Colombia: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Positive Results but State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach

Colombia is the world's leading producer of cocaine, with production levels more than tripling from 2013 through 2017 (see figure). The U.S. and Colombian governments have been longstanding partners in the fight against drug trafficking. Since the launch of Plan Colombia in 1999, the U.S. government has invested over $10 billion in counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. This assistance has supported a range of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development programs.

GAO was asked to review U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. This report examines (1) to what extent the U.S. government has assessed the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of U.S.-supported eradication, interdiction, and alternative development programs in Colombia. GAO reviewed data and documentation from U.S. agencies, performed a literature review of relevant research on counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, conducted fieldwork in Colombia, and interviewed U.S. and Colombian officials.

U.S. agencies that provide counternarcotics assistance to Colombia conduct performance monitoring of their activities, such as by tracking the hectares of coca fields eradicated and the amount of cocaine seized, but have not consistently evaluated the effectiveness of their activities in reducing the cocaine supply. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has evaluated some of its alternative development programs, but the Department of State (State), which has lead responsibility for U.S. counternarcotics efforts, has not evaluated the effectiveness of its eradication and interdiction activities, as called for by its evaluation policies. Additionally, State has not conducted a comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach, which relies on a combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development. Without information about the relative benefits and limitations of these activities, the U.S. government lacks key information to determine the most effective combination of counternarcotics activities.

GAO's review of U.S. agency performance monitoring data and third-party research offers some information about the relative effectiveness of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development activities. For example, available evidence indicates that U.S.-supported eradication efforts in Colombia may not be an effective long-term approach to reduce the cocaine supply, due in part to coca growers responding to eradication by moving coca crops to national parks and other areas off limits to eradication. Agency data show that U.S.-supported interdiction efforts in Colombia seized hundreds of tons of cocaine and arrested thousands of drug traffickers, yet the net cocaine supply has increased and third-party studies have mixed findings on the long-term effectiveness of interdiction efforts. USAID evaluations indicate that alternative development programs in Colombia have provided legal economic opportunities to some rural populations previously involved in illicit crop production. However, USAID as well as third-party research suggests that alternative development requires significant and sustained investment and some programs have had design and sustainability challenges.

GAO recommends that State, in consultation with relevant agencies, (1) evaluate the effectiveness of eradication and interdiction in reducing the cocaine supply in Colombia and (2) undertake a comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia that considers the relative benefits and limitations between eradication, interdiction, and alternative development efforts. State generally concurred with the recommendations.

Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia have increased  substantially in recent years, hitting record levels in 2017, according to  U.S. government and United Nations (UN) estimates. These increases  have occurred despite the longstanding partnership between the United  States and Colombia to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. In  1999, the Colombian government announced the launch of a major  initiative, known as Plan Colombia, which was designed to reduce the  production of illegal drugs and improve security in the country. At that  time, Colombia had become the world’s leading producer of cocaine and  was in the midst of a violent internal conflict that had lasted for decades.  This multi-sided conflict was fueled by proceeds from illegal drug  trafficking and involved the Marxist insurgent organization the  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym,  FARC) and other armed left-wing groups, as well as right-wing  paramilitary groups. Since Plan Colombia’s inception, the U.S.  government has provided over $10 billion in support of the  counternarcotics and security effort, according to the Department of State  (State). This support has included assistance for eradication, interdiction,  and alternative development programs. In providing counternarcotics  assistance to Colombia, the U.S. government has sought to use a whole  of government approach involving a range of agencies. The Colombian  government has also made significant investments in the fight against  illegal drugs, with its own funding representing about 95 percent of the  total spent since the start of Plan Colombia.

When Plan Colombia was launched in 1999, some feared that Colombia  was on the brink of becoming a failed state, but it has since seen  significant improvements in security, including dramatic drops in violence  and the reassertion of state control over much of the country’s territory.  For example, between 2000 and 2016, homicides in Colombia declined  by 53 percent and kidnappings declined by 94 percent. As the security  situation improved, Colombian authorities were also able to achieve  considerable reductions in coca cultivation and cocaine production,  reaching a low point in 2012. Meanwhile, the Colombian government  undertook peace negotiations with the FARC, which were formally  concluded in a peace agreement in November 2016 that the parties have  begun to implement. Starting in 2013, however, coca cultivation and  cocaine production in Colombia have been on the rise once again,  according to U.S. government and UN estimates. In addition, Colombia  continues to struggle with the presence of drug trafficking organizations  and other armed criminal actors in many parts of the country. Colombia is  currently at an important juncture as it seeks to implement the peace  agreement and address increasing illicit drug production.

You asked us to review U.S.-supported eradication, interdiction, and  alternative development programs in Colombia and what is known about  the effectiveness of these programs in achieving U.S. counternarcotics  goals. Specifically, this report examines (1) to what extent the U.S.  government has assessed the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts  in Colombia, (2) what is known about the effectiveness of U.S.  government-supported eradication programs in Colombia over the last 10  years, (3) what is known about the effectiveness of U.S. government- supported interdiction programs in Colombia over the last 10 years, and  (4) what is known about the effectiveness of U.S. government-supported  alternative development programs in Colombia over the last 10 years.

To address these objectives, we analyzed Department of Defense (DOD),  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ),  State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) data and  documentation, including available evaluations and performance  monitoring data the agencies use to assess the effectiveness of their  counternarcotics activities in Colombia. We also interviewed officials  from each of these agencies to gather further information regarding what  is known about the effectiveness of U.S.-supported counternarcotics  efforts in Colombia. In assessing to what extent the U.S. government has  assessed the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, we  compared U.S. agencies’ actions to requirements established in agency  evaluation policies and to federal internal control standards. As part of our  work, we also collected data from the UN and the Colombian government  related to drug production trends and counternarcotics efforts. To assess  the reliability of these data, we reviewed available documentation and  interviewed knowledgeable U.S. officials. We determined that the U.S.  government, UN, and Colombian government data were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes in this report. To validate and supplement U.S.  government information regarding the effectiveness of its  counternarcotics programs, we also conducted a literature review to  determine what relevant research has concluded about these programs in  Colombia and the extent to which relevant non-U.S. government studies  reached similar or different conclusions than the U.S. government’s  findings regarding the effectiveness of U.S.-supported counternarcotics  programs in Colombia. To conduct our literature review, we developed a  list of search terms related to eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development in Colombia and conducted a search using selected  bibliographic databases. In order to narrow down the initial search results  to a priority list of studies, we considered a variety of factors including the  relevance of the study to our research questions, the extent to which the  study focused on Colombia or was more global in nature, whether the  study had been published in 2008 or later, and whether the study  included original research. In total, we selected 23 studies to include in  our review and to analyze in greater depth for this report. As part of our  work, we also conducted interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of  three non-U.S. government experts. Finally, we conducted fieldwork in  Colombia where we interviewed U.S. and Colombian officials that have  responsibility for and insights into U.S.-funded counternarcotics  programs. For more information about our scope and methodology, see  appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to December  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and also continues to  be a source of heroin and marijuana. After declining most years since  2000, coca cultivation and cocaine production increased again in  Colombia beginning in 2013, hitting record highs in 2017 (see fig. 1).  Much of the cocaine produced in Colombia is consumed in the United  States. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA)  Cocaine Signature Program, over 90 percent of cocaine found in the  continental United States is of Colombian origin. In 2017, the DEA  reported that cocaine use in the United States was increasing concurrent  with production increases in Colombia. Although the United States  continues to be the primary market for Colombian cocaine, Colombian  drug traffickers are also expanding into other markets around the world,  according to DEA and Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)  reporting.

U.S., Colombian, and UN officials; as well as third-party researchers,  have cited a variety of reasons for the increases in coca cultivation and  cocaine production in Colombia, including:  the Colombian government’s decision to end aerial eradication of  coca crops in October 2015; prior to the end of aerial spraying, coca growers’ movement to areas  off limits to aerial spraying and other countermeasures employed by  growers;  the Colombian government’s desire to avoid social protests in coca- growing regions controlled by the FARC during peace negotiations;  the FARC’s drive to induce farmers to plant additional coca in areas  under their control in anticipation that the Colombian government  would provide subsidies for farmers to switch from coca to licit crops  after the conclusion of the peace agreement; declining Colombian and U.S. funding for counternarcotics efforts; decreases in the price of gold, which diminished criminal  organizations’ revenues from illegal gold mining and led to a  redirection of resources back to cocaine production to make up  losses; and  increased demand for cocaine in the United States and other parts of  the world.

Armed Conflicts and Drug Trafficking in Colombia over Time

Colombia has historically been one of Latin America’s more enduring  democracies and successful economies. However, Colombia has also  faced more than 50 years of internal conflict and has long been a leading  drug producing and trafficking nation. See figure 2 for a map showing  Colombia’s geographic location relative to the United States.

For several decades, Colombia has struggled with a multi-sided conflict,  involving both left-wing guerilla groups and right-wing paramilitary groups  (see sidebar for background information on Colombia). Since its start, the  conflict has resulted in at least 220,000 deaths and the displacement of  more than 5 million Colombians, according to the Congressional  Research Service. The FARC, a Marxist insurgent organization formed in  1964, was the largest of the left-wing groups. At its peak, the FARC had  an estimated 16,000 to 20,000 fighters, according to the Congressional  Research Service. In an effort to unseat the Colombian government, the  FARC, along with the second largest left-wing guerilla group in Colombia,   the National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym ELN),  undertook a widespread campaign of murder, kidnapping, extortion, and  other human rights violations, according to various sources. Over time,  the two groups also became increasingly involved in drug trafficking to  fund their operations. (slightly less than twice the size of Texas)

In response to the violence caused by the FARC and the ELN, a number  of wealthy Colombians, including drug traffickers, began to hire armed  paramilitary groups for protection during the 1980s. According to DOD  officials, initially these groups were formed legally as self-defense groups;  however, they turned to crime and drug trafficking over time. Many of  these groups subsequently united under an umbrella organization called  the United-Self Defense Forces of Colombia (known by the Spanish  acronym AUC). According to reporting from various U.S. government and  third-party sources, the AUC murdered individuals suspected of  supporting the FARC and ELN and engaged in direct combat with these  groups. From 2003 through 2006, the AUC formally dissolved after  negotiating a peace agreement with the administration of former  Colombian President Álvaro Uribe. However, some former AUC members  did not demobilize and instead joined criminal groups (known as criminal  bands, or Bacrim) that continue to be involved in drug trafficking today,  according to reporting from various U.S. government and third-party  sources.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Peru and Bolivia were the leading  global producers of cocaine but enforcement efforts in those two  countries increasingly pushed cocaine production into Colombia. By the  late 1990s Colombia had emerged as the leading source of cocaine in the  world.

Over time the landscape of drug trafficking in Colombia has changed. In  the 1980s and early 1990s, major drug trafficking organizations such as  the Medellín and Cali cartels controlled cocaine trafficking in  Colombia. These cartels were vertically integrated organizations with a  clearly defined leadership that controlled all aspects of cocaine production  and distribution in their respective geographic areas. By the late 1990s,  however, Colombian authorities, with the support of the United States,  had largely succeeded in dismantling these two cartels. Over time, drug  trafficking in Colombia fragmented and is now generally characterized by  more loosely organized networks that are less integrated and have less  well-defined leadership structures. Major organizations currently involved  in drug trafficking include the Clan del Golfo, the largest of the Bacrim;  FARC dissident groups that have not accepted the peace agreement; and  the ELN.

In August 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC reached a  peace agreement ending more than five decades of conflict. The peace  agreement was the culmination of four years of formal negotiations. In  October 2016, however, Colombian voters narrowly defeated a  referendum on whether to accept the peace agreement. After the voters  rejected the agreement, the Colombian government and the FARC  worked to make certain revisions and signed a second accord. The  Colombian Congress then approved the revised agreement in November  2016. The Colombian government has estimated that it will cost $43  billion to implement the peace agreement over 15 years but State has  estimated that the cost will be between $80 billion and $100 billion.

The peace agreement included agreements on six major topics:  land and rural development,  the FARC’s political participation after disarmament,  illicit crops and drug trafficking,  victims’ reparations and transitional justice,  the demobilization and disarmament of the FARC and a bilateral  cease-fire, and  verification to enact the programs outlined in the final accord.

The agreement on illicit crops and drug trafficking addresses a range of  issues related to coca eradication and crop substitution, public health and  drug consumption, and drug production and trafficking. As part of the  agreement, the FARC committed to work to help resolve the problem of  illegal drugs in the country and to end any involvement in the illegal drug  business. Among other things, the Colombian government pledged to  prioritize voluntary drug-crop substitution programs over forced  eradication, and where forced eradication was necessary, to prioritize  manual removal over aerial spraying. Other portions of the peace  agreement also relate to counternarcotics efforts. For example, the  section on land and rural development discusses benefits for farmers who  undertake substitution of illicit crops.

Colombian authorities and the FARC have completed several actions  called for under the peace agreement but progress on implementation  has been uneven. Since the finalization of the peace agreement in  November 2016, over 7,000 FARC members have disarmed and  surrendered almost 9,000 weapons, about 1.7 million rounds of  ammunition, and about 42 tons of explosive material, according to State  reporting. The Colombian Congress has also passed implementing  legislation, including a bill establishing the Special Jurisdiction for Peace  to support transitional justice efforts. However, a significant number of  FARC members have refused to demobilize and key FARC leaders have  been accused of violating the peace agreement through continued  involvement in the drug trade and other illegal activities. According to  State reporting, the FARC has also failed to offer information on drug  trafficking routes, contacts, and financing, as it had committed to do under  the accord. The peace agreement continues to be controversial in  Colombia with many Colombians believing that it does not do enough to  hold the FARC accountable for the violence and crimes that it committed.  Colombian President Iván Duque, who assumed control of the  government in August 2018, has stated his intention to revise some  elements of the agreement.

Currently, the Colombian government is also engaged in peace  negotiations with the ELN that were formally launched in February 2017.  Although the talks continue, the negotiations have experienced several  setbacks. For example, the two parties had agreed to a temporary  ceasefire that lasted from September 4, 2017, to January 9, 2018, but  they did not reach an agreement to extend the ceasefire and the ELN  launched a number of attacks shortly thereafter, including a police station  bombing in the city of Barranquilla that killed 7 police officers and injured  more than 40.

Plan Colombia and U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia

Colombia and the United States have a longstanding partnership on  counternarcotics efforts. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. government has  provided assistance to the Colombian government to support its efforts to  combat illicit drug production and trafficking activities. However, by the  late 1990s, Colombia had become the world’s leading producer of  cocaine and a major source of heroin used in the United States. In  response, the Colombian government, with U.S. support, launched Plan  Colombia in 1999 with the goals of (1) reducing the production of illicit  drugs and (2) improving security in the country by reclaiming areas of the  country held by illegal groups.

U.S. assistance to Colombia over the years has focused on three key  approaches for reducing the supply of illegal drugs produced in the  country and trafficked to the United States: eradication, interdiction, and  alternative development.

Eradication. Eradication seeks to reduce coca cultivation by  destroying coca plants through either the aerial spraying of herbicides  on the crops, or the manual spraying of herbicides or uprooting of the  plants by personnel on the ground.

Interdiction. Interdiction seeks to disrupt or dismantle drug trafficking  organizations by investigating the operations of drug traffickers;  seizing drugs and their precursors, cash, and other assets;  destroying processing facilities; blocking air, sea, and land drug  trafficking routes; and arresting and prosecuting drug traffickers.

Alternative development. Alternative development seeks to  discourage involvement in the drug trade by providing people with  viable, legal livelihoods through training, technical assistance, and  other support; as well as by working with the private sector, civil  society, and the Colombian authorities to create the necessary  conditions in communities for legal economies to develop.

Under the general guidance of the White House’s ONDCP and the  leadership of State at the country-level, a number of U.S. agencies have  a role in supporting counternarcotics efforts in these three key areas.  ONDCP is, among other things, responsible for developing the National  Drug Control Strategy and coordinating the implementation of this  strategy. It does not implement any counternarcotics programs in  Colombia. State is the lead agency responsible for setting U.S.  counternarcotics policy in Colombia, consistent with the overall direction  provided by the National Drug Control Strategy. The ambassador at  Embassy Bogotá has ultimate authority over all U.S. agencies operating  in the country. State is the agency primarily responsible for supporting  eradication efforts in Colombia. A number of agencies are responsible for  supporting various aspects of interdiction efforts in Colombia, including:  State; DOD; DOJ’s Criminal Division, DEA, and Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI); and DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Coast Guard.  USAID is the agency primarily responsible for supporting alternative  development efforts in Colombia.

The U.S. government provided about $5 billion in foreign assistance for  Colombia in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. State and USAID provide  foreign assistance to Colombia for a range of programs and activities that  extend beyond counternarcotics efforts. State and USAID provide this  assistance to Colombia through several accounts. State funds the largest  share of its programs in Colombia through the International Narcotics  Control and Law Enforcement account. It also provides funding to  Colombia through the Foreign Military Financing; International Military  Education and Training; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,  and Related Programs accounts. USAID implements its programs in  Colombia using funding from the Economic Support Fund account. DOD  provides counternarcotics funding to Colombia through its Central  Transfer Account. Figures 3 and 4 show U.S. assistance to Colombia in  fiscal years 2008 through 2017.

The U.S. government’s efforts in Colombia are part of its broader efforts  to combat drug trafficking throughout the Western Hemisphere, including  in other partner countries and in the “transit zone,” which is the area from  South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean  used to transport illicit drugs to the United States. In addition, the U.S.  government combats the illegal drug problem through a range of  domestic law enforcement efforts and programs designed to reduce illicit  drug use. These various efforts are not addressed in this report.

Recent Developments in U.S.-Colombia Efforts on Counternarcotics

The Obama administration supported the peace process in Colombia and  announced a new initiative in February 2016, known as Peace Colombia.  Peace Colombia was designed to establish a new framework for  cooperation between the two countries and refocus U.S. assistance to  support peace agreement implementation. The administration called for  an initial $450 million in funding for Peace Colombia in fiscal year 2017.  Under Peace Colombia, U.S. assistance was to be focused in three  areas:  consolidating and expanding progress on security and  counternarcotics while reintegrating the FARC into society; expanding the Colombian state’s presence and institutions to  strengthen the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former  conflict areas; and promoting justice and other essential services for conflict victims.

More recently, the Trump administration has raised questions about  Colombia’s commitment to meeting its counternarcotics obligations. As  required by law, the Trump administration in September 2017 issued a  memorandum documenting the annual presidential determination on  countries that are major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries. As  in years past, the memorandum identified Colombia as one of these  countries. The memorandum also stated that the administration had  seriously considered designating Colombia as a country that had  demonstrably failed to adhere to its obligations under international  counternarcotics agreements due to the extraordinary growth of coca  cultivation and cocaine production over the past three years. According to  the memorandum, the administration ultimately decided not to take this  step because of the close partnership between the U.S. government and  the Colombian National Police and Armed Forces. However, the  memorandum underscored that the administration would keep the  designation as an option and expected Colombia to make significant  progress in reducing coca cultivation and cocaine production.

As part of the U.S.-Colombia High Level Dialogue in March 2018, the  U.S. and Colombian governments pledged to expand counternarcotics  cooperation over the next 5 years with the goal of reducing Colombia’s  estimated coca cultivation and cocaine production by 50 percent by the  end of 2023.

U.S. Agencies Conducted Performance Monitoring of Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, but Have Not Evaluated Key Efforts and State Has Not Undertaken a Comprehensive Review of the Overall Approach

U.S. Agencies Conducted Performance Monitoring of Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, but Have Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Eradication and Interdiction Efforts

U.S. agencies have conducted ongoing performance monitoring of  various counternarcotics activities in Colombia, but State, DOD, DHS,  and DOJ have not conducted evaluations of U.S. eradication and  interdiction programs. Performance monitoring is the ongoing review  and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward  pre-established goals. It is typically conducted by program or agency  management. Performance monitoring focuses on whether a program  has achieved its objectives, expressed as measurable performance  standards. In contrast, program evaluations are individual systematic  studies conducted periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a  program is working. They are often conducted by experts, either from inside or outside the agency, who are not working on the program.  Program evaluations typically examine a broader range of information on  program performance and its context than is feasible to monitor on an  ongoing basis.

U.S. agencies have conducted a range of performance monitoring efforts  to assess their counternarcotics activities in Colombia. While some  monitoring is performed through interagency mechanisms, most  monitoring is done at the individual agency level.

Interagency monitoring mechanisms include ONDCP reports, such as its  annual Budget and Performance Summary and its annual National Drug  Control Strategy Performance Reporting System Report, and Embassy  Bogotá’s annual Performance Plan and Reports. ONDCP’s Budget and  Performance Summaries and Performance Reporting System Reports  are not Colombia-specific and discuss a range of domestic and  international counternarcotics efforts. These reports, however, generally  provide some limited performance information related to Colombia. For  example, ONDCP’s Budget and Performance Summaries include  information, by agency, on their counternarcotics budget requests as well  as some selected performance reporting. As part of these documents,  State and USAID have reported data on certain performance metrics  specific to Colombia, such as the number of hectares of drug crops  eradicated in U.S. government-assisted areas of Colombia and the  number of rural households benefitting from U.S. government  interventions in Colombia. In addition, the reports contain narrative  related to the results of counternarcotics activities in Colombia. At the  country level, Embassy Bogotá’s annual Performance Plan and Report  provides information on the embassy’s progress in meeting its goals and  objectives, including those related to counternarcotics. As part of these  reports, the embassy provides data on results for the fiscal year, relative  to established targets, for a range of counternarcotics performance  metrics. These Performance Plan and Reports primarily focus on State  and USAID activities, rather than describing the results of all U.S.  agencies’ activities in Colombia.

At the agency level, State, USAID, DOD, DOJ, and DHS and their  components have, to varying degrees, conducted performance monitoring  of their counternarcotics activities in Colombia. Examples of key  performance monitoring activities, by agency, are described below:

State: State, with input from other U.S. agencies involved in  counternarcotics efforts, produces its annual International Narcotics  Control Strategy Report, which is global in scope, but includes specific  country reports, including on Colombia. These reports describe key  steps that Colombia has taken over the year to combat drug trafficking  and how U.S. assistance has supported these efforts. In addition,  State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  (INL) has developed a Colombia country plan for 2017 through 2021  that presents results data for a number of counternarcotics-related  indicators, such as the percent of coca hectares eradicated against  Colombia’s national goals and the number of hours flown by the  Colombian National Police in support of counternarcotics and other  related missions. The INL country plan also establishes performance  targets for future years. State/INL implementing partners are also  responsible for producing periodic reports that describe their progress  in meeting pre-established performance targets for their projects.

USAID: USAID has developed a Colombia-specific information  system, the Monitoring and Evaluation Clearinghouse (Monitor), that  provides the agency with information about the status and progress of  all USAID alternative development projects in Colombia. For example,  Monitor tracks metrics such as the number of hectares of licit crops  supported by USAID, the number of beneficiaries from improved  infrastructure services, and the number of households who have  obtained documented property rights as a result of USAID assistance.  USAID implementing partners are also responsible for producing  periodic reports that describe their progress in meeting pre- established performance targets for their projects.

DOD: U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) completes annual  Program Objective Memorandums (POM) related to each of its  program areas as part of the DOD budget process. Each POM is tied  to a particular project code. For example, SOUTHCOM has a project  code for counternarcotics support in South America and a project  code for the Regional Helicopter Training Center in Colombia. As part  of each POM, SOUTHCOM reports on the activities supported under  the project code and reports on results relative to pre-established  performance targets. Examples of metrics tracked in the POMs  include the rate of operational readiness of Colombian maritime patrol  aircraft and the hours a day the Colombian Air Force was able to  provide video surveillance to support operations.

DOJ: DEA has developed its annual Threat Enforcement Planning  Process, which guides the agency’s operational strategy and serves  as a means of monitoring performance. Under this three-stage  process, DEA offices, including the one in Colombia, first identify  threats within their area of responsibility that link to agency-wide  threats that DEA has established. The offices then develop  mitigation/enforcement plans for each identified threat, and,  subsequently, produce impact statements that summarize the  outcomes and results related to each mitigation/enforcement plan. For  example, the impact statements describe key arrests that have been  made and major seizure operations. In addition, the FBI office in  Colombia produces an annual summary of statistics to monitor the  accomplishments of the Colombian vetted unit that it supports,  including the number of arrests, the amount of drugs seized, and the  commercial value of assets seized.

DHS: ICE and CBP stated that they do not conduct performance  monitoring activities specific to Colombia. Coast Guard officials stated  that the Coast Guard compiles information that it provides to its  Colombian counterparts on a recurring basis, including data on the  number of Colombian-flagged ship interdictions it has completed and  the number of Colombian nationals apprehended. All three agencies  contribute to DHS annual performance reports. These annual reports  include some performance information related to DHS  counternarcotics efforts more broadly, such as ICE’s work combatting  transnational criminal organizations that may operate in Colombia.

State, USAID, DOD, DOJ, and DHS use a range of metrics to assist them  in both formally and informally monitoring the performance of eradication,  interdiction, and alternative development efforts in Colombia. These  agencies produce some of these data, while in other cases they use data  from other sources including implementing partners, the Colombian  government, and the UN. Examples of key metrics include:

Eradication: hectares of coca cultivated, hectares of coca eradicated,  and coca replanting rates.

Interdiction: amounts of cocaine seized, the number of cocaine  processing laboratories destroyed, the number of drug trafficking  organizations disrupted or dismantled, and the number of drug  trafficking suspects extradited to the United States.

Alternative Development: the number of households involved in  coca cultivation, increases in the value of sales of legal products in  areas involved in narcotics production, the number of households  receiving land titles as a result of U.S. assistance, and the value of  agricultural and rural loans generated through U.S. assistance.

State, USAID, DEA, and DOD have undertaken efforts to further  strengthen their performance monitoring efforts in recent years. For  example, in September 2017, State/INL signed a new monitoring and  evaluation contract for the Western Hemisphere which is designed to  strengthen its existing performance measures and identify new metrics to  better assess performance. According to a State official, the contractor is  currently working with both State officials in Washington D.C. and at  embassies in the Western Hemisphere to, among other things, develop a  list of performance measures that link to INL’s goals for the region and  that involve data that can be feasibly and consistently collected across  the countries in the region. USAID officials noted that recently USAID has  been collecting data on contextual indicators and developing baseline  studies to help inform new alternative development programs it is  implementing in Colombia. According to USAID officials, these baseline  studies have collected information related to productivity, exports,  income, multidimensional poverty, citizen security, social capital, and trust  in institutions. In addition, as noted above, DEA established its new  Threat Enforcement Planning Process in fiscal year 2017. According to  DEA, this process is designed to, among other things, allow the agency to  move beyond basic output measures and better assess how its offices,  including the office in Colombia, are doing in combatting priority threats  within their area of responsibility. Finally, according to a DOD official,  DOD’s Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats is developing  guidance for assessing the counternarcotics programs it supports around  the world to help the office’s leadership make better informed decisions  about how to best use DOD’s limited counternarcotics resources.

Although performance metrics are useful for monitoring progress and can  help inform evaluations of effectiveness, they are generally not intended  to assess effectiveness directly. For example, U.S. agencies track data  on the amount of cocaine seized in Colombia, but a number of U.S.  officials noted that it is unclear to what extent increases in cocaine  seizures in recent years are due to the increased effectiveness of  interdiction efforts or more cocaine being present in Colombia to seize. As  another example, some agencies track data on the number of Colombian  officials receiving counternarcotics training through their programs, but  these data are not designed to capture what, if any, improvements in  counternarcotics outcomes are achieved as a result of that training.

USAID has completed independent evaluations of several of its  alternative development programs. However, other agencies have not  formally evaluated the long-term effectiveness of their eradication or  interdiction activities.

Alternative Development: Since 2008, USAID has conducted a number  of formal, independent evaluations of its alternative development  programs in Colombia. Some of these evaluations have examined  USAID’s alternative development efforts more broadly, while others have  focused on the effectiveness of specific programs such as USAID’s  Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative, More Investment in  Sustainable Alternative Development, and Areas for Municipal-Level  Alternative Development programs. Many of these evaluations were done  through a 5-year monitoring and evaluation contract that USAID awarded  to Management Systems International in May 2013.

Eradication and Interdiction: State, DOD, DEA, FBI, ICE, CBP, and the  U.S. Coast Guard all reported that they had not conducted any formal,  systematic evaluations to assess the effectiveness of U.S.-supported  eradication and interdiction efforts in Colombia since 2008. State  documents indicate that State was considering an evaluation of its  counternarcotics activities in Colombia as early as 2015; however, State  officials noted that these plans were delayed due to competing priorities.  State reported that it now plans to award a contract in 2019 for an  evaluation of its counternarcotics activities. According to State officials,  a scope of work for the evaluation has not been completed, so the details  of the planned evaluation have not yet been decided, including whether  the evaluation would assess activities in the long term and which activities  it would include. State’s November 2017 evaluation policy highlights the  importance of evaluations in achieving U.S. foreign policy outcomes and  ensuring accountability. The policy establishes a requirement that all  large programs, such as State’s counternarcotics program in Colombia,  be evaluated at least once in the program’s lifetime, or once every 5  years for ongoing programs. According to State officials, evaluations  can be challenging to design and potentially entail significant investments  of resources and time; however, State’s evaluation policy reaffirms the  importance and feasibility of conducting evaluations, including impact  evaluations. Without evaluations of U.S.-supported eradication and  interdiction efforts in Colombia, U.S. agencies do not have complete  information regarding the long-term effectiveness of these efforts in  reducing coca cultivation and the cocaine supply. As the lead agency  responsible for setting U.S. counternarcotics policy in Colombia, State is  best positioned to lead an evaluation of U.S.-supported eradication and  interdiction efforts in the country. However, such an evaluation would  benefit from the involvement and expertise of other U.S. agencies  engaged in counternarcotics activities in Colombia. State’s evaluation  policy encourages such evaluations that are undertaken collaboratively  with other U.S. agencies.

State Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive Review of the Overall U.S. Counternarcotics Approach in Colombia to Determine the Most Effective Combination of Activities

The U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia has historically entailed  a combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  programs. Although the U.S. government implements a wide range of  counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and can point to various results for  these activities, State and other U.S. agencies have no systematic way to  determine whether the current combination of activities is the most  effective approach to achieve U.S. goals. According to DEA officials,  measuring the effectiveness of overall U.S.-counternarcotics efforts in  Colombia has been particularly challenging in recent years due to  historical, transformational events which have taken place in that country.  Various U.S. officials acknowledged that the substantial increases in coca  cultivation and cocaine production as well as the other significant  changes that have occurred in Colombia in recent years, including the  end of aerial eradication, the conclusion of the peace agreement with the  FARC, and decreases in Colombian and U.S. counternarcotics budgets,  necessitate that the U.S. government review its approach to  counternarcotics efforts and consider adjustments to reflect these  developments.

In addition, the U.S. government’s approach is affected by Colombia’s  counternarcotics priorities and key initiatives, which continue to evolve.  For example, in September 2015, Colombia announced a new  counternarcotics strategy which specified three priority areas: rural  development programs to reduce drug cultivation; law enforcement efforts  to dismantle drug trafficking organizations; and public health approaches  to reduce domestic drug consumption. Colombia has also launched an  initiative to establish Strategic Operational Centers (known by the  Spanish acronym CEO) in key regions of the country. These CEOs are  designed to bring together the Colombian military, police, and civilian  agencies to focus on a whole-of-government approach to improving  security, establishing a state presence, and fighting drug trafficking in  these areas. The Colombian government has now launched CEOs in  three areas—Tumaco, San José del Guaviare, and Caucasia—and plans  to open a fourth, in Cúcuta, later in 2018 (see fig. 5). It is also  considering adding a fifth CEO in the Caquetá/Putumayo region. In  addition, the Colombian government, with support from the U.S.  embassy, launched the Antioquia Free from Coca initiative in December  2017. The initiative seeks to bring together the Colombian national  government, local governments in Antioquia, the armed forces, the  private sector, and the U.S. government to create a new model for  development and counternarcotics in the Antioquia region. State has  reported that the U.S. government plans to shift substantial resources to  the initiative.

Various U.S. officials stated that finding an appropriate combination of  eradication, interdiction, and alternative development assistance is critical  to achieve the U.S. objective of reducing cocaine production and  trafficking in Colombia in this new context. To find this combination, U.S.  officials stated that there are a range of considerations to weigh. For  example, U.S. officials stated that they must consider to what extent to  prioritize pursuing short-term reductions in coca cultivation and cocaine  supplies versus longer-term efforts to address the underlying causes of  the drug problem in Colombia, such as the widespread lack of legal  economic opportunities in rural areas of the country. In addition, U.S.  officials and documents from various agencies noted that  counternarcotics efforts must be properly sequenced and coordinated to  be effective. DEA analysis, for example, found that farmers are unlikely to  permanently abandon coca farming without sustained and concurrent  eradication and alternative development.

Although U.S. officials noted the importance of finding an appropriate  combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  assistance, they acknowledged that they have not undertaken a  comprehensive review of their counternarcotics approach in Colombia  that considers the benefits and limitations of these efforts to determine  whether the U.S government’s current combination of activities is the  most effective approach to achieve U.S. counternarcotics goals. Officials  from State and other agencies noted that such reviews are challenging to  do systematically and noted that they must generally rely on imperfect  metrics, such as the amount of coca being cultivated, to determine if their  counternarcotics approach is working. In addition, most U.S. efforts at  measuring performance and evaluating results are focused at the  individual agency level, rather than designed to determine what  combination of U.S. counternarcotics activities will best achieve U.S.  objectives of reducing the cocaine supply.

Federal internal control standards state that agency management should  use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Among other  things, the standards note agency management should use quality  information to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s  performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks. Without a  comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia  that considers the combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development efforts, the U.S. government lacks important information on  how to most effectively combat drug trafficking in a changing environment  in Colombia. To undertake such a review, the U.S. government might  determine the need to collect additional information and conduct further  evaluations of its counternarcotics programs, but it could also potentially  use a range of existing information on what is known about the  effectiveness of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  programs. State, as the lead agency at the embassy in Colombia, would  be best positioned to guide an interagency effort to undertake such a  review.

Available Evidence Indicates that U.S.- Supported Eradication Efforts in Colombia May Not Be an Effective Long- Term Supply- Reduction Approach

State’s INL has supported Colombian aerial and manual eradication  efforts over time, but these efforts have declined after the Government of  Colombia’s decision to end aerial eradication and several years of limited  or no funding for manual eradication driven by decreased Colombian  government demand for this assistance, according to State officials.  Despite these declines, officials from several U.S. agencies reported  eradication should be a vital component of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in  Colombia. Nevertheless, U.S. officials and the studies and experts in our  review identified a number of factors which may reduce the effectiveness  of eradication as a supply reduction approach, including the strategies  coca growers use to mitigate the effects of eradication and potential  adverse effects it may have on Colombian citizens. Additionally, third- party research suggests that eradication efforts do not substantially affect  the long-term supply of cocaine and are potentially costly.

Since 2008 U.S.- Supported Eradication Efforts Have Declined after Changes in Colombian Counternarcotics Policy; However, U.S. Officials Believe Eradication Is an Important Component of an Overall Counternarcotics Approach

INL has provided financial assistance and operational support for  Colombian eradication efforts in three key areas: aerial eradication,  manual eradication, and aviation support. Overall eradication efforts,  however, have declined over time and the Colombian government  stopped aerial eradication altogether in 2015.

Aerial Eradication: Until 2015, INL directed the largest portion of its  eradication assistance toward the Colombian National Police aerial  eradication program. The program’s goal was to reduce coca  cultivation and harvests by spraying coca fields with glyphosate. INL  helped fund, plan, and operate the aerial eradication program. It  provided the pilots, planning, aircraft, logistics, maintenance, and fuel  to operate the program’s two spray bases. Funding for the aerial  eradication program declined over time from $66.2 million in fiscal  year 2008 to $12.7 million in fiscal year 2014. From October 2013 to  October 2014, aerial eradication was temporarily suspended by the  U.S. Embassy in Bogotá after two pilots were shot down during  eradication operations. In May 2015, the Colombian government  stopped the aerial eradication program amid concerns that glyphosate  had a negative impact on public health. Cessation of aerial spraying  took effect in October 2015.

Manual Eradication: According to State officials, U.S. assistance  shifted from aerial to manual eradication after the 2015 ban on aerial  spraying. Manual eradication involves using mobile eradication teams,  which are transported into coca fields to manually remove and destroy  coca plants (see fig. 6). These teams are made up of Colombian  police and military personnel, as well as civilian contractors, according  to INL officials. Initially manual eradication was used in concert with  aerial spraying in an effort to combat replanting in areas already  subjected to aerial spraying, but with the ban on aerial spraying,  manual eradication became a stand-alone approach. INL provides a  variety of support for manual eradication teams including operational  support and equipment, such as demining and brush cutters.  Additionally, INL helps identify and fund the development of new  technologies that might improve the effectiveness of manual  eradication, such as armored ground spraying vehicles which protect  manual eradicators from the danger of improvised explosive devices  and landmines. INL funding for manual eradication varied during fiscal  years 2008 through 2016, ranging from four fiscal years where INL  provided no funding to a high of $9.5 million in fiscal year 2014. INL  funding for manual eradication increased substantially in fiscal year  2017 to $26 million. According to State, decreases in the budget for  manual eradication were driven by reduced Colombian government  demand for this assistance.

INL Aviation Support: INL has also provided aviation support to the  Colombian National Police and the Colombian Army to assist  counternarcotics efforts. According to INL, these aviation programs  provide critical assistance for a number of counternarcotics efforts  such as eradication, but also for interdiction, and security operations.  Because Colombia is a vast country with rugged terrain, many rivers,  and poor roads, State officials indicated air mobility is critical for  effective counternarcotics operations.

Colombian National Police (CNP): INL provides logistical,  operational, maintenance, safety, and training assistance to the  CNP’s aviation brigade in support of its counternarcotics  operations. The CNP aviation program costs roughly one-third of  INL’s Colombia budget, averaging about $55 million annually in  fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Under this program INL helped  the CNP procure its air fleet. Currently, the INL aviation program  supports a total of 56 CNP aircraft, of which 52 are owned by the  U.S. government (see fig. 7). Additionally, INL’s aviation  program provides assistance for the CNP to build maintenance  facilities, develop training plans, implement safety programs, and  procure equipment, such as flight recorders and communications  gear. As of 2018, INL also plans to provide $21 million over 4  years for the CNP’s aerial imagery collection and data analysis  system, which Colombian authorities use to map coca fields and  plan eradication missions.

Colombian Army: INL provided aviation support for the  Colombian Army prior to Colombia’s takeover of the army aviation  program in 2012—a process known as nationalization. INL  provided the Colombian Army’s aviation program nearly $150  million from fiscal years 2008 through 2011. According to INL, this  support contributed significantly to the Colombian Army’s aerial  eradication efforts as well as efforts to dismantle armed drug  trafficking organizations, such as the FARC and ELN. In 2008, the  Colombian government began to nationalize 62 aircraft from INL  and, in 2012, assumed full responsibility for their maintenance and  operations.

Multiple Factors May Limit the Effectiveness of Eradication Efforts or Undermine Their Viability as a Long-Term Supply- Reduction Strategy

U.S. and UN officials as well as third-party studies we reviewed identified  a number of factors that reduced the effectiveness of eradication efforts at  an operational level. We previously reported that U.S. funded  counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying, did not  achieve Plan Colombia’s overarching goal to reduce the cultivation,  production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in part because  coca farmers responded with a series of effective countermeasures.  Separately, State also indicated that aerial eradication was becoming less  effective prior to the end of the spraying program in 2015. Similarly, U.S.  and UN officials noted factors that had a negative impact on the  effectiveness of manual eradication efforts.

Crop displacement: U.S. officials, UN reports, and third-party  researchers have noted that eradication has caused coca cultivation  to move, or be displaced, to smaller plots and areas “off-limits” to  aerial spraying, such as national parks, territories near international  borders, and protected indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas, thus  diminishing its impact on supply reduction. According to INL, at the  beginning of the 2000s plots of 10 or more hectares were  commonplace, easy to identify, and spray, but by 2016, the average  plot size was less than a hectare, making aerial spraying more  difficult. In addition, coca cultivation in areas off-limits to aerial  spraying, such as national parks, border areas, and indigenous and  Afro-Colombian areas, has increased substantially. According to one  State cable, in 2014 over 70 percent of the nationwide cultivation  increases in cultivation occurred in these areas. The Congressional  Research Service reported that cultivation increased in these areas by  50 percent between 2014 and 2015. Likewise, a UN report noted  that between 2015 and 2016, coca cultivation had increased by 32  percent in indigenous areas, by 45 percent in Afro-Colombian areas,  and by 27 percent in national parks. According to the UN report,  these areas account for only .04 percent of Colombia’s national  territory but are the source of 32 percent of the nation’s coca  cultivation. Four of the studies in our literature review also concluded  that eradication led to crop displacement. One study indicated that the  displacement of coca cultivation tends to disproportionately affect  vulnerable populations by concentrating crime in the areas where  these populations tend to live. The study concluded that coca  cultivation has increased in some of the most socially and  environmentally vulnerable areas of Colombia, including  disadvantaged rural communities and has tended to further  marginalize those Afro-Colombian communities that experienced  dramatic increases in coca cultivation.

Countermeasures: Coca growers and drug traffickers can employ  countermeasures, such as using mines and improvised explosive  devices, which create serious risks for manual eradication teams. For  example, 4 manual eradicators were killed and 39 wounded during  manual eradication operations in 2017, according to one State cable.  Likewise, aerial spraying operations were also targeted by attacks.  For example, in 2013 two pilots were shot down while conducting  aerial eradication operations. This attack led to a temporary halt in  aerial spraying operations. One State cable reported that from 1996 to  October 2015 at least five spray aircraft were downed by hostile fire,  resulting in the deaths of four pilots.

Replanting, pruning, and other mitigation efforts: Coca growers  have developed techniques, including replanting and pruning, which  can mitigate damage to coca plants and reduce the effectiveness of  eradication efforts. According to a 2017 UN report, 80 percent of the  coca fields detected in 2016 had previously been subjected to aerial  or manual eradication efforts. One DEA report confirmed that 25  percent of coca growers in the region they studied in 2008 had  replanted their crops after spraying. Colombian government data  showed that from 2014 through 2016 areas subjected to manual  eradication were replanted between 25 and 37 percent of the time. In  addition, coca growers can prune bushes immediately after spraying  to help counter the effects of glyphosate and allow the plants to yield  fresh leaves that may be harvested. According to data provided by  State, from 2006 through 2012 areas subjected to aerial spraying  were reconstituted—replanted or pruned—on average about 56  percent of the time. Growers may also intersperse coca plants  alongside licit agricultural crops because aerial eradication efforts  tend to be focused on large coca fields and attempt to avoid licit  crops.

Coca growers’ economic incentives: According to a DEA study, in  2007, nearly 60 percent of coca growers were ready to abandon coca  farming. Likewise, a 2009 DEA study stated that sustained aerial  eradication efforts, lasting 5 to 8 years, would force coca growers to  give up coca farming. DEA noted that the Putumayo region, which it  used as a model in the study, was “nearing a tipping point” in which  coca cultivation would be abandoned after aerial eradication caused  60-80 percent losses in coca fields. However, aerial eradication efforts  were sustained at or above 100,000 hectares from 2002 to 2012  before decreasing and eventually ending altogether in 2015. By 2016,  coca cultivation had increased substantially and DEA data showed  that only 5 percent of growers were ready to abandon coca. Similarly,  a UN coca cultivation survey found that the number of households  involved in the coca trade increased steadily from roughly 60,000 in  2008 to over 100,000 in 2016. DEA officials we interviewed agreed  that it now appears that coca growers do not “abandon” coca farming  during periods of sustained eradication, but rather they temporarily  stop farming coca until it is economically advantageous to resume.  State officials noted that they anticipate increases in eradication levels  under President Duque and expect that increased eradication may  alter coca farmers’ analysis of the benefits and risks of growing coca.  One expert we interviewed was skeptical that eradication could ever  raise the economic costs of growing coca high enough to dissuade  farmers from growing coca because they find it easy to grow and are  very responsive to price changes. The expert stated that the revenues  from growing coca are often significantly higher than the costs of  growing the plant. Given such high potential profits, there is typically  an economic incentive to grow the crop.

A number of other factors may also undermine the viability of eradication  as a supply reduction strategy more broadly:

Protests against eradication: According to a 2017 State cable, rural  protestors use blockading tactics at eradication sites to disrupt manual  eradication efforts. This cable reported that protesters blocked 428  manual eradication operations in 2016, and 152 operations in 2017. In  addition, these protests against manual eradication efforts have led to  violent confrontations between local populations and Colombian  security forces. One such confrontation in Nariño—Colombia’s top  coca-producing region—led to the deaths of a number of civilian  protesters.

Destruction of licit agriculture: Local civil society organizations in  Colombia maintain that glyphosate spraying drifts with the wind and  kills legal crops near eradicated areas, negatively affecting local  populations. State maintains that its eradication programs had a  minimal impact on licit crops; however, those whose licit crops had  been harmed as a result of aerial spraying were eligible for  compensation. According to State, from 2001 through the end of the  aerial spraying program in October 2015, Colombians registered  nearly 18,000 complaints of accidental spraying of licit crops. Of these  complaints, State noted that only 3 percent were found to have merit  and were therefore eligible for compensation.

Debate over adverse health effects: The debate over the purported  negative health effects of glyphosate has made aerial spraying efforts  in Colombia controversial. In March 2015, the World Health  Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer identified  glyphosate as “probably” able to cause cancer in humans. However,  two U.S. agencies dispute these findings. From 2002 through 2011,  State formally certified to Congress that the glyphosate spraying  program posed no unreasonable health risks to humans. The  Environmental Protection Agency has also generally concluded that  glyphosate exposure from aerial eradication in Colombia has not been  linked to adverse health effects. Several other studies we reviewed  discussed the potential health effects of glyphosate.

International disputes: In 2013, Ecuador and Colombia agreed to a  settlement to a case Ecuador filed in 2008 before the International  Court of Justice in The Hague seeking a prohibition of the use of  herbicides in aerial eradication near the Colombia-Ecuador border as  well as indemnification for claimed damages associated with  Colombia’s eradication program. Ecuador received $15 million in  compensation from Colombia for alleged health and environmental  harms and Colombia agreed to a 10 kilometer exclusion zone on the  border with Ecuador in which it would not conduct aerial spraying.

Third-Party Research Suggests that Eradication Efforts Do Not Have a Substantial Long-Term Effect on Reducing Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Supply and Are Potentially Costly

Third-party research we reviewed suggests that eradication efforts do not  have a substantial long-term effect on coca cultivation and cocaine supply  and are potentially costly. Eight studies in our literature review had key  findings on the effectiveness of eradication efforts in Colombia. All eight  studies raised questions regarding the effectiveness of eradication as a  strategy to substantially reduce coca cultivation and the cocaine supply.  Five studies also generally concluded it is a potentially costly supply  reduction approach.

Five studies found that eradication has only a small effect on reducing  coca cultivation, but the estimates for reductions varied by study. For  example, one study found that a 1 percent increase in the risk of  eradication decreases coca cultivation by roughly .44 hectares. Another  study estimated that a 1 percent increase in the risk of eradication would  decrease the total area in Colombia under cultivation by .66 percent.  Likewise, a third study found that as a result of displacement, the supply  reduction effects of spraying were so small that an additional 33 hectares  must be sprayed every year in order to reduce coca cultivation by 1  hectare.

Three other studies concluded eradication efforts had no net effect on  reducing the coca or cocaine supplies, or have led to increased coca  cultivation. For example, one of these studies reported that a 1 percent  increase in eradication actually increases the amount of land under coca  cultivation by 1 percent as growers try to compensate for losses. The  author noted that municipal level data on eradication and coca cultivation  trends was broadly compatible with their findings. In addition, the author  presented data from 2006 through 2012 which indicated a 38 percent  decrease in eradication levels as well as a 38 percent decrease in coca  cultivation. Another study concluded that the effects of eradication were  nullified by coca growers’ ability to rapidly relocate their operations to  other areas.

Several of the studies we reviewed examined aspects of the costliness of  eradication efforts, but relied on cost data that were either limited or we  were unable to substantiate. Three studies generally concluded that  eradication is costly in absolute terms, while two others suggested that  eradication appears to be more costly than other alternative  counternarcotics efforts. For example, one study suggested removing 1  kilogram of cocaine from retails markets through eradication would cost  the United States roughly $940,000. Another study estimated that an  additional $100,000 spent on eradication would reduce coca cultivation in  Colombia by 1.5 percent.

U.S.-Supported Interdiction Efforts Seized a Substantial Amount of Cocaine and Disrupted Drug Trafficking Organizations in Colombia, but the Long-Term Effect of These Efforts is Unclear

U.S. agencies have provided a variety of support for Colombian  interdiction efforts, including capacity building and operational support.  These efforts resulted in the seizures of a substantial amount of cocaine  and precursor chemicals and disrupted drug trafficking organizations by  arresting these organizations’ leadership and seizing valuable assets.  However, the long-term effects of these efforts are unclear due to  continued increases in cocaine production and the emergence of new  drug traffickers. U.S. and Colombian officials identified a number of ways  to improve the effectiveness of interdiction. A limited number of third-party  studies on interdiction suggest mixed findings but indicate interdiction  may be more effective than eradication because it targets drug trafficking  at a more costly point in the production and distribution process.

U.S. Agencies Have Provided Capacity Building and Operational Assistance to Support Colombian Interdiction Efforts

Building Partner Capacity: U.S. agencies provided a range of  assistance that has improved Colombian authorities’ capacity to conduct  interdiction efforts. U.S. and Colombian officials noted that because of  these efforts, Colombian security services were able to provide  counternarcotics training and support to other countries in the region. Key  examples of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity included:

Counternarcotics forces: U.S. agencies provided a broad range of  assistance to improve the effectiveness of Colombian  counternarcotics forces. For example, INL funded the creation and  training of the Colombian Army’s counternarcotics brigades—military  units responsible for seizing cocaine, destroying cocaine processing  labs, and securing eradication sites. In addition, DOD and INL  provided training and expertise to the Colombian National Police’s  Junglas unit, which is a highly-trained special operations unit used to  detect and destroy cocaine labs and capture high value drug  traffickers. INL funded the construction of the Colombian National  Police training facility where security services from Colombia and  neighboring countries receive counternarcotics-related training.  Likewise, DOD provided a broad array of programs designed to  improve the operational capabilities of Colombian security forces. For  instance, the agency’s Regional Pilot Training School helps provide  helicopters, training, and certification for up to 50 Colombian and 24  international pilots annually. According to DOD, the goal of this  program is to increase the Colombian capacity to rapidly deploy to  remote areas of the country to conduct counternarcotics operations.

Equipment procurement and maintenance: U.S. agencies provided  assistance to procure and maintain equipment for their Colombian  counterparts. The largest such effort is INL’s Aviation Program, which  procured and maintained a fleet of aircraft for the Colombian National  Police. The aviation program allows the police to conduct interdiction  operations in areas of the country which are difficult to access,  according to INL officials. INL also procured and maintained other  equipment, including communications equipment and night vision  goggles. In addition, DOD provided equipment to vetted Colombian  security forces with counter-narcotics missions, including patrol boats;  protective gear; and specialized navigation, communications, and  surveillance equipment.

Judicial support: For over 20 years DOJ’s Office of Overseas  Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) has  provided a range of assistance to help reform the Colombian judicial  system and improve its ability to prosecute crimes. According to  OPDAT officials, this assistance is critical for the successful  prosecution of drug cases. The office assisted with prosecutor  training, case-based mentoring, case efficiency, litigation skills, and  plea bargaining. Likewise, DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative  Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provided training, including  curriculum development, seminars, and on-the-job training, to improve  the Colombian government’s ability to conduct criminal investigations  and develop forensics capabilities according to agency officials.  ICITAP’s training efforts in Colombia focused, in part, on reforming  Colombia’s legal framework as well as fostering cooperation and  organizational development between the country’s judicial and law  enforcement agencies.

Investigative support: A number of U.S. agencies worked closely  with Colombian vetted units, to support these agencies’ missions  abroad. For example, DEA provided funding, training, and vetting for  Colombian Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs). According to DEA  officials, DEA conducted bilateral counternarcotics and money  laundering investigations with these Colombian vetted units. Similarly,  the FBI and ICE both work with Colombian vetted units and provide  investigative support for counternarcotics investigations. For example,  the FBI worked closely with its vetted unit in Colombia to investigate  transnational criminal organizations. FBI officials told us that these  cases were almost exclusively related to drug trafficking organizations  in Colombia.

Operational Support: U.S. agencies also provided operational support  for Colombian interdiction operations. Key examples of U.S. operational  support include:

Targeting, extraditions, and prosecutions: A number of U.S.  offices supported the targeting, extradition, and prosecution of  Colombian drug traffickers. For example, DOJ’s Organized Crime  Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) developed the  Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list in order to  identify and target the leaders of major drug trafficking organizations.  Likewise, the FBI targets drug trafficking leadership as well as  facilitators—those who support drug traffickers financially or  politically—by investigating money laundering and corruption cases  according to agency officials. In addition, DOJ officials partnered with  the Colombian government to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. for  trial. According to the DEA officials, extradition is one of the most  effective investigative tools against drug trafficking in Colombia. The  DEA officials noted that the vast majority of persons charged and  extradited to the United States from Colombia have been convicted.  Additionally, an FBI official stated that the extradition of high level  drug traffickers has the potential to degrade the operational ability of  their organizations because these extradited leaders may cooperate  with U.S. courts to get reduced sentences. This cooperation can then  create leads for new cases and provide new information and  witnesses for active cases, further undermining the operations of  criminal organizations.

Detection and monitoring: Several U.S. agencies supported  Colombian interdiction efforts by assisting with detecting and  monitoring of drug trafficking operations. For example:

According to DEA, during bilateral investigations the agency and  its Colombian counterparts utilized a number of investigative tools  to detect and monitor drug trafficking networks and money  laundering organizations with the ultimate goal of prosecution in  Colombia and the United States. DEA stated that information  gleaned from these efforts is shared and used to coordinate  maritime interdiction operations that can lead to additional  evidence for prosecution. One DEA official stated that these  detection and monitoring efforts yield more leads than U.S. and  Colombian security forces have the resources to interdict.

Beginning in 2003, INL supported the CNP’s Air Bridge Denial  program. This program was developed to help improve the  Colombian government’s ability to detect and intercept airplanes  smuggling drugs into and out of Colombia. In 2003, Colombia  documented 60 to 70 flights per month transporting drugs into and  out of the country. Today, Colombia reports detecting no more  than two or three flights per year, according to State. The  program, including all aircraft, hangars, equipment, and facilities  was nationalized in January 2010. Following nationalization, INL’s  Air Bridge Denial budget decreased from roughly $20 million in  2004 to $1 million in 2012 and, at present, INL no longer funds the  program.

DOD also provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  (ISR) in support of interdiction operations. According to officials  the agency uses its ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles to help  Colombian security forces track maritime vessels moving drugs on  Colombia’s Pacific coast. For example, DOD provided various  task forces, which include Colombian police, army, navy, marines,  and coast guard units, with ISR support via ScanEagle systems,  including imaging and video to support interdiction efforts along  the Pacific coast of Colombia, according to DOD officials.

Monitoring Data Show Interdiction Efforts Seized a Substantial Amount of Cocaine and Disrupted Drug Trafficking Organizations; However, the Long-Term Effects of These Efforts Are Unclear

U.S., UN, and Colombian monitoring data indicate that interdiction  disrupts drug trafficking operations by seizing large amounts of cocaine,  precursor chemicals, and other assets used by drug trafficking  organizations. According to UN data, the amount of cocaine seized in  Colombia increased from about 198 metric tons in 2008 to an estimated  435 metric tons in 2017 (see fig. 9). These totals accounted for an  estimated 42 percent and 32 percent of the cocaine produced in those  years, respectively. From 2008 through 2017 the total financial impact of  cocaine seizures on drug trafficking organizations exceeded $4 billion.  Several factors may explain these increases in the amount of cocaine  seized. Several U.S. officials noted that increases in cocaine production  means there is more cocaine to be seized in transit, while another official  stated that seizure increases without corresponding increases in  resources indicate that interdiction efforts may be becoming increasingly  effective over time. In addition, interdiction efforts have led to the  destruction of numerous drug processing facilities. From 2008 through  2017, nearly 30,000 coca paste and cocaine processing laboratories were  destroyed, according to Colombian data.

Since 2008, Colombian security forces have also seized over 30 million  gallons of the liquid precursor chemicals necessary for the production of  cocaine, as well as 8,087 vehicles, 1,083 boats, 18 airplane, 65,778  firearms, over 13 million rounds of ammunition, and 34,800 pieces of  communications equipment associated with drug trafficking operations,  according to Colombian government data. In addition, since 2008, ICE  estimates that Colombian authorities have seized over $35 million in bulk  cash and hundreds of millions of dollars in drug related contraband at  Colombian ports.

U.S. supported interdiction efforts have contributed to the disruption and  dismantling of a number of drug trafficking organizations and the arrest  and extradition of high value drug trafficking suspects on the CPOT and  priority target organization (PTO) lists (see table 1). For example, as  part of an “Operation Agamemnon II” that sought to disrupt and dismantle  the Clan del Golfo, Colombian forces killed the group’s second-in- command, Roberto Vargas Gutierrez in August 2017; captured its third-in- command, Luis Orlando Padierna Pena in November 2017; and killed or  captured many other senior and mid-level leaders. Likewise, in April  2017, Colombian forces arrested Edison Washington Prado Álava in  Tumaco and seized $25 million in cash. Prado Álava, known as the  “Pablo Escobar of Ecuador,” had issued death threats against police,  prosecutors, and judges in both Ecuador and Colombia. In February  2018, with the cooperation of Colombian authorities, Prado Álava was  extradited to the United States, where he is facing prosecution.

From fiscal years 2008 through 2017, OCDETF reported that Colombian  forces arrested 31 Colombians, disrupted 273 Colombian organizations  and dismantled 94 others linked to the CPOT list. From calendar years  2008 through 2017, DEA reported that U.S. and Colombian authorities  had also disrupted 83 PTOs and dismantled 201 others, including an  estimated 5,444 PTO-related arrests. DEA officials stated that nearly all  of these extraditions were for drug related crimes and these individuals  were all “high value” targets.

However, the long-term effect of these efforts is unclear. While seizures  remove roughly 40 percent of the total cocaine supply each year on  average, increases in cocaine production mean that the net supply of  cocaine destined for the United States has increased despite the  substantial amount of cocaine seized. U.S. officials also stated that while  arrests and extraditions remove drug trafficking leaders, which may  temporarily degrade the operational capabilities of drug trafficking  organizations, the lucrative nature of the cocaine market ensures that  others will replace these individuals.

U.S. and Colombian sources identified several other challenges that may  impact the effectiveness of interdiction efforts. One FBI official stated that  as investigative efforts fragment drug trafficking organizations, it becomes  more challenging to target organizations and dismantle their command  and control structures. One of the studies we reviewed suggested that as  these organizations are dismantled, local populations may be affected by  pronounced cycles of violence as competing armed groups vie for control  of drug trafficking operations in areas formerly under the control of an  established criminal organization which has been dismantled. Sources  also stated that extraditions may become less of a deterrent to drug  traffickers over time as they and their legal counsels become more  familiar with the U.S. judicial system and are able to effectively plead to  lesser charges and get lighter sentences.

U.S. and Colombian Officials Identified Opportunities to Improve the Effectiveness of Interdiction Efforts

U.S. and Colombian officials identified a number of ways to improve  interdiction efforts and increase the effectiveness of these operations:

Maritime/riverine boat program: State and DOD have already  provided assistance to strengthen Colombia’s maritime and riverine  interdiction capabilities, but INL officials noted that they were  exploring options to provide further support for riverine interdiction  efforts given the significance of Colombia’s waterways in drug  trafficking. A number of U.S. and Colombian officials, including  officials from INL, the Colombian Navy, and the U.S. and Colombian  Coast Guards, stated that an enhanced “boat program,” similar to  INL’s aviation program, would improve the country’s ability to interdict  cocaine shipments traveling along Colombian maritime routes.  Officials noted that features of such a program should include the  procurement, supply, and maintenance of boats capable of tracking  down the “go fast” boats used by traffickers. These vessels cost $1  million each, and provide a significant return on investment, according  to Colombian authorities. One such boat, for example, was able to  interdict 12 tons of cocaine (valued at $60 million) in 1 year in  Tumaco, Colombian officials stated.

Port of entry/container interdiction operations: DHS officials from  ICE and CBP have supported Colombian efforts to seize drugs and  other contraband at air and sea ports of entry. However, one ICE  official stated that container smuggling is the “Achilles’ heel” of  cocaine interdiction efforts in Colombia. According to this official,  Colombian ports vary in their willingness to cooperate with U.S.  agencies in order to combat drug smuggling. For example, the official  stated that one port provides a lot of information to ICE and CBP  officials because it participates in CBP’s Container Security Initiative,  while another port is known for corruption and smuggling. This official  believes that hundreds of tons of cocaine leave via containers  carrying licit merchandise and reported that, for example, one  interdiction operation targeting the port in Cartagena had resulted in  the seizure of 35 tons of cocaine since 2015. According to ICE  officials, assigning more personnel to Colombian air and seaports  would greatly increase seizures of cocaine and contraband.

Drug trafficking organization funding/finance: A number of U.S.  and Colombian sources suggested that interdiction efforts can be  improved by targeting drug trafficking organizations’ assets and  revenues. Because money is at the top of the value chain, disrupting  cash flow before it can return to drug traffickers would have a  significant impact on their ability to profit from criminal activities and  continue to fund their operations, according to several U.S. and  Colombian sources. One expert we spoke to indicated that interdiction  efforts could be improved by targeting money laundering, bulk cash  shipments, and contraband smuggling. According to one FBI official,  drug trafficking organizations cannot operate without financing, and as  a result it is important to focus on money laundering cases. Similarly,  one ICE official described bulk cash shipments and money laundering  as the “fuel” that drives drug trafficking and believes it is critical to  devote more resources in this area. DEA stated that in addition to its  bilateral investigations with Colombia, the agency also conducts  simultaneous money laundering investigations often resulting in  seizures of assets and bulk cash. However, INL officials stated that  Colombian asset forfeiture laws have made it difficult for authorities to  seize and liquidate the assets of drug traffickers. In 2017, revisions to  these laws were passed making it easier for Colombian officials to  liquidate these assets and use these resources to fund further  counternarcotics efforts; however, State noted that the revised asset  forfeiture process still faces several challenges including the limited  number of judges and long periods of time needed to adjudicate these  cases.

Regional maritime interdiction operations: U.S. and Colombian  officials suggested that sustaining regional maritime interdiction  operations between the U.S., Colombia, and other nations in the  transit zone can significantly disrupt drug trafficking operations if  maintained long term. For example, beginning in March 2017, the  U.S. and Colombian navies—along with maritime authorities from  Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, Honduras, Ecuador, Guatemala, and  Nicaragua—conducted Operation Orion, a series of coordinated  maritime interdiction operations targeting different areas of the transit  zone. One of these operations, conducted jointly by Colombia and  Panama, seized 2.5 tons of cocaine in 1 month and led to 20 arrests.  U.S. Coast Guard officials stated that Operation Orion was a  successful, short-term example of how regionally coordinated  operations can improve the effectiveness of maritime interdiction and  believe that continuous operations of this type would dramatically  improve the effectiveness of interdiction efforts overall. U.S. Coast  Guard officials also noted that these types of coordination efforts  among Colombia and other countries in the region are an important  step toward self-sufficiency and away from a reliance on U.S. funding  and law enforcement support for maritime operations. However, these  officials noted that there are currently not enough resources devoted  to interdiction to sustain these types of partnerships in the long term.  Colombian Navy officials agreed that countries in the region need to  devote more resources to sustain these types of regional efforts.  However, these officials also noted that Colombia has taken some  steps, such as developing permanent information sharing agreements  with regional partners, to develop these types of relationships.

A Limited Number of Third- Party Studies on Interdiction Have Mixed Findings, but Suggest Potential Effectiveness Relative to Eradication

Third-party research we reviewed had limited findings related to  interdiction. While seven of the studies in our literature review discussed  aspects of interdiction efforts, four studies had findings related to the  effect of these efforts on the cocaine supply. These four studies had  mixed findings about the overall effectiveness of interdiction efforts. One  study we reviewed found that an increased emphasis on interdiction  efforts in Colombia, beginning in 2006, had achieved a substantial  reduction in the net supply of cocaine. Another study indicated that  increases in the costs to produce cocaine were mainly due to the  interdiction of precursor chemicals such as gasoline. However, two  other studies concluded that increased cocaine seizures did not have a  substantial impact on either the price or the overall supply of cocaine,  which has steadily increased since 2013.

Several of the seven studies we reviewed suggested that interdiction is  more effective or more cost-effective than eradication efforts. Two studies  indicated that interdiction policies had a greater impact on the cocaine  supply than eradication policies. For example, one study showed that the  destruction of cocaine processing labs has a greater impact on cocaine  prices than aerial or manual eradication efforts. Two other studies  concluded that interdiction was more cost effective than eradication  efforts. For example, one study indicated that the cost of removing 1  kilogram of cocaine from retail markets in the United States was $175,000  if resources were devoted to interdiction and $940,000 if resources were  devoted to eradication. However, this study relied on cost estimates that  were either limited or we were unable to substantiate.

A number of the studies in our literature review and experts we  interviewed stated that counternarcotics resources should primarily be  devoted to interdiction efforts instead of eradication efforts because they  target drug traffickers at the top of the “value chain”. According to these  studies and experts, counternarcotics actions are more costly to drug  traffickers at this stage of the drug trafficking process. For example, two  studies indicated that the destruction of cocaine processing labs is the  most effective counternarcotics effort. One study stated that the  destruction of these labs is an effective interdiction strategy because  these labs add significant value to the final product, cocaine lost at this  stage is not easily replaced, and the destruction of labs reduces demand  for coca leaves and coca cultivation. This study indicated that for every  lab destroyed, coca cultivation decreases by 3 hectares as demand for  the leaves falls. Another study indicated that the number of processing  laboratories destroyed accounts for 75 percent of the price fluctuation of  cocaine.

U.S.-Supported Alternative Development Programs in Colombia Have Achieved Some Positive Results, but Officials and Research Have Noted Some Implementation Challenges

U.S.-supported alternative development programs in Colombia have  attained some positive outcomes. USAID evaluations and monitoring data  show that alternative development programs have achieved a number of  positive results in increasing opportunities to participate in the legal  economy in Colombia, but have also faced issues that reduced their  effectiveness. U.S. and Colombian officials stated that alternative  development programs are important to a long-term counternarcotics  strategy, but noted a number of implementation challenges. Third-party  research suggests that alternative development has the potential to  reduce coca cultivation if properly implemented.

USAID Has Supported a Range of Alternative Development Programs Designed to Increase Licit Economic Opportunities in Colombia

USAID’s alternative development programs in Colombia provide support  in a number of key areas, including programs that are intended to: assist in the development of value chains for agricultural products,  such as cacao and coffee, or the development of licit businesses;  support land formalization efforts, including the issuance of land titles  and the development of Colombia’s national registry of land  ownership (known as a cadaster);  increase access to rural finance;  strengthen producer associations (see fig. 10);  leverage private sector investment to support rural development; provide needed infrastructure to strengthen communities and support  legal economies including roads, schools, electricity, and sanitation;  and  support civil society organizations and strengthen governance,  including efforts to build social capital and increase the presence of  the Colombian government in areas affected by conflict.

According to USAID, over time, it has broadened the focus of its  alternative development efforts to move beyond crop substitution  programs and to instead work to transform underdeveloped regions within  Colombia and address the underlying issues that drive the economics  and culture of drug trafficking. USAID noted that it has also sought to  prioritize particular geographic regions, rather than seeking to implement  programs throughout the whole country. Table 2 lists examples of  alternative development programs that USAID has funded in Colombia  over the past 10 years. USAID, State, and Colombian officials noted that  this broader, more comprehensive focus for alternative development is  necessary in order to create the conditions that would be conducive for  legal alternatives to coca cultivation to be viable in many parts of  Colombia. For example, Colombia faces substantial deficiencies in its  road network. Without improvements in the road network, many  Colombians in rural areas do not have a feasible way of transporting legal  crops to markets or accessing basic services. Significant numbers of  Colombian farmers also do not possess title to their land, which, among  other things, limits their ability to access credit and reduces their  incentives to make longer-term investments in legal crops such as cacao,  which take years to mature.

USAID Evaluations and Monitoring Data Show that Alternative Development Programs Have Achieved Some Positive Results, but Have Also Faced Issues that Reduced Their Effectiveness

We reviewed seven independent evaluations that USAID has  commissioned since 2008. These evaluations reported that USAID  alternative development programs have achieved a range of positive  results. For example, a 2016 midterm impact evaluation of USAID’s  Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative found that, among other  things, an increased number of program beneficiaries reported that their  economic situation was good or very good compared to the baseline at  the beginning of the project. In addition, the evaluation found that  program beneficiaries’ sales of supported products had increased  significantly and had far exceeded USAID targets. A 2014 post- implementation evaluation of two USAID programs (1) More Investment in  Sustainable Alternative Development and (2) Areas for Municipal-Level  Alternative Development found positive outcomes for some beneficiaries,  including success in helping producer associations get their products to  market.

However, the evaluations also reported that USAID alternative  development programs did not achieve all intended goals and faced  certain implementation issues including problems with project design,  program funding not being sustained for adequate periods, and a lack of  consistent support from the Colombian government, which was a partner  in these programs. For example, an April 2009 evaluation of USAID  alternative development efforts under Plan Colombia reported, among  other things, that many marketable crops in Colombia, such as cacao or  coffee, take several years to grow before they are ready to harvest and  produce income for farmers. Thus, farmers need income support during  this period as they transition from dependence on coca to legal crops,  but, according to the evaluation, USAID and the Colombian government  frequently did not provide sufficient income to cover food costs or other  expenses, making farmers highly vulnerable to resume coca cultivation.  An April 2011 evaluation of USAID’s Integrated Governance Response  program reported that some funded projects were at a standstill due to  the delays by the Colombian local and regional governments in fulfilling  their commitments. USAID, for example, had funded the construction of a  cold-storage facility to assist milk producers in one region, but the facility  had not been provided with electricity because the municipal government  had not sent a building inspector to approve its construction. A February 2017 review of alternative development in Colombia reported that a  number of alternative development efforts may require longer time  horizons than allowed by most USAID contracts or cooperative  agreements.

In addition to these evaluations, other USAID assessments have reported  that alternative development programs have achieved some positive  results. For example, data from USAID’s Monitor system report that  USAID projects related to “Inclusive Rural Economic Growth” exceeded  their targets for 23 of 44 performance indicators for which results were  reported for fiscal year 2017. Similarly, for fiscal year 2017, USAID  reported that it exceeded its targets for six of nine performance indicators  related to inclusive rural growth that were tracked in Embassy Bogotá’s  Performance Plan and Report (see table 3). An internal USAID analysis  also noted that the agency had been able to increase the ratio of legal  crops grown relative to coca in areas where it had funded programs to  increase opportunities for such crops. Specifically, USAID reported that in  14 departments where it had funded such programs, the ratio of illegal to  USAID-supported legal crops under cultivation had decreased from 302:1  hectares to 13:1 hectares from 2011 to 2016.

USAID noted different factors that resulted in three of the nine targets not  being met. For example, USAID stated that the target for households with  formalized land was not met because the Colombian government  eliminated the agency previously responsible for land formalization in  December 2015 and created two new agencies in its place. According to  USAID, these new agencies did not begin operations until March 2017,  which delayed USAID’s work with the Colombian government on the  project and created uncertainty about the Colombian government’s land  policy and administration.

Data reported by UNODC also provides certain information related to the  effectiveness of alternative development efforts in Colombia. UNODC, for  example, collects and reports data on the number of households involved  in coca production as part of its annual illicit crop cultivation surveys.  These data show that the number of households in Colombia involved in  coca cultivation increased from 59,328 to 106,900 between 2008 and  2016 (an increase of 80 percent). Such data indicate that any gains  achieved in encouraging Colombians to switch from illegal to legal  livelihoods through alternative development programs have been  outweighed by other factors driving increased involvement in coca  cultivation.

U.S. and Colombian Officials View Alternative Development Programs as Important to a Long-Term Counternarcotics Strategy, but Noted a Number of Implementation Challenges

U.S. and Colombian officials stated that alternative development, and the  creation of viable opportunities for Colombians to get access to public  services and participate in the legal economy, is important to solving the  drug problem in Colombia. However, these officials acknowledged that  comprehensive alternative development is a long-term approach that  requires significant investment. They also pointed out that large portions  of rural Colombia have been marginalized for decades and that the  Colombian government will need to make substantial, sustained  investments in rural areas to establish the necessary conditions for legal  economies to develop. According to USAID officials, USAID data indicate  that the regions where USAID has intervened have fared better than the  areas where it has not, but the scope and scale of its interventions have  not been significant enough to counteract overall coca cultivation and  cocaine production trends in the country.

U.S. government analysis and officials noted that there are also powerful  economic disincentives for farmers to shift from the cultivation of coca to  legal crops such as coffee or cacao. According to State analysis, while  prices per kilo of cacao and coffee are higher than coca, lower investment  costs, more frequent harvests, higher yields per hectare, minimal field  maintenance costs, and negligible transportation costs, make growing  coca the more profitable economic choice in most parts of Colombia. For  example, in the Nariño region, State found that growing coca can be up to  14 times more profitable per hectare than cacao, factoring in all costs.  DEA analysis has found that average annual profit accrued by Colombian  farmers from a hectare of coca increased by more than 120 percent from  2012 to 2016. In addition, DEA analysis has found that as profitability has  increased, the number of coca farmers wanting to stop growing coca has  declined substantially.

According to USAID documents and officials, a number of other factors  have also affected USAID’s ability to effectively support alternative  development efforts in Colombia, including Colombian policy and legal  restrictions, insecure and inaccessible locations, coordination challenges  with the Colombian government, the diversity of needs within Colombian  communities, and Colombia’s current alternative development focus and  U.S. legal restrictions.

Colombian policy and legal restrictions. USAID has been limited in its  ability to implement alternative development programs in a number of  coca cultivating areas due to policy and legal restrictions. For example,  according to USAID evaluations and officials, under the Colombian  government’s previous “zero coca” policy, it was prohibited from providing  any assistance in an area until it was proved that all coca in the area had  been eradicated. As a result, USAID was unable to provide assistance for  coca growers to switch to and remain in legal livelihoods. In addition,  approximately 8 to 10 percent of coca is grown in national parks, where,  according to USAID, under Colombian law, it may not implement any  development projects.

Insecure and inaccessible locations. USAID has been limited in its  ability to provide assistance in some key coca growing areas of the  country due to security concerns and the remote nature of the locations.  According to USAID, the Colombian government has at times prohibited it  from operating in “red zones” where there was active, armed conflict.  USAID stated that it has also chosen not to fund programs in some  regions because it is too dangerous for the agency’s implementing  partners to safely operate. In addition, USAID noted that some of the  areas with the highest concentration of coca are largely inaccessible,  making it challenging to implement assistance programs, since many of  them have no roads and can only be reached by boat or by foot.

Coordination challenges with the Colombian government. According  to USAID officials, USAID has also faced challenges because of the lack  of consistent, coordinated support from the Colombian government and  difficulties getting Colombian agencies to work together. For example,  after the Colombian government announced the National Consolidation  Plan in 2009, USAID focused its assistance in 40 of the 58 municipalities  that the Colombian government had selected for consolidation. Despite  evidence of progress being made in these areas, by 2013 the Colombian  government had begun to reduce its support for the policy, according to  USAID. USAID stated that impediments to the successful continuation of  the plan included, among other things, a lack of political support,  disorganization at the top levels of the Colombian government, changes  to and the politicization of the Colombian government’s administrative  entity leading the effort, and challenges executing national budgets  flexibly and efficiently at the local level. As a result, USAID stated that it  was forced to adapt its efforts in the later years of the plan to focus on  working with local partners rather than the national government.

Diversity of needs within Colombian communities. USAID has faced  challenges designing appropriate alternative development programs  given the diversity of communities within Colombia that have differing  needs in terms of alternative development support. For example, there  are a wide range of microclimates throughout Colombia which can make  it challenging to replicate the same types of technical assistance for  farming of legal crops in different parts of the country. USAID noted that it  works to tailor its alternative development programming to specific  regions. For example, USAID reported that it worked to tailor its  assistance to meet the needs of an indigenous community in Northern  Cauca. USAID was seeking to improve access to finance in the  community; however, due to communal ownership of land, the community  could not use land as collateral for loans, according to USAID. Thus,  USAID stated that it tailored its assistance by setting up a revolving fund  managed and administered by the community itself to expand financing  for local businesses. U.S. and Colombian officials noted the need for  additional information on various communities to know how to best design  programs that would work in the different areas.

Colombia’s current alternative development focus and U.S. legal  restrictions. According to USAID, its efforts to support alternative  development in Colombia have also been challenged by the Colombian  government’s current program focus. According to USAID, State, and  Colombian officials, a central part of the Colombian government’s  counternarcotics strategy under the peace accord is to implement a  voluntary eradication and crop substitution program. Under the program,  in exchange for voluntarily eradicating their coca crops, farmers receive  cash assistance and technical support to help them transition to the  cultivation of legal crops. However, according to USAID, the Colombian  government is implementing the program in conjunction with the FARC.  As a result, USAID officials stated that the U.S. government’s ability to  support the program is restricted because the FARC is still designated as  a Foreign Terrorist Organization. USAID and State officials also pointed  out a range of implementation problems with the program and stated that  the plan has had little to no impact on the current coca cultivation trends  in Colombia. For example, USAID officials noted that the payment of  stipends to farmers has begun before the eradication of their coca has  been required or verified. As of April 2018, the Colombian government  had signed up approximately 50,000 families for the program, according  to State reporting. However, State reported that the Colombian  government has publicly acknowledged that the program is lagging in  achieving its intended results and was forced to reduce its targets under  the program from 50,000 to 22,000 hectares in 2017.

Third-Party Research Suggested that Alternative Development Has the Potential to Reduce Coca Cultivation if Properly Implemented, but Noted Limitations

Independent research and non-governmental experts we spoke to  generally suggested that alternative development programs have the  potential to strengthen legal economic activity and encourage  communities to shift away from coca cultivation, if properly implemented.  Ten studies in our literature review discussed alternative development. Of  these 10 studies, 3 included original research that found evidence  regarding the potential effectiveness of alternative development programs  in Colombia.

One study we reviewed found that social investment in infrastructure  and human capital could be an effective and complimentary strategy  for controlling illegal crops. The study found that $5.55 spent in  social investment per inhabitant in a given municipality prevented the  cultivation of a new hectare of coca.

A different study, looking at land titling efforts in Colombia, found that  the formalization of one additional hectare of land for small  landholders within a given municipality resulted in a decrease of  approximately 1.4 hectares of land allocated to coca cultivation within  that municipality.

An additional study found that implementing community planning  models that involved citizen participation could be effective in  encouraging the adoption of alternative development projects and the  substitution of legal crops in place of coca.

Several other studies did not include original research on the  effectiveness of alternative development programs, but made  recommendations to increase the emphasis placed on such efforts based  on the authors’ review of existing evidence. For example, one review of  existing research recommended that policies aimed at reducing illicit crop  cultivation should be centered upon alternative livelihood programs. The  study noted that the Colombian government should consider expanding  and improving a successful alternative development program it had  previously implemented in the Macarena region of Colombia.

Some studies and experts, however, raised issues about the  implementation of alternative development programs and noted potential  limitations in their effectiveness. For example, one study that assessed  the effectiveness of alternative development found that because coca  cultivation is unlikely to change as a result of increases in perceived risk  and relative profit, alternative development was likely to have only small  effects on coca cultivation levels. Another study noted that alternative  development programs have tended to be located far from areas where  coca crops have been grown. Thus, the study recommends pursuing  more comprehensive counternarcotics efforts in areas affected by coca  cultivation. An additional study cited the success of one regional  alternative development program, but noted that many alternative  development programs in Colombia have faced implementation  problems. One expert we interviewed stated that alternative  development can work in particular parts of Colombia, yet such efforts  were likely not viable in some key coca growing regions, where there is  little infrastructure to market legal crops. Thus, the expert stated it is  crucial to target where alternative development programs are  implemented.

Since the launch of Plan Colombia almost 20 years ago, the U.S. and  Colombian governments have partnered closely to combat drug trafficking  through a mix of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  efforts. Since then, violence in Colombia has decreased and the  successful negotiation of a peace agreement with the FARC brought an  end to that 50-year conflict. However, increasing cocaine production  levels in the past 4 years and the continued existence of a range of  violent criminal groups underscore the ongoing threat of narcotics  trafficking for Colombia.

As the U.S. government seeks to support Colombia in this new phase of  its fight against drug trafficking, U.S. agencies should consider what  combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  activities will help to best achieve their counternarcotics goals. There is a  range of available information that can help provide U.S. agencies with  insight into the effectiveness of their eradication, interdiction, and  alternative development activities. However, to date, State and other U.S.  agencies involved in eradication and interdiction activities in Colombia  have not evaluated these efforts to determine their long-term  effectiveness in reducing the cocaine supply. In addition, State has not  undertaken a comprehensive review of the U.S. government’s  counternarcotics approach in Colombia. Such a review would help State  to systematically consider the relative benefits and limitations of the U.S.  government’s eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  activities. With this information, State would be well positioned to ensure  that it and other U.S. agencies are prioritizing limited resources and  pursuing the combination of counternarcotics activities with the greatest  likelihood of achieving long-term success in the fight against drug  trafficking in Colombia.

We are making two recommendations to State:  The Secretary of State should, in consultation with other U.S. agencies  involved in counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, conduct an evaluation of  the long-term effectiveness of eradication and interdiction in reducing the  cocaine supply. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of State should, in consultation with other U.S. agencies  involved in counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, undertake a  comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia  and identify what changes, if any, should be made to the types and  combination of U.S. activities, taking into consideration how the relative  benefits and limitations between eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development may impact the effectiveness of these efforts.  (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of the report to DHS, DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID  for review and comment. DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State and USAID also  provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III and IV,  respectively. In its written comments, State noted that it agreed in general  with our recommendations, but suggested that our first recommendation  be broadened to encompass an evaluation of the effectiveness of whole- of-government counternarcotics efforts, rather than focusing on  eradication and interdiction specifically. We respect State’s argument in  favor of broadening the scope of our first recommendation, but we chose  not to revise our recommendation based on this rationale. We believe that  an evaluation focusing specifically on the long-term effectiveness of  eradication and interdiction in reducing the cocaine supply would provide  State with important information on two key components of the approach  that has characterized U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia for  decades but have not been evaluated to date. Such an evaluation would  be consistent with analyses already undertaken for alternative  development, and would contribute to a better understanding of the  strengths and weaknesses of each of these three key efforts. In addition,  our second recommendation to State addresses the need for a broader,  comprehensive review of the overall U.S. counternarcotics approach,  which would expectedly take into account eradication, interdiction, and  alternative development, as well as other U.S. efforts to combat drug- related criminal activities. If State opts to pursue a broader evaluation of  all U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, we would consider this  responsive to our first recommendation as long as the evaluation includes  a meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of eradication and  interdiction efforts.

Additionally, as part of its comments, State highlighted the importance of  a whole-of-government approach to counternarcotics in Colombia that  employs a range of efforts that are implemented in a coordinated manner.  Consequently, State noted that any review of the individual components  of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy will present an incomplete picture  and State expressed concern that we had considered eradication,  interdiction, and alternative development in isolation. In the report, we  note that the U.S. government’s counternarcotics approach in Colombia  has long called for a mix of eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development efforts and we highlight the fact that U.S. officials believe  that finding the appropriate combination of these efforts is critical to  achieving the U.S. government’s counternarcotics objectives in Colombia.  Thus, while we present more in-depth analyses of eradication,  interdiction, and alternative development, we begin our discussion with an  overall description of U.S. efforts in Colombia more generally, covering  the role of various U.S. agencies in these efforts, the nature of overall  collaboration with Colombia, and the events that shaped the current  situation.

Finally, in its comments, State said that we had failed to consider relevant  information on eradication that had been published by various sources. In  developing our findings in this report, we reviewed available U.S.  government, Colombian government, and United Nations data and  analysis on eradication, as well as third-party research, and we sought to  accurately present this range of information in a balanced manner.  Accordingly, we have made relevant modifications to our narrative to  further describe information in UN studies related to the results of  eradication efforts in Colombia.

In its comments, USAID stated that it concurred with our recommendation  that State lead a comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics  approach in Colombia. USAID noted that it believes such a review could  help identify what changes, if any, are necessary to make to the types  and combination of U.S. activities, while taking into consideration how the  relative benefits and limitations of eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development could affect the effectiveness of these efforts.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and  State, as well as the Attorney General and the USAID Administrator. In  addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines (1) to what extent the U.S. government has  assessed the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, (2)  what is known about the effectiveness of U.S. government-supported  eradication programs in Colombia over the last 10 years, (3) what is  known about the effectiveness of U.S. government-supported interdiction  programs in Colombia over the last 10 years, and (4) what is known about  the effectiveness of U.S. government-supported alternative development  programs in Colombia over the last 10 years.

To assess to what extent the U.S. government has assessed the  effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, we analyzed  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD),  Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of State (State), and U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) data and documentation  that describe U.S-supported counternarcotics efforts since 2008,  including available performance monitoring data and evaluations that the  agencies use to assess the effectiveness of their counternarcotics  activities in Colombia. In doing so, we reviewed performance reporting  that the agencies conduct through interagency mechanisms including the  Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) annual National Drug  Control Strategy Performance Reporting System report and Budget and  Performance Summary report, as well Embassy Bogotá’s annual  Performance Plan and Report. In addition, we reviewed agency-level  performance monitoring data and related reports produced by DHS, DOD,  DOJ, State, and USAID, as well as their relevant component agencies  and offices. For example, we reviewed State’s annual International  Narcotics Control Strategy Report, performance data from USAID’s  Monitoring and Evaluation Clearinghouse information system, U.S.  Southern Command annual program management reviews,  DEA/Colombia impact statements produced through its Threat  Enforcement Planning Process, and annual DHS performance reports.  We also reviewed evaluations that USAID had conducted of its alternative  development programs in Colombia. To identify relevant USAID  evaluations, we consulted USAID officials and conducted a search of  USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse, which is USAID’s online, publicly available repository of program documentation. In  evaluating to what extent the U.S. government has assessed the  effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, we compared  State’s actions to its evaluation policy. In addition, we compared U.S.  agencies’ actions to applicable federal internal control standards.

To determine what is known about the effectiveness of U.S. government  supported eradication, interdiction, and alternative development  programs, we analyzed DHS, DOD, DOJ, State and USAID data and  documentation related to counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. As part of  our work, we also analyzed data from the United Nations Office on Drugs  and Crime’s (UNODC) annual surveys of territories in Colombia affected  by illicit crops, which documented coca cultivation and cocaine drug  productions trends, as well as counternarcotics efforts. In addition, we  analyzed Colombian government data and other reporting describing  counternarcotics efforts. These U.S. government, United Nations, and  Colombian government data included a range of metrics. For eradication  programs, we reviewed metrics including estimated coca cultivation  levels, eradication levels, coca plant productivity levels, coca replanting  rates, and the territorial distribution of coca cultivation. For interdiction, we  reviewed metrics including estimated cocaine production levels; the levels  of seizures of cocaine, precursor chemicals, and drug trafficking  organization assets; the number of drug trafficking organizations  disrupted or dismantled; and the number of drug trafficking organization  members arrested and extradited. For alternative development programs,  we reviewed metrics including the number of households involved in coca  cultivation, the amounts of coca cultivated relative to legal crops in areas  receiving U.S. government support, increases in the value of sales of  legal products in areas involved in narcotics production, the number of  households receiving land titles as a result of U.S. assistance, and the  value of agricultural and rural loans generated through U.S. assistance.  To assess these data, we reviewed available documentation, and  interviewed cognizant U.S. officials. In addition, we were able to compare  different sources in some instances, specifically the U.S. government and  the UN estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia.  We noted several limitations to these data. For example, the coca  cultivation and production figures are estimates, and while both the U.S.  government and UN have procedures to verify their estimates, there were  differences between the two sources in terms of the levels of production  and cultivation reported due to differences in their estimating  methodologies. For example, one challenge to estimating the hectares of  coca eradicated is that crop fields can be eradicated multiple times in 1  year, which means that the total number of hectares eradicated can  exceed the total number of hectares cultivated in some years. Likewise  we noted that kilograms of cocaine seized in Colombia may be the result  of a variety of actions, and can be influenced by the volume of cocaine  production, as well as the actions of law enforcement officials. We  determined that the U.S. government, United Nations, and Colombian  government data were sufficiently reliable to present general trends from  2008 through 2017.

Further, we reviewed agency documentation from State, USAID, DOD,  and DEA in order to identify plans, reviews, strategies, and assessments  related to counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. For example, we reviewed  State’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, Embassy  Bogotá’s annual Performance Plan and Reports, DOD U.S. Southern  Command performance management reviews, and DEA’s Threat  Enforcement Planning Process assessment. In addition, we reviewed  seven evaluations that USAID had commissioned of its alternative  development programs in Colombia and identified relevant findings from  these evaluations regarding the effectiveness of alternative development  efforts in Colombia. Some of these evaluations related to specific  alternative development programs, while others evaluated USAID’s  alternative development efforts in Colombia more broadly. It was beyond  the scope of this engagement to assess the quality of these evaluations.  We also reviewed USAID performance data in its Monitor system and in  Embassy Bogotá’s annual Performance Plan and Report and compared  USAID’s results to the targets it had established. We did not perform an  assessment of the underlying metrics that USAID used, as our purpose  was to compare actuals to targets.

To gather further information regarding what is known about the  effectiveness of U.S. government supported eradication, interdiction, and  alternative development programs, we interviewed U.S. officials that have  responsibility for and insights into U.S.-supported counternarcotics efforts  in Colombia from:

DHS, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S.

DOD, including the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats and U.S. Southern  Command;

DOJ, including the Criminal Division, the Drug Enforcement  Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; and USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.

In addition, we conducted fieldwork in Colombia in March 2018. During  our fieldwork, we interviewed U.S. officials from DHS, DOD, DOJ, State,  and USAID involved in counternarcotics activities at Embassy Bogotá. In  addition, we interviewed various officials from Colombian security and  civilian agencies and from the UNODC. We also visited the headquarters  of the Colombian National Police Air Service’s headquarters in  Guaymaral (near Bogotá) and the Colombian National Police’s  International School for the Use of Police Force for Peace (near Ibagué).  Finally, as part of our fieldwork, we visited Tumaco in southwest  Colombia. Tumaco is the municipality with the highest levels of coca  cultivation in Colombia and is also the most significant hub for the  trafficking of cocaine out of the country. In Tumaco, we visited the  Colombian government’s Strategic Operation Center, observed a manual  eradication operation, and met with a number of USAID alternative  development program beneficiaries. The information on foreign law in this  report is not the product of GAO’s original analysis, but is derived from  interviews and secondary sources.

Finally, to help validate and supplement U.S. government findings  regarding the effectiveness of its counternarcotics programs, we  conducted a literature review to determine the extent to which relevant  non-U.S. government studies either validated or reached different  conclusions than the U.S. government’s findings regarding the  effectiveness of U.S.-supported counternarcotics programs in Colombia.  To conduct this review, we developed a list of search terms related to  eradication, interdiction, and alternative development in Colombia. Then,  working with a GAO research librarian, we conducted a search using  selected bibliographic databases, including Scopus and SciELO. We  conducted searches for materials in both English and Spanish. The  searches resulted in the identification of an initial list of 261 English- language articles and 45 Spanish-language articles. The team then  conducted a process to narrow down the initial search results to a priority  list of studies. In order to narrow down the results, we considered a  variety of factors including the relevance of the study to our research  questions, the extent to which the study focused on Colombia or was  more global in nature, whether the study had been published in 2008 or  later, and whether the study included original research. To validate our  priority list of studies, we shared our results with a non-U.S. government  expert who had studied counternarcotics efforts in Colombia to see if  there were further studies that we should include. We added one  additional study based upon his review. In total, we selected 23 studies to  include in our literature review and to analyze in greater depth for this  report. Within our literature review, we identified a relatively small number  of authors that had conducted research relevant to our work, in particular,  studies related to interdiction efforts in Colombia. As a result, there are  several authors who have more than 1 study included within the list of 23  studies we selected. For each of the 23 studies we selected, we  completed a data collection instrument to, among other things, identify the  study’s key findings and recommendations and to make a high-level  assessment that the study was of sufficient quality to include in our  review. We ensured that our selection included studies issued or  published in 2008 or later. During our review, we noted that several  studies analyzed data from slightly earlier time periods. In addition, we  noted that some studies analyzed data for particular regions or settings  within Colombia. While this does not affect the quality of the studies, it  does raise the possibility that their findings might not fully apply to the  current situation in Colombia.

As part of our work, we also conducted interviews with a  nongeneralizable sample of three non-U.S. government experts to gather  further information regarding what is known about the effectiveness of  U.S. counternarcotics programs. In selecting these experts, we sought to  choose people with different types of experiences studying and working  on counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, in order to get a range of  perspectives about these efforts.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to December  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This bibliography contains citations for the 23 studies we reviewed  regarding the effectiveness of Colombian counternarcotics efforts.

Beltrán, S. “La Institucionalidad Rural en Colombia: Reflexiones para Su  Análisis y Fortalecimiento.” Mundo Agrario, vol. 17, no. 53 (2016).

Camacho, A., and D. Mejía. “The Health Consequences of Aerial  Spraying Illicit Crops: The Case of Colombia.” Journal of Health  Economics, vol. 54 (2017): 147-160.

Ceron, C., I. De los Rios-Carmenado, and S. Fernández. “Illicit Crops  Substitution and Rural Prosperity in Armed Conflict Areas: A Conceptual  Proposal Based on the Working With People Model in Colombia.” Land  Use Policy, vol. 72 (2018): 201-2014.

Davalos, E. “New Answers to an Old Problem: Social Investment and  Coca Crops in Colombia.” International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 31  (2016): 121-130.

Fisher, D., and A. Meitus. “Uprooting or Sowing Violence?: Coca  Eradication and Guerrilla Violence in Colombia.” Studies in Conflict &  Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 9 (2017): 790-807.

Ibanez, M., and F. Carlsson. “A Survey-Based Choice Experiment on  Coca Cultivation.” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 93 (2010):  249-263.

Ibanez, M., and S. Klasen. “Is the War on Drugs Working? Examining the  Colombian Case Using Micro Data.” The Journal of Development Studies,  vol. 53, no. 10 (2017): 1650-1662.

Ince, M., “Filling the FARC-Shaped Void.” The RUSI Journal, vol. 158, no.  5 (2013): 26-34.

Jonsson, M., E. Brennan, and C. O’Hara. “Financing War or Facilitating  Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in  Colombia and Myanmar.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 39, no. 6  (2016): 542-559.

López, L., J. Castro, and A. España. “Los Efectos Globo en los Cultivos  de Coca en la Región Andina (1990-2009).” Apuntes del CENES, vol. 35,  no. 61 (2016): 207-236.

McDermott, J., “La Nueva Generación de Narcotraficantes Colombianos  post-FARC: ‘Los Invisibles’.” InSight Crime (2018).

Mejía, D., “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs.” The  Brookings Institution (2015).

Mejía, D., and P. Restrepo. “The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug  Production and Trafficking.” Journal of Economic Behavior and  Organization, vol. 126 (2016): 255-275.

Mejía, D., P. Restrepo, and S. Rozo. “On the Effects of Enforcement on  Illegal Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment in Colombia.” World  Bank Group (2015).

Muñoz-Mora, J.C., S. Tobón, and J. d’Anjou. “The Role of Land Property  Rights in the War on Illicit Crops: Evidence from Colombia.” World  Development, vol. 103 (2018): 268-283.

Quintero, S., and I. Posada. “Estrategias Políticas para el Tratamiento de  las Drogas Ilegales en Colombia.” Revista Facultad Nacional de Salud  Pública, vol. 31, no. 3 (2013): 373-380.

Reyes, L., “Estimating the Causal Effect of Forced Eradication on Coca  Cultivation in Colombian Municipalities.” World Development, vol. 61  (2014): 70-84.

Rincón-Ruiz, A., H. Correa, D. Léon, and S. Williams. “Coca Cultivation  and Crop Eradication in Colombia: The Challenges of Integrating Rural  Reality into Effective Anti-Drug Policy.” International Journal of Drug  Policy, vol. 33 (2016): 56-65.

Rincón-Ruiz, A., U. Pascual, and S. Flantua. “Examining Spatially Varying  Relationships between Coca Crops and Associated Factors in Colombia,  Using Geographically Weight Regression.” Applied Geography, vol. 37  (2013): 23-33.

Sánchez, M., “Cultivos Ilícitos y Confianza Institucional en Colombia.”  Politica y Gobierno, vol. 21, no. 1 (2014): 95-126.

Sandoval, L., A. Lopez, and C. Cárdenas. “Determinantes y  Caracteristicas de la Oferta de Cocaina en Colombia (1989–2006).”  Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas: Investigación y Reflexión, vol.  17, no. 2 (2009): 199-208.

Seatzu, F., “‘If Ya Wanna End War and Stuff, You Gotta Sing Loud’—A  Survey of the Provisional Agreement between FARC and Colombia on  Illicit Drugs.” Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Política y  Humanidades y Humanidades, vol. 18, no. 36 (2016): 373-389.

Thoumi, F., “Políticas Antidrogas y La Necesidad de Enfrentar las  Vulnerabilidades de Colombia.” Análisis Politico, no. 67 (2009): 60-82.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Juan Gobel (Assistant Director),  Ryan Vaughan (Analyst-in-Charge), Owen Starlin, Pedro Almoguera,  Martin De Alteriis, Leia Dickerson, Neil Doherty, Mark Dowling, Dawn  Locke, and Aldo Salerno made key contributions to this report.

The U.S. government has invested over $10 billion in counternarcotics and security efforts in Colombia since 1999. Security has improved but cocaine production has more than tripled from 2013 through 2017.

The U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia includes disrupting drug trafficking, destroying coca crops, and supporting alternative livelihoods for coca farmers. We found the State Department has not comprehensively reviewed this approach. Such a review could help State ensure U.S. agencies are pursuing the mix of activities with the greatest likelihood of long-term success.

We recommended State comprehensively review the U.S. approach.