Department of State: Integrated Action Plan Could Enhance Efforts to Reduce Persistent Overseas Foreign Service Vacancies

State staffs Foreign Service employees to more than 270 embassies and consulates worldwide to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. In 2009 and 2012, GAO identified ongoing Foreign Service staffing gaps.

GAO was asked to review State's Foreign Service staffing. This report examines (1) vacancies in State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State's efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State's Global Employment Management System data as of March 2018. The system includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions, including the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions and whether each position is filled or vacant. GAO also reviewed its relevant prior reports and State workforce planning documents. In addition, GAO interviewed State staff at 10 overseas posts, selected on the basis of large numbers of Foreign Service vacancies and diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant at these posts, among other factors.

The Department of State's (State) data show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts since 2008. According to the data, 13 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of March 2018. This percentage is similar to the percentages GAO reported for 2008 and 2012, when 14 percent of these positions were vacant. In addition, State's data show persistent vacancies at overseas posts in generalist positions that help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and in specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. State's data also show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts with State's highest foreign policy priorities and in regions with security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests.

According to staff at overseas posts, Foreign Service vacancies adversely affect State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Staff at overseas posts told us that vacancies increase workloads, contributing to low morale and higher stress for Foreign Service staff and that vacancies in Political and Economic positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—limit the reporting on political and economic issues that posts are able to provide to State headquarters. Notably, officials also stated that vacancies in specialist positions may heighten security risks at overseas posts and disrupt post operations. For instance, some overseas post staff said that vacancies in Information Management positions had increased the vulnerability of posts' computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats.

State described various efforts—implemented by multiple offices in the department —to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies, but these efforts are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. An example of State's efforts is the “Hard-to-Fill” program, which allows Civil Service staff an opportunity to fill a Foreign Service vacancy on a single overseas tour. According to GAO's 2017 High-Risk Series report, an agency should design and implement an action plan—integrated across its relevant offices—that defines the root causes of all skills gaps and suggests corrective measures. However, State has not developed such an action plan for reducing persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Without developing an integrated action plan, overseas Foreign Service vacancies may persist. As a result, State's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and help ensure secure and efficient operations could be adversely impacted.

GAO recommends that State develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. State concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will take steps to develop an integrated action plan.

To advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests, the Department  of State (State) had staffed Foreign Service employees to about 9,850  overseas positions at more than 270 overseas posts worldwide as of  March 31, 2018. Those Foreign Service employees play a critical role in  achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. However, as we reported in 2009  and 2012, State has faced challenges in meeting its overseas staffing  needs, resulting in Foreign Service staffing gaps that put diplomatic  readiness at risk.

We were asked to review staffing for State’s Foreign Service at overseas  posts. In this report, we examine (1) vacancies in State’s Foreign Service  staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service  vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State’s efforts to address  Foreign Service vacancies.

To address these objectives, we analyzed State’s personnel data on  Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts from State’s Global  Employment Management System (GEMS) as of March 2018. We also  interviewed State officials from the Bureau of Human Resources and the  Bureau of Consular Affairs, as well as State officials representing the  Offices of the Executive Director for State’s six regional bureaus. In  addition, we interviewed staff at 10 overseas posts. We conducted  interviews in person with staff at 3 of these posts—the U.S. Embassy in  Beijing, China; the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, China; and the U.S.  Embassy in New Delhi, India—and conducted telephone interviews with  staff at the other 7 posts—the U.S. Embassies in Abuja, Nigeria; Bogota,  Colombia; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Kabul,  Afghanistan; Mexico City, Mexico; and N’Djamena, Chad; and the U.S.  Consulate in Frankfurt, Germany. We also reviewed State workforce  planning documents and budget documents, such as State’s Five Year  Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan: Fiscal Years 2016-2020  and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. We did not  assess whether the total number of authorized overseas Foreign Service  positions was appropriate or met State’s needs.

In addition, we reviewed State Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports  as well as our 2012 and 2009 reports on human capital challenges at  State and effective strategic human capital management across the  federal government. In particular, our 2017 report High-Risk Series:  Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on  Others states that strategic human capital management is a high-risk  issue across the federal government, and lists five key elements as a  road map for agency efforts to improve and ultimately address such  issues. For our third objective, we assessed whether State’s efforts to  address vacancies were guided by a corrective action plan that identifies  the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts  and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. Appendix I  contains a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and  methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to March 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

State is the lead agency involved in implementing American foreign policy  and representing the United States abroad. According to State and  USAID’s joint strategic plan for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, State’s  goals are to (1) protect America’s security at home and abroad, (2) renew  America’s competitive advantage for sustained economic growth and job  creation, (3) promote American leadership through balanced  engagement, and (4) ensure effectiveness and accountability to the  American taxpayer.

State’s Foreign Service employees serve in a variety of functions at  overseas posts as either generalists or specialists. Foreign Service  generalists help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and are  assigned to work in one of five career tracks: consular, economic,  management, political, or public diplomacy. Generalists at overseas posts  collect information and engage with foreign governments and citizens of  foreign countries and report the results of these interactions back to State  headquarters in Washington, D.C., among other functions. Foreign  Service specialists abroad support and maintain the functioning of  overseas posts and serve in one of 25 different skill groups, in positions  such as security officer or information management. Specialists at  overseas posts play a critical role in ensuring the security and  maintenance of the posts’ facilities, computer networks, and supplies as  well as the protection of post staff, their family members, and local staff,  among other functions.

State may require Foreign Service employees to be available for service  anywhere in the world, as needed, and State has the authority to direct  Foreign Service employees to any of its posts overseas or to its  headquarters in Washington, D.C. However, as noted in our 2012  report, State generally does not use this authority, preferring other means  of filling high-priority positions, according to State officials. The process  of assigning Foreign Service employees to their positions typically begins  when they receive a list of upcoming vacancies for which they may  compete. Foreign Service employees then submit a list of positions for  which they would like to be considered, known as bids, to the Office of  Career Development and Assignments and consult with their career  development officer. The process varies depending on an officer’s grade  and functional specialty, and State uses a variety of incentives to  encourage Foreign Service employees to bid on difficult-to-fill posts.

State groups countries of the world—and corresponding U.S. overseas  posts in these countries—into areas of responsibility under six geographic  regional bureaus:

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs  Overseas posts report to State headquarters through their respective  regional bureaus. For example, because the Bureau of African Affairs has  responsibility for developing and managing U.S. policy concerning parts  of the African continent, U.S. overseas posts in Nigeria report through the  bureau to State headquarters.

According to State officials, State maintains personnel data on State  employees in its GEMS database. GEMS includes information on Foreign  Service and Civil Service positions; in particular, it shows the total number  of authorized Foreign Service positions at State and whether each  position is currently filled or vacant. As displayed in figure 1, the GEMS  data show that the majority of Foreign Service employees (73 percent)  work in positions at overseas posts. However, some Foreign Service staff  (27 percent) are assigned to positions in the United States, where they  may complete required language or other training, serve as desk officers  for the regional bureaus, or work in other functions at State headquarters.

Overseas Foreign Service Vacancies Have Persisted over Time While Overseas Foreign Service Staffing Has Increased, Staffing Gaps Persist

According to State data, the number of both staffed and vacant overseas  Foreign Service positions increased between 2008 and 2018. As shown  in figure 2, the number of positions staffed grew from 6,979 in 2008 to  8,574 in 2018—a more than 20 percent increase. Despite the increase in  the number of positions staffed, our analysis found that as of March 31,  2018, overall, 13 percent of State’s overseas Foreign Service positions  were vacant. This vacancy percentage is similar to the percentages of  vacancies in overseas Foreign Service positions that we reported in 2012  and 2008. In 2012, we reported that 14 percent of State’s overseas  Foreign Service positions were vacant as of October 31, 2011, and we  reported that the same percentage of overseas Foreign Service  positions—14 percent—were vacant as of September 30, 2008.

According to State officials, State’s ability to hire Foreign Service  employees to fill persistent vacancies has been affected by factors such  as reduced appropriations. For instance, according to State officials and  State’s Five Year Workforce Plan, because of funding cuts enacted in  fiscal year 2013, State could only hire one employee for every two leaving  the Foreign Service. From fiscal years 2014 to 2016, funding for State’s  annual appropriations supported hiring to replace Foreign Service  employees projected to leave the agency, according to State officials.  These officials indicated, however, that Foreign Service hiring was again  impacted from January 2017 through May 2018 by a hiring freeze. As a  result, State hired below levels required to replace full projected attrition  of Foreign Service employees.

State’s Data Show Higher Vacancy Rates in Foreign Service Specialist Positions Compared to Foreign Service Generalist Positions

While State’s data show persistent vacancies in both generalist and  specialist positions at overseas posts, specialist positions remain vacant  at a higher rate. State’s data show that 12 percent (680 of 5,660) of  overseas Foreign Service generalist positions were vacant as of March  31, 2018, a slight decrease from the 14 percent of overseas Foreign  Service generalist positions that we reported vacant in 2012. State’s  data also show that 14.2 percent (594 of 4,188) of all overseas Foreign  Service specialist positions were vacant, close to the 14.8 percent  vacancy rate that we reported in 2012.

State’s data show persistent vacancies in Foreign Service generalist  positions responsible for analysis, engagement, and reporting at overseas  posts. As shown in table 1, among Foreign Service generalist career  tracks, the political, economic, and “other” tracks had the largest  percentage of vacant positions, with, respectively, 20 percent, 16 percent,  and 14 percent of positions vacant as of March 31, 2018. Our 2012 report  noted vacancies in the same three career tracks. Political officers at  overseas posts are responsible for collecting and analyzing information  on political events, engaging with foreign governments, and reporting  back to State headquarters. Economic officers at overseas posts work  with foreign governments and other U.S. agencies on technology,  science, economic, trade, and environmental issues. The “other”  generalist career track includes positions designated as “Executive” or  “International Relations,” which, according to State officials, may be filled  by generalists from any of State’s five career tracks.

State’s data show persistent vacancies in Foreign Service specialist  positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts.  Among the 10 largest Foreign Service specialist skill groups, security  officer, office management specialist, and information management had  the largest percentages of vacant positions. As shown in figure 3, in these  three groups, respectively, 16 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent of  positions were vacant. The vacancies in these three specialist skill groups  are persistent; in 2012, we reported that the same three groups had the  largest numbers of vacant positions. Security officers are typically  responsible for responding to various threats to the physical security of  overseas posts and for ensuring the protection of post staff, their family  members, and local staff. Office management specialists provide  professional management and administrative support. Information  management staff are typically responsible for maintaining and ensuring  the security of State’s computer networks and communications systems  at overseas posts.

State Faces Challenges Recruiting Personnel to Fill Some Foreign Service Specialist Positions That Often Require Specialized Skills and Competencies

State officials said that State has had difficulty in recruiting and hiring  Foreign Service employees to fill specialist positions in some skill groups  at overseas posts. According to State officials and staff at overseas posts,  some vacant specialist positions are more difficult to fill than others  because candidates for these positions must often possess skills in fields  such as medicine or information technology that tend to be highly sought  after in the private sector. According to staff at overseas posts, it is not  uncommon for specialist candidates in these fields to choose higher- paying jobs in the private sector rather than specialist positions in the  Foreign Service. Additionally, in some circumstances, State must  compete with other federal agencies to recruit specialists from the same  limited pool of talent. Consequently, according to State officials, State has  been unable to attract and retain personnel with the skills necessary to fill  some Foreign Service specialist positions, which has led to persistent  vacancies in specialist positions.

Vacancies in Foreign Service specialist positions at overseas posts  present additional challenges because specialized skills and  competencies are often required to perform the work of these positions.  According to State officials, because Foreign Service generalists may be  assigned to work outside of their career tracks, in some circumstances,  State has more flexibility in filling a generalist vacancy than a specialist  vacancy. For example, generalists outside the consular career track can  serve as a consular officer for one or more tours of duty. However,  specialist positions often require specialized skills or experience that  generalists may not possess. In addition, according to staff at overseas  posts, it is generally not possible for a Foreign Service specialist from one  skill group to perform the work of a Foreign Service specialist from a  different skill group. For instance, a Foreign Service specialist assigned  to the medical section at a post will not be able to help address the  workload of a vacant position in the information management section.  Thus, according to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in specialist  positions at the posts may create greater challenges than vacancies in  generalist positions.

State’s Data Show Persistent Foreign Service Vacancies at Overseas Posts with State’s Highest Foreign Policy Priorities

According to State’s data, as of March 31, 2018, overseas posts with  State’s highest foreign policy priorities had the highest percentages of  vacant Foreign Service positions. Using its Overseas Staffing Model  process, State assigns each embassy to one of seven categories based  primarily on the level and type of work required to pursue the U.S.  government’s diplomatic relations with the host country at post. As we  previously reported, the rankings are closely associated with the  department’s foreign policy priorities; the higher the category, the greater  the resources needed to conduct the work of the overseas post and the  higher the post’s foreign policy priority. For example, the highest-level  category, level 5+, includes the largest, most comprehensive full-service  posts, where the host country’s regional and global role requires  extensive U.S. personnel resources. The lowest-level category includes  small embassies with limited requirements for advocacy, liaison, and  coordination in the host country’s government. As shown in table 2,  according to State’s data, as of March 31, 2018, overseas posts in the  “Embassy 5+” category had the highest percentage of vacant positions.  The results of this analysis were similar to those we reported in 2012.

State’s Data Show Higher Vacancy Rates in Regions with Security Risks That Could Threaten U.S. Foreign Policy Interests

While State has Foreign Service vacancies worldwide, as of March 31,  2018, the highest percentages of vacancies were in the South and  Central Asian Affairs Bureau (SCA) and Near Eastern Affairs Bureau  (NEA)—bureaus representing regions with heightened security risks that  could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests, according to State. SCA,  which includes countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, faces  a host of security and stability challenges that could threaten U.S.  interests, according to a February 2018 report from State’s Office of  Inspector General. NEA includes countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and  Saudi Arabia, which have faced numerous security threats in recent years  that could also threaten U.S. interests overseas.

As shown in figure 4, among State’s regional bureaus, as of March 31,  2018, SCA and NEA had the highest percentages of overseas Foreign  Service vacancies at 21 percent (238 of 1,115 positions) and 18 percent  (234 of 1,279 positions), respectively. In 2012, we reported that these  two bureaus also had the highest percentages of overseas Foreign  Service vacancies among regional bureaus.

Overseas Foreign Service Vacancies Have Adverse Effects on State’s Diplomatic Readiness Vacancies in Overseas Foreign Service Positions Increase Workloads and Affect Employee Morale, According to Staff at Overseas Posts

Vacancies in Foreign Service positions at overseas posts increase  workloads and adversely affect the morale of Foreign Service employees.  According to State officials in headquarters and staff at overseas posts,  when a Foreign Service position at an overseas post is vacant, Foreign  Service employees at that post are generally responsible for covering the  workload of the vacant position. Further, Foreign Service employees at  some posts—particularly posts with fewer Foreign Service staff—may be  responsible for covering the workload of multiple vacant positions. For  example, at two African posts we heard examples of Foreign Service  employees covering the workload of multiple vacant Foreign Service  positions. As a result of increased workloads, Foreign Service employees  are also more likely to have less time available to perform some important  functions, according to staff at overseas posts. According to staff at  overseas posts, such functions include training and supervising entry- level Foreign Service employees, local staff, and eligible family members  (EFM); reducing the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse; improving and  innovating processes at post that could reduce inefficiencies; initiating  and implementing projects that could enhance various diplomatic efforts;  and conducting maintenance of systems.

In addition, according to staff at overseas posts, vacancies adversely  affect staff morale. Staff at multiple posts said that vacancies and the  resulting increased workloads had created substantial stress and  increased “burnout” of Foreign Service employees at the posts. They  noted that these levels of stress and burnout had contributed to Foreign  Service employees’ ending their overseas assignments early for medical  or personal reasons. These curtailments, in turn, had increased the  overall vacancies and their effects at overseas posts.

Vacancies in Overseas Foreign Service Generalist Positions, Especially in the Political and Economic Career Tracks, Adversely Affect State’s Diplomatic Readiness

According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in Foreign Service  generalist positions at overseas posts adversely affect State’s diplomatic  readiness. Among Foreign Service generalist career tracks, the political  and economic career tracks had the two largest percentages of vacant  positions—20 percent and 16 percent, respectively—as of March 31,  2018.

According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in political and economic  positions at overseas posts—particularly posts with fewer Foreign Service  employees—limit the amount of reporting on political and economic  developments that posts are able to submit back to State headquarters.  For example, Foreign Service employees from three posts in Africa told  us that persistent, long-term vacancies in those posts’ political and  economic positions had constrained their abilities to provide full reporting  on political and economic developments in their host countries. According  to staff at overseas posts, reporting on political and economic  developments in other countries—submitted by overseas posts back to  State headquarters—is essential for State to make informed foreign policy  decisions. Foreign Service employees from two posts in large countries in  East and South Asia also told us that vacancies in these sections had  limited their capacity to engage with host government officials on  important, strategic issues for the United States, such as reducing nuclear  proliferation or enhancing trade and investment relationships with the  United States. Vacancies in the political and economic career tracks at  overseas posts could adversely affect State’s ability to achieve two of the  goals in State and USAID’s joint strategic plan for fiscal years 2018  through 2022—(1) renew America’s competitive advantage for sustained  economic growth and job creation and (2) promote American leadership  through balanced engagement.

Vacancies in Overseas Foreign Service Specialist Positions May Heighten Security Risks at Overseas Posts and Disrupt Post Operations

According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in Foreign Service  specialist positions at overseas posts may heighten the level of security  risk at the posts and disrupt post operations. Among Foreign Service  specialist skill groups with the highest number of vacant positions,  security officer, office management specialist, and information  management had the largest percentages of vacant positions—16  percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent, respectively—as of March 31, 2018.

According to staff at overseas posts, vacancies in security officer  positions at overseas posts reduce the amount of time that security staff  can spend identifying, investigating, and responding to potential security  threats to the post. Security officers are also responsible for identifying  and analyzing host-country intelligence-gathering efforts at their  respective overseas posts—and post staff told us that, because of  vacancies in these positions, some security officers had been unable to  complete this work for their posts, potentially increasing the risk of foreign  government officials gaining access to sensitive information. Also, post  staff told us that security officer vacancies limit the amount of time that  security officers present at posts can devote to important security  oversight activities, including regular training, drilling, and supervising of  local guard forces and security contractors. Post staff noted, for example,  that security officers at overseas posts should conduct regular training  and drilling exercises to evaluate their local guard force’s effectiveness in  searching a vehicle entering the post compound for explosive devices.  According to post staff, when these important security oversight activities  are not properly and regularly conducted, the level of security risk at  these overseas posts may increase.

According to State officials in headquarters and staff at overseas posts,  as well as reporting by State’s OIG, vacancies in information  management positions at overseas posts have increased the vulnerability  of posts’ computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other  malicious threats. State officials told us that the Foreign Service had  faced chronic shortages of information management staff available to fill  these positions worldwide. According to State officials, because of  ongoing information management vacancies, some required tasks—such  as conducting planned network maintenance—were performed  infrequently or not at all. In another example, staff at overseas posts said  that because of vacancies, information management staff had been  unable to regularly check their computer system logs to ensure that  security breaches had not taken place. Post staff added that, if a breach  did occur, vacancies could increase the amount of time needed to identify  an attack and deploy countermeasures, further increasing the risks to  posts’ computer networks. Inspections conducted by State’s OIG from fall  2014 to spring 2016 found that information management staff at 33  percent of overseas posts had not performed various required information  management duties. According to State’s OIG, neglect of these duties  may leave the department vulnerable to increased cybersecurity attacks.

According to staff at overseas posts, the office management specialist  position at overseas posts has evolved considerably over time; these  specialists increasingly play a critical role in ensuring that the work of  overseas posts is effectively completed. Post staff said that office  management specialists provide administrative and other support  services to other Foreign Service employees and are assigned to various  sections of post. For example, staff at one post noted that office  management specialists assigned to the Security Officer sections at  overseas posts reduce the workload of security officers by completing  more routine security tasks and allowing the security officers to focus on  more challenging or involved tasks necessary to secure overseas posts.  Post staff told us that vacancies in office management specialist positions  reduce the amount of work that can be completed by other Foreign  Service employees at overseas posts. For example, when office  management specialist positions assigned to the Security Officer or  Information Management sections of posts are vacant, these vacancies  further exacerbate the higher number of vacancies that already exist in  these sections. According to staff at overseas posts, higher numbers of  office management specialist vacancies require other Foreign Service  employees to spend a significant amount of time on administrative tasks,  reducing the amount of time these staff can spend on mission-critical  activities.

State Described Various Efforts to Address Overseas Foreign Service Vacancies, but These Efforts Are Not Guided by an Integrated Action Plan to Reduce Persistent Vacancies State Officials Described Various Efforts to Help Address Vacancies

Officials in headquarters and at overseas posts described various State  efforts to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies. According to  State officials, Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts are a  complex problem that multiple offices within State address on an  individual basis.

State’s Efforts to Address Overseas Foreign Service Vacancies Are Not Guided by an Integrated Action Plan to Reduce Persistent Vacancies

State’s various efforts to address overseas Foreign Service vacancies are  not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies.  Our 2017 High-Risk Series report calls for agencies to, among other  things, design and implement action plan strategies for closing skills  gaps. The action plan should (1) define the root cause of all skills gaps  within an agency and (2) provide suggested corrective measures,  including steps necessary to implement solutions. This report also  emphasizes the high risk that mission-critical skills gaps in the federal  workforce pose to the nation.

While various State offices have implemented the efforts we identified,  State lacks an action plan that is integrated—or consolidated—across its  relevant offices to guide its efforts to address persistent overseas Foreign  Service vacancies. Moreover, some staff at overseas posts  acknowledged that the efforts State has taken to help address vacancies  have not reduced persistent Foreign Service vacancies, notably in  specialist positions. In response to our inquiry about an action plan, State  officials said that the agency does not have a single document that  addresses Foreign Service staffing gaps at overseas posts. Instead, State  officials directed us to State’s Five Year Workforce Plan: Fiscal Years  2016-2020, stating that it was the most comprehensive document that  outlines State’s efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies at overseas  posts. The workforce plan notes that it provides a framework to address  State’s human capital requirements and highlights State’s challenges and  achievements in recruiting, hiring, staffing, and training Foreign Service  staff. However, in reviewing the portions of the workforce plan that State  indicated were most relevant, we found that the workforce plan does not  include an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of the  persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies we identified or suggest  corrective measures to reduce vacancies in these positions, including  steps necessary to implement solutions.

State officials also noted that they frequently meet to discuss and address  workforce issues. For example, they said they convene a multi-bureau  planning group that meets biweekly to discuss strategic workforce issues  such as hiring needs based on attrition and other issues. However,  according to State officials, this group has not developed an action plan to  reduce persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts.

State lacks an integrated action plan to guide its efforts to address  persistent Foreign Service vacancies that includes corrective measures to  address the root causes of the vacancies. Without defining the root  causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and  identifying appropriate corrective measures, overseas vacancies may  persist and continue to adversely affect State’s ability to achieve U.S.  foreign policy goals.

Foreign Service generalists and specialists at overseas posts are critical  to advancing U.S. foreign policy and economic interests abroad.  However, for at least a decade, the Foreign Service has had persistent  vacancies in both generalist and specialist positions at overseas posts. In  particular, large numbers of vacant positions have persisted over time in  certain overseas Foreign Service positions, such as information  management and security officer positions. These vacancies in critical  positions at overseas posts have adversely affected State’s ability to carry  out its mission effectively and threaten State’s ability to ensure the  security and safety of its employees, their families, and post facilities.  While State has made some efforts to address Foreign Service  vacancies, addressing chronic vacancies in critical positions at overseas  posts requires a thoughtful, coherent, and integrated action plan that  defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at  overseas posts along with suggested corrective measures to reduce such  vacancies, following what was called for in our 2017 High-Risk Series  report. Developing such an action plan would help State address its  persistent staffing gaps, improve its ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy  goals, and help ensure secure and efficient operations.

The Secretary of State should develop an integrated action plan that  defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at  overseas posts and provides suggested corrective measures to reduce  such vacancies, including steps necessary to implement solutions.  (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment. In its  comments, reproduced in appendix III, State concurred with our  recommendation. State also noted that it has taken actions and identified  some causes of vacancies, but acknowledged that it lacks an integrated  action plan and will take steps to develop such a plan. State also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6881 or bairj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix IV.

This report examines (1) vacancies in the Department of State’s (State)  Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign  Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State’s efforts to  address Foreign Service vacancies.

To address these three objectives, we interviewed State officials from the  department’s Bureau of Human Resources and Bureau of Consular  Affairs as well as State officials representing the Offices of the Executive  Director for State’s six regional bureaus. We also interviewed staff at 10  overseas posts. We conducted in-person interviews with staff at 3 of  these posts—the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate in  Shanghai, China, and the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. We  conducted telephone interviews with staff at the other 7 posts—the U.S.  Embassies in Abuja, Nigeria; Bogota, Colombia; Kinshasa, Democratic  Republic of the Congo; Kabul, Afghanistan; Mexico City, Mexico; and  N’Djamena, Chad; and the U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt, Germany. We  used the following criteria to select overseas posts for interviews: (1)  posts with larger numbers of Foreign Service vacancies; (2) posts with  diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant; (3)  posts with higher relative importance to U.S. economic, national security,  and other foreign policy interests; and (4) posts in a range of geographic  locations by State region.

To examine vacancies in State’s Foreign Service staffing at overseas  posts, we analyzed State’s personnel data on Foreign Service staffing at  overseas posts from the department’s Global Employment Management  System (GEMS), as of March 2018. Our analysis of the GEMS data  includes Foreign Service positions filled by permanent Foreign Service  employees as well as positions filled by nonpermanent Foreign Service  employees, such as Consular Fellows. This analysis does not include the  number of staffed and vacant positions at overseas posts in Libya, Syria,  and Yemen, which, at the time of our review, were in suspended  operations status, as well as U.S. Mission Somalia, which was operating  under special circumstances at a different location.

To calculate vacancy rates, we divided the total number of positions by  the number of positions listed as vacant in GEMS. For example, a post  with 10 positions and 2 vacancies would have a vacancy rate of 20  percent. We calculated vacancy rates for each of the following categories:  type (i.e., generalist or specialist), function (e.g., consular or information  management), regional bureau (i.e., Bureau of African Affairs or Bureau  of Western Hemisphere Affairs), and embassy and nonembassy rankings  from State’s Overseas Staffing Model (i.e., Embassy 3+ or 5).

According to State officials, the data in GEMS have a number of  limitations:

The number of vacant positions at overseas posts listed in GEMS  may be overstated, because State has not yet decided to remove  some of these positions from its database.

Some of the vacancies in GEMS are short-term or temporary. Foreign  Service employees periodically rotate out of their positions at their  overseas posts, sometimes creating temporary vacancies until the  positions are filled by incoming Foreign Service employees.

The GEMS data show larger numbers of vacant Foreign Service  positions at posts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan than actually  were unstaffed at these posts. According to State officials, this  discrepancy results from State’s relying heavily on shorter-term  assignments to fill Foreign Service positions at these locations. These  shorter-term assignments are not reflected in GEMS, and the  positions therefore appear vacant.

The GEMS data may not reflect Foreign Service employees who have  been temporarily reassigned from one overseas post to another.

The GEMS data may show positions as filled although the Foreign  Service employee filling the position has not yet arrived at post.

To assess the reliability of the GEMS database, we asked State officials  whether State had made any major changes to the database since our  2012 report, when we assessed the GEMS data to be sufficiently reliable.  State officials indicated that no major changes had been made. We also  tested the data for completeness, confirmed the general accuracy of the  data with officials at selected overseas posts, and interviewed  knowledgeable officials from State’s Office of Resource Management and  Organizational Analysis concerning the data’s reliability. We found the  GEMS data to be reliable for the purpose of determining the numbers and  percentages of vacant Foreign Service positions at overseas posts. We  did not validate whether the total number of authorized overseas Foreign  Service positions was appropriate or met State’s needs.

We also reviewed State workforce planning documents and budget  documents, such as State’s Five Year Workforce and Leadership  Succession Plan: Fiscal Years 2016-2020 and Quadrennial Diplomacy  and Development Review. In addition, we reviewed State Office of  Inspector General reports as well as our previous reports on human  capital challenges at State and effective strategic human capital  management across the federal government. In particular, our report  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial  Efforts Needed on Others notes that strategic human capital management  is a high-risk issue across the federal government and lists five key  elements as a road map for agency efforts to improve and ultimately  address such issues. For our third objective, we assessed whether  State’s efforts to address vacancies were guided by a corrective action  plan that identifies the root causes of persistent Foreign Service  vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce  such vacancies, including steps necessary to implement solutions.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to March 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Analysis of Vacant Foreign Service Positions at Overseas Posts in Various Categories as of March 31, 2018

Management 10 largest specialist skill groups at overseas posts Security Officer

Staffed positions at overseas posts Overseas posts by Overseas Staffing Model category Embassy 1 or 2 655

The “Economic” generalist career track includes positions from the “Science Officer” staffing skill  group in the GEMS data.  170 Foreign Service employees were not staffed to one of the six regional bureaus.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant  Director), Ian Ferguson (Analyst-in-Charge), Anthony Costulas, Natalia  Pena, Debbie Chung, Chris Keblitis, Reid Lowe, Justin Fisher, and  Alexander Welsh made key contributions to this report.

The Department of State's Foreign Service staff at posts around the world provide a range of services, such as processing visa applications and promoting U.S. interests abroad.

Since 2008, State has had trouble filling some positions at these posts, notably in information management and security, but State doesn't have a plan to address this issue. Chronic vacancies increase Foreign Service staff workloads, raise stress, and lower morale. Without identifying and addressing persistent vacancies, the work and security of overseas personnel suffer.

We recommended that State develop a plan to define the causes of and reduce persistent vacancies.


Department of Justice: Continued Action Needed To Address Incarceration Challenges and Offenders' Reentry

BOP's rising costs and offender recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation. For example, BOP's operating costs have generally increased over time, and in fiscal year 2017 amounted to more than $6.9 billion, or 24 percent of DOJ's total discretionary budget. In addition, from 1980 through 2013, BOP's prison population increased by almost 800 percent, from 24,640 to 219,298. While the prison population began to decline in 2013, DOJ has continued to identify prison crowding as a critical issue. GAO has examined a number of DOJ efforts to slow the growth of the prison population and to reduce recidivism through the use of reentry programs to help offenders successfully return to the community.

This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address (1) DOJ's incarceration reduction initiatives, and (2) BOP reentry programs.

This statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 through June 2016, along with updates on the status of recommendations obtained as of December 2017. For the updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has fully addressed two of six GAO recommendations related to its incarceration reduction initiatives . In June 2015 and June 2016, GAO reported that to help address challenges associated with incarceration, DOJ had, among other things, taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing initiatives to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes. GAO made six recommendations to DOJ related to these efforts. As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and has not fully addressed the remaining four. Specifically, to enhance efforts to measure program outcomes, DOJ issued guidance on proper data entry and began tracking data on different types of pretrial diversion programs that allow certain offenders to avoid incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In addition, as of December 2017, DOJ has taken steps to partially implement GAO's recommendation to address unnecessary delays in reviewing inmates' petitions to commute their sentences.

DOJ has not taken action to address recommendations to better assess the results of pretrial diversion programs or another effort to prioritize prosecutions and reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities, among other goals. Further, in December 2017, DOJ noted there had been policy changes since GAO made a recommendation related to enhancing measures to monitor prioritizing prosecution and sentencing reform. Although DOJ reported taking some actions to implement GAO's recommendation, these actions did not include establishing measures that incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement systems.

DOJ has addressed two of four GAO recommendations related to its reentry programs . As part of its mission to protect public safety, DOJ's Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides reentry programming that aims to facilitate offenders' successful return to the community and reduce recidivism (a return to prison or criminal behavior). These reentry efforts include programs offered in BOP facilities as well as contractor-managed residential reentry centers (RRC)—also known as halfway houses—and home confinement services that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the community. GAO issued three reports in February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 and made four recommendations to BOP in this area.

As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the four recommendations and has begun to take action to address one of the remaining two. Specifically, to implement one of GAO's recommendations, DOJ established a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of all the 18 reentry programs it offers to inmates in BOP facilities. To implement another GAO recommendation to improve cost management, DOJ began requiring contractors to submit separate prices for RRC beds and home confinement services. As of December 2017, DOJ noted it has taken initial steps to address a recommendation to track outcome data for its RRC and home confinement programs; however, it has not taken action to develop measures to assess the performance of these programs.

GAO has made 10 recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve performance measurement and resource management. DOJ generally concurred and has addressed or taken steps to address several. GAO continues to believe all of these recommendations should be fully implemented.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our  prior work on ways in which the Department of Justice (DOJ) can better  assess incarceration reduction initiatives and reentry efforts. This  statement reflects prior GAO products issued from February 2012 through  June 2016, along with recent updates on the status of our  recommendations.

As of December 2017, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was  responsible for about 184,000 federal inmates and operating 122  institutions (prisons) across the country. BOP’s rising costs and offender  recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation.  For example, BOP’s operating costs have generally increased over time,  and in fiscal year 2017 amounted to more than $6.9 billion, or 24 percent  of DOJ’s total discretionary budget. In addition, from 1980 through 2013,  BOP’s prison population increased by almost 800 percent, from 24,640 to  219,298. While the prison population began to decline in 2013, DOJ has  continued to identify prison crowding as a critical issue, particularly in high  security institutions. Further, while BOP reports that recidivism rates have  declined over the past two decades, the U.S. Sentencing Commission  found that of federal offenders released in 2005, 49 percent were  rearrested, 32 percent were reconvicted, and 25 percent were  reincarcerated during the eight year follow-up period.

During the course of our prior work, DOJ was taking steps to slow the  growth of the federal prison population by pursuing alternatives to  incarceration at various stages of the criminal justice process for  nonviolent, low-level offenders, in part to help reduce the size and related  costs of the federal prison population. Knowing the outcomes of these  efforts can help BOP adjust its policies and procedures, and ultimately  optimize their benefits.

My testimony today is based on our work examining DOJ’s efforts to  manage the federal prison system. This statement addresses two key areas in which we have issued reports and highlights our  recommendations to DOJ to enhance program performance  measurement and resource management. Specifically, this statement  addresses (1) DOJ’s incarceration reduction initiatives and (2) BOP’s  reentry programs.

This statement is based on several reports we issued from February 2012  through June 2016, and includes updates on selected aspects of these  reports as of December 2017. For our prior work, we reviewed relevant  laws and DOJ and BOP policies, and analyzed documentation and data  on the use of incarceration alternatives at or before sentencing. In  addition, we interviewed DOJ and BOP headquarters and district officials,  and conducted site visits to selected BOP institutions (which were chosen  to cover a range of characteristics, including but not limited to inmate  gender and presence of relevant BOP programs). More information about  the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found in those  reports.

To update the status of DOJ’s efforts to address the recommendations we  made in these reports, we collected and analyzed information from DOJ  and BOP program officials on actions they have taken or planned in  response. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Key Stakeholders in the Federal Criminal Justice Process

Various DOJ and federal judiciary stakeholders play key roles in the  federal criminal justice process, and as such, they can also have key  roles in considering whether to use incarceration alternatives for a given  offender or inmate. For example, in the course of the federal criminal  justice process, a U.S. attorney is involved in the process of investigating,  charging and prosecuting an offender, among other responsibilities.  Federal defenders are called upon to represent defendants who are  unable to financially retain counsel in federal criminal proceedings. The  U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Office (PPSO), an office within the  judiciary, also has responsibilities including supervising an offender  pretrial or after conviction. Federal judges are responsible for determining  an offender’s sentence, and, in the case of incarceration, BOP is  responsible for caring for the inmate while in custody.

Federal laws and guidelines determine what, if any, incarceration is  appropriate for offenders. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984  established the independent U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) within  the judicial branch and charged it with, among other things, developing  federal sentencing guidelines. The guidelines specify sentencing  guideline ranges—a range of time (in months) that offenders should serve  given the nature of their offense and other factors—but also permit  sentences to depart upward or downward from guideline ranges because  of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In 2005, the Supreme Court  found the sentencing guidelines, which had previously been binding for  federal judges to follow in sentencing criminal defendants, to be advisory  in nature. Regardless of the guidelines’ advisory nature, judges are still  required to calculate sentences properly and to consider the guideline  ranges as well as the nature and circumstances of the offense, the  defendant’s history, and the need for deterrence, among other sentencing  goals.

As we reported in June 2016, alternatives to incarceration were available  at various steps in the federal criminal justice process, from charging and  prosecution through incarceration (see figure 1).

For instance, at the front-end of the criminal justice process, there are  pretrial diversion programs that can provide offenders an opportunity to  avoid prosecution or incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In  addition, toward the end of inmates’ periods of incarceration, BOP may  place inmates in residential reentry centers (RRC, also known as halfway  houses), in which inmates are housed outside of a prison environment  prior to their release in the community. During their time in RRCs, inmates  are authorized to leave for approved activities, such as work; are  monitored 24 hours a day, such as through sign-out procedures; are  required to work or be actively seeking work; and are required to pay a  percentage of their salaries as a subsistence fee to cover some of their  expenses at the RRC.

In addition, BOP may place inmates in home confinement toward the end  of their sentences. While in home confinement, inmates are required to  remain in their homes when not involved in approved activities, such as  employment, and are supervised and monitored, such as through  curfews, random staff visits, or electronic monitoring. RRC staff may  provide the supervision of inmates in home confinement. Through an  interagency agreement, BOP and the PPSO also established the Federal  Location Monitoring Program, through which PPSO officers provide  supervision for BOP inmates on home confinement under certain  conditions. Among other things, to qualify inmates ordinarily must be  classified as minimum security level; seek and maintain employment; and  pay for all or part of the costs of the Federal Location Monitoring  Program.

Overview of BOP’s Institutions and Role in Transitioning Offenders into Society

BOP is responsible for the custody and care of federal inmates. As of  December 2017, there were a total of about 184,000 federal inmates,  according to BOP. According to BOP data, 83 percent of these inmates  are in the 122 institutions managed by BOP. The remainder are confined  in secure privately managed or community-based facilities, local jails, or  in home confinement.

BOP has a role to help ensure that offenders properly transition into  society and avoid a return to prison or criminal behavior (recidivism) after  they have completed their terms of incarceration. Among other activities,  BOP provides reentry services to inmates within federal prisons that may  include drug treatment programs, education and vocational training, and  psychology services. BOP also is to facilitate the transfer of inmates into  RRCs, which provide assistance as inmates transition into communities,  to include home confinement. RRCs provide employment counseling and  job placement assistance, financial management assistance, and  substance abuse treatment or counseling as well as other services, which  may vary by facility. According to BOP, approximately 180 RRCs provide  housing for over 7,500 federal offenders prior to release into their  communities.

Federal Collateral Consequences Can Affect Reentry

As we reported in September 2017, individuals convicted of a crime may  have limitations placed upon them that can affect their reentry.  Individuals convicted of a crime generally face a sentence, which can  include fines, probation, and incarceration in jail or prison. In addition to  the sentence, individuals may also face collateral consequences— penalties and disadvantages, other than those associated with a  sentence, which can be imposed upon an individual as a result of a  conviction. For example, collateral consequences may prohibit people  who committed crimes involving a sex offense or offense involving a child  victim from working in a child care facility. Collateral consequences can  be contained in federal and state laws and regulations. Notably, federal  collateral consequences can serve various functions, such as enhancing  public safety or protecting government interests. In 2012, the American  Bar Association began compiling the first nationwide inventory of  collateral consequences, known as the National Inventory of the  Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC). As of December 31,  2016, the NICCC contained roughly 46,000 collateral consequences  established through federal and state laws and regulations.

We reported on collateral consequences contained in federal laws and  regulations (i.e., federal collateral consequences) that can be imposed  upon individuals with nonviolent drug convictions (NVDC). Our review of  the NICCC found that, as of December 31, 2016, there were 641  collateral consequences in federal laws and regulations that can be  triggered by NVDC. The NICCC data indicated that these 641 collateral  consequences can limit many aspects of an individual’s life, such as  employment, business licenses, education, and government benefits. For  example, individuals may be ineligible for certain professional licenses,  federal education loans, or federal food assistance. Moreover, we found  that the NICCC identified that 78 percent of these 641 collateral  consequences can potentially last a lifetime.

We also reported on selected stakeholders’ views. We spoke to 14  individuals who were leaders of organizations representing judges,  victims of crime, and states, among others—on actions the federal  government could consider to mitigate these collateral consequences.  Most of the stakeholders that we interviewed—13 of 14—said it was  important for the federal government to take action to mitigate federal  collateral consequences for NVDC. Thirteen stakeholders said that  mitigating federal collateral consequences could potentially reduce the  likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend. Similarly, 11 stakeholders  said that mitigation could potentially increase the likelihood that  individuals with NVDC successfully reenter the community after jail or  prison. The text box below identifies some of the statements made by  stakeholders during our interviews from our prior work regarding federal  collateral consequences for NVDC.

Stakeholder Perspectives on Federal Collateral Consequences for Nonviolent Drug Convictions, as Reported in GAO-17-691 “The breadth of federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions is so massive and affects so many aspects of a  person’s life, such as family life, immigration, jury service, housing, employment, and voting, that they contribute to an underclass  of people.”   “Many instances wherein the federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions end up making it hard for people to  live a law abiding life. For example, they may not be able to live in public housing or may be barred from getting an occupational  license or doing a particular job. This may push them to turn back to committing crimes to make some money.”   “…some federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions are sensible and appropriate. If we abolish  exist  you could imperil public safety…”   “We can’t just say we’re going to err on the side of public safety and implement a wide range of collateral consequences strictly  across the board. The problem is that public safety is undermined by making it impossible for individuals to move on from the  criminal offense.”   “It is important not to assume that nonviolent means that there is no victim.”

Since 1980, the federal prison population increased from about 25,000 to  about 184,000, as of December 2017. In June 2015 and June 2016, we  reported that in part to help address challenges associated with  overcrowding in certain institutions and related costs of incarceration,  DOJ had taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing  initiatives to: use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent  crimes; prioritize prosecutions to focus on serious cases; and commute,  or reduce, sentences of qualified federal inmates. In these reports, we  highlighted potential areas for continued oversight of these initiatives and  made six recommendations. DOJ concurred with five of these  recommendations and partially concurred with the other. As of December  2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and had not  fully addressed the remaining four.

DOJ could better measure effectiveness of pretrial diversion  alternatives. In June 2016, we reported that DOJ had taken steps to  pursue alternatives to incarceration for certain offenders, but could  improve data collection and efforts to measure outcomes resulting from  the use of pretrial diversion alternatives. Our review examined two  pretrial diversion programs on the front-end of the criminal justice process  that provided offenders an opportunity to avoid incarceration if they satisfy  program requirements. Title 9 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual permits U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices to divert, at the discretion of a U.S. Attorney, certain  federal offenders from prosecution into a program of supervision and  services administered by the PPSO. Under the Title 9 diversion program,  if the offender fulfills the terms of the program, the offender will not be  prosecuted, or, if the offender has already been charged, the charges will  be dismissed.

In addition to the Title 9 Pretrial Diversion Program, federal criminal  justice stakeholders within some judicial districts have voluntarily  established court-involved pretrial diversion practices. Court-involved  pretrial diversion allows certain federal offenders the opportunity to  participate in supervised programs or services, such as a drug court to  address criminal behavior that may be linked to addiction to drugs or  alcohol. Program participants are to meet regularly with court officials  including a judge and pretrial services officer to discuss their progress in  the program. If the offender satisfies program requirements, the offender  may not be prosecuted, charges may be dismissed, or the participant  may receive a reduced sentence.

While DOJ had collected some data on the use of pretrial diversion, we  found that the data were of limited usefulness and reliability because its  case management system did not distinguish between the different types  of diversion and DOJ had not provided guidance to U.S. Attorneys’  Offices as to when and how pretrial diversion cases are to be entered into  the system. In addition, we found that DOJ had not measured the  outcomes or identified the cost implications of its pretrial diversion  programs. To address these deficiencies, we made four  recommendations to DOJ. The first two relate to tracking and entering  pretrial diversion data, while the second two relate to assessing outcomes  based on the data. Specifically, we recommended that DOJ (1) separately  identify and track the different types of pretrial diversion programs, (2)  provide guidance to its attorneys on the appropriate way to enter data, (3)  identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes and costs of pretrial  diversion programs, and (4) develop performance measures to assess  diversion program outcomes. DOJ concurred with all four of our  recommendations.

In October 2016, DOJ took actions to fully implement the first two  recommendations. Specifically, in September 2016, DOJ provided  guidance to staff in its U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that outlines (1) the use of  two new pretrial diversion codes—one for Title 9 pretrial diversion and  another for court-involved diversion and (2) the appropriate entries to  create and dispose of each type of pretrial diversion. Attorneys were  instructed to use the codes starting on October 1, 2016. However, as of  December 2017, DOJ has not implemented the third and fourth  recommendations. We continue to believe that by obtaining data on the  costs and outcomes of pretrial diversion programs and establishing  performance measures, DOJ would gain multiple advantages in its ability  to manage these programs and optimize their outcomes and cost  implications.

DOJ could better assess initiatives to address prison overcrowding  and costs. In June 2015, we reported that DOJ could better measure the  efficacy of two incarceration initiatives designed to address challenges  related to overcrowding and rising costs. One of these was the Smart on  Crime initiative, announced in August 2013 as a comprehensive effort to: prioritize prosecutions to focus on the most serious cases;  reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities and reduce  overburdened prisons; pursue alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes;  improve reentry to curb repeat offenses and re-victimization; and  surge resources to prevent violence and protecting most vulnerable  populations.

In our report, we found that DOJ had established indicators that were  well-linked to these goals; however, the indicators lacked other key  elements of successful performance measurement systems, such as  clarity, a measurable target, or context. For example, none of the  indicators had numerical targets by which to assess whether overall goals  and objectives are achieved. To address this deficiency, we  recommended that DOJ modify its Smart on Crime indicators to  incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement  systems. DOJ partially concurred with the recommendation, and agreed  to continually refine and enhance the indicators to improve their clarity  and context. However, DOJ did not agree that establishing measurable  targets for its indicators was appropriate. We recognized that it might not  be appropriate to create targets for every indicator. Nevertheless, we  maintained that measurable performance targets that are properly  developed, communicated, and managed, can aid Department leadership  in the admittedly challenging task of assessing progress in the Smart on  Crime Initiative.

In March 2017, DOJ noted that, due to a change in administration, the  status of the Smart on Crime Initiative was uncertain. In May 2017, the  Attorney General issued a new charging and sentencing policy to all  federal prosecutors that effectively rescinded any previous policy of DOJ  that is inconsistent with the new charging and sentencing policy, including  certain aspects of the Smart on Crime Initiative. In December 2017,  DOJ stated it would start to collect data on and monitor the  implementation of this new policy. However, DOJ did not provide  information on how it plans to modify its indicators to incorporate key  elements of successful performance measurement systems. To the  extent that DOJ continues to implement other aspects of the Smart on  Crime initiative, such as improving reentry and surging resources to  prevent violence we continue to believe this recommendation is valid.

The second initiative we addressed in our June 2015 report was the  Clemency Initiative, which encourages nonviolent, low-level federal  offenders to petition to have their sentences commuted, or reduced, by  the President. Commutation of sentence, as we reported, has long been  considered to be an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted.  According to DOJ, in 2013, then-President Obama expressed a desire to  review more petitions, and DOJ pledged to expedite the review of such  petitions in order to provide them to the President for consideration.  However, we found that DOJ had not adequately assessed the extent to  which the Clemency Initiative is expeditiously identifying meritorious  petitions because it had not tracked how long it takes for petitions to clear  each step in its review process or identified and addressed any processes  that may contribute to unnecessary delays. We made a recommendation  to DOJ to address this deficiency. DOJ concurred, but in March 2017  DOJ stated that it had no standard review process to evaluate. In  December 2017, DOJ reported to us that it has taken steps to accelerate  the review of commutation cases, such as assigning two attorneys to  spend additional time on commutation cases. Although DOJ’s actions are  consistent with our recommendation, DOJ has not tracked how long it  takes for petitions to clear each step in its review process. This makes it  unclear whether DOJ’s actions are addressing the processes that  contribute to unnecessary delays.

DOJ Has Addressed Two of Four GAO Recommendations Related to its Reentry Programs

As part of its mission to protect public safety, BOP provides reentry  programming that aims to facilitate offenders’ successful return to the  community and reduce recidivism. These reentry efforts include programs  offered in BOP facilities, as well as RRC and home confinement services  that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the  community. In our February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 reports we  highlighted potential areas for continued oversight and made four  recommendations to BOP. As of December 2017, BOP has implemented  two of the four recommendations and has taken action to address one  other recommendation.

BOP has developed a plan to evaluate its reentry programs. In June  2015, we reported that BOP had 18 reentry programs available to  inmates in BOP institutions in the areas of inmate treatment and  education. We found that while BOP had plans to evaluate the  performance of some of its reentry programs, it did not have a plan in  place to prioritize evaluations across all of these programs. As a result,  we recommended that BOP include, as part of its current evaluation plan,  all 18 of BOP’s national reentry programs, and prioritize its evaluations by  considering factors such as resources required for conducting  evaluations. In May 2016, BOP provided to us an evaluation plan that  was consistent with our recommendation. BOP has continued to update  the evaluation plan to reflect changes in priority. For example, the most  recent plan, updated in July 2017, lists BOP’s Mental Health Step Down  Unit program as its top priority, with a target evaluation date of fiscal year  2018. According to BOP, this reflects the need for analysis of services for  seriously mentally ill inmates.

BOP has taken steps to assess costs of home confinement services.  In February 2012, we reported that BOP did not know the actual cost of  home confinement services. To facilitate inmates’ reintegration into  society, BOP may transfer eligible inmates to community corrections  locations for up to the final 12 months of their sentences. Inmates may  spend this time in a RRC and in confinement in their homes for up to 6  months. BOP contracts with private organizations to manage the RRCs  and monitor inmates in home confinement. At the time of our review,  BOP was paying a rate of 50 percent of the overall per diem rate  negotiated with the RRC for each inmate in home confinement. For  example, if BOP paid a contractor the average community corrections per  diem rate of $70.79 for each inmate housed in a RRC, BOP would pay  $35.39 per day for that contractor’s supervision of each inmate in home  confinement. However, according to BOP, the agency did not require  contractors to provide the actual costs for home confinement services as  part of their contract and therefore did not know the cost of home  confinement. To help BOP better manage its costs, we recommended  that BOP establish a plan for requiring contractors to submit separate  prices of RRC beds and home confinement services. BOP implemented  this recommendation and determined that all new solicitations as of  February 1, 2013, will have separate line items for RRC in-house beds  and home confinement services. According to BOP, as of November  2017, 184 solicitations with separate RRC bed and home confinement  service line items have been issued since February 2013.

BOP could better measure the outcomes of RRCs and home  confinement. In June 2016, we reported that BOP was not positioned to  track the information it would need to help measure the outcomes of  inmates placed in RRCs and home confinement and did not have  performance measures in place. Specifically, we found that, as part of  its strategic plan, BOP had two measures—one to track the number of  inmates placed into RRCs, and another to track the number of inmates  placed in home confinement. However, these measures did not help  assess the outcomes of RRCs and home confinement, such as how  these programs may or may not affect the recidivism rates of inmates. To  address this deficiency, we made two recommendations to BOP to (1)  identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes of the RRC and home  confinement programs; and (2) develop performance measures by which  to help assess program outcomes. DOJ concurred with these  recommendations.

As of December 2017, BOP has taken steps to implement our  recommendation to identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes of  RRCs and home confinement. In particular, BOP reported to us that it has  developed a revised Statement of Work for use with its RRC contractors  that requires the contractors to track and report quarterly to BOP on,  among other things, the number of placements into and releases from  RRCs and home confinement; revocations from RRCs or home  confinement; and RRC and home confinement residents that have  secured full, part-time, or temporary employment. BOP plans to compile  these data to track contractor performance and program outcomes.  Further, BOP reported to us that it has developed a voluntary survey that  asks RRC residents about their RRC experiences, including the amount  of help they received in finding and keeping a job, and finding a place to  live. These actions are in line with our recommendation and we will  continue to monitor their implementation. However, as of December 2017,  BOP has not provided evidence to us that it has developed performance  measures by which to help assess program outcomes. We continue to  believe BOP should do so.

Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have.

For further information about this statement, please contact Diana Maurer  at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Other individuals who made key contributions to this  statement include Brett Fallavollita (Assistant Director), David Alexander,  Pedro Almoguera, Joy Booth, Billy Commons, III, Tonnye’ Connor-White,  Jessica Du, Lorraine Ettaro, Michele Fejfar, Christopher Hatscher, Susan  Hsu, Tom Jessor, Matt Lowney, Heather May, and Jill Verret. Key  contributors for the previous work on which this testimony is based are  listed in each product.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.