Federal Protective Service: DHS Should Take Additional Steps to Evaluate Organizational Placement

FPS, within DHS's NPPD, conducts physical security and law enforcement activities for about 9,000 federal facilities and the millions of employees or visitors who work in or visit these facilities. FPS moved from GSA to DHS's ICE in 2003 and to NPPD in 2009. GAO has reported that FPS faced challenges in each location. Legislation enacted in November 2018 requires DHS to review placement options for FPS and could result in FPS moving again within DHS or to another executive branch agency.

GAO was asked to review issues related to organizational placement options for FPS. This report examines (1) the potential effects of FPS's placement in selected agencies and (2) steps DHS has taken to assess placement options for FPS. GAO identified five key organizational placement criteria based on prior work and identified eight agencies as potential placement options. The agencies were selected because they have the largest number of law enforcement officers or perform physical security, among other reasons. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from FPS, selected agencies, and key stakeholders. GAO compared agencies to FPS to determine if they meet the organizational placement criteria. An agency meets the criteria if it has similarities to FPS.

In considering organizational placement options for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS), GAO found that none of the eight agencies GAO selected met all the key organizational placement criteria; thus, any of the organizational placement options could result in both benefits and trade-offs. For example, keeping FPS in DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) could provide FPS some benefits because FPS and NPPD have missions that include the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities, facility protection responsibilities, and access to and sharing of information related to national homeland security. However, unlike FPS, NPPD does not perform both physical security and law enforcement activities, which is a potential trade-off. In another example, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the United States Marshals Service (Marshals) could provide benefits because they currently coordinate with FPS on facility protection. However, Marshals does not have a mission or goals that explicitly focus on the protection of infrastructure or facilities and GSA does not perform law enforcement, which are potential trade-offs.

DHS has not taken key steps to fully assess potential placement options. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the organizational structure of FPS, such as its placement in NPPD, even though FPS and NPPD have evolved since FPS was placed in NPPD in 2010. Standards for Internal Control state that agency management should establish an organizational structure to achieve the agency's objectives and that an effective management practice for attaining this outcome includes periodically evaluating the structure to ensure that it has adapted to changes. Additionally, because DHS did not analyze FPS's current placement in NPPD, DHS does not have a benchmark for comparison to other agencies. DHS recently established a working group to assess the placement of FPS. However, the group's planned activities are limited in several ways. For example, the group's draft charter does not indicate that the working group will describe what DHS expects to achieve by changing FPS's placement. Further, the draft charter does not indicate that the working group will evaluate the benefits and trade-offs of placement options. GAO has previously identified these and other steps as key to successful organizational change or analysis of alternatives. These steps would help DHS address the 2018 legislation to review placement options for FPS—including, how DHS considered the results of GAO's review. Regardless of the legislation, DHS may not be positioning itself to make an informed decision as to what organization best supports FPS.

DHS should identify the expectations for changing FPS's placement and take steps to fully evaluate placement options. DHS concurred with the recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them.

For almost 50 years, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) has been  charged with protecting federal facilities and the employees and  individuals who work in or visit them. Specifically, FPS provides physical  security and law enforcement services at about 9,000 facilities, a majority  of which are held or leased by the General Services Administration  (GSA). In the 1970s, GSA created FPS as part of its Public Buildings  Service (PBS). Since then, FPS has been moved twice—in 2003 to the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) and in 2009 to DHS’s National Protection and  Programs Directorate (NPPD).

The organizational placement of an office or agency can affect its  performance and ability to meet its mission. During FPS’s current and  previous organizational placements, FPS experienced a number of  operational, management, and funding challenges, which had a bearing  on FPS’s ability to accomplish its mission. FPS has made progress in  addressing some issues, but others persist. Legislation enacted in  November 2018 could lead to FPS moving again.

Given your interest in ensuring that FPS fully addresses challenges so  that it can effectively carry out its duties, as well as any statutory changes  that may result in FPS moving again, you asked us to review issues  related to current or future organizational placement options for FPS. This  report examines:  the potential effect of FPS’s placement in selected agencies based on  key criteria for evaluating organizational placement, and  steps DHS has taken to assess placement options for FPS.

To conduct this work, we reviewed our prior work related to organizational  transformation, work in which we identified organizational and  accountability criteria that Congress should consider when determining  which agencies to include or exclude from the newly created DHS (at that  time, 2002). The criteria are relevant to our review of FPS’s  organizational placement as Congress considers whether (or where) to  place FPS in various agencies within or outside it. For each criterion, we  also identified elements (i.e., characteristics) that are specific to FPS  based upon our review of FPS documents and our prior work on topics  related to the criteria, our discussions with federal officials, an association  representing federal law enforcement officers, and a former high-ranking  official in NPPD with knowledge of FPS.

We applied these key criteria to eight agencies that could be potential  organizational placement options for FPS. We identified these agencies  based upon: agencies with the largest number of law enforcement officers, agencies that provide physical security services, agencies where FPS was previously, or is currently placed, or

FPS’s management preference (see table 1).

At FPS and each of the selected agencies, we reviewed documentation  and interviewed officials to identify similarities, differences, and other  considerations with regard to each of the five key criteria. For the first four  key criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2) responsibilities; (3)  organizational culture; and (4) information sharing and coordination—we  determined that a selected agency met the criteria if the agency or its  subcomponents have any similarities to FPS. For the last criterion— mission support—we determined that a selected agency met the criterion  if the agency or its subcomponents have mission support similar to FPS  or could provide mission support that FPS needs. Although we used the  key criteria to assess the eight agencies we selected, the criteria can be  used to assess any potential placement option for FPS. Our analysis is  based on the selected agencies’ operations at the time of our review.

We also obtained views from stakeholders on the alignment between FPS  and the selected agencies as well as on the potential placement options.  These stakeholders include officials from FPS, the selected agencies, as  well as:  representatives from unions that represents NPPD employees,  including FPS employees, and Protective Security Officers (i.e.,  contract guards);   representatives from associations of federal law enforcement officers  and contract guard companies; officials from selected agencies that coordinate with or use FPS for

Department of Justice for law enforcement coordination;  Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration  as large users of FPS facility protection; officials from DHS’s Interagency Security Committee, which develops  the security standards for non-military federal facilities; and  staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

We also obtained views from a former high-ranking official in NPPD with  knowledge of FPS. The results of these interviews are non-generalizable  to all of FPS’s stakeholders but provide useful examples of considerations  related to various placement options.

We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government for relevant management responsibilities, such as  determining if FPS’s current organizational placement in NPPD is optimal  and effectively achieves the agency’s objectives. And, we reviewed our  prior reports on key practices and questions for organizational change  and best practices for an analysis of alternatives process. We used  practices identified in these reports as well as internal controls to assess  the steps DHS has taken to assess placement options for FPS. See  appendix I for more details on our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to January 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

While its core mission of protecting federal facilities has remained  constant as FPS moved from one agency to another, its responsibilities  have changed. While in GSA’s PBS, FPS was responsible for protecting  GSA held-or–leased facilities, providing both physical security and law  enforcement services. To protect buildings, FPS officers developed  physical security risk assessments, installed security equipment, and  oversaw contract guard services. As a part of its law enforcement  services, among other duties, FPS officers enforced laws and regulations  aimed at protecting federal facilities and the persons in such facilities and  conducted criminal investigations. Following the September 11, 2001  attacks, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted; it created  DHS and moved FPS from GSA to the new department, effective in  March of 2003. Within DHS at ICE, FPS’s responsibilities grew beyond  solely protecting GSA buildings to include homeland security activities  such as implementing homeland security directives and providing law  enforcement, security, and emergency-response services during natural  disasters and special events.

In 2009, DHS proposed transferring FPS from ICE to NPPD. In explaining  the proposed transfer in DHS’s fiscal year 2010 budget justification to  Congress, DHS noted that this move would allow ICE to focus on its law  enforcement mission of protecting the American people by targeting the  people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal activities  relating to our nation’s borders. DHS noted that FPS should reside  within NPPD given that both agencies had responsibilities for  implementing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS further  noted that FPS would be able to gain synergy by working alongside  NPPD’s Office of Infrastructure Protection and that having FPS and the  Office of Infrastructure Protection in the same organization would further  solidify NPPD as DHS’s lead for critical infrastructure protection. The  fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations act, which was signed into law on  October 28, 2009, funded FPS under NPPD via revenue and collections  of security fees. While in NPPD, FPS continued to lead physical security  and law enforcement services at GSA-held or GSA-leased facilities and  continued its efforts in homeland security activities.

Throughout FPS’s different organizational placements in DHS, we have  reported that FPS faces persistent challenges meeting its mission to  protect facilities. In 2003, we designated federal real-property  management as a high-risk area, in part, because of physical security  challenges at federal facilities, such as the need for a risk-based  approach to determining the level of security required. In 2011, we  reported on FPS’s challenges in transferring mission support functions  when transitioning from ICE into NPPD. While FPS has been in NPPD,  we also reported on challenges FPS faced, such as in performing risk  assessments, managing and overseeing contract guards, collaborating  with GSA and the Marshals on facility security, and funding its  operations. We made recommendations to help address these  challenges, and FPS has made progress in addressing some of these  recommendations. For example, FPS (1) developed a Modified  Infrastructure Survey Tool to help it more effectively perform risk  assessments, (2) coordinated with GSA and other agencies to reduce  unnecessary duplication in risk assessments, (3) implemented new  procedures to better manage and oversee contract guards, and (4) as of  September 2018, established a formal agreement with GSA on roles and  responsibilities related to facility protection. However, as we discuss later  in this report, challenges related to other aspects of overseeing contract  guards, collaborating with GSA and Marshals, and funding persist.

In November 2018, legislation was enacted that could result in FPS  moving for a third time, although the location has not been determined.  This legislation—which reorganizes NPPD to an organization that has a  greater statutory focus on managing cyber risks—requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to, within 90 days after the completion of our  review, determine the appropriate placement for FPS within DHS and  begin transfer of FPS to that entity. If the Secretary determines that  DHS is not an appropriate placement for FPS, the Secretary would be  required to submit to the Director of OMB and Congress an explanation  for the reasons of such a determination—including, among other things,  how DHS considered the results of our current review—and a  recommendation on the appropriate placement of FPS within the  executive branch of the federal government.

When DHS was established, we identified organizational and  accountability criteria for the department. From this prior work, we  identified key criteria that are relevant to assessing potential placement  options for FPS, as shown in table 2.

In addition, other practices provide valuable insights for agency officials to  consider when evaluating or implementing a reorganization or  transformation. For example, we have previously reported (1) on key  practices and questions for organizational transformations, mergers and  consolidations, and agency reform efforts and (2) on best practices for the  analyses of alternatives. We reported that organizational  transformations, such as a change in organizational placement, can take  many years to fully implement, can result in reduced productivity and  morale in the short-term, and may require up-front investments.  Therefore, we found that these practices and questions offer valuable  insights for agency officials to consider when evaluating or implementing  a reorganization or transformation. For example, in May 2012, we  reported that a key practice in organizational change is for agency  officials to identify and agree on the specific goals of the change—that is,  what the agency expects to achieve by making the change—or the  problems a change will solve. In July 2003, we reported that  implementing a large-scale organizational transformation requires the  concerted efforts of both leadership and employees to accomplish new  organizational goals. In October 2015, we identified best practices for  analyzing alternatives, such as defining criteria to assess alternatives,  identifying a range of alternatives to assess, and analyzing the benefits  and trade-offs of each alternative.

Moving FPS to Any of the Selected Agencies Evaluated Would Result in Both Benefits and Trade- offs

We found that none of the selected agencies met all the organizational  placement criteria; thus, any of the organizational placement options  could result in both benefits and trade-offs. Officials from FPS and some  of the selected agencies as well as representatives from other  stakeholders we interviewed (e.g., an association of federal law  enforcement officers, a union representing FPS employees, and others)  provided us with examples of how those benefits and trade-offs might  affect FPS.

In instances where selected agencies met organizational placement  criteria (that is, in instances where selected agencies were similar to  FPS), FPS could experience benefits. See table 3 for a summary of how  selected agencies met and did not meet key organizational placement  criteria, and appendix II and III for additional details. For example, for the  mission, goals, and objectives criterion, DHS, NPPD, and Secret Service  could provide benefits to FPS because, like FPS, their mission or goal  statements as noted in their strategic plans include an explicit focus on  the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities. Also, GSA has a  statutory facility protection mission. Our prior work found that placing an  agency into an organization that has a similar mission may help ensure  that the agency’s mission receives adequate funding, attention, visibility,  and support. For the responsibilities criterion, DHS, CBP, Secret  Service, Justice, and the Marshals could provide benefits to FPS,  because all of these agencies, like FPS, perform both physical security  and law enforcement activities. In the past, FPS faced challenges  ensuring that both these activities were prioritized, according to FPS  officials. Officials explained that a parent agency that is able to focus on  both activities could help ensure equal and adequate attention in both  areas. While there are similarities in responsibilities between FPS and  these agencies, there are differences in the extent to which and for what  purpose these agencies perform the responsibilities, some of which we  discuss following table 3.

Because none of the agencies met all criteria, placing FPS in any of the  selected agencies would require trade-offs. For example:

While placing FPS in DHS, NPPD, or the Secret Service may provide  FPS benefits in areas related to mission, responsibilities, and  information sharing, there could be some adverse effect on FPS’s law  enforcement operations or other activities. Specifically, as discussed  above, placement in DHS, NPPD, or the Secret Service could provide  FPS benefits because these agencies have similar missions and  facility protection responsibilities, and have access to and share  information related to national homeland security that FPS needs to  carry out its mission. However, NPPD, for example, does not perform  law enforcement activities. Therefore, according to FPS officials,  FPS’s law enforcement activities may not continue to receive full  attention. Further, keeping FPS in NPPD may not address some of  the challenges related to culture, such as morale issues that,  according to an official from the association of law enforcement  officers, stem in part from FPS not being placed in a law enforcement  organization. If placed in the Secret Service, this agency may not  have the administrative capacity to handle the additional FPS human  capital workload. Secret Service officials told us that they have a  staffing shortage, which is exacerbated by the time it takes to vet  applicants and process new staff through background checks and  security clearances.

As another example, FPS’s placement in GSA or Marshals could  enhance coordination among these agencies, but there could be  some adverse effect on FPS’s ability to carry out its mission or  responsibilities. Specifically, GSA and Marshals could be appropriate  choices as these agencies currently coordinate with FPS on facility  protection. For GSA’s held or leased facilities, FPS is primarily  responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in those  facilities while GSA, as the federal government’s landlord, performs  some physical security activities, such as funding and repairing  security fixtures. At federal courthouses, FPS is the primary federal  agency responsible for patrolling and protecting the perimeter while  Marshals is responsible for the security of the federal judiciary and as  such provides for security inside the building. However, we have  found challenges FPS has faced in coordinating with these agencies.  In December 2015, for example, we found that FPS and GSA had not  agreed on a common outcome related to facility protection or the roles  and responsibilities to accomplish their missions. Further, in  September 2011, we reported that FPS and Marshals faced  challenges related to coordination, such as in the implementation of  roles and responsibilities and the use or participation in existing  collaboration mechanisms. In September 2018, NPPD and GSA  signed a memorandum of agreement that, among other things,  describes FPS’s and GSA’s roles and responsibilities, and FPS,  Marshals, and other agencies involved in protecting courthouses (i.e.,  GSA and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) are working to  finalize a separate agreement for courthouse security. As these  agreements are implemented, coordination between these agencies  should improve as we have previously reported that establishing clear  roles and responsibilities, in agreements or through other  mechanisms, contribute to effective coordination. In addition,  Marshals may be a good placement option for FPS since both  agencies perform physical security and law enforcement activities,  and because both agencies use a large number of contract guards.  However, because FPS does not share mission and goals with  Marshals, it may be less equipped to prioritize FPS’s activities in the  law enforcement and physical security areas. Justice and Marshals  officials said that, in their view, Marshals is different from FPS  because Justice and Marshals perform limited physical security  activities and have an extensive law enforcement mission, while the  opposite is the case for FPS. Further, Marshals officials said that  FPS’s and Marshal’s law enforcement activities support different  purposes—with Marshals supporting a violent-crime reduction mission  and FPS supporting a facility protection mission. As a result, Marshals  officials said that FPS’s facility protection mission may not receive full  attention. Regarding contract guards, Marshal’s guard force is  smaller, performs different activities, and has different requirements  compared to FPS’s guard force. Regarding GSA, while GSA performs  some physical security activities, it does not perform law enforcement,  which is a critical part of FPS’s responsibilities and, according to some  stakeholders we interviewed, a key aspect of FPS’s culture. GSA also  does not have the same access to information related to national  homeland security as FPS currently has, and therefore, FPS’s access  to this information could be affected, according to officials.

Finally, various placement options could help FPS address some of its  long-standing challenges such as in overseeing contract guards,  collaborating with GSA and the Marshals, and funding. However,  these placements could also affect whether FPS’s needs are  prioritized. For example, placing FPS in GSA or the Marshals may  further help address coordination challenges. Additionally, placing  FPS in GSA could address challenges FPS faces with funding. If  placed in GSA, GSA and FPS could consider whether to use the  Federal Buildings Fund for security projects related to facility  management, such as installing cameras. OMB staff said that there  are limitations with the Federal Buildings Fund, such as the amount of  funding available for security projects. Further, the adverse effect of  placing FPS in either GSA or the Marshals is that Marshals does not  share mission and goals with FPS and that GSA does not have law  enforcement responsibilities; therefore, these agencies may not  prioritize FPS’s needs.

For additional information on how the various agencies met each  criterion, see appendixes II and III.

DHS Has Not Taken Key Steps to Fully Assess Potential Placement Options

When managing an agency or considering an organizational change,  such as that of FPS’s placement within or outside of DHS, our prior work  has stated that an agency can benefit from periodically evaluating its  organizational structure, identifying what a change is expected to achieve,  and analyzing alternatives. Specifically, Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government states that agency management should  establish an organizational structure to achieve the agency’s objectives.  According to the Standards, an effective management practice for  attaining this outcome includes periodically evaluating the organizational  structure to ensure that it meets its objectives and has adapted to  changes. We have also reported that a key practice in organizational  change is to identify and agree on what a change is expected to achieve  or the problems the change will solve. The process of defining such  expected outcomes can help decision makers reach a shared  understanding of what challenges need to be addressed. Furthermore,  we have reported on best practices for analyzing alternatives to help  ensure that agencies select the option that best meets their needs.  These practices can be applied to a wide range of activities or programs  in which an alternative must be selected from a set of possible options.  The practices include assessing the current environment to provide a  basis for comparison with other alternatives and identifying and assessing  benefits and trade-offs of each alternative.

However, DHS has not taken key steps to fully assess potential  placement options. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the organizational  structure of FPS, such as its placement in NPPD, even though both have  evolved since FPS was placed in NPPD in 2010. For example, NPPD has  increased its focus on protecting the nation’s cyber infrastructure as  threats in this area have grown, and its funding for this purpose has  increased. In light of these changes, in 2015 and 2016, DHS proposed  that NPPD restructure itself to increase its focus on cybersecurity.  However, the proposals did not include an assessment of FPS’s  organizational placement. The November 2018 legislation gave NPPD a  greater statutory focus on cyber risk and may result in additional changes  to the organization’s activities. Additionally, while in NPPD, FPS also  has been increasingly engaged in providing law enforcement for  homeland security, with the establishment of a rapid protection force of  that can respond to heightened threat situations. Given these changes,  without an assessment, DHS cannot be certain that FPS is currently  placed in an agency that enables FPS to meet its mission.

Additionally, because DHS did not analyze FPS’s current placement in  NPPD, it does not have a benchmark for comparison to other agencies.   Without such an analysis, it is unclear whether FPS needed to be moved  from NPPD. On one hand, FPS made progress while placed in NPPD in  addressing many of our recommendations, and some stakeholders we  spoke with (officials from DHS and NPPD) said that FPS was in the right  place in NPPD. For example, a DHS official stated that from a resource  perspective there was no good reason to move FPS out of NPPD as the  official had not seen a business case to do so. Additionally, an NPPD  official stated that mission alignment and an opportunity to influence the  national facility-security policy were compelling reasons for FPS to stay in  NPPD. Further, NPPD officials said that FPS was meeting its mission and  objectives. On the other hand, FPS continued to experience challenges in  carrying out its mission in NPPD—such as in overseeing contract guards,  collaborating with GSA and the Marshals, and having adequate funding— such that questions have been raised as to whether placing FPS in NPPD  was successful.

DHS has recently initiated an effort to evaluate FPS’s placement, but it  lacks several of the elements for a successful evaluation. Specifically, in  August 2018, DHS, NPPD, and FPS established a working group with a  draft charter with the objective of making a recommendation to the  Secretary of Homeland Security on the organizational placement of FPS  within DHS. The working group’s evaluation criteria for FPS placement  consist of mission, command and control, resources, implementation schedule, and workforce and culture. While establishing this group and  identifying criteria are positive steps in assessing FPS’s placement, the  group’s planned activities are limited in several ways. For example, while  the charter is a draft, it does not indicate that the working group will  describe what changing FPS’s placement is expected to achieve. This  factor is particularly important given that each placement option has its  benefits and trade-offs and that stakeholders’ opinions of the options  varied. Changing FPS’s placement could include: addressing one or more of the key criteria previously discussed in this addressing some or all of the challenges that persist, such as in  collaboration or contract guard oversight; or a combination of both.

Further, the draft charter does not indicate that the working group will  evaluate agencies outside of DHS or incorporate best practices for  analyzing alternatives, such as evaluating FPS’s current placement in  NPPD and the benefits and trade-offs of placement options. Without  conforming to the best practices, DHS will not have assurance that the  working group recommends the alternative that best meets mission  needs.

DHS’s current approach to evaluating FPS’s placement limits DHS’s  ability to reliably assess the merits of placement options supported by  GSA and FPS. GSA officials said GSA would take FPS and moving FPS  back to GSA could benefit tenants in federal facilities, strengthen security  support, and reduce redundancies because both agencies have federal  facility protection responsibilities. Further, according to GSA, if  consolidated under GSA, FPS could become more efficient, better  manage costs, and leverage acquisition processes by making use of  GSA’s existing services. FPS officials stated that they prefer FPS to be a  standalone entity that reports directly to DHS leadership. According to  FPS, being a standalone agency in DHS would establish the protection of  federal facilities as a critical mission of DHS and provide FPS with the  direct support of DHS leadership. Further, according to FPS officials,  having this support would better enable them to carry out their mission.  However, neither GSA nor FPS has conducted analyses to support their  preferences, and DHS is not planning to look at options outside of DHS at  this time. As a result, DHS cannot fully assess FPS’s or GSA’s positions.

Once DHS identifies what it expects to achieve by moving FPS, in line  with key practices for organizational change, and establishes an  evaluation approach that reflects best practices for an analysis of  alternatives, it will be in a position to best assess benefits and trade-offs  previously discussed. In absence of these steps, DHS may not be  positioning itself to make an informed decision as to what organization  best supports FPS.

Over the past 15 years, FPS has been located in three different agencies  (GSA, ICE, and NPPD), and there continues to be disagreement about  whether it is currently in the best place to achieve its objectives. Further,  agency and stakeholder opinions vary about where and whether FPS  should move. DHS has established a working group to evaluate  placement options for FPS. However, the working group’s planned  activities do not include key steps to fully assess potential placement  options. Specifically, while the group’s charter is a draft, it does not state  whether it plans to assess FPS’s current placement in NPPD, what DHS  expects to achieve by changing FPS’s placement, or effective placement  options for relocating FPS.

These steps would help DHS address legislation enacted in November  2018 requiring the review of placement options for FPS—including how  DHS considered the results of our review. Regardless of the legislation,  DHS cannot have a complete discussion that leads to an informed  decision on FPS’s placement without taking these steps. Identifying the  expected outcomes of changing FPS’s placement and performing  analyses are critical because organizational change can take many years  to fully implement, can result in reduced productivity and morale in the  short-term, and may require up-front investments. Without determining  what it expects to achieve by moving FPS and conducting an evaluation  using appropriate criteria, DHS may not be well-positioned to identify an  organization that best supports FPS.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Secretary of  Homeland Security:  The Secretary of Homeland Security—in consultation with NPPD and  FPS—should identify the specific goals of a change in FPS’s placement— that is, what DHS expects to achieve by moving FPS to another agency.  (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Homeland Security—in consultation with NPPD, FPS,  and other agencies as relevant—should fully evaluate placement options  for FPS based on what DHS expects to achieve by changing FPS’s  placement, an assessment of FPS’s current placement, and other best  practices such as an analysis of alternatives assessing the benefits and  trade-offs discussed in this report. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this product to DHS, GSA, Justice, and OMB for  comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred  with our recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address  them. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. GSA, Justice, and OMB only provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of  General Services, the Attorney General, the Director of OMB, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the  GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To address our objectives, we reviewed our prior work related to  organizational transformation, where we identified organizational and  accountability criteria that Congress should consider when determining  which agencies to include or exclude from the newly created DHS. The  criteria are relevant to our review of FPS’s organizational placement as  Congress considers whether to include or exclude FPS in various  agencies within and outside DHS. We selected a subset of the criteria  that are the most relevant to FPS’s organizational placement to include in  our review. For each criterion, we also identified elements (i.e.,  characteristics) that are specific to FPS based upon our review of FPS  documents and our prior work on topics related to the criteria, and our  discussions with federal officials with experience in facility security, the  Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and a former high-ranking  official in NPPD with knowledge of FPS.

To identify challenges facing FPS, we reviewed our past work and the  status of our prior recommendations, and interviewed stakeholders and  agency officials. We reviewed pertinent proposed and enacted legislation  related to DHS’s reauthorization and FPS. We reviewed Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government for relevant management  responsibilities. And, we reviewed our prior reports on key practices and  questions for organizational change and best practices for an analysis of  alternatives process. We used practices identified in these reports as  well as internal controls to assess the steps DHS has taken to assess  placement options for FPS.

We applied the key criteria to eight selected agencies in DHS, GSA, and  the Department of Justice (Justice) that we determined could be potential  organizational placement options for FPS, as shown in table 4.

We selected three of our eight placement options (CBP, ICE, and Secret  Service) based upon our review of the most recently available data from  the Department of Justice on the number of federal law enforcement  officers. We selected these three agencies because they employed the  largest number of law enforcement officers within DHS. Our selection of  agencies with federal law enforcement officers is relevant because FPS  employs such officers. We selected three options (GSA, NPPD, and a  standalone entity in DHS) because FPS was previously organizationally  placed within GSA, is currently placed in NPPD, and because of FPS’s  preference to be a standalone entity reporting directly to the Deputy  Secretary of DHS. We selected our remaining two options (a standalone  entity within Justice and the Marshals) because the duties of the Marshals  include law enforcement and protection of federal courthouses and  because legislation proposed during our review would have, if enacted,  instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security to recommend the  appropriate placement of FPS within the executive branch of the federal  government. We also identified DHS’s Office of the Chief Security  Officer as an office within DHS that has the facility security responsibility  for managing contract guards at DHS’s former headquarters at the  Nebraska Avenue Complex in Washington, D. C. We determined that this  security office is a policy office within DHS’s Management Directorate  with its primary mission being the security of DHS employees and a focus  on expanding internal security policy. For the purposes of our review, we  did not include OCSO as a potential placement option for FPS because  the security office does not have a large number of law enforcement  officers, plans to divest operational security responsibilities, and was not  a previous, current or FPS desired placement. Our exclusion of OCSO  does not preclude DHS from assessing OCSO as a placement option for  FPS.

We reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from FPS and the  selected agencies to identify similarities, differences, and other  considerations with regard to each of the key criteria. For the first four key  criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2) responsibilities; (3)  organizational culture; and (4) information sharing and coordination—we  determined that a selected agency met the criteria if the agency or its  subcomponents have any similarities to FPS. For the last criterion— mission support—we determined that a selected agency met the criterion  if the agency or its subcomponents have mission support similar to FPS  or could provide mission support that FPS needs. Although we used the  key criteria to assess eight agencies we selected, the criteria can be used  to assess any potential placement option for FPS.

We also reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with  stakeholders including:  representatives from the Federal Law Enforcement Officers  Association;  representatives from the American Federation of Government  Employees Local 918 (the union that represents NPPD employees— including FPS);  representatives from two unions that represent a large number of  Protective Security Officers (i.e., contract guards),  the United Government Security Officers of America and Security  and

Security, Police and Fire Professionals Association of America;  representatives from the National Association of Security Companies  (an association of contract guard companies); officials from agencies that coordinate with or use FPS for facility  the Department of Justice for law enforcement coordination and  the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security  Administration as large users of FPS facility protection;  staff from the Office of Management and Budget; and officials from DHS’s Interagency Security Committee, which develops  the security standards for non-military federal facilities.

We also obtained views from a former high-ranking official in NPPD with  knowledge of FPS. Additionally, we obtained views from officials, staff,  and representatives from FPS, the selected agencies and stakeholders  on the alignment between FPS and the agencies as well as on the  potential placement options. The results of these interviews are non- generalizable to all of FPS’s stakeholders but provide useful examples of  considerations related to various placement options.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to January 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comparison of Selected Agencies and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) in Elements Associated with Key Organizational-Placement Criteria

Based on our prior work related to organizational transformation, we  identified five key criteria to consider when assessing placement options  for FPS: (1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2) responsibilities; (3)  organizational culture; (4) information sharing and coordination; and (5)  mission support. For each criterion, we identified elements that are  specific to FPS. We identified these elements from documentation and  interviews from federal officials with experience in facility security, the  Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, a former high-ranking  official in NPPD with knowledge of FPS, and our review of prior work on  topics related to the criteria. We compared selected agencies that could  be placement options to FPS in each of the elements—see tables below.  The selected agencies are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Protection and Programs  Directorate (NPPD), United States Secret Service (Secret Service),  General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Justice (Justice),  and the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals). We assumed that FPS would  be a standalone entity in DHS, GSA, and Justice.

For elements in the first four criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives;  (2) responsibilities; (3) organizational culture; and (4) information sharing  and coordination—a “yes” in the table means that any function of the  selected agency or its subcomponents have similarities to FPS. For  elements in the last criterion—mission support—a “yes” means that any  function of the selected agencies or its subcomponents have mission  support similar to FPS or could provide mission support that FPS needs.  For all criteria, the “yes” designation does not account for the magnitude  of the effort or activities performed by each of the selected agencies.

Appendix III: Summary of Selected Agencies’ Similarities and Differences Related to Key Organizational-Placement Criteria

We identified five key organizational placement criteria that are relevant  to consider when assessing FPS’s placement: (1) mission, goals, and  objectives; (2) responsibilities; (3) organizational culture; (4) information  sharing and coordination; and (5) mission support. We evaluated whether  selected agencies that could be placement options for FPS met the key  organizational placement criteria. The selected agencies are the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS); U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD); United States  Secret Service (Secret Service); General Services Administration (GSA);  Department of Justice (Justice); and the U.S. Marshals Service  (Marshals). We assumed that FPS would be a standalone entity in DHS,  GSA, and Justice.

For the first four criteria—(1) mission, goals, and objectives; (2)  responsibilities; (3) organizational culture; and (4) information sharing and  coordination—we determined that a selected agency met the criteria if the  agency or its subcomponents have similarities to FPS in relevant  elements identified in appendix II. We determined that a selected agency  met the mission support criterion if the agency or its subcomponents have  similarities to FPS or could provide FPS needed mission support in  relevant elements.

FPS’s mission focuses on the protection of federal facilities and the  people working in and visiting those facilities.

In table 10 and subsequent paragraphs, we describe how selected  agencies met the mission, goals, and objectives criterion—that is, the  selected agencies that were similar to FPS for this criterion—areas of  consideration if FPS is placed in those agencies, and how the selected  agencies did not meet the criterion.

DHS, NPPD, and Secret Service are similar to FPS in that their mission  statements or goals as stated in their strategic plans include an explicit  focus on the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities. GSA has a  statutory facility protection mission. Our prior work found that placing an  agency into an organization that has a similar mission may help ensure  that the agency’s mission receives adequate funding, attention, visibility,  and support. One of DHS’s goals—as noted in its strategic plan covering  fiscal years 2014 to 2018—is to reduce risk to the nation’s critical  infrastructure. In addition, NPPD’s mission is to lead the national effort to  protect and enhance the resilience of the nation’s physical and cyber  infrastructure. To carry out this mission, NPPD coordinates efforts to  protect infrastructure in 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including a  government facilities sector. Further, the Secret Service’s mission is to  ensure, among other things, the security of the United States President,  Vice President, and other individuals. The Secret Service’s Uniformed  Division protects locations necessary for accomplishing its mission of  protecting these individuals. Per statute, GSA is responsible for the  operation, maintenance, and protection of buildings and grounds  occupied by the federal government and under the jurisdiction, custody,  and control of GSA.

While DHS, NPPD, Secret Service, and GSA may be good placement  options for FPS given their similarities in mission or goals (i.e., focus on  infrastructure or facility protection), stakeholders we interviewed identified  some key areas of consideration that may have a bearing on how well  FPS would fit in NPPD, Secret Service, and GSA.

NPPD: FPS and NPPD officials expressed concerns about the fit  between the two agencies given differences in how they perform their  infrastructure protection missions. Specifically, FPS has employees  who directly protect federal facilities, while NPPD’s physical  infrastructure protection efforts provide guidance and resources to  federal, state, and local governments, and private sector companies  so that they can protect their facilities. Furthermore, officials from  FPS, NPPD, the union representing FPS officials, an association  representing federal law enforcement officers, and a former high- ranking official in NPPD said that a difference between the two  agencies is that FPS performs law enforcement activities to carry out  its protection mission while NPPD does not.

Secret Service: Officials from FPS and Secret Service said that  placing FPS in the Secret Service could present challenges because  the two agencies’ missions have some fundamental differences—FPS  focuses on protecting federal facilities and Secret Service focuses on  protecting individuals such as the United States President and Vice  President. Furthermore, another difference is that the scope of  facilities that the Secret Service protects is smaller and narrower than  FPS, according to FPS and Secret Service officials. FPS protects  about 9,000 facilities throughout the United States, while Secret  Service’s Uniformed Division—which is responsible for protecting  facilities—protects a limited number of facilities in the National Capital  Region (e.g., the White House, the Vice President’s residence). FPS  officials said that another consideration between the two agencies is  that FPS’s mission of protecting federal facilities would get lost in  Secret Service’s mission of protecting the President of the United  States and other key individuals.

GSA:  Stakeholders provided differing views on how well FPS would  fit in GSA. An official from CBP and officials from Justice said that  FPS should be placed in GSA because FPS focuses on GSA-held or- leased facilities. Furthermore, GSA officials stated FPS and GSA  could merge as both have the authority to protect federal facilities,  and there is an intuitive relationship between GSA’s focus on the  management and operations of federal facilities and FPS’s mission of  the security of federal facilities. Conversely, officials from FPS, staff  from OMB, and officials of an association that represents security  companies, said that FPS should not move to back to GSA. These  officials and staff said that FPS should not move to GSA because,  among other reasons, the two agencies have different missions: GSA  focuses on federal real estate and some physical security activities  not homeland security or law enforcement.

CBP, ICE, Justice, and Marshals do not have mission statements or goals  that focus explicitly on infrastructure or facility protection. Nonetheless, as  we discuss in the next section of this report, CBP, Justice, and Marshals  have some facility protection responsibilities.

In addition, FPS and the selected agencies share few or no operational  objectives. DHS, ICE and NPPD share one or two operational objectives  with FPS—DHS shares objectives that focuses on mitigating risks and  responding to incidents, ICE shares one that focuses on intelligence  gathering, and NPPD shares one that focuses on facility assessments.  FPS, Justice, and Marshals have a few similar operational objectives. The  three agencies have objectives that focus on the integration and use of  intelligence information. FPS and Marshals also have similar objectives that focus on facility assessments, mitigating risks, and on rapidly  responding to emergencies and incidents.

To carry out its facility protection mission at about 9,000 federal facilities,  FPS performs physical security as well as law enforcement activities. As  a part of its physical security activities, FPS conducts facility security  assessments, identifies countermeasures (e.g., equipment and contract  guards) best suited to secure a facility, and oversees contract guards. As  a part of its law enforcement activities, FPS proactively patrols facilities,  responds to incidents, and conducts criminal investigations, among other  things. FPS also provides additional operational law enforcement support,  at the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to address  emerging threats and homeland security incidents. According to FPS  officials, previous placements have focused on physical security or law  enforcement, but not both. For example, FPS officials told us that  because of ICE’s focus on law enforcement, FPS’s physical security  activities took a backseat to ICE’s law enforcement mission. Similarly,  according to FPS officials, NPPD has not prioritized FPS’s law  enforcement activities because NPPD does not have a focus on law  enforcement.

One of FPS’s most critical activities is overseeing about 13,500 contract  guards who are posted at federal facilities and are responsible for  controlling access to facilities, responding to emergency situations  involving facility safety and security, and performing other duties. FPS is  responsible for overseeing these guards to ensure, among other things,  that they are performing their assigned duties and have the necessary  training and certifications. We have reported on challenges FPS faces in  overseeing contract guards. For example, in August 2012, we reported  that FPS faced challenges ensuring that contract guards have the  necessary training and certifications. We found that although FPS verifies  contractor-reported guard certification and training information by  conducting monthly audits, FPS does not independently verify the  contractor’s information.

In table 11 and subsequent paragraphs, we describe how selected  agencies met the “responsibilities” criterion—that is, the selected  agencies that were similar to FPS for this criterion—areas of  consideration if FPS is placed in those agencies, and how the selected  agencies did not meet the criterion.

Like FPS, DHS, the selected agencies in DHS (except ICE), GSA,  Justice, and Marshals have responsibilities for federal facility protection.  As discussed above, DHS, NPPD, and the Secret Service have mission  or goal statements that explicitly address infrastructure or facility  protection. CBP’s, GSA’s, Justice’s, and Marshals’ mission or goal  statements do not explicitly state a focus on infrastructure or facility  protection, but these agencies have some facility protection  responsibilities to help achieve their missions. For example, GSA has  some protection responsibilities for about 8,700 GSA-held or GSA-leased  facilities in support of its mission of managing the federal real estate  portfolio. GSA conducts repairs that affect the operation of building  security equipment and develops policy and requirements for the building  security used in the design and construction of GSA buildings. Marshals  have security responsibilities at federal courthouses in support of its  mission to protect, defend, and enforce the nation’s justice system.

Stakeholders we interviewed identified some areas of consideration that  may have a bearing on how well FPS would fit in agencies that have  facility protection responsibilities:

Officials from FPS and Marshals questioned how FPS would meld  with agencies that protect facilities on a smaller scale. CBP, Justice,  and Marshals perform facility protection at a smaller number of  facilities as compared to FPS and GSA: CBP has facility protection  responsibilities at about 1,200 border patrol stations, ports of entry,  and other facilities; Justice (excluding Marshals) at 36 facilities; and  Marshals at about 430 facilities with a judicial presence, while FPS  and GSA have protection responsibilities at about 9,000 and 8,700  facilities, respectively.

Justice and Marshals officials said that there are some differences  between their agencies and FPS’s facility protection responsibilities.  Specifically, these officials said that unlike FPS, Justice and Marshals  have limited responsibilities for facility protection, and in the case of  Marshals, this responsibility is related to the protection of the federal  judiciary.

Physical Security and Law Enforcement Activities

FPS most closely aligns with DHS, CBP, Secret Service, Justice, and  Marshals because these agencies perform both physical security and law  enforcement activities. However, as discussed in the paragraph below,  there are differences in the extent to which and for what purpose these  agencies perform these activities. The remaining agencies perform either  physical security (NPPD, GSA) or law enforcement activities (ICE), but  not both.

While DHS, CBP, Secret Service, Justice, and Marshals align with FPS  with regard to the two types of activities it performs, there are differences  in how these agencies perform these activities because these agencies’  activities and missions differ from FPS. For example, Justice and  Marshals officials explained that in their view, Justice and Marshals are  different from FPS because Justice and Marshals perform limited physical  security activities and have extensive law enforcement missions, whereas  FPS has a limited law enforcement mission and an extensive facility  protection mission. Further, Marshals officials said that FPS’s and  Marshal’s law enforcement activities support different purposes—with  Marshals supporting a violent-crime reduction mission and FPS  supporting a facility protection mission. As a result, Marshals officials said  that FPS’s facility protection mission may not receive full attention.  Further while FPS performs law enforcement activities relevant to federal  facility protection, the Secret Service performs law enforcement relevant  to protecting key individuals, such as the President. Furthermore,  although GSA does not perform law enforcement activities, GSA officials  said that if FPS moved to GSA, its leadership would provide FPS  organizational support that would enable both FPS’s law enforcement and  physical security activities. FPS officials stated that if FPS moved outside  of DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security—who is responsible for  protecting the nation—may lose protection responsibilities for federal  facilities as well as the ability to use FPS for law enforcement support  when needed for homeland security.

Like FPS, Marshals also employs a large number of contract guards for  facility protection. The remaining agencies (DHS, CBP, ICE, NPPD,  Secret Service, GSA, and Justice) use FPS’s contract guards, procure a  limited number of guards or use their own federal officers for facility  protection, according to officials from these agencies. Similar to FPS,  Marshals also performs compliance reviews of training and certification  information maintained by its contractors, and Marshals officials explained  that these reviews are performed periodically.

Staff from OMB and an association of security companies said that  Marshals may be a good fit for FPS because Marshals, like FPS, uses a  contract guard force. We have previously reported that a consideration of  moving one agency into another is whether the move can help improve  the efficiency and effectiveness of agency missions by, among other  things, addressing gaps. In this regard, one consideration is whether  FPS could leverage the Marshals’ oversight of its own contract guards to  address its ongoing challenges in this area.

However, differences between FPS’s and Marshals’ contract guard  programs exist. For example, Marshals’ guard force is smaller than FPS’s  with about 4,400 guards and the day-to-day duties of FPS’s contract  guards are different from Marshals’ contract guards. Both FPS’s and  Marshals’ contract guards control access to facilities. However, Marshals  contract guards also provide security for the judicial process, such as  providing armed escort services to judges, jurors, and other court  personnel and providing security in a courtroom during hearings.  Furthermore, some requirements between the two guard forces vary. For  example, Marshals has more stringent requirements for contract guards  in the areas of education and law enforcement experience.

While there are many areas relevant to organizational culture, law  enforcement is a key aspect of FPS’s organizational culture, according to  officials from an association of security companies and a former high- ranking official in NPPD. One area that has affected FPS’s culture,  particularly morale, according to an official from the association of law  enforcement officers, is that FPS’s criminal investigators receive federal  law enforcement officer retirement benefits, while its inspectors—who  also perform some law enforcement and who form the majority of FPS’s  workforce—do not.

In table 12 and subsequent paragraphs, we describe how selected  agencies met the organizational culture criterion—that is, the selected  agencies that were similar to FPS for this criterion—areas of  consideration if FPS is placed in those agencies, and how the selected  agencies did not meet the criterion.

DHS, nearly all the selected agencies in DHS, and Justice have cultures  similar to FPS because they are all law enforcement agencies, but NPPD  and GSA do not. An official from an association of federal law  enforcement officers said moving FPS to a law enforcement agency may  improve FPS’s employee satisfaction. Specifically, this official explained  that one advantage of moving FPS to a law enforcement agency is that it  could mean that FPS inspectors could be reclassified into positions that  would receive federal law enforcement officer retirement benefits, leading  to improved employee satisfaction and retention. FPS officials said that  Justice’s long-standing culture that is focused on law enforcement is  something that FPS sees as one of Justice’s advantages.

Although FPS and some of the selected agencies are similar in that their  cultures focus on law enforcement, there are differences among their  cultures. For example, FPS officials questioned how their agency would  meld with the Secret Service since it has long history, and Marshals  officials said that FPS and the Marshals do not have comparable  legacies. The Secret Service and Marshals have been around for about  150 and 230 years, respectively, while FPS has a 47-year history. In  addition, FPS and the law enforcement agencies may have different  hiring practices, which can influence the culture of the workforce. Secret  Service, for example, requires that all its employees hold a top-secret  security clearance. This level of clearance is not required for all of FPS’s  employees, according to an FPS official. If FPS moved to Secret Service,  Secret Service officials stated that there may be a need to create different  workforce categories due to differences in the hiring requirements, a  situation that may affect FPS’s and the Secret Service’s employee  morale.

Regarding information sharing, in 2016, DHS designated a division within  FPS as a Component Intelligence Program (CIP). CIPs are organizations  in DHS that collect, gather, process, analyze, produce, or disseminate  information related to national homeland security. According to FPS  officials, FPS’s participation in meetings held by the CIPs is important  because it provides FPS more visibility on the threats that other DHS  agencies have identified and actions they plan to take. Further, FPS  shares information obtained in CIP meetings with federal agencies across  the United States to support emergency preparedness, security, and  employee safety. Additionally, as a CIP, FPS has an opportunity to  provide input on the national homeland-security information that the  Secretary of Homeland Security receives. Finally, FPS has greater  access to information than it might otherwise receive without the CIP  designation. FPS officials said that FPS’s designation as a CIP was a  “game changer” for FPS’s abilities to identify and share information on  emerging threats. FPS officials explained that FPS’s placement could  influence whether FPS continues to have direct access to information  related to national homeland security that it needs to carry out its mission.

Regarding coordination, FPS currently coordinates with both GSA and  Marshals to fulfill its facility protection mission; however, we have  reported on challenges FPS has faced in coordinating with these  agencies.

FPS’s coordination with GSA: FPS and GSA share responsibility for  protecting federal facilities. FPS is primarily responsible for protecting  federal employees and visitors in federal facilities held or leased by  GSA. GSA serves as the federal government’s landlord and, in this  role, performs some physical security activities such as funding and  repairing security fixtures. In December 2015, we found that FPS and  GSA had not agreed on a common outcome related to facility  protection or the roles and responsibilities to accomplish their  missions.

FPS’s coordination with Marshals: FPS coordinates with Marshals to  protect about 430 federal courthouses. At courthouses held or leased  by GSA, FPS is the primary federal agency responsible for patrolling  and protecting the perimeter of the facilities and for enforcing federal  laws and regulations in those facilities. Marshals has primary  responsibility for the security of the federal judiciary, including the safe  conduct of court proceedings and the security of federal judges, court  personnel, jurors, and the visiting public. In September 2011, we  reported that FPS, Marshals, and other agencies involved in  protecting courthouses (i.e., GSA and the Administrative Office of the  U.S. Courts) faced challenges related to coordination, such as in the  implementation of roles and responsibilities and the use or  participation in existing collaboration mechanisms.

In table 13 and subsequent paragraphs, we describe how selected  agencies that met the information sharing and coordination criterion—that  is, the selected agencies that were similar to FPS for this criterion—areas  of consideration if FPS is placed in those agencies, and how the selected  agencies did not meet the criterion.

Like FPS, all of the selected agencies except GSA have access to and  can share information related to national homeland security, and these  agencies could share that same information with FPS. Specifically, like  FPS, the selected agencies in DHS are CIPs or participate in other  groups that have access to and can share information related to national  homeland security. Justice and Marshals have access to homeland  security information through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and  participate in separate groups where national homeland security  information is shared, including the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the  National Counterterrorism Center.

While selected agencies in DHS and Justice are similar to FPS in the  area of information sharing, there are some differences and challenges  that decision makers would need to consider before placing FPS in these  agencies. For example, FPS and the selected agencies in DHS and  Justice require different types of information to meet respective mission  needs. In previous organizational placements, FPS has faced challenges  with information sharing. For example, FPS officials told us that when  FPS was part of ICE, they relied on ICE to provide them with information,  which slowed down FPS’s ability to react to information specific to facility  protection. This may not be an issue if FPS continues to have direct  access to information as a CIP.

While GSA does not have access to national homeland security  information, GSA has access to and shares information pertinent to the  security of government facilities through, among other sources,  participation in the government facilities sector of the Government  Coordinating Council and Interagency Security Committee. Officials from  FPS, an association of security companies, and a former high-ranking  official in NPPD—said if FPS moved to GSA, FPS could lose direct  access to critical information that is necessary for it to accomplish its  mission. Furthermore, staff from OMB said FPS’s participation in DHS’s  homeland security groups has given the agency some level of credibility.  Thus, if FPS moved to an agency that does not have access to national  homeland security information, such as GSA, there may be resistance  from DHS agencies and others in sharing information with FPS, according  to the OMB staff. If FPS moved to Justice or Marshals, FPS officials said  that they would be able to continue to access and share homeland  security information through Justice’s information sharing community.  Thus, a move to either of these two agencies would not have as great an  impact to their access to homeland security information as a move to  GSA would, according to FPS officials.

Based on the coordination challenges we found in our prior work, FPS  and GSA or Marshals may continue to disagree on roles and  responsibilities if FPS is placed in these agencies. However, in  September 2018, NPPD and GSA signed a memorandum of agreement  that, among other things, describes FPS’s and GSA’s roles and  responsibilities, and FPS, Marshals, GSA, and the Administrative Office  of the U.S. Courts are working to finalize a separate agreement for  courthouse security. Accordingly, coordination between these agencies  should improve with the implementation of these agreements as we have  previously reported that establishing clear roles and responsibilities, in  agreements or through other mechanisms, contribute to effective  coordination.

Moving one agency into another does not necessarily mean that the two  agencies will coordinate better. As discussed earlier in this report, FPS  moved from ICE to NPPD so that FPS could gain synergy with NPPD’s  Office of Infrastructure Protection, which is responsible for coordinating  infrastructure protection across government and the private sector.  According to OMB staff we interviewed, this synergy has not happened in  part because NPPD and FPS missions are self-contained—with FPS  focused on federal facility infrastructure and the Office of Infrastructure  Protection focused on other types of infrastructure, including privately  owned infrastructure.

DHS, CBP, ICE, NPPD, and Secret Service do not have joint  responsibilities for coordinating facility protection because these agencies  rely on FPS to provide security services or provide their own security  services.

FPS officials told us that over the course of its previous organizational  placements, FPS’s mission support capabilities have matured and that it  is now able to provide its own mission support in most areas. For  example, FPS owns and uses many of the key operational and business- related information technology (IT) systems and applications it needs to  carry out its mission. Despite the maturation of FPS’s in-house mission  support activities, FPS still receives some mission support services from  other agencies in DHS, such as human capital and some aspects of  information technology. FPS would need mission support in these areas if  it changed its organizational placement. Separately, FPS has faced  challenges in the area of financial management, and changing FPS’s  placement could help address those challenges. Finally, FPS offers its  own training courses and has access to DHS’s Federal Law Enforcement  Training Centers (FLETC), and therefore it does not need mission support  from a parent agency in this area.

In table 14 and subsequent paragraphs, we describe how selected  agencies met the mission support criterion—that is, the selected agencies  that had mission support that FPS needs—areas of consideration if FPS  is placed in those agencies, and how the selected agencies did not meet  the criterion.

Among the agencies we reviewed, GSA has the infrastructure to support  FPS in its funding approach. FPS officials told us that one of the key  challenges they experienced in ICE was that ICE did not have institutional  knowledge on FPS’s funding approach, particularly FPS’s fee structure,  and FPS experienced changes in fees that were not aligned to what was  needed to cover its efforts. FPS funds its operations by collecting security  fees from federal agencies that use FPS for facility protection. GSA is well  positioned to support FPS’s funding approach because it is the only  agency we reviewed that also collects monies from multiple federal  agencies to support some of its operations. According to documentation  we reviewed and interviews with officials from selected agencies, we  found that among the remaining agencies, some do not collect fees  (NPPD, Secret Service) and others collect fees to support operations, but  not from other federal agencies (DHS, CBP, ICE, Justice, Marshals).

Further, based on our review of FPS’s fiscal year 2019 budget request to  Congress and our past work, we found that FPS faces challenges in  generating enough revenue to cover its operational costs. If placed in  GSA, GSA and FPS could consider whether to use the Federal Buildings  Fund for security projects related to facility management, such as  installing cameras. OMB staff said that there are limitations with the  Federal Buildings Fund, such as the amount of funding available for  security projects. Further, OMB staff said that finding cost-effective ways  for FPS to carry out its operations will help the agency address its funding  challenges.

Any of the selected agencies could provide FPS needed human capital  support. FPS performs some human capital activities, such as estimating  the number of staff it needs to perform its mission but does not have  delegated examining authority that allows it to fill competitive civil service  jobs. NPPD—FPS’s current parent agency—has this authority and is  responsible for recruiting, hiring, and performing other human capital  services on behalf of FPS. All the selected agencies we reviewed have  delegated examining authority. Thus, any one of these agencies could  provide human capital services on behalf of FPS. Officials from three of  the selected agencies—ICE, the Secret Service, and Marshals—said that  they already face challenges with hiring enough staff to fulfill their own  missions or may not have the administrative capacity to handle an  additional human capital workload for FPS. For example, officials from the  Secret Service and Marshals said they have staffing shortages, which  negatively affects their ability to fulfil their missions. The shortage is  exacerbated by the time it takes to vet applicants and process new staff  through background checks and security clearances, according to the  officials. Marshals officials said absorbing FPS would not help the agency  address the staffing shortage because FPS employees perform a  different mission, including a different law enforcement mission, which  require different skill sets, training, etc. Further, Marshals officials said  that given the time it takes to vet its own applicants and process its own  staff, it lacks the administrative capacity to take on a new agency. Finally,  Justice officials said that if FPS moved into Marshals, FPS staff would  require ongoing human resources support for such things as performance  management, payroll, personnel action processing, and benefits  counseling. They said that Marshals is not staffed to assume the full  human capital services required of another agency. Separately, an official  from ICE said that the agency’s human capital office is currently  undergoing a major realignment of service functions and that given FPS’s  large workforce, ICE would not have the administrative capacity to take  on the additional human capital workload for FPS.

NPPD may experience some gaps in providing some human capital  functions if FPS moved out of NPPD. According to NPPD, FPS provides  NPPD 23 staff positions to help NPPD carry out its human capital  activities. If FPS moved out of NPPD, NPPD staff said that 15 of the  positions could be realigned back to FPS. The remaining 8 positions,  which perform major functions including processing pay and managing  information technology systems for human capital needs, would need to  remain in NPPD if they are not replaced by NPPD. According to NPPD  officials, the human capital teams that perform these functions are  already understaffed and the skillsets for these functions are not plentiful  in the workforce. Thus, if NPPD were unable to retain these positions,  NPPD officials said that there may be significant gaps, such as in  processing pay.

FPS’s operational and business-related IT systems and applications  would not be greatly affected by a change in FPS’s organizational  placement because FPS owns many of the systems and applications it  needs to carry out its mission. For example, FPS owns a system to help  agency officials conduct and track facility security assessments and  another system to track law enforcement activities (e.g., tracking  investigative cases and incidents). If FPS’s placement changed, the  agency could take its systems with it, though there may be some  transition or integration costs, according to FPS officials.

FPS uses some IT systems or applications that it does not own and that  would need some consideration if FPS changed its organizational  placement, particularly if FPS moved outside DHS. For example, FPS  uses ICE’s system for managing financial transactions and ICE’s IT  network. If FPS moved outside of DHS, resources would be needed to  remove FPS from this ICE system and network, according to FPS  officials. GSA and Justice have financial management systems that FPS  could use. Marshals do not have its own financial management but uses  Justice’s system. According to Justice and Marshals officials, Justice’s  financial management system is currently not configured to support the  collection of fees that support operations. Any changes to the  configuration of Justice’s financial management system, such as the  inclusion of FPS’s fee-based collections, would require the approval of  Justice and possibly other Justice components that use the system. If  FPS stayed within DHS, including as a standalone entity within DHS, it  could potentially continue to use ICE’s system or use CBP or the Secret  Service’s systems.

DHS, CBP, ICE, Secret Service, Justice, and Marshals provide law  enforcement training, but FPS would not need access to such training if  placed in these agencies because FPS provides its own training on topics  related to facility protection. For example, FPS provides training to its  inspectors on physical security activities, such as identifying  countermeasures needed at facilities. FPS officials said that there would  be no efficiency gained in merging FPS and these agencies’ training  programs because FPS performs activities that most other law  enforcement agencies do not perform. NPPD and GSA do not perform  law enforcement activities and therefore do not have law enforcement  training programs. If moved to either of these two agencies, FPS could  continue to use its own training courses.

Furthermore, CBP, ICE, Secret Service, and Marshals are Federal Law  Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Partner Organizations, meaning  that they have access to training provided at FLETC training facilities.  FPS is also currently designated as a FLETC Partner Organization and  therefore would not need to rely on these agencies to obtain this  designation. All Partner Organizations, regardless of whether they are  DHS agencies or not, share the same equal privileges at FLETC,  including priority scheduling for basic and advanced law enforcement  training. Nonetheless, Justice and Marshals officials explained that their  FLETC training curriculum, planning, and structure are vastly different  than other Partner Organizations due to the differing mission sets. NPPD  and GSA are not FLETC Partner Organizations. According to FLETC  officials, however, because FPS is currently a FLETC Partner  Organization, it would continue to have access to FLETC while in NPPD  or GSA.

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Amelia Bates Shachoy  (Assistant Director); Roshni Davé (Analyst-in-Charge); Ben Atwater;  Jazzmin Cooper; George Depaoli; Adam Gomez; Geoffrey Hamilton;  Malika Rice; Amy Rosewarne; Kelly Rubin; Sarah Veale; and Amelia  Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report.

The Federal Protective Service protects about 9,000 federal facilities and their occupants.

FPS is part of the Department of Homeland Security, but it's been moved to two "parent agencies" within the department in the last 15 years. Reorganization can affect an agency's performance; after each move, FPS faced new duties and challenges.

But where's the best fit? We reviewed 8 potential parent agencies and found benefits and trade-offs for each.

Homeland Security is also assessing the issue, and should follow best practices for doing so. For example, we recommended setting goals and expectations for a move.