two, we reviewed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ efforts  to develop and update personnel requirements for our selected case  study systems and interviewed knowledgeable service officials about their  perception of the sufficiency of those personnel requirements for  supporting training and deployment requirements. We compared  requirements documents with DOD Directive 1100.4, which states that  personnel requirements should be driven by workload and established at  the minimum levels necessary to accomplish mission and performance  objectives, and with Navy Instruction 1000.16L. The Navy instruction  states that personnel requirements must be validated as program  changes dictate and at a minimum annually over a system’s lifecycle to  determine if a personnel update is required. We also compared the life  cycle cost estimate for the RQ-21 Blackjack with DOD Instruction  5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, and with Office of  Management and Budget guidance. DOD Instruction 5000.02 requires  that components determine a weapon system program’s life cycle cost by  planning for the many factors needed to support the system, including  personnel. The Office of Management and Budget guidance states that to  keep the cost analyses for capital assets, such as weapon systems,  current, accurate, and valid, cost estimating should be continuously  updated based on the latest information available as programs mature.

We also reviewed the Navy’s policies on operating and maintaining UAS  and documentation from the Marine Corps about any effects of those  policies on personnel workload, and interviewed service officials about  any effects and efforts to review and update policies. We then compared  those efforts with DOD policy and with federal internal controls standards  that emphasize the importance of having clear, updated policies that align  with an organization’s mission and goals. Finally, we compared goals  established in DOD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013- 2038 and Department of the Navy strategy documents on unmanned  systems with federal internal controls standards that state than an  agency’s management should define goals clearly to enable the  identification of risk.

For objective three, we reviewed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’  approaches for selecting, training, and tracking unmanned system  operators to identify any challenges. We also reviewed Navy reports and  Marine Corps data on operator inventory and retention levels relative to  the services’ requirements and goals. Specifically, we reviewed Navy  reports on the retention of certain aviation personnel to serve as UAS  operators for fiscal years 2015 through 2017 because data from earlier  years were less relevant given the lower numbers of UAS inventories. We  requested data from the Marine Corps on its inventories of and  requirements for enlisted UAS operators for fiscal years 2007 through  2017, and on UAS officers for fiscal years 2013 (the first year of available  data) through 2017. We requested retention data—actual numbers of  personnel who reenlisted versus annual quotas—on enlisted UAS  operators for fiscal years 2010 (the earliest year for which data were  available) through 2017.

We assessed the reliability of the Marine Corps’ data by administering  questionnaires to obtain information on the quality control measures in  place to ensure that the data systems record, track, and report reliable  data, and by interviewing knowledgeable officials and manually testing  the data for errors and omissions. We found the data to be sufficiently  reliable for our purposes of describing personnel inventory trends and the  sufficiency of operator personnel to meet requirements. We found that the  retention data are of undetermined reliability but are reporting them  because they are the data of record used by Marine Corps planning  officials.

We also compared Navy and Marine Corps financial incentives for  retaining personnel as UAS operators with DOD’s 2012 Eleventh  Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, which established that  organizations should assess civilian supply and demand and civilian  wages to determine the most cost-effective special and incentive pay  strategies. We compared any Marine Corps efforts to address workforce  challenges specific to the Marine Corps’ UAS operator career field with a  key principle of strategic human capital planning from our prior work,  which states that agencies should ensure that “flexibilities” are part of  their overall human capital strategy. We interviewed Marine Corps UAS  leaders and conducted discussion groups with UAS operators and  officers from one squadron, selected because of its experience level, to  learn their views about UAS personnel requirements and staffing  approaches and career satisfaction. We provide further details on our  scope and methodology in appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to February  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Unmanned systems provide DOD with capabilities for conducting a range  of military operations, including environmental sensing and battlespace  awareness; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection;  counter-improvised explosive device capabilities; port security; precision  targeting; and precision strike. DOD’s unmanned systems operate in  different warfighting “domains” ranging from air, land, and maritime  environments. As shown in figure 1, DOD categorizes its unmanned  systems into five groups by domain (i.e., aerial and maritime, including  surface and underwater) and other attributes of size and capability.

Group 1 UASs weigh fewer than 20 pounds and operate below 1,200 feet  in altitude, whereas group 5 UASs weigh more than 1,320 pounds and  operate above 18,000 feet. Similarly, USVs are categorized in five  groups, increasing in size and capability from very small to extra-large,  and UUVs are categorized in four groups—small, medium, large, and  extra-large.

Organizational Roles and Responsibilities for Evaluating Workforces

Various offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the  Department of the Navy have roles and responsibilities for evaluating the  appropriate mix of personnel for the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ total  workforces.

According to Section 129a of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs  DOD’s general policy for total force management, the Secretary of  Defense is required to establish policies and procedures for determining  the most appropriate and cost efficient mix of military, federal civilian, and  contractor personnel to perform the missions of the department. Section  2463 of Title 10 mandates the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel  and Readiness (USD(P&R)) to devise and implement guidelines and  procedures to ensure consideration is given to using DOD civilian  employees to perform new functions and functions that are performed by  contractors and could be performed by civilian employees.

DOD policies also establish roles and responsibilities for the USD(P&R):

DOD Directive 1100.4 establishes departmental policy concerning  workforce management, including multiple responsibilities for the  USD(P&R) (e.g., reviewing the workforce management guidelines and  practices of DOD components for compliance with established  policies and guidance).

DOD Instruction 1100.22 implements policy set forth under DOD  Directive 1100.4; assigns responsibilities; and prescribes procedures  for determining the appropriate mix of military, federal civilian, and  contractor personnel. The instruction assigns to the USD(P&R) the  responsibility for overseeing the instruction’s implementation and  working with component heads to ensure that they establish policies  and procedures consistent with this instruction.

DOD Instruction 7041.04 states that DOD’s USD(P&R), the  Comptroller, and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation are responsible for developing a DOD-wide cost model for  estimating and comparing the full costs of DOD workforce and  contract support.

Section 129a of title 10 of the U.S. Code directs the Secretary of Defense  to delegate responsibility for the implementation of policies and  procedures established by the Secretary to the Secretaries of the military  departments. In accordance with this delegation, the Secretary of the  Navy has overall responsibility for requirements determination, planning,  programming, and budgeting for policies and procedures for determining  the appropriate and cost-effective mix of personnel.

DOD policies establish the following roles and responsibilities for the  military department Secretaries, including the Secretary of the Navy and  heads of other DOD components:

DOD Directive 1100.4 requires the component heads to designate an  individual with full authority for workforce management, to include  responsibility for, among other things, developing annual personnel  requests to Congress considering the advantages of converting from  one form of support (active or reserve military servicemembers,  federal civilians, or private sector contractors) to another for the  performance of a specified function, consistent with section 129a of  the U.S. Code.

DOD Instruction 1100.22 establishes that the component heads  should require that their designated workforce authority issue  implementing guidance requiring the use of the instruction when  determining workforce mix for current, new, or expanded missions.

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.7R assigns authority for workforce  management in the Department of the Navy, including workforce mix issues, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve  Affairs.

Navy and Marine Corps Processes for Determining and Staffing Personnel Requirements

Concurrently with a weapon system’s development through DOD’s  acquisition process, the Navy and the Marine Corps determine the  numbers and types of personnel and skills required for their unmanned  systems. The personnel requirements development process generally  begins with the program manager from a Navy systems command (e.g.,  Naval Air Systems Command for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and  Naval Sea Systems Command for ships and submarines) that is  responsible for supervising the management of assigned acquisition  programs. The program manager and systems command utilize Navy  policies and other inputs to formulate initial requirements. In doing so, the  program manager coordinates any Navy personnel requirements with the  Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and other entities such as the  Navy Personnel Command and commands that will operate and maintain  the systems, such as the U.S. Fleet Forces Command and the  Commander, Naval Air Forces. For Marine Corps aircraft systems, the  program manager from the Naval Air Systems Command coordinates  with Marine Corps headquarters entities, such as the Deputy  Commandant for Aviation and the Deputy Commandant for Combat  Development and Integration. The program manager and systems  command calculate the cost of personnel as part of a system’s total life  cycle cost. The program manager validates personnel requirements as  program changes dictate and at a minimum annually, over a system’s  lifecycle.

The Navy and the Marine Corps staff the units that will operate and  maintain their unmanned systems by filling the required positions to the  extent possible based on the number of positions funded and the number  of trained and qualified personnel available to fill them. This staffing  process is managed by the Navy Personnel Command and in the Marine  Corps by the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Not Evaluated Using Federal Civilian Employees and Private Sector Contractors as Workforce Alternatives for Unmanned System Operators

The Navy and the Marine Corps are in the process of rapidly growing  their portfolios of unmanned systems, but have not evaluated the use of  alternative workforces—specifically the use of federal civilian employees  and private sector contractors as unmanned system operators. DOD  Directive 1100.4 states that authorities should consider all available  sources when determining workforce mix, including federal civilians and  contractors, and personnel shall be designated as federal civilians except  in enumerated circumstances. According to DOD Instruction 1100.22,  the initial steps in planning for personnel requirements include  determining categories of eligible personnel (e.g., military  servicemembers, federal civilian employees, or private sector  contractors). These determinations are based on whether activities to be  performed are “military essential” (the activity must be performed by a  military servicemember), “inherently governmental” (the activity could be  performed by a military servicemember or a federal civilian employee), or  “commercial” (the activity could be performed by military servicemembers,  federal civilians, or private sector contractors). Military servicemembers  and federal civilians must be considered before the services may  consider using contractors to perform a function.

In the absence of workforce alternative analyses, the services have  decided to rely solely on military servicemembers as operator workforces  for all of their unmanned systems, including the eight systems we  reviewed in detail. For all eight case studies, Navy and Marine Corps  officials told us that their decisions to rely on servicemembers as  operators were based on the pre-existing force structure made up of  personnel who were already trained in related mission areas. For seven  of the eight selected systems, the officials stated that they did not  evaluate the use of federal civilians or contractors in their determinations  for using military personnel for their operator workforces. In the case of an  eighth system, the MQ-4 Triton UAS, the Navy evaluated using contractor  personnel, but did so without first considering the use of federal civilian  employees as DOD policy requires. In a 2009 analysis for the Triton, the  Navy concluded that comparisons between the cost-effectiveness of  using military personnel and federal civilian employees were beyond the  expertise of the working group that performed the analysis. Ultimately, the  Navy decided to use military personnel as Triton operators.

According to senior-level officials from OUSD(P&R), there are concerns  within the department about the level of consideration the military  services have applied to workforce mix alternatives for unmanned system  operators. As a result, OUSD(P&R) and other entities from the Office of  the Secretary of Defense commissioned the Institute for Defense  Analyses to conduct a study, which was published in June 2016, on  alternative staffing strategies to enable DOD to accomplish UAS-related  missions more cost-effectively. The study found that staffing alternatives  exist for each service and could produce cost savings. According to the  Institute for Defense Analyses’ report, the use of enlisted personnel for a  portion of the Navy’s and the Air Forces’ UAS operator workforces offers  the potential for savings, as could the use of limited duty officers or  warrant officers. The Institute for Defense Analyses also reported that  federal civilian employees of DOD could generate the most substantial  savings of the options studied if they were used in combination with  military servicemembers as UAS operators responsible for the launch and  recovery of air vehicles. OUSD(P&R) officials stated that this latter  approach would free up military servicemembers to fill key positions for  supporting military readiness in other areas of operations that are military  personnel essential, and better leverage the services’ limited military  personnel end strengths.

In September 2016, OUSD(P&R) issued a proposal for an additional  study of UAS staffing options that stated that the Department of the  Navy’s workforce mix determination (i.e., relying on military  servicemembers as operators) is “immature and infeasible” and that any  recommended approaches should also be applied to unmanned maritime  systems. OUSD(P&R) has also commissioned a study to clarify  circumstances in which military servicemembers should be considered  essential for certain positions, which is expected to be complete by the  end of fiscal year 2018. OUSD(P&R) officials stated that they plan to  continue their efforts to expand awareness of these studies and of the  available workforce mix alternatives for UAS operators with military  service officials.

On the basis of our discussions with Navy and Marine Corps workforce  planners, key reasons for not evaluating workforce alternatives for  unmanned system operators were that planners did not believe it was  necessary, and they did not believe that federal civilian employees or  private sector contractors were viable workforce alternatives to military  servicemembers for such roles and functions. For example, officials cited  concerns that federal civilians cannot serve aboard Navy ships or provide  rapid deployment capability. However, officials from OUSD(P&R) told us  that these concerns are inaccurate, noting that federal civilian employees  have deployed on Navy ships. Further, we note that DOD’s Expeditionary  Civilian Workforce comprises federal civilian employees across DOD  components who are available to deploy within 120 days of notice to meet  urgent requirements. DOD officials responsible for the Expeditionary  Civilian Workforce program stated that such personnel are intended to be  predictable, reliable, and effective so that the military services will source  them and the combatant commands can depend upon them.

Further, service workforce planners stated that relevant service-level  guidance is unclear on when and how such personnel can and should be  considered for performing in operational roles and in deployable  positions. The Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ policies do not provide  details about the types of operational roles specific to a service, including  those related to unmanned system operators, that could be filled with  federal civilians or private sector contractors, nor do the policies provide  guidance on the limitations and benefits of using these personnel  sources, such as those identified in DOD-commissioned reports and our  prior work. For example, military personnel can be the most costly of the  three personnel categories and shortages exist in certain functions that  have been deemed military essential and are in high demand, such as  fighter pilots. On the other hand, federal civilians and private sector  contractors can be cost-effective and may augment military  servicemembers on a short-term basis if needed (see table 1).

Federal internal controls standards emphasize the importance of having  clear, updated policies that align with an organization’s mission and  goals. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs agreed that the cited service policies do  not provide the sort of detail and clarity that could aid planners and  decision makers with determining eligible personnel categories for their  workforces and weighing the benefits and limitations thereof. Clarifying  their respective workforce planning policies could help workforce planners  better understand when, where, and how federal civilians or contractors  may serve in operational roles (e.g., from shore or from underway naval  vessels) and what the benefits and limitations are. The use of military  servicemembers, and not federal civilians or private sector contractors, as  unmanned system operators may indeed be the most appropriate and  cost-effective workforce option for the Navy and the Marine Corps.  However, the services will not have certainty about the basis for such  decisions without first clarifying workforce planning policies and then  applying the revised policies to evaluate the use of all personnel  resources available to them for future unmanned systems.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Not Fully Developed Personnel Requirements for One of Eight Selected Unmanned Systems or Updated Related Policies and Goals

The Navy and the Marine Corps have efforts underway to develop  requirements for operators, maintainers, and other support personnel  needed for selected unmanned systems. According to Navy information,  personnel requirements for three systems are sufficient and the  sufficiency of requirements for four other systems is yet undetermined.  However, the Navy and the Marine Corps have not updated personnel  requirements and the related cost estimate for the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS  based on deployment data. Furthermore, the Department of the Navy has  not fully evaluated and updated policies or clarified goals that may inform  future personnel requirements development and updates to requirements.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Developed Personnel Requirements for Selected Unmanned Systems but Have Not Updated the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS Requirements and Cost Estimate

The Navy and the Marine Corps have efforts underway to develop  requirements for operators, maintainers, and other support personnel  needed for selected unmanned systems, commensurate with each  system’s maturity in DOD’s acquisition process. The USVs associated  with the littoral combat ships, the Snakehead Large Displacement UUV,  and the MQ-25 Stingray UAS are in earlier phases of both acquisition and  personnel requirements development and, according to Navy information,  the precise number of required personnel will be determined and updated  as the systems progress through acquisition. On the other hand, the MK  18 UUVs, MQ-8 Fire Scout UAS, MQ-4 Triton UAS, and RQ-21 Blackjack  UAS have matured the furthest through DOD’s acquisition process. The  Navy and the Marine Corps have identified personnel requirements, and  service officials told us they have reviewed their sufficiency as units have  trained and deployed with the systems. Although future modifications to  personnel requirements for the MK 18 UUVs, the MQ-8 Fire Scout, and  the MQ-4 Triton may be needed as their inventories and the pace of  deployments increase, Navy officials told us the numbers of operators are  appropriate at this time to meet mission objectives based on available  deployment data and feedback from operators.

For the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS, however, Navy and Marine Corps  headquarters and command entities disagree with unit-level officials  about the sufficiency of the personnel requirements. Marine Corps UAS  squadrons have identified a requirements shortfall of 13 to 21 personnel  per detachment to support each RQ-21 Blackjack UAS. The UAS  squadrons have established that a total of 22 personnel are necessary to  form a detachment sufficiently sized to support operations with the UAS.  Marine Corps unit-level officials told us that this personnel requirement is  based on the numbers needed to conduct training and deployments since  the first Blackjack system was delivered in 2015, for which 22 to 30  personnel have been needed per detachment to meet mission  requirements. In contrast, higher level command and service  headquarters entities in the Navy and the Marine Corps have established  a requirement of nine Marine Corps personnel per detachment, including  three enlisted UAS operators and one UAS officer along with  maintenance and support personnel. Squadron officials stated to the  Navy and the Marine Corps in their written rebuttal of the 9-person  requirement that 13 more personnel are needed to support operations for  10 to 12 hours per day, or up to 24 hours a day for 10-day surges in  operations, and to comply with naval aviation maintenance procedures.  Marine Corps officials also told us that the squadrons believe these  additional personnel are essential for supporting the workload and levels  of supervision they believe are necessary to operate and maintain an RQ- 21 Blackjack UAS and avoid mishaps and damage to the aircraft during  recovery.

DOD policy directs that personnel requirements should be driven by  workload and established at the minimum levels necessary to accomplish  mission and performance objectives. In addition, according to a Navy  instruction, personnel requirements must be validated as program  changes dictate and at a minimum annually, over a system’s lifecycle to  determine if a personnel update is required. The Navy instruction also  identifies guidelines for average weekly working hours and personnel  availability for different tasks, which are key elements in the calculation of  personnel requirements. The instruction states that routinely exceeding  these guidelines to meet workloads should be avoided because it can  adversely affect unit morale, retention and safety.

With respect to the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS, Marine Corps officials stated  that the concept of operations has changed for the service’s vision of  employing the system to support Marine Expeditionary Units and that the  9-person detachment requirement was based on the outdated concept of  operations. As a result, Marine Corps officials told us that the personnel  requirements for the squadrons that operate them are too low to support  the workloads associated with the systems and service headquarters- level decision makers have not yet updated them based on the most  current and enduring concept of operations for the system. Marine Corps  officials stated that efforts are underway to review the differences in  personnel requirements deemed necessary by squadrons and  headquarters-level entities as training and deployments continue, which is  a positive step. However, according to the program office, the personnel  requirements were not changing at the time of this report. Until the Navy  and the Marine Corps update the personnel requirements for the RQ-21  Blackjack based on the most current and enduring concept of operations  and deployment data, the services will lack current information about the  number of operators needed for the squadrons that operate the RQ-21  Blackjack.

In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps have not updated the life  cycle cost estimate for the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS to include additional  personnel that Marine Corps squadrons have needed for current  operations and expect to need for future operations and deployments.  The program office estimated the total Marine Corps personnel cost for  the RQ-21 Blackjack based on detachments of 9 personnel each at  approximately $371 million over the program’s expected 19-year life  cycle—nearly 20 percent of the Marine Corps’ life cycle cost for the  program. However, this estimate may be too low because Marine Corps  squadrons have reported that they need up to 21 more personnel per  detachment to support the workload associated with the system, as  discussed previously.

DOD guidance requires that components determine a weapon system  program’s life cycle cost by planning for the many factors needed to  support the system, including personnel. Decision makers use this  information to determine whether a new program is affordable and the  program’s projected funding and personnel requirements are achievable.  In addition, the Office of Management and Budget’s Capital Programming  Guide indicates that to keep the cost analyses for capital assets, such as  weapon systems, current, accurate, and valid, cost estimating should be  continuously updated based on the latest information available as  programs mature.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have updated the life cycle cost estimate  for the RQ-21 Blackjack to account for changing assumptions, such as  the expected usage rate of spare parts for system repairs, but not for  additional Marine Corps personnel that squadrons have reportedly  needed for deployments. Without updating the cost estimate as  appropriate after updating personnel requirements, the Navy and the  Marine Corps may not have current information about the Marine Corps’  RQ-21 Blackjack UAS lifecycle cost and affordability.

The Department of the Navy Has Made Positive Steps but Has Not Fully Evaluated and Updated Policies or Clarified Goals for Informing Future Personnel Requirements

The Navy Has Modified Some UAS Policies but Has Not Fully Evaluated and Updated Policies to Inform Future Personnel Requirements

The Department of the Navy has made some positive steps but has not  fully evaluated and updated its aviation policies for operation and  maintenance of certain UAS to inform the development of future  personnel requirements. According to officials from the Navy Manpower  Analysis Center, correctly determining personnel workload and the  related numbers of personnel required for operation and maintenance is  especially critical for UAS units because of the safety risks associated  with operating in shared airspaces and over populated areas. These  officials also stated that naval aviation policies—which apply to manned  aircraft and UAS—affect the workload of operators and maintenance  personnel and the numbers required to achieve a squadron’s mission and  meet the standards prescribed in the policies. For example, the Naval Air  Training and Operating Procedures Standardization manual contains  provisions for pilot fatigue and hours they can fly compared with the hours  they must rest. Further, the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program  instruction prescribes standards for performing and documenting quality  assurance steps for maintenance tasks, among other things.

Our review of these selected policies found that some naval aviation  standards have been modified to account for UAS separately from  manned aircraft, and to some extent between UAS of different sizes and  capabilities. The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures  Standardization manual was updated in 2016 with a new chapter for UAS  policies and operations. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program  instruction has been updated to specify that UAS of groups 3, 4, and 5  will always be governed by the policy similar to manned aircraft, with a  few exceptions, such as compass calibration.

Notwithstanding these updates, Marine Corps headquarters- and unit- level officials told us that the policies have not been fully reviewed and  updated to account for differences in UAS of varying sizes and  capabilities, especially group 3 UAS, which are those systems weighing  55 to 1,320 pounds. According to these officials, applying certain  procedures and standards from these policies equally across different  sizes of UAS is problematic for group 3 UAS in particular, which includes  the RQ-21 Blackjack. The officials stated that the application of such  standards affects workloads and personnel levels in a way that prevents  squadrons from accomplishing their missions as efficiently as possible.  Specifically, they stated that upholding current naval aviation standards is  one key reason—the other being changes to the concept of operations for  the RQ-21 Blackjack—for having staffed up to 21 more personnel per  RQ-21 Blackjack detachment than the 9-person requirement discussed  earlier in this report.

Applying naval aviation operating and maintenance standards equally  across different sizes of UAS may not align with the Marine Corps’  concept of operations, which states that all UAS are intended to be  recovered by landing or capture even though they may be expendable.  Each RQ-21 Blackjack system includes five air vehicles, more than one of  which could be unavailable for assigned missions at the same time. For  example, Marine Corps officials told us that damage to RQ-21 Blackjack  air vehicles can be caused by weather, a deficiency with the air vehicle  itself, a crash landing, or a combination of factors, and up to three air  vehicles could be unavailable at a time. These officials told us that  holding the RQ-21 Blackjack to maintenance standards designed for  other non-expendable aircraft may not be efficient because their  application has a limited effect on mishap rates relative to the additional  personnel needed to uphold the standards. Moreover, in discussion  groups we held with Marine Corps UAS operator personnel, operators  mentioned that mishap investigations performed to existing standards  sideline operators from training pending the investigation’s outcome.  Such standards also apply to the Navy’s larger, non-expendable UAS like  the MQ-8 Fire Scout and the MQ-4 Triton.

According to DOD Directive 1100.4, existing policies, procedures, and  structures should be periodically evaluated to ensure efficient and  effective use of personnel resources. Further, federal internal controls  standards emphasize the importance of having clear, updated policies  that align with an organization’s mission and goals. Such goals could  include the Department of the Navy’s goal to accelerate the development  and fielding of unmanned systems, and the Marine Corps’ emphasis on  reducing operator workload and providing effective and efficient support  to mission execution and decision making. For example, the Marine  Corps’ UAS concept of operations envisions a future in which one UAS  operator will perform multiple functions as opposed to the current  approach in which multiple Marines are necessary for a single mission.

We found that the Navy has taken a preliminary step to further evaluate  what policy changes may be needed to support unmanned systems by  establishing an advisor position for this purpose within the Naval  Innovation Advisory Council. The advisor is responsible for making  recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy and other senior leaders  to streamline policy and remove roadblocks that hinder innovation, among  other things. In addition, the program manager for the RQ-21 Blackjack  and the Marine Corps’ Deputy Commandant for Combat Development  and Integration are supporting a research effort through the Naval  Postgraduate School to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of naval  aviation maintenance procedures for group 3 UAS, according to a Marine  Corps official who is leading this effort.

While these are positive steps, the time frames for making such policy  changes have not been identified. In addition, we did not find evidence  that the Navy has taken or planned related steps such as determining  whether future reductions to personnel requirements could be  accomplished, and any associated cost savings, or benefits to UAS  operations if policies were further updated to account for UAS of different  sizes and capabilities. The Navy has thus far prioritized the evaluation  and modification of acquisition-related policies to expedite the delivery of  unmanned systems to units, consistent with a 2015 memorandum from  the Secretary of the Navy. Unless the Navy and the Marine Corps  prioritize updating policies for operating and maintaining UAS of different  sizes and capabilities they may miss opportunities to effectively and  efficiently use personnel resources as system inventories grow.

The Department of the Navy Lacks Clear Overarching Goals for Informing Future Unmanned System Personnel Requirements

The Department of the Navy also lacks clear overarching goals for  informing future unmanned system personnel requirements and the level  of priority that should be assigned to these systems and the units that  operate them for the purpose of personnel resourcing decisions. While  DOD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038 stated  that the department must strive to reduce the number of personnel  required to operate and maintain its unmanned systems, the Department  of the Navy has not affirmed this goal or communicated any other  personnel goals for its unmanned system development. Department of  the Navy documents we reviewed for unmanned systems expressed  goals that are less directly related to personnel requirements, to include  expanding the range of operations and reducing costs and risks to  personnel safety and mission success. As previously mentioned, the  Navy has prioritized the evaluation and modification of acquisition-related  policies to expedite the delivery of unmanned systems to units, consistent  with a 2015 memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy.

Navy and Marine Corps officials we spoke with who are responsible for  the RQ-21 Blackjack and other case study systems we reviewed told us  they did not believe the Department of the Navy has a clear and  overarching goal for unmanned system personnel requirements either  now or over the long-term. For example, officials stated that they did not  know if the Department of the Navy expects that fewer personnel should  be needed to operate and support unmanned systems than the numbers  of personnel required for other types of systems. Without such clarity  about personnel-related goals and priority levels, some officials  expressed concern that using the term “unmanned” systems conveys  expectations that technological advances can substantially reduce  personnel requirements in the near term, and that funding for related  personnel resources are a lower priority than those for other system  types. For example, a senior Navy personnel official told us that the  Navy’s past goals and related efforts to reduce personnel required for its  ship crews—an initiative referred to as optimal manning—makes them  cautious about whether the same goals and efforts will be adopted for  unmanned systems and could produce similar, undesirable effects on  readiness.

Navy officials at three commands also stated they are concerned that  resources for unmanned system personnel over future years may not  keep pace with the increasing inventories of the systems if a lower priority  is assigned to them in budget decisions in the absence of goals and  clarity over priorities. The Navy’s Commander, Submarine Forces,  identified a personnel shortfall for supporting increased UUV inventories  as its second-highest personnel priority for the Navy’s fiscal year 2019  budget deliberations to help underscore to headquarters entities the  importance of personnel resources for such systems. According to Navy  officials, the Navy has since authorized the requested addition of 66  personnel to the command to augment the sole unit that will operate the  Snakehead Large Displacement UUV along with increasing inventories of  other types of UUVs.

Federal internal controls standards state that an agency’s management  should define goals clearly to enable the identification of risk. By  applying this standard to the Department of the Navy’s acquisition and  operations of unmanned systems, such goals could include whether or  not unmanned systems should require fewer personnel resources than  manned counterparts. Until the Secretary of the Navy clarifies  overarching goals for unmanned system personnel requirements and  resource priority levels and communicates them to requirements planners  and budget decision makers, the services will be hampered in developing  future personnel requirements and identifying risks as system inventories  grow and operations expand.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Developed Staffing Approaches for Unmanned System Operators, but Face Challenges Meeting Personnel Requirements

The Navy and the Marine Corps have developed staffing approaches to  select, train, and track unmanned systems operators and to retain some  UAS operators by offering special and incentive pays. However, both  services face challenges in ensuring that there are sufficient UAS  operators to meet personnel requirements. Yet neither service has  assessed the commercial drone industry to inform its retention approach  for UAS operators. Although Marine Corps UAS operators and officers  report low morale and career satisfaction, the Marine Corps has not fully  explored the use of human capital flexibilities to address these workforce  challenges.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Developed Staffing Approaches to Select, Train, Track, and Retain Unmanned System Operators

In the Navy, unmanned system operations are secondary skills for  personnel from related communities. For its UASs in groups 4 and 5, for  example, the Navy utilizes personnel from manned aviation communities  within the same mission areas, such as MH-60 helicopter pilots and  aircrew who are selected and then trained to operate the MQ-8 Fire Scout  UAS. Likewise, Navy officials stated that personnel from related  communities are selected and trained to operate USVs and UUVs. The  Navy is taking steps to track these trained operator personnel by using  secondary skill identification codes. According to Navy officials, these  identification codes will help personnel managers monitor the inventories  of personnel with unmanned system operator qualifications and provide a  temporary surge in capability if needed.

In contrast to the Navy’s approach, the Marine Corps has a primary  career field for operating UAS, including enlisted and officer personnel.  The Marine Corps replenishes its UAS operator and officer personnel  inventories by selecting from eligible applicant groups. To become UAS  operators, enlisted marines must achieve minimum test scores  comparable to those required for other high-skill occupations, such as  intelligence specialists. Eligible groups include new graduates of recruit  training and experienced marines who apply for a lateral transfer from  another occupational specialty. UAS officers take a separate test battery  and must attain the same minimum scores as other officers who are  selected for manned naval aviation training. They are selected from three  sources: new graduates of officer training; pilot or flight officer trainees  who do not complete their manned aircraft qualification; and experienced  officers seeking a transfer from another occupational specialty, including  pilots of manned aircraft. Following their selection, enlisted personnel and  officers must complete 5 months of Army UAS training courses or 6  months of Air Force UAS training courses, respectively. The Marine  Corps then assigns a primary occupation identification code to trained  personnel, which facilitates tracking their inventory to help meet  requirements.

To help retain sufficient numbers of personnel to meet requirements, both  the Navy and the Marine Corps have offered special and incentive pays  to personnel who operate UASs. Navy personnel who serve as air vehicle  operators for the MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4 Triton or as MQ-4 Triton  tactical coordinators are eligible for two types of aviation pays based on  their qualification as pilots or naval flight officers rather than their UAS  assignments—monthly “flight pay” of up to $1,000 and aviation career  continuation pay bonuses of $75,000 for a new 5-year contract, as of  fiscal year 2017. Marine Corps UAS officers are not offered special and  incentive pays, but enlisted operators have been eligible for a selective  reenlistment or selective retention bonus since 1998, which ranged from  $8,250 up to $19,750 in fiscal year 2017 for qualified marines who  committed to an additional 4 years of service.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Face Challenges Meeting UAS Operator Personnel Requirements and Have Not Assessed Commercial Competition to Inform Staffing Approaches

Navy Faces Challenges Meeting UAS Operator Personnel Requirements

Based on our analysis, the Navy faces challenges with meeting personnel  requirements for UAS operators although, according to Navy officials, it is  too soon to know if personnel shortfalls may arise with unmanned  maritime systems because many programs are in early in stages of  development. Navy officials told us they have sufficient numbers of  personnel to operate the current inventory of UAS, which included 49  MQ-8 Fire Scouts and 2 MQ-4 Tritons as of September 2017. As UAS  inventories increase, the Navy has reported growing retention challenges  among its pilots and naval flight officers over the past 3 years as the U.S.  economy improves and commercial airline hiring increases. Navy aviation  and workforce planning officials told us this could affect the ability to fill  both its manned aviation and UAS personnel requirements.

According to Navy proposals for the Navy’s aviation retention bonus  program, future retention shortfalls are expected in the helicopter,  maritime patrol and reconnaissance, and E-2 Hawkeye communities,  among others. The first two communities are sources of personnel for the  MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4 Triton and, according to Navy officials, the  latter community is being considered as a personnel source for the MQ- 25 Stingray. In particular, the Navy has reported concerns about the  future retention of its maritime patrol and reconnaissance pilots because  their experience directly translates to a commercial 737 aircraft.  Additionally, the Navy has reported shortages and significant retention  issues in meeting requirements for its reserve helicopter and maritime  patrol and reconnaissance pilots, communities that the Navy uses to  augment its available inventories of active duty pilots who also operate  UASs.

The Marine Corps Has Not Met Personnel Requirements for UAS Operators

Based on our analysis, the Marine Corps has experienced past shortfalls  of UAS operators through fiscal year 2017. Since the first fiscal year of  available data after the inception of the Marine Corps’ career specialty for  UAS officers in 2012, personnel inventories have increased but fallen  short of requirements (see fig. 2).

For fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the Marine Corps was substantially  short of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels (i.e., O3, O4, and O5  pay grades) to serve as UAS officers. Consistent with this trend, the  Marine Corps has designated UAS officer inventories as unhealthy since  fiscal year 2013. Marine Corps officials told us these shortfalls could be  attributable to the annual growth in requirements for this new community.  They also stated that they do not currently anticipate retention challenges  for UAS officers. However, according to these officials, their predictions  about UAS officer retention for future years are based on data from other  longer established career fields as proxies until more UAS officer data are  available.

For fiscal years 2007 through 2017, inventories of enlisted UAS operators  increased in all but one year, but fell short of requirements (see fig. 3) in  part due to substantial yearly shortfalls of certain junior enlisted  personnel. According to a Marine Corps official, the UAS operator  inventory will exceed requirements in fiscal year 2018 because the  requirement has decreased by about 60 percent from the previous year.

However, the Marine Corps has leveraged lateral personnel transfers  from other occupations to meet approximately 33 to 89 percent of its  yearly retention quotas for first-term UAS operator reenlistments since  fiscal year 2010 (see fig. 3 above). A Marine Corps personnel planning  official told us that personnel transfers have been helpful and necessary  for meeting retention quotas. However, other Marine Corps officials told  us that heavily leveraging transfers shows that the UAS community is not  retaining its own experienced operators—that is, UAS operators who  have attained proficiency and advanced skills and been deployed. For  more senior enlisted UAS operators eligible for a second reenlistment or  beyond, the Marine Corps has fallen short of its retention quotas for fiscal  years 2015 through 2017.

The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Not Assessed Commercial Supply, Demand, and Wages to Inform Staffing Approaches for UAS Operator Requirements

Despite the current and future challenges previously discussed, Navy and  Marine Corps officials told us that the services have not used information  about the commercial drone industry to inform their use of special and  incentive pays because they did not believe doing so was needed. Marine  Corps officials told us that they have not observed a retention problem for  UAS operators and officers and unless they miss retention goals in 3  consecutive years they will not consider changing financial incentives— i.e., increasing bonuses to enlisted UAS operators or offering special and  incentive pays to UAS officers. Until such time, pilots who are selected for  the UAS career field are informed by the Marine Corps that their flight pay  and aviation continuation pay bonus eligibility will be terminated. Another  Marine Corps official with knowledge of the UAS community told us that  studying the commercial drone industry and the potential effect on  retention is timely because the services must program for the necessary  resources for financial incentives 2 years in advance of the budget year.  They stated that after 3 years of missing retention goals the problem  could persist for another 2 years before additional funds were available to  increase retention bonuses given the programming and budget cycle.

Navy workforce planning officials acknowledged that they are concerned  about increasing difficulty in providing sufficient numbers of mid-career  pilots to meet the Navy’s aviation requirements over future years, which  includes UAS operator requirements. In addition to competition from  commercial airlines, Navy officials told us a growing labor market in the  commercial drone industry could exacerbate pilot retention challenges for  those with secondary qualifications to operate UAS. However, they added  that little is known about the demand and available wages in that industry.

Likewise, Marine Corps officials told us that past challenges in meeting  requirements and retaining experienced operators could persist in future  years, and hiring in the commercial drone industry could affect retention.  These officials stated that the Air Force could also pose a future retention  challenge for the Marine Corps’ UAS operator community. The Air Force  offers the potential for higher pay to its UAS operators than the Marine  Corps along with larger and more capable types of UAS. The Air Force  reported to Congress in July 2017 that its projections of enlisted UAS  operator retention indicate that a bonus may be necessary as soon as  2022. During discussion groups we held with Marine Corps UAS  operators, enlisted operators cited the potential for higher pay for their  skills outside the Marine Corps as a factor that has influenced  reenlistment decisions among them or their peers. Operators in one  group told us that three of their five RQ-21 Blackjack instructors were  former enlisted operators from their squadron who secured employment  with the RQ-21 Blackjack’s manufacturer as private sector contractors.

DOD’s 2012 Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation  determined that organizations should assess civilian supply and demand  and civilian wages to develop the most cost effective special and  incentive pay strategies. We reported in February 2017 that conducting  such an assessment is a key principle of effective human capital  management by which to evaluate DOD’s special and incentive pay  programs. Our report also found that the services do conduct such  assessments for aviation, nuclear propulsion, and cybersecurity  occupations. Without assessing the commercial drone industry and  using such information to inform retention approaches, including the use  of special and incentive pays, the Navy and the Marine Corps may not  know if their approaches are effectively tailored to ensure a sufficient  number of UAS operators are available to meet future requirements.

Marine Corps UAS Operators and Officers Report Low Morale and Career Satisfaction, but the Marine Corps Has Not Fully Examined Human Capital Flexibilities to Address These Issues

The Marine Corps has experienced workforce challenges with its career  field for UAS officers and enlisted operators, including diminished morale  and career satisfaction and short periods of time in which operators are  trained and available to UAS squadrons before their contract or squadron  assignment ends. Results of a 2015 Marine Corps survey of UAS officers  showed that about 65 percent of captains and first lieutenants who  responded were dissatisfied with their career and about 75 percent of that  group cited low job satisfaction as influencing their decision to leave the  Marine Corps.

UAS officers and enlisted operators in all eight discussion groups we held  told us about factors that enhance their morale, including the  opportunities to learn and to shape their community and their positive  deployment experiences, but they also discussed factors that negatively  affect their job satisfaction. UAS operators in all enlisted groups cited the  frequency of personnel turnover in the squadron as a source of frustration  in developing and retaining expertise with the RQ-21 Blackjack. Officers  told us they feel like a lower tier priority in Marine Corps aviation for  reasons ranging from the lack of a uniform insignia device akin to those  awarded to manned aircraft pilots (i.e., pilot “wings”), to confusion over  the strategy and missions for Marine Corps UAS now and in future years.  UAS officers also told us they desired assignments to positions outside  the UAS squadrons that they believed would enhance their leadership  ability, but such positions had not consistently been available to them  because they were needed to fill squadron billets. For example, the  Marine Corps has limited or restricted UAS officers from applying for in- residence professional military education opportunities in past years  because they could not be diverted from billets requiring their  qualifications due to inventory shortages.

UAS operators and officers spend approximately 2 years or more of their  3-year squadron assignment awaiting and completing training to attain  proficiency and advanced skills with the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS. After  training and deployment, they may have about 4 months or fewer to  impart their knowledge and deployment experience to others in the  squadron before they reach the end of their squadron assignment, the  end of their service obligation, or both (see fig. 4).

According to Marine Corps officials we spoke with, the loss of  experienced UAS operators who do not reenlist and are replaced by  lateral transfers from other careers results in diminished UAS expertise  among mid-career enlisted members in the squadrons. These officials  told us that personnel who transfer to the UAS career to replace  experienced operators must spend at least 2 years in training for initial  qualification and then proficiency on the RQ-21 Blackjack. Moreover,  Marine Corps officials told us that a portion of the UAS operators who  reenlist past their first contract must fulfill 3-year special duty assignments  outside the UAS community. They stated that this exacerbates the  diminished squadron expertise and is the reason that some operators  leave rather than reenlist in the Marine Corps.

Although the Marine Corps has taken steps to address challenges with  UAS operator inventories by using special and incentive pays for enlisted  operators and limiting opportunities that would divert officers away from  squadrons, as previously discussed, it has not fully explored flexibilities  for managing its UAS career fields more effectively to help meet  requirements. Employing flexibilities to improve job satisfaction could help  improve retention of experienced personnel in an already-challenged  environment. For example, the Marine Corps has not authorized available  aviation special and incentives pays for UAS officers in spite of  challenges meeting personnel requirements. As mentioned previously,  pilots who are selected for the UAS career field are informed by the  Marine Corps that their flight pay and aviation continuation pay bonus  eligibility will be terminated. The Marine Corps has incentivized enlisted  personnel from certain specialties, such as aircraft maintenance, to both  reenlist and to remain in a specified unit as recently as fiscal year 2018,  but has not offered this opportunity to UAS operators. By considering  longer UAS operator contracts, the Marine Corps could increase the  availability of experienced operators to squadrons, where they can pass  on their knowledge and skills to junior enlisted personnel.

Our prior work has identified that a key principle for effective strategic  human capital planning is that organizations should ensure that  flexibilities are part of the overall human capital strategy to ensure  effective workforce planning. According to Marine Corps officials, they  have not taken additional steps to address workforce challenges in part  because inventories of UAS operators and officers have grown and  squadrons have generally attained readiness goals and accomplished  their deployment missions despite personnel shortages. Further, these  officials stated that low morale and career satisfaction could be partially  caused by the current transition from the RQ-7 Shadow UAS to the RQ- 21 Blackjack, and to the relative newness of the officer career field.  Without exploring these or other human capital flexibilities to improve  morale and career satisfaction and maximize operators’ availability to  squadrons, the Marine Corps may face continued challenges in meeting  personnel requirements and the growing demands of expanding  operations and increasing UAS inventories. Moreover, as the Marine  Corps budgets for additional resources to establish its own school for  UAS operator training, flexibilities that could improve retention and  maximize operator availability could also help ensure the greatest return  on its investment in the UAS operator workforce.

For almost 20 years we have identified strategic management of human  capital as a high-risk area across government in part because of  persistent gaps in mission critical skills. With the Navy’s commitment to  accelerate the delivery of unmanned systems to the fleet and its budget of  nearly $10 billion to develop and procure those systems in fiscal years  2018 through 2022, having sufficient personnel with the appropriate skills  at the right time will be critical. To that end, without additional actions to  improve their workforce planning the Navy and the Marine Corps may not  be positioned to support their expanding unmanned systems operations.  Specifically, lacking clear workforce planning policies, decision makers  may not know when they should consider using federal civilian employees  and private sector contractors as alternatives in determining the most  appropriate and cost-effective workforces for their unmanned system  operators.

With respect to personnel requirements development, until the Marine  Corps’ requirements and related cost estimates for the RQ-21 Blackjack  UAS are updated, the services will lack current information about the  number of operators needed and their affordability. Further, unless the  Navy and the Marine Corps prioritize policy updates for operating and  maintaining UAS of different sizes and capabilities they may miss  opportunities to effectively and efficiently use personnel resources as  system inventories grow. Without assessing the commercial drone  industry and using that information to inform retention approaches, the  Navy and Marine Corps may not know whether special and incentive  pays are effectively tailored to ensure a sufficient number of UAS  operators are available to meet future requirements. The Marine Corps, in  particular, may continue to face challenges in meeting requirements and  growing operational demands until it examines additional flexibilities to  improve morale and career satisfaction among its UAS operator  workforce and maximize the availability of operators serving in its  squadrons. Overall, unmanned systems are key to future Navy and  Marine Corps operations, but for these systems to be effective the  services need to ensure that they take the necessary actions to provide  sufficient personnel.

We are making the following ten recommendations to DOD. The  Secretary of the Navy ensures that:

The Chief of Naval Operations should clarify workforce planning  policies to identify circumstances in which federal civilian employees  and private sector contractors may serve in operational roles and  what the benefits and limitations are of using federal civilians and  private sector contractors as alternative workforces.  (Recommendation 1)

The Chief of Naval Operations should, after clarifying workforce  planning policies, apply the revised policies to evaluate the use of  alternative workforces (including federal civilian employees and  private sector contractors) for future unmanned system operators.  (Recommendation 2)

The Commandant of the Marine Corps should clarify workforce  planning policies to identify circumstances in which federal civilian  employees and private sector contractors may serve in operational  roles and what the benefits and limitations are of using federal  civilians and private sector contractors as alternative workforces.  (Recommendation 3)

The Commandant of the Marine Corps should, after clarifying  workforce planning policies, apply the revised policies to evaluate the  use of alternative workforces (including federal civilian employees and  private sector contractors) for future unmanned system operators.  (Recommendation 4)

The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, in coordination with  the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat  Development and Integration, should update the Marine Corps  personnel requirements associated with the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS  based on the most current and enduring concept of operations and  utilize the updated requirements in planning for UAS squadron  personnel requirements. (Recommendation 5)

The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, should update the  life cycle cost estimate for the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS to make  adjustments as appropriate after updating the personnel requirements  for the system. (Recommendation 6)

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9), in  coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, should  prioritize continued efforts to fully evaluate policies for operating and  maintaining UAS of different sizes and capabilities, such as group 3  UAS—to include establishing completion time frames, determining  whether reductions to personnel requirements could be accomplished,  and identifying any associated cost savings and the benefits to the  UAS squadrons’ ability to complete missions—and update such  policies as needed. (Recommendation 7)

The Secretary of the Navy should clarify overarching goals for  unmanned systems’ personnel requirements, including related priority  levels for resourcing purposes, and communicate them to  requirements planners and budget decision makers.  (Recommendation 8)

The Chief of Naval Personnel and the Deputy Commandant for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs should assess civilian supply,  demand, and wages in the commercial drone industry and use the  results to inform retention approaches, including the use of special  and incentive pays for UAS operators. (Recommendation 9)

The Deputy Commandant for Aviation and the Deputy Commandant  for Manpower and Reserve Affairs should examine the use of  additional human capital flexibilities that could improve the career  satisfaction and retention of experienced UAS operators and  maximize their availability to squadrons. Such flexibilities could  include authorizing available special and incentive pays; permitting  UAS operators to extend their enlistments to serve longer within  squadrons; ensuring the availability of career- and promotion- enhancing opportunities for professional military education;  considering the use of a potential insignia device for operators; or  extending UAS operator contract lengths. (Recommendation 10)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD concurred with eight  of our recommendations and partially concurred with two  recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments on the draft  report, which we incorporated as appropriate.

With regard to our recommendation to assess civilian supply, demand,  and wages in the commercial drone industry and use the results to inform  retention approaches, DOD partially concurred. DOD stated that it will  assess competitive markets, both externally and internally, and then  analyze the usage of incentive pays for UAS operators when retention  rates and inventory levels of personnel display decreasing trends. DOD  added that such analysis would be premature if conducted before initial  operational capability is attained for each UAS because retention  behaviors and air crew dynamics are not yet established. As noted in our  report, the Navy and the Marine Corps have each attained initial  operational capability with one UAS (i.e., the MQ-8 Fire Scout B-variant  and the RQ-21 Blackjack) and quantities of these and other UAS are  expected to increase in future years. Additionally, the Marine Corps has  designated UAS officer inventories as unhealthy since fiscal year 2013.  Accordingly, we continue to believe that conducting such assessments  and using the results are timely and important steps to ensure enough  personnel to meet future operator requirements.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to examine the use of  additional human capital flexibilities that could improve the career  satisfaction and retention of experienced UAS operators. DOD stated that  human capital flexibilities are constantly under review. Further, DOD  stated that the UAS community is still in its infancy, but as it continues to  grow and become healthier, assignment opportunities and flexibilities will  become more prevalent and special and incentive pays will be examined  as retention rates dictate. Such efforts would meet the intent of our  recommendation if the opportunities and flexibilities DOD considers  include other examples cited in our recommendation. That is, we continue  to believe that DOD should also consider permitting UAS operators to  extend their enlistments to serve longer within squadrons; ensuring the  availability of career- and promotion-enhancing opportunities for  professional military education; considering the use of a potential insignia  device for operators; and extending UAS operator contract lengths.

We are providing copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the  Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Characteristics of Selected Navy and Marine Corps Unmanned Systems

Navy MQ-8 Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System

The Navy’s MQ-8 Fire Scout unmanned aerial system (UAS) (B and C  variants) is intended to provide real-time imagery and data in support of  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions for surface, anti- submarine, and mine warfare. The system is part of the surface warfare  and mine countermeasures mission packages of the littoral combat ships.  The MQ-8 system comprises one or more air vehicles with sensors, a  control station, and ship equipment to aid in vertical launch and recovery.  According to the program office, the MQ-8C has 90 percent commonality  with the previously developed MQ-8B. The primary differences between  the two are structural modifications to accommodate the MQ- 8C’s larger  airframe and fuel system.

The manufacturer has delivered 49 aircraft to the Navy as of September  2017 (including 30 B variants and 19 C variants), and 11 more aircraft (C  variants) are scheduled to be delivered by fiscal year 2019.

The Navy attained initial operational capability with the B variant of the  Fire Scout in fiscal year 2014, and plans to attain initial operational  capability with the C variant in December 2018, depending on the  availability of the littoral combat ship from which it deploys.

A composite aviation detachment embarked on a littoral combat ship  consists of up to 24 personnel, including operator air crews equipped with  one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 Fire Scout UAS. An air crew  consists of two personnel: one air vehicle operator and one mission  payload operator. There is no additive personnel requirement associated  with operators of the MQ-8 Fire Scout because these personnel already  reside within existing expeditionary MH-60 helicopter squadron  detachments. The littoral combat ships’ crew berthing constraints was a  key limiting factor in creating the personnel requirements for the number  of air crew in a single composite aviation detachment.

Navy officials told us that they believe, based on deployment experiences  and available data, that the personnel requirements for the MQ-8 Fire  Scout are correct, although they stated that the operational tempo has  been very limited to date due to problems with the littoral combat ship that  have reduced the number of deployments.

MH-60 helicopter pilots and enlisted aircrewmen from expeditionary  helicopter squadrons attend 8 and 6 weeks, respectively, of MQ-8 Fire  Scout UAS training. During deployments, these personnel serve dual  roles as air crew of both the MH-60 and the MQ-8 Fire Scout.

MQ-8 Fire Scout air vehicle operators hold primary career designators as  Navy helicopter pilots, and after their UAS training they are identified with  an additional qualification designator of DY8. According to a senior Navy  official, private sector contractors trained 126 air vehicle operators prior to  February 2015, and since then Navy has trained another 91 air vehicle  operators as of May 2017.

MQ-8 Fire Scout mission payload operators have an enlisted rating as a  helicopter aircrewman, and after their UAS training they are identified with  a Navy enlisted classification code of 8367. According to a senior Navy  official, private sector contractors trained 148 mission payload operators  through March 2017, and the Navy has trained another 68 mission  payload operators since February 2017 (as of May 2017).

According to Navy officials, they do not expect that the approach for  staffing MQ-8 Fire Scout aircrew to negatively affect accessions or  retention in the helicopter community, even when operational tempo  increases, but they are continuing to monitor feedback from deployments.

The Navy’s MQ-4 Triton UAS is intended to provide persistent maritime  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data collection and  dissemination capability in an operating area of a 2,000 nautical miles  radius. Based on the Air Force’s RQ-4B Global Hawk air vehicle, the MQ- 4 Triton was formerly known as the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance  UAS. Triton UAS sensors can provide detection, classification, tracking,  and identification of maritime targets. Additionally, the MQ-4 Triton is  designed with a communications relay capability that can link dispersed  forces in the theater of operation. The system will cue other Navy assets  for further situational investigation and/or attack, and will also provide a  battle damage assessment of the area of interest. Tactical-level data  analysis will occur in real-time at shore-based mission control systems via  satellite communications.

The MQ-4 Triton is planned to operate from five shore-based sites  worldwide as part of the Navy’s family of maritime patrol and  reconnaissance systems. From these sites, five MQ-4 Triton air vehicles  will be airborne concurrently, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week (see  fig.6).

As a precursor to the MQ-4 Triton, the Navy’s RQ-4A Broad Area  Maritime Surveillance System-Demonstrator has been continuously  deployed to the U.S. Central Command area since January 2009. All four  of those planned demonstrator systems have been delivered to the Navy.

The manufacturer has delivered 2 systems to the Navy as of September  2017 and the Navy expects 10 more systems to be delivered through  fiscal year 2021. At the time of this report, no air vehicles had yet been  delivered to the Navy’s first unmanned patrol squadron; the 2 systems  were being utilized for testing.

The Navy has estimated that it will attain initial operational capability with  the MQ-4 Triton UAS in 2021.

One of the Navy’s two planned unmanned patrol squadrons (referred to  as VUPs) will have 30 mission crews, the other squadron will have 20  mission crews, and both squadrons will have additional launch and  recovery operators. A MQ-4 Triton mission crew will consist of four  personnel: one air vehicle operator, one tactical coordinator, and two  mission payload operators. Future upgrades to the MQ-4 Triton will  require a fifth mission crew member to fill a signals intelligence capability  operator position. The number of required mission crew members was  based in part upon a model that Naval Air Systems Command utilizes to  project the number of air crew personnel to support a system.

According to Navy officials, the additional personnel requirements for the  Navy associated with the establishment of Triton squadrons are offset by  realignments of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, including  the retirement of the P-3 Orion aircraft and reduction of associated  personnel requirements.

Navy officials told us that they believe, based in part on experience with  the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance - Demonstrator, that the personnel  requirements for the MQ-4 Triton are adequate, although they stated that  they will continue to review and monitor the requirements for sufficiency in  future years as the Navy attains steady state operations with the system’s  five continuous orbits.

The Navy’s approach for staffing operator aircrew for the MQ-4 Triton is  to utilize a portion of its naval aviators, naval flight officers, and enlisted  aircrew whose qualification is on a maritime patrol and reconnaissance  force aircraft (e.g., the P-8A Poseidon) and assign them to an unmanned  patrol squadron following a sea tour with their primary aircraft. According  to Navy officials, the career path for all its aviators generally includes a  number of shore duty options following a first deployment. The unmanned  patrol squadron assignments will be an additional option for aviators’ first  shore tour. The Navy will provide Triton aircrew members with  approximately 3 months of training to qualify on the UAS in connection  with their unmanned patrol squadron assignment. Air vehicle operators  and tactical coordinators who are trained and qualified on the MQ-4 Triton  will be identified with an additional qualification designator of DC5.  Trained and qualified mission payload operators will be identified with a  Navy enlisted classification of 7828.

According to Navy officials, they do not expect the approach for staffing  MQ-4 Triton aircrew to affect accessions or retention in the maritime  patrol and reconnaissance community at this time, but it is too soon to be  certain. In the meantime, the officials stated that they will continue to  monitor personnel feedback and reassure personnel about the career  value of experience in a MQ-4 Triton squadron. In addition, the Navy  plans to leverage members of its reserve component to augment the pool  of available personnel who can be assigned to its VUP squadrons.

The Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray UAS will be the first UAS to operate from  aircraft carriers. According to Navy officials, the MQ-25 Stingray’s primary  mission will be to provide a robust refueling capability to extend the range  and reach of the carrier air wing and reduce the need for F/A-18E/F  Super Hornets to perform refueling missions, freeing them for strike  missions, and preserving service life. As a secondary mission, the MQ-25  Stingray will also provide an intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance capability. The Navy previously referred to the MQ-25  Stingray as the Carrier Based Aerial Refueling System, a program that  followed a restructuring of the former Unmanned Carrier-Launched  Airborne Surveillance and Strike program.

The Navy’s initial plan is to purchase 72 MQ-25 Stingray air vehicles.

No systems have been delivered and a delivery schedule has not been  established because the system is still in an early stage of DOD’s  acquisition process, with a contract award for system development  scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2018.

The Navy has estimated attaining initial operational capability with the  system by the mid-2020s time frame.

The Navy has not yet developed a staffing approach for MQ-25 Stingray  operators. According to Navy officials involved in establishing plans and  requirements for the system, they are considering different options for the  systems’ operators, including using enlsited personnel or an approach  similar to that used for the MQ-8 Fire Scout operators in which a  population of aviation personnel, including pilots, would be identified from  a related, existing aircraft community—such as the E-2 Hawkeye  aircraft—and provided with UAS qualification training if they were  assigned to operate the MQ-25 Stingray in a composite squadron along  with their other primary aircraft. According to these officials, at the  direction of the Commander of Naval Air Forces, they have considered  establishing a new UAS operator career field and surveyed midshipmen  at the U.S. Naval Academy to gauge their interest in such a career.

The Marine Corps’ RQ-21 Blackjack UAS provides units with a dedicated  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability for tactical  commanders in real time by providing actionable intelligence and  communications relay for 12-hour continuous operations per day, with a  short surge capability of 24-hours of continuous operations for a 10-day  period, during any 30-day cycle.

An RQ-21 Blackjack system consists of five air vehicles, two ground  control stations, multi-mission payloads, one launcher, one recovery  system, data links, and support systems. Standard payloads include  electro-optical and infrared cameras, communications relay payload, and  automatic identification system. Future upgraded capabilities may include  command and control integration, weapons integration, heavy fuel  engine, laser designator, frequency agile communications relay, digital  common data link, and cyclic refresh of the electro-optical and infrared  cameras.

The RQ-21 Blackjack can be launched and recovered from land or from  air-capable ships, including L-class ships (e.g., amphibious transport  docks) (see fig. 7).

The manufacturer has delivered 11 systems to the Marine Corps as of  September 2017 and the Marine Corps expects the other 21 planned  systems to be delivered through 2022.

The Marine Corps attained initial operational capability with the RQ-21  Blackjack in 2016.

The Marine Corps has three active duty unmanned aerial vehicle  squadrons (VMU 1, 2, and 3) and one reserve VMU squadron (VMU 4)  that will operate the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS. Each active duty VMU will  contain nine detachments and each detachment will comprise 9  personnel—including 1 UAS officer and 3 enlisted UAS operators—and  one RQ-21 Blackjack UAS. The Marine Corps Reserve’s VMU 4 will  contain three detachments.

The Marine Corps’ does not distinguish between requirements for air  vehicle operators and mission payload operators for the RQ-21 Blackjack  because those functions are performed by the same operator.

The Marine Corps has a primary career field for operating UAS, including  enlisted UAS operators and UAS officers. The Marine Corps replenishes  its UAS operator and officer personnel inventories by selecting from  eligible applicant groups. For enlisted UAS operators, eligible groups  include new graduates of recruit training and experienced marines who  apply for a lateral transfer from another occupational specialty. UAS  officers are selected from three sources: new graduates of officer training;  pilot or flight officer trainees who do not complete their manned aircraft  qualification; and experienced officers seeking a transfer from another  occupational specialty, including pilots of manned aircraft.

The Marine Corps requires certain minimum test scores before marines  can be selected for UAS training. Enlisted marines must achieve  minimum test scores comparable to those required for other high-skill  occupations, such as intelligence specialists. Officers take a separate  test battery and must attain the same minimum scores as other officers  who are selected for manned naval aviation training. Following their  selection for UAS training, enlisted personnel must complete 5 months of  Army UAS training courses to attain their military occupational specialty  as a UAS operator. Officers attend 6 months of Air Force training courses  to attain their occupational specialty. The Marine Corps then assigns a  primary occupation identification code to trained personnel, which is 7314  for enlisted UAS operators or 7315 for UAS officers.

The Marine Corps assigns enlisted personnel and officers to one of its  UAS squadrons after they attain their occupational specialty, where they  continue their UAS training to attain and maintain proficiency and  advanced qualifications. As discussed earlier in this report, Marine Corps  UAS squadrons believe that an RQ-21 Blackjack detachment requirement  of 9 personnel is not sufficient to meet their workloads. Since 2015,  squadrons have staffed their deploying detachments with up to 30  personnel each to support the workload and levels of supervision they  believe are necessary to operate and maintain an RQ-21 Blackjack UAS  and avoid mishaps and damage to the aircraft during recovery to meet  operating and maintenance standards, among other reasons.

Navy Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vehicle and Unmanned Influence Sweep System

The Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)  and Unmanned Influence Sweep System will be part of the mine  countermeasures mission package of the Navy’s littoral combat ships  (see fig. 8).

The Mine Countermeasures USV will tow a sonar payload for mine  hunting. The Unmanned Influence Sweep System will use the same USV  platform to tow an acoustic and magnetic influence sweep payload to  clear bottom and moored mines. Both systems will be launched and  recovered from littoral combat ships.

For the Mine Countermeasures USV, the projected inventory is 2 systems  per mine countermeasures mission package for a total of 48 systems, in  addition to systems needed for training.

For the Unmanned Influence Sweep System, the projected inventory is 1  per mine countermeasures mission package for a total of 24 payloads, in  addition to payloads for training.

As of September 2017, two Mine Countermeasures USVs were under  construction, but neither had been delivered to the Navy. The Navy plans  to attain initial operational capability with the Mine Countermeasures  USVs in fiscal year 2021.

As of September 2017, one Unmanned Influence Sweep System had  been constructed and the Navy expects it to be delivered for testing by  fiscal year 2018. The Navy plans to attain initial operational capability with  the Unmanned Influence Sweep System in fiscal year 2019.

The Mine Countermeasures USV and Unmanned Influence Sweep  System will be operated by littoral combat ship mine countermeasures  mission package crews of 20 personnel each. The precise number of  operators per system will be determined and updated as the systems  progress through acquisition.

According to Navy officials, USV operators associated with the littoral  combat ships’ mine countermeasures mission package crews will not be  directly accessed and recruited to such positions. Instead, these officials  stated that enlisted sailors from related primary career ratings will be  assigned to the crews and trained on the USVs along with other systems  as part of a longer training pipeline. Upon their completion of training, the  Navy plans to identify them with a Navy enlisted classification code of  1206, Littoral Combat Ship Mine Warfare Mission Package Specialist.

Navy MK 18 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Family of Systems

The Navy’s MK 18 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) family of  systems consists of the MK 18 “Mod 1” Swordfish UUV and the MK 18  “Mod 2” Kingfish UUV. The MK 18 Mod 1 Swordfish is a man-portable  system that performs autonomous, low-visibility exploration and  reconnaissance missions in support of amphibious landings and mine  countermeasures operations, among other things. The MK 18 Mod 2  Kingfish UUV is a larger vehicle with increased endurance and depth, and  more advanced sensors to improve mine countermeasures capabilities.  The Mod 1 Swordfish and the Mod 2 Kingfish operate in very shallow  water and shallow water zones, and will be tactically integrated to enable  detection of moored and bottom mines at increased standoff and reduced  risk to operators and systems that would otherwise be operating in the  minefield.

The MK 18 systems can be launched and recovered from shore, from  rigid hull inflatable boats or from ships (see fig. 9).  41 (25 Mod 1 Swordfish and 16 Mod 2 Kingfish)

The manufacturer has delivered 33 systems (21 Mod 1 Swordfish and 12  Mod 2 Kingfish) to the Navy as of fiscal year 2017. The Navy attained full  operational capability with the first increment of the Mod 1 Swordfish in  fiscal year 2007 and expects to attain initial operational capability with the  first increment of the Mod 2 Kingfish in fiscal year 2019.

MK 18 UUVs are operated by platoons within three different Navy units:  Explosive Ordinance Disposal Mobile Unit One, Mobile Diving and  Salvage Unit Two, and the Naval Oceanography Mine Warfare Center.  According to Navy officials, the establishment of such platoons did not  generate an additive personnel requirement to those units. The minimal  personnel requirement for MK 18 operations includes three UUV  operators and a UUV supervisor, along with an officer-in-charge, a boat  coxswain, and a boat engineer.

According to Navy officials, the Navy does not directly access or recruit  personnel to fill its requirements for operators of the MK 18 UUVs. These  officials stated that, instead, enlisted sailors from related primary career  ratings, including special warfare boat operator and aerographer’s mate  ratings, can be assigned to a unit that operates the UUVs either on their  first tour or later in their career on a subsequent assignment. Navy  officials also stated that Navy Expeditionary Combat Command is  coordinating with the Commander, Submarine Forces, to potentially utilize  the Navy enlisted classification code of 9550 for its UUV operators.

The Navy’s Snakehead Large Displacement UUV will be a long- endurance, off-board system that will conduct reconnaissance and  surveillance missions in denied areas and in waters too shallow or  otherwise inaccessible for conventional platforms (see fig. 10).

The Snakehead Large Displacement UUV will be launched and recovered  from submarines and surface ships.

No systems have been delivered to the Navy. The Navy is planning for  the first 2 systems to be delivered in fiscal year 2020 and for another 2  systems to be delivered in fiscal year 2023. The Navy will attain initial  operational capability with the first phase systems when two of them are  delivered and tested on a host platform, a life-cycle sustainment plan is in  place, and personnel are trained and equipped to operate and maintain  the system from a host platform.

The Navy plans to field the Snakehead Large Displacement UUVs to  UUV Squadron 1. According to Navy officials, the squadron is also testing  or operating more than 10 other types of UUVs and expects to receive 2  or more other new types of UUVs  through approximately fiscal year  2020, along with the Snakehead. Although Navy officials told us that it is  too soon to analyze and determine the numbers of personnel required for  the system at the time of this report, they plan to utilize forward-deployed  operators to launch and recover the vehicle, an operator to control the  vehicle from an operations center on land, and a mission payload  operator as needed depending on the mission. The precise number of  operators per system will be determined and updated as the systems  progress through acquisition.

In staffing personnel to meet requirements for UUV Squadron 1, Navy  officials stated that they do not directly access or recruit personnel to fill  such positions. Instead, these officials told us that enlisted sailors from  related career ratings within the submarine community, such as sonar  technicians, are assigned to the squadron generally after they have  completed at least one previous assignment and have approximately 5  years of experience in the Navy. According to the officials, once  personnel are assigned to the squadron, they receive UUV training to  qualify on the systems they will operate, and they will be identified with a  Navy enlisted classification code of 9550 for UUV operators.

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the extent to which the Navy and the Marine Corps  have (1) evaluated workforce alternatives for their unmanned system  operators, including the use of federal civilian employees and private  sector contractors; (2) developed and updated personnel requirements  and related policies and goals that affect requirements for operators,  maintainers, and other support personnel for selected unmanned  systems; and (3) developed approaches for staffing unmanned system  operators to meet personnel requirements and have met those  requirements.

To address these objectives, we included in the scope of our review the  Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ unmanned aerial systems (UAS),  unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and unmanned underwater vehicles  (UUV) that were programs of record in calendar year 2016. On the basis  of Department of the Navy documentation and interviews with  knowledgeable officials, we identified 24 such systems. To provide  illustrative examples for our first and third objectives and to address the  entirety of our second objective, we further narrowed our scope to those  systems that had progressed far enough through DOD’s acquisition  process to be part of a program of record within the purview of the  services’ system commands. Additionally, we narrowed our scope for  UASs, in particular, to those categorized as group 3 or above. We  omitted smaller group 1 UASs because service officials told us that those  systems are fielded in larger numbers as additional capabilities for  existing units in accomplishing their missions and entail a small workload  for operating and maintaining them relative to UASs of group 3 and  above. Group 2 UASs that the Navy and the Marine Corps utilize are  contractor-owned and operated, which was outside the scope of our  review.

From the remaining unmanned systems in our scope, we selected eight  case studies to review the services’ evaluations of workforce alternatives,  development and updates of personnel requirements and related policies  and goals, and staffing approaches: four UASs—the Navy’s MQ-4 Triton,  MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-25 Stingray, and the Marine Corps’ RQ-21  Blackjack; the two USVs—the Unmanned Influence Sweep System and  the Mine Countermeasures USV—associated with the Navy’s littoral  combat ships; and two types of the Navy’s UUVs—the MK 18 family of  UUV systems and the Snakehead Large Displacement UUV—based on  their size and missions. Although the results of the UUV case studies  cannot be generalized to all UUVs across the Navy, they illustrate  different characteristics of and approaches used for workforce mix,  requirements, and staffing for such systems.

To address our first objective, we compared any Navy and Marine Corps  efforts to evaluate federal civilian employees and private sector  contractors as workforce alternatives for operators of all of their  unmanned systems, including those from our case study sample, with  criteria from (1) DOD Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower  Management, which directs, among other things, that authorities consider  all available sources when determining workforce mix, and that  workforces be designated as federal civilians except in certain  circumstances, and (2) DOD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures  for Determining Workforce Mix, which establishes the workforce mix  decision process and directs that workforce planning authorities consider  all available personnel when determining the workforce mix—that is, the  combination of military servicemembers, federal civilians, and private  sector contractors. Specifically, we analyzed available documentation for  the selected case study systems on any evaluations the services  performed of alternative workforces and the related decisions made about  eligible personnel categories, and interviewed knowledgeable service  officials about factors that informed those evaluations and decisions and  any reasons for not evaluating workforce alternatives.

We also interviewed officials from the Navy and OUSD(P&R) who are  responsible for reviewing workforce and personnel planning documents  for Navy and Marine Corps programs to understand any broader DOD or  service workforce planning efforts for unmanned systems, and reasons  for omitting certain personnel categories from consideration for systems  that are in development. We reviewed our prior reports on workforce mix  and DOD-commissioned workforce mix studies and interviewed officials  from OUSD(P&R) to identify limitations and benefits associated with  different categories of personnel, including military servicemembers,  federal civilian employees of DOD, and private sector contractors. We  reviewed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ policies on workforce  planning to determine whether those policies provide more detailed  guidance or criteria relative to those available in DOD’s policies on  circumstances for which alternative personnel sources should be  considered or on the limitations and benefits associated with different  workforce mix options. We also compared these service-level workforce  planning policies with federal internal controls standards that emphasize  the importance of having clear, updated policies that align with an  organization’s mission and goals.

To address our second objective, we reviewed the Navy’s and the Marine  Corps’ efforts to develop and update personnel requirements for our  selected case study systems, including documentation of steps taken to  analyze and determine personnel requirements levels. We interviewed  service officials about their views of the sufficiency of those personnel  requirements for supporting training and deployment requirements for the  selected systems. For any systems that service officials were concerned  about the sufficiency of related personnel requirements, we compared  documentation of the requirements with DOD Directive 1100.4 and with a  Navy instruction. The DOD policy states that personnel requirements  should be driven by workload and established at the minimum levels  necessary to accomplish mission and performance objectives. Navy  Instruction 1000.16L states that personnel requirements must be validated as program changes dictate and at a minimum annually over a  system’s lifecycle to determine if a personnel update is required. Further,  we reviewed documentation of the life cycle cost estimate for the number  of Marine Corps personnel required to operate and maintain the RQ-21  Blackjack, and of UAS squadrons’ position on the sufficiency of those  personnel requirements, and compared those documents with DOD  guidance requiring that components determine a weapon system  program’s life cycle costs by planning for the many factors needed to  support the system, including personnel, and with Office of Management  and Budget guidance that states that to keep the cost analyses for capital  assets, such as weapon systems, current, accurate, and valid, cost  estimating should be continuously updated based on the latest  information available as programs mature.

In addition, we reviewed Navy policies on operating and maintaining UAS  and documentation from the Marine Corps about the effect of those  policies on UAS squadron personnel workload, and interviewed Navy and  Marine Corps headquarters- and unit-level officials about those effects  and any efforts underway to review and update policies. We then  compared those efforts to review and update policies with DOD Directive  1100.4 stating that existing policies, procedures, and structures should be  periodically evaluated to ensure efficient and effective use of personnel  resources, and with federal internal controls standards that emphasize  the importance of having clear, updated policies that align with an  organization’s mission and goals. Finally, we compared goals  established in DOD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013- 2038 and Department of the Navy strategy documents on unmanned  systems with federal internal controls standards that state than an  agency’s management should define objectives clearly to enable the  identification of risk.

For our third objective, we reviewed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’  steps to select, train, and track unmanned system operators to identify  any challenges. We reviewed for the selected systems a combination of  manpower estimate reports and personnel and training plan documents to  identify approaches for staffing operators. We also reviewed personnel  and training manuals describing prerequisites for related military  qualifications and occupations. We interviewed command- and unit-level  officials from the Navy and the Marine Corps to discuss the effectiveness  of current staffing approaches for meeting their training and deployment  requirements.

Focusing on challenges with providing enough personnel to serve as UAS  operators in particular, we also reviewed Navy reports on the retention of  certain aviation personnel to serve as UAS operators and we reviewed  Marine Corps data on its UAS operator inventory and retention levels  relative to its requirements and goals. Specifically, we reviewed Navy  reports on retention for fiscal years 2015 through 2017 because data from  earlier years were less relevant given the lower numbers of UAS  inventories. We requested data from the Marine Corps on its inventories  of and requirements for enlisted UAS operators for fiscal years 2007  through 2017 and on UAS officers for fiscal years 2013 (the first year of  available data) through 2017. We requested retention data—actual  numbers of personnel who reenlisted versus annual quotas—on enlisted  UAS operators for fiscal years 2010 (the earliest year for which data were  available) through 2017.

We assessed the reliability of these Marine Corps data by administering  questionnaires and interviewing relevant personnel responsible for  maintaining and overseeing the systems that supplied the data and  manually checking the data for errors or omissions. Through these  methods, we obtained information on the systems’ ability to record, track,  and report on these data, as well as on the quality control measures in  place. We found the inventory and requirements data to be sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of describing personnel inventory trends and the  sufficiency of operator personnel to meet requirements. We found that the  retention data are of undetermined reliability but are reporting them  because they are the data of record used by Marine Corps planning  officials. We also reviewed Navy and Marine Corps financial incentives for  retaining sufficient personnel to serve as UAS operators and compared  those approaches with criteria from DOD’s 2012 Eleventh Quadrennial  Review of Military Compensation, which established that organizations  should assess civilian supply and demand and civilian wages to  determine the most cost effective special and incentive pay strategies.

Further, we compared the Marine Corps’ efforts to address workforce  challenges specific to the Marine Corps’ UAS operator career field with a  key principle of strategic human capital planning from our prior work,  which states that agencies should ensure that flexibilities are part of their  overall human capital strategy. In our prior work, we found that strategic  human capital planning is an important component of an agency’s effort  to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining  staff needed for an agency to achieve its goals and of an agency’s effort  to align human capital activities with the agency’s current and emerging  mission. Specifically, we have found that an agency’s efforts to conduct  strategic human capital planning should include, among other things,  building the capability needed to address administrative, educational, and  other requirements important to supporting workforce strategies by  ensuring that flexibilities are part of the overall human capital strategy.  We focused on workforce challenges in the Marine Corps, in particular,  because it has a long-established career field for UAS operators, and the  Navy does not yet have a separate career field for any of its unmanned  systems operators.

We identified workforce challenges within the Marine Corps’ UAS  operator career field by reviewing a 2015 Marine Corps-sponsored survey  of its pilot and UAS officer workforce. The survey included questions  about satisfaction with career and benefits, and intentions to stay in the  Marine Corps and the underlying reasons for these. Although officers in  ranks of first lieutenant through lieutenant colonel were surveyed, we  were unable to include majors and lieutenant colonels in reporting results  for UAS officers because the Marine Corps aggregated those officers’  responses with those of majors and lieutenant colonels who operate other  types of aircraft. By reviewing the survey methodology and interviewing  an official involved in administering the survey and analyzing the results,  we determined that the survey results were sufficiently reliable for  reporting the perceptions about career satisfaction at a single point in  time for UAS operators who answered those questions.

In addition, we visited one of three active duty Marine Corps UAS  squadrons, which we chose because it had the most deployment  experience with the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS. We met with squadron  leaders to discuss their views about UAS personnel requirements and  staffing approaches. We also conducted eight small group discussions  with active duty UAS operators and officers—separately for enlisted  personnel and officers—to gain their perspectives on topics such as  morale, workload, and career satisfaction. The opinions of Marine Corps  UAS operators we obtained during our discussion groups are not  generalizable to the population of UAS operators in the Marine Corps.

Office of the Deputy Commandant for Aviation

Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and

Office of the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2  We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to February  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Lori Atkinson, (Assistant Director), Melissa Blanco, Tim Carr, Mae  Jones, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Ben Sclafani, Mike Silver, and Paul  Sturm.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission  Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and  Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18,  2017.

High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial  Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2017.

Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage  Special and Incentive Pay Programs. GAO-17-39. Washington, D.C.:  February 3, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Human  Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces. GAO-17-53. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Air  Force and Army Pilot Workforce Challenges. GAO-16-527T. Washington,  D.C.: March 16, 2016.

Military Personnel: Army Needs a Requirement for Capturing Data and  Clear Guidance on the Use of Military for Civilian or Contractor Positions.  GAO-15-349. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2015.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Pilot  Training. GAO-15-461. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2015.

Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned  Aerial System Pilots. GAO-14-316. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2014.

Human Capital: Additional Steps Needed to Help Determine the Right  Size and Composition of DOD’s Total Workforce. GAO-13-470.  Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2013.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results- Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories.  GAO-10-331. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2010.

Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning.  GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.