Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements

Fighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations. The military services invest significant time and funding to train, compensate, and retain fighter pilots. According to Air Force officials, it costs between $3-$11 million and takes approximately 5 years to develop an individual fighter pilot to lead combat missions.

Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of the fighter pilot workforce. GAO's report (1) assesses the extent to which the military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, and describes any contributing factors as well as initiatives to address the differences, and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services had reevaluated squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including consideration of UAS pilot requirements.

GAO analyzed military service personnel data, documentation on service initiatives to address factors contributing to fighter pilot shortages, and service documentation of requirements; met with a non-generalizable sample of fighter pilots at seven locations; and interviewed DOD and service officials.

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps had gaps between the actual numbers of fighter pilots and authorizations (i.e. funded positions) in fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017. In FY 2017 the Air Force's gap was the widest at 27 percent of authorizations (see fig. below) and is projected to continue through FY 2023. The Marine Corps' gap grew from 6 percent in FY 2006 to 24 percent in FY 2017; it is concentrated in fighter pilots below the rank of major. While the Navy did not have comparable data, it had a gap at fighter pilots' first operational tours that grew from 12 percent in FY 2013 to 26 percent in FY 2017, and Navy officials stated it could increase through mid-2019. Service officials attributed these gaps to aircraft readiness challenges, reduced training opportunities, and increased attrition of fighter pilots due to career dissatisfaction. To help increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking actions, including increasing the amounts of financial incentives to retain pilots.

The military services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). According to service guidance, squadron requirements are to be reviewed on a 2-year schedule and to be updated as conditions change (in June 2017 the Navy revised its guidance to extend its schedule from 2 years to 5 years). However, service officials acknowledged that they have not updated all squadron requirements within the last 2 years. These officials stated that the requirements have not been reevaluated because existing conditions do not warrant the change. However, fighter pilots and squadron leaders interviewed at locations GAO visited consistently stated that the typical workload has significantly increased in recent years due to, among other things, changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology and reductions to administrative support in squadrons. Further, the military services have not assessed the effect of increased reliance on UAS on fighter pilot requirements. The Air Force's vision for UAS notes that systems will work in tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft and that autonomous technologies will potentially lead to personnel efficiencies. Without re-evaluating squadron requirements to reflect current and emerging conditions, the nature of the gap may be inaccurate and thus make it difficult for the military services to target strategies to meet their personnel needs.

GAO recommends that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on fighter pilots to perform an  array of missions that are critical to its ability to successfully execute its  national security mission. Developing fighter pilots requires a significant  investment of time and funding. According to Air Force officials, a fighter  pilot requires approximately 5 years of training to be qualified to lead  flights, at a cost of between about $3 million to $11 million depending on  the specific type of aircraft. Retaining qualified pilots is important not only  to ensure that operational requirements can be met, but also to recoup  the substantial investments the military services make in training their  pilots.

Since 2001, we have identified the strategic management of human  capital as a high-risk issue because of the mission-critical skills gaps  within the federal workforce that pose a high risk to the nation by  impeding the government from cost-effectively serving the public and  achieving results. In 2017, we reported that the military services  implemented retention bonuses differently for pilots of different types of  aircraft, and that their implementation approaches generally varied from  year to year. We recommended that DOD clarify guidance regarding the  extent to which personnel performance should be incorporated into  retention decisions—including the use of bonuses to retain pilots. DOD  concurred with the recommendation, but as of December 2017 had not  yet implemented changes in response.

Senate Armed Services Committee Report 114-255, accompanying a bill  for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included  a provision for us to review DOD’s management of the fighter pilot  workforce. For our report, we (1) assessed the extent to which the  military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared  to authorizations, and described any contributing factors as well as  initiatives to address the differences and (2) assessed the extent to which  the military services had reevaluated squadron requirements for the  number of fighter pilots needed, including consideration of unmanned  aerial system (UAS) pilot requirements.

For objective one, we compared “authorizations”—specifically, those  positions authorized and funded by Congress for fighter pilots in the  active and reserve components of the Air Force, the Navy, and the  Marine Corps—with the corresponding staffing levels (i.e., the actual  number of pilots available to staff those positions) in those military  services. For each of the military services, we also compared  authorizations with staffing levels of all fixed-wing, cockpit-operated  communities (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing communities). We did  not include the Army in our review because it does not operate fighter  aircraft.

For the Air Force and the Marine Corps, we compared fighter pilot staffing  levels for the active and reserve components to authorized positions for  fiscal years 2006 through 2017, and we also obtained and analyzed  projections for these data for fiscal years 2018 through 2023. We also  compared fighter pilot staffing levels for Air Force and Marine Corps  active components with operational authorized positions. The Navy does  not separate non-operational fighter pilot authorizations from  authorizations for other pilots, and therefore we were unable to compare  Navy fighter pilot staffing levels with authorizations as we did for the Air  Force and the Marine Corps. We instead analyzed staffing levels for Navy  fixed-wing communities in the active component for fiscal years 2011  through 2017, and compared pilot staffing levels to authorizations for the  three career milestones that Navy officials told us they use to monitor and  manage their fixed-wing pilot communities for fiscal years 2013 through  2017. These milestones are first operational tour, mid-career Department  Head, and Command. We also analyzed differences between staffing  targets and staffing levels for the Navy Reserve fighter pilot community  for fiscal year 2017, the only year of data available. We also analyzed  Navy retention data for mid-career pilots eligible for Department Head  assignments in the same communities for fiscal years 2013 through  2017.

To assess the reliability of the data we obtained, we reviewed  corroborating documentation, analyzed the data for inconsistencies, and  interviewed service officials about the reliability of the data. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to describe the trends in  personnel staffing levels and authorizations for the time period included in  our scope.

To discuss factors that may have contributed to differences in the number  of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, we met with DOD and service  officials and reviewed service documentation regarding the factors  officials identified. We also held discussion groups with a non- generalizable sample of fighter pilots and squadron leaders to obtain their  views on the factors that they believe have contributed to low numbers of  fighter pilots. To identify any initiatives the military services had taken or  planned to address factors contributing to low numbers of fighter pilots,  we interviewed service officials and reviewed documentation related to  relevant military service initiatives.

For objective two, we reviewed Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps  guidance to determine the frequency that fighter pilot squadron  requirements are to be reviewed. We then reviewed service  documentation and interviewed service officials to determine the extent to  which these requirements had been reviewed on schedule. We also  reviewed service documentation regarding the planned mix of aviation  platforms for future operations and discussed with service officials the  extent to which these plans are incorporated into forecasts of fighter pilot  squadron requirements. Our scope and methodology is described in  detail in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2016 to April 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Fighter pilots staff both operational and non-operational positions, and  fighter pilots alternate between these positions throughout their career.  Operational positions include both flying (i.e., combat pilot or instructor  pilot positions) and non-flying positions, such as a close air support duty  officer in an Air Operations Center or an air controller in a ground infantry  unit. In flying positions, fighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to  achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations and  include Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack  aircraft with air-to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic warfare missions.  These aircraft operate during the first days of a conflict to penetrate  enemy air space, defeat air defenses, and achieve air dominance,  allowing follow-on ground, air, and naval forces freedom to operate within  the battle space. Once air dominance is established, fighter aircraft  continue to strike ground targets for the remainder of the conflict. Some  fighter aircraft are also essential to protecting the homeland by  responding to potential airborne and ground-based threats.

Fighter pilots are assigned a variety of tasks when they are in an  operational squadron. As well as studying for flights, flying, and  debriefing, fighter pilots must also perform other squadron duties, such as  coordinating squadron travel to external training locations, scheduling  daily flights, or overseeing squadron maintenance departments. In  addition to these duties, fighter pilots are required to complete common  military training (i.e., training that is required for all military personnel and  is not linked to a particular occupation). In May 2017, we reported that  common military training comprises more than half of mandatory training  requirements in the military services (not including additional training that  the military services may require for specific groups of servicemembers,  such as fighter pilots).

Non-operational positions are generally non-flying positions and include  assignments to headquarters or combatant command positions. Certain  non-operational positions can only be filled by qualified pilots. For  example, certain positions require fighter pilots due to the need for  specialized technical knowledge, such as writing operational manuals for  fighter aircraft. Other non-operational positions are more general in nature  and are divided among officer communities in a military service. For  example, Navy officials told us that certain shore assignments—positions  that do not involve deployment—can be staffed by officers from aviation,  submarine, or surface warfare communities.

DOD’s current fighter aircraft fleet is comprised of both legacy and new  aircraft (see fig. 1). The legacy aircraft include Air Force F-16, F-15, A-10,  and F-22A and Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18A-D, EA-6B, and AV-8B.  Most of these aircraft were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s and are  more than 25 years old on average. DOD has been recapitalizing this  aging legacy fleet by acquiring and fielding new aircraft, namely the  Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G and the joint service F-35. The  Departments of the Air Force and the Navy are operating many of their  fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives, and  some of these legacy aircraft are confronted with sustainment challenges  that affect their availability. In 2017, senior Air Force and Navy officials  testified before the House Armed Services Committee regarding, among  other things, the maintenance and sustainment issues relating to aging  aircraft that are affecting the readiness of their forces.

Processes for Determining and Staffing Fighter Pilot Authorizations

According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps guidance, the military  services are to determine personnel requirements for military units.  Service officials told us that this process includes squadron  requirements—that is, the number of operational positions in a fighter  pilot squadron that a military service has determined should be staffed by  a qualified fighter pilot. Squadron requirements are primarily based on the  missions the squadrons are expected to fulfill, and the military services  use a variety of inputs to determine fighter pilot squadron requirements.  These inputs include the projected operations of fighter squadrons,  analyses of the amount of workload in the squadrons, the number of  aircraft assigned to the squadrons, and the planned ratio of fighter pilots  to aircraft. The military services are to determine the required number of  fighter pilots to staff squadrons and meet operational mission needs and  to document these in squadron staffing documents. The military  services also determine the rank that pilots should have when staffing  specific positions in a squadron—for example, Marine Corps F/A-18  squadron staffing documents specify the rank that should be held by  pilots leading specific departments such as those for safety, operations,  and maintenance. According to service officials, the military services then  staff squadron requirements to the extent possible based on the number  of those requirements funded by Congress and the number of trained and  qualified personnel available to be staffed to those positions (see fig. 2).  We refer to these funded positions as authorizations. Military service  workforce planning documents acknowledge that, after this process, a  squadron’s staffing level may be lower than the established squadron  requirements—a readiness risk that the military services manage by  assigning a higher priority to the staffing of certain positions, such as  those in deployed squadrons.

The military services vary in how they define when gaps between  authorizations and staffing levels become a shortage. Specifically, fighter  pilot staffing levels of 85 to 99 percent of authorizations could be  considered a shortage, depending on the military service. For example,  Air Force officials told us that their established practice is that pilot  communities with less than 100 percent of authorizations are considered  to be insufficiently staffed. Navy officials told us that they have a shortage  when they are unable to fully staff deploying squadrons. Marine Corps  personnel documents reflect that Marine Corps communities with less  than 85 percent of authorizations are considered “unhealthy.”

The process of staffing fighter pilots is managed in the Air Force by the  Air Force Personnel Center, in the Navy by the Navy Personnel  Command, and in the Marine Corps by the Deputy Commandant for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs. According to service guidance, the  Secretaries are to review squadron requirements, and this review is  required every 2 years for the Air Force and the Marine Corps and every  5 years for the Navy. Further, DOD guidance states that staffing  requirements are driven by workload and shall be established at the  minimum levels necessary to accomplish mission and performance  objectives.

The Military Services Had Fewer Fighter Pilots Than Authorizations Due to a Variety of Contributing Factors; Initiatives Are Underway to Increase Fighter Pilot Staffing Levels

According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps data, each military  service had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations from fiscal years 2013  through 2017, and the Air Force and the Marine Corps project that these  gaps will continue for several years. According to service officials,  because of low numbers of fighter pilots, the military services are unable  to staff all operational fighter pilot positions. According to the military  services, deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots,  due to staffing approaches that include extending deployments and  augmenting deployed squadrons with fighter pilots from other squadrons.  Service officials identified multiple factors that have led to low numbers of  fighter pilots, including challenges in training and retaining fighter pilots.  To increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking a variety  of actions.

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps Had Fewer Fighter Pilots Than Authorizations

According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps data, each military  service had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations (i.e., funded positions)  from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. Specifically, the Air Force and the  Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for most years  from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. The magnitude of these gaps has  grown since fiscal year 2006 and is projected to continue through at least  fiscal year 2023. The Navy had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations in  fiscal years 2013 through 2017. According to service officials, these gaps  between fighter pilot numbers and authorizations have prevented the  military services from fully staffing operational positions, including in non- deployed squadrons and training units.

The Air Force Generally Had Fewer Fighter Pilots Than Authorizations Since Fiscal Year 2006, Including for Operational Positions Since Fiscal Year 2014

According to Air Force pilot staffing level and authorizations data for fiscal  years 2006 through 2017, the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than  authorizations for 11 of 12 years from fiscal years 2006 through 2017.  This gap grew from 192 fighter pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal  year 2006 to 1,005 (27 percent) in fiscal year 2017. According to briefing  documents prepared by the Air Force, this gap is concentrated among  fighter pilots with fewer than 8 years of experience. The Air Force  forecasts that the fighter pilot gap will persist over time, even as the Air  Force takes steps to train more fighter pilots and improve retention.  Figure 3 shows the Air Force fighter pilot staffing levels and  authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. For information on  trends for all Air Force fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities, see appendix  II.

According to Air Force data, the Air Force generally had sufficient fighter  pilots to staff operational positions for fighter pilots for fiscal years 2006  through 2013. Air Force officials added that during that period, Air Force  fighter pilot gaps were generally limited to non-operational positions, such  as staff assignments at Air Force headquarters or combatant commands.  However, our analysis found that the Air Force has been unable to fully  staff operational positions since fiscal year 2014. The gap between  staffing levels and operational positions increased from 39 fighter pilots (1  percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2014 to 399 (13 percent) in fiscal  year 2017.

The Navy Had Fewer Fighter Pilots Than Authorizations for Operational Positions in Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017

According to Navy fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations data for  fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the Navy had fewer fighter pilots than  authorizations for each of these fiscal years. Specifically, in fiscal year  2013 the Navy had a gap of 57 fighter pilots (12 percent) at the first tour  milestone (i.e., a fighter pilot’s first operational tour at sea completed  between 3 and 6 years of service), and this gap grew to 136 fighter pilots  (26 percent) in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 4). Navy officials told us that  they believe current gaps in the fighter pilot community could increase  through mid-2019. For information on trends for all Navy fixed-wing  aircraft pilot communities, see appendix III.

According to Marine Corps pilot staffing levels and authorizations data for  fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots  than authorizations during that time frame. This gap grew from 63 fighter  pilots (6 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 262 (24 percent)  in fiscal year 2017. Further, according to Marine Corps data, the gap is  concentrated in the Marine Corps’ junior fighter pilot population (i.e.,  those fighter pilots below the rank of Officer-4—a major). The Marine  Corps forecasts that the fighter pilot gap will decrease over time as the  Marine Corps phases out legacy aircraft and takes steps to improve  retention. Figure 5 shows the Marine Corps active component fighter pilot  staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. For  information on trends for all Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft pilot  communities, see appendix IV.

In addition, Marine Corps data showed that the Marine Corps was unable  to fully staff fighter pilot operational positions since fiscal year 2016. The  gap between staffing levels and operational positions increased from 12  fighter pilots (1 percent of authorizations) to 57 (7 percent) in fiscal years  2016 through 2017.

The Military Services Used Various Staffing Approaches to Mitigate the Impact of Low Numbers of Fighter Pilots on Deploying Squadrons

Although all of the military services had fewer fighter pilots than  authorizations in fiscal years 2013 through 2017, service officials stated  that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots.  Service officials reported using various approaches to continue to fully  staff deploying fighter squadrons, including (1) prioritizing staffing fighter  pilots to flying positions that require fighter pilot-specific technical skills;  (2) using senior pilots to staff junior positions; and (3) having pilots deploy  for longer and more frequently than planned, including on deployments  with other squadrons. For example, Navy officials told us that  approaches such as extending fighter pilots’ deployments allowed them to  reduce the fiscal year 2017 first tour fighter pilot gap from 136 pilots (26  percent) to 75 pilots (15 percent).

However, squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that these  approaches are having a negative impact on the fighter pilot workforce.  Specifically, squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that the high pace  of operations for senior fighter pilots has limited their availability to train  junior pilots, which has constrained the military services’ ability to  increase the number of pilots with specific qualifications. In addition,  fighter pilots told us that increased frequency of individual deployments  cause instability for their families and lead to career dissatisfaction.  Additionally, as we have previously reported, a high tempo of operations  has increased the challenge of aviation squadrons to rebuild readiness.  For example, according to Air Force officials, high deployment rates for  Air Force squadrons have resulted in less time for squadrons to complete  their full training requirements because high deployment rates mean that  there are fewer aircraft available for training at home stations.

Service officials report that they can also mitigate low numbers of fighter  pilots by leveraging surpluses in other pilot communities. For example, as  outlined in Air Force documents supporting pilot retention bonuses, the  Air Force has staffed mobility pilots (i.e., cargo transport and aerial  refueling pilots) to instructor pilot positions for certain basic flying training  that would otherwise be staffed by fighter pilots. The Navy can also staff  certain Department Head positions designated for fighter pilots with non- pilot aviators from that community. According to military service data,  fighter pilot communities generally have the largest gaps among all  military fixed-wing pilot communities. For example, in fiscal year 2017 the  Air Force had 73 percent of the fighter pilots it needed, while the bomber  community, which had the second largest gap among Air Force fixed- wing pilot communities, had 85 percent of the pilots it needed.

Service Officials Cited Multiple Factors That Have Contributed to Low Numbers of Fighter Pilots

According to service officials, squadron leaders, and fighter pilots,  multiple inter-related factors have reduced each military service’s number  of fighter pilots. Factors cited include reductions to active duty end  strength, aircraft readiness challenges, and declining retention.

Reductions to Active Duty Military End Strength

Reductions to active duty military end strength have contributed to  reductions in fighter pilot staffing levels. Service officials told us that  reductions to military service end strength targets as part of the 2008  drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and funding reductions  related to the Budget Control Act of 2011 led to reductions in the fighter  pilot workforce. For example, the Air Force offered 54 fighter pilots early  retirement incentives in fiscal years 2014 through 2015, while the Marine  Corps offered 49 fighter pilots early retirement options between fiscal  years 2013 through 2016. Further, as we have previously reported, the  Air Force used fighter pilots to meet the initial demand for UAS  operators. Air Force officials told us that they removed 206 of those  pilots from the fighter pilot community in fiscal years 2011 through 2012.  Reduced force structure has also decreased the opportunities for fighter  pilots to gain experience in their aircraft. For example, the Air Force  reported that the number of total Air Force fighter squadrons (including  the reserve components) declined from 134 in fiscal year 1989 to 55 in  fiscal year 2017 (a 59-percent decrease), and as such fewer squadrons  are available to provide newly trained fighter pilots with flying experience.

Reduced aircraft availability has affected fighter pilots’ ability to meet flight  hour targets. Service leaders told us that this has resulted in delays in  training new pilots with the necessary qualifications to participate in  certain missions. Specifically, according to November 2017 testimony, Air  Force, Navy, and Marine Corps leaders reported that fighter pilots do not  meet military service flight hour targets—in part due to reduced aircraft  availability. For example, Navy and Marine Corps leaders testified that  Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 pilots average 13.5 and 12.7 flight hours  per month, respectively, compared with goals of 20.1 and 15.7 hours per  month. A senior Air Force leader testified before Congress that Air  Force fighter pilots average about 16 flight hours per month. In June  2017 we reported on readiness challenges in Air Force and Marine Corps  aviation squadrons.

The military services have trained fewer fighter pilots than targeted over  the last decade. In fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the Air Force trained  12 percent fewer new fighter pilots than the targeted amount, while the  Navy and the Marine Corps each trained 8 percent fewer new fighter  pilots than the targeted amount. Fighter pilots told us that the need to  prioritize the staffing of experienced pilots to deploying squadrons has  limited the number of experienced personnel available to train newer  pilots at home stations.

Recent Safety Concerns Regarding  Onboard Systems in Naval Aircraft  In April 2017, the Navy paused all basic flight  training on the T-45 aircraft due to safety  concerns regarding the oxygen supply and  atmospheric pressurization systems aboard  the training aircraft. The Navy and the Marine  Corps share basic flight training resources,  including training for fixed-wing aircraft pilots  on T-45 aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps  officials told us that if these basic training  squadrons are unable to produce newly  trained fighter pilots on schedule, this can  lead to a decreased number of new fighter  pilots in both military services. The F/A-18 has  also been affected by problems with onboard  oxygen supply systems leading to hypoxia,  which can occur when aircrews receive  insufficient or contaminated oxygen on board  the aircraft. In August 2017 the Navy  established a team to lead its effort to  research and prevent these problems in fixed- wing aircraft. numbers of trained pilots. In addition, aircraft readiness challenges led the  Navy to pause flight training on the T-45 training aircraft in April 2017 due  to safety concerns regarding the oxygen supply systems aboard the  training aircraft. Navy officials reported that gaps in first tour operational  positions designated for all fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities could  grow from 86 pilots in fiscal year 2017 to about 100 in fiscal year 2019.

Declining retention has also contributed to low fighter pilot numbers. Our  analysis of Air Force and Navy bonus retention data shows that retention  of experienced fighter pilots has declined in recent years.

We found that the number of Air Force fighter pilots that have signed  retention contracts decreased from 63 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 35  percent in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 6). This decline has continued even  as the Air Force increased its maximum aviation bonus contract from  $125,000 in fiscal year 2012 to $225,000 beginning in fiscal year 2013,  the highest amount offered by any of the military services.

According to Navy retention data, the Navy pool of fighter pilots eligible  for the Department Head milestone (i.e., a mid-career operational  leadership tour for different aspects of squadron management for pilots  with between about 11 and 13 years of service) has shrunk over time.  Navy officials told us that, as a result, the percentage of fighter pilots  selected for the Department Head milestone has increased. For example,  the Department Head selection rate for Navy F/A-18 pilots increased from  49 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 100 percent in fiscal year 2017.

Further, the Navy did not meet its goals for fighter pilots signing retention  bonuses at the Department Head milestone in fiscal years 2013 through  2017. For example, the Navy fell short of its retention bonus target of 73  fighter pilots by 38 pilots (48 percent of the target) for fiscal year 2017. In  comparison, the surveillance and transport pilot community met or  exceeded its target of pilots who signed a bonus contract 2 out of 5 years  during that same period, while the maritime patrol pilot community met or  exceeded its target 4 out of 5 years. Figure 7 shows the Navy Department  Head active component fixed-wing pilot retention bonus take rate for  fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

Squadron leaders and fighter pilots we met with attributed declining  retention to the staffing approaches being used by the military services to  mitigate fighter pilot gaps and fully staff deployed squadrons. For  example, squadron leaders told us that assigning senior fighter pilots to  junior positions hurts retention by reducing leadership opportunities  believed to be necessary for promotion. Fighter pilots also told us that  quality of life has decreased as a result of longer and more frequent  deployments. Further, fighter pilots told us that understaffing fighter pilots  in operational units has resulted in an increased workload per pilot and  lower quality of service for non-deployed fighter pilots in those units.

The Air Force Has Implemented Initiatives to Help Increase Fighter Pilot Numbers and the Navy and the Marine Corps Are Formulating Initiatives to Address Overall Retention Concerns

The Air Force has developed and implemented initiatives to help increase  fighter pilot numbers, and the Navy and the Marine Corps are developing  initiatives to address overall retention concerns. The Air Force  established a dedicated team to identify and develop initiatives  specifically to address its reported fighter pilot shortage, and this effort  has resulted in over 35 implemented initiatives. The Navy and the Marine  Corps have not formulated initiatives specifically for fighter pilots, but  have identified actions to address retention concerns. Navy and Marine  Corps officials stated that, because the military services can still staff  authorizations for deployed squadrons, they do not believe their staffing  levels of fighter pilots have reached a critical shortage. However, Navy  and Marine Corps personnel management officials we met with told us  that they are closely monitoring trends in fighter pilot retention, and they  believe that decreased retention in the near future may exacerbate fighter  pilot gaps in their military services. The military services’ initiatives are  summarized below.

The Air Force established a dedicated effort to address fighter pilot  workforce challenges, and many initiatives from this effort have been  implemented. Specifically, in March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air  Force directed the initiation of an effort to address the Air Force fighter  pilot shortage. The Air Force created a Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team  in March 2016, and began formulating initiatives to address the fighter  pilot shortage that the Air Force identified. For example, as the result  of one initiative, 126 contractors have been placed in fighter  squadrons to assist with administrative tasks and reduce workload for  fighter pilots, and additional contractor support is in the process of  being added. Also, in the fall of 2016 the Air Force reinstated its  award program to recognize fighter pilots for superior performance.  According to a member of the Air Force’s Fighter Enterprise Tiger  Team, the awards are non-monetary, but because they are merit- based they can help fighter pilots to be more competitive when being  assessed for promotion.

In February 2017, the Air Force effort was expanded from a focus on  fighter pilots to include all rated personnel and renamed the Aircrew  Crisis Task Force. The 37 initiatives implemented by the Air Force  as of November 2017 as a result of the Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team  and Aircrew Crisis Task Force efforts are presented in appendix V.

The Navy is formulating a service-wide strategy—referred to as Sailor  2025—which includes over 40 initiatives to address retention issues  throughout the Navy. We identified 10 initiatives from Sailor 2025 that  may address some of the retention issues raised in our discussion  groups with fighter pilots—such as dissatisfaction with the  assignments and promotion processes. For example, Navy officials  told us they are developing staffing software to manage assignments  and make the process more transparent and flexible. The Navy is also  testing a new performance evaluation system to more accurately  evaluate sailor performance. In addition, the Navy has adjusted the  existing aviation bonus program by increasing the maximum bonus  amount for fighter pilots from $25,000 to $30,000 per year for fiscal  year 2018. To increase the number of available fighter aircraft, the  Navy has also established a Rhino Readiness Recovery team— referring to the Navy’s term for the F/A-18 E-F Super Hornet aircraft— to identify and address readiness challenges in that community. Navy  officials told us they believe their approaches are sufficient to address  any potential future Navy fighter pilot gaps.

In November 2017, the Marine Corps reinstated the aviation bonus  program last offered by the Marine Corps in fiscal year 2011. The  Marine Corps is offering 2-year contracts totaling $40,000 to fighter  pilots who have completed their service obligation—except for those  fighter pilots assigned to the EA-6B aircraft. However, the Marine  Corps is not in the process of developing any non-monetary initiatives  to address pilot retention. Rather, the Marine Corps is addressing  aircraft readiness challenges—an issue consistently raised by fighter  pilots in our discussion groups—by establishing four lines of effort to  increase the number of available fighter aircraft for fighter squadrons.  Marine Corps officials told us that they have begun implementing  multiple initiatives for those lines of effort. For example, one initiative  is focused on improving availability of aircraft spare parts by  increasing their funding and modernizing the spare parts supply chain.  Another initiative is focused on growing the maintenance workforce  and retaining experienced aircraft maintainers. Specifically, the  Marine Corps is offering retention bonuses to experienced aircraft  maintainers.

The Military Services Have Not Reevaluated Fighter Pilot Squadron Requirements to Reflect Changing Conditions, Increased Workload, and Emerging UAS Requirements

Fighter pilots and squadron leaders told us that the fighter pilot  occupation has significantly changed in recent years, but the military  services have not reevaluated fighter squadron requirements. Fighter  pilots and squadron leaders from each of the military services consistently  told us that the fighter pilot occupation has significantly changed in recent  years due to changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology, additional  training requirements, and the removal of administrative support positions  from squadrons. The fighter pilots added that these changes have led to  an unsustainable increase in workload. As discussed earlier, squadron  requirements—the number of fighter pilots needed to meet operational  mission needs—are calculated by the military services using a variety of  inputs, including workload. Once these requirements are funded by  Congress, they are an “authorization.” Service guidance requires  squadron requirements to be reevaluated on a 2-year schedule (5 years  for the Navy) and to be updated as conditions change.

For the Air Force, guidance defines staffing requirements as the staffing  needed to accomplish a job, mission, or program, and notes that staffing  should be sized to reflect the minimum essential level to accomplish the  required workload. The Office of the Administrative Assistant to the  Secretary of the Air Force (Resources), along with Major Command  manpower staffs establish staffing standards and, at a minimum, by policy  are to reevaluate these standards for applicability and updates every 2  years, or earlier if dictated by significant workload or mission changes.  The Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency determines staffing resource  requirements and provides staffing and management consultation  services to Air Force functional communities for improved resource  utilization and enhanced mission effectiveness and efficiency.

The Air Force could not provide specifics on the most recent updates to  squadron requirements, because such data were stored in a database  that managed requirements on a position-by-position basis, rather than  aggregated by squadron. Air Force pilots and squadron leaders  consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons, such as  a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, increased training requirements, and reduced administrative support, have increased fighter  pilot workload. However, Air Force officials told us that metrics that inform  squadron requirements (i.e., crew ratios, the targeted ratio of pilots to  aircraft) have not been increased because the Air Force is instead  prioritizing the effort to recapitalize its fleet of fighter aircraft. Separately  from reevaluating squadron requirements, Air Force officials told us that  they have implemented changes to address workload concerns cited by  fighter pilots—such as adding contractor staff in squadrons to provide  administrative support, as part of initiatives to address fighter pilot  shortages they have identified. According to Air Force officials, the Air  Force is currently reassessing non-operational requirements for fighter  pilots (i.e., non-flying positions at headquarters organizations). Air Force  officials told us that this reassessment is focused on determining which  non-operational requirements currently assigned to fighter pilots could be  assigned to other types of officers or pilots, to reduce the overall number  of fighter pilot requirements.

For the Navy, squadron requirements are dependent on the current  wartime requirements developed by the Navy, referred to as the Required  Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment of a  particular squadron, aircraft configuration, specified operating profile,  computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints. The June  2017 update to the relevant Navy guidance reduced the frequency of the  reviews of these requirements from every 2 years to every 5 years, with  updates as required by those officials responsible for specific units.

Navy officials told us that reviews are to be completed every 2 years, but  updates are only made to squadron staffing documents if specific events  occur, such as additional aircraft being assigned to a squadron. Navy  officials added that they believe squadron requirements are accurate and  updated with sufficient frequency. However, Navy pilots and squadron  leaders consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons,  such as a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, increased  training requirements, and more frequent individual deployments, have  increased fighter pilot workload. However, the Navy has not recently  updated squadron requirements to reflect such changes. Specifically,  Navy fighter pilot squadron requirements are outlined in 15 Navy  squadron staffing documents, and as of November 2017, 9 out of 15 of  those documents had not been updated within the last 2 years.

For the Marine Corps, guidance states that reviews to optimize force  structure will be conducted every 2 years, taking into consideration new  and emerging requirements. Marine Corps pilots and squadron leaders  consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons, such as  a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, reduced aircraft  availability, and more frequent individual deployments, have increased  fighter pilot workload. However, the Marine Corps has not updated  squadron requirements to reflect such changes. Specifically, Marine  Corps fighter pilot squadron requirements are outlined in four fighter  squadron staffing documents, and, as of November 2017, none had been  updated within the last 2 years.

Marine Corps squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that updates to  squadron requirements are not being conducted for squadrons of legacy  aircraft, but added that they believe updates are warranted due to the  continued delays in fielding the F-35 and resulting extensions to the  planned service of legacy platforms. Marine Corps officials told us that  they have not updated squadron requirements because (1) Marine Corps  fighter pilot authorizations and staffing levels are below squadron  requirements, so any increase to squadron requirements would require a  significant increase to fighter pilot authorizations, and (2) the Marine  Corps has faced challenges obtaining technical assistance to conduct  workload assessments in fighter squadrons. The Navy Manpower  Analysis Center conducts workload reviews of squadrons, based on  specific events such as changes to the amount of time needed for  maintaining the specific type of aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps fighter  pilots we met with told us that they have had difficulties maintaining  fighter jets in their squadrons, and Navy and Marine Corps leaders have  made similar statements in congressional testimony. Further, Marine  Corps officials told us that they have had difficulty utilizing the Navy  Manpower Analysis Center to update workload analyses for their fighter  squadrons, as they believed the center prioritizes work for Navy organizations. Navy Manpower Analysis Center officials told us that there  is no formal requirement for their organization to conduct analyses for the  Marine Corps, but that they respond to such requests on an ad-hoc basis.  They added that the Marine Corps Combat Development Command has  formal responsibility for updating Marine Corps workload analyses. We  have previously reported that the size and data collection capacity of the  Navy Manpower Analysis Center has limited the Navy’s capacity to carry  out periodic workload reassessments, which may be a contributing factor  to chronic under-staffing of ship crews.

The Military Services Have Not Incorporated Plans for Increased Reliance on UAS into Fighter Pilot Workforce Projections

According to a DOD planning document, funding for UAS platforms was  expected to grow by 17 percent in fiscal years 2014 through 2018.  Moreover, in 2015, the Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment  of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Unmanned Systems  and announced that the F-35 will likely be the last cockpit-operated strike  fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will buy or fly. The Chief of  Naval Operations announced in 2017 that the future of the Navy includes  UAS systems as an integral part of the future fleet and must be  purchased in large numbers to expand naval presence in key areas. For  example, the Navy is developing a UAS platform—the MQ-25 Stingray— which is intended to replace that portion of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft’s  mission set that involves re-fueling other F/A-18 aircraft.

Also, in 2015 the Secretary of the Air Force stated that UAS pilots were  flying on average about four times more hours than pilots in cockpit- operated aircraft. Further, a document outlining the Air Force’s vision for  UAS for fiscal years 2009 through 2047 notes that systems will work in  tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft, for example to attack air-defense  systems, and that autonomous technologies will potentially allow one pilot  to direct multiple aircraft, leading to personnel efficiencies.

Although the impact of UAS on the fighter pilot workforce appears to be  significant, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have not  accounted for the planned increased use of UAS to complete missions  similar to those carried out by fighter aircraft, and the potential impact of  these changes on fighter pilot requirements. Specifically, Air Force and  Navy officials told us that their military services have not conducted an  assessment of the impact of future UAS operations on fighter pilot  requirements. While the UAS platforms that are expected to overlap  with fighter aircraft missions will not be fielded until the mid-2020s, the  length of time required to develop an experienced fighter pilot compels  the military services to begin incorporating these planned changes to  fighter pilot requirements promptly. For example, Navy fighter pilots who  are entering initial training in 2018 will not have completed their active  duty service obligation (currently 8 years after Navy pilots complete flight  training) when the MQ-25 Stingray system is expected to be fielded in  2026.

A key tenet of human capital planning is determining existing and future  skills and competencies, and associated workforce gaps. Without steps  by the military services, to include reevaluating workload and taking into  account the impact that the planned use of UAS will have on the fighter  pilot workforce, the military services will not fully know the extent and  nature of gaps between fighter pilot numbers and authorizations and how  to best target actions to address these gaps.

Fighter pilots are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance  during combat operations. To achieve that mission, the military services  must have appropriate numbers of qualified fighter pilots. Service officials  report that no unit is deploying without 100 percent of its fighter pilots, and  they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their operational  missions. Nevertheless, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps,  are reporting fewer fighter pilots than authorizations, and they project that  these gaps will continue through at least fiscal year 2023. Without re- evaluating fighter pilot requirements, it will be difficult for the military  services to accurately determine the number of fighter pilots needed to  complete missions and help ensure success in combat. Specifically,  without updating squadron requirements to reflect the growing  administrative burden on fighter pilots in non-deployed squadrons, the  currently identified differences between fighter pilot numbers and  authorizations may be understated. By contrast, without updating future  fighter pilot requirements to take into account changing roles and  missions—in particular the increasing role of UAS in combat operations— forecasted fighter pilot gaps may be overstated. In short, reevaluating  fighter pilot requirements is a key first step to help the military services  clearly determine the magnitude of the gaps and target strategies to meet  their personnel needs.

We are making the following three recommendations:

The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Director of  Operations and the Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency reevaluate  fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current  assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of  future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat aviation.  (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval  Operations reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include  updating current assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing  the impact of future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat  aviation. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. We  had initially recommended that the Marine Corps also assess the impact  of UAS platforms on fighter pilot squadron requirements, but removed  that portion of the third recommendation because Marine Corps officials  told us that Marine Corps UAS squadrons will continue to be resourced  with operators through the accession process and Marine Corps UAS  operator requirements do not affect either pilot inventories or fighter pilot  workload. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOD  concurred with our recommendations, citing its commitment to addressing  manpower, personnel, and training challenges for the fighter pilot  community and broader aviation and aviation support capabilities. DOD  also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Air Force; the  Secretary of the Navy; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.

To assess the extent to which the military services had differences in the  number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, as well as  contributing factors and service initiatives to address the differences, we  obtained and analyzed data on authorizations designated for pilots and  corresponding staffing levels of pilots for all fixed-wing, cockpit-operated  (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft communities in the Air Force,  the Navy, and the Marine Corps. We did not include the Army in the  scope of our review because the Army does not operate fighter aircraft.

For the Air Force and the Marine Corps active component, we compared  pilot staffing levels with authorizations for all fixed-wing aircraft  communities for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. We obtained and  analyzed projected authorizations and staffing levels for the same pilot  communities for fiscal years 2018 through 2023. We further obtained and  reviewed Marine Corps data on fighter pilot operational position staffing  targets and staffing levels for fiscal year 2017 and similar Air Force data  for fiscal year 2018. We also compared Air Force and Marine Corps  reserve component fighter pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal  years 2006 through 2017.

For the Navy, we obtained and analyzed data on authorizations  designated for active and reserve component pilots for fiscal years 2006  through 2017, and staffing levels for all Navy fixed-wing aircraft  communities in the active component for fiscal years 2011 through 2017.  However, the Navy’s authorization data did not specify how many fighter  pilots were assigned to non-flying assignments because the Navy does  not fully assign non-flying authorizations to specific communities, unlike  the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Therefore, we were unable to  conduct an analysis comparing total Navy fighter pilot staffing levels with  authorizations, as we did for the Air Force and the Marine Corps. We  instead obtained and analyzed Navy data on differences between  authorizations and pilot staffing levels for first operational tour,  Department Head, and Command positions for all fixed-wing aircraft pilot  communities in the active component. We also obtained and analyzed  Navy data on differences between staffing targets and pilot staffing levels  for the Navy Reserve for fiscal year 2017, the only year of data available.  We also obtained and analyzed Navy retention data for pilots eligible for  Department Head assignments, a mid-career milestone in fixed-wing  communities for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. Retention data for the  Department Head milestone are made available in annual aviation  continuation pay reports to Congress. Fiscal year 2018 retention data will  be available in fiscal year 2019. We further obtained and analyzed the  number of fighter pilots the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps  trained in fiscal years 2007 through 2016.

To assess the reliability of the data we obtained, we reviewed  corroborating documentation, analyzed the data for inconsistencies, and  interviewed service officials about the reliability of the data. We  determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable to describe the  trends in personnel staffing levels and authorizations for the time period  included in our scope.

We met with DOD and service officials to discuss the results of our  analysis and factors that may have contributed to low numbers of fighter  pilots. We also collected and reviewed service documentation regarding  the factors they identified. We interviewed service officials and reviewed  documentation to identify any initiatives taken or planned to increase  fighter pilot numbers.

In addition, we selected a non-generalizable sample of locations where  fighter pilots are stationed (see table 1). We selected these locations  based on geographic diversity (one location for each military service in  both the eastern and western portions of the contiguous United States), a  diversity of types of fighter aircraft, and a mix of squadron types at the  locations (i.e., operational squadrons, training squadrons, and reserve  component squadrons). In selecting locations we also considered the  availability of pilots due to conflicts with deployment or training events. At  each location, we moderated one to two discussion groups with fighter  pilots for a total of 13 discussion groups ranging from between 3 and 20  pilots per group. We held separate sessions with junior and senior pilots  at all locations, except for at Naval Air Station Oceana, Marine Corps Air  Station Cherry Point, and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, due to pilot  availability. We also interviewed unit leadership at these locations (i.e.,  wing and squadron commanders and executive officers) to obtain their  perspective on the status of the fighter pilot workforce. While these  discussion groups and interviews allowed us to learn about many  important aspects of the fighter pilot workforce from the perspective of  fighter pilots and squadron leaders, they were designed to provide  anecdotal information and not results that would be representative of all  the department’s more than 5,000 fighter pilots as of fiscal year 2017.

To assess the extent to which the military services have reevaluated  squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including  the consideration of UAS pilot requirements, we reviewed service  guidance to determine the frequency with which elements of fighter pilot  squadron requirements are to be reevaluated, reviewed service  documentation, and interviewed service officials to determine the extent  to which these elements had been reevaluated on schedule, reviewed  service documentation regarding the planned mix of cockpit-operated and  remotely-operated aviation platforms for future operations, and discussed  with service officials the extent to which these plans are incorporated into  forecasts of fighter pilot squadron requirements.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2016 to April 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comparison of Air Force Pilot Staffing Levels and Authorizations for Fixed- Wing, Cockpit-Operated Aircraft

The Air Force uses pilots from both the active and reserve components to  staff fixed-wing, cockpit-operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing)  aircraft pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds through  appropriations. These Air Force pilots staff a mix of operational and non- operational positions. Operational positions include both flying (e.g.,  combat pilot or instructor pilot positions) and non-flying positions (e.g.,  close air support duty officer positions in an Air Operations Center) that  directly support combat operations. Non-operational positions are  generally non-flying, and include assignments to headquarters or  combatant command positions, some of which can be staffed by other  types of Air Force officers. This appendix compares Air Force pilot  staffing levels with authorizations for operational and non-operational  positions for all fixed-wing aircraft communities for fiscal years 2006  through 2017.

Air Force fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, bomber, mobility,  surveillance, and special operations aircraft. Fighter pilots operate tactical  aircraft that engage in air-to-air and air-to-surface attacks and include the  A-10, F-15, F-16, F-22A, and F-35 aircraft. Bomber pilots operate aircraft  to deliver munitions and include the B-1, B-2, and B-52 aircraft. Mobility  pilots operate aircraft used for aerial refueling and troop and cargo  transport and include the C-17 and KC-135 aircraft. Surveillance pilots  operate aircraft used for surveillance and reconnaissance to support  ground troops and include the E-8 and U-2 aircraft. Special operations  pilots operate aircraft that provide close-air support for ground troops,  including the AC-130.

Air Force officials report that they can staff certain operational positions  designated for fighter pilots with pilots from other pilot communities that  have surpluses. For example, Air Force officials told us they can staff  mobility or surveillance pilots (communities which both had a surplus of  pilots in fiscal year 2017) to certain basic flying training instructor pilot  positions that would otherwise be staffed by fighter pilots. Figure 8 shows  the Air Force active component fixed-wing aircraft community pilot staffing  levels and authorizations for fiscal year 2017.

According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had  fewer fighter pilots than authorizations in 11 of 12 years from fiscal year  2006 through fiscal year 2017. This gap grew from 192 fighter pilots (5  percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 1,005 (27 percent of  authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 9 shows the comparison of the  Air Force’s active component fighter pilot staffing levels with  authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

According to Air Force data for the reserve components the Air National  Guard and the Air Force Reserve, the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots  than authorizations every fiscal year from fiscal year 2006 through 2017.  For example, the Air Force reported that the reserve components had a  gap of 271 fighter pilots (17 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017.  Figure 10 illustrates the gap between staffing levels and authorizations for  Air Force fighter pilots in the reserve components for fiscal years 2006  through 2017.

According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had  fewer bomber pilots than authorizations in fiscal years 2014 through  2017. This gap grew from 11 bomber pilots (1 percent of authorizations)  in fiscal year 2014 to 135 (15 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year  2017. Figure 11 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active  component bomber pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years  2006 through 2017.

According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had  more mobility pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through  fiscal year 2017. This surplus peaked at 1,637 mobility pilots (132 percent  of authorizations) in fiscal year 2011, and declined to 264 (105 percent of  authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 12 shows the comparison of the  Air Force’s active component mobility pilot staffing levels with  authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

According to Air Force data for the active component for fiscal years 2006  through 2017, the Air Force had fewer surveillance pilots than  authorizations in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. In fiscal year 2017, the  surplus was 220 surveillance pilots (128 percent of authorizations). Figure  13 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component  surveillance pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006  through 2017.

According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had  fewer special operations pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2017. Special operations pilot staffing levels and  authorizations have increased substantially from fiscal year 2009 through  fiscal year 2017. Further, the gap between the staffing levels and  authorizations decreased from 342 special operations pilots (29 percent  of authorizations) in fiscal year 2009 to 227 (14 percent of authorizations)  in fiscal year 2017. Figure 14 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s  active component special operations pilot staffing levels with  authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

Appendix III: Comparison of Navy Pilot Staffing Levels and Authorizations for Fixed- Wing, Cockpit-Operated Aircraft

The Navy uses pilots from both the active and reserve component to staff  fixed-wing, cockpit operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft  pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds through appropriations.  These Navy pilots staff a mix of operational and non-operational  positions. Operational positions include both flying (i.e., combat pilot or  instructor pilot) and non-flying positions that directly support combat  operations. Non-operational positions are generally non-flying positions,  and include assignments to positions at headquarters or in the combatant  commands that can be staffed by other types of Navy officers.

The Navy does not separate non-operational fighter pilot authorizations  from authorizations for other pilots. As a result, this appendix only  presents Navy pilot staffing levels for those communities for fiscal years  2011 through 2017, and compares Navy pilot staffing levels to specific  operational positions. Specifically, we compared authorizations and pilot  staffing levels for Navy first operational tour, Department Head, and  Command positions for all fixed-wing, cockpit-operated aircraft  communities in the active component for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

Navy fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, surveillance and  transport, and maritime patrol aircraft. Navy fighter pilots operate tactical  aircraft for air defense and support. Fighter aircraft include both legacy  and Super Hornet variants of the F/A-18, as well as newer tactical  aircraft such as the EA-18G developed for electronic warfare and the F- 35. Surveillance and transport pilots operate turboprop aircraft, including  the E-2D for surveillance and airborne early warning missions and the C- 2A for troop and cargo transport between aircraft carriers and shore  bases. Maritime patrol pilots operate jet aircraft for missions including  anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, and include aircraft such  as the P-8A.

According to Navy personnel data, Navy fighter pilot staffing levels  decreased from 1,707 fighter pilots in fiscal year 2015 to 1,548 (a 9- percent decrease) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 15 compares changes in the  Navy fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol pilot staffing  levels for fiscal years 2011 through 2017.

According to Navy fixed-wing pilot staffing levels and authorizations data  for the first tour milestone (i.e., pilots’ first operational tours at sea for  pilots generally with between 3 and 6 years of service), the Navy was  unable to fully staff fighter pilot, surveillance and transport, and maritime  patrol operational positions from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. The  fighter pilot gap grew from 57 fighter pilots (12 percent of authorizations)  in fiscal year 2013 to 136 fighter pilots (26 percent) in fiscal year 2017.  The surveillance and transport pilot gap varied from 29 pilots (20 percent  of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 30 pilots (23 percent) in fiscal year  2017, while the maritime patrol community pilot gap decreased from 112  pilots (23 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 4 pilots (1  percent) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 16 compares the Navy active  component fighter pilot, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol  communities’ first tour staffing levels and authorizations for operational  positions for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

According to Navy fixed-wing aviator staffing levels and authorizations  data for the Department Head milestone (i.e., a mid-career operational  leadership tour for different aspects of squadron management for pilots  with between about 11 and 13 years of service), the military service had  more fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviators than  authorizations for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. However, the surplus of  fighter aviators compared with authorizations decreased from 68 aviators  (133 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 28 aviators (114  percent) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 17 compares the Navy active  component fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviator  communities’ Department Head staffing levels and authorizations for  operational positions for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

According to Navy fixed-wing aviator staffing levels and authorizations  data for the Command milestone (i.e., a leadership tour for Commanders,  including squadron commander, for aviators with between about 17 and  19 years of service) the number of fighter, surveillance and transport, and  maritime patrol aviators compared with authorizations increased from  fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, while the fighter pilot  community had fewer aviators than authorizations in fiscal year 2013 (a  gap totaling 2 percent of authorizations), it had a surplus of aviators in  fiscal year 2017 (2 percent above authorizations). Figure 18 compares  the Navy active component fighter, surveillance and transport, and  maritime patrol aviator communities’ Command milestone staffing levels  and authorizations for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.

Appendix IV: Comparison of Marine Corps Pilot Staffing Levels and Authorizations for Fixed-Wing, Cockpit Operated Aircraft

The Marine Corps uses pilots from both the active and reserve  components to staff fixed-wing, cockpit-operated (hereafter referred to as  fixed-wing) aircraft pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds  through appropriations. These Marine Corps pilots staff a mix of  operational and non-operational positions. Operational positions include  both flying (e.g., combat pilot or instructor pilot positions) and non-flying  positions (e.g., air controller in a ground infantry unit) that generally  support combat operations. Non-operational positions are generally non- flying and include assignments to headquarters or combatant command  positions, some of which can be staffed by other types of Marine Corps  officers. This appendix compares Marine Corps pilot staffing levels with  authorizations for operational and non-operational positions for all fixed- wing aircraft communities for fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

Marine Corps fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, tiltrotor, and  tanker aircraft. Fighter pilots operate tactical aircraft for air defense and  close air support and attack missions, and include the EA-6B, AV-8B,  F/A-18, and F-35. Tiltrotor pilots operate the MV-22—an aircraft that  operates as a helicopter for takeoffs and landings and, once airborne,  converts to a turboprop aircraft—and is used to transport combat troops  and equipment. Tanker pilots operate the KC-130, an aircraft used for in- flight refueling and transport of troops and equipment.

According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine  Corps had fewer pilots than authorizations in all of its fixed-wing  communities in fiscal year 2017. The Marine Corps forecasts this gap will  persist through at least fiscal year 2023. Figure 19 shows the Marine  Corps active component fixed-wing pilot staffing levels and authorizations  for fiscal year 2017.

According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine  Corps had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2017. This gap grew from 63 fighter pilots (6 percent  of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 322 fighter pilots (24 percent) in  fiscal year 2017. Figure 20 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps’  active component fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal  years 2006 through 2017.

According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine  Corps had fewer fighter pilots than operational positions in fiscal years  2016 and 2017. Figure 21 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps’  active component fighter pilot staffing levels with operational positions for  fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

According to Marine Corps data for the reserve component, the Marine  Corps Reserve, a community that the Marine Corps uses to augment its  available staffing levels of active duty pilots, had more fighter pilots than  authorizations for 8 of 12 years in fiscal years 2006 through 2017. The  Marine Corps had a gap of seven reserve component fighter pilots (6  percent of authorizations) for fiscal year 2017. Figure 22 shows the  Marine Corps Reserve fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for  fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine  Corps had fewer junior fighter pilots—those pilots between grades  Officer-1 and Officer-3—than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through  fiscal year 2017. Marine Corps officials told us that, as a result, the  Marine Corps assigns pilots at the Officer-4 grade to staff positions  designated for junior pilots. For example, in fiscal year 2017 the Marine  Corps needed an additional 309 junior fighter pilots (48 percent of  authorizations) to fill all authorizations. Figure 23 shows the comparison  of the Marine Corps active component junior and senior fighter pilot  staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal year 2017.

According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine  Corps had fewer tiltrotor pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006  through fiscal year 2017. Tiltrotor pilot staffing levels and authorizations  have increased substantially from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year  2017. Further, the gap between the staffing levels and authorizations has  decreased from 137 tiltrotor pilots (70 percent of authorizations) in fiscal  year 2006 to 322 tiltrotor pilots (34 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year  2017. Figure 24 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps active  component tiltrotor pilot staffing levels and authorizations in fiscal years  2006 through 2017.

According to Marine Corps active component data, the Marine Corps had  fewer tanker pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal  year 2017. This gap decreased from 86 tanker pilots in fiscal year 2006  (22 percent of authorizations) to 18 tanker pilots (5 percent of  authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 25 shows the comparison of the  Marine Corps active component tanker pilot staffing levels and  authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017.

Appendix V: Initiatives Implemented by the Air Force to Address Reported Fighter Pilot Shortages

In March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force created the Fighter  Enterprise Tiger Team to address the fighter pilot shortage that the Air  Force identified. In February 2017, the Air Force effort was expanded to  include all rated personnel and renamed the Aircrew Crisis Task Force.  According to Air Force officials, the task force has focused on the  following areas to improve fighter pilot retention: work/life balance, quality  of service, and monetary compensation. In August 2017 the Aircrew  Crisis Task Force held a Dedicated Aircrew Retention Team Summit that  included organizing discussion groups with pilots to obtain information on  retention challenges. According to Air Force officials, in September 2017,  the task force presented 25 of the 44 recommendations developed at the  summit to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as of November 2017 the  Chief of Staff had decided to implement 2 of them immediately and  conduct additional analysis on the other 23. The recommendations being  analyzed include reducing the length and number of deployments for  fighter pilots and converting some non-flying fighter pilot positions to UAS  pilot positions. As of November 2017, these efforts had resulted in 37  implemented initiatives (see table 2).

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Lori Atkinson, Assistant Director; Vincent Buquicchio, Timothy Carr,  Mae Jones, Foster Kerrison, Amie Lesser, Michael Silver, and Nell  Williams.

Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Position the Navy and the  Marine Corps to Support Expanding Unmanned Systems Operations.  GAO-18-162. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2018.

Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission  Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.

DOD Training: DOD Has Taken Steps to Assess Common Military  Training. GAO-17-468. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2017.

Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and  Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18,  2017.

High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial  Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2017.

Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage  Special and Incentive Pay Programs. GAO-17-39. Washington, D.C.:  February 3, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Human  Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces. GAO-17-53. Washington, D.C.:  January 31, 2017.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Air  Force and Army Pilot Workforce Challenges. GAO-16-527T. Washington,  D.C.: March 16, 2016.

Unmanned Aerial Systems: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Pilot  Training. GAO-15-461. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2015.

Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned  Aerial System Pilots. GAO-14-316. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2014.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain,  with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions.  GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results- Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories.  GAO-10-331. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2010.

Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning.  GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.

Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Define Pilot Requirements  and Promote Retention. GAO/NSIAD-99-211. Washington, D.C.: August  20, 1999.