Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints

The Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between U.S. ports of entry. On the southwest border, Border Patrol deploys agents along the immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles from the border as part of a layered approach known as the defense in depth strategy. Immigration checkpoints, generally located between 25 and 100 miles from the border, are one element of this strategy. GAO was asked to review the defense in depth strategy.

This report addresses: (1) the factors Border Patrol considers in deploying agents, (2) where apprehensions of illegal crossers and seizures of contraband are occurring, and (3) what data show about how checkpoints contribute to apprehensions and seizures, among other objectives. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed Border Patrol documents and data on apprehensions and seizures from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, visited two southwest border sectors, interviewed officials from the other seven southwest border sectors and Border Patrol headquarters, and reviewed prior GAO work on border security.

According to U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), agent deployment decisions are based on factors such as staffing levels and the availability of agents, among other things. As of May 2017, nationwide, Border Patrol had about 1,900 fewer agents than authorized, which officials cited as a key challenge for optimal agent deployment. In recent years, attrition has exceeded hiring (an average of 904 agents compared to 523 agents) according to officials. GAO analyzed scheduling data, including time that agents were scheduled to be not working (for example, off duty or on leave) because these activities can affect deployment decisions by reducing the number of agents available on a particular day. GAO found that agents were available for deployment about 43 percent of the time.

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, Border Patrol apprehended a total of almost 2 million individuals along the southwest border, and these apprehensions increasingly occurred closer to the border, with 42 percent of apprehensions occurring one-half mile or less from the border in fiscal year 2016 compared to 24 percent in fiscal year 2012. One driver for this change is the increasing number of apprehensions of children, whom officials report may turn themselves in to Border Patrol without attempting to evade detection. Meanwhile, over this period, the locations where seizures of contraband occurred remained roughly the same, with the majority occurring 10 or more miles from the border.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, GAO found that 2 percent of apprehensions and 43 percent of seizures occurred at checkpoints; however, determining the extent to which apprehensions and seizures are attributable to checkpoints is difficult because of long-standing data issues. More apprehensions and seizures may be attributable to checkpoints, but Border Patrol's reporting does not distinguish apprehensions that occurred “at” versus “around” a checkpoint. Border Patrol is drafting guidance to clarify how checkpoint apprehension and seizure data are to be recorded that would respond to a 2009 GAO recommendation to improve the internal controls for management oversight of checkpoint data. GAO also determined that seizures at checkpoints differed from those at other locations. Specifically, 40 percent of seizures at checkpoints were 1 ounce or less of marijuana from U.S. citizens. In contrast, seizures at other locations were more often higher quantities of marijuana seized from aliens.

GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time but has previously recommended that Border Patrol establish internal controls for checkpoint data, among other things. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has taken some steps to improve the quality of checkpoint data, but additional actions are needed to fully implement the recommendation.

The United States’ international border with Mexico continues to be  vulnerable to illegal cross-border traffic. The U.S. Border Patrol (Border  Patrol)—an office within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that has primary responsibility  for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry—recorded more  than 400,000 apprehensions and more than 15,000 seizures in fiscal year  2016. Agents are among the key resources Border Patrol deploys— along with infrastructure and technology—to respond to cross-border  threats, and Border Patrol’s most recent strategic plan calls for a risk- based approach to resource deployment.

Along the southwest border, Border Patrol deploys agents along the  immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles from the border as part of  a layered approach the agency refers to as the defense in depth strategy.  As part of this strategy, Border Patrol deploys agents on temporary duty  assignments to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) located in difficult to  access areas near the border to reduce the response time to threats in  these areas, and it also deploys agents to immigration checkpoints  (checkpoints) that are generally located on highways 25 to 100 miles from  the border.

At checkpoints, Border Patrol agents screen vehicles for aliens who were  able to illegally cross the border undetected at or between ports of entry.  Border Patrol checkpoints are located on major U.S. highways and  secondary roads. This permits checkpoints to be far enough inland to  detect and apprehend aliens in violation of U.S. immigration law,  smugglers, and potential terrorists attempting to travel farther into the  interior of the United States on ingress routes after evading detection or  otherwise avoiding required inspection at the border. According to Border  Patrol data, there are about 140 locations that Border Patrol uses for  checkpoint operations near the southwest border, although not all of them  are operational at all times. Some of these checkpoints have a  permanent structure with off-highway inspection lanes and technology to  facilitate inspection and convenience, while other checkpoints have  temporary infrastructure in the form of trailers and generators. DHS’s  Congressional Justification for the fiscal year 2018 budget notes that,  because checkpoints are an integral part of the defense in depth strategy,  measurements of checkpoint events (apprehensions and seizures) serve  as barometers of the effectiveness of Border Patrol’s overall strategy to  deny illegal entries into the United States.

Communities located near the southwest border may be positively or  negatively impacted by the placement and operation of checkpoints and  other Border Patrol resources deployed under the defense in depth  strategy. You requested that we review Border Patrol’s defense in depth  strategy. This report addresses the following questions:  1.  What factors does Border Patrol consider in deploying agents to the  different layers of the defense in depth strategy along the southwest  border, including FOBs along the border and checkpoints?  2.  Where are apprehensions and seizures occurring in relation to the  border, as a reflection of Border Patrol’s defense in depth strategy?  3.  What do data show about how checkpoints contribute to  apprehensions and seizures?  4.  What is known about the effects of Border Patrol’s defense in depth  strategy on surrounding communities, and how, if at all, does Border  Patrol engage with these communities to identify and respond to any  such effects?

To address these objectives, we analyzed Border Patrol data and  documents, visited two southwest border sectors, and interviewed Border  Patrol officials from the other seven southwest border sectors and Border  Patrol headquarters. Specifically, we analyzed Border Patrol data on  planned agent deployment, apprehensions, and seizures across all nine  southwest border sectors from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We  selected these years because they were the five most recent fiscal years  for which complete data were available at the time of our review.

We also selected the two sectors to visit (Tucson sector and Rio Grande  Valley sector) based on the role of checkpoints in those locations, the  presence of FOBs, the role of known community groups that engage with  Border Patrol, and a relatively high level of known cross-border illegal  activity in those sectors, among other factors. In these two sectors, we  met with sector and station officials, local law enforcement agencies, and  community groups. We selected local law enforcement agencies and  community groups based on recommendations from sector officials and  geographic considerations, such as proximity to checkpoints. We also  visited Border Patrol facilities including checkpoints and FOBs. Both in- person during our visits to the two selected sectors and by phone with the  remaining seven sectors, we interviewed officials responsible for making  agent deployment decisions to discuss how sectors and stations decide  to deploy agents, the operational results of agent deployment, and how  sectors and stations respond to any effects of Border Patrol’s defense in  depth strategy on the surrounding community. We also interviewed  officials from Border Patrol headquarters—specifically officials from the  Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO) and from the Border  Community Liaison (BCL) Program—and officials responsible for  overseeing and analyzing Border Patrol deployment, apprehension, and  seizure data. These interviews focused on Border Patrol’s oversight of  and data regarding agent deployment, enforcement actions, and  checkpoints.

We also reviewed our prior work regarding checkpoints, the defense in  depth strategy, and issues related to private property damage along the  southwest border. In particular, we reviewed recommendations from our  August 2009 report on checkpoints and assessed actions taken in  response to these recommendations to determine whether they had been  implemented.

To address our first objective, we analyzed data on planned agent  deployment from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System  (BPETS) for fiscal years 2013 through 2016. We reviewed the activities  in the data to determine broad categories represented among the  activities. Border Patrol officials responsible for overseeing the data  concurred with our categories and how we organized the activities into  these categories. We assessed the reliability of these data by testing for  missing data and obvious errors, reviewing related documentation, and  interviewing knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data  used in our analyses were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.

To address our second and third objectives, we obtained and analyzed  apprehension and seizure data from Border Patrol’s Enforcement  Integrated Database/e3 (e3) database for fiscal years 2012 through 2016.  We assessed the reliability of these data by testing for missing data and  obvious errors, reviewing related documentation, and interviewing  knowledgeable agency officials. We used Global Positioning System  (GPS) coordinates contained in the e3 data to analyze distance from the  border and proximity and relation to checkpoints for apprehensions and  seizures. In assessing the reliability of these data, we identified some  apprehension and seizure records with GPS coordinates that were  outside the scope of our review. We excluded the small percentage of  records that had missing GPS coordinates or had GPS coordinates that  were not within the boundaries of southwest Border Patrol sectors. We  determined that the data used in our analyses were sufficiently reliable for  the purposes of this report. For our analysis of apprehensions’ and  seizures’ proximity and relation to checkpoints, we analyzed data for  fiscal years 2013 through 2016 because a listing of checkpoints that were  operational in fiscal year 2012 was not available.

To address our fourth objective, we reviewed BCL program documents  from headquarters and all nine southwest border sectors, interviewed  officials in these sectors, and met with community members and local law  enforcement officials in the two sectors we visited. We spoke with officials  from all nine southwest border sectors about their views on the effects  that Border Patrol and illegal cross-border activity have had on nearby  communities up to 100 miles from the border. Our interviews also focused  on Border Patrol’s efforts to identify and respond to any effects, including  the organization of and actions taken as part of the BCL program.  Although the information we obtained from these interviews cannot be  generalized to other communities near border checkpoints, these  interviews provided important insights and perspectives about the  checkpoints.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to November 2017  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Border Patrol’s Organizational Structure

Border Patrol divides responsibility for southwest border security  operations geographically among nine sectors, each with its own sector  headquarters. Each sector is further divided into varying numbers of  stations. For example, the Tucson sector has divided geographic  responsibility across eight stations, seven of which have responsibility for  miles of land directly on the U.S.-Mexico border. Stations’ areas of  responsibility are divided into zones. Border Patrol refers to “border  zones”—those having international border miles—and “interior zones”— those without international border miles. For example, as shown in figure  1, within the Tucson sector, the Sonoita station has only border zones,  the Willcox station has only interior zones, and the other stations have a  mix of both border and interior zones. According to Border Patrol officials,  dividing stations into zones allows sectors to more effectively analyze  border conditions, including terrain, when planning how to deploy agents.  Zone dimensions are largely determined by geography and topographical  features, and zone size can vary significantly.

In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, Border Patrol was statutorily required  to maintain a minimum of 21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but  Border Patrol has faced challenges in staffing to that minimum level. As  of May 2017, Border Patrol had about 19,500 agents on board.  Additionally, in January 2017, an executive order called for the hiring of  5,000 additional Border Patrol agents, subject to available appropriations,  and Border Patrol is aiming to have 26,370 agents by the end of fiscal  year 2021. The Acting Commissioner of CBP reported in a February  2017 memo to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security that from  fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016, Border Patrol hired an average of 523  agents per year while experiencing a loss of an average of 904 agents  per year. The memo cited challenges such as competing with other  federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations for applicants. In  particular, the memo noted that CBP faces hiring and retention  challenges compared to DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (which is also planning to hire additional law enforcement  personnel) because CBP’s hiring process requires applicants to take a  polygraph examination, Border Patrol agents are deployed to less  desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol agents generally receive lower  compensation.

Border Patrol headquarters, with input from the sectors, determines how  many authorized agent positions will be allocated to each of the sectors.  According to Border Patrol officials, these decisions take into account the  relative needs of the sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and the flow  of illegal activity. Each sector’s leadership determines how many of the  authorized agent positions will be allocated to each station within their  sector. Sector leadership also distributes newly assigned agents—those  agents recently hired whom headquarters has assigned to the sector, or  existing agents who are being transferred—to specific stations within the  sector. Table 1 shows the number of authorized agent positions for each  southwest border sector as well as the number of agents who were  assigned to each of those sectors, as of May 2017.

Once a sector assigns agents to a station, station officials assign agents  to a shift. Most agents work 10-hour shifts, which allows for some overlap  in time for the outgoing shift to relay key information to the incoming  shift. Most agents work 5 days per week with 2 off duty days.

Border Patrol has 17 FOBs that are established in forward or remote  locations in five of the nine southwest border sectors to sustain Border  Patrol operations. According to Border Patrol officials, the primary  function of these facilities is to give the Border Patrol a tactical advantage  by reducing response time to threats or actionable intelligence. Typically,  agents are assigned for 7 days, during which they reside at the FOB and  deploy to their assigned duties. FOBs allow agents to be pre-positioned  at these locations, which reduces the portion of an agent’s shift that is  spent in transit between the station and the patrol location. In addition,  these facilities are intended to increase security awareness and presence  in the border areas where they are located. FOBs are staffed by Border  Patrol agents on temporary duty assignments from their permanent duty  station. After their shift, they are normally required to remain at the FOB  to rest, prepare for their next shift, and be available, if needed, to respond  to operational issues. Figure 2 includes a photo of a FOB in the Rio  Grande Valley sector. Five of the nine southwest border sectors—Yuma,  Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, and the Rio Grande Valley—have FOBs,  whereas the other four sectors—San Diego, El Centro, Del Rio, and  Laredo—do not.

Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints—permanent and  tactical—that differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location. While  both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed locations,  permanent checkpoints—as their name suggests—are characterized by  their brick and mortar structures, that may include off-highway covered  lanes for vehicle inspection and several buildings including those for  administration, detention of persons suspected of smuggling or other  illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in the inspection process.  Figure 2 shows examples of permanent and tactical checkpoints we  observed in the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson sectors, and figure 3 is a  map depicting the locations of permanent checkpoints near the southwest  border.

Border Patrol agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do  not have when conducting roving patrols away from the border. The  United States Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol agents may stop a  vehicle at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if  there is no reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal  entrants, and also held that the operation of a fixed checkpoint does not  require a judicial warrant. The Court further held that, provided the  intrusion is sufficiently minimal so as not to require particularized  justification, Border Patrol agents “have wide discretion” to refer motorists  selectively to a secondary inspection area for additional brief  questioning. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that Border Patrol  agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable  suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the  United States—a higher threshold for stopping and questioning motorists  than at checkpoints. The constitutional threshold for searching a vehicle  is the same, however, and must be supported by either consent or  probable cause, whether in the context of a roving patrol or a checkpoint  search. Probable cause can include a canine detecting something it is  trained to detect (e.g., concealed people, narcotics). Figure 4 shows a  Border Patrol canine team inspecting a vehicle at a checkpoint.

We have previously reported on topics related to the defense in depth  strategy, and specifically on checkpoints. In August 2009, we reported  on the measurement of checkpoint performance and the impact of  checkpoint operations on nearby communities, among other things  related to checkpoints. In that report, we made recommendations to,  among other things, strengthen checkpoint design and staffing and  improve the measurement and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness,  including measuring community impacts. CBP has implemented two of  our recommendations from that report—specifically, Border Patrol  explored and considered the feasibility of a checkpoint performance  model and required that traffic volumes be studied and considered when  designing new permanent checkpoints. Appendix I provides details on the  status of all six recommendations from that report. We also reported in  December 2012 on how Border Patrol manages personnel resources at  the southwest border, including aspects of the defense in depth strategy,  such as where apprehensions and seizures were occurring relative to the  southwest border. That report focused on the Tucson sector—which at  the time had the most Border Patrol apprehensions of the nine southwest  border sectors—and compared data on agent deployment,  apprehensions, and seizures from the Tucson sectors with data for other  sectors.

Border Patrol Deploys Agents Based on Availability and Geography, Among Other Factors, and Agent Activity Schedules Vary By Sector

Border Patrol Assigns Agents Based on Factors Such As Availability, Geography, and Illegal Traffic Patterns

According to sector officials, decisions about agent deployment in terms  of location and activity are based on multiple factors, including the  availability of agents for a given shift, the geography in a station’s area of  responsibility, and illegal traffic patterns. For example, when considering  the various assignments that need to be filled for a given day, supervisors  must take into account agents that are unavailable because they are off  duty, on scheduled leave, or are scheduled to attend training. The  geography in a station’s area of responsibility can also affect decisions  about where to deploy available agents. For example, Border Patrol may  have limited access to certain areas because of challenging terrain,  limited or poor quality roads, or private ownership. Supervisors also  review information about illegal traffic patterns in their areas of  responsibility to determine where enforcement operations may be  needed.

One key factor in how Border Patrol makes deployment decisions at the  station level is the overall number of agents available. Officials from all  nine southwest border sectors cited current staffing levels and the  availability of agents as a challenge for optimal deployment. Nationwide,  as of May 2017, Border Patrol had nearly 1,900 fewer agents than  authorized and has faced hiring and retention challenges in recent years.  As shown in table 1 earlier, eight of the nine southwest border sectors  were below their authorized agent staffing levels as of May 2017. As  such, resources are constrained and station officials must make decisions  about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number of  agents available.

Within sectors, some stations may be comparatively more understaffed  than others because of recruitment and retention challenges, according to  officials. Generally, sector officials said that the recruitment and retention  challenges associated with particular stations were related to quality of  life factors in the area near the station—for example, agents may not  want to live with their families in an area without a hospital, with low- performing schools, or with relatively long commutes from their homes to  their duty station. This can affect retention of existing agents, but it may  also affect whether a new agent accepts a position in that location. For  example, officials in one sector said that new agent assignments are not  based solely on agency need, but rather also take into consideration  agent preferences. These officials added that there is the potential that  new agents may decline offers for stations that are perceived as  undesirable, or they may resign their position earlier than they otherwise  would to pursue employment in a more desirable location.

Supervisors make decisions about how to deploy agents based on the  number of agents assigned to a shift who are available to work the shift  on a particular day. On any given day, some agents will be off duty, in  training, or have annual or sick leave scheduled, thereby reducing the  number of agents available for deployment during a shift.

To assess how Border Patrol has scheduled and deployed agents across  the southwest border sectors, we analyzed the scheduled deployment  data that supervisors entered into BPETS for fiscal years 2013 through  2016. Supervisors enter data into BPETS in advance of a shift to track  expected time and attendance. Supervisors record work status by  indicating whether an agent will be working, off duty, or otherwise not  working (for example, on annual leave or scheduled sick leave), and for  agents who are working, the supervisors also record an assignment to  which the agent is expected to be deployed that day. We analyzed these  assignments to determine how agents’ work time was distributed among  activities in the following categories:

Operations and Patrol refers to frontline activities that involve identifying  and apprehending illegal entrants and identifying and seizing contraband.  Some specific examples include linewatch, sign cutting, and checkpoint  duties.

Operational Support refers to activities, such as intelligence gathering or  surveillance, that support frontline agents conducting operations and  patrol activities.

Processing refers to activities that occur after apprehending an individual,  including transport, processing, detention, and removal.

Legal Support and Litigation refers to activities, such as attending court  proceedings, that involve prosecution of apprehended individuals.

Training refers to activities that involve providing instruction, attending  training, or completing qualification/certification tests.

Administrative and Other Non-Enforcement Activities refers to activities  other than those above, including public relations, hiring and recruitment,  and policy and compliance.

Our analysis included time that agents were scheduled to be off duty or  on scheduled leave because scheduled time off can affect supervisors’  deployment decisions by reducing the number of agents available on a  particular day.

As shown in figure 5, agents were unavailable for deployment for a total  of 42 percent of time (off duty time, scheduled non-work time, and  training), and about 43 percent of agents’ time was scheduled for  operations and patrol activities in the field. As an example, this means  that a station with 300 total agents—with 100 agents assigned to each of  three shifts—would have had on average about 42 of the 100 agents per  shift unavailable because of planned time not working (off duty or other  scheduled non-work time) or in training. Of the remaining 58 agents, on  average, about 43 would have been scheduled to field-based operations  and patrol activities, and 15 would have been assigned to other activities.

Furthermore, it is important to note that BPETS deployment schedules  reflect the scheduled availability and deployment of agents, rather than  actual deployment. Actual availability or deployment may have differed  because of changes in circumstances or other factors, and supervisors  are not required to update BPETS to reflect these deployment changes.  For example, an agent who was assigned to patrol the border might do so  for part of a shift, but upon apprehending an illegal entrant the agent may  spend some or all of the remainder of the shift processing the  apprehended individual. According to Border Patrol officials, additional  agents in the field may also be pulled from their patrol activities to  conduct processing when large groups are apprehended.

Border Patrol station officials also make deployment decisions based on  the unique geographical factors in their area of responsibility, such as  proximity to population centers and access to certain areas (including  remote areas where FOBs are located). In addition, whether the station is  responsible for the operation of checkpoints is another factor that station  officials consider in making decisions about how to most effectively use  available agents for operations and patrol activities in the field.

In relatively populated areas close to the border, the window of time  Border Patrol has to respond to illegal crossings may be shorter than in  more remote areas where agents may have more time to apprehend  illegal crossers. Thus, proximity to population centers is a factor that  officials consider when deciding how many agents to deploy to particular  locations within a station’s area of responsibility. In February 2017, we  reported that Border Patrol officials said that populated urban  environments offer an advantageous setting for illegal entrants because  within seconds to minutes these entrants can blend in with the local U.S.  community after crossing the border. Therefore Border Patrol has  intended to divert illicit cross-border activities into more remote or rural  environments, where illegal entrants may require hours or days to reach  the nearest U.S. community. For example, El Centro sector officials told  us that an outlet mall located at the immediate border posed a threat in  terms of the limited time it would take illegal crossers to assimilate into  the population. Similarly, officials in one station in the Rio Grande Valley  sector identified a town that is very close to the Rio Grande River, and  Border Patrol agents must aim to apprehend crossers within a two to  three block distance to prevent crossers from blending in with residents of the town. Sector officials generally stated that stations prioritize  deployment to areas along the immediate border.

Border Patrol may have limited access to certain areas because of land  ownership or limited road infrastructure, and this may affect decisions  about how to deploy agents (if at all) to these areas. Some sectors  consist primarily of privately owned land, and Border Patrol officials must  obtain permission from the landowner, or a judicial warrant, to access any  private lands further than 25 miles from the border. Border Patrol  officials in one sector noted that some landowners do not want Border  Patrol on their property. Additionally, the availability and condition of road  infrastructure can make it challenging for agents to get to some locations.  For example, officials in sectors with mountainous terrain cited challenges  related to accessing and patrolling mountainous areas. In particular,  officials in the Tucson sector noted that the sector includes seven  mountain ranges and estimated that about 20 percent of the 262 miles of  land border in the sector are inaccessible by vehicle. As a result, these  officials said that agents deployed to those areas patrol by foot,  horseback, and air.

In some areas where there are terrain and road access challenges,  Border Patrol may establish FOBs to facilitate access to areas near the  immediate border and enable agents to spend a greater proportion of  their shifts on patrol. Border Patrol sector officials in the five sectors that  currently operate at least one FOB, as well as officials in one other sector  that previously operated a FOB, said that FOBs are beneficial for  maximizing patrol time in difficult to reach locations. Assigning agents to  these locations on temporary duty assignments reduces the portion of an  agent’s shift that is spent in transit between the station and the patrol  location. For example, officials in one sector said that the transit time  between the station and the FOB is a 5 to 6 hour round trip. Thus, transit  to that location could comprise 50 to 60 percent of a shift for agents deployed to that patrol area if they were to report to the station each day  prior to beginning their patrol duties. Instead, agents travel between the  station and the FOB only as part of the first and last day of their multi-day  assignment to the FOB, and on the days in between they are pre- positioned at the FOB to begin patrols at the start of their shift.

Although FOBs can help facilitate access to some remote locations, there  can also be associated challenges, and therefore, they may not be an  effective solution in all cases to improving access to remote areas. For  example, officials in one sector noted that Border Patrol had considered  establishing a FOB to improve accessibility to that location, but there  were challenges to securing the rights to access private property and  providing for adequate facilities given that the area of interest did not  have infrastructure to supply water to the FOB if it were to be built. In  February 2016, the DHS Office of the Inspector General reported that  although the challenge of supplying water to FOBs rarely causes Border  Patrol to shut down a FOB, it is a frequent problem that often requires  additional resources to resolve. Additionally, some remote or difficult to  access locations may be located on private or tribal lands, which require  Border Patrol to negotiate access and other aspects of FOB operations,  or on wildlife refuges, which may have limitations regarding the types of  infrastructure or operations in order to preserve the local habitat.

Stations that have responsibility for checkpoints in their areas of  responsibility consider checkpoint operations in their deployment  decisions. Border Patrol’s checkpoints policy includes a recommended  minimum number of agents to operate the checkpoint. The nature of a  checkpoint—whether it is permanent or tactical—can also affect  deployment. Permanent checkpoints are generally intended to be  operational most of the time, meaning that stations with responsibility for  permanent checkpoints generally assign at least the minimum number of  agents to those checkpoints to ensure continuous operation. In contrast,  tactical checkpoints are intended to be set up for short-term or intermittent  use. Accordingly, a station can make a decision about whether to operate  a tactical checkpoint based on a determination of whether it is more  effective to staff the checkpoint or whether it is more effective to deploy  those agents elsewhere. Stations with responsibility for both the  immediate border and interior checkpoints must balance agent  deployment across both responsibilities. In contrast, border stations that  do not contain checkpoints in their areas of responsibility do not have to  distribute agents between checkpoint and patrol activities. Similarly,  interior stations that do not have responsibility for the border can prioritize  checkpoints.

Additionally, for stations with checkpoints, supervisors must determine  how many agents, if any, to deploy to the areas around a checkpoint  through which illegal entrants or smugglers may travel to circumvent the  checkpoint (known as circumvention routes). We reported in August 2009  that Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and respond to  circumvention activity, but at the time, officials stated that other priorities  sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents  and resources in checkpoint circumvention routes. Similarly, as part of  this review, sector officials said checkpoint circumvention routes may not  be patrolled at all times because of the need to deploy agents elsewhere,  including to the checkpoint itself to meet the minimum number of agents  needed to keep the checkpoint operational. According to officials, in some  locations, sensors and cameras assist with monitoring traffic in  circumvention routes, and when technology detects traffic, agents can be  deployed to respond.

In our August 2009 report, we reported that checkpoint performance can  be hindered by limited staffing at checkpoints. Border Patrol policy  recommended the minimum number of agents for checkpoint operation,  but sector managers may have had other priorities for staff placement,  and thus stations may have only staffed checkpoints—and circumvention  routes—with the minimum number of agents. Additionally, as part of that  review, we found that design and planning documents for the planned  Interstate 19 checkpoint in the Tucson sector did not include an estimate  of the number of agents who would be deployed to address circumvention  activity at the new checkpoint. We recommended that, in connection with  planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, CBP should conduct a  workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing allocations  to determine the resources needed to address anticipated levels of illegal  activity around the checkpoint.

In January 2017, Border Patrol began construction of a new checkpoint  facility on U.S. Highway 281 south of Falfurrias, Texas, that will replace  the existing checkpoint. The current checkpoint has a maximum of five  lanes of traffic, whereas the new checkpoint will have a maximum of eight  lanes. Border Patrol provided us an estimate for the number of agents,  supervisors, and canine units that are expected to be needed to operate  the new checkpoint; however, the information provided lacked supporting  details, such as a discussion of what data were collected and how the  data were analyzed to determine how many agents would be needed to  staff the checkpoint and the surrounding circumvention routes. Given  existing staffing constraints, having an accurate workforce planning needs  assessment is important to inform future considerations for how to deploy  agents to address anticipated levels of illegal activity at and around the  checkpoint. Therefore, we continue to believe this recommendation is  warranted.

Intelligence Information about Illegal Traffic Patterns

Sector officials said they consider intelligence information—such as  information about illegal traffic patterns and data on apprehensions and  seizures; the types of threats in the area (e.g., illegal border crossing,  drug smuggling); and transnational criminal organizations’ tactics,  techniques, and procedures—when determining where to deploy  available agents. Officials said they also receive information on suspected  illegal traffic from community members, and stations may deploy agents  to respond.

Sectors Vary in How Much Time Agents Are Scheduled for Operations and Patrol Activities and Where Such Activities Are Scheduled to Occur

From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the nine southwest border sectors  varied in how they distributed work time scheduled to activities in the six  categories previously discussed—(1) operations and patrol, (2)  operational support, (3) processing, (4) legal support and litigation, (5)  training, and (6) administrative and other non-enforcement—although all  the sectors scheduled the majority of agents’ time (between 61 and 77  percent) to operations and patrol activities. As shown in figure 6, the Rio  Grande Valley sector scheduled the smallest percentage of agents’ work  time to operations and patrol activities (61 percent) and the highest  percentage of time to processing (13 percent). As discussed later in this  report, the Rio Grande Valley had the highest number of apprehensions  out of the nine southwest border sectors from fiscal year 2012 through  2016, thereby affecting the time needed for processing or otherwise  attending to apprehended individuals.

The scheduling data also show variations in the locations where sectors  plan to deploy agents to operations and patrol activities in proximity to the  border. Specifically, as shown in figure 7, the sectors ranged from  scheduling 34 to 61 percent of operations and patrol time in border zones  (for the Big Bend and Rio Grande Valley sectors, respectively) and from  17 to 52 percent of operations and patrol time in non-border zones (for  the Del Rio and Big Bend sectors, respectively). In some cases, the data  do not include a zone assignment, and sectors varied in what percentage  of operations and patrol scheduling assignments did not have a zone  assignment. Including a zone assignment is not required by Border Patrol  policy, and headquarters and sector officials identified some possible  reasons why an assignment may not include a zone. For example,  officials said that an agent could be deployed to an activity that has  responsibility for multiple zones or no specific zone, such as roving patrol,  specialty units (such as an intelligence unit or special operations), or  assisting CBP’s Air and Marine Operations. Officials from one sector  noted that a zone may not be assigned in the data because supervisors  assign them orally when agents arrive at the start of a shift, and this  provides supervisors flexibility to make the assignments based on the  most up-to-date information about traffic patterns. Border Patrol  headquarters officials said that the reasons for variations in border zone  deployment are the same as we previously reported in December 2012— specifically, differences in geographical factors among the southwest  border sectors (such as varying topography, ingress and egress routes,  and land access issues, and structural factors such as technology and  infrastructure deployments) that can affect how sectors operate and may  preclude closer deployment to the border.

Sectors also varied in terms of the proportion of operations and patrol  time scheduled for checkpoint-related activities. Across the nine  southwest border sectors from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2016,  approximately 9.4 percent of agents’ time scheduled for operations and  patrol was scheduled for checkpoint activities. However, the number of  agent hours scheduled for checkpoint activities—and what percentage of  operations and patrol time these hours represent—vary by sector because of differences in factors, such as the number of checkpoints in a  sector, the relative size of checkpoints, and the overall number of agents  in a sector. For example, as shown in table 2, the El Centro and Big Bend  sectors scheduled a similar number of hours to checkpoint-related  activities, but these hours represented different percentages of total  scheduled operations and patrol activities time—13.9 percent and 21.0  percent, respectively—which partly reflects that the El Centro sector has  almost double the number of agents and fewer checkpoints than the Big  Bend sector.

Apprehensions Occurred Closer to the Border in Fiscal Year 2016 Compared to Fiscal Year 2012, While Seizure Locations Remained Relatively Unchanged

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, 33 percent of southwest border  apprehensions were made one-half mile or less from the border, and over  this time period apprehensions increasingly occurred closer to the border,  as shown in figure 8. Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016,  apprehensions one-half mile or less from the border increased from 24  percent to 42 percent. During the same time period, the percentage of  apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border steadily  dropped, from 27 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 15 percent of all  apprehensions in fiscal year 2016.

While all nine southwest border sectors exhibited this trend of an increase  in apprehensions one-half mile or less from the border and a decrease in  apprehensions farther than 20 miles from the border, the Rio Grande  Valley sector had the greatest influence on the overall southwest border  trend because that sector accounted for almost half (42 percent) of all  southwest border apprehensions during this time period. Consistent with  the overall trend for southwest border apprehensions in figure 8 above,  the percentage of Rio Grande Valley sector apprehensions one-half mile  or less from the border increased (from 27 percent in fiscal year 2012 to  48 percent in fiscal year 2016) and the sector’s percentage of  apprehensions more than 20 miles from the border decreased (from 30  percent in fiscal year 2012 to 12 percent in fiscal year 2016). Appendix II  provides more detailed information about trends in apprehensions by  sector for fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

According to Border Patrol officials and apprehension data, one key driver  for apprehensions occurring closer to the border is the increasing number  of apprehensions of children (either unaccompanied or as part of family  units) from countries other than Mexico. We have previously reported  that CBP officials have attributed high apprehension rates in the Rio  Grande Valley sector to the high number of unaccompanied children and  adults with children, many of whom turn themselves in to Border Patrol  without attempting to evade detection. Officials said children are often  told by smugglers to wait in specific locations where agents frequently  patrol so that they will be found. According to Border Patrol officials,  persons apprehended from Central America are often fleeing violence,  and once apprehended they may assert claims for asylum in the United  States.

As shown in table 3, apprehensions of individuals, particularly children,  from Central American countries (specifically, El Salvador, Guatemala,  and Honduras) increased, while apprehensions of Mexicans, including  children, decreased. In particular, in the Rio Grande Valley sector, the  number of children apprehended from El Salvador, Guatemala, and  Honduras increased almost tenfold, from 6,869 in fiscal year 2012 to  60,084 in fiscal year 2016. Such apprehensions also increasingly  occurred closer to the border. In fiscal year 2016, Border Patrol  apprehended 36,882 children from these countries (about 61 percent)  one-half mile or less from the border, compared to 1,830 (about 27  percent) in fiscal year 2012. Although other sectors accounted for smaller  percentages of overall southwest border apprehensions, all sectors saw  notable increases in the percent of apprehensions who were children  from Central America and who were apprehended closer to the border.  Border Patrol officials said other factors may also have contributed to the  change in apprehension patterns, such as changes in where patrols  occurred during the time period we analyzed.

From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, seizure locations  remained roughly the same, with between 64 and 70 percent of seizures  occurring 10 or more miles from the border each year and between 9  percent and 11 percent of seizures occurring one-half mile or less from  the border each year, as shown in figure 9.

Trends within individual sectors varied, but unlike with apprehensions, no  single sector dominated the proportion of seizures to strongly influence  the overall pattern for the southwest border. The greatest number of  seizures during the 5 fiscal years occurred in the Tucson, Big Bend, and  Rio Grande Valley sectors (34, 19, and 16 percent of all seizures  respectively). These sectors each had different distributions of where  seizures occurred, as shown in figure 10. In particular, about 1 percent of  seizures in the Big Bend sector occurred within 1 mile of the border,  compared to 13 percent of seizures in the Tucson sector and 37 percent  of seizures in the Rio Grande Valley sector. Appendix III provides more  detailed information about trends in seizures by sector for fiscal year 2012  through fiscal year 2016.

Long-Standing Data Quality Issues Make It Difficult to Precisely Measure Checkpoints’ Contributions to Apprehensions and Seizures

Checkpoints’ Role in Apprehensions and Seizures Is Difficult to Measure with Precision Because Of Long- Standing Data Quality Issues

According to our analysis of Border Patrol data, checkpoints accounted  for about 2 percent of apprehensions and almost half of seizures in  southwest border sectors. However, determining the extent to which  apprehensions and seizures farther from the border are attributable to  checkpoints is difficult because of data quality issues that have persisted  since we previously reported on checkpoints in August 2009. In that  report, we found that Border Patrol had established a number of  measures for checkpoint performance to inform the public on program  results and provide management oversight, including measures related to  apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints and on circumvention routes.  However, we reported that information gaps and reporting issues  hindered public accountability and that inconsistent data collection and  entry hindered Border Patrol’s ability to monitor the need for program  improvement. Specifically, we found that a lack of management oversight  and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the  overstatement of checkpoint performance results in agency performance  reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints.  For example, officials at some checkpoints were including apprehensions  that occurred within a 2.5-mile radius of the checkpoints in their reporting  of apprehensions at checkpoints, which led to inconsistent reporting  across checkpoints. We reported that the lack of oversight and unclear  data collection guidance hindered management’s ability to monitor the  need for program improvement. We therefore recommended, among  other things, that Border Patrol establish internal controls for  management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness  of checkpoint performance data.

In response to our recommendations, Border Patrol issued several  memoranda in 2009 and 2010 related to the collection of checkpoint data,  including guidance intended to distinguish between apprehensions and  seizures occurring at checkpoints compared to those occurring in  circumvention routes. In particular, these memoranda stated that:  “At the checkpoint” is defined as the area including the checkpoint itself  and the roadway prior to the checkpoint marked with cones and/or  warning signs related to checkpoint operations (which, according to  Border Patrol’s checkpoint policy, are to begin on the roadway one-half  mile from the checkpoint itself). Apprehensions and seizures occurring  at a checkpoint are to be recorded by selecting the appropriate  checkpoint location from a dropdown list of landmarks (landmark data  field).  “Circumvention” is defined as “any deviation from a normally used route  of egress in order to avoid detection by a checkpoint,” and if an individual  was apprehended while attempting to circumvent a checkpoint, the  apprehension is to be recorded by marking a checkbox labeled  “Circumvention App?” (There is no data field for seizures that indicates  that Border Patrol seized contraband from someone attempting to  circumvent a checkpoint, but the seizure can be associated with an  apprehension or arrest record for the person carrying the contraband,  and the apprehension or arrest record may have the “Circumvention  App?” box checked.)

However, as discussed below, these memoranda have not fully  addressed our recommendation because our analysis indicates that  issues persist regarding the accuracy and consistency of data on  checkpoint apprehensions and seizures. These issues continue to affect  how Border Patrol monitors and reports on checkpoint performance  results.

According to Border Patrol officials, since the implementation of these  memoranda, Border Patrol has reported on apprehensions and seizures  at checkpoints based solely on the landmark data field. Specifically, an  apprehension or seizure event is reported as having occurred at a  checkpoint if the landmark associated with the event corresponds to the  landmark for a checkpoint (checkpoint landmark). In September 2016, the  Border Patrol Chief testified before a congressional committee that  Border Patrol apprehended 8,503 individuals and seized over 75,000  pounds of drugs at checkpoints nationwide in fiscal year 2015, and the  officials responsible for overseeing and analyzing the data said that these  numbers were generated by determining the number of apprehensions  and seizures associated with a checkpoint landmark. Furthermore,  CBP’s fiscal year 2018 congressional budget justification noted that  measurement of checkpoint activities—such as apprehensions at  checkpoints—can gauge checkpoint operational effectiveness and  provide insight into the effectiveness of the Border Patrol’s overall  national border enforcement strategy. CBP reported in the budget  justification that apprehensions at checkpoints ranged from 1.34 to 2.52  percent of nationwide apprehensions across fiscal years 2013 through  2016.

To assess Border Patrol’s efforts to implement our August 2009  recommendation and determine the extent to which Border Patrol’s  reporting of checkpoint statistics provides accurate information about  enforcement actions at and around checkpoints, we analyzed  apprehension and seizure data from fiscal years 2013 through 2016.  For example, as shown in table 4, an apprehension or seizure event that  occurred one-half mile or less from a checkpoint (according to the GPS  coordinates of the event) and that was also associated with the nearest  checkpoint landmark was considered category 1.

Our analysis of Border Patrol data, as shown in table 5, indicates that at  least 31,639 apprehensions and 30,449 seizures—those that are in  category 1—occurred at checkpoints from fiscal years 2013 through 2016  based on both the GPS coordinates and the landmarks associated with  those apprehensions and seizures. These apprehension and seizure  events would be considered as occurring “at checkpoint” for Border Patrol  reporting purposes because a checkpoint landmark was associated with  the event.

However, for the 19,759 apprehensions and 1,182 seizures in category  2—which are not included in Border Patrol’s reporting—it is unknown  what proportion should be considered “at a checkpoint.” This is because  for each of these apprehensions and seizures, the associated landmark  does not correspond to the nearest checkpoint landmark, even though the  GPS coordinates indicate that these apprehensions and seizures  occurred one-half mile or less from a checkpoint location. Border Patrol  officials said that one reason why the checkpoint landmark might not be  indicated for apprehensions and seizures that occur one-half mile or less  from a checkpoint is if the checkpoint is nonoperational at the time.  However, our analysis suggests that not all apprehensions and seizures  recorded in category 2 would reflect instances of checkpoints being non- operational. For example, about 30 percent of apprehensions that were  one-half mile or less from the Falfurrias, TX, checkpoint (4,278 of 14,345  apprehensions) did not use the landmark for that checkpoint. Border  Patrol officials in the Rio Grande Valley sector said the Falfurrias  checkpoint is rarely closed, so the checkpoint being closed does not fully  explain why the relevant checkpoint landmark was not used. Because  Border Patrol’s policies do not provide guidance about recording data  differently when a checkpoint is operational or nonoperational, it is  unclear what proportion of apprehensions or seizures in category 2 reflect  inconsistent application of Border Patrol’s guidance versus instances of a  checkpoint being nonoperational.

There are also inconsistencies in how Border Patrol is recording and  reporting on apprehensions and seizures on potential circumvention  routes. Events in category 3 appear to have occurred in circumvention  routes rather than at checkpoints—they occurred farther than one-half  mile from a checkpoint, and thus do not fit Border Patrol’s definition of an  apprehension that occurs “at a checkpoint”—but because they are  associated with a checkpoint landmark, Border Patrol’s reporting of  events at checkpoints includes these apprehensions and seizures.

Additionally, officials responsible for compiling checkpoint data said that  they have not analyzed the use of the “Circumvention App?” checkbox to  separately determine apprehensions that occur around checkpoints.  Although the GPS coordinates and associated landmarks suggest that  apprehensions in category 4 are not related to checkpoints, there were  over 27,000 apprehensions in this category that had the “Circumvention  App?” box checked. However, these apprehensions have not been  included in statistics related to checkpoints because Border Patrol’s  reporting to date has focused on events associated with checkpoint  landmarks and has not separately analyzed or reported the number of  apprehensions for which the “Circumvention App?” box was checked. In  doing so, Border Patrol’s reporting does not differentiate between  apprehensions that occurred at versus around a checkpoint. Border  Patrol officials agreed that the agency’s policies could better differentiate  between these areas and how to record data for events that occur in each  location.

Examining apprehensions specific to an individual checkpoint further  illustrates the inconsistencies in data recorded for checkpoints. Figure 11  shows how apprehensions at and around one checkpoint have been  recorded using GPS coordinates and landmarks, in relation to the one- half mile radius around the checkpoint.

Border Patrol’s methodology for determining the number of  apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints—which counts only  apprehensions and seizures associated with checkpoint landmarks—may  result in overstating or understating apprehensions and seizures that  occurred at checkpoints; however, the precise number of apprehensions  and seizures that occurred at checkpoints cannot be determined because  of the data inconsistencies noted above. For example, Border Patrol’s  reporting—such as in the Border Patrol Chief’s testimony or CBP’s fiscal  year 2018 budget justification—may overstate apprehensions at  checkpoints by including apprehensions in category 3, while it may  understate apprehensions by not including some portion, or all, of the  apprehensions in category 2. For the 4 fiscal years of data we analyzed,  this means that Border Patrol’s methodology for attributing apprehensions  to checkpoints would potentially overstate by 1,746 apprehensions (about  0.1 percent of total southwest border apprehensions) and potentially  understate by as many as 19,759 apprehensions (about 1.2 percent of  total southwest border apprehensions). Although these numbers  represent relatively small percentages of total southwest border  apprehensions, they are important for the measurement of checkpoint  apprehensions given that Border Patrol has generally reported that about  2 percent of apprehensions occur at checkpoints, and in particular,  adding 1.2 percentage points to the reported 2 percent would increase  the reported contributions of checkpoints by about 50 percent.

Although Border Patrol issued guidance in 2009 and 2010 in response to  our recommendation, our analysis demonstrates that this guidance does  not provide sufficient clarity on how data are to be recorded, and as a  result data quality issues have persisted. For example, Border Patrol’s  guidance does not indicate what landmark should be used when an agent  apprehends an individual who was attempting to circumvent a checkpoint.  Additionally, Border Patrol has not provided sufficient oversight of the  accuracy, consistency and completeness of checkpoint data since the  guidance was issued. In July 2013, Border Patrol issued a memorandum  to establish the Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO), and  the memorandum tasked CPMO with overseeing checkpoint data quality  and accuracy, among other things. However, CPMO was not officially  formed until the summer of 2016 when we began this review. Officials  noted that while Border Patrol staff had been consistently assigned to  oversee checkpoint data as a collateral duty, these assignments were not  within an officially formed CPMO and there was no centralized oversight  of checkpoint data or performance. The Associate Chief responsible for  overseeing CPMO told us he had not been aware of the memorandum  establishing CPMO until we requested checkpoint policies as part of this  review, and he explained that CPMO had not been formally established  under his predecessor at the time of the July 2013 memorandum.

In late summer 2016, the Associate Chief formally established CPMO  with the two Border Patrol agents who were, at the time, assigned part- time to oversee checkpoints. However, the CPMO establishing memo  called for two full-time staff members, and one of the staff assigned to  CPMO part-time moved to another position within Border Patrol several  months later. The first full-time staff person was assigned to CPMO in  January 2017. In March 2017, CPMO officials said they agreed with our  findings regarding inconsistent recording of checkpoint data, and they  said they have drafted a policy to provide additional guidance, including  how to distinguish how data are recorded for apprehensions and seizures  that occur at the checkpoint versus around the checkpoint. The Assistant  Chief for CPMO, in consultation with sector and data analysis officials,  has drafted additional guidance for recording apprehensions and seizures  data in a manner that differentiates between events that occurred at  versus around checkpoints. According to this official, this guidance will be  included in a larger update to Border Patrol’s checkpoint policy because  the checkpoint policy was last updated in 2003. Border Patrol officials  said they expect the updated checkpoint policy with additional data entry  guidance and procedures will be in place by March 2018, following Border  Patrol and CBP management review and approval and programming  changes to Border Patrol’s data systems.

Having quality control procedures in place to accurately document  apprehensions and seizures that occur at and around checkpoints is  important to enable Border Patrol to measure checkpoint effectiveness  and to make better deployment decisions about the extent to which  circumvention routes should be staffed. Distinguishing between the  locations of apprehensions and seizures, relative to checkpoints, would  provide more visibility into illegal traffic patterns at and around  checkpoints that can be used for staffing and other resource decisions.  Until revised internal control practices are in place, including data  collection guidance and sufficient oversight of the recording of the data,  our 2009 recommendation that Border Patrol establish internal controls  for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and  completeness of checkpoint performance data remains warranted. As  part of our regular follow up on implementation of our recommendations,  we will monitor Border Patrol’s progress in issuing and implementing the  planned update to its checkpoint policy.

Almost Half of Seizures that Occurred at Checkpoints Were One Ounce or Less of Marijuana from U.S. Citizens

In addition to analyzing where apprehensions and seizures occurred, we  analyzed marijuana seizure data to determine how seizures that occurred  at checkpoints compared to those that occurred at other locations. As  shown in figure 12, out of the 30,449 seizures that occurred at  checkpoints, at least 12,214 (40 percent) were 1 ounce or less of  marijuana seized from U.S. citizens. In contrast, seizures occurring at  non-checkpoint locations were more often higher-quantities seized from  aliens. For example, more than three-quarters of marijuana seizures at  non-checkpoint locations were of over 50 pounds (25,792 out of 33,477  seizures). (Appendix III includes additional detail on the distribution of  marijuana seizures by quantity seized.)

Border Patrol officials said that the primary purpose of checkpoints is to  enforce immigration laws, but agents at checkpoints are also expected to  take action when they incidentally encounter violations of other federal  laws. In particular, they noted that when a trained canine alerts agents to  the presence of a concealed human or substance the canine was trained  to detect, agents are required to respond to the alert. Based on the  canine alert, agents do not know until they conduct a search of the  vehicle what the canine detected (concealed human or illicit substance) or  what quantity of a substance might be present—and therefore, agents  cannot determine prior to an inspection whether the occupants of the  vehicle are travelling with what would generally be considered a personal  use quantity of a substance or whether they are carrying larger quantities  potentially with the intent to distribute, dispense, or manufacture.

Collecting Additional Data Could Improve Border Patrol’s Existing Efforts to Identify and Respond to Community Concerns Regarding the Defense in Depth Strategy

Defense in Depth Strategy’s Effects on Surrounding Communities are Difficult to Quantify, but Collecting Additional Data Could Inform Actions to Address Such Effects

Members of state and local law enforcement and business and  community groups that we spoke to generally support Border Patrol’s  efforts, but some raised concerns about checkpoint operations and the  broader defense in depth strategy. Members of all three community  groups we met with during our visits to the Rio Grande Valley and Tucson  sectors generally supported Border Patrol. Additionally, officials from law  enforcement agencies we interviewed generally said they had a positive  working relationship with Border Patrol and that Border Patrol has played  a role in limiting cross-border illicit activity in their communities. For  example, one law enforcement official from the Tucson sector said that  the community would be overwhelmed without Border Patrol’s efforts in  the area, and another said that without the defense in depth approach,  illegal activity would likely be worse, although this latter official noted  there can be communication and coordination challenges in working with  Border Patrol. Some residents and law enforcement officials we met with  in the two sectors we visited said that they support Border Patrol’s use of  checkpoints. For example, the leader of one community group said the  group’s members viewed checkpoints positively, and members from  another group said that some residents in their community believe that  their local checkpoint is making the community safer through law  enforcement presence.

However, Border Patrol’s defense in depth deployment strategy may also  result in communities ranging up to 100 miles from the border  experiencing effects associated with Border Patrol enforcement actions to  interdict illicit cross-border activity. In April 2015, we reported that illicit  cross-border activity can negatively affect business and the safety of  farms and ranches on or near the border. Although data are limited to  support the extent of criminal activity tied to cross-border illegal traffic,  available data indicate that cross-border traffic affects areas beyond the  immediate border. For example, in fiscal year 2016, 20 percent of all  Border Patrol apprehensions and 77 percent of all seizures occurred  more than five miles from the border. Therefore, illegal crossers and drug  smugglers may sometimes travel near or through communities and  private property in areas that are not along the immediate the border,  prior to being apprehended by Border Patrol. For example, members of  one community group we interviewed said that there are hundreds of  illegal crossers and smugglers who attempt to circumvent the local  checkpoint by walking through the surrounding ranches. Echoing views  from ranchers we interviewed for a December 2012 report, members of  one community group we spoke with as part of this review said that they  would like to see Border Patrol direct more enforcement efforts at the  immediate border to prevent illegal crossers from entering their  communities or properties. Officials we interviewed from two sheriffs’  departments in nearby counties said they have heard similar views from  residents.

Community groups and law enforcement officials we met with as part of  this review identified concerns regarding private property damage and  public safety resulting from illegal cross border traffic, similar to concerns  we have reported in the past.

Private Property Damage: Community members have reported damage  to private property suspected to have occurred as a result of individuals  trying to illegally cross the border or Border Patrol enforcement actions.  Border Patrol officials we spoke with in six of nine sectors cited concerns  from community residents about illegal crossers and Border Patrol agents  traveling on their private property. Additionally, officials from two sheriffs’  departments told us that ranchers in their communities have voiced  complaints about damage on their properties resulting from illegal  crossers or Border Patrol activity. These concerns are similar to concerns  we identified in an April 2015 report, in which we reported that  landowners had reported damage to private property—including broken  gates, destroyed crops, and injured or lost livestock—as a result of  individuals trying to illegally cross the border (see fig. 13).

In addition to identifying damage suspected to be caused by illegal  crossers, landowners we spoke with as part of that review also reported  damage that may have resulted from Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts.  We previously reported in April 2015 that some landowners had filed tort  claims alleging damage to their property as a result of the conduct of an  employee of Border Patrol or any CBP component that was acting within  the scope of his or her official duties. Examples of such claims include  CBP vehicles crashing through properties and damaging fences, gates,  irrigation pipes, and crops.

Public Safety: Additionally, according to Border Patrol and local law  enforcement officials, illegal entrants and smugglers could pose a public  safety risk to communities along the border or further inland. We  previously reported in December 2012 that ranchers in the Tucson sector  said they were most concerned about safety. Officials from law  enforcement agencies that we interviewed as part of this current review  said that crime resulting from illicit cross-border activity has affected  border communities. In particular, law enforcement officials we spoke  with cited drug smuggling (including recruiting juveniles to engage in drug  smuggling), home invasions, burglaries, and vandalism. The effects  related to public safety and private property associated with Border  Patrol’s defense in depth strategy may be felt more acutely in  communities near checkpoints; in particular, one of Border Patrol’s stated  goals for checkpoints is to deter and disrupt smuggling efforts, and as a  result, smuggling traffic may be pushed onto checkpoint circumvention  routes, which may pass through these communities. We previously  reported in August 2009 that Border Patrol officials acknowledge that this  approach can adversely impact communities near checkpoints, and said  that sometimes there were not enough agents in place to deter illegal  activity or apprehend trespassers in surrounding areas. As noted earlier  in this report, this remains true—checkpoint circumvention routes are not  always patrolled.

We are unable to measure the extent Border Patrol’s defense in depth  strategy has affected communities through measures such as crime rates  or effects on property values. As part of previous reviews, we have  reviewed information related to the impacts of illegal cross-border activity  on local communities, including reports of property damage (such as tort  claims) and available crime data. As a result, we have previously reported  that methodological challenges existed and data were unavailable to  substantiate the extent to which illegal border crossings and drug  smuggling have affected local communities in terms of public safety and  private property damage. In August 2009 we reported that a comparison  of community impacts for the time before and after a checkpoint was  established would require a complete set of historical data to develop a  baseline understanding, before interpreting factors that can change the  baseline. However, there are limited data sets for specific geographic  areas around checkpoints, with county level data being the smallest  possible geographic area, in many cases. For instance, in terms of crime  data, officials from one police department in the Tucson sector told us  that they did not track criminal activity committed by illegal entrants. In  2011, as part of Border Patrol’s efforts to implement our August 2009  recommendations, Border Patrol requested a study to identify the effects  of checkpoints on nearby communities and develop an approach to  measure these effects, and this study also noted data limitations that  affect conclusions regarding the effects of checkpoints on surrounding  communities.

Implementing two of our August 2009 recommendations could help  Border Patrol collect relevant data to examine the community effects of  checkpoint operations specifically and take corresponding actions to  respond to ongoing community concerns. In August 2009 we reported  that Border Patrol had previously identified performance measures to  examine the effect checkpoint operations have on quality of life in the  surrounding communities, but the agency was not using these measures.  As a result, Border Patrol was hindered in its ability to assess the impact  of checkpoints on local communities. We recommended that Border  Patrol (1) implement quality of life measures identified by Border Patrol to  evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local communities; and (2)  use the information generated from the quality of life measures in  conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations and  address identified impacts.

Border Patrol agreed with the recommendations but has not yet fully  implemented them. In 2010, Border Patrol asked a DHS Center of  Excellence, co-led by the University of Arizona and the University of  Texas at El Paso, to conduct a study to help address our  recommendations. The resulting December 2012 report made several  recommendations to Border Patrol on evaluating the impact of  checkpoints on local communities using quantitative measures and with  maintaining regular contact with the public to elicit opinions on  experiences with the checkpoint, both positive and negative. Border  Patrol has since reported plans for implementing our recommendations  but has revised the estimated completion dates several times. (See  appendix I for more information about Border Patrol’s planned actions to  address these recommendations.) As discussed later in this report,  Border Patrol provides opportunities for members of the community to  express concerns related to the defense in depth strategy since our  previous review of checkpoint operations in 2009, however, some  residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we spoke  to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints may  have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality of life  measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical  information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint  operations. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations  remain warranted.

Border Patrol Is Taking Steps to Identify and Respond to Community Concerns

Border Patrol uses a variety of methods to collect feedback from  community members related to the defense in depth strategy. It receives  feedback through direct communication and informal relationships, which  are facilitated in part by communication and outreach events organized by  sector Border Community Liaison (BCL) programs. Border Patrol initiated  the BCL program in April 2011 in an effort to enhance Border Patrol’s  relationships with landowners and the community as a whole. According  to the July 2012 CBP implementation memo, the BCL program’s function  and associated positions are intended to enhance CBP’s interaction with  communities and provide a fact-based understanding of community  views, concerns, and issues as they relate to CBP. According to Border  Patrol officials, sector BCL agents interact with members of the local  community to address complaints and also introduce the community to  how Border Patrol operates so that there is a better understanding and  relationship between Border Patrol agents and the surrounding  community.

Each sector has its own BCL program designed to address complaints  and improve the relationship between Border Patrol agents and the  surrounding community, and the efforts within each program range from  official events to informal communications. Sector and station BCL  programs organize official events such as cook-offs, stakeholder events,  and open houses where community members learn about Border Patrol’s  activities and have the opportunity to share their concerns. As an  example of informal communications, Border Patrol officials from one  station in the Rio Grande Valley sector told us that agents and officials  make an effort to be very approachable to community members, as  demonstrated through actions such as the station’s patrol agent in charge  providing a personal cell phone number to local residents to facilitate  direct communication.

In addition, every southwest border sector uses the Compliments and  Complaints Management System (CCMS). The CCMS is a computerized  system that allows users to log and track complaints or compliments. The  CCMS is meant to identify trends and patterns in community comments to  better address complaints and compliments, but Border Patrol officials  have questioned its usefulness. Following a pilot program, in January  2017, CCMS became a permanent program to all CBP offices that have  interaction with the public. Comments can be entered directly by residents  or by Border Patrol officials who have received feedback from the  community. According to the memo, CBP also standardized the response  time for compliments and complaints entered into the system throughout  the agency. Agency officials are to send an acknowledgment of receipt  within 5 business days and complete responses within 45 days.

Officials from six of nine sectors said they generally preferred the less  formal methods of interacting with the community, as discussed above,  compared to the CCMS. Some of the reasons they identified included that  community members often prefer to speak with an agent instead of  inputting their concern into a system, very few complaints or compliments  are logged into the CCMS by residents, the system is not user friendly,  and it is rarely used for data recall. According to a report generated by  Border Patrol headquarters, there were 599 comments entered into the  CCMS nationwide in calendar year 2016. Of those, 81 were compliments.

Border Patrol takes various actions to respond to community concerns it  has identified, including considering the input of local stakeholders when  making deployment decisions. For example, officials from the Tucson  sector told us that agents engage with ranchers who have game cameras  on their properties so station officials can consider the flow of illegal  entrants or drug smugglers on their properties when making deployment  decisions. Moreover, officials from the Rio Grande Valley sector said that  sector and station officials take into account population centers when  making deployment decisions to attempt to deploy agents in positions to  apprehend entrants prior to reaching population centers because once  they enter the general population they are more difficult to detect and  apprehend. Additionally, community members and Border Patrol officials  told us that agents respond to calls of suspected illegal cross-border  activity on private lands. Border Patrol has various mechanisms in place  for community members to notify agents of suspected activity. For  example, one station in the Rio Grande Valley sector created a mobile  phone application and released a limited number of licenses for ranchers  and landowners to take a picture if they see suspicious activity and send  it directly to Border Patrol. Moreover, landowners in the Rio Grande  Valley sector told us that Border Patrol has been responsive to calls when  something out of the ordinary has been spotted on private land.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security  for their review and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix  IV, DHS provided an update on planned actions to implement the four  open recommendations from our August 2009 report. DHS also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations Related to Checkpoints

In August 2009, we reported on and made recommendations regarding  the measurement of checkpoint performance and the impact of  checkpoint operations on nearby communities, among other things  related to checkpoints. In comments provided on our August 2009 report,  the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with those  recommendations. This appendix provides additional detail regarding the  status of the recommendations from that report, including two  recommendations that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has  implemented.

Recommendation 1: Establish milestones for determining the feasibility  of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to  compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity  passing through the checkpoint undetected.

Status: Closed – Implemented  In August 2009, we reported that the Border Patrol had developed some  useful measures of checkpoint performance, but the agency lacked a  model or method that would allow the agency to compare the number of  apprehensions and seizures made at the checkpoint to the level of illegal  activity passing through the checkpoint undetected. The lack of this  information challenged the Border Patrol’s ability to measure checkpoint  effectiveness and provide public accountability. In 2010, Border Patrol  asked a DHS Center of Excellence to study checkpoint performance,  including developing a checkpoint performance model, and the DHS  Center of Excellence issued its report in December 2012. In June 2013,  Border Patrol reported that the agency had considered the checkpoint  performance models proposed by the National Center for Border Security  and Immigration—the DHS Center of Excellence—but determined it was  not feasible to use the proposed models due to cost prohibitions and  other factors. This action was responsive to the intent of our  recommendation to study the feasibility of a checkpoint performance  model, and this recommendation has been closed as implemented.

Recommendation 2: Establish internal controls for management  oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint  performance data.

In August 2009, we reported on inconsistencies in the way agents  collected and entered performance data into the checkpoint information  system. As a result, data reported in the system were unreliable. In  October 2009, Border Patrol issued a memorandum specifying which  data fields agents should use to indicate that an enforcement activity  occurred at a checkpoint (or on a circumvention route, for  apprehensions), and in January 2010 Border Patrol issued an additional  memorandum on checkpoint data integrity that further specified  definitions for “at the checkpoint” and “circumvention.” In subsequent  years, Border Patrol officials reported to us that they were taking steps to  develop a redesigned checkpoint information system, implement a data  oversight procedure, and provide training, and estimated completion  dates were revised several times. In its comments on this report (see app.  IV), DHS stated that it expects to issue an updated checkpoint policy,  including updates on data entry guidance and oversight to address data  integrity, by February 28, 2018. As discussed earlier in this report, data  quality issues have persisted, and without established internal controls,  the integrity of Border Patrol’s performance and accountability system  with regard to checkpoint operations remains uncertain.

Recommendation 3: Implement the quality of life measures that have  already been identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that  checkpoints have on local communities. Implementing these measures  would include identifying appropriate data sources available at the local,  state, or federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be  collected and used in support of these measures.

In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol had identified some  measures to evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local  communities in terms of quality of life, but Border Patrol had not  implemented the measures. As a result, the Border Patrol lacked  information on how checkpoint operations could affect nearby  communities. In October 2009, the Border Patrol reported that it was  reevaluating its checkpoint performance measures, including quality of life  measures. In December 2012, the DHS Center of Excellence completed  a study for CBP on checkpoints. This study made several  recommendations to Border Patrol on evaluating the impact of  checkpoints on local communities using quantitative measures and with  maintaining regular contact with the public to elicit opinions on  experiences with the checkpoint, both positive and negative. At the time,  the Border Patrol noted it intended to develop quantitative measures on  community impact, such as on public safety and quality of life, using  information collected in the new checkpoint information system it was  planning. Border Patrol also noted that it was considering the budgetary  feasibility of (1) conducting a survey of checkpoint travelers to gather  detailed information about the community and impact metrics that are of  highest importance to the public and (2) implementing an expedited lane  for regular and pre-approved travelers. In July 2014, the Border Patrol  revised the expected completion date for its actions to address this  recommendation to March 2015, noting that it planned to request ideas  from the field commanders on what the agency could measure that would  accurately depict the impact of checkpoints on the community. In June  2015, Border Patrol revised the expected completion date to September  2015. In September 2016, officials from Border Patrol’s Checkpoint  Program Management Office said quality of life measures had not been  implemented and they were not aware of any plans to develop and  implement such measures. In its comments on this report (see app. IV),  DHS stated that it expects to establish performance measures related to  community impacts by February 28, 2018. As noted earlier in this report,  residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we spoke  to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints may  have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality of life  measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical  information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint  operations.

Recommendation 4: Use the information generated from the quality of  life measures in conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource  allocations and address identified impacts.

In August 2009, we reported that while the Border Patrol’s national  strategy cites the importance of assessing the community impact of  Border Patrol operations, the implementation of such measures was  lacking in terms of checkpoint operations. In October 2009, the Border  Patrol reported that once it had completed an upgrade of its existing  checkpoint data systems and had reevaluated its checkpoint performance  measures, the agency would begin using information garnered by these  performance measures to inform future resource allocation decisions.  This was originally expected to be completed by September 30, 2010, but  due to budgetary and other issues, the checkpoint system upgrades were  not yet completed as of June 2013. Border Patrol then reported to us in  June 2013 that the redesigned and upgraded checkpoint information  system was expected to be implemented in September 2014, but this  system has not been developed or implemented, and in September 2016,  officials from Border Patrol’s Checkpoint Program Management Office  stated that they were not aware of any planned or completed actions to  address this recommendation. In its comments on this report (see app.  IV), DHS stated that it expects to establish performance measures related  to community impacts by February 28, 2018, and that these measures will  be used to inform resource allocation decisions. As noted earlier in this  report, residents and local law enforcement officials near checkpoints we  spoke to for this review remain concerned about the effects checkpoints  may have on their communities. Measuring performance, such as quality  of life measures related to checkpoints, would give Border Patrol critical  information on which to base decisions for improving checkpoint  operations.

Recommendation 5: Require that current and expected traffic volumes  be considered by the Border Patrol when determining the number of  inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be  conducted and documented, and that these requirements be explicitly  documented in Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards.

Status: Closed – Implemented  In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol did not conduct traffic  studies when designing three recently constructed checkpoints. As a  result, we could not determine if the Border Patrol complied with its  checkpoint design guidelines to consider current and future traffic  volumes when determining the number of inspection lanes at the three  checkpoints. In the absence of documented traffic studies, the Border  Patrol could not determine if the number of inspection lanes at each of  these checkpoints was consistent with current and projected traffic  volumes, or if a different number of lanes would have been more  appropriate. On October 28, 2009, the Border Patrol finalized an  addendum to the Border Patrol Facilities Design Standard, which requires  the Border Patrol to acquire, document, and utilize traffic study data  collected by the state Departments of Transportation regarding current  and projected traffic volumes on roadways where permanent checkpoints  are to be constructed. The traffic studies are to be documented by the  Border Patrol and utilized as the baseline requirement to determine the  number of inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, and therefore  this recommendation has been closed as implemented.

Recommendation 6: In connection with planning for new or upgraded  checkpoints, conduct a workforce planning needs assessment for  checkpoint staffing allocations to determine the resources needed to  address anticipated levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.

In August 2009, we reported that Border Patrol’s checkpoint strategy to  push illegal crossers and smugglers to areas around checkpoints—which  could include nearby communities—underscores the need for the Border  Patrol to ensure that it deploys sufficient resources and staff to these  areas. In October 2009, Border Patrol reported that the agency was  evaluating its checkpoint policy regarding the establishment of a new  checkpoint or the upgrade of an old checkpoint, and checkpoint policy  changes would be finalized by September 30, 2010. Border Patrol also  reported that checkpoint system upgrades that capture data on  checkpoint performance would help management determine future  resource needs at checkpoints. In June 2013, Border Patrol reported that  due to budget and other issues, the checkpoint system upgrade had not  been completed, and the rewritten checkpoint data protocol had not been  approved. In June 2013, Border Patrol reported that as part of the  checkpoint study conducted by the DHS Center of Excellence, the Center  created checkpoint simulation tools that would help inform resource  allocations when determining the number of inspection lanes on current  or new checkpoints. The Border Patrol agreed with the utility of such a  model, but noted that the Border Patrol would need to purchase modeling  software—a cost-prohibitive measure in the current budget environment.  In the interim, Border Patrol is developing a formal workforce staffing  model to identify staffing strategies for all Border Patrol duties. Border  Patrol expected to implement this model for checkpoint staffing  assignments in fiscal year 2014. However, in July 2014, Border Patrol  reported that the Border Patrol’s Personnel Requirements Determination  project was still being developed and that process would inform staffing at  checkpoints, although the project is not specific to checkpoint staffing  needs. As a result, Border Patrol revised its expected implementation  date to September 2015. However, according to the Border Patrol official  overseeing the project, subsequent changes in leadership and factors  unrelated to checkpoints have affected the overall time frames for the  Personnel Requirements Determination project. In September 2016,  Border Patrol officials reported that the agency’s Personnel Requirements  Determination process would not provide information on staffing needs  until fiscal year 2017 or 2018. In its comments on this report (see app.  IV), DHS stated that it expects to use information from the Personnel  Requirements Determination process to determine staffing requirements  and address our recommendation by September 30, 2019. Given that  local residents continue to express concerns about the impacts of  checkpoints on communities, conducting a needs assessment when  planning for a new or upgraded checkpoint could help better ensure that  officials consider the potential impact of the checkpoint on the community  and plan for a sufficient number of agents and resources.

Appendix II: Trends in Southwest Border Apprehensions, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

This appendix contains additional detail about trends in southwest border  apprehensions from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, including trends in  the: number of apprehensions by sector, distribution of apprehensions by sector and by distance from the border, distribution of apprehensions by sector and by proximity to checkpoints.

From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, Border Patrol apprehended a total  of almost 2 million individuals in southwest border sectors. The number  of apprehensions over this period rose to a peak in fiscal year 2014,  declined in fiscal year 2015, and rose again in fiscal year 2016. Over this  5-year period, about two-thirds of the apprehensions occurred in the Rio  Grande Valley and Tucson sectors (42 percent and 23 percent,  respectively), and the Rio Grande Valley sector accounted for an  increasing percentage of total southwest border apprehensions over this  time period (from 27 percent of all southwest border apprehensions in  fiscal year 2012 to 46 percent of apprehensions in fiscal year 2016). As  shown in figure 14, apprehensions also increased in five other sectors,  but the other sectors represented consistently smaller percentages of all  apprehensions over the 5-year period.

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security stated during  testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs that apprehensions have dropped sharply since the  beginning of 2017. He stated, for example, that Border Patrol  apprehended approximately 1,000 unaccompanied alien children in  March 2017 (a time of year he noted when apprehensions generally are  higher) compared to over 7,000 unaccompanied alien children in  December 2016.

Distribution of Apprehensions by Sector and by Distance from the Border

As noted in this report, apprehensions overall for the southwest border  increasingly occurred closer to the border. Table 6 shows the distribution  for each sector of apprehensions by distance from the border during fiscal  years 2012 through 2016.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the percent of apprehensions  occurring at checkpoints varied by sector. We assigned each  apprehension into one of four location categories based on whether the  GPS coordinates for the event occurred close enough to the GPS  coordinates for a checkpoint to be considered “at a checkpoint” and  whether the event’s landmark corresponds to the nearest checkpoint  landmark. Table 7 shows the distribution of apprehensions for each  sector by location category during fiscal years 2013 through 2016, and  the extent to which apprehensions were identified as checkpoint  circumventions based on use of the “Circumvention App?” checkbox.  Differences in sector apprehensions at checkpoints could depend in part  on the number of checkpoints within a sector, the amount of time  checkpoints are operational, and the extent to which sectors consistently  apply guidance on how to enter data for apprehensions that are related to  checkpoint operations.

Appendix III: Trends in Southwest Border Seizures, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

This appendix contains additional detail about trends in southwest border  seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, including trends in the: number of seizures by type of contraband seized, number of seizures by sector, distribution of seizures by sector and by distance from the border,  seizures related to Border Patrol checkpoints each available year by  sector, and marijuana seizures at checkpoints by quantity seized.

Border Patrol seized almost 90,000 prohibited items in southwest border  sectors from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. Most of these  seizures (92 percent) were narcotics, and 87 percent of narcotics  seizures were marijuana. The remaining seizures were of firearms,  ammunition, currency, or other property. As shown in table 8, the number  of seizures on the southwest border generally decreased from fiscal year  2012 to fiscal year 2016, with the exceptions of slight rises in the amount  of methamphetamines and heroin seized during this period.

The greatest number of seizures during the 5 fiscal years occurred in the  Tucson, Big Bend, and Rio Grande Valley sectors (34, 19, and 16 percent  respectively). Collectively, these three sectors accounted for 69 percent  of southwest border seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. For all  southwest border sectors except the Big Bend sector, the numbers of  seizures decreased during this 5-year period. For example, the number of  seizures in the Tucson sector decreased 12 percent, and the number of  seizures in the Rio Grande Valley sector decreased 36 percent during this  period. The number of seizures in the Big Bend sector increased 39  percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Figure 15 shows the  number of seizures from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 by sector.

Distribution of Seizures by Sector and by Distance from the Border

As noted in this report, the location where seizures occurred remained  relatively stable from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, with the  majority of seizures occurring 10 miles or more from the southwest  border. Table 9 shows the distribution of seizures for each sector by  distance from the border during fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the percent of seizures occurring at  checkpoints varied by sector. We assigned each seizure into one of four  location categories based on whether the GPS coordinates for the event  occurred close enough to the GPS coordinates for a checkpoint to be  considered “at a checkpoint” and whether the event’s landmark  corresponds to the nearest checkpoint landmark. Table 10 shows the  distribution of seizures for each sector by checkpoint location category  during fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Differences in sector seizures at  checkpoints could depend in part on the number of checkpoints within a  sector, the percent of time checkpoints are operational, and the extent to  which sectors consistently apply guidance on how to enter data for  seizures that are related to checkpoint operations.

Most southwest border seizures were narcotics, and most narcotics  seizures were marijuana. As noted in this report, marijuana seizures at  checkpoints were often for smaller quantities compared to marijuana  seizures at non-checkpoint locations. Table 11 shows that about 67  percent of marijuana seizures at checkpoints were for quantities less than  or equal to 1 ounce, whereas the quantities seized at non-checkpoint  locations were often larger. For example, more than three-quarters of  marijuana seizures at non-checkpoint locations were of over 50 pounds  (25,792 out of 33,477 seizures).

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant  Director), David Alexander, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, Monica Kelly,  John Mingus, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Christine San, Adam Vogt, and  Tomas Wind made significant contributions to this report.