Offshore Oil Spills: Restoration and Federal Research Efforts Continue, but Opportunities to Improve Coordination Remain

The Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills are two of the largest offshore oil spills in U.S. history, causing long-lasting damage to marine and coastal resources. OPA includes provisions to prevent and respond to such oil spills by authorizing (1) federal-state trustee councils that manage billions of dollars from legal settlements and (2) an interagency committee to coordinate oil pollution research, among other things.

GAO was asked to review the federal government's response, restoration, and research efforts after the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills. This report examines, among other things, (1) how the trustee councils have used the restoration trust funds and the status of restoration and (2) the interagency committee's coordination of oil spill research efforts.

GAO reviewed the councils' plans for the funds and how they were used, federal funding of oil spill research by member agencies, and key laws. Also, GAO evaluated the coordination of such efforts against a leading collaboration practice. GAO interviewed members of the trustee councils and the interagency committee.

The trustee councils, composed of federal and state members, have used portions of the restoration trust funds from the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spill settlements to restore natural resources. From October 1992 to January 2018, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council used about 86 percent of the fund's roughly $1 billion, primarily on habitat protection and restoration of damaged natural resources. According to the council, all but 5 of the 32 natural resources and human services identified as damaged by the spill have recovered or are recovering. The health of Pacific herring is one example of a resource that has not yet recovered. Further, the presence of lingering oil remains a concern almost 30 years after the spill. In May 2018, GAO accompanied trustee council researchers to the spill area and observed the excavation of three pits that revealed lingering oil roughly 6 inches below the surface of the beach, as captured in the photo below. The Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage Assessment Trustee Council finalized a programmatic restoration plan in 2016; four trustee implementation groups have since issued initial restoration plans for designated restoration areas, and three anticipate issuing restoration plans in 2019 or later. From April 2012 to December 2017, the council used 13 percent of the at least $8.1 billion restoration trust fund, mostly on habitat protection, enhancing recreation, and marine wildlife and fishery restoration.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which was enacted after the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (interagency committee) to coordinate oil pollution research among federal agencies and with relevant external entities, among other things. However according to the trustee council members that manage the restoration trust funds, the committee does not coordinate with the trustee councils and some were not aware that the interagency committee existed. The research of the member agencies could be relevant to the trustee councils' work on restoration. By coordinating directly with the trustee councils, the interagency committee could ensure better knowledge sharing between groups and leverage its member agencies' resources to inform and support the work of the councils.

GAO recommends, among other things, that the interagency committee coordinate with the trustee councils to support their work and research needs. The agency agreed with GAO's recommendations.

In March 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska’s  Prince William Sound, spilling an estimated 11 million gallons of oil and  contaminating about 1,500 miles of Alaska’s south central coastline. At  the time, this was the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history. Enacted  following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)  included several provisions to prevent and respond to oil spills, such as  requirements to assess damages to natural resources from oil  discharges, including spills, and to develop and implement plans for  restoration. Approximately 20 years later, in April 2010, an explosion on  the BP America Production Company’s (BP) leased Deepwater Horizon  oil rig spilled over 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, setting  a new record as the largest oil spill in U.S. waters.

OPA established a “polluter pays” system, placing the primary burden of  liability and costs of oil spills on the responsible party for the vessel or  facility from which oil is discharged. Under this system, the responsible  party assumes, up to a specified limit, the burden of paying for spill costs,  including both removal costs (for cleaning up the spill) and damage  claims (for restoring the environment and paying compensation to parties  economically harmed by the spill). Above specified limits, a responsible  party is no longer financially liable, although there are exceptions if, for  example, the oil discharge is the result of gross negligence.

Following initial response and cleanup efforts, restoration activities related  to a significant offshore oil spill, such as those from Exxon Valdez or  Deepwater Horizon, can endure for decades. Under OPA, federal, state,  tribal, and foreign government officials may be designated to act on  behalf of the public as trustees of natural resources. In the wake of both  oil spills, federal and state trustees entered into legal settlements with  responsible parties to resolve certain claims. In October 1992, the federal  government and the state of Alaska created the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill  Trustee Council (Exxon Valdez Trustee Council) to administer the $900  million civil settlement designated for cleanup costs, damage  assessment, litigation, and restoration after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In  April 2016, the federal government and affected states established a  memorandum of understanding that created the Deepwater Horizon  Natural Resource Damage Assessment Trustee Council (Deepwater  Horizon Trustee Council) to administer the eventual $8.8 billion  restoration fund to address natural resource damages resulting from the  Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

OPA also established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil  Pollution Research (interagency committee) to coordinate a  comprehensive program of oil pollution research, technology  development, and demonstration among federal agencies in cooperation  and coordination with external entities, such as industry, universities,  research institutions, state governments, and other nations, as  appropriate. Federal agencies of the interagency committee conduct and  fund research projects related to preventing, preparing for, responding to,  and restoring the environment after oil spills. Later in this report, we  describe in more detail the extent of research funded by the interagency  committee. In accordance with OPA, the chair of the interagency  committee—a representative of the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard)— must submit a report to Congress every 2 years on its past and planned  activities for oil pollution research. Under OPA, one of the interagency  committee’s responsibilities is to coordinate with federal agencies and  external entities on an oil pollution research and development program  that includes methods to restore and rehabilitate natural resources  damaged by oil spills.

In March 2011, we reported that the interagency committee had taken  limited actions to foster communication and coordination among member  agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. Among other things, we  recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the chair  of the interagency committee, in coordination with member agencies, to  provide a status update regarding the revisions of the committee’s  research plan and establish a more systematic process to identify and  consult with key nonfederal stakeholders. The agency agreed with the  recommendations, and the interagency committee implemented them by  publishing an updated Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan  (research and technology plan) that includes a retrospective analysis of  completed research as well as a forecast of new research needs. In  addition, the interagency committee has employed several sources of  information to better understand ongoing research needs and activities  within industry, academia, and the government.

To help inform offshore oil spill response efforts and decision making,  government, industry, and academic scientists conduct research on the  use and effect of various response techniques in different situations and  environments, such as the icy waters of the Alaskan Arctic and the deep  waters of the Gulf of Mexico. One such response technique used to  manage the environmental impacts after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill  was the application of chemical dispersants. In May 2012, we reported  on the use of dispersants and recommended that the Commandant of the  Coast Guard direct the chair of the interagency committee in coordination  with member agencies to, among other things, identify information on key  dispersant research in its research and technology plans and periodically  update and disseminate this information in its biennial reports to  Congress. We also recommended that the application of dispersants in  subsurface and Arctic conditions be among the areas prioritized in future  research. The member agencies generally concurred with our  recommendations. In its research and technology plan for fiscal years  2015 through 2021, the interagency committee identified dispersants as  one of the committee’s standing research areas, specifically noting the  use of dispersants in cold weather conditions and deep sea  environments.

You asked us to review issues related to the federal government’s  response, restoration, and research efforts following the Exxon Valdez  and Deepwater Horizon oil spills. This report examines (1) how the  Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) trustee councils have  used the restoration trust funds from the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater  Horizon oil spills and the status of the restoration efforts, (2) the status of  the interagency committee’s oil spill research efforts and how  coordination of such efforts has changed since we last reported on them  in March 2011, and (3) what literature suggests about the effectiveness of  various oil spill response techniques in the Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico.

To examine how the NRDA trustee councils used the restoration funds  from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (from October 1992 to January 2018) and  Deepwater Horizon oil spill (from April 2012 to December 2017) for  restoration and the status of the restoration efforts, we obtained data from  each trustee council on the amount of funds (1) ordered by the settlement  for each restoration type; (2) authorized by the trustees for, but not yet  spent on, restoration activities (authorizations); (3) spent on restoration  activities (expenditures); and (4) not yet authorized for restoration  activities (remaining balance) through calendar year 2017 for Deepwater  Horizon and through January 31, 2018, for Exxon Valdez. We assessed  the reliability of the financial data that the NRDA trustee councils provided  by, among other things, reviewing the annual reports for each trustee  council and interviewing knowledgeable council staff about the steps they  took to maintain these data and determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our report. We also examined the approved  restoration plans and, when available, annual reports on restoration activities, as well as reports and scientific studies that the trustee councils  funded. We met with officials from the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council to  discuss the distribution of settlement money for restoration purposes after  the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and with officials from the Deepwater Horizon  Trustee Council, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council  (RESTORE Council), and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to  discuss the distribution of settlement money for restoration purposes after  the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We also traveled to Alaska and the Gulf  of Mexico to better understand the status of restoration.

To examine the status of federal oil spill research efforts by the  interagency committee and how coordination of such efforts has changed  since we last reported on it in March 2011, we requested funding data  and project information on oil spill research from all 15 member agencies  of the interagency committee. We received data from the nine member  agencies that reported funding oil spill research projects from fiscal years  2011 through 2017. These agencies provided data on agency expenditures on oil spill research and the research category of any  projects funded. We assessed the reliability of these data by, among  other things, reviewing related documentation and interviewing  knowledgeable agency officials from the nine member agencies that  provided data on the steps they took to maintain this information and  determined that in most cases the data were sufficiently reliable for the  purposes of our report.

We also interviewed officials at each of the 15 member agencies and  compared their coordination practices to one of our federal leading  practices for interagency collaboration to evaluate the interagency  committee’s efforts to coordinate oil spill research. We chose to focus  on the collaboration practice pertaining to participants. In addition, we  reviewed the 2013 interagency committee charter, the committee’s most  recent biennial reports to Congress covering fiscal years 2008 through  2017, and the committee’s third multi-year research and technology plan  for fiscal years 2015 through 2021. We also attended two committee  meetings and reviewed minutes of eight past meetings. We reviewed  OPA’s provisions that established and govern the interagency  committee’s coordination efforts and membership, as well as various  related executive documents.

To examine what literature suggests about the effectiveness of various oil  spill response techniques in the Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico, we  conducted a literature search for studies that analyzed and summarized  the effectiveness of various oil spill response techniques in those regions.  We identified existing literature from 1989 (the year of the Exxon Valdez  oil spill) to March 2018 by conducting searches of various databases,  such as Scopus and ProQuest. We chose to focus on three primary  response techniques—mechanical recovery, in-situ burning, and the use  of dispersants—used to clean up offshore oil spills. Our subject matter  expert helped the team narrow the list of literature results and we relied  on 16 studies and articles that we determined were relevant to our  research objective. These studies and articles covered both regions and  the three response techniques, but each study did not cover the entire range of these topics. For example, some of the studies were focused on  one response technique in a specific region or environment. We  supplemented the list of studies from these databases with information  from our previous reports and those of the Congressional Research  Service, the National Academies Press, the Environmental Protection  Agency (EPA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  (NOAA), the Coast Guard, the American Academy of Microbiology, and  the Arctic Oil Spill Response Joint Industry Program. For a complete list  of the literature, see the bibliography. We shared our summary of the  literature search findings with agency officials representing some of the  interagency committee members and included their perspectives where  relevant. We did not independently evaluate the effectiveness of these  response techniques.

For more details on our objectives, scope, and methodology, see  appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to January 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

OPA amended the Clean Water Act and established provisions  expanding and consolidating the federal government’s authority to  prevent and respond to oil spills. This includes providing the federal  government with the authority to perform cleanup immediately after a spill  using federal resources, monitor the response efforts of the spiller, or  direct the spiller’s cleanup activities. OPA also established a “polluter  pays” system, placing the primary burden of liability and costs of oil spills  on the responsible party for the vessel or facility from which oil is  discharged. Under this system, the responsible party assumes, up to a  specified limit, the burden of paying for spill costs, including both removal  costs (for cleaning up the spill) and damage claims (for restoring the  environment and paying compensation to parties economically harmed by  the spill).

OPA authorized the use of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to fund up to  $1 billion per spill incident for pollution removal costs and damages  resulting from oil spills and mitigation of a substantial threat of an oil spill  in navigable U.S. waters when a responsible party cannot or does not pay  for the cleanup. After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Resources  and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived  Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (RESTORE Act)  established a new trust fund for programs, projects, and activities that  restore and protect the environment and economy of the Gulf Coast  region as well as the RESTORE Council, which is to summarize its  activities for each calendar year’s activities in an annual report to  Congress.

In addition, NOAA finalized regulations in 1996 for assessing natural  resource damages resulting from a discharge or substantial threat of a  discharge of oil. The NRDA regulations recognize that OPA provides for  designating federal, state, and tribal officials as natural resource trustees  and authorizes them to make claims against the parties responsible for  the injuries23, 24 Under NRDA regulations, a trustee council’s work usually  occurs in three steps: (1) a pre-assessment phase, (2) the restoration  planning phase, and (3) the restoration implementation phase. During  the pre-assessment phase the trustees are to determine whether they  have jurisdiction to pursue restoration. In the restoration planning phase  the trustees are to evaluate information on potential injuries and use that  information to determine the need for, type of, and scale of restoration.  Finally, the restoration implementation phase describes the process for  implementing restoration.

The NRDA regulations define injury as an observable or measurable adverse change in  a natural resource or impairment of a natural resource service.  15 C.F.R. 990.11. federal and state trustees entered into legal settlements with responsible  parties to resolve certain claims. The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council is in  the restoration implementation phase, while the Deepwater Horizon  Trustee Council is in both the restoration planning and implementation  phases. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution  Contingency Plan, commonly known as the National Contingency Plan,  contains the federal government’s framework and operative requirements  for preparing and responding to discharges of oil and releases of  hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. It establishes that  federal oil spill response authority is determined by the location of the  spill: the Coast Guard has response authority in the U.S. coastal zone,  and EPA covers the inland zone. In addition, NOAA is to provide  scientific analysis and consultation during oil spill response activities in  the coastal zones.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989  contaminated portions of national wildlife refuges, national and state  parks, a national forest, and a state game sanctuary—killing or injuring  thousands of sea birds, marine mammals, and fish and disrupting the  ecosystem in its path. In October 1991, the U.S. District Court for the  District of Alaska approved a civil settlement and criminal plea agreement  among Exxon, the federal government, and the state of Alaska for  recovery of natural resource damages resulting from the oil spill. Exxon  agreed to pay $900 million in civil claims in 11 annual payments and $125  million to resolve various criminal charges.

In August 1991, the federal government and the state of Alaska signed a  memorandum of agreement and consent decree to act as co-trustees in  collecting and using natural resource damage payments from the spill.  The 1991 memorandum states that all decisions related to injury  assessment, restoration activities, or other use of the natural resource  damage payments are to be made by unanimous agreement of the  trustees. According to the memorandum, the trustees are to use the  natural resource damage payments to restore, replace, rehabilitate,  enhance, or acquire the equivalent of the natural resources injured as a  result of the oil spill and the reduced or lost services provided by such  resources. The memorandum also recognized that EPA was designated  to coordinate restoration activities on behalf of the federal government. In  1992, the trustees established the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council to  ensure coordination and cooperation in restoring the natural resources  injured, lost, or destroyed by the spill.

In 1994, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council prepared a restoration plan for  use of the funds, which consisted of five categories: (1) general  restoration; (2) habitat protection and acquisition; (3) monitoring and  research; (4) restoration reserve; and (5) public information, science  management, and administration. The restoration plan noted that in  addition to restoring natural resources, funds may be used to restore  reduced or lost services (including human uses) from injured natural  resources, which includes subsistence, commercial fishing, recreation,  and tourism services. The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council is advised by  members of the public and a panel of scientists, and its Executive  Director manages the day-to-day administrative functions. The Exxon  Valdez Trustee Council has published documents that are on the  council’s public website, such as the Injured Resources and Services list  (current as of 2014), lingering oil updates (current as of 2016), annual  reports (current as of 2018), and annual project work plans (current as of  2018).

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 resulted in  the tragic loss of 11 lives and a devastating environmental impact and  affected the livelihoods of thousands of Gulf Coast citizens and  businesses. In April 2016, BP, the federal government, and the five Gulf  Coast states agreed to a settlement resolving multiple claims for federal  civil penalties and natural resource damages related to the spill totaling  up to $14.9 billion. Under the terms of the consent decree for the  settlement, BP must pay up to $8.8 billion in natural resource damages  under OPA, which includes $1 billion BP previously committed to pay for  early restoration projects, and up to $700 million to address injuries that  were unknown to the trustees as of July 2, 2015, including for any  associated Natural Resource Damage assessment and planning  activities, or to adapt, enhance, supplement, or replace restoration  projects or approaches that the trustees initially selected. BP is to make  these payments into the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Natural Resource  Damages Fund managed by the Department of the Interior (Interior), to  be used jointly by the federal and state trustees of the Deepwater Horizon  Trustee Council for restoration of injured or lost natural resources.

Two additional, separate restoration funds are to receive money from the  BP civil and criminal penalties: (1) the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund  established under the RESTORE Act is to receive 80 percent of the $5.5  billion Clean Water Act civil penalty paid by BP to support environmental  restoration and economic recovery projects in the Gulf Coast region and  (2) the Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund managed by the nonprofit  National Fish and Wildlife Foundation is to receive $2.394 billion in  criminal penalties. For more information on the amount and distribution of  the BP civil and criminal payments, see figure 1.

Prior to reaching the settlement in 2016, BP signed an agreement in April  2011 to provide $1 billion toward early restoration projects in the Gulf of  Mexico to address injuries to natural resources caused by the spill. Early  restoration projects may be developed prior to the completion of the injury  assessment, which can take months or years to complete. Payments by  BP for early restoration projects are counted towards its liability for the  $8.8 billion in natural resource damages resulting from the spill.

The designated trustees are to administer these payments for natural  resources, according to OPA. The designated trustees include federal  officials from Interior, NOAA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and  EPA, as well as state officials from the five Gulf States that were affected  by the spill—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. In  February 2016, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council finalized the  Programmatic Damage Assessment and Restoration Plan (programmatic  restoration plan) that provided the council’s injury assessment and  proposed a framework for identifying and developing project-specific  restoration plans. The five goals of the programmatic restoration plan  are to (1) restore and conserve habitat; (2) restore water quality; (3)  replenish and protect living coastal and marine resources; (4) provide and  enhance recreational opportunities; and (5) provide for monitoring,  adaptive management, and administrative oversight to support restoration  implementation. According to the 2016 programmatic restoration plan, the  Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council is to coordinate with other Deepwater  Horizon restoration programs, such as those funded by the RESTORE  Act, the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, and other entities.

The 2016 programmatic restoration plan established Trustee  Implementation Groups for each of the seven designated restoration  areas—one for each of the five Gulf States, the Region-Wide  implementation group, and the Open Ocean implementation group.  Each trustee implementation group is to plan, decide on, and implement  restoration activities, including monitoring and adaptive management, for  the funding that the consent decree allocated to its restoration area.  Federal trustees serve in all the trustee implementation groups, and state  trustees serve on the Region-Wide implementation group and the trustee  implementation groups for their states; decisions are to be made by  consensus. The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council is to coordinate the  work of the trustee implementation groups by establishing standard  procedures and practices to ensure consistency in developing and  implementing restoration activities.

Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research

OPA created the interagency committee to provide a comprehensive,  coordinated federal oil pollution research program and promote  cooperation with industry, universities, research institutions, state  governments, and other nations through information sharing, coordinated  planning, and joint funding of projects. It also designated member  agencies and authorized the President to designate other federal  agencies as members of the interagency committee. As of November  2018, the interagency committee consisted of 15 federal members  representing independent agencies, departments, and department  components. OPA directs that a representative from the Coast Guard  serve as the chair, and the interagency committee charter designates that  a representative from NOAA, EPA, or the Bureau of Safety and  Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) serve as the vice-chair and that the  committee’s Executive Director provide staff support. The interagency  committee’s charter notes that it shall meet at least semi-annually or at  the decision of the chair. According to OPA, the chair’s duties include  reporting biennially to Congress on the interagency committee’s activities  related to oil pollution research, development, and demonstration  programs. OPA also required the interagency committee to prepare and  submit a research and technology plan, which has been updated  periodically.

In September 2015, the interagency committee released the research and  technology plan for fiscal years 2015 through 2021. This research and  technology plan updates the interagency committee’s 1992 plan, revised  in 1997, and provides a new baseline of the nation’s oil pollution research  needs. The plan is primarily directed at federal agencies with  responsibilities for conducting or funding such research, but it can also  serve as a research planning guide for nonfederal stakeholders such as,  industry, academia, state governments, research institutions, and other  nations, according to interagency committee documents. The 2015  research and technology plan established a common language and  planning framework to enable researchers and interested parties to  identify and track research in four classes or categories that represent  general groupings of oil spill research:

Prevention: Research that supports developing practices and  technologies designed to predict, reduce, or eliminate the likelihood of  discharges or minimize the volume of oil discharges into the  environment.

Preparedness: Research that supports the activities, programs, and  systems developed prior to an oil spill to improve the planning,  decision-making, and management processes needed for responding  to and recovering from oil spills.

Response: Research that supports techniques and technologies that  address the immediate and short-term effects of an oil spill and  encompasses all activities involved in containing, cleaning up,  treating, and disposing of oil to (1) maintain the safety of human life,  (2) stabilize a situation to preclude further damage, and (3) minimize  adverse environmental and socioeconomic effects.

Injury assessment and restoration: Research that involves collecting  and analyzing information to (1) evaluate the nature and extent of  environmental, human health, and socioeconomic injuries resulting  from an incident; (2) determine the actions needed to restore natural  resources and their services to pre-spill conditions; and (3) make the  environment and public whole after interim losses.

Trustee Councils Use Restoration Trust Funds for Approved Activities, Which Are Largely Completed for Exxon Valdez and in the Early Stages for Deepwater Horizon

In response to the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills and by  forming trustee councils, federal and state trustees have used the  restoration trust funds to authorize money for activities in accordance with  approved restoration plans. The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council has  largely completed restoration work and authorized approximately $985  million, roughly 86 percent of the restoration trust fund, primarily on  habitat protection and general restoration, research, and monitoring  activities. As a result of these restoration activities and natural recovery,  the majority of the injured natural resources and human services in the  spill area has recovered or is recovering, according to the council’s  assessment. However, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council continues to  monitor the lack of recovery of Pacific herring and the presence of  lingering oil in the spill area. The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council is  completing early restoration work and initial post-settlement restoration  planning. It has authorized approximately $1.1 billion for restoration  activities, roughly 13 percent of the restoration trust fund, and spent $368  million, roughly 5 percent of the restoration trust fund, primarily on habitat  protection and enhancing recreation, such as building boat ramps and  other recreational facilities.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council Has Used 86 Percent of the Restoration Trust Fund, and Most Injured Natural Resources Have Recovered

Exxon’s payments to the restoration trust fund totaled approximately $900  million, and the interest earnings, as of January 2016, totaled $247  million. From 1992 to 2018, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council authorized  the expenditure of approximately $985 million or 86 percent of the roughly  $1.15 billion in principal funds plus interest from the restoration trust fund,  primarily on habitat protection ($445 million) and general restoration,  research, and monitoring of injured natural resources ($234 million). The  remaining unspent restoration trust fund balance as of January 2018 was  $210 million, split evenly between the habitat investment subaccount for  future habitat protection activities and the research investment  subaccount for future general restoration activities (see fig. 2).

According to the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council, as of January 2018, it  had spent approximately $445 million to protect and enhance habitat,  including acquiring 628,000 acres of lands and interest in lands. As  outlined in the trustee council’s 1994 restoration plan, the habitat program  is intended to minimize further injury to resources and services and allow  recovery to continue with the least interference by authorizing funds for  federal and state resource agencies to acquire title or conservation  easements on ecologically valuable lands. For example, in 2017 the  Exxon Valdez Trustee Council authorized about $5.5 million to acquire a  conservation easement on 1,060 acres at the northeastern end of Kodiak  Island in the Gulf of Alaska, known as Termination Point. The trustee  council authorized funds for this acquisition to (1) protect the property  from timber logging and development and (2) provide habitat and feeding  areas for marine birds injured by the spill, such as marbled murrelets and  pigeon guillemots. According to the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council,  habitat acquisitions prevent additional injury to species during recovery,  promote restoration of spill-affected resources and services, and are the  primary tool for acquiring equivalent resources harmed by the spill. The  habitat program also supports habitat enhancement projects, which,  according to the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council, aim to repair human- caused harm to natural resources, their habitats, and the services they  provide to humans. For example, the trustee council authorized $2.2  million to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources to stabilize stream  bank vegetation and install elevated steel walkways to provide less- damaging access to the Kenai River, a popular fishing destination.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council has spent roughly $234 million from  October 1992 to January 2018 on hundreds of general restoration,  monitoring, and research activities. As outlined in the 1994 restoration  plan, general restoration includes activities that manipulate the  environment, manage human use, and reduce marine pollution. Research  and monitoring activities also provide information on the status and  condition of resources and services, including (1) whether they are  recovering, (2) whether restoration activities are successful, and (3)  factors that may be constraining recovery, according to the 1994 plan. For  example, since 2012, the trustee council has authorized money for a  program called Gulf Watch Alaska that provides long-term monitoring  data on the status of environmental conditions—such as waters  temperature and salinity—and the marine and nearshore ecosystems.  Gulf Watch Alaska provides data to federal, state, and tribal agencies, as  well as the public, that informs resource conservation programs and aid in  the management of species injured by the spill. According to the trustee  council, its expenditures for research projects have resulted in hundreds  of peer-reviewed scientific studies and increased knowledge about the  marine environment that benefits the injured resources.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council has spent roughly $89 million from  October 1992 to January 2018 on administration, science management,  and public information. According to the 1994 restoration plan,  expenditures under this category cover the cost to (1) prepare work plans,  (2) negotiate habitat purchases, (3) provide independent scientific review,  (4) involve the public, and (5) operate the restoration program. Although  the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council set a target of 5 percent administrative  costs in the 1994 restoration plan, according to a written statement that  the trustee council provided, administrative costs averaged around 6  percent from 1994 through 2001. The trustees and council staff we  interviewed told us that in hindsight the 5 percent target was unrealistic as  it did not reflect the actual administrative costs at that time, although such  costs were included in project budgets or were absorbed by federal and  state agencies. Therefore, in 2012, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council  changed the way it accounted for administrative costs and has included  these costs in the administrative budget. According to the trustee council,  under the new accounting policy, administrative costs were recalculated  and estimated at around 19 percent for the period 2002 through 2018.

The remaining $210 million Exxon Valdez restoration trust fund balance is  held by the Alaska Department of Revenue in two interest-bearing  subaccounts. As of January 2018, the research subaccount and the  habitat subaccount each held approximately $105 million. In the 1994  restoration plan, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council established the need  for a restoration reserve to ensure that restoration activities could  continue to be supported after the final annual payments from the Exxon  Corporation were received in September 2001. According to the 1994  restoration plan, the trustee council planned to set aside $12 million per  year for a period of 9 years into the restoration reserve, totaling $108  million plus interest. In 1999, the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council resolved  to transfer the estimated remaining balance of $170 million to the  restoration reserve and split the money into two subaccounts. Since  2002, the trustee council is to make allocations for its annual work plans  and ongoing habitat acquisition using these accounts.

In 2010, the trustee council established a 20-year strategic plan to spend  the remaining trust funds using four 5-year incremental work plans. In  November 2010, the trustee council issued a call for project proposals for  the first 5-year work plan, for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Although  the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council solicited invitations on a 5-year cycle, it  has authorized money for each project annually. In a written statement,  the trustee council also stated that it continues to pursue and acquire  from willing sellers remaining parcels of land that prior studies have  identified as high-priority habitat. According to the Exxon Valdez Trustee  Council’s long-term spending scenario, both of the subaccounts are  expected to be depleted by 2032 or earlier as determined by the market’s  performance.

According to the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council’s 2014 restoration plan  update—its most recent assessment of injured resources and services— all but 5 of the 32 natural resources and human services identified as  injured by the spill have recovered, are recovering, or are very likely  recovered. In the 1994 restoration plan, the trustee council established  a list of resources and services that suffered injuries from the spill, and  developed specific, measurable recovery objectives for each injured  resource and service. The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council has  periodically assessed the status of those resources, most recently in  2014. As of the 2014 assessment, the following 4 resources were listed  as not recovering: (1) marbled murrelets, (2) Pacific herring, (3) pigeon  guillemots, and (4) one group of killer whales. In addition, the recovery of  Kittlitz’s murrelets was listed as unknown. According to the Exxon  Valdez Trustee Council, the status of these resources in 2018 is largely  similar to their status in 2014 except that one population of pigeon  guillemots has likely increased as a result of a predator-control project  that the council supported. However, the overall status of this species has  not been determined. In a written statement, the trustees stated that the  trustee council plans to initiate its next assessment of injured resources in  late 2018.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council remains particularly concerned about  the health of the Pacific herring population and the presence of lingering  oil. According to the trustee council’s 2014 restoration plan update,  Pacific herring are considered an ecologically and commercially important  species that in addition to being fished for human consumption is a  source of food for various marine species. The assessment noted a  combination of factors, including disease, predation, and poor recruitment  of additional fish to the stock through growth or migration, appear to have  contributed to the continued suppression of herring populations. As a  result, the herring fishery has been closed for 23 of the 29 years since the  oil spill and has not met the trustee council’s recovery objective. To  address concerns regarding the Pacific herring, the trustee council plans  to authorize additional money for ongoing Pacific herring research and  monitoring through the anticipated end date for the fund in fiscal year  2032, for an estimated total cost of roughly $23 million over 20 years.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council also has concerns regarding the  presence of lingering oil in the spill area. According to a March 2016  report for the trustee council, approximately 27,000 gallons of lightly  weathered oil from the Exxon Valdez spill remains, located along almost  22 miles of shoreline at a small number of subsurface sites, where  oxygen and nutrients are at levels too low to support microbial  degradation. In May 2018, we accompanied researchers working with  the trustee council to the spill area and observed the excavation of three  pits that revealed lingering oil roughly 6 inches below the surface of the  beach, as captured in figure 3. According to the researchers, oil  previously recovered from this location was identified as belonging to the  Exxon Valdez oil spill. Evidence of exposure to lingering oil was observed  as recently as 2009 in a variety of marine species, including sea otters  and harlequin ducks, according to the 2016 lingering oil report. The report  also noted that the most recent studies show that the sea otter and  harlequin duck populations have recovered and that lingering oil is no  longer causing ecological damage. Further, studies demonstrated that  minimally intrusive remediation of the oil would only be effective at a small  number of sites, according to the 2016 report. Therefore, although the  trustee council has decided not to pursue remediation of the oil, it stated  that it has authorized money for projects to study the effects of oil and  lingering oil totaling over $16 million and will continue to monitor the oil to  document its physical and chemical changes over time. The Exxon  Valdez Trustee Council expects that lingering oil will persist for decades;  however, its representatives said that the evidence indicates that there  are no current biological effects of the oil.

The Exxon Valdez Trustee Council’s priorities for future spending are  outlined in the 2014 restoration plan update, and in addition to long-term  herring research and lingering oil, the priorities include long-term  monitoring of marine conditions and injured resources, shorter-term  harbor restoration projects, and habitat protection.

The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council Has Used 13 Percent of the Restoration Trust Fund, and Most Restoration Activities Are in the Initial Planning Phase

Since the federal and state governments reached a final settlement with  BP in 2016 and the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council finalized a  programmatic restoration plan, four trustee implementation groups have  issued initial independent restoration plans. Specifically, the Alabama,  Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas trustee implementation groups have  issued initial restoration plans. According to the Deepwater Horizon  Trustee Council, the trustee implementation groups covering Florida,  Open Ocean, and Region-Wide restoration are in the midst of a multiyear  planning effort and anticipate issuing initial restoration plans in 2019 or  later. The trustee implementation groups are responsible for developing  and approving restoration plans and resolutions, which, when approved,  authorize money to be spent on restoration projects. This process  includes soliciting project ideas, submitting proposed plans for public  comment, and ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations,  such as the National Environmental Policy Act. According to the trustee  council, there is no specific timetable for approving future restoration  plans, as plans are approved on an ongoing basis—typically for several  projects at a time. The four completed restoration plans, together with  early restoration spending and other activities, including planning and  administrative efforts, account for all authorizations made by the  Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council as of December 31, 2017, according  to NOAA—the agency that manages the system the trustee councils uses  for financial reporting. As shown in figure 4, these authorizations include  approximately $1.1 billion, or 13 percent, of the $8.1 billion restoration  trust fund on five goals.

The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council has authorized roughly $460  million for habitat protection—about 10 percent of the almost $4.7 billion  ordered for this use by the settlement. According to the 2016  programmatic restoration plan, habitat protection includes both  conservation acquisition and habitat enhancement, such as creating,  restoring, or enhancing coastal wetlands. For example, during the first  phase of early restoration in 2012, the trustee council authorized $14.4  million to the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority to  create 104 acres of new brackish marsh at Lake Hermitage in Barataria  Bay, Louisiana. The project involved dredging sediment and planting  native marsh vegetation to restore marsh habitat damaged by the spill.  The project is currently in the monitoring phase. As of the end of 2017,  the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council had approved 34 habitat  protection projects, many of which were still in progress as of December  2017. The initial results of these projects include the restoration of over  4,000 acres of habitat and the creation of over 40 artificial reefs,  according to a written statement by the federal trustees.

The trustee council has authorized roughly $349 million to enhance  recreational use—about 83 percent of the almost $420 million ordered for  this use by the settlement. According to the 2016 programmatic  restoration plan, enhancing recreational use includes acquiring land along  the coast, building improved or new infrastructure, and improving  navigation for on-water recreation. For example, during the first phase of  early restoration in 2012, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council  authorized approximately $5.3 million to the Florida Department of  Environmental Protection to repair and construct boat ramps in Pensacola  Bay and Perdido Bay, Florida. Construction was completed in 2016, and  the project is currently in the monitoring and operations and maintenance  phase. As of the end of 2017, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council  had approved 43 projects to enhance recreational use, many of which  were still in progress as of December 2017. These projects have provided  new or enhanced facilities, such as pavilions, picnic areas, and boat  ramps, according to a written statement by the federal trustees.

The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council has authorized roughly $218  million to restore coastal and marine wildlife—about 12 percent of the  almost $1.8 billion ordered for this use by the settlement, primarily for  birds ($108 million), sea turtles ($50 million), oysters ($38 million), and  fish ($20 million). According to the 2016 programmatic restoration plan,  restoring coastal and marine wildlife includes activities that restore the  resources, such as fish, sea turtles, and deep coral communities, which  contribute to a productive, biologically diverse, and resilient ecosystem.  For example, during the first phase of early restoration in 2012, the  trustee council authorized $11 million to the Mississippi Department of  Environmental Quality to deploy a mixture of oyster shells, limestone, and  concrete on 1,430 acres in waters off Hancock and Harrison Counties in  Mississippi. This material, when placed in oyster spawning areas,  provides a surface for free swimming oyster larvae to attach and grow  into oysters. The project is currently in the monitoring and operations and  maintenance phase. As of the end of 2017, the Deepwater Horizon  Trustee Council had approved 32 projects to restore coastal and marine  wildlife.

Although the trustee council authorized millions of dollars to restore  coastal and marine wildlife, it authorized 1 percent or less of funds  ordered by the settlement for sturgeon, marine mammals, submerged  aquatic vegetation, and other seafloor species—such as corals.  According to the 2016 consent decree, the Open Ocean implementation  group is responsible for authorizing the majority of the restoration funds  for these types of wildlife, but that trustee implementation group has not  yet completed its initial restoration plan. According to NOAA, the  complexity of restoring several of these resources necessitated additional  preplanning and restoration technique development prior to considering  specific restoration projects for several of these types of wildlife. The  trustee implementation group is developing two restoration plans that will  include projects for birds and sturgeon, as well as for sea turtles, fish,  marine mammals, and corals, according to a Deepwater Horizon Trustee  Council press release. The trustee council released the first draft plan for  public comment in October 2018, and plans to release the second plan in  early 2019. In August 2017, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council  announced that the Louisiana implementation group was soliciting project  ideas to fund the restoration of submerged aquatic vegetation, among  other types, to include in a future restoration plan but has not yet  submitted such a plan for public review.

Roughly $27 million has been authorized for administrative oversight and  monitoring activities, or about 3 percent of the almost $810 million that the  settlement ordered for this use. The majority of the funding ($25 million)  was for administrative oversight activities, and the balance was for  monitoring. According to the 2016 programmatic restoration plan,  administrative oversight includes the costs for trustees to guide project  selection, implementation, and adaptive management. For the state  trustees, all administrative costs are covered by their respective trustee  implementation groups, and for federal trustees, all administrative costs  are covered by the Open Ocean implementation group. For example,  during the postsettlement phase, the trustee council authorized  approximately $6.6 million to Interior for (1) participation on the trustee  council; (2) restoration planning, plan development, and coordination with  other trustees; (3) environmental compliance reviews; (4) technical  assistance; and (5) financial management, among other uses. As of the end of 2017, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council had approved nine  administrative oversight and monitoring projects, which remained ongoing  as of December 31, 2017. The results of the trustee council’s activities in  this area so far include the completion of a monitoring and adaptive  management manual and its standard operating procedures.

The Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council has authorized $4 million to  restore water quality—about 1 percent of the $410 million that the  settlement ordered for this use. According to the 2016 programmatic  restoration plan, restoring water quality includes both reducing nonpoint  nutrient pollution to coastal watersheds and improving water quality in  Florida through efforts such as stormwater control and erosion control. As  of the end of 2017, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council approved two  nonpoint nutrient reduction projects to address excessive nutrient loads in  Gulf waters but no water quality projects in Florida. For example, in  2017, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council authorized approximately  $224,000 to conduct restoration planning to develop, draft, and finalize a  restoration plan addressing nonpoint nutrient reduction, among other  goals. The trustee council has authorized few funds to date for this  restoration goal because, in part, the Florida implementation group has  not yet completed its first postsettlement restoration plan. In September  2017, the trustee council announced that the Florida implementation  group was reviewing water quality project ideas for its initial restoration  plan, and it released a draft of the plan for public comment in September  2018. According to the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council, the final plan  will be released in January 2019.

Interagency Committee Members Funded Oil Spill Research Projects from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017, but the Committee Did Not Coordinate with All Relevant Entities

Nine of the interagency committee member agencies funded over 100 oil  spill research projects per year from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, for a  total cost of about $200 million; however, we found that the interagency  committee did not coordinate its research with some key entities. More  specifically, approximately half of the interagency committee members  said internal coordination on such research improved during this time, but  the committee may not have included all relevant agencies, and we found  that the committee did not coordinate with relevant trustee councils.

Nine Member Agencies Funded over 100 Oil Spill Research Projects per Year for a Cost of About $200 Million from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017

During fiscal years 2011 through 2017, 9 of the 15 interagency committee  member agencies funded oil spill research projects, spending about $200  million on this research, based on our review of agency data from the  member agencies. These nine agencies were the Bureau of Ocean  Energy Management, BSEE, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy,  EPA, NASA, NOAA, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety  Administration, and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. One of these  agencies—BSEE—spent about $84 million, or about 40 percent of the  total amount spent by all nine agencies (see table 1).

In March 2011 we reported that during fiscal years 2000 through 2010,  seven interagency committee member agencies spent about $163 million  on oil pollution research, according to officials from those agencies. Since  we last reported on the interagency committee, three additional agencies  told us that they also fund oil spill research—the Department of Energy,  BSEE, and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission—while the U.S. Navy  told us that it no longer funds oil spill research projects.

According to agency officials, the nine interagency committee member  agencies funded from 100 to 200 research projects annually from fiscal  years 2011 through 2017. These nine agencies reported funding research  projects in one or more of the interagency committee’s four oil spill  research categories: prevention, preparedness, response, and injury  assessment and restoration (see table 2).

The Interagency Committee Improved Internal Research Coordination Efforts but May Not Have Included All Relevant Agencies and Did Not Include the NRDA Trustee Councils

We reported in March 2011 that federal agencies conducted oil pollution  research but that the interagency committee had taken limited actions to  foster the communication and coordination of this research among  member agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. More specifically, we  noted that member agencies were not consistently represented on the  interagency committee and interested nonfederal stakeholders reported  limited contact with the interagency committee. We recommended,  among other things, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the  chair of the interagency committee, in coordination with member  agencies, establish a more systematic process to identify and consult with  key nonfederal stakeholders.

Officials from 8 of the 15 member agencies said they believe that the  interagency committee’s coordination efforts have improved since the  Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. In response to our recommendation  on coordination with nonfederal stakeholders, we found that members  consistently attend major oil spill conferences and workshops. In addition,  we observed that the interagency committee invites outside speakers and  researchers to its meetings to update the membership on ongoing  research activities in academia, industry, and the government. The  committee charter calls for meetings at least semiannually, but since  fiscal year 2011 the interagency committee has held quarterly meetings  with member agencies as well as meetings with outside groups of  knowledgeable stakeholders.

At the meetings, member agencies have the opportunity to present  information on oil spill research they are conducting, share information  about upcoming research conferences, and listen to presentations by  outside groups. According to member agency officials, some of the  benefits of the interagency committee’s improved coordination efforts  include a reduction in research redundancies,  increased understanding of the broader oil spill research community,  the facilitation of relationships,  the identification of research gaps, and  the ability to leverage resources.

U.S. Navy officials said that the interagency committee facilitated  communication between member agencies that use the Navy’s  equipment for research purposes. As a result of discussions that took  place at an interagency meeting, the Navy offered the use of a hydraulic  power unit to the Coast Guard for hydraulic testing in Arctic conditions in  Alaska. Officials from a few of the member agencies, including the Coast  Guard, BSEE, EPA, and NOAA, told us that they collaborate on oil spill- related research efforts with other member agencies of the interagency  committee.

In addition, the release of the 2015-2021 research and technology plan  provides a new baseline for research, including 150 priority oil pollution  research needs within 25 research areas. According to the research and  technology plan, future updates will reflect advancements in oil pollution  technology and changing research needs by capitalizing on the unique  roles and responsibilities of each member agency. According to officials  from one member agency, the revised research and technology plan has  helped member agencies coordinate with other member agencies to  leverage funding and expertise. Member agencies also cooperate with  nonfederal research entities on research needs and activities.

The interagency committee has demonstrated key practices that  strengthen coordination, such as agreeing on common terminology and  priorities for oil spill research in its revised research and technology plan.  However, the committee could enhance coordination by ensuring that  relevant participants have been included—another key practice. Under  OPA, certain federal agencies are members of the interagency  committee, but member agencies may choose which office or official  represents them at meetings and coordinates with other members on  committee-related work. Officials from 6 of the 15 member agencies told  us that their particular research efforts are not the focus of ICCOPR  meetings, and therefore ICCOPR’s ability to coordinate their research  efforts are less valuable. For example, NASA officials said the office  representing their agency at meetings is not involved in oil spill research,  but other offices within their agency fund or conduct relevant research.

In addition, 7 of the 15 officials we interviewed from member agencies  suggested that other federal agencies could be relevant to the  committee’s research efforts. For example, officials we interviewed from  several member agencies suggested including the U.S. Geological  Survey (USGS) as a full member because of its relevant research and  mapping expertise. According to committee documents, the interagency  committee considered adding USGS in 2015 but has not made a decision  on USGS’s membership. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, under his  or her capacity as chair of the interagency committee, has been  delegated authority to appoint additional agencies to the committee as  appropriate.

A leading practice for collaboration calls for interagency groups to ensure  that all relevant participants have been included in collaborative efforts.  According to this leading practice, participants should have the  appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute to the outcomes  of the collaborative effort.

However, interagency committee member agency officials said the  committee has not systematically reviewed its membership to determine  which offices within current member agencies are the most relevant to its  mission and whether adding other federal agencies as members would be  beneficial. By systematically reviewing its membership to determine  whether any additional agencies should be involved in coordinating oil  spill research and that the most appropriate offices within member  agencies are represented, the interagency committee could improve its  ability to coordinate research among federal agencies.

In addition, agency officials knowledgeable about the work of the NRDA  trustee councils are not the same officials representing their agency as  members on the interagency committee. The research and technology  plan notes that the interagency committee’s injury assessment and  restoration research is intended to support the NRDA process. However,  the NRDA trustees who manage the restoration funds for the Exxon  Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills told us that they have not  coordinated or communicated on oil spill research or restoration efforts  with the interagency committee; therefore, they would not have been  involved with developing the research and technology plan. In addition,  some trustee council members told us that they were not even aware that  the interagency committee existed.

Under OPA, one of the interagency committee’s responsibilities is to  coordinate with federal agencies and external entities on an oil pollution  research program that includes methods to restore and rehabilitate  natural resources damaged by oil spills. As previously discussed, the  NRDA trustee councils are charged with assessing natural resource  damages for the natural resources under their trusteeship and developing  and implementing plans for restoration efforts. The research that the  interagency committee members fund includes research on restoration  that could be pertinent to the work of the NRDA trustee councils. For  example, following the oil spill in 2010, the Deepwater Horizon Trustee  Council evaluated baseline conditions for several different representative  species, such as sea turtles and Gulf sturgeon, to quantify the extent of  injury as part of the restoration planning process that OPA regulations  required. Some interagency committee member agencies, such as NOAA  and BOEM, fund research on baseline data that could inform the NRDA  trustee councils’ injury assessment work. In turn, the NRDA trustee  councils’ work could also inform the interagency committee’s coordination  of future oil spill research by, for example, identifying gaps in research as  identified and prioritized in updates to the research and technology plan.  By coordinating with the NRDA trustee councils, the interagency  committee could ensure that its research informs and supports the  councils’ damage assessment and restoration efforts and better  leverages members’ resources.

Literature Suggests the Effectiveness of Offshore Oil Spill Response Techniques Varies Based on Regional Environmental Differences and Other Factors

According to the literature we reviewed, environmental differences  between the Gulf of Mexico and Arctic regions, as well as factors such as  the type of oil, influence the potential effectiveness of various oil spill  response techniques. In each region, environmental conditions, such as  water and air temperature, water movement, and salinity, influence how  effective oil spill response techniques can be. Further, according to the  literature we reviewed, these conditions determine which response  techniques are appropriate.

Environmental conditions, such as ocean water and air temperature, can  influence the effectiveness of natural oil removal through evaporation or  biodegradation. These processes may occur more quickly in warmer  climates, such as in the Gulf of Mexico. In the event of an oil spill,  communities of microbes can bloom to respond to the new supply of oil.  According to a 2011 report from the American Academy of Microbiology,  these microbes can biodegrade up to 90 percent of some light crude oil,  but the largest and most complex molecules––such as the ones that  make up road asphalt––are not significantly biodegradable. A 2016  study found that higher temperatures lead to increased biodegradation,  and increased salinity had a small positive impact on crude oil removal.  However, the American Academy of Microbiology report also states that  while microbes can biodegrade oil over time, the process may not be fast  enough to prevent ecological damage. Therefore, immediate containment  or physical removal of the oil is an important first response.

The effectiveness of oil removal is also influenced by conditions of the  water, determined by wind, waves, and currents. According to literature  we reviewed, winds and currents can make it more difficult to remove the  oil, increasing the likelihood of the oil spill affecting larger areas and  additional plant and animal populations. Further, high seas and rough  waters can make some response techniques less effective. According to  a 2017 study that estimates the effect of environmental conditions on  deploying oil spill response techniques in the Arctic Ocean, most  response techniques are not suitable during Arctic winters, between  November and June.

Literature we reviewed also shows that other factors influence the  effectiveness of response techniques, including oil type, oil thickness, and  the location and depth of oil spill events. Light crude oil typically  evaporates and biodegrades more quickly than heavy crude oil, which is  more viscous. However, if the oil slick is too thin, it becomes difficult to  contain and limits response options. Oil spilled in a remote location, such  as the place where the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred, may complicate  response efforts because equipment and personnel are far away and may  not be able to respond within the window of opportunity before the oil  spreads.

According to Coast Guard officials, during an oil spill response, various  response techniques are used to minimize the negative effects on the  water surface, water column, and shorelines, each with different  applications, advantages, disadvantages, and risks. The response  techniques we reviewed are:

Mechanical recovery in the marine environment uses a variety of  containment booms, barriers, and skimmers, as well as natural and  synthetic absorbent materials to capture and store the spilled oil until  it can be disposed of properly.

In-situ burning, meaning in-place burning, is the process of igniting  and burning oil slicks in a controlled environment.

Dispersants are chemicals that can mitigate the immediate damage  caused by oil at the surface and help accelerate the natural removal  of the spilled oil. Dispersants work similarly to dish soap, breaking up  the oil into small droplets that can more easily spread through the  water.

Mechanical Recovery Safely Removes Spilled Oil but Has Limitations in Certain Conditions

The advantage of mechanical recovery is that it physically removes the oil  from the water, minimizing the negative effects of the oil. Mechanical  recovery can be used to safely remove oil where other methods might  cause health risks or environmental damage, according to a 2013 report  published by the National Academies Press.

However, mechanical recovery has limitations in some conditions. If the  oil slick is thin, it is difficult to achieve a significant rate of recovery and  requires a lot of equipment to concentrate the slick so it is thick enough to  be collected. According to literature we reviewed, mechanical recovery is  less effective during inclement weather or high seas because the oil  spreads and can emulsify in these conditions and is difficult to contain.  Low temperatures and the presence of ice also make it challenging to  achieve high recovery rates, and mechanical recovery becomes  increasingly ineffective as wave heights increase, according to literature  we reviewed.

Furthermore, the process of recovering the oil is labor- and cost-intensive,  and recovery can be delayed if the equipment is not readily available.  Mechanical recovery is especially challenging to implement quickly when  spills occur in remote areas, such as with Exxon Valdez, or where the oil  is traveling quickly and broadly, such as with Deepwater Horizon. For  example, according to a 1999 EPA report, skimmers were not readily  available during the first 24 hours following the Exxon Valdez oil spill,  repairs to damaged skimmers were time-consuming, and continued  inclement weather slowed down the recovery efforts. In addition, a  disadvantage of mechanical recovery is that temporary storage for large  amounts of oil is frequently needed and recovered oil is generally brought  back to the shore for disposal, according to Interior officials. Because of  the resources required to physically remove the oil, it is difficult to recover  a large percentage of the spilled oil through mechanical recovery in large  oil spills.

In-Situ Burning Can Efficiently Eliminate Oil but Has Potential Side Effects

According to two studies and an agency document we reviewed, in-situ  burning can be a highly effective technique for eliminating spilled oil from  the sea surface. In response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, roughly  5 to 6 percent of all of the spilled oil was burned, about double the  amount of oil removed with skimmers, according to a 2013 National  Academies Press report.

The primary advantage of in-situ burning is its efficiency. In ideal  conditions, this method can quickly eliminate spilled oil. According to  several reports we reviewed, in optimal conditions, in-situ burning can  eliminate up to 90 percent of the spilled oil contained for burning with a  relatively minimal investment of equipment or manpower. Literature we  reviewed suggests that it is especially suited for response in Arctic  conditions, particularly in ice-covered water where logistics and  environmental conditions may preclude other options and where the ice  can act as a natural barrier to help keep the oil slick thick enough to burn.

However, in-situ burning also has its disadvantages. Burning has a  narrow window of opportunity, and if the approval process takes longer  than it takes to prepare for the burn, the opportunity for using in-situ  burning may be lost, according to a NOAA document. Similar to  mechanical recovery, burning can only be used if the oil slick is a certain  thickness and when waves, wind, and currents are not too strong. In-situ  burning becomes increasingly difficult in strong winds or with waves over  3 feet tall. A second disadvantage is that the burn residue caused by in- situ burning may have negative effects on ocean life, though studies we  reviewed differed on this matter. According to a 2014 National Academies  Press report about oil spills in the U.S. Arctic environment, a series of  studies in the 1990s found that burn residues have little to no impact on  oceanic organisms. However, a 2015 review on burn residues from in- situ burning in Arctic waters concluded that not enough research has  been done on the side effects of burn residue from in-situ burning.  According to NOAA officials, another disadvantage of in-situ burning is  that the soot from inefficient combustion can result in unsightly and  unhealthy particulates that may affect any downwind populations before  the smoke dissipates.

Use of Dispersants Is Versatile but Its Effectiveness Depends on Several Factors

According to Coast Guard officials, chemical dispersants are typically  used in conjunction with mechanical means and are considered when  offshore mechanical methods are recognized as inadequate because of  the spill volume, the geographical extent of the slicks, or specific on- scene environmental conditions.

According to the literature we reviewed, an advantage of dispersants is  their versatility. Dispersants are not as limited by environmental  conditions as other response techniques, and they can be applied on  surface or underwater environments. Further, dispersants can be applied  through a variety of mechanisms. For example, they can be applied on oil  slicks at the water’s surface by boats, planes, or helicopters. Dispersants  can also be used below the surface, through subsea injection at the site  of the spill, as was applied in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

However, the literature suggests that the effectiveness of dispersants  depends on many factors, such as the type of oil, type of dispersant used,  and sea and weather conditions. According to Coast Guard officials, the  decision to use dispersants is made after careful consideration of the  location of the spill, type of oil spilled, seasonal resources at risk, and the  environmental conditions at the time, as these factors influence the  effectiveness and practicality of using dispersants, as well as the  advisability of the tactic in the face of other options and risks. These  officials also noted that dispersants are rarely used in the United States,  but in certain situations, where mechanical means such as booming and  skimming may not be effective, dispersants may be considered.

In addition to the uncertainty of their effectiveness, the potential  environmental risks associated with dispersants are also uncertain. One  2014 study states that while dispersants were thought to undergo rapid  degradation in the water column, there was evidence that the dispersants  remained on Gulf of Mexico beaches almost 4 years after the Deepwater  Horizon oil spill. During the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, responders  applied over 1.8 million gallons of chemical dispersants to the spilled oil— an unprecedented volume in the United States. It was the first major oil  spill to use dispersants on such a large scale, and approximately 42 percent of these dispersants were applied sub-sea in the first operational  sub-sea application of this technique. According to Coast Guard  officials, the toxicity and long-term effects of large-scale application of  dispersants on the ecology of marine life are unknown. According to  literature we reviewed, there is evidence that chemically dispersed oil and  some dispersant compounds may be toxic to some marine life, especially  those in early life stages. Coast Guard officials also said that continued  monitoring and further review of scientific research should improve the  understanding of the impact of dispersants on mitigating the effects of oil  spills as well as their overall environmental impact.

Following initial response and cleanup efforts, restoration activities related  to a significant offshore oil spill, such as those from Exxon Valdez or  Deepwater Horizon, can endure for decades. Federal agencies of the  interagency committee conduct and fund research projects related to  preventing, preparing for, responding to, and restoring the environment  after oil spills. The interagency committee has improved the coordination  of federal oil spill research efforts since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in  2010. However, the interagency committee has not systematically  reviewed its membership to determine which offices within current  member agencies are the most relevant to its mission and whether  adding other federal agencies as members would be beneficial. By  systematically reviewing its membership to determine whether any  additional agencies should be involved in coordinating oil spill research  and that the most appropriate offices within member agencies are  represented, the interagency committee could improve its ability to  coordinate research among federal agencies.

In addition, the interagency committee does not coordinate with the  NRDA trustee councils that manage the large restoration funds and  monitor the restoration of damaged resources after a specific spill, such  as the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills. Coordinating with  the NRDA trustee councils could help ensure that the interagency  committee’s oil spill research program is effectively supporting the  damage assessment and restoration efforts of the councils, and better  knowledge sharing between groups and leveraging its members’ oil spill  research resources.

We are making the following two recommendations to the Commandant  of the U.S. Coast Guard at the Department of Homeland Security:  The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the chair of the  Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, in  coordination with member agencies, to systematically review its  membership to determine whether any additional agencies should be  involved in coordinating oil spill research and that the most appropriate  offices within member agencies are represented. (Recommendation 1)

The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the chair of the  Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, in  coordination with member agencies, to coordinate with the relevant  Natural Resource Damage Assessment trustee councils to help ensure  that the interagency committee’s research informs and supports the  councils’ damage assessment and restoration efforts. (Recommendation  2)

We provided our draft report to the Department of Agriculture,  Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of  Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior,  Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, National  Aeronautics and Space Administration, and U.S. Arctic Research  Commission for review and comment. In comments reprinted in appendix  II, the Department of Homeland Security concurred with our  recommendations. In addition, the departments of Commerce, Homeland  Security, Interior, and EPA provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the  appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture,  Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, the Interior, and  Transportation; the Administrators of EPA and NASA; the Executive  Director of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission; and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

This report examines (1) how the Natural Resource Damage Assessment  (NRDA) trustee councils have used the restoration trust funds for the  Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills and the status of the  restoration efforts; (2) the status of the Interagency Coordinating  Committee on Oil Pollution Research’s (interagency committee) oil spill  research efforts and how coordination of such efforts has changed since  we last reported on it in March 2011; and (3) what literature suggests  about the effectiveness of various oil spill response techniques in the  Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico.

To examine how the NRDA trustee councils used the restoration funds  from the Exxon Valdez oil spill (from October 1992 to January 2018) and  the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (from April 2012 to December 2017) for  restoration and the status of the restoration efforts, we obtained data from  each trustee council on the amount of funds (1) ordered by the settlement  for each restoration type; (2) authorized by the trustees for, but not yet  spent on, restoration activities (authorizations); (3) spent on restoration  activities (expenditures); and (4) not yet authorized for restoration  activities (remaining balance) through calendar year 2017 for Deepwater  Horizon and through January 31, 2018, for Exxon Valdez. To assess the  reliability of the financial data, we reviewed related budget  documentation; interviewed knowledgeable council staff about how fund  balances are recorded and reported; reviewed the totals for obvious  errors and inconsistencies; and reviewed internal control documents,  such as a database manual and standard operating procedures. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our  report.

We examined the approved restoration plans (1994 restoration plan and  2014 restoration plan update for the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the 2016  programmatic damage assessment and restoration plan for the  Deepwater Horizon oil spill) and, when available, annual reports on  restoration activities (1994 through 2018 annual reports for the Exxon  Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (Exxon Valdez Trustee Council) and  2016 and 2017 annual financial reports for the Deepwater Horizon  Natural Resource Damage Assessment Trustee Council (Deepwater  Horizon Trustee Council)). We also reviewed project reports and scientific  studies that the trustee councils funded to gain a better understanding of  the status of restoration of injured natural resources, restoration priorities,  activities, and progress made by the trustee councils. We reviewed laws  and regulations that provide the legal authority for federal agencies to  intervene and respond after an oil spill, such as the Oil Pollution Act of  1990 (OPA), the Clean Water Act, and NRDA regulations. We met with  officials from the Exxon Valdez Trustee Council to discuss the distribution  of settlement money for restoration purposes after the Exxon Valdez oil  spill, and with officials from the Deepwater Horizon Trustee Council, Gulf  Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council (RESTORE Council), and the  National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to discuss the distribution of  settlement money for restoration purposes after the Deepwater Horizon  oil spill. Additionally, in May 2018, we traveled to multiple locations in the  former spill area in Alaska to observe the extent of restoration efforts and  ongoing issues. Along with researchers sent by the Exxon Valdez Trustee  Council, we excavated three pits that revealed lingering oil about 6 inches  below the surface of the beach on Eleanor Island in Prince William  Sound. These researchers told us that oil previously uncovered at this  location had been linked to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In addition to  fieldwork in Alaska, in November 2017 and February 2018, we attended  public meetings in Alabama and Louisiana to learn about restoration  plans for the Gulf States.

To examine the status of the interagency committee’s federal oil spill  research efforts and how coordination of such efforts has changed since  we last reported on it in March 2011, we requested funding data and  project information on oil spill research from all 15 member agencies of  the interagency committee. We received data from the 9 member agencies that reported funding oil spill research projects from fiscal years  2011 through 2017. These 9 agencies provided data on agency  expenditures on oil spill research and the research category of any  projects funded.  We assessed the reliability of the data by reviewing  related documentation, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and  reviewing agency internal controls for each of the 9 member agencies  that provided us data about the steps they take to maintain this  information. We determined that in most cases the data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of our report. However, we chose not to provide  the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) agency  expenditures for oil spill research because NOAA officials were unable to  provide reliable data on the actual amount the agency spent on such  research during the time period we requested. In addition, some agency  officials we interviewed raised the concern that their agencies do not track  oil spill research funding and therefore the information they provided on  expenditures for such research may not include all relevant efforts that  could inform oil spill prevention, preparedness, response, and restoration.

We also interviewed officials from the 15 member agencies to learn about  each agency’s oil spill research efforts and participation in and  coordination through the interagency committee, and compared their  coordination practices to one of our federal leading practices for  collaboration for interagency groups to evaluate the interagency  committee’s efforts to coordinate such research. We chose to focus on  the collaboration practice pertaining to participants because it appeared  to be the most challenging for the interagency committee based on the  findings of our previous March 2011 report, the actions taken by the  interagency committee to address our recommendations from that report,  and our own findings from our research for this report. In addition, we  reviewed the 2013 interagency committee charter, the committee’s most  recent biennial reports to Congress covering fiscal years 2008 through  2017, and the committee’s third multiyear research and technology plan  for fiscal years 2015 through 2021; attended two committee meetings;  and reviewed minutes of eight past meetings. We also reviewed OPA’s  provisions that established and govern the interagency committee’s  coordination efforts and membership, as well as various related executive  documents.

To examine what literature suggests about the effectiveness of various oil  spill response techniques in the Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico, we  conducted a literature search for studies and articles that analyzed and  summarized the effectiveness of various oil spill response techniques in  those regions. We identified existing literature from 1989 (the year of the  Exxon Valdez oil spill) to March 2018 by searching various databases,  such as Scopus and ProQuest. We chose to focus on three primary  response techniques—mechanical recovery, in-situ burning, and the use  of dispersants—used to clean up after offshore oil spills according to  knowledgeable stakeholders and the literature we reviewed. The  database search produced over 800 results. Our subject matter expert  helped the team narrow this list to 50 results, of which we relied on 16  studies and articles that we determined were most relevant to our  research objective of determining the effectiveness of various oil spill  response techniques in the Arctic and the Gulf of Mexico. Some literature  was not included if it was too specific for the scope of our review.  Literature published recently, generally within the past 10 years, was  considered more relevant. We supplemented the list of studies from these  databases with literature from the Congressional Research Service, the  National Academies Press, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),  NOAA, the American Academy of Microbiology, the Arctic Oil Spill  Response Joint Industry Programme, and our previous report on oil  dispersants. In total, we relied upon 22 literature results to inform the  findings of our objective. For a complete list of the literature, see the  bibliography. We shared our summary of the literature search findings  with agency officials representing some of the interagency committee  member agencies. The following agencies responded with comments and  we included their perspectives where relevant: the Department of the Interior, EPA, NOAA, and the U.S. Coast Guard. We did not  independently evaluate the effectiveness of these response techniques.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to January 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Christine Kehr (Assistant  Director), Amy Ward-Meier (Analyst-in-Charge), Colleen Candrl, Nirmal  Chaudhary, Juan Garay, Cindy Gilbert, Matt Hunter, Jessica Lewis, Joe  Maher, Greg Marchand, Kimberly (Kim) McGatlin, Cynthia Norris, Travis  Schwartz, Sheryl Stein, Sara Sullivan, Vasiliki (Kiki) Theodoropoulos,  Matthew Valenta, Sarah Veale, and Dan Will made key contributions to  this report.

We reviewed literature to examine what it suggests about the  effectiveness of various oil spill response techniques in the Arctic and the  Gulf of Mexico. This bibliography contains citations for the studies and  articles that contributed to these findings.

American Academy of Microbiology, Microbes and Oil Spills FAQ  (Washington, D.C.: 2011).

Arctic Oil Spill Response Technology Joint Industry Programme,  Synthesis Report, D. Dickens-DF Dickens Associates, LLC (May 3,  2017).

Belore, Randy C., Ken Trudel, Joseph V. Mullin, and Alan Guarino.  “Large-scale Cold Water Dispersant Effectiveness Experiments with  Alaskan Crude Oils and Corexit 9500 and 9527 Dispersants.” Marine  Pollution Bulletin, vol. 58 (2009): 118-128.

Boufadel, Michel C., Xiaolong Geng, and Jeff Short. “Bioremediation of  the Exxon Valdez Oil in Prince William Sound Beaches.” Marine Pollution  Bulletin, vol. 113 (2016): 156-164.

Brakstad, Odd G., Trond Nordtug, and Mimmi Throne-Holst.  “Biodegradation of Dispersed Macondo Oil in Seawater at Low  Temperature and Different Oil Droplet Sizes.” Marine Pollution Bulletin,  vol. 93 (2015): 144-152.

Committee on Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine  Environment; Ocean Studies Board; Polar Research Board; Division on  Earth and Life Studies; Marine Board; Transportation Research Board;  National Research Council, Responding to Oil Spills in U.S. Arctic Marine  Environment. National Academies Press (US) (Washington, D.C.: 2014).

Committee on the Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Mississippi Canyon- 252 Oil Spill on Ecosystem Services in the Gulf of Mexico, Ocean Studies  Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council, An  Ecosystem Services Approach to Assessing the Impacts of the  Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. National Academies  Press (US) (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2013).

Corn, Lynne M., Claudia Copeland, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:  Coastal Wetland and Wildlife Impacts and Response. Congressional  Research Service (July 7, 2010).

Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Emergency and Remedial  Response, Understanding Oil Spills and Oil Spill Response, EPA 540-K- 99-007 (Dec 1999).

Fletcher, Sierra, Tim Robertson, Bretwood Higman, and Elise DeCola.  Estimating Impact of Environmental Conditions on Deployment of Marine  Oil Spill Response Tactics in the U.S. Arctic Ocean, proceedings of the  Fortieth AMOP Technical Seminar. Ottawa: Environment and Climate  Change Canada, 2017, 246-264.

Fritt-Rasmussen, Janne, Susse Wegeberg, d Kim Gustavson, “Review on  Burn Residues from In Situ Burning of Oil Spills in Relation to Arctic  Waters.” Water Air Soil Pollution, vol. 226 (2015).

GAO, Oil Dispersants: Additional Research Needed, Particularly on  Subsurface and Arctic Applications, GAO-12-585 (Washington, D.C.: May  30, 2012).

Naseri, M., and J. Barabady, Safety and Reliability: Methodology and  Applications—Performance of Skimmers in the Arctic Offshore Oil Spills.  London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2015, 607-614.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Oil Spill - Behavior,  Response and Planning: Open-water Response Strategies: In-situ  Burning, (August 1997).

Nedwed, Tim, Tom Coolbaugh, and Amy Tidwell. Subsea Dispersant Use  during the Deepwater Horizon Incident, proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth  AMOP Technical Seminar on Environmental Contamination and  Response. Vancouver, BC; Canada, ExxonMobil Upstream Research  Company, 2012, 506-518.

Nyankson, Emmanuel, Dylan Rodene, and Ram B. Gupta.  “Advancements in Crude Oil Spill Remediation Research After the  Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.” Water Air Soil Pollution (2016).

Rahsepar, Shokouh, Martijn P.J. Smit, Albertinka J. Murk, Huub H.M.  Rijnaarts, and Alette A.M. Langenhoff. “Chemical Dispersants: Oil  Biodegradation Friend or Foe?” Marine Pollution Bulletin, vol. 108 (2016):  113-119.

Ramseur, Jonathan L., Oil Spills: Background and Governance.  Congressional Research Service (Sept 15, 2017).

Sharma, Priyamvada, and Silke Schiewer. “Assessment of Crude Oil  Biodegradation in Arctic Seashore Sediments: Effects of Temperature,  Salinity, and Crude Oil Concentration.” Environmental Science and  Pollution Research (2016): 14881-14888.

Shi, X., P.W. Bellino, A. Simeoni, and A.S. Rangwala. “Experimental  Study of Burning Behavior of Large-scale Crude Oil Fires in Ice Cavities.”  Fire Safety Journal, vol. 79 (2016): 91-99.

United States Coast Guard, On Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater  Horizon Oil Spill, (September 2011).

White, Helen K., Shelby L. Lyons, Sarah J. Harrison, David M. Findley,  Yina Liu, and Elizabeth B. Kujawinski. “Long-Term Persistence of  Dispersants Following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.” Environmental  Science & Technology Letters (2014): 295-299.

After a significant offshore oil spill—such as the Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon incidents—it can take decades and billions of dollars to undo the environmental damage. A federal-state trustee council is set up after a spill to manage the money for related environmental restoration projects.

Federal research on environmental restoration after an oil spill could be relevant to the trustee councils' work. But we found that the committee that coordinates federal oil spill research doesn't collaborate with the trustee councils. We recommended that it do so.