Rental Housing Assistance: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Criminal History Policies and Implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative

HUD has encouraged PHAs to balance resident safety with the housing needs of persons with criminal records when administering its rental assistance programs. PHAs are responsible for screening program applicants. The HUD OIG and the FBI implement the Fugitive Felon Initiative to identify and apprehend wanted persons receiving rental assistance.

GAO was asked to review HUD's criminal history policies and the Fugitive Felon Initiative. This report examines (1) federal requirements for PHAs' criminal history policies, (2) HUD guidance and monitoring of these requirements, and (3) implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations and interviewed officials from HUD, the HUD OIG, and the FBI; analyzed Fugitive Felon Initiative data from 2013 through 2017; and interviewed staff at a nongeneralizable sample of 10 PHAs (selected based on size and other factors).

Federal requirements for public housing agencies. Federal statutes and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations require public housing agencies (PHA) to conduct criminal history checks on individuals applying for rental assistance under HUD's public housing and Housing Choice Voucher programs and deny assistance for six types of offenses. Mandatory denials include convictions for producing methamphetamine on the premises of federally-assisted housing and lifetime sex offender registrants. Otherwise, PHAs generally have discretion in establishing their criminal history policies and may deny assistance for other offenses or factor in mitigating circumstances.

HUD monitoring of public housing agencies. From 2011 through 2016, HUD issued new guidance to PHAs on criminal history policies, but these changes are not reflected in HUD's program guidebooks for PHAs. These guidebooks serve as key reference tools, but have not been updated in over 15 years. Updating them would help HUD more accurately communicate its criminal history policies. While HUD officials said their current efforts to update the guidebooks will reflect recent criminal history policy notices, documentation provided by the agency on these updates did not specifically address criminal history guidance. In addition, HUD's compliance reviews of high-risk PHAs do not address some criminal history policy requirements, such as the prohibition on using arrest records as the basis for determining eligibility. Further, these reviews are largely limited to examining PHAs' written policies and do not cover how PHAs implement those policies. More comprehensive compliance reviews would improve HUD's ability to identify areas of noncompliance with criminal history policy requirements.

Fugitive Felon Initiative. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shared data through the Fugitive Felon Initiative, which led to the apprehension of more than 1,200 wanted persons who may have lived in HUD-assisted housing. However, GAO found that the HUD OIG had not defined its regional office responsibilities under the initiative and that four of the seven HUD OIG regions did not participate from 2012 through 2016. The HUD OIG revised its procedures for the initiative in April 2018 to include regional office responsibilities, such as coordinating with law enforcement agencies. According to HUD OIG officials, regional offices are now required to coordinate with law enforcement agencies on a priority list of investigative leads, which include warrants for violent felonies, sexual assault, and narcotics distribution. However, the HUD OIG does not plan to assess regional office implementation of several requirements. Collecting and assessing more comprehensive information on regional office activities would help the HUD OIG determine the extent to which regions are undertaking required activities. In addition, the HUD OIG and the FBI have not consistently shared information on the initiative's results—such as apprehension statistics and program savings—which could help evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative. Further, the HUD OIG's and the FBI's current activities to implement the initiative differ in some areas from the agreed-upon responsibilities listed in their 2012 memorandum of understanding. Updating the memorandum to reflect current responsibilities under the initiative could help improve collaboration between the agencies and improve implementation.

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that HUD update PHA guidebooks and improve monitoring procedures; that the HUD OIG assess more comprehensive information on the implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative; and that the HUD OIG and the FBI consistently share information on the initiative's results and update their memorandum of understanding to reflect current responsibilities. HUD and the FBI generally agreed. The HUD OIG did not agree with two of our recommendations. GAO maintains the recommendations, as discussed in the report.

Balancing the safety of residents receiving rental assistance with the  housing needs of persons with a criminal history is a challenging  undertaking that has received increased attention in recent years. Over 3  million households receive rental assistance through the Department of  Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) public housing and Housing  Choice Voucher (HCV) programs. In the 1990s, HUD encouraged public  housing agencies (PHA)—local entities responsible for administering  these programs on HUD’s behalf—to develop and enforce strict screening  and eviction policies as part of their antidrug and anticrime initiatives.  However, within the last decade, HUD has encouraged PHAs to move  away from strict policies that deny housing assistance to anyone who has  engaged in criminal activity. For example, in 2011, the Secretary of HUD  issued a letter encouraging PHAs to consider providing “second chances”  for formerly incarcerated individuals and to implement policies that  balance resident safety with the housing needs of persons with criminal  history records.

In addition, HUD’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) works with the  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement  agencies to implement the Fugitive Felon Initiative. Under this initiative,  these agencies share information in an effort to locate and apprehend  fugitive felons and investigate the fraudulent receipt of HUD benefits. In  recent years, some members of Congress have raised questions about  the presence of fugitive felons in public housing and the effectiveness of  the Fugitive Felon Initiative.

GAO was asked to review HUD’s criminal history policies and the Fugitive  Felon Initiative. This report examines (1) the statutory and regulatory  requirements for PHAs’ criminal history policies for public housing and  HCV programs; (2) the extent to which HUD provides guidance and  monitors PHA implementation of criminal history policy requirements for  public housing and HCV programs; and (3) the HUD OIG’s  implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative, in coordination with the  FBI.

To describe the federal statutory and regulatory requirements (federal  requirements) for PHAs’ criminal history policies, we reviewed federal  statutes and HUD regulations for the public housing and HCV programs  on providing housing assistance to persons with criminal history records  and arrest warrants, including fugitive felons. In addition, to obtain  information about the implementation of federal requirements, we  interviewed officials from HUD headquarters and five HUD field offices  and 10 PHAs in four selected metropolitan areas: Chicago, Dallas/Ft.  Worth, New York City, and Philadelphia. In selecting these areas, we  considered, among other things, the sizes of the PHAs (measured by the  number of units), geographic location, and the proximity of HUD field  offices and HUD OIG regional offices to each other. We selected two or  three PHAs to visit in each of the four areas, resulting in a  nongeneralizable sample of 10 PHAs. We selected these PHAs based on  factors that included their size, presence of both public housing and HCV  programs, and geographic location (for example, urban or nonurban  location). We selected HUD field offices by determining which field office  oversees each of the selected PHAs.

To determine the extent to which HUD provides guidance and monitors  PHA implementation of criminal history policy requirements, we reviewed  HUD guidance (letters, notices, and program guidebooks) for the public  housing and HCV programs. We interviewed officials from the 10 selected  PHAs for their perspectives on HUD’s guidance. We also reviewed HUD’s  procedures for monitoring PHAs, specifically those that review PHA  compliance with federal requirements on providing housing assistance to  persons with criminal history records. We interviewed officials from HUD  headquarters and our sample of five HUD field offices about the agency’s  efforts to monitor and oversee PHAs’ implementation of criminal history  policy requirements. We assessed HUD’s guidance and compliance  procedures in relation to federal statutes, HUD regulations concerning  criminal history policies, and internal control standards.

To determine the extent to which the HUD OIG, in coordination with law  enforcement agencies, implements and monitors the Fugitive Felon  Initiative, we reviewed agreements between the HUD OIG and the FBI  and between the HUD OIG and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). We  reviewed HUD OIG’s Standard Operating Procedure for the Fugitive  Felon Initiative and interviewed officials from the FBI, HUD OIG, and  USMS headquarters to obtain information on the processes these  agencies follow as part of the initiative. We also interviewed officials from  all seven HUD OIG Office of Investigation regional offices and relevant  USMS Fugitive Task Forces in our four selected metro areas (see above).  We assessed the HUD OIG’s and the FBI’s activities in relation to their  interagency agreement, OIG’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for  the Fugitive Felon Initiative, and federal internal control standards. In  addition, we collected and analyzed data on the results of HUD OIG’s  2017 efforts to cross-reference HUD tenant data and the FBI’s Wanted  Persons File (sent to the HUD OIG in September 2016) to identify  potential investigative leads into the possible location of fugitive felons.  Specifically, we summarized the types of offenses related to the potential  investigative leads by grouping similar offenses together and identified  the top 10 most frequently occurring offenses.

To assess the reliability of the HUD OIG data we interviewed  knowledgeable agency officials, conducted electronic testing for missing  data and obvious errors, observed HUD OIG’s process for cross- referencing HUD tenant data and the FBI’s Wanted Persons File, and  reviewed system documentation for the relevant data systems. We  determined these data to be reliable for our purposes of reporting on the  number of potential investigative leads, including by type of offense and  associated HUD rental assistance program. We also reviewed FBI data  on the results of law enforcement agencies (as reported to the FBI from  fiscal years 2013 through 2017) in apprehending fugitive felons based on  potential investigative leads produced by the initiative. To assess the  reliability of the FBI data we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials  and reviewed documentation for the related FBI data system. We  determined these data to be reliable for our purposes of describing the  number of apprehensions resulting from the potential investigative leads  identified as part of the Fugitive Felon Initiative. Further details on our  scope and methodology appear in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to August 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher Programs

HUD administers its public housing and HCV programs—which serve  eligible low- and very-low income households, the elderly, and persons  with disabilities—through local PHAs. PHAs are typically municipal,  county, or state agencies created under state law to develop and manage  public housing units for low-income families. PHAs that participate in the  programs contract with HUD to provide housing in exchange for federal  grants and subsidies. In total, there were 3,825 PHAs as of December  2017, according to HUD data. PHAs may administer both public housing  and HCV programs.

HUD’s public housing program provides low-rent housing units to over 1  million eligible households. According to HUD, the majority of PHAs  (approximately 3,300 of the 3,825 PHAs) across the country take part in  its public housing program. These PHAs own and manage public housing  properties, which can include high-rise and low-rise buildings, scattered  single family properties, or be part of mixed-income housing  developments. Some PHAs manage public housing programs with less  than 100 units and others manage programs with more than 30,000 units.  For the public housing program, PHAs handle admissions, calculate  rents, and enforce leases, among other duties. Under the terms of their  contracts with HUD, PHAs agree to administer their properties according  to federal statute and HUD regulations, and in exchange they receive  funding from HUD. These statutes and regulations provide PHAs with  more discretion in developing certain policies, such as parts of the  admissions process, and less discretion in developing other policies, such  as the income determination process. PHAs are required to develop plans  that describe their policies through a process that allows for—and  responds to—community feedback.

Approximately 2,200 PHAs across the country are responsible for  managing the day-to-day operations of the HCV program, including  determining the eligibility of households, approving applications, and  distributing vouchers. The HCV program subsidizes housing costs for  approximately 2.2 million households in the private rental market as of  March 2018, according to HUD officials. In the HCV program, participants  are able to find their own housing within the PHA’s jurisdiction, including  most single-family homes, townhouses, and apartments. If the household  moves out of the unit, it can move with continued assistance to another  private rental unit. PHAs are required to state their admissions policies  within their administrative plans and make these plans publically  available.

HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) is responsible for  implementing HUD’s public housing and HCV programs, among others.  Forty-five PIH field offices across the country are charged with overseeing  PHAs’ compliance with HUD rules. Within PIH, the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary for Public Housing and Voucher Programs develops  national policy, allocates funding, and provides program direction for  public housing and HCV programs. The Office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary for Field Operations oversees the field offices. Figure 1 shows  the organizational chart for selected HUD divisions with responsibilities  related to public housing and HCV programs.

HUD OIG operates independently within HUD and reports to the Office of  the Secretary. The OIG conducts audits, evaluations, and investigations  to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and promotes effective  and efficient government operations. The HUD OIG Office of  Investigations conducts work through a headquarters office and seven  regional offices. The Office of Investigations initiates investigations about  possible violations of laws or regulations in the administration of HUD  programs and activities, or misconduct on the part of HUD employees or  recipients of HUD funds.

The HUD OIG Office of Investigations began the Fugitive Felon Initiative  in fiscal year 2003, in response to a request from USMS and one of our  prior recommendations. The Initiative began as a data-sharing effort  between HUD OIG and USMS to identify fugitives that may be living in  HUD-assisted housing. According to HUD OIG officials, the data-sharing  responsibilities were transferred from USMS to the FBI in 2004. This  initiative has been governed by three memoranda of understanding  (MOU). Specifically, a 2002 MOU between HUD OIG and USMS facilitated sharing USMS a 2004 MOU between HUD OIG and the FBI established a process to  share a larger set of warrant data from federal, state, and local law  enforcement agencies; and a 2012 MOU between HUD OIG and the FBI clarified the purposes of  the Fugitive Felon Initiative and the roles of HUD OIG and the FBI.

For the purposes of this report, we refer to the Fugitive Felon Initiative as  the data-sharing effort between HUD OIG and the FBI to locate and  apprehend fugitives. The term “Fugitive Felon Initiative,” however, is HUD  OIG’s name for the program. The FBI participates in the data-sharing  efforts with HUD OIG through the FBI’s Fugitive Identification Notice  Delivery project. This project leverages FBI data-sharing with a small  number of federal agencies, including HUD, to identify the possible  location of fugitives.

The Fugitive Felon Initiative is a law enforcement initiative, and it  operates separately from PHA processes for conducting criminal history  screenings to determine eligibility for housing assistance. Consistent with  the 2002 and 2004 MOUs, the 2012 MOU states that the primary purpose  of the Fugitive Felon Initiative is to apprehend fugitives and the secondary  purpose is for HUD OIG to investigate, identify, and refer for prosecution  the fraudulent receipt of HUD benefits. The Fugitive Felon Initiative  includes HUD programs administered by PHAs—including public housing  and HCV—as well as additional HUD programs not administered by  PHAs.

Through the Fugitive Felon Initiative, the HUD OIG leverages FBI and  HUD data to identify potential investigative leads into the possible location  of fugitives. The FBI shares with the HUD OIG nationwide data on felony  and misdemeanor warrants from the FBI’s Wanted Persons File. The  Wanted Persons File is included in the FBI’s National Crime Information  Center (NCIC) database. The HUD OIG also accesses data from HUD’s  Public and Indian Housing Information Center (PIC) system and Tenant  Rental Assistance Certification System (TRACS). These systems  maintain data on tenants who receive housing assistance. The HUD OIG  then cross-references the FBI and HUD data to identify potential  investigative leads based on possible matches between these data  sources.

As shown in figure 2, after the FBI receives a list of potential investigative  leads from the HUD OIG, the FBI is to verify that warrants associated with  the leads remain active because some warrants may have been resolved  during the period of time the HUD OIG cross-referenced the FBI and HUD  data. For example, a warrant may no longer be active if the individual  associated with the warrant was already arrested or if the case involving  the warrant was dismissed. For warrants that remain active, the FBI  disseminates these investigative leads by sending “lead letters” to the federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies that entered the warrant  into NCIC. These lead letters provide information, such as a possible  address for an individual with the outstanding warrant. HUD OIG also  disseminates potential investigative leads to its regional offices.

HUD OIG regions may assist law enforcement in apprehending a fugitive  or make referrals to PHAs to take administrative action against a tenant.  This referral informs the PHA that one of its tenants may be a fugitive or  has been apprehended. To ensure law enforcement agencies have  sufficient time to apprehend wanted persons, the 2012 MOU states that  HUD OIG regions must wait 60 days after law enforcement agencies  have received the investigative leads before making referrals to PHAs.  PHAs then have discretion about whether to take administrative action  against the tenant to terminate assistance.

Federal Statutes and HUD Regulations Include Requirements for PHAs’ Criminal History Policies but Some Also Provide Discretion

Federal Statutes and HUD Regulations Require PHAs to Conduct Criminal Background Checks and Mandate Denial of Housing Assistance for Certain Offenses

PHAs must follow federal statutes and HUD regulations (federal  requirements) in determining eligibility for public housing and HCV  assistance for persons with criminal history records. These requirements  include the following:  Conducting criminal background checks for program applicants. PHAs  are required to conduct criminal background checks on all applicants to  the public housing and HCV programs. PHAs must conduct these checks  in the state where the housing is located and also check for criminal  history records in other states where the applicant and members of the  applicant’s household are known to have resided. When recertifying  tenants, PHAs are not required to conduct criminal background checks.  According to HUD officials, there are barriers to conducting background  checks when recertifying tenants such as limited staff resources and cost  constraints.

Obtaining sufficient evidence of criminal activity. In November 2015,  HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing issued a notice on the use of  arrest records and other issues related to denying and terminating  housing assistance for individuals who have engaged in criminal  activity. The notice stated that the fact that an individual was arrested is  not sufficient evidence that the individual engaged in criminal activity and  informed PHAs that arrest records could not be used as the basis for  denying admissions, terminating assistance, or evicting tenants. In a  Frequently Asked Questions document pertaining to the notice, HUD  advised PHAs to review their plans and revise their policies, as needed,  to comply with the Notice. PHAs may use other forms of evidence such  as conviction records, police records, or witness statements to determine  whether the individual engaged in disqualifying criminal activity. The  notice also reminded PHAs that their policies and procedures for  screening applicants and eviction or termination of assistance must  comply with the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act, and that  inconsistent application of standards or decisions based on partial or  inaccurate information (such as arrest record information) may result in  liability under these laws.

Establishing a process that allows applicants and tenants to dispute  adverse information. PHAs must provide applicants and tenants with  notification and the opportunity to dispute the accuracy and relevance of a  criminal record before denying admission or terminating assistance on the  basis of such a record.

Denying or terminating assistance for certain types of criminal-related  offenses. HUD regulations mandate that PHAs deny admission to the  public housing and HCV programs for six types of offenses, two of which  require lifetime bans on admissions. Specifically, PHAs must permanently  ban admissions for individuals convicted of producing methamphetamine  on the premises of federally assisted housing and individuals subject to a lifetime registration requirement under a state sex offender program. For  the other four mandatory denials—which are related to illegal drug use,  drug-related crime, and alcohol abuse—PHAs have some discretion to  determine whether the offense applies to an applicant or household  member or to consider mitigating circumstances. While six offenses  require denial of admissions, only one of these offenses—the offense  related to methamphetamine production—also mandates termination of  assistance, as shown in table 1.

In addition, federal statute and HUD regulations require that PHAs include  certain offenses that are grounds for denial or termination in their policies,  but give PHAs discretion on when and how to act on them. For example,  PHAs can, but are not required to, terminate assistance for “fugitive  felons.” Table 1 provides a summary of criminal history-related  restrictions for the public housing and HCV programs.

PHAs Generally Have Discretion in Establishing Their Criminal History Policies

PHAs generally have discretion in establishing their specific criminal  history policies, apart from the specific federal requirements discussed  above. Below are examples of how policies vary among the 10 PHAs we  reviewed.

PHAs Have Discretion by Design   In the 1990s, Congress enacted legislation to  deregulate federal housing assistance  programs, which gave public housing  agencies broader discretion in establishing  their own policies for tenant selection, income  and rent, and administrative operations for the  public housing and Housing Choice Voucher  programs. This included discretion on policies  for screening applicants, denying admissions,  and terminating assistance.

Denials and terminations. PHAs may choose to deny or terminate  assistance for additional offenses that are not specifically listed in federal  requirements. All of the PHAs we reviewed had established policies to  deny admissions or terminate tenancy for additional offenses. For  example, in addition to the mandatory denials, one PHA had a written  policy to deny admission to public housing to applicants or household  members convicted of arson or child molestation and persons who  committed homicide, armed robbery, trafficking, or domestic violence in  the past 3 years. Another PHA would deny housing assistance if an  applicant, tenant, household member, or guest had ever committed  homicide, kidnapping, rape or sexual assault, indecency with a child, or  arson. According to selected PHA’s written policies, other offenses for  which PHAs may deny admission or terminate tenancy include selling,  producing, or manufacturing illegal substances; violent behavior; property  destruction; and fraud, bribery, or other crimes in connection with a  federally-assisted housing program.

Lookback periods. PHAs can establish periods of time before the  admission decision during which an applicant must not have engaged in  certain types of criminal activity, such as drug-related or violent crimes,  known as lookback periods. Based on our interviews with selected PHAs,  lookback periods generally ranged from 2 years to 7 years but were  sometimes longer for offenses such as homicide or assault. For example,  one PHA had a policy to deny housing assistance to individuals who have  committed manslaughter, robbery, illegal possession of a firearm or  deadly weapon, assault, or physical violence to persons or property within  a 5-year period. Another PHA had a 5-year lookback period for felony  convictions for burglary; a 10-year lookback period for felony convictions  for assault, kidnapping, abduction, forcible sex, or arson; and a 20-year  lookback period for convictions for first degree murder, according to its  screening criteria for the public housing and HCV programs. Some PHAs  began the lookback period on the date of the conviction, and others on  the date the offense occurred.

Representatives of three PHAs we interviewed said that they had revised  their policies in the past 5 years to reduce their lookback periods. For  example, from 2013 through 2016, one PHA reduced its lookback period  for all offenses first from 10 years to 7 years, and then finally to 3 years.  The officials said their neighborhood had a high incarceration rate and  they wanted to give second chances to ex-offenders. Officials from  another PHA said that in 2016, they changed their lookback period from  10 years to 5 years at the suggestion of their new deputy director.

Use of arrest records. According to HUD’s 2015 guidance, PHAs cannot  rely on arrest records to determine eligibility for housing assistance.  However, they may still review arrest records and may make an adverse  housing decision based on the conduct underlying an arrest if the conduct  indicates that the individual is not suitable for tenancy and the PHA has  sufficient evidence (in addition to the arrest record) that the individual  engaged in the conduct. Officials from 9 of the 10 PHAs said that they  did not rely on arrest records to determine eligibility for assistance.  Officials from the remaining PHA told us they have used arrest records as  the basis for denying assistance for certain offenses and believed they  complied with HUD’s notice on the use of arrest records by providing the  applicant or tenant the right to appeal the denial or termination.

Of the 9 PHAs that did not rely on arrest records for determining eligibility  for assistance, officials at 5 PHAs indicated that they obtained and  reviewed information on arrest records, but that they did not take action to  deny assistance or terminate tenancy based on an arrest record. Officials  at 1 PHA stated that they only took action based on conviction records  and officials at another PHA stated they do not use arrest records at all in  making eligibility determinations. For cases where an applicant has  charges pending, officials at 2 PHAs said that they may wait for the case  to be closed prior to making an eligibility determination.

Consideration of mitigating circumstances and other factors. PHAs  sometimes consider mitigating circumstances for applicants or tenants  who may otherwise be denied housing assistance. Officials from PHAs  we interviewed took different approaches to allowing mitigating  circumstances and other factors. For example, officials from one PHA  said that it always considered mitigating circumstances and requested  such information as part of the application process. Officials at another  PHA said that after a denial letter is sent, applicants can provide evidence  of mitigating circumstances during the appeals process. Another PHA’s  officials said that in making eligibility decisions, they considered the  severity of the crime and whether the individual completed rehabilitation.  As allowed by federal requirements, some PHAs included in their policies  factors to consider when determining whether or not to deny or terminate  housing assistance. For example, one PHA’s policy stated that in  making such determinations it considers several factors such as the  seriousness of the case and the effects that denying assistance may have  on other household members or the community. Officials from another  PHA said that they allowed public housing residents to preserve their  tenancy on the condition that the offending household member is  permanently excluded from the public housing unit.

Selected PHAs’ Coordination with Local  Law Enforcement   Officials we interviewed at 10 public housing  agencies (PHA) said they coordinated with  local law enforcement as part of their efforts to  address criminal activity in public housing.  Two PHAs have their own police departments.   Three PHAs said that local police officers  patrol their public housing properties and  inform the PHA if there are any issues related  to criminal activity. Officials at one of the  larger PHAs we interviewed said that staff  check arrest reports every night to see if any  crimes were committed by their tenants.  Officials at another PHA said that they had  off-duty police officers regularly patrol their  public housing properties and had security  cameras on their properties that are  monitored by local police.

Timing and Frequency of Background Checks. In addition to federal  requirements to conduct criminal background checks at time of  application, PHAs may also choose to conduct such checks as part of an  annual recertification process for persons already receiving rental  assistance. Officials from 3 of the 10 PHAs we interviewed said that they  conducted background checks on tenants during the recertification  process. In addition, officials from 3 other PHAs said that they may  conduct background checks if issues arise during a person’s tenancy or  at any time. Officials from the other 4 PHAs we interviewed did not  provide additional details on conducting tenant background checks.

Methods Used to Obtain Criminal History Information. Federal statute and  HUD regulations authorize PHAs to obtain criminal history information  from law enforcement agencies. HUD has also recognized that PHAs  may obtain this information through other means. HUD officials at one  regional office estimated that most of the PHAs under their purview use  private companies to obtain criminal history information. Of the 10 PHAs  we interviewed, 6 said that they hired private screening companies to  provide the PHA with a criminal history report for an applicant or tenant.

Criminal History Records and Data Quality  Challenges  The completeness and accuracy of criminal  history information is a known and persistent  challenge for state and federal agencies and  private companies that compile and sell this  information to entities such as employers and  public housing agencies.    In its 2015 notice on the use of arrest records,  the Department of Housing and Urban  Development (HUD) affirmed its commitment  to the goal of ensuring that individuals are not  denied access to HUD-subsidized housing on  the basis of inaccurate, incomplete, or  otherwise unreliable evidence of criminal  conduct.  In addition, the Federal Interagency  Reentry Council, of which HUD is a  participating agency, reported that it plans to  take steps to address widespread  inaccuracies in criminal records, and that it  would work with consumer reporting agencies  to develop best practices for improving the  accuracy of criminal records.

Officials from one of the selected PHAs we interviewed said that the  housing authority’s police department conducted the criminal background  check and determined whether to approve or deny the applicant based on  the results, consulting with the PHA if needed. Officials at two PHAs said  a local law enforcement agency or state agency did the initial criminal  background check to determine if the applicant has a criminal record, and  if so, a private screening company may obtain the individual’s detailed  criminal record. Another PHA said that their staff used state databases to  conduct criminal background checks.

HUD Has Not Yet Updated Its Guidebooks for PHAs with Newer Criminal History Policy Guidance, and Its Compliance Reviews Do Not Address Some Requirements

HUD Has Not Yet Updated Its Guidebooks to Reflect New Criminal History Policy Guidance

As of mid-May 2018, HUD officials stated that they were in the process of  updating HUD’s HCV Program Guidebook and Public Housing  Occupancy Guidebook (guidebooks), including updating sections of these  guidebooks with new criminal history policies. However, the  documentation HUD provided on these updates did not specifically  address criminal history policies. The guidebooks serve as key reference  documents and are designed to advise PHAs on the administration of the  HCV and public housing programs, but have not been revised since 2001  and 2003, respectively. From 2011 through 2016, HUD issued notices  and other documents that urged PHAs to move away from policies that  deny admissions or tenancy to anyone who has engaged in criminal  activity, and instead to seek policies that strike a balance between  resident safety and the reentry needs of formerly incarcerated individuals  and others with criminal history records.

In 2011, the Secretary of HUD issued a letter to PHAs encouraging  them to allow ex-offenders to rejoin their families in the public housing  or HCV programs when appropriate. The letter reminded PHAs that  they have broad discretion to set admission and termination policies  for the public housing and HCV programs, aside from the federal  requirements. The letter also reminded PHAs that they have  discretion to consider other factors such as evidence of rehabilitation  or participation in social service programs when screening applicants  for suitability.

HUD issued a notice in 2012 recommending that PHAs terminate the  tenancy of persons living in federally assisted housing who were  erroneously admitted while subject to a state lifetime sex offender  registration requirement or who commit sex offenses while living in  federally assisted housing. HUD recommended that PHAs ask at the  time of annual recertification whether any member of the household is  subject to a state lifetime sex offender registration program in any  state. If the PHA finds that a member of the household engages in  criminal activity, including sex offenses, while living in HUD-assisted  housing, the PHA should pursue termination of tenancy, according to  the notice.

As previously discussed, HUD issued a notice on criminal history  policies and the use of arrest records in 2015, stating that the fact that  an individual was arrested is not sufficient evidence that the individual  engaged in criminal activity. In addition, the notice stated that HUD  does not require the adoption of “one strike” policies (for example,  policies that deny admissions or tenancy to anyone who has engaged  in criminal activity), and that in most cases PHAs have discretion to  determine whether to deny admission or terminate assistance to  applicants or households with criminal history records.

In 2016, the HUD Office of General Counsel issued a document  indicating that policies that exclude individuals based on arrests do  not satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s burden of proof. The document  further stated that housing providers should consider factors such as  the type of crime and the length of time since conviction when making  housing decisions based on criminal history records.

As of mid-May 2018, HCV and public housing guidebooks were outdated  because they did not reflect the letters and notices cited above. HUD has  not updated the guidebooks in more than 15 years because they do not  frequently update these documents. For example, according to HUD’s  website, the 2003 Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook is the first  update in over 20 years. We reported previously that HUD had struggled  to maintain up-to-date and complete policies and procedures across its  management functions. In March 2018, HUD officials told us they had  begun the process of updating their HCV and public housing guidebooks,  noting that PHAs have requested such an update. HUD officials said the  eligibility chapters of the updated guidebooks will reflect the notices that  HUD has provided to PHAs in recent years on criminal history policies.  However, we requested documentation on HUD’s planned updates and  the information we received did not clearly indicate that the new criminal  history guidance would be incorporated into the guidebooks.

Federal internal control standards state that management should  communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s  objectives. This can include ensuring appropriate means of  communicating with external parties. Effective communications can take  many forms, including guidance. By updating its HCV and public housing  guidebooks to reflect newer criminal history guidance, HUD can ensure  that these guidebooks serve as consolidated and up-to-date references  for PHAs that accurately communicate HUD’s current guidance on  criminal history policies.

HUD’s Reviews for Some High-Risk PHAs Do Not Comprehensively Address Criminal History Policies

HUD reviews the criminal history policies for the small number of PHAs it  designates as high risk or very-high risk, but these reviews do not  address all related federal requirements or their implementation. Using its  National Risk Assessment, HUD designates each PHA on a quarterly  basis as low, moderate, high, or very-high risk. The assessment uses  quantitative and qualitative data sources to identify, mitigate, prevent, and  anticipate potential risk in five categories: financial, physical, governance,  management risks, and risks to the HCV program. This assessment does  not include specific metrics related to PHAs’ criminal history policies,  according to HUD officials. HUD uses the results to direct field staff  resources towards higher-risk PHAs, such as providing these PHAs with  technical assistance or conducting compliance reviews.

HUD Field Staff May Have Cause to Review  PHAs’ Criminal History Policies for  Various Reasons    Outside of the Department of Housing and  Urban Development’s (HUD) Compliance  Monitoring Checklist, HUD field staff may  have cause to review a PHA’s criminal history  policies for other reasons. Those reasons  include complaints from applicants who were  denied assistance for criminal history reasons  or low occupancy rates, which could indicate  that people do not want to live in particular  public housing complexes for safety reasons,  or that a PHA’s screening policies may be too  stringent. HUD may also review a PHA’s  criminal history policies through the annual  plan submission process. According to HUD  officials, about one-third of PHAs are required  to submit annual plans, which describe PHAs’  policies governing resident or tenant eligibility,  and selection and admission, among other  policies.

Although HUD does not routinely monitor PHAs’ compliance with federal  requirements on criminal history policies, it does evaluate some aspects  of compliance for those high-risk and very-high-risk PHAs that receive a  compliance review. To conduct these compliance reviews, field staff use  HUD’s Compliance Monitoring Checklist (checklist). The checklist, which  was first piloted in 2016 among six PHAs, contains six questions field  staff must cover that directly relate to PHAs’ criminal history policies.  These include questions on the PHA’s policies for denying applicants for  drug-related criminal activity and checking states’ sex offender registry  lists. In 2017, HUD expanded the use of the checklist to 74 high-risk and  very-high-risk PHAs. For 2018 reviews, HUD officials stated that each of  HUD’s 45 field offices will be required to use the checklist for at least one  high-risk PHA in their portfolio, meaning the checklist will be applied to at  least 45 PHAs out of 626 PHAs designated as high risk and very-high risk  (out of a total of 3,825 PHAs as of December 2017), according to HUD  officials. HUD field offices can choose to use the checklist at more than  one PHA, according to HUD officials. Prior to this checklist, HUD officials  said HUD field staff collected information on PHAs’ criminal history  policies through HUD’s Rental Integrity Monitoring reviews by which HUD  field office staff collect and analyze PHA income and rent information,  identify income and rent errors, and assess PHA policies and procedures  in both the public housing and HCV programs. However, HUD no longer  required these reviews after 2006, though field staff may still conduct  them, according to HUD officials.

As shown in table 2, the checklist generally directs field staff to obtain a  copy of a PHA’s written policies related to criminal history. For two of the  six questions, field staff are also directed to review supporting materials  and interview PHA staff, but for the other four questions, no additional  information must be obtained. According to HUD officials, field staff who  conduct the reviews are experienced and know to obtain additional  information even if it is not listed in the checklist guidance. Officials stated  that the checklist was not intended to be a step-by-step guide.

HUD’s checklist does not include items to assess PHAs’ compliance with  additional aspects of PHAs’ criminal history policies. As shown in table 2,  the checklist includes specific items related to federal requirements on  drug-related criminal activity, sex offenders, and convictions for  methamphetamine production for which PHAs are required to deny  admissions for public housing and HCV programs. The checklist,  however, does not cover the requirement related to the abuse of alcohol.

In addition, HUD’s checklist also does not address the requirement that  PHAs may not use arrest records as the basis for denying or terminating  assistance. Officials from 8 of the 10 PHAs we interviewed stated that  they were already implementing policies or changed their policies to  follow HUD’s notice on arrest records. However, we found that 1 of the 2  remaining PHAs we interviewed had not yet updated its written policies,  though officials at this PHA said they did not base any decisions on arrest  records in practice. The other PHA’s policies state that a record of  arrest(s) will not be used as the basis for the denial or proof that the  applicant engaged in disqualifying criminal activity, but officials from this  PHA said that they did use arrest records as the basis for denying  assistance to persons. Specifically, PHA officials stated that they based  assistance decisions on records of arrest for drug-related or violent  activity if the arrest had not been dismissed, had not reached disposition,  and occurred within the last 5 years. Officials from this PHA said that they  comply with HUD’s 2015 notice by providing the applicant the right to  appeal a denial or termination (officials said that appeals by applicants  are rare).

HUD’s checklist instructions direct Office of Public and Indian Housing  (PIH) field staff to note regulatory violations that they observe when  conducting compliance reviews using the checklist. However, officials in  HUD headquarters stated that they could not provide information on any  regulatory violations related to PHAs’ criminal history policies specifically  because they have aggregate results from the 2017 checklist reviews,  which do not specify the type of compliance issues identified by field staff.  As a result, violations related to criminal history policies would be  included under the general categories of PHA’s Admissions and  Continued Occupancy Policies (for public housing) or Administrative  Plans (for HCV). In addition, none of the HUD staff we interviewed from  July through December 2017 from five of HUD’s field offices discussed  any instances of noncompliance specifically related to PHAs’ criminal  history policies. Field staff we interviewed identified a range of potential  actions they might take if they found that a PHA’s criminal history policies  did not meet HUD’s requirements. These actions could include providing  technical assistance to the PHA, requiring the PHA to make corrective  actions within a specified time frame, or requiring the PHA to rescreen  applicants.

HUD is required by law to assess the performance of PHAs in all major  areas of management operations, including implementing effective  screening and eviction policies and other anticrime strategies. In  addition, federal internal control standards indicate that management  should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to  risks. However, HUD’s checklist does not address PHAs’ criminal  history policies in a comprehensive manner. For example, it generally  does not require field staff to go beyond reviewing written policies and  obtaining additional information on how the policies are being  implemented. In addition, field staff are not required to address some  federal requirements, such as PHAs’ use of arrest records. According to  agency officials, HUD issued the arrest record notice in response to  information indicating that PHAs were basing denial decisions on whether  an individual had been arrested, which is not sufficient evidence of  criminal activity. In our interviews of 10 selected PHAs, as discussed  above, officials from one PHA described practices that were not in line  with its written policy on the use of arrest records. Specifically, the  officials stated that they make housing assistance decisions based on  arrest records though their policies state they will not. Another PHA had  not updated its written policy to reflect its practice of not basing decisions  on arrest records. HUD officials stated that, due to resource issues, they  developed the checklist to address high-risk areas, but that they planned  to review the checklist again after the guidebooks are updated. By  reviewing the checklist to determine what additional criminal history policy  requirements should be included and revising the checklist instructions to  direct staff to obtain information on PHAs’ implementation of criminal  history policy requirements, HUD could improve its ability to identify areas  of noncompliance. Noncompliance, according to HUD’s public housing  guidebook, could lead to admission of ineligible families or unlawful  discrimination.

The Fugitive Felon Initiative Has Led to Apprehensions, but Its Implementation and Program Oversight Have Been Inconsistent

The HUD OIG Identified and Shared Potential Leads on Locations of Fugitives with the FBI

Through the Fugitive Felon Initiative, the HUD OIG and the FBI have  shared information that has produced thousands of potential investigative  leads on the location of fugitives who may live in HUD-assisted housing.  From May through June 2017, the HUD OIG identified approximately  18,000 potential investigative leads using FBI warrant data from  September 2016, according to HUD OIG officials and FBI data. The  HUD OIG identified these leads by cross-referencing the approximately  2.4 million felony and misdemeanor warrants in the FBI’s Wanted  Persons File with the approximately 10.6 million records in HUD’s PIC  and TRACS data systems. Cross-referencing involves identifying  corresponding records within the FBI and HUD data that show the same  or similar names, the same date of birth, and the same sex. A HUD OIG  official stated that this process is designed to be overly inclusive to  minimize the risk of missing a potential investigative lead. In addition,  because the Fugitive Felon Initiative uses data from HUD tenant files,  fugitives who live in HUD-assisted housing but are not listed on the rental  agreement would not be identified through this process, according to  HUD OIG officials.

As part of its activities under the Fugitive Felon Initiative, after cross- referencing the FBI and HUD data, the HUD OIG distributed potential  investigative leads to HUD OIG regional offices and the FBI. According  to HUD OIG officials, the list of potential investigative leads they sent to  HUD OIG regional offices only included extraditable warrants for felony  offenses. The FBI did not verify these potential investigative leads to  determine if the warrants remained active. The list of potential  investigative leads the HUD OIG sent to its regional offices differed from  the list of leads the FBI distributed to law enforcement agencies.  Specifically, the investigative leads the FBI distributed to law enforcement  agencies contained only extraditable warrants for both felony and  misdemeanor offenses that the FBI verified remained active, according to  FBI officials.

According to our analysis of HUD OIG data, many of the potential  investigative leads the HUD OIG sent to its regional offices involved  nonviolent offenses, though a small percentage included crimes such as  assault or homicide. Specifically, from May through June 2017, the HUD  OIG sent 4,814 potential investigative leads (about 27 percent of the  approximately 18,000 potential investigative leads) to its regional offices.  As shown in table 3, about one-third of these leads were for failure to  appear in court or probation violations—the two most frequently occurring  offenses.

According to FBI officials, once they electronically receive the list of  potential investigative leads from the HUD OIG, their system  automatically removes potential leads when either (1) the warrant  associated with the lead is no longer active or (2) the warrant associated  with the lead is not extraditable. A warrant would no longer be active if an  arrest or other warrant resolution occurred between the time the FBI sent  the Wanted Persons File to the HUD OIG and the time the HUD OIG  returned the list of potential investigative leads to the FBI. An investigative  lead would not be extraditable if the fugitive’s address fell outside of the  geographic extradition area. According to HUD OIG officials, the HUD  OIG sent the FBI approximately 18,000 potential investigative leads in  2017. FBI data show that the warrants associated with 9,415 of these  leads remained active once the FBI received the leads. Of the potential  leads with active warrants, FBI data show that 4,957 of the warrants were  extraditable and active. According to FBI officials, they sent lead letters— which notify law enforcement agencies of the possible location of a  fugitive who may be receiving HUD assistance—for the leads associated  with the extraditable warrants that remained active to the relevant law  enforcement agency. Lead letters include information from HUD tenant  data and the associated warrant, such as name, date of birth, Social  Security number, warrant number, date of the lead, and a possible  address for the individual.

The FBI’s Investigative Lead Letters Facilitated Apprehensions

The FBI’s investigative lead letters have led to over 1,200 fugitive  apprehensions from fiscal years 2013 through 2017 as a result of the  Fugitive Felon Initiative. FBI data show that the FBI sent lead letters to  law enforcement agencies for active, extraditable warrants each time the  FBI received a list of potential investigative leads from the HUD OIG from  fiscal years 2013 through 2017. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the  FBI sent approximately 45,100 lead letters to law enforcement agencies  for extraditable warrants that remained active (out of approximately  66,000 total potential investigative leads FBI data show it received from  the HUD OIG during this time period, which included extraditable and  nonextraditable active warrants).

Law enforcement agencies provide information to the FBI on the  disposition of most warrants associated with lead letters. According to FBI  officials, when the FBI provides a lead letter to law enforcement agencies,  it includes an optional questionnaire on the disposition of the warrant.  Law enforcement agencies return the questionnaire about 75 percent of  the time, according to FBI data. Data from these questionnaires show that  law enforcement agencies reported 1,260 fugitive apprehensions that  were facilitated by information from the Fugitive Felon Initiative from fiscal  years 2013 through 2017. Lead letters do not always result in  apprehensions. For example, law enforcement agencies may have  resolved the outstanding warrant through a separate investigation, been  unable to locate the subject of the warrant, or decided to not extradite a  subject located in another state, according to FBI data. There may also  be additional apprehensions that occurred without the FBI’s knowledge if  the law enforcement agency apprehended an individual but did not return  the disposition questionnaire to the FBI.

From fiscal years 2013 through 2016, law enforcement agencies reported  numbers of apprehensions resulting from the Fugitive Felon Initiative  ranging from 254 to 339 each year (see table 4). However, in fiscal year  2017, law enforcement agencies reported a substantial decrease in  apprehensions to 77. FBI officials stated that this decrease was a direct  result of the decrease in the frequency and speed with which the HUD  OIG cross-referenced HUD and FBI data and provided potential leads to  the FBI. Specifically, the HUD OIG did not cross-reference data for over a  year during fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and the HUD OIG did not return  the results to the FBI for 10 months after receiving warrant data from the  FBI in September 2016, which resulted in many warrants no longer being  active, according to FBI officials. HUD OIG officials stated that the lag in  returning potential investigative leads to the FBI in July 2017 was due to  staff turnover. HUD OIG officials stated they are developing a process so  that staff turnover will not prevent the HUD OIG from cross-referencing  the data in the future.

Of the 77 apprehensions in fiscal year 2017 based on the HUD OIG’s  potential investigative leads, our analyses showed that many were for  nonviolent offenses. Specifically, about 57 percent were for failure to  appear in court or probation violations. The next most frequent offenses  included larceny, fraud, dangerous drugs, harassing communication,  parole violation, and contempt of court. These offenses made up  approximately 25 percent of all apprehensions.

The HUD OIG Has Revised Its SOP to Address Inconsistent Regional Office Participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative

Participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative among the HUD OIG’s  regional offices was inconsistent and declined from fiscal years 2012  through 2016. In April 2018, the HUD OIG revised its Standard Operating  Procedure (SOP) for the Fugitive Felon Initiative to define regional office  responsibilities, improve consistency among regional offices’ participation,  and leverage the FBI’s efforts.

The inconsistent participation of HUD OIG regional offices in the Fugitive  Felon Initiative resulted from changes in HUD OIG investigative priorities,  inconsistent data-sharing from HUD OIG headquarters, and resource  constraints:  Change in agency priorities. According to HUD OIG officials, beginning  in 2012, the HUD Inspector General prioritized investigations that would  have significant financial effects, such as fraud committed by PHA  employees. Subsequently, four of the seven HUD OIG regional offices did  not participate in the Fugitive Felon Initiative from 2012 through 2016,  according to regional officials, while the other three regional offices  participated by following-up on at least some of the potential investigative  leads.

In addition, most HUD OIG regional offices stopped participating in USMS  fugitive task forces after 2012. Specifically, officials in six of the seven  regional offices said that before 2012, they coordinated with or  participated in USMS task forces to investigate potential leads they  received from HUD OIG headquarters. An agent in one regional office  who participated as a member on the USMS Regional Fugitive Task  Force said that he gathered additional information on fugitives from law  enforcement and assisted in the apprehension of fugitives. According to  officials in that region, they stopped participating in the task force in 2012.  Similarly, officials in four other regional offices that coordinated with or  participated in USMS fugitive task forces either did not receive the data  from HUD OIG headquarters after 2012 or stated that they discontinued  their formal involvement in the USMS task forces around 2012. Officials in  the sixth regional office stated that they continue to interact with the  USMS fugitive task force. Officials in the seventh regional office reported  not working with USMS on fugitive apprehensions. Officials we  interviewed from three USMS fugitive task forces confirmed their prior  interaction with three HUD OIG regions. According to HUD OIG and  USMS officials, the three HUD OIG regional offices stopped working with  the USMS fugitive task forces in 2005, 2012, and 2015, respectively. For  example, officials from one task force stated that a HUD OIG agent was  detailed to the task force until 2015 and provided them with related HUD  information to locate potential fugitives.

Inconsistent data-sharing. HUD OIG headquarters did not consistently  share potential investigative leads with all regional offices after 2012,  which affected their participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative. HUD OIG  headquarters did not track when it shared potential investigative leads  with its regional offices, but our interviews indicate that regional offices  did not consistently receive leads from HUD OIG headquarters. Officials  from three regional offices stated that they continued to receive data on  the potential leads from headquarters from 2012 through 2016, one  received data on the potential leads from 2012 through 2014, one  received the data upon request from 2012 through 2015, and two did not  receive the data after 2012. Of the three regional offices that received the  potential leads from 2012 through 2016, officials from two offices stated  that they conducted further investigations or coordinated with law  enforcement to pursue apprehensions of fugitives on at least some of the  potential leads.

Resource constraints. Resource constraints limited HUD OIG regional  office participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative, according to officials  from six of the seven regional offices. Officials from two of these regions  stated that their staff levels have been reduced in recent years, limiting  the resources available to address the hundreds of potential investigative  leads from HUD OIG headquarters. They noted that following up on  each lead was time-consuming, requiring agents to reenter warrant  information into NCIC, identify the law enforcement agency point of  contact, and call the agency to provide the potential location of the  wanted person. Officials from four regions that continued to receive the  potential investigative leads after 2012 stated that they investigated a  subset of leads, such as leads for violent offenses. Officials from another  region that continued to receive the leads after 2012 stated they did not  follow up on any of the leads they received due to work constraints.

In April 2018, the HUD OIG revised its SOP and added guidance for  regional office participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative. The prior  version of the SOP (issued in 2016) did not specifically define regional  activities. The 2018 SOP states that regional offices will be responsible  for verifying that the warrant associated with the potential investigative  lead is still active and coordinating with the law enforcement agency that  originally entered the warrant into NCIC. In addition, regional offices will  generally be required to conduct additional research by querying criminal  databases, referring leads to PHAs for administrative action, and  recording their efforts in the HUD OIG case management system.

The 2018 SOP states that based on resource and staffing levels, HUD  OIG regions may limit their participation in the Fugitive Felon Initiative to  only “priority” leads. According to HUD OIG headquarters officials,  regional offices are to follow up on priority leads by undertaking activities  listed in the 2018 SOP such as coordinating with law enforcement  agencies and referring leads to PHAs for administrative action. The  Prioritized Fugitive Felon List is defined as leads associated with warrants  for violent felonies, sexual assault, and narcotics distribution, as well as  other offenses that may affect the health and safety of housing residents,  children, national security, or law enforcement. The 2018 SOP also  details a new process in which HUD OIG headquarters will provide  regional offices with (1) the priority list of leads and (2) the nonpriority list  of leads, which includes all leads associated with extraditable felony  warrants not included in the priority list.

The 2018 SOP also states that the HUD OIG will cross-reference FBI and  HUD data twice each year and return the list of potential investigative  leads to the FBI before sending it to HUD OIG regional offices. As a new  step under the 2018 SOP, the FBI will verify whether each warrant on the  list is active before sending the list back to the HUD OIG, which according  to HUD OIG officials, is intended to reduce the number of leads with  inactive warrants provided to regional offices.

Because the HUD OIG only recently issued the new SOP, it is too early to  assess its effectiveness in enhancing regional office participation in the  Fugitive Felon Initiative.

The HUD OIG Has Reporting Requirements for the Fugitive Felon Initiative, but Does Not Plan to Collect or Assess Data on Some Key Aspects of Regional Implementation

The 2018 SOP includes some added requirements for HUD OIG  headquarters to track and report some statistics related to its regional  offices’ activities, but the HUD OIG does not plan to collect or assess data  on some activities listed in the 2018 SOP that HUD OIG officials stated  regional offices are required to undertake for the Prioritized Fugitive Felon  List. Under the 2018 SOP, HUD OIG headquarters will be responsible  for tracking and reporting statistics on the number of referrals, evictions,  PHA actions, and positive matches. However, the 2018 SOP does not  require the HUD OIG to track the extent to which its regional offices  undertake all the activities that HUD OIG officials stated regions are  required to undertake, such as contacting and coordinating with relevant  law enforcement agencies for the leads on the Prioritized Fugitive Felon  List.

The HUD OIG’s 2018 SOP states that the development and use of the  SOP is integral to a successful quality control system and that it provides  pertinent information needed to perform a required task properly by  facilitating consistency. Federal internal control standards state that  management should establish activities to monitor the internal control  system and evaluate results. HUD OIG headquarters officials stated that  they do not plan to collect or assess information on the extent to which  regional offices are implementing the new SOP because collecting such  information would be resource intensive. However, we believe the HUD  OIG could obtain more comprehensive information on its regional offices’  activities using current resources. For example, the 2018 SOP states that  HUD OIG regions are to create a subject profile in the case management  system on all confirmed hits. This indicates that the regions will track their  efforts to implement the new SOP. As a result, HUD OIG headquarters  could collect and assess this information on the extent to which regions  are implementing the new SOP through periodic data calls to its regional  offices. Collecting and assessing more comprehensive information would  better enable the HUD OIG to (1) determine the extent to which HUD OIG  regions are undertaking activities listed in the 2018 SOP, including  activities agency officials stated regions are required to undertake for the  leads on the “Prioritized Fugitive Felon List” and (2) identify any areas for  improvement. Such assessments of regional office efforts would also  inform HUD OIG headquarters of whether the new SOP is being  implemented as intended and consistently, which is particularly important  given the regions’ inconsistent participation in the initiative in the past.

The HUD OIG and the FBI Have Not Consistently Shared Results of the Initiative

The HUD OIG and the FBI have not consistently shared information on  the results of the Fugitive Felon Initiative or agreed on the type of  information that would be the most useful to share. The 2012 MOU for the  initiative states that (1) the FBI is to provide apprehension and other  fugitive felon statistics to the HUD OIG monthly and (2) the HUD OIG is to  provide apprehension information and estimated program savings to the  FBI every 30 days.

FBI Apprehension Data. Prior to 2012, the FBI shared aggregate data  on apprehensions that resulted from its lead letter process with the HUD  OIG, but stopped doing this at the request of the HUD OIG, according to  FBI officials. During our review and at the request of the HUD OIG, the  FBI resumed sharing information on apprehensions with the HUD OIG in  November 2017. However, rather than providing aggregate apprehension  statistics, the FBI provided individual disposition letters to the HUD OIG  on a weekly basis. While the disposition letters contain information on  apprehensions, HUD OIG officials stated that aggregate statistics would  better assist them in judging the effectiveness of the initiative.

HUD OIG Apprehension Data. HUD OIG headquarters has not tracked  the numbers of apprehensions of wanted persons under the initiative and  therefore has not shared this information with the FBI. HUD OIG officials  stated that it is not feasible for them to collect and share this information  with the FBI every month. The HUD OIG’s April 2018 SOP also states  that the HUD OIG will no longer share information on apprehensions with  the FBI. As of April 2018, FBI officials said that they were not aware of  any changes to the HUD OIG’s responsibilities for sharing apprehension  information under the 2012 MOU.

HUD OIG Program Savings Data. FBI data show that HUD OIG  headquarters has not shared program savings data with the FBI since  2012. HUD OIG headquarters officials stated that they do not currently  have a method for estimating program savings under the Fugitive Felon  Initiative although they have calculated program savings in the past. FBI  data show that the HUD OIG provided an estimate of program savings in  2012. The HUD OIG and the FBI have not agreed on whether sharing  information on program savings would be useful in implementing the  initiative. The 2012 MOU also does not specify for what purpose the HUD  OIG should share information on program savings with the FBI. FBI  officials stated, however, that if they received data on apprehensions and  program savings in the future, they would use this information to report to  FBI management to show the ongoing results from the initiative as well as  benefits for law enforcement.

In our prior work, we found that collaborating agencies should develop  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report results. Reporting on these  activities can help the agencies identify areas for improvement such as  policy and operational effectiveness. In the 2012 MOU, the HUD OIG  and the FBI documented the information they would share on results;  however, they have not consistently shared this information, according to  HUD OIG and FBI officials. In addition, in its 2018 SOP, the HUD OIG  stated that it would no longer collect or share data on apprehensions or  program savings with the FBI, but this change is not reflected in the  current MOU. By agreeing on what information on results would be useful  to share, and consistently sharing this information, the HUD OIG and the  FBI could enhance their ability to identify areas for improvement and  evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative.

The HUD OIG and the FBI Have Not Updated Their 2012 MOU to Reflect Program Changes

In addition to not consistently sharing information on results, we found  several other areas where the 2012 MOU between the HUD OIG and the  FBI does not align with current processes for implementing the Fugitive  Felon Initiative. The MOU also does not reflect changes made by HUD  OIG’s April 2018 SOP, and the HUD OIG generally had not discussed  these changes with the FBI.

Prosecution for Fraud. According to HUD OIG officials, the HUD OIG  generally does not pursue tenant fraud cases as part of the Fugitive Felon  Initiative, although the MOU lists this as one of the purposes of the  initiative. Specifically, the MOU states that in addition to apprehending  fugitive felons, the secondary purpose of the initiative is to investigate,  identify, and refer for prosecution individuals who fraudulently receive  HUD benefits. However, according to HUD OIG headquarters and  officials from one regional office, the HUD OIG generally does not pursue  federal tenant fraud cases because these cases typically do not meet the  dollar threshold for federal prosecution.

New Data-Sharing Process. The HUD OIG’s 2018 SOP includes a new  procedure in which the FBI will return verified investigative leads to the  HUD OIG, but the MOU does not include this new responsibility for the  FBI. As discussed earlier, the FBI will now be responsible for verifying  whether each warrant on the list of potential investigative leads is active  and then sending a list of investigative leads with active warrants to the  HUD OIG for distribution to its regional offices. According to FBI officials,  they have discussed this added step with the HUD OIG and are currently  developing the capability to implement it.

HUD OIG Referrals to PHAs. The MOU states that HUD OIG regional  offices should not refer cases to PHAs for administrative action for 60  days after the FBI sends the lead letter to law enforcement. However, the  MOU does not specify how HUD OIG regional offices will be notified  about when the 60-day period begins. In addition, officials from HUD OIG  regional offices had differing understandings of when this 60-day period  begins, and officials from one region stated that they had only recently  become aware that there was a 60-day waiting period. Further, the  current MOU does not reflect new language in the HUD OIG’s 2018 SOP  that allows HUD OIG regional offices to make referrals to PHAs if the  subject of the warrant is on the Prioritized Fugitive Felon List and is  apprehended before the 60-day period expires.

HUD OIG Interaction with Law Enforcement. The HUD OIG and the  FBI have not updated the 2012 MOU to reflect that, under the 2018 SOP,  HUD OIG regional offices are now generally tasked with proactively  contacting and coordinating with law enforcement. Further, according to  HUD OIG officials, regional offices are required to proactively contact and  coordinate with law enforcement for persons on the Prioritized Fugitive  Felon list. However, the MOU only states that the HUD OIG will  encourage law enforcement agencies to contact the HUD OIG’s regional  Special Agents in Charge for assistance with fugitive apprehension  activities.

Our prior work has found that agencies that articulate their agreements in  formal documents can strengthen their commitment to working  collaboratively, and written agreements are most effective when they are  regularly updated. The HUD OIG and the FBI articulated their  agreement for the Fugitive Felon Initiative in the 2012 MOU, but the MOU  has not been updated to reflect either of the agencies’ current  implementation of the initiative or the HUD OIG’s updated April 2018  SOP, according to HUD OIG and FBI officials. As discussed previously,  the HUD OIG’s April 2018 SOP includes program changes that affect the  activities listed in the 2012 MOU, but according to HUD OIG officials, they  have only raised some tentative changes with the FBI. According to FBI  officials, as of April 2018 HUD OIG officials mentioned that they are  interested in updating the MOU, but the HUD OIG has not discussed any  specific changes with the FBI and has not made a formal request to  update the MOU. HUD OIG officials stated that they are waiting to  process the findings of this GAO report before finalizing program changes  with the FBI. Jointly agreeing to any changes in HUD OIG and FBI  responsibilities under the Fugitive Felon Initiative and updating the MOU  to reflect these changes could improve collaboration between the HUD  OIG and the FBI and improve implementation of the initiative.

Criminal history policies for federally assisted housing and the Fugitive  Felon Initiative help ensure the safety of residents receiving rental  assistance. In the past decade, HUD issued notices and other documents  urging PHAs to strike a balance between resident safety and the reentry  needs of individuals with criminal history records. By completing its  planned updates of program guidebooks to reflect this guidance, HUD  could help ensure that PHA staff know and follow HUD’s current guidance  on criminal history policies. In addition, HUD could improve its ability to  identify and address potential noncompliance by determining what  additional criminal history requirements to include in its compliance  reviews and obtaining additional information on how PHAs are  implementing their policies as part of these reviews.

Through the Fugitive Felon Initiative, the HUD OIG and the FBI undertook  efforts that led to over 1,200 apprehensions of wanted persons in the past  5 years. During the course of our review, the HUD OIG updated its  procedures for the initiative in an effort to better define regional office  responsibilities and improve the consistency of their participation, as well  as to leverage the FBI’s efforts. However, collecting and assessing more  comprehensive information on the extent to which regional offices are  implementing these new procedures would better enable the HUD OIG to  determine the extent to which its regional offices are fulfilling their  responsibilities and identify areas for improvement. In addition, by  consistently sharing useful information on the results of the initiative, the  HUD OIG and the FBI would have better information with which to  evaluate the overall effectiveness of the initiative. Finally, the HUD OIG  and the FBI could improve their collaboration by agreeing to changes in  HUD OIG and FBI responsibilities under the initiative and updating the  MOU to reflect these changes.

We are making a total of seven recommendations: two to HUD’s Office of  Public and Indian Housing, three to HUD’s Office of the Inspector General  Office of Investigation, and two to the FBI. Specifically:

The HUD Assistant Secretary for the Office of Public and Indian  Housing should complete its updates of the HCV Program Guidebook  and Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook to reflect current guidance  on criminal history policies for its public housing and HCV programs.  (Recommendation 1)

The HUD Assistant Secretary for the Office of Public and Indian  Housing should review HUD’s Compliance Monitoring Checklist to  determine if questions should be added to address additional federal  criminal history requirements and revise checklist instructions to direct  HUD staff to obtain information on PHAs’ implementation of these  requirements during compliance reviews. (Recommendation 2)

The HUD Assistant Inspector General for the Office of Investigation  should collect and assess more comprehensive information on  regional efforts to implement the activities listed in the 2018 SOP.  (Recommendation 3)

The HUD Assistant Inspector General for the Office of Investigation  should, in collaboration with the FBI, determine what information on  fugitive apprehensions and any estimated program savings that occur  as the result of the Fugitive Felon Initiative would be most useful and  consistently share such information with the FBI. (Recommendation 4)

The HUD Assistant Inspector General for the Office of Investigation  should, in collaboration with the FBI, update the Fugitive Felon  Initiative MOU to reflect the agencies’ current activities and  responsibilities. (Recommendation 5)

The Director of the FBI should, in collaboration with the HUD OIG,  determine what information on fugitive apprehensions that occur as  the result of the Fugitive Felon Initiative would be most useful and  consistently share such information with the HUD OIG.  (Recommendation 6)

The Director of the FBI should, in collaboration with the HUD OIG,  update the Fugitive Felon Initiative MOU to reflect the agencies’  current activities and responsibilities. (Recommendation 7)

We provided a draft of this report to HUD, the HUD OIG, and DOJ  (including the FBI and USMS) for review and comment. HUD provided  comments in an email and the HUD OIG provided comments, the latter of  which are reproduced in appendix II. The FBI provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USMS informed us that  they did not have any comments.

In an email received from a HUD PIH audit liaison on July 16, 2018, HUD  stated that they agreed with our recommendation to reflect current  guidance on criminal history policies in HUD’s updated public housing  and HCV program guidebooks (Recommendation 1) and expect to  publish the relevant updated chapters in December 2018. In response to  our recommendation to review questions in HUD’s Compliance  Monitoring Checklist and include instructions for obtaining information on  the implementation of the requirements (Recommendation 2), agency  officials stated that they reviewed the current checklist questions and  determined that no additional questions or revisions are needed at this  time. However, the officials did not provide supporting documentation on  how they determined that the existing questions were sufficient. They also  did not address the part of our recommendation related to HUD revising  its checklist instructions to direct staff to obtain information on PHAs’  implementation of criminal history policy requirements. We believe these  actions are needed to fully address our recommendation.

In its written comments, the HUD OIG disagreed with our  recommendation that it collect and assess more comprehensive  information on regional office efforts to implement activities listed in the  2018 SOP (Recommendation 3). The HUD OIG stated that it is not  feasible to capture information on regional offices’ activities without  diverting resources from its primary mission, and that it would be  burdensome to create additional mechanisms to monitor participation.   We disagree. According to the 2018 SOP, the HUD OIG will be  responsible for collecting and reporting statistics for some regional office  activities, such as the number of referrals. As discussed in this report, we  believe the HUD OIG could obtain more comprehensive information on  additional required regional activities using existing resources, such as  through periodic data calls to regions. Such assessments of regional  office activities are particularly important given that regional offices had  not consistently participated in the Fugitive Felon Initiative in the past.  Accordingly, we believe our recommendation is still warranted.

The HUD OIG also disagreed with our recommendation to determine  what information on results of the Fugitive Felon Initiative would be the  most useful to share in collaboration with the FBI (Recommendation 4).  The HUD OIG stated that its ability to determine apprehensions and  program savings is limited. However, the current MOU between the HUD  OIG and the FBI states that the HUD OIG is to share this information with  the FBI. In addition, in May 2018, HUD OIG officials stated that HUD OIG  plans to track statistics on apprehensions that occur with HUD OIG  involvement and eventually share these statistics with the FBI. The intent  of our recommendation is for the HUD OIG and the FBI to collaborate to  determine what information on results should be shared and then share  such information consistently. We believe our recommendation provides  sufficient flexibility for the HUD OIG and the FBI to determine what  information on results would be feasible to collect, and maintain that such  collaboration could better position the HUD OIG and the FBI to enhance  their ability to identify any areas for improvement and evaluate the  effectiveness of the initiative. The HUD OIG agreed with our  recommendation to update the Fugitive Felon Initiative MOU to reflect the  agencies’ current activities and responsibilities (Recommendation 5).

In an email received on July 9, 2018, an FBI management and program  analyst stated that the FBI agreed with our recommendation to determine  what information on apprehensions resulting from the Fugitive Felon  Initiative would be most useful to share and consistently share this  information with the HUD OIG (Recommendation 6). The FBI also agreed  with our recommendation to update the Fugitive Felon Initiative MOU to  reflect the agencies’ current activities and responsibilities  (Recommendation 7).

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the  Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Inspector General of  the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Attorney  General of the United States, and other interested parties. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please  contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at (202) 512-8678 or garciadiazd@gao.gov, or  Gretta Goodwin at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao.gov. Contact points  for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be  found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines (1) the statutory and regulatory requirements for  public housing agencies’ (PHA) criminal history policies for public housing  and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) programs; (2) the extent to which the  Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides  guidance and monitors PHA implementation of criminal history policy  requirements for public housing and HCV programs; and (3) the  implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative by the HUD Office of  Inspector General (OIG), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI).

To describe the statutory and regulatory requirements (federal  requirements) for PHAs’ criminal history policies, we reviewed federal  statutes and HUD regulations for the public housing and HCV programs  on providing housing assistance to persons with criminal history records  and arrest warrants, including fugitive felons. We focused on the public  housing and HCV programs because PHAs screen applicants and  determine eligibility for these programs, whereas property owners are  primarily responsible for these functions for other HUD rental assistance  programs. In addition, the HCV program is the U.S. government’s largest  rental assistance program. In addition, we interviewed officials from HUD  headquarters as well as officials in five HUD field offices and 10 PHAs in  four selected metropolitan areas: Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, New York  City, and Philadelphia. We used a cluster sampling technique to select  the four metropolitan areas. In selecting these areas, we considered  geographic location and proximity of HUD field offices and HUD OIG  regional offices to each other, whether there were options to visit a variety  of differently sized PHAs that had different characteristics (such as ones  that managed both the public housing and HCV programs or had a law  enforcement department), and participation of HUD OIG regional offices  in the Fugitive Felon Initiative. In each of the four selected metropolitan  areas, we selected two to three PHAs to visit, for a total nongeneralizable  sample of 10 PHAs (see table 5). In selecting PHAs, we considered PHA  size (as measured by the number of public housing and HCV units),  whether the PHA implemented both public housing and HCV programs,  distance in miles between a PHA and the HUD and HUD OIG metro area  offices, and whether a PHA was in an urban or nonurban location and  had a law enforcement department.

We selected five HUD field offices by determining which field office  oversees each of the selected PHAs. We interviewed officials from the 10  selected PHAs and reviewed their criminal history policies to better  understand the federal requirements and how PHAs implemented them  for the public housing and HCV programs. We did not conduct a  compliance audit of the selected PHAs. We also interviewed officials from  three housing associations (selected based on their expertise with the  public housing and HCV programs) about federal requirements and  PHAs’ implementation of the requirements. In addition, we interviewed a  nonprofit organization that wrote a report on HUD’s criminal records  policies and two private companies that conducted criminal background  screening for PHAs to better understand criminal screening processes.

To determine the extent to which HUD provides guidance and monitors  PHA implementation of criminal history policy requirements, we reviewed  HUD letters and notices for the public housing and HCV programs. We  also reviewed HUD’s 2001 HCV Program Guidebook and 2003 Public  Housing Occupancy Guidebook. We interviewed officials from the 10  selected PHAs for their perspectives on HUD’s guidance. We also  reviewed HUD’s monitoring procedures for PHAs. Specifically, we  reviewed documentation related to HUD’s National Risk Assessment as  well as HUD’s Compliance Monitoring Checklist for reviewing PHA  compliance with federal requirements, including requirements on  providing housing assistance to persons with criminal history records.  We interviewed officials from HUD headquarters and our sample of five  HUD field offices about the agency’s efforts to monitor and oversee  PHAs’ implementation of criminal history policy requirements (same  selected regional offices discussed above). We assessed HUD’s  guidance and compliance procedures in relation to federal requirements  for criminal history policies in relation to federal statutes, HUD regulations  concerning criminal history policies, and internal control standards.

To determine the extent to which the HUD OIG, in coordination with law  enforcement agencies, implements and monitors the Fugitive Felon  Initiative, we reviewed memorandum of understanding (MOU)  agreements between the HUD OIG and the FBI and between the HUD  OIG and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) on their efforts to share and  analyze data on HUD tenants and wanted persons and coordinate any  apprehension efforts. We reviewed HUD OIG’s Standard Operating  Procedure for the Fugitive Felon Initiative and interviewed officials from  the FBI, HUD OIG, and USMS headquarters to obtain information on the  processes these agencies follow as part of the initiative. We also  interviewed officials from all seven HUD OIG Office of Investigation  regional offices and relevant USMS Fugitive Task Forces in our four  selected metropolitan areas to obtain information on their involvement  with and perspectives on the Fugitive Felon Initiative. We worked with  USMS Headquarters to identify the relevant fugitive task force that would  have jurisdiction over the geographic area covered by a HUD OIG  regional office. We assessed the HUD OIG’s and the FBI’s activities in  relation to their current MOU, OIG’s Standard Operating Procedure for  the Fugitive Felon Initiative, and federal internal control standards. We  collected and analyzed data on the HUD OIG’s Fugitive Felon Initiative.  Specifically, we analyzed the results of the HUD OIG’s 2017 efforts to  cross-reference HUD tenant data and the FBI’s Wanted Persons File  (from September 2016) to identify potential investigative leads into the  possible location of fugitive felons. We summarized the types of offenses  related to these potential investigative leads by grouping similar offenses  together and identified the top 10 most frequently occurring offenses.  Table 6 lists the subcategories of assault, burglary, fraud, forgery,  larceny, and robbery. There were no subcategories associated with the  other 4 offenses in the top 10 most frequently occurring (failure to appear,  probation violation, parole violation, and dangerous drugs).

To assess the reliability of the HUD OIG data, we interviewed  knowledgeable agency officials, conducted electronic testing for missing  data and obvious errors, observed the HUD OIG’s process for cross- referencing HUD tenant data and the FBI’s Wanted Persons File, and  reviewed system documentation for the data systems the HUD OIG uses  to cross-reference the data. We determined these data to be reliable for  our purposes of describing the number of potential investigative leads  produced by the initiative, the types of offenses associated with the  potential investigative leads, and the HUD rental assistance programs in  which identified fugitive felons participated. We also reviewed FBI data on  the results of law enforcement agencies (as reported to the FBI from  fiscal years 2013 through 2017) in apprehending fugitive felons based on  potential investigative leads produced by the initiative. To assess the  reliability of the FBI data, we interviewed knowledgeable agency officials  and reviewed documentation for the data system the FBI uses to store  and retrieve these data. We determined these data to be reliable for our  purposes of describing the number of apprehensions that result from the  potential investigative leads identified as part of the Fugitive Felon  Initiative.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to August 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In addition to the contacts named above, Allison Abrams (Assistant  Director), Eric Erdman (Assistant Director), Charlene J. Lindsay (Analyst  in Charge), Charlene Calhoon, Mara McMillen, David Ballard, Rudy  Chatlos, Willie (Billy) Commons III, Marc Molino, Tovah Rom, and Tyler  Spunaugle made key contributions to this report.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the FBI play roles in ensuring resident safety in federally-assisted housing. For example, HUD is responsible for monitoring local public housing agencies' compliance with requirements for screening applicants.

Also, HUD's Office of Inspector General works with the FBI to identify and apprehend fugitives who may be living in federally-assisted housing. But these efforts have not been consistent.

We made 7 recommendations to enhance HUD's oversight of local public housing agencies and improve collaboration between HUD's Office of Inspector General and the FBI.