James Webb Space Telescope: Integration and Test Challenges Have Delayed Launch and Threaten to Push Costs Over Cap

JWST, a large, deployable telescope intended to be the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. Congress set an $8 billion JWST development cost cap in 2011, and the remaining $837 million is for its operations costs. JWST is intended to revolutionize our understanding of star and planet formation and advance the search for the origins of our universe. With significant integration and testing planned for the remaining period until launch, the JWST project will still need to address many challenges during the remainder of integration and testing.

Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the sixth such report. This report assesses the extent to which JWST is (1) meeting its schedule commitments, and (2) able to meet its cost commitments. GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, reviewed relevant policies, conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.

In 2017, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project delayed its launch readiness date by at least 5 months, and further delays are likely. The delay—from October 2018 to a launch window between March and June 2019—was primarily caused by components of JWST's spacecraft taking longer to integrate than planned. JWST made considerable progress toward the completion of integration and test activities in the past year. However, the project used all remaining schedule reserve—or extra time set aside in the schedule in the event of delays or unforeseen risks—to address technical issues, including an anomaly on the telescope found during vibration testing. Extending the launch window provided the project up to 4 months of schedule reserve. However, shortly after requesting the new launch window in September 2017, the project determined that several months of schedule reserve would be needed to address lessons learned from the initial folding and deployment of the observatory's sunshield (see image). Given remaining integration and test work ahead—the phase in development where problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip—coupled with only 1.5 months of schedule reserves remaining to the end of the launch window, additional launch delays are likely. The project's Standing Review Board will conduct an independent review of JWST's schedule status in early 2018 to determine if the June 2019 launch window can be met.

JWST will also have limited cost reserves to address future challenges, such as further launch delays, and is at risk of breaching its $8 billion cost cap for formulation and development set by Congress in 2011. For several years, the prime contractor has overestimated workforce reductions, and technical challenges have prevented these planned reductions, necessitating the use of cost reserves. Program officials said that existing program resources will accommodate the new launch window—provided remaining integration and testing proceeds as planned without any long delays. However, JWST is still resolving technical challenges and work continues to take longer than planned to complete. As a result, the project is at risk of exceeding its $8 billion formulation and development cost cap.

GAO has made recommendations on the project in previous reports. NASA agreed with and took action on many of GAO's prior recommendations, but not on others—some of which may have provided insight to the current schedule delays. For example, in December 2012, GAO recommended that the JWST project perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis.

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is one of the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) most complex projects  and top priorities, which is intended to revolutionize our understanding of  star and planet formation and advance the search for the origins of our  universe. The innovative technologies within the telescope, as well as the  sheer size of some of its components—such as the tennis-court-sized  sunshield—illustrate some of the immense development challenges. The  project is now in the midst of a period of significant integration and test  activities for its elements and major subsystems. During this period,  unforeseen challenges could arise and affect the cost and schedule for  the project, as evidenced by a recent announcement that JWST delayed  its launch readiness date by 5 to 8 months because of technical  challenges. Until its launch, NASA and its contractors’ continued ability to  identify and respond to challenges in a timely and cost-effective manner  will likely influence whether JWST can meet its cost commitments to  Congress and avoid further schedule delays.

The on-time and on-budget delivery of JWST is also a high congressional  priority, as Conference Report No. 112-284 included a provision for GAO  to assess the JWST program annually and to report to the Committees on  Appropriations on key issues relating to program and risk management,  achievement of cost and schedule goals, program technical status, and  oversight mechanisms. This report is our sixth in response to that  provision. For this report, we assessed the extent to which (1) the JWST  project is managing technical challenges and integration risks in order to  meet its schedule commitments, and (2) technical challenges and higher- than-planned contractor workforce levels are affecting the JWST project’s  ability to meet its cost commitments.

To address these objectives, we examined the schedule, technical, and  cost performance of the project since our last report in December 2016— which also focused on the project’s cost and schedule commitments. To assess the extent to which the JWST project is managing technical  challenges and integration risks in order to meet its schedule  commitments, we reviewed project and contractor schedule  documentation, and held interviews with program, project, and contractor  officials on the progress made and any challenges faced building and  integrating the different components of the observatory. We examined  and analyzed monthly project status reports to management to monitor  schedule reserve levels and usage and potential risks and technical  challenges that may impact the project’s schedule, and to gain insights on  the project’s progress since our last report in December 2016. Further, we  attended flight program reviews at the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) headquarters on a quarterly basis, where the  current status of the program was briefed to NASA headquarters officials  outside of the project. We examined selected individual risks for elements  and major subsystems from monthly risk registers prepared by the project  to understand the likelihood of occurrence and impacts to the schedule  based on steps the project is taking to mitigate the risks. We examined  the project’s schedule risk assessment to determine the impact of  technical challenges and schedule execution rates on the project’s  planned launch readiness date. Furthermore, we interviewed project  officials at Goddard Space Flight Center, contractor officials from the  Northrop Grumman Corporation, and the Association of Universities for  Research in Astronomy’s Space Telescope Science Institute concerning  technological challenges that have had an impact on schedule, and the  project’s and contractor’s plans to address these challenges. We also  obtained information from independent NASA reviewers on the status of  project software and challenges.

To assess the extent to which technical challenges and higher-than- planned contractor workforce levels are affecting the JWST project’s  ability to meet its cost commitments, we reviewed and analyzed program,  project, and contractor data and documentation and held interviews with  officials from these organizations. We reviewed JWST project status  reports on cost issues to determine the risks that could impact cost. We  analyzed contractor workforce plans against workforce actuals to  determine whether contractors are meeting their workforce plans. We  monitored and analyzed the status of program and project cost reserves  in current and future fiscal years to determine the project’s financial  posture. We examined and analyzed earned value management data  from the project’s observatory contractor to identify trends in  performance, whether tasks were completed as planned, and likely  estimates at completion.

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington,  D.C.; Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland; Northrop  Grumman Corporation in Redondo Beach, California; and the Space  Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Maryland. We also obtained  information from officials at the Independent Verification and Validation  facility in Fairmont, West Virginia.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to February 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

JWST is envisioned to be a large deployable space telescope, optimized  for infrared observations, and the scientific successor to the aging Hubble  Space Telescope. JWST is being designed for a 5-year mission to find  the first stars, study planets in other solar systems to search for the  building blocks of life elsewhere in the universe, and trace the evolution of  galaxies from their beginning to their current formation. JWST is intended  to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5 million kilometers—or 1 million  miles—from the Earth. With a 6.5-meter primary mirror, JWST is  expected to operate at about 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble  Space Telescope. JWST’s science instruments are designed to observe  very faint infrared sources and therefore are required to operate at  extremely cold temperatures. To help keep these instruments cold, a  multi-layered tennis court-sized sunshield is being developed to protect  the mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat.

The JWST project is divided into three major segments: the observatory  segment, the ground segment, and the launch segment. When complete,  the observatory segment of JWST is to include several elements (Optical  Telescope Element (OTE), Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM),  and spacecraft) and major subsystems (sunshield and cryocooler). The  hardware configuration created when the Optical Telescope Element and  the Integrated Science Instrument Module were integrated, referred to as OTIS, is not considered an element by NASA, but we categorize it as  such for ease of discussion. Additionally, JWST is dependent on software  to deploy and control various components of the telescope, and to collect  and transmit data back to Earth. The elements, major subsystems, and  software are being developed through a mixture of NASA, contractor, and  international partner efforts. See figure 1 for an interactive graphic that  depicts the elements and major subsystems of JWST.

For the majority of work remaining, the JWST project is relying on two  contractors: Northrop Grumman Corporation and the Association of  Universities for Research in Astronomy’s Space Telescope Science  Institute (STScI). Northrop Grumman plays the largest role, developing  the sunshield, the Optical Telescope Element, the spacecraft, and the  Mid-Infrared Instrument’s cryocooler, in addition to integrating and testing  the observatory. STScI’s role includes soliciting and evaluating research  proposals from the scientific community, and receiving and storing the  scientific data collected, both of which are services that it currently  provides for the Hubble Space Telescope. Additionally, STScI is  developing the ground system that manages and controls the telescope’s  observations and will operate the observatory on behalf of NASA. JWST  will be launched on an Ariane 5 rocket, provided by the European Space  Agency.

JWST depends on 22 deployment events—more than a typical science  mission—to prepare the observatory for normal operations on orbit. For  example, the sunshield and primary mirror are designed to fold and stow  for launch and deploy once in space. Due to its large size, it is nearly  impossible to perform deployment tests of the fully assembled  observatory, so the verification of deployment elements is accomplished  by a combination of lower level component tests in flight-simulated  environments; ambient deployment tests for assembly, element, and  observatory levels; and detailed analysis and simulations at various levels  of assembly.

Schedule and Cost Reserves for NASA Projects

We have previously reported that complex development efforts like JWST  face numerous risks and unforeseen technical challenges, which  oftentimes can become apparent during integration and testing. To  accommodate unanticipated challenges and manage risk, projects  reserve extra time in their schedules, which is referred to as schedule  reserve, and extra money in their budgets, which is referred to as cost  reserve.

Schedule reserve is allocated to specific activities, elements, and major  subsystems in the event of delays or to address unforeseen risks. Each  JWST element and major subsystem has been allocated schedule  reserve. When an element or major subsystem exhausts schedule  reserve, it may begin to affect schedule reserve on other elements or  major subsystems whose progress is dependent on prior work being  finished for its activities to proceed. The element or major subsystem with  the least amount of schedule reserve determines the critical path for the  project. Any delay to an activity that is on the critical path will reduce  schedule reserve for the whole project, and could ultimately impact the  overall project schedule.

Cost reserves are additional funds within the project manager’s budget  that can be used to address unanticipated issues for any element or  major subsystem, and are used to mitigate issues during the development  of a project. For example, cost reserves can be used to buy additional  materials to replace a component or, if a project needs to preserve  schedule reserve, reserves can be used to accelerate work by adding  shifts to expedite manufacturing. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center  (Goddard)—the NASA center with responsibility for managing JWST— has issued procedural requirements that establish the levels of both cost  and schedule reserves that projects must hold at various phases of  development. In addition to cost reserves held by the project manager,  management reserves are funds held by the contractors that allow them  to address cost increases throughout development. We have found that  management reserves should contain 10 percent or more of the cost to  complete a project and are generally used to address various issues tied  to the contract’s scope.

History of Cost Growth and Schedule Delays

JWST has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays.  Prior to being approved for development, cost estimates of the project  ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with expected launch dates ranging  from 2007 to 2011. Before 2011, early technical and management  challenges, contractor performance issues, low level cost reserves, and  poorly phased funding levels caused JWST to delay work after cost and  schedule baselines were established, which contributed to significant cost  and schedule overruns, including launch delays. The Chair of the Senate  Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies  requested from NASA an independent review of JWST in June 2010.

NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel,  which issued its report in October 2010, and concluded that the baseline  funding did not allot adequate reserves, resulting in an unexecutable  project. Following this review, the JWST program underwent a replan in  September 2011, and in November of that same year, Congress placed  an $8 billion cap on the formulation and development costs for the  project. On the basis of the replan, NASA rebaselined JWST with a life- cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion which included additional money for  operations and a planned launch in October 2018. The revised life-cycle  cost estimate included a total of 13 months of funded schedule reserve.

We have previously found that since the project’s replan in 2011, the  JWST project has met its cost and schedule commitments. In our most  recent report in December 2016, we found that the project was still  operating within its committed schedule while in its riskiest phase of  development—integration and test—but had used about 3 months of  schedule reserve since our previous December 2015 report. In addition,  we found that the project was facing numerous risks and single points of  failure before launch. Finally, we found that while the project was meeting  its cost commitments despite technical and workforce challenges, the  observatory contractor had continued to maintain a larger workforce for  longer than planned in order to address technical issues. In these prior  reports, we have made recommendations with regard to improving cost  and schedule estimating, updating risk assessments, and strengthening  management oversight. NASA has generally agreed and taken steps to  implement a number of our recommendations. For example, in December  2015, we recommended that the JWST project require contractors to  identify, explain, and document anomalies in contractor-delivered monthly  earned value management reports. NASA concurred with this  recommendation and, in February 2016, directed the contractors to  implement the actions stated in the recommendation. However, NASA did  not implement some recommendations, which if implemented, may have  provided insight into the challenges it now faces. For example, in  December 2012, we recommended the JWST project update its joint cost  and schedule confidence level (JCL), a point-in-time estimate that, among  other things, includes all cost and schedule elements and incorporates  and quantifies known risks. NASA policy requires projects to establish  commitment baselines at a 70 percent confidence level. Although NASA  concurred with this recommendation, it did not take steps to implement it.  An updated JCL may have portended the current schedule delays, which  could have been proactively addressed by the project.

Considerable Progress Made Across JWST Project, but Integration and Test Challenges Have Delayed Launch at Least 5 Months with Further Delays Likely

While much progress on hardware integration and testing and several risk  reduction efforts have occurred over the past several months, the JWST  project also used all of its schedule reserves established at the replan in  2011 to address various technical issues, including a test anomaly on the  telescope and sunshield hardware challenges. In September 2017, the  JWST project requested a launch window at least 5 to 8 months later than  the planned October 2018 launch readiness date, based on the results of  a schedule risk assessment that showed that various components of the  spacecraft element integration were taking longer to complete than  expected. The new launch window included up to 4 months of additional  schedule reserves. However, shortly after requesting the revised launch  window from the European Space Agency (ESA), which will contribute the  launch vehicle, the project learned from Northrop Grumman that up to  another 3 months of schedule reserve use was expected, due to lessons  learned from conducting deployment exercises of the spacecraft element  and sunshield. After incorporating some schedule efficiencies, the project  now has 1.5 months of schedule reserve remaining. Given the remaining  integration and test work ahead—the phase in development where  problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip—and  risks remaining to be reduced to acceptable levels, coupled with a low  level of schedule reserves, we believe that additional delays to the  project’s launch readiness date are likely.

JWST Project Completed Significant Integration and Test Work

Since our last report, the JWST project has made considerable progress  toward completing its third and fourth of five total integration and test  phases for the combined optical telescope element and integrated  science instrument module (OTIS) and the spacecraft elements,  respectively. Previously, the project and Northrop Grumman completed  the Integrated Science Instrument Module and the Optical Telescope  Element integration phases in March 2016, as shown in Figure 2 below.

OTIS progress: Hardware integration and two of three key  environmental tests—acoustics and vibration—were completed in  2016 and early 2017, respectively. The third key test, cryovacuum— which was conducted in a large cryovacuum chamber to ensure the  telescope can operate at the near-absolute zero cryogenic  temperatures of space—began in July 2017 at Johnson Space Center  and successfully concluded in October 2017. The project identified a  technical issue with the stability of the optical mirror that affects image  quality, and by conducting some additional testing, determined that it  was caused by a test equipment setup issue and not related to the  flight hardware itself. Project officials stated that they plan to delay  shipping the completed OTIS element to the Northrop Grumman  facility in California for final integration with the spacecraft element  from late December 2017 to February 2018. According to project  officials, the delay allows the project to shift some of the work to  prepare OTIS for integration with the spacecraft—such as cleaning  the mirrors—to Johnson Space Center where it will not have to share  space in the crowded clean room at Northrop Grumman as sunshield  fold and stow activities are ongoing. OTIS is expected to arrive at  Northrop Grumman months ahead of its need date for integration into  the observatory.

Spacecraft element progress: All spacecraft element hardware has  been delivered and mechanical integration of spacecraft hardware— including the five layers of the sunshield—is largely complete.  Northrop Grumman has also completed a folding operation and the  first full deployment of the integrated spacecraft element. Northrop  Grumman plans to refold the sunshield and complete one more  deployment cycle, after environmental testing, in this phase of  integration and testing.

The project and its contractors conducted risk reduction testing on OTIS  and the spacecraft elements to reduce risk for challenging environmental  tests on flight hardware. These tests allowed the project and its  contractors to practice processes and procedures for testing on flight  hardware to create a more efficient test flow and proactively address  issues before flight hardware tests commenced. For example, the second  risk reduction test on the OTIS pathfinder hardware showed that vibration  levels inside the test chamber were too high, and adjustments to the  ground support equipment were implemented to address this issue.  Additionally, Northrop Grumman officials noted that risk reduction tests on  the spacecraft element have helped demonstrate facility capability and  logistics for the upcoming tests of flight hardware.

The project has also progressed in preparing the software and ground  systems that will operate the observatory and manage and control the  telescope’s observations. According to NASA’s Independent Verification  and Validation group, the overall status of JWST software development  and integration efforts is very positive with minimal development  remaining, and the group has significant confidence that the mission  software will support the mission objectives. Additionally, the Space  Telescope Science Institute has made considerable progress in preparing  JWST’s ground systems, such as preparing the Mission Operations  Center and conducting the Mission Operations Review in April 2017.

The project has made notable progress in reducing and closing numerous  tracked risks. In December 2016, we reported that the project maintained  a risk list with 73 items. Currently, the list of tracked risks has 47 items to  be closed or mitigated to acceptable levels. The completion of the OTIS  cryovacuum test enabled the project to recently close several risks. For  example, the project previously tracked a risk that the instrument module  and telescope element might have to be de-integrated if OTIS testing  revealed workmanship issues. With the successful completion of the  testing, this risk was closed in fall 2017. The project also obtained a  waiver from the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance to NASA’s risk  policy for its over 300 single point failures throughout the observatory, the  majority of which are related to the sunshield. Project officials reported  that the elimination of all single point failures on the JWST Mission is not  practical or even feasible, due mainly to the large number of  deployments, and that all mitigations practical to address and minimize  them have been implemented.

JWST Delayed Launch Due to Integration Challenges on the Spacecraft Element, Avoiding a Potential Launch Site Conflict

In the summer of 2017, the JWST project conducted a schedule risk  assessment that showed that the October 2018 launch readiness date  was unachievable, primarily due to the various components of spacecraft  element integration taking longer to complete than planned. The project  performed the schedule risk assessment in order to provide ESA a  desired launch window about one year prior to the expected launch date.  The assessment took into account remaining work to be completed,  lessons learned from environmental testing, and the current performance  rates of integrating the spacecraft element. As a result of the assessment,  in September 2017 NASA requested from ESA a launch window of March  2019 to June 2019. The requested launch window represents a 5- to 8- month delay from the previously planned October 2018 launch readiness  date.

The schedule risk assessment incorporated input from Northrop  Grumman on expected durations for remaining spacecraft and  observatory level integration activities. However, the project’s analysis  determined that the expected durations provided by Northrop Grumman  were overly optimistic. As a result, the project incorporated uncertainty  factors into the analysis, which added 2 to 3 months to the schedule. The  project also estimated an additional 5 to 8 weeks would be needed  because of emerging technical issues not specifically accounted for by  the schedule risk assessment. Additionally, the project updated the  expected time required at the launch site for processing activities and  added about 1.25 months. According to project officials, the confidence in  the launch window identified is in line with that of a typical NASA JCL at  70 percent. NASA’s independent Standing Review Board reviewed the  assessment and found that it was a thorough approach for reviewing the  schedule, risks, and uncertainties and that the new proposed launch  readiness range is technically feasible with reasonable risk.

NASA’s request for a March to June 2019 launch window was driven by  its own schedule and technical issues, but also avoids potential conflicts  with other mission launches. Regardless of JWST’s launch readiness,  and prior to undertaking the schedule risk assessment, the project  learned in November 2016 of potential scheduling conflicts at the launch  site in French Guiana. After numerous delays, BepiColombo, a joint  ESA/Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency mission to Mercury, is  currently forecasted to have an October 2018 launch readiness date.  According to program officials, that mission could have taken precedence  over JWST given that planetary missions generally have more limited  launch windows. Additionally, Arianespace, a commercial company,  currently has a commercial launch scheduled for the December 2018  timeframe.

JWST Project Consumed all of its Planned Schedule Reserve to Address Technical Challenges

While much progress has been made since we last reported in December  2016, the project and Northrop Grumman consumed the remaining 6  months of schedule reserves established at the 2011 replan to address  technical challenges that arose during the OTIS and the spacecraft  element integration and test work, as well as additional challenges  identified by the schedule risk assessment. Specifically:  In February 2017, a vibration anomaly during OTIS vibration testing at  Goddard Space Flight Center, occurring in parallel with spacecraft  and sunshield issues, consumed 1.25 months and delayed the start of  cryovacuum testing, the final event in the OTIS integration and test  phase, by several weeks.

In April 2017, spacecraft and sunshield issues consumed an  additional 1.25 months. Specifically, a contractor technician applied  too much voltage and irreparably damaged the spacecraft’s pressure  transducers, components of the propulsion system, which help  monitor spacecraft fuel levels. The transducers had to be replaced  and reattached in a complicated welding process. At the same time,  Northrop Grumman also addressed several challenges with  integrating sunshield hardware such as the mid-boom assemblies and  membrane tensioning system, which help deploy the sunshield and  maintain its correct shape.

Finally, in September 2017, the remaining 3.5 months of previously  planned schedule reserves was consumed as a result of the  contractor having underestimated the time required to complete  integration and test work on the spacecraft and other risks identified in  the schedule risk analysis. Specifically, execution of spacecraft  integration and test tasks, due to the complexity of work and cautious  handling given sensitivity of flight hardware, was slower than planned.  For example, the installation of numerous membrane retention  devices slowed the pace of the work. According to Northrop Grumman  officials, the sunshield is elevated off the ground for installation work  and the size and quantity of the work lifts necessary for the  technicians to access the sunshield requires more maneuvering and  prevents the technicians from working on the forward and aft  sunshield assemblies simultaneously.

Taking into account the consumption of planned reserves and the  establishment of the revised launch window, the project expected to have  up to 4 months of schedule reserve extending to the end of the launch  window range, or June 2019. However, shortly after the project notified  ESA of the launch delay in September 2017, the project received updated  information from Northrop Grumman and determined that up to 3 months  of schedule reserve would be needed based upon lessons learned from  Northrop Grumman’s initial sunshield folding operation and implications  for remaining deployment test activities. After incorporating some  schedule efficiencies, the project now has 1.5 months of schedule reserve  remaining. This level of schedule reserve is below the standards  established by Goddard Space Flight Center for a project at this stage of  development. The project is working with Northrop Grumman to  determine if any further schedule reserve can be regained by  incorporating schedule efficiencies and adjusting integration and test  plans. As shown in the figure below, Northrop Grumman’s work on the  spacecraft element remains on the project’s critical path—the schedule  with the least amount of reserve, which determines the overall schedule  reserve for the project—now with an estimated 1.5 months of schedule  reserve to the end of the launch window in June 2019.

Ongoing Spacecraft Integration and Test Issues, Challenging Remaining Work, and Slow Contractor Performance Make Additional Launch Delays Likely

Given several ongoing technical issues, and the work remaining to test  the spacecraft element and complete integration of the telescope and  spacecraft, combined with continuing slower than planned work at  Northrop Grumman, we believe that the rescheduled launch window is  likely unachievable. For example, in May 2017, Northrop Grumman found  that 8 of 16 valves in the spacecraft propulsion system’s thruster modules  were leaking beyond allowable levels. The project and Northrop  Grumman were unable to definitively isolate the root cause of the leaks;  however, Northrop Grumman determined that the most likely cause is a  handling error at their facility. Specifically, the material around the valves  deteriorated due to a solvent used for cleaning. All of the thruster  modules were returned to the vendor for investigation and refurbishment.  According to project officials, the refurbished thruster modules were  returned to the contractor facility in late 2017 for reattachment. However,  reattaching the repaired modules is a challenge because of the close  proximity of electronics and other concerns. The project included about  one month in the schedule risk assessment to account for the time spent  investigating and determining the path forward for the thruster issue;  however, the full schedule impact of reattaching the thruster modules to  the spacecraft element had not yet been determined and was not  incorporated into the analysis. In November 2017, the project and  Northrop Grumman chose a reattachment method that project officials  stated is expected to require less time to complete and pose fewer risks  to the hardware than a traditional welding approach.

In October 2017, when conducting folding and deployment exercises on  the sunshield, Northrop Grumman discovered several tears in the  sunshield membrane layers. According to program officials, a  workmanship error contributed to the tears. The tears can be repaired;  however, some schedule reserve may be required to repair them.  Additionally, during the deployment exercise, one of the sunshield’s six  membrane tensioning systems experienced a snag. Northrop Grumman  is planning to implement a slight design modification to prevent the issue  from occurring again. Northrop Grumman officials have not yet  determined if the schedule will be affected as a result.

Beyond mitigating the specific spacecraft thruster module valve leak and  sunshield issues, the project faces significant work ahead, and numerous  risks remain to be mitigated to acceptable levels. For example, the project  and Northrop Grumman must:

Resolve lingering technical issues from the OTIS cryovacuum test and  prepare and ship OTIS to the Northrop Grumman facility in California  for integration with the spacecraft.

Complete integration of spacecraft hardware, and conduct spacecraft  element environmental tests and remaining deployments of the  spacecraft and sunshield—activities which, to date, have taken  considerably longer than planned.

Integrate the completed OTIS element with the spacecraft element  and test the full observatory in the fifth and final integration phase,  which includes another set of challenging environmental tests.

Mitigate approximately 47 remaining tracked hardware and software  risks to acceptable levels and continue to address the project’s 300+  potential single point failures to the extent possible.

Prepare and ship the observatory to the launch site and complete final  launch site processing, including installation of critical release  mechanisms.

Project officials have expressed concern with Northrop Grumman’s ability  to prevent further schedule erosion as the project moves through  remaining integration and test work. With the project’s current low level of  schedule reserves, even a relatively minor disruption could cause the  project to miss its revised launch window. According to program officials,  the contractor has increased its daily work shifts from two to three and is  now working 24 hours per day on spacecraft integration, which further  limits schedule flexibility. In early 2018, the project’s independent  Standing Review Board will review the latest schedule inputs based on  updated knowledge about spacecraft integration and test activity  durations. For example, according to project officials, by early 2018, the  contractor is expected to have completed the second of four planned fold  and stow sequences on the sunshield, which will provide more insight into  whether the current planned schedule is realistic. The Standing Review  Board will also examine the project’s plans for schedule efficiencies and  potential integration and test adjustments to determine if the June 2019  launch window can be met. Project officials stated that following this  review, NASA senior management will be briefed on the Standing Review  Board’s findings and will then formally identify a new launch readiness  window.

Our prior work has shown that integration and testing is the phase in  which problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip.  For a uniquely complex project such as JWST, this risk is magnified. Now  that the project is well into its complex integration and test efforts, events  are sequential in nature and there are fewer opportunities to mitigate  issues in parallel. Since the replan, the project has used about 2.5  months of schedule reserve per year to address technical issues, but, as  discussed above, it now has only approximately 1.5 months of schedule  reserve to last until the end of the revised launch window in June 2019.  Thus, past experience with technical issues in earlier integration phases  suggests that this amount of reserve will not be adequate for the  challenging work ahead, and further delays to launch readiness are likely.  We will continue to monitor the project’s progress in meeting its revised  schedule as more information is available during this critical integration  and test phase.

Higher Contractor Workforce Levels to Address Continuing Technical Challenges Places JWST at Risk of Exceeding Cost Commitments

Northrop Grumman continued to maintain higher than planned workforce  levels in the past year and, as a result, NASA will have limited cost  reserves to address future challenges. Northrop Grumman’s ability to  control costs and decrease its workforce is central to JWST’s capacity to  meet its long-term cost commitments. For the past 44 months, Northrop  Grumman’s actual workforce has exceeded its projections and the  company is not expected to significantly reduce its workforce until the  spring of 2019, when NASA plans to ship the completed observatory to  the launch site. Northrop Grumman had planned to reduce its workforce  in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 as work was planned to be completed, but  has needed to maintain higher workforce levels due to technical  challenges and the work taking longer than expected. Figure 6 illustrates  the difference between the workforce levels that Northrop Grumman  projected for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and its actual workforce levels  during that period.

As shown in figure 6, Northrop Grumman has slightly reduced its  workforce since the beginning of fiscal year 2016. However, staffing  levels remain higher than projected as a result of previously noted  technical challenges including spacecraft and sunshield integration and  test challenges, to keep specialized engineers available when needed  during final assembly, and to complete required testing activities.  Projections made at the beginning of fiscal year 2017—when the  expected launch readiness date was October 2018—expected workforce  levels to begin at 472 full-time equivalent staff and drop to 109 at the end  of the fiscal year. However, technical challenges and delays in completing  scheduled work did not allow for the planned workforce reduction and  Northrop Grumman reported 496 full-time equivalent staff in September  2017, or 387 more than planned. According to JWST project officials and  similar to previous years, Northrop Grumman’s priority for fiscal year 2018  is to maintain schedule in order to ensure that the new launch window set  from March to June 2019 can be met. As a result, Northrop Grumman’s  contractor workforce levels are expected to continue to be elevated  through JWST’s final integration and test phase in fiscal year 2019 where  the spacecraft and OTIS will be integrated before shipment to the launch  site.

Northrop Grumman submitted a cost overrun proposal to NASA in July  2016, primarily to address costs associated with sustaining its workforce  at higher levels than planned in fiscal year 2017. An overrun proposal  seeks to increase the value of a cost-reimbursement contract when the  total estimated cost is less than the contract’s estimated cost to complete  the performance of the contract. In addition to higher workforce levels,  the overrun proposal replenished contractor management reserves that  had been used to address technical issues, and addressed projected  growth in the contractor’s cost to complete work. NASA and the  contractor completed negotiations in September 2017 and executed a  contract modification that added $179.9 million to the value of the contract  to cover Northrop Grumman’s cost overrun and additional negotiated  items, such as particle dampers. This amount was intended to cover the  cost of the remaining work through the expected launch date of October  2018. However, by September 2017 Northrop Grumman had no  remaining schedule reserves and a limited amount of cost reserves with  which to address future costs.

Furthermore, the project determined—as discussed above—that the  October 2018 launch window was not feasible and established a new  launch window. According to JWST project officials, the project expects to  issue a request for proposal in early 2018 to cover the costs for the  remaining work through the new launch window. The project plans to use  a significant portion of fiscal years 2018 and 2019 program cost reserves  to address Northrop Grumman costs and unanticipated technical  challenges. According to JWST program officials, if the contractor does  not improve its schedule efficiency, the remaining reserves will be used to  offset increased cost resulting from taking longer to complete the work.

For the sixth consecutive year, the JWST project managed spending  within its allocated budget in fiscal year 2017. However, JWST is still  resolving technical challenges and planned work continues to take longer  to complete. Prudent management of its resources allowed the project to  carry into fiscal year 2018 about a third more carry over funding than it  had projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Program officials said  that assuming the remaining integration and tests proceed as planned  and no long delays are encountered, the existing program resources  accommodate the new launch window of March to June 2019. The project  continues to identify funding options in the event of a delay of beyond the  end of the launch window. Under the 2011 replan, Congress placed an $8  billion cap on formulation and development costs, but any long delays  beyond the new launch window—which, as noted above, are likely— place the project at risk of exceeding this cap.

We requested comments from NASA, but agency officials determined that  no formal comments were necessary. NASA provided technical  comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and  interested congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on GAO’s website and http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Richard Cederholm, (Assistant  Director); Karen Richey, (Assistant Director); Jay Tallon, (Assistant  Director); Brian Bothwell, Laura Greifner, Daniel Kuhn, Katherine Lenane,  Jose Ramos, Carrie Rogers, Sylvia Schatz, and Roxanna Sun made key  contributions to this report.

The James Webb Space Telescope, the planned successor to the Hubble Telescope, is one of NASA’s most complex and expensive projects.

NASA recently announced that JWST's launch would be delayed several months, from October 2018 to no later than June 2019, because components of the telescope are taking longer to integrate than planned.

Based on the amount of work NASA has to complete before JWST is ready to launch, we found that it's likely the launch date will be delayed again. If that happens, the project will be at risk of exceeding the $8 billion cost cap set by Congress.