Emergency Communications: Office of Emergency Communications Should Take Steps to Help Improve External Communications

Public-safety communications systems are used by thousands of federal, state, and local jurisdictions. It is vital that first responders have communications systems that allow them to connect with their counterparts in other agencies and jurisdictions. OEC offers written guidance, governance planning, and technical assistance to help ensure public-safety entities have the necessary plans, resources, and training to support emergency communications. FirstNet, an independent authority within the Department of Commerce, is establishing a public-safety network.

GAO was asked to review OEC's efforts related to interoperable emergency communications. This report examines (1) OEC's and FEMA's collaborative efforts to develop grant guidance; (2) how OEC incorporates FirstNet's network and other emerging technologies into its plans and offerings; and (3) the extent to which OEC has assessed its methods of communication. GAO evaluated OEC's and FEMA's coordination against GAO's leading practices for interagency collaboration; surveyed all 54 state-designated SWICs; evaluated OEC's communications efforts against federal internal control standards; and interviewed officials that represented various areas of public safety.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) collaborate on grant guidance to help public-safety stakeholders use federal funds for interoperable emergency communications. GAO found that OEC's and FEMA's efforts generally align with GAO's leading practices for effective interagency collaboration. For example, OEC's and FEMA's memorandum of agreement and standard operating procedures articulate their agreement in formal documents, define their respective responsibilities, and include relevant participants. During this review, the agencies established a process to monitor and assess grantees' compliance with the grant guidance. However, because the grants for 2018 were not yet awarded at the time of GAO's review, GAO was unable to assess the effectiveness of the new process.

OEC incorporates the First Responder Network Authority's (FirstNet) nationwide public-safety broadband network and other emerging technologies into various offerings such as written guidance, governance planning, and technical assistance. Public-safety organizations GAO interviewed and statewide interoperability coordinators (SWIC) GAO surveyed were generally satisfied with OEC's communication efforts.

OEC has not assessed its methods for communicating with external stakeholders. According to federal internal control standards, management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives and periodically assess its methods of communication so that the organization has the appropriate tools to communicate quality information on a timely basis. Some SWIC survey respondents and public-safety representatives identified an opportunity for OEC to improve its methods of communication. For example, 26 of the 54 SWICs responded that OEC could use additional tools or approaches, such as social media, for improving communication with its stakeholders. In addition, public-safety officials reported that they have missed training because they were unaware of opportunities. Because OEC has not assessed its methods of communication, OEC may not be using the best tools and approaches to provide timely information on training opportunities, workshops, and other emergency communications information to the public-safety community.

OEC should assess its methods of communication to help ensure it is using the appropriate tools in communicating with external stakeholders. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

Public-safety communications systems are used by first responders— such as police officers and firefighters—in thousands of federal, state,  and local jurisdictions. It is vital for first responders to have:  sufficient capacity to handle the communications, and  interoperable communications systems that enable first responders to  connect with their counterparts in other agencies and jurisdictions,  even if their counterparts’ systems or equipment vendors differ.

The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)—located within the  Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Protection and  Programs Directorate (NPPD)—was created in 2007 to promote  interoperable emergency communications, among other things. OEC  offers written guidance, governance planning, and technical assistance to  help ensure federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies have the  necessary plans, resources, and training they need to support operable  and interoperable emergency communications. OEC coordinates with  other DHS agencies that have responsibilities for emergency  communications, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA), which awarded over $50 billion in preparedness grants funding  to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments from fiscal years 2002  through 2018. According to OEC, its guidance, governance planning,  and technical assistance have changed to reflect changes in technology,  including the creation of the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet).  FirstNet was created to establish a nationwide, interoperable, wireless  broadband network for use by federal, state, tribal, and local public-safety  personnel. According to FirstNet, the nationwide network will transform  the future of public-safety communications for first responders.

You asked us to obtain information on OEC’s and FEMA’s grant guidance  efforts as well as OEC’s plans and offerings for emergency  communications. This report examines:

OEC’s and FEMA’s collaborative efforts to develop and implement  emergency communications grant guidance; how OEC incorporates FirstNet’s nationwide public-safety broadband  network and other emerging technologies into its plans and offerings,  and stakeholders’ views regarding those efforts; and  the extent to which OEC has assessed its methods of communication.

To address these objectives, we reviewed OEC and FEMA  documentation on their collaborative efforts related to grants, including  memorandums of agreement and standard operating procedures. We  also interviewed OEC and FEMA staff to obtain information on their  collaboration efforts. We assessed whether the agencies’ actions align  with the seven key features of interagency collaboration that we have  previously identified. We also reviewed OEC documents and technical  assistance offerings, including the 2014 National Emergency  Communications Plan. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 6  of the 10 OEC coordinators. We selected these OEC coordinators to  achieve variety across geography, population density, tribal presence,  and territory representation; their views do not represent OEC’s official  agency position.

Additionally, we surveyed the statewide interoperability coordinators  (SWIC) from 48 states, the District of Columbia, and 5 territories. We  surveyed SWICs from May 2018 to July 2018 and received responses  from all 54 SWICs. We conducted semi-structured interviews with  officials from 10 public-safety organizations that are members of both the SAFECOM committee and the Public Safety Advisory Committee  (PSAC). We selected organizations that represent various areas of  public safety (e.g., law enforcement, public works, and fire and  emergency medical services) and different levels of jurisdiction (i.e.,  federal, state, local, or tribal). We also assessed OEC’s efforts for  communicating with public-safety stakeholders against pertinent federal  standards for internal control. Additional details about our scope and  methodology can be found in appendix I, and a copy of our survey results  can be found in appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to December  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Effective communication is vital to first responders’ ability to respond to  emergencies and to ensure their safety. For example, first responders  use public-safety communications systems to gather information,  coordinate a response, and request additional resources and assistance  from neighboring jurisdictions and the federal government. OEC has  taken a number of steps aimed at supporting and promoting the ability of  public-safety officials to communicate in emergencies and work toward  operable and interoperable emergency communications nationwide. OEC  develops policy and guidance supporting emergency communications  across all levels of government and across various types of emerging  technologies such as broadband, Wi-Fi, and NextGen 911, among others.  OEC also provides technical assistance—including training, tools, and  online and on-site assistance—for federal, state, local, and tribal first  responders. First responders use different communications systems,  such as land mobile radio (LMR), commercial wireless services, and  FirstNet’s network.

LMR: These systems are the primary means for first responders to  use voice communications to gather and share information while  conducting their daily operations and coordinating their emergency  response efforts. LMR systems are intended to provide secure,  reliable voice communications in a variety of environments, scenarios,  and emergencies. Across the nation, there are thousands of  separate LMR systems.

Commercial wireless services: Public-safety entities often pay for  commercial wireless services to send data transmissions such as  location information, images, and video. Some jurisdictions also use  commercial wireless services for voice communications.

Nationwide dedicated-broadband network: Consistent with the law,  FirstNet is working to establish a nationwide dedicated network for  public-safety use that is intended to foster greater interoperability,  support important data transmissions, and meet public-safety officials’  reliability needs. In creating FirstNet in 2012, Congress provided it  with $7 billion in federal funds for the network’s initial build-out and  valuable spectrum for the network to operate on. Unlike current LMR  systems, the devices operating on FirstNet’s network will use the  same radio frequency band nationwide. It is expected that these  devices will be interoperable among first responders using the  network because the devices will be built using the same open, non- proprietary, commercially available standards.

Communications systems must work together, or be interoperable, even  though the systems or equipment vendors may differ. The interoperability  of emergency communications enables first responders and public-safety  officials to use their radios and other equipment to communicate with  each other across agencies and jurisdictions when needed and as  authorized, as shown in figure 1.

OEC is tasked with developing and implementing a comprehensive  national approach to advance interoperable communications  capabilities. For example, according to OEC, it supports and promotes  communications used by emergency responders and government officials  and leads the nation’s operable and interoperable public-safety and  national security/emergency preparedness communications efforts. OEC  notes that it plays a key role in ensuring federal, state, local, tribal, and  territorial agencies have the necessary plans, resources, and training  needed to support operable and interoperable emergency  communications. To help in this effort, OEC instituted a coordination  program that established regional coordinators across the nation.  According to OEC, its coordinators work to build trusted relationships,  enhance collaboration, and stimulate the sharing of best practices and  information between all levels of government, critical infrastructure  owners and operators, and key non-government organizations.

OEC developed the National Emergency Communications Plan in 2008  and worked with federal, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions to update it in  2014 to reflect an evolving communications environment. The long-term  vision of the plan—which OEC views as the nation’s current strategic plan  for emergency communications—is to enable the nation’s emergency- response community to communicate and share information across all  levels of government, jurisdictions, disciplines, and organizations for all  threats and hazards, as needed and when authorized.

To help it accomplish this mission, OEC works with three emergency  communications advisory groups: SAFECOM, the Emergency  Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC), and the National Council  of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC). These  organizations promote the interoperability of emergency communications  systems by focusing on technologies including, but not limited to, LMR  and satellite technology.

SAFECOM: According to the 2018 SAFECOM Strategic Plan,  SAFECOM develops products and completes a range of activities  each year in support of its vision and mission, including providing a  national view of public-safety priorities and challenges, developing  resources and tools aligned to the 2014 National Emergency  Communications Plan, and collaborating with partner organizations to  promote the interoperability of emergency communications. One of  the products developed by SAFECOM each year is the Guidance on  Emergency Communications Grants. SAFECOM consists of more  than 50 members that represent local, tribal, and state governments;  federal agencies; state emergency responders; and intergovernmental  and national public-safety organizations.

ECPC: The ECPC is an interagency collaborative group that provides  a venue for coordinating federal emergency-communications efforts.  The ECPC works to improve coordination and information sharing  among federal emergency-communications programs. The ECPC  does this by serving as the focal point for emergency communications  issues across the federal agencies; supporting the coordination of  federal programs, such as grant programs; and serving as a clearing  house for emergency communications information, among other  responsibilities. The ECPC has 14 member agencies that are  responsible for setting its priorities.

NCSWIC: This council consists of SWICs and their alternates from 50  states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia. According to  SAFECOM, NCSWIC develops products and services to assist the  SWICs with leveraging their relationships, professional knowledge,  and experience with public-safety partners involved in interoperable  communications at all levels of government.

Additionally, in 2013, FirstNet established the PSAC to provide advice to  FirstNet. The committee is composed of members who represent local,  tribal, and state public-safety organizations; federal agencies; and  national public-safety organizations.

FEMA is responsible for coordinating government-wide disaster response  efforts, including on-the-ground emergency communications support and  some technical assistance. For example, FEMA’s regional emergency- communications coordinator is responsible for providing emergency  communications assistance on an as-needed basis and coordinating  FEMA’s tactical communications support during a disaster or emergency.  FEMA also provides a range of grant assistance to state, local, tribal, and  territorial entities, including preparedness grants that can be used for  emergency communications.

As noted above, in November 2018, legislation was signed into law that  reorganized and renamed NPPD and OEC. Previously, OEC was one of  five divisions under the Office of Cyber Security and Communications  which in turn was one of five divisions within NPPD. However, NPPD has  been renamed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and  OEC was renamed the Emergency Communications Division and was  elevated to one of three direct reporting divisions within the new agency.  See figure 2 for an illustration of changes made to OEC’s organizational  placement.

OEC’s and FEMA’s Joint Efforts for Emergency Communications Grants Generally Follow Key Features for Effective Interagency Collaboration

OEC and FEMA have responsibilities for developing and implementing  grant guidance for grantees using federal funds for interoperable  emergency communications. Specifically, OEC and FEMA officials told us  FEMA is responsible for administering the grants, and OEC coordinates  emergency communications grant guidance annually through  SAFECOM’s Guidance on Emergency Communications Grants. We  reviewed OEC’s and FEMA’s collaborative efforts related to grant  guidance and found that their efforts generally follow our previously  identified leading practices for effective interagency collaboration, as  described below.

Written Guidance and Agreements. Agencies that formally  document their agreements can strengthen their commitment to  working collaboratively. OEC and FEMA formalized their  coordination efforts for interoperable emergency communications  grants in a memorandum of agreement in 2014. This memorandum  assigned OEC and FEMA responsibilities and established a joint  working group to develop standard operating procedures, which OEC  said were drafted the following year but not formally approved by  FEMA, that govern coordination between the agencies. We also  reported that written agreements are most effective when the  collaborators regularly monitor and update them. When we started  our review, OEC and FEMA officials told us that they had not updated  the memorandum of agreement, which included the draft standard  operating procedures as an appendix. However, the agencies  approved an updated memorandum of agreement and standard  operating procedures, and OEC provided them to us in July 2018.

Leadership. When buy-in is required from multiple agencies,  involving leadership from each can convey the agencies’ support for  the collaborative effort. According to OEC and FEMA officials, their  grants coordination efforts include high-level leadership. Specifically,  senior leaders from both agencies signed the 2014 and 2018  memorandums of agreement. Also, OEC officials told us that their  leaders in the grants program office are responsible for overseeing  the collaborative effort.

Bridging Organizational Culture. Collaborating agencies should  establish ways to operate across agency boundaries and address  their different organizational cultures. OEC and FEMA operate  across agency boundaries in several ways. First, both agencies told  us that they participate in the ECPC Grants Focus Group, whose  members coordinate across federal grant programs to support  interoperable emergency communications. The group reviews  SAFECOM guidance and, according to FEMA officials, meets on a  quarterly basis. Second, OEC officials said the agencies foster open  lines of direct communication via conference calls, e-mail  correspondence, and in-person meetings. OEC and FEMA officials  told us their communications include sharing and reviewing language  in FEMA’s notices that announce grant opportunities and OEC’s  SAFECOM guidance. Third, the agencies said that OEC officials  conduct emergency-communications-related trainings and briefings  for FEMA at least once a year. According to OEC officials, these  trainings have included a discussion on the movement toward  broadband and FirstNet. Finally, FEMA officials told us that their  program analysts have attended conferences with OEC to speak to  the SWICs about grant programs. They said the program analysts  explained how the grant money can be leveraged to support projects  within the individual states and answered questions about the grants.  OEC officials said having FEMA attend conferences to discuss  specific grant information is useful for public-safety stakeholders.

Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities. Collaborating agencies can  get clarity when they define and agree upon their respective roles and  responsibilities. As part of the 2014 and 2018 memorandums of  agreement, OEC and FEMA established clear responsibilities for how  each agency will support the grants coordination effort. For example,  both offices were responsible for assigning experienced program staff  and contributing to the development of standard operating procedures  by attending meetings and conducting research. Also, the standard  operating procedures clarify how OEC and FEMA will share  information, solicit input on grants guidance language, and review  grant applications.

Participants. Including relevant participants helps ensure individuals  with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities will contribute to the  collaborative effort. OEC and FEMA identify points of contact in their  memorandums of agreement. According to OEC officials, they did not  always work with the correct FEMA staff before the 2014  memorandum was developed. Also, FEMA officials told us that their  grants program staff who participate in the coordination effort with  OEC perform those specific responsibilities as a collateral duty on an  as needed basis. According to OEC officials, OEC’s performance  plans outline coordination with FEMA and areas related to the  agencies’ memorandum of agreement for the staff who handle grant  issues. OEC and FEMA officials said participants’ responsibilities  include serving as technical subject matter experts and reviewing  language for grants guidance and notices of funding opportunities.

Resources. Collaborating agencies should identify the human,  financial, and technological resources they need to initiate or sustain  their efforts. OEC and FEMA staff their collaborative effort with  employees from their grants offices to address their human resource  needs. These employees perform work related to emergency  communications grants as outlined in their performance plans or as a  collateral duty. The agencies also provide OEC access to FEMA’s  non-disaster grants system to share grantee information. According to  OEC and FEMA officials, their collaboration efforts do not require  either agency to obligate funds or use special technology, such as  online information-sharing tools.

Outcomes and Accountability. Collaborating agencies that create a  means to monitor and evaluate their efforts can better identify areas  for improvement. According to OEC and FEMA documentation, the  primary goal of the draft standard operating procedures was to  prevent grantees from improperly using federal funds, such as  purchasing equipment that is not interoperable. OEC officials said the  biggest gap in those standard operating procedures was that they did  not include a monitoring program to ensure grantees were compliant  with grant guidance, which include requirements for interoperability.  OEC’s and FEMA’s July 2018 standard operating procedures  established a process to track and monitor grantee compliance. They  also identified a process for assessing the information they collect and  how it will be shared among OEC and FEMA, and when appropriate,  other stakeholders. At the time of our review, OEC and FEMA officials  told us they had not implemented the monitoring procedures because  the grants for the 2018 grant cycle were not yet awarded. Accordingly,  we could not evaluate the effectiveness of the new procedures to  monitor and assess grantee compliance, and without conducting such  an evaluation, we could not determine whether OEC’s and FEMA’s  efforts align with the key practice in this area. Senior officials from  both agencies said the monitoring procedures would be updated if  they do not work as intended.

OEC Incorporates FirstNet’s Network and Emerging Technologies into Its Plans and Offerings

After being established in 2007, OEC initially focused on enhancing the  interoperability and continuity of LMR systems. However, according to  OEC officials, its programs, products, and services have adapted and  evolved to incorporate new modes of communications and technologies.  Additionally, OEC’s technical assistance offerings for emergency  communications technology have evolved over time as new technologies  have come into use. For example, OEC’s technical assistance catalog  contains new or enhanced offerings on topics related to broadband issues  such as FirstNet’s network, Next Generation 911, alerts and warnings,  and incident management.

In 2014, DHS released its second National Emergency Communications  Plan, which identified the need to focus on broadband technologies,  including FirstNet’s nationwide public-safety broadband network. One of  the plan’s top priorities is “ensuring emergency responders and  government officials plan and prepare for the adoption, integration, and  use of broadband technologies, including the planning and deployment of  the nationwide public-safety broadband network.” To meet this priority,  OEC officials told us that they provide stakeholders with a wide range of  products and services to help prepare for the adoption, integration, and  use of broadband. For instance, officials said that they leverage OEC’s  governance groups—SAFECOM, NCSWIC, and ECPC—to develop  products and services and to identify specific challenges and  requirements regarding broadband. Additionally, OEC officials told us that  they coordinate regularly with FirstNet staff and invite FirstNet to meet  and brief the stakeholder community on the latest deployment  information. However, OEC officials told us that FirstNet’s network is one  option available to public-safety and government officials to access  broadband communications and information sharing and explained that  OEC maintains a neutral position for all technologies and vendors.  Accordingly, OEC is not responsible for promoting any vendor solutions,  including FirstNet’s network, and there is no requirement for OEC to do  so. Additionally, five of six OEC coordinators we interviewed told us that  FirstNet’s network is only one of several emergency-communications  technology options and that OEC should continue to provide information  to public-safety stakeholders regarding other providers. For example,  there are commercial carriers that provide wireless broadband services,  and we have previously reported that these commercial carriers could  choose to compete with FirstNet.

According to OEC officials, prior to the start of each fiscal year, OEC  engages with stakeholders to gather feedback on new or revised  technical assistance offerings, as well as updates to existing plans and  documents. OEC officials told us that they expect an increase in technical  assistance requests that focus on issues related to mobile data use,  broadband governance, standard operating procedures, and policies and  procedures. According to OEC officials, OEC has delivered more than  2,000 technical-assistance-training courses and workshops since 2007,  and OEC will continually update its technical assistance offerings to  incorporate new modes of communications and technologies into training,  exercises, and standard operating procedures for its stakeholders.

The majority (7 of 10) of public-safety organizations that we interviewed  told us that OEC sufficiently incorporates information regarding FirstNet’s  network into its guidance and offerings. For example, officials from 6 of 10  organizations that we interviewed told us that OEC must strike a balance  between FirstNet’s network and other emerging technologies, and that  OEC has successfully accomplished this task. Additionally, the majority of  SWICs responded to our survey that it is at least moderately important for  OEC to incorporate the FirstNet network and emerging technologies into  its written guidance, technical assistance offerings, training opportunities,  workshops, and grant guidance, Furthermore, in most cases, SWICs  responded that OEC has incorporated FirstNet’s network and emerging  technologies into these areas, as follows:

FirstNet network. In our survey, the majority of SWICs responded  that OEC has incorporated, to a large or moderate extent, FirstNet’s  network into its written guidance (65 percent) and technical assistance  offerings (59 percent), and half of SWICs said the same for OEC’s  workshops. However, fewer SWICs reported that OEC incorporated  FirstNet’s network, to a large or moderate extent, into its training  opportunities (39 percent) and grant guidance (33 percent).

Emerging technologies. The majority of SWICs reported that OEC  has incorporated, to a large or moderate extent, emerging  technologies into its written guidance (87 percent); technical  assistance offerings (81 percent); training opportunities (74 percent);  workshops (78 percent); and grant guidance (56 percent).

See figure 3 for complete survey data regarding SWICs’ views on the  extent that OEC has incorporated FirstNet’s network and emerging  technologies into its offerings.

In surveying SWICs on the usefulness of OEC’s efforts to incorporate  FirstNet’s network and emerging technologies into its offerings, we found  the following:

FirstNet network. The majority of SWICs reported that OEC’s efforts  to incorporate FirstNet’s network into its written guidance (67 percent),  technical assistance offerings (59 percent), and workshops (59  percent) have been very or moderately useful. However, less than a  majority of SWICs reported that OEC’s efforts to incorporate FirstNet’s  network into its training opportunities (46 percent) and grant guidance  (40 percent) have been very or moderately useful.

Emerging technologies. The majority of SWICs reported that OEC’s  efforts to incorporate emerging technologies into its written guidance  (93 percent), technical assistance offerings (85 percent), training  opportunities (74 percent), workshops (85 percent), and grant  guidance (72 percent) have been very or moderately useful.

See figure 4 for complete survey data regarding SWICs’ views on the  usefulness of OEC’s efforts to incorporate FirstNet’s network and  emerging technologies into its offerings.

Even following the implementation of FirstNet, public-safety stakeholders  told us they expect OEC will play an important role in ensuring  interoperable emergency communications, both regarding the FirstNet  network and other technologies. For example, 45 of 54 (83 percent) of  SWICs we surveyed reported that OEC will likely have a large or  moderate role for ensuring interoperable emergency communications  once FirstNet’s network is fully operational. Additionally, nearly all (9 of  10) of public-safety organizations we interviewed said that they believe  OEC will continue to play an important role in ensuring interoperable  emergency communications after the implementation of FirstNet’s  network.

OEC Has Not Assessed Its Methods for Communicating with External Stakeholders

OEC is required to conduct extensive nationwide outreach to support and  promote interoperable emergency-communications capabilities by state,  regional, local, and tribal governments and public-safety agencies in the  event of natural disasters and acts of terrorism and other man-made  disasters. According to federal standards for internal control,  management should externally communicate the necessary quality  information to achieve the entity’s objectives. This includes  communicating with external parties and using the appropriate methods  of communication. The federal standards state that management should  periodically assess the entity’s methods of communication so that the  organization has the appropriate tools to communicate quality information  throughout and outside of the entity on a timely basis.

Most public-safety organizations we interviewed told us that OEC  communicates with their organization frequently through committee  meetings and other means. For example, 9 of the 10 organizations told us  that a key form of communication between their organization and OEC is  participation in emergency-communications advisory groups such as  SAFECOM, NCSWIC, and PSAC. Furthermore, OEC officials reported  that OEC’s guidance documents, plans, tools, and technical assistance  offerings are formally provided to the public-safety community through the  SAFECOM, NCSWIC, and ECPC distribution lists. Governing body  representatives then distribute the information to their organizations and  stakeholders. These documents are also available on DHS’s website.  Furthermore, 4 of the 10 organizations told us that they regularly have  direct communications with OEC staff. The large majority of SWICs  responded that they are very or moderately satisfied with the  communication efforts from both OEC headquarters (81 percent) and  OEC coordinators (93 percent).

However, some stakeholders identified communication challenges as well  as opportunities for OEC to improve communication. For example,  approximately one quarter (26 percent) of SWICs said that OEC does not  communicate training well, and these SWICs reported that they are either  unaware of OEC training opportunities related to FirstNet’s network and  other emerging technologies, or that they mostly learn about OEC training  opportunities from other sources. See figure 5 below for additional survey  information regarding SWICs’ views on how well OEC communicates  training opportunities related to FirstNet’s network and other emerging  technologies.

Also with respect to OEC’s communication efforts with stakeholders, four  of six OEC coordinators and 3 of 10 public-safety organizations we  interviewed, along with 26 of 54 (48 percent) of the SWICs we surveyed,  identified the need for OEC to use additional tools or approaches for  improving communication with SWICs and the public-safety community.  For example, one coordinator said that there are public-safety  stakeholders who are unaware of OEC. Similarly, representatives from a  public-safety organization we interviewed told us that OEC should help  public-safety stakeholders better understand what OEC does. Both the  OEC coordinator and public-safety stakeholders in these examples  identified the need for OEC to use social media to improve public-safety  stakeholders’ understanding of OEC and its offerings. Additionally, an  OEC coordinator told us that each region is different, and unless there is  an OEC coordinator who is proactive about communicating information to  the public-safety community, then important information does not get out  to the appropriate people. The coordinator also said that it is difficult to  communicate information to all of the needed stakeholders because he is  solely responsible for communicating with many public-safety entities and  jurisdictions within multiple states. Furthermore, a SWIC reported that  other organizations use social media for communicating during disasters  and for notifying interested parties about events and trainings, and that  OEC should do the same. OEC officials told us that NPPD recently  established a Twitter account that OEC has used to increase awareness  of programs, products, and services. However, since the establishment of  the account in February 2018 through September 2018, only 23 of  NPPD’s 280 tweets and retweets (8.2 percent) made mention of OEC, 15  of which occurred in March 2018.

In addition to social media, some public-safety organizations and SWICs  identified additional tools or approaches that OEC could use to improve  communication with the public-safety community. These tools and  approaches include designating an intergovernmental specialist or liaison  within OEC to coordinate with public-safety stakeholders, developing  additional regional-focused meetings such as conferences and  workshops, and creating online or distance-learning opportunities (e.g.,  online training, webinars, online chat or bulletin board services, etc.).

Although OEC officials told us that they employ mechanisms to  understand the effectiveness of OEC’s programs, products, and services,  we found OEC has not specifically assessed its methods of  communication. For example, OEC analyzes feedback forms provided at  meetings and stakeholder engagements, gathers direct input from  stakeholders through in-person and phone discussions and e-mail, tracks  the open rate of e-mails and website and blog post traffic, and reviews  social media analytics for specific event campaigns. At the time of our  review, OEC officials told us that they were developing a formal  performance-management program to measure the impact of OEC’s  programs on the public-safety and national security/emergency  preparedness communities. However, these broad efforts aimed at  reviewing the overall programs are not designed for the specific purpose  of assessing OEC’s methods of communication, and OEC does not have  any plans in place for doing so.

Lacking an assessment of its methods of communication, OEC may be  missing opportunities to learn which tools and approaches are the most  effective and to use those to deliver timely information to public-safety  stakeholders. As noted above, this can result in public-safety officials  missing trainings or not receiving other helpful information. Furthermore,  not using additional methods of communication or tools could contribute  to uncertainty among the public-safety community about OEC’s mission  and its efforts to improve the interoperability of emergency  communications.

OEC has multiple efforts supporting interoperable emergency  communications that the public-safety community relies on to better  respond to emergency situations. Although public-safety stakeholders we  contacted were generally satisfied with OEC’s communications efforts,  OEC could be missing opportunities to use additional tools and  approaches, such as social media, to improve communication with public- safety officials. Absent an assessment of its methods of communication,  OEC cannot ensure it is using the best methods to provide relevant and  timely information on training opportunities, workshops, technical  assistance offerings, and other emergency-communications information  to the public-safety community.

OEC should assess its methods of communication to help ensure it has  the appropriate tools and approaches to communicate quality information  to public-safety stakeholders, and as appropriate, make adjustments to its  communications strategy. (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In  response, DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in  appendix III. DHS concurred with our recommendation and provided an  attachment describing the actions it would take to implement the  recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested  parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines (1) the Office of Emergency Communications’  (OEC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)  collaborative efforts to develop and implement guidance for grantees  using federal grants for interoperable emergency communications; (2)  how OEC incorporates FirstNet’s nationwide public-safety broadband  network and other emerging technologies into its plans and offerings, and  stakeholders’ views regarding those efforts; and (3) the extent to which  OEC has assessed its methods of communication.

To evaluate OEC’s and FEMA’s collaborative efforts to develop and  implement grant guidance, we collected and reviewed documentation  relevant to the collaborative effort, including memorandums of  agreements, standard operating procedures, and meeting agendas. We  assessed OEC’s and FEMA’s actions against the seven key  considerations for interagency collaborations. We also interviewed OEC  and FEMA Grant Programs Directorate officials who have responsibilities  for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants. We asked them to  discuss their approach to interagency collaboration, including the process  to jointly develop grant guidance language. We asked agency officials  questions that were based on the key considerations for implementing  interagency collaborative mechanisms that we identified in a prior report.

To determine how OEC has incorporated FirstNet’s network and other  emerging technologies into its plans and offerings, we reviewed relevant  OEC documentation, including fact sheets and technical assistance  guides. We also reviewed the 2014 National Emergency Communications  Plan (NECP) and OEC’s March 2017 biennial report to Congress on the  progress toward meeting NECP goals. We interviewed OEC  headquarters officials about the agency’s efforts to date, including how  OEC develops its offerings and workshops and communicates this  information to the public-safety community. We also interviewed 6 of 10  OEC coordinators using a semi-structured interview format to get on-the- ground perspectives from OEC staff who serve as points of contact for  public-safety stakeholders. We selected OEC coordinators to achieve  variety across geography, population density, tribal presence, and  territory representation. We interviewed OEC coordinators to obtain their  perspectives as subject matter experts, but their views should not be  attributed to OEC’s official agency position.

In addition, to obtain stakeholders’ views on OEC’s efforts to incorporate  FirstNet’s network and other emerging technologies into plans and  offerings, we surveyed all 54 statewide interoperability coordinators  (SWIC) from 48 states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. We  obtained a list of SWICs from DHS and confirmed additional contact  information via e-mail. We conducted a web-based survey to learn  SWICs’ perspectives on issues including the importance of incorporating  FirstNet’s network and other emerging technologies into OEC’s plans and  offerings, OEC’s communication with the public-safety community, and  SWICs’ level of satisfaction with OEC’s efforts. To ensure the survey  questions were clear and accurately addressed the relevant terms and  concepts, we pretested the survey with SWICs from three states: Illinois,  Massachusetts, and Texas. These SWICs were selected to get  perspectives from officials who have served in the role for at least several  years and SWICs who are new to the position. We administered our  survey from May 2018 to July 2018 and received 54 responses for a 100  percent response rate.

We also used a semi-structured interview format to obtain views from  representatives from 10 public-safety organizations who have expertise in  public-safety and federal emergency-communications efforts (see table  1). To identify relevant organizations, we reviewed our prior report that  identified 34 organizations that are members of both OEC’s SAFECOM  advisory group and FirstNet’s Public Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC).  We researched the members to help determine the extent to which each  organization is involved in issues related to our review. We selected 10  public-safety organizations to interview on the basis of: (1) this research,  (2) information from DHS, and (3) a literature review. Because one  association declined our request for an interview, we contacted and  interviewed another relevant organization from the original list of 34  member organizations. The views shared by the representatives we  interviewed are not generalizable to all public-safety organizations that  interact with OEC; however, we were able to secure the participation of  organizations that focus on various public-safety issues across federal,  state, local, and tribal jurisdictions and thus believe their views provide a  balanced and informed perspective on the topics discussed.

To evaluate the extent that OEC has assessed its methods of  communication, we reviewed OEC’s documentation for collecting  stakeholders’ feedback. We also reviewed the interview responses from  OEC officials and the public-safety organizations listed in table 1 and the  SWIC survey data pertaining to OEC’s communications efforts. We  assessed OEC’s efforts against federal standards for internal control  regarding external communications and periodic evaluation of its methods  of communication.

Appendix II: Survey of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators

The questions we asked in our survey of statewide interoperability  coordinators (SWIC) and the aggregate results of responses to the  closed-ended questions are shown below. We do not provide results for  the open-ended questions. We surveyed all SWICs from 48 states, five  territories, and the District of Columbia. We administered our survey from  May 2018 to July 2018 and received 54 responses for a 100 percent  response rate. Due to rounding, the aggregated results for each closed- ended question may not add up to exactly 100 percent. For a more  detailed discussion of our survey methodology see appendix I.

1. What best describes the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) in your  state?

1a. If you selected “Other,” please explain.  (Written responses not included)

2. Does the SWIC also serve in the role of the FirstNet State Point of Contact  (SPOC)?

0%  2a. If no, how often does the SWIC coordinate with the SPOC on FirstNet’s  nationwide public safety broadband network?

2b. If you selected “rarely or never,” please explain.  (Written responses not included)

OEC Coordination Support - FirstNet’s Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network

The questions in this section ask your opinion about OEC’s efforts to help  the public safety community improve interoperable emergency  communications capabilities. This section will be about FirstNet’s  nationwide public safety broadband network.

3. In your opinion, how important is it for OEC to incorporate FirstNet’s nationwide public safety broadband network into the  following areas?

Please specify the other area in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

4. To what extent has OEC incorporated FirstNet’s nationwide public safety broadband network into the following areas?

5. In your opinion, how useful have OEC’s efforts to incorporate FirstNet’s nationwide public safety broadband network into  the following areas been in helping your state address challenges with its emergency communications?

Please specify the other area in the box below.  (Written responses not included)  6. Please provide any additional comments you have on OEC’s efforts to  address FirstNet’s nationwide public safety broadband network as part of  interoperable emergency communications.  (Written responses not included)  7. What, if anything, could OEC do to further address FirstNet’s  nationwide public-safety broadband network in its interoperable  emergency communications efforts?  (Written responses not included)

8. In your opinion, to what extent will OEC have a role for ensuring interoperable  emergency communications once FirstNet’s nationwide public-safety broadband  network is fully operational?

8a. Please explain your response to question 8 in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

OEC Coordination Support - Emerging Technologies

The questions in this section ask your opinion about OEC’s efforts to help  the public safety community improve interoperable emergency- communications capabilities. This section will be about other emerging  technologies.

9. Should OEC address the following emerging technologies in its interoperable emergency communications efforts?

Wireless Local Area Networks (e.g., Wi-Fi)

9a. If you responded “Yes” to other, please specify in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

10. In your opinion, how important is it for OEC to incorporate emerging technologies into the following areas?

11. To what extent has OEC incorporated emerging technologies into the following areas?

12. In your opinion, how useful have OEC’s efforts to incorporate emerging technologies into the following areas been in  helping your state address challenges with its emergency communications?

Please specify the other area in the box below.  (Written responses not included)  13. Please provide any additional comments you have on the usefulness  of OEC’s efforts to incorporate emerging technologies into interoperable  emergency communications.  (Written responses not included)  14. What, if anything, could OEC do to further incorporate emerging  technologies into its interoperable emergency communications efforts?  (Written responses not included)

The following questions are about OEC’s communication efforts with  SWICs and the public safety community.

15. In your opinion, how well does OEC communicate to SWICs training opportunities in the following areas?

Emerging technologies (i.e., Wi-Fi, NextGen  911, etc.)

15a. If you responded to other, please specify in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

16. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the communication efforts from the following OEC organizational levels?

16a. If you responded to other, please specify in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

17. In your opinion, are there additional tools or approaches that OEC could use to  improve communication with SWICs and the public-safety stakeholder community?

17a. Please identify and describe additional tools and approaches in the  box below.  (Written responses not included)

18. In your opinion, does OEC face any challenges that affect its ability to meet the  needs of the public safety community?

18a. Please explain in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

The following questions ask your opinion about SAFECOM grant  guidance for interoperable emergency communications equipment. OEC  develops annual SAFECOM guidance in an effort to provide current  information on emergency communications policies, eligible costs, best  practices, and technical standards for state, local, tribal, and territorial  grantees investing federal funds in emergency communications projects.

19. In your opinion, how clear are the following aspects of the SAFECOM grant guidance for interoperable emergency  communications equipment?

19a. If you responded to other, please specify in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

20. In the past 2 years, has your state developed supplemental statewide guidance  to clarify the SAFECOM grant guidance for interoperable emergency  communications equipment?

20a. Please explain in the box below, why your state developed  supplemental statewide guidance.  (Written responses not included)

21. In your opinion, is there a need to improve the SAFECOM grant guidance for  interoperable emergency communications equipment?

21a. If yes, please explain in the box below.  (Written responses not included)

22. If you would like to expand upon any of your responses to the  questions above, or if you have any other comments about OEC’s  interoperable emergency communications efforts, please write them in  the box below.  (Written responses not included)

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino (Assistant  Director); Ray Griffith (Analyst in Charge); Josh Ormond; Cheryl  Peterson; Kelly Rubin; Andrew Stavisky; Sarah Veale; Michelle Weathers;  and Ralanda Winborn made key contributions to this report.

In an emergency, it's vital that first responders can communicate with their counterparts in other agencies and jurisdictions. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) offers a range of services and assistance to first responders to support interoperable communications systems and technologies.

First responders and other public safety officials we surveyed were generally satisfied with OEC’s work. However, some would like more information about OEC and its offerings.

We recommended that OEC ensure it is using the best communication tools to share information on training opportunities, workshops, and other emergency communications efforts.


Federal Judiciary: The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Should Ensure Financial Disclosure Redaction Reports Are Submitted to Congress Annually

Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, federal judges and certain judicial employees must file financial disclosure reports that can be made available to the public. Federal law accounts for the potential security risks of the judiciary and authorizes the redaction of information from judicial officials' reports if the Judicial Conference, in consultation with the United States Marshals Service (USMS), finds that revealing certain information could endanger judicial officials or members of their families.

This report addresses the following for calendar years 2012 through 2016, the most recent years for which full data were available: (1) Actions taken by the Judicial Conference to ensure judicial officials file financial disclosure reports, and the number of reports filed; (2) The judiciary's compliance with procedures for responding to requests for financial disclosure reports and the number of reports released; and (3) The number of redaction requests made, the types of information requested to be redacted, and the judiciary's consistency in reporting results to Congress in a timely manner.

GAO interviewed AOUSC and USMS officials, reviewed relevant laws and guidance, and analyzed data on redaction requests.

The Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary's principle policy-making body, developed an electronic filing system, guidance, and a compliance process to help ensure judicial officials file financial disclosure reports that adhere to applicable laws and regulations, and data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) show that more than 4,000 reports were required to be filed annually from 2012 through 2016. According to AOUSC officials, as of March 2018, all financial disclosure reports required to be filed from 2012 through 2016 were filed, except for one in 2015 and one in 2016. AOUSC officials are working with the filers to ensure these reports will be filed.

The Judicial Conference established procedures for responding to requests for copies of financial disclosure reports, and the number of reports released has varied. From 2012 through 2016, AOUSC annually received, on average, about 70 requests for copies of judicial officials' reports and released approximately 16,000 reports during this time. Each request can vary—from a request for a single judicial official's report to a request for multiple judicial officials' reports.

From 2012 through 2016, a small percentage of judicial officials requested redactions from their financial disclosure reports. On average, 3.2 percent of financial disclosure reports filed included a redaction request and about 85 percent of those requests were granted. Of the information requested to be redacted, about 76 percent was related to the unsecured location of a judicial official's spouse, child, or residence. AOUSC is required by federal law to submit annual reports to Congress on use of the judicial redaction authority, such as the number of reports with redactions and types of information redacted, but AOUSC has not consistently submitted the reports on an annual basis in recent years. GAO found that AOUSC does not have a formal process for preparing and submitting the reports to Congress. Implementing a more formal process, with specified steps and timeframes, would better position AOUSC to provide Congress with more timely reports.

GAO recommends that AOUSC develop and implement a formal process, with steps and timeframes, to better ensure that required annual reports are submitted to Congress within the following year. AOUSC concurred with the recommendation.

Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, federal judges  and certain judicial employees, like similar officials in the legislative and  executive branches of government, must file annual financial disclosure  reports that can be made available to the public. These reports help  preserve and promote the integrity of public officials and institutions by  disclosing financial information, but may also include information that  could compromise the safety of these officials and their families.  According to the United States Marshals Service (USMS), judicial officials  received 2,357 threats and inappropriate communications in fiscal year  2016 alone.

Federal law accounts for the potential security risks faced by members of  the federal judiciary (judiciary) and authorizes the redaction of personal  and sensitive information from financial disclosure reports that could  endanger these officials or members of their families. Potential risks to  judicial officials could be general or specific. General risks include  revealing the unsecured location of a judicial official, a spouse’s place of  employment, or a child’s school. Specific threats could include the  potential for kidnapping or extortion, or a threat of violence against a  judge by a former defendant or litigant. For example, in 2012, a federal  judge requested that certain information be redacted from his financial  disclosure report after an inmate convicted of threatening to kill the judge  was released from prison and requested a copy of the judge’s report, as  well as information on the judge’s home security system. The law that  authorizes the judiciary to redact financial disclosure reports also requires  it to submit annual reports on the operation of its redaction authority to  specified congressional committees. Reports should include information  on the total number of financial disclosure reports with redactions and the  types of information redacted, among other things.

The Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal judiciary’s  principle policy-making body, is responsible for implementing the  judiciary’s redaction authority in a manner that provides the intended  safety measures without compromising timely public access to judicial  officials’ financial disclosure reports. In light of the importance of  balancing these goals, you asked us to review the process for filing  financial disclosure reports and requesting redactions of information from  those reports, and to provide data on the numbers and types of  information being redacted. This report addresses the following  questions:  (1) What actions has the Judicial Conference taken to ensure that judicial  officials are complying with the requirement to file financial disclosure  reports and how many reports have been filed each year from 2012  through 2016?  (2) Is the judiciary complying with procedures for responding to requests  for judicial officials’ financial disclosure reports and how many reports has  the judiciary released each year from 2012 through 2016?  (3) During the period from 2012 through 2016, how many redaction  requests did judicial officials make, what types of information did they  request be redacted, and did the judiciary consistently report the results  of judicial officials’ redaction requests to Congress in a timely manner?

To examine the actions the Judicial Conference has taken on financial  disclosure report filing and the reports filed, we interviewed officials from  the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) on their processes  for ensuring that judicial officials file financial disclosure reports, and the  extent to which reports required to be filed were, in fact, filed. We  reviewed key policy and guidance documents related to these processes,  including Guide to Judiciary Policy, Filing Instructions for Judicial Officers  and Employees, and a Step by Step Guide for the Preparation and  Electronic Filing of Financial Disclosure Reports; and we reviewed  relevant laws related to financial disclosure reports, such as the Ethics in  Government Act of 1978 and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. We also  reviewed data included in AOUSC’s annual redaction request reports and  data provided to us by AOUSC on the number of reports required to be  filed and the number of reports filed every year for calendar years 2012  through 2016—the 5 most recent years for which full data were available  at the time of our review.

To examine the judiciary’s compliance with procedures for responding to  requests for financial disclosure reports and the number of reports  released each year from 2012 through 2016, we interviewed AOUSC  officials on their processes for responding to requests and the numbers of  requests received each year. We reviewed relevant documentation, such  as the guidance that dictates the process for responding to requests. We  reviewed data included in AOUSC’s annual redaction request reports and  data provided by AOUSC on the number of requests received per year for  calendar years 2012 through 2016.

To determine how many and what types of information judicial officials  requested be redacted from 2012 through 2016, and whether the judiciary  has consistently reported results of judicial officials’ redaction requests to  Congress in a timely manner, we interviewed AOUSC officials on the  redaction request process. We also interviewed USMS officials on the  security consultation process and how they coordinate with AOUSC on  redaction requests. Additionally, we requested documentation for all  redaction requests made by judicial officials during the two months of  September and October for each year from 2012 through 2016, of which  there were 45 such requests. In return, AOUSC provided us with all  relevant documentation for these 45 redaction requests that were made during this time period. We also requested and received the AOUSC  database that contains data on all redaction requests received from  calendar years 2012 through 2016. We reviewed and analyzed the 45  redaction requests and compared the data in these case files to the  information contained in AOUSC’s redaction database and we  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting  purposes. We then analyzed data from the AOUSC database on  redaction requests to determine the number of redaction requests that  were granted (in whole or in part) or denied; as well as the type of  information that judicial officials requested be redacted from their financial  disclosure reports from calendar years 2012 through 2016. In order to  categorize the type of information requested to be redacted from judicial  officials’ financial disclosure reports, two GAO analysts independently  reviewed the description of the redaction requests and the related section  of the financial disclosure reports as contained in the AOUSC database  and reached consensus on which of seven different categories to place  the redaction requests—full report; unsecured location of spouse, child, or  residence; asset names; asset value; gifts; reimbursement; or other. In  those cases where the description of the information redacted was too  vague, or did not easily fit into one of the remaining categories, we placed  it in the “other” category. Using the AOUSC redaction request database  and data provided on the total number of reports required to be filed, we  also determined the percentage of judges and other judicial employees  who had requested redactions from their financial disclosure reports each  year, as well as the types of information requested to be redacted, by  percent. Finally, to determine whether the judiciary consistently reported  results of judicial officials’ redaction requests to Congress in a timely  manner, we interviewed relevant AOUSC staff, reviewed available  guidance on the procedures for gathering information and producing the  annual reports, and requested copies of the annual redaction reports for  2012 through 2016. AOUSC staff could not locate annual reports for  calendar years 2013 and 2014. We contacted staff from two  congressional committees of jurisdiction to request copies of the missing  reports and they also could not locate the reports.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to May 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Purpose and Structure of the Judicial Conference and AOUSC

The Judicial Conference of the United States is the national policy-making  body of the federal courts. The Chief Justice of the United States is the  presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. The Conference operates  through a network of 20 committees, including the Committee on  Financial Disclosure. The Judicial Conference delegated authority to  redact information from a financial disclosure report to the Committee on  Financial Disclosure. Upon request from a judicial official, the committee,  in consultation with the USMS, redacts the information when it decides  that revealing such personal or sensitive information could endanger the  judicial official or a member of his or her family. Responsibilities of the  Committee on Financial Disclosure include reviewing reports filed,  adjudicating requests for redactions of information from the report,  approving and modifying reporting forms and instructions, and monitoring  the release of reports to ensure compliance with statute and the  committee’s guidance. The Judicial Conference of the United States is  responsible for implementing the judiciary’s redaction authority in a  manner that provides judicial officials with the intended security measures  without compromising timely public access to judicial officials’ financial  disclosure reports.

AOUSC is the agency within the judicial branch that provides a broad  range of legislative, legal, financial, technology, management,  administrative, and program support services to federal courts. It is  responsible for carrying out Judicial Conference policies, and one of its  primary responsibilities is to provide staff support and counsel to the  Judicial Conference and its committees, including the Committee on  Financial Disclosure. The Director of AOUSC serves as the Secretary to  the Judicial Conference and is an ex officio member of the Executive  Committee.

Legislative Basis for Filing Financial Disclosure Reports

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, requires specified  judicial, legislative, and executive branch officials to file annual financial  disclosure reports in the spring of each year. These reports include  financial information for the previous calendar year. Financial disclosure  reports are made up of nine parts—positions, agreements, non- investment income, reimbursements, gifts, liabilities, investments and  trusts, explanatory comments, and certification and signature. (See  appendix I for a copy of a blank annual financial disclosure report).

In addition to filing an annual report, covered judicial officials are required  to file financial disclosure reports when nominated (nomination report);  within 30 days of taking office (initial report); and within 30 days of leaving  their position (final report)—see table 1.

Federal law also requires that copies of judicial officials’ financial  disclosure reports be made available, upon written request, to members  of the public. Judicial officials may request that certain information be  redacted before their financial disclosure reports are sent to the  requesting individuals.

Legislative Basis for Judicial Redaction Authority

The judiciary’s authority to redact information from financial disclosure  reports was established in 1998 and was initially authorized for a 3-year  period. That legislation also instituted an annual congressional reporting  requirement for the judiciary on the operation of the redaction authority.  Over the past 20 years, the judiciary’s redaction authority and reporting  requirement have been successively reauthorized for various periods of  time, but have lapsed on occasion. The authority was most recently  reauthorized on March 23, 2018 through the end of 2027.

According to AOUSC officials, while the redaction authority lapsed, the  Committee on Financial Disclosure did not grant any new redaction  requests, but it did grant requests to continue redactions that were  approved prior to December 31, 2017.

The Judiciary’s Process for Adjudicating Redaction Requests and Responding to Requests for Copies of Financial Disclosure Reports

The Judicial Conference, through its Committee on Financial Disclosure,  has developed a multistep process for reviewing federal judges’ requests  for redactions of information from their financial disclosure reports and  requests for copies of these reports, as shown in figure 1. While the  committee encourages judicial officials to request redactions at the time  they file their financial disclosure reports, AOUSC officials stated that  most redaction requests were made after judicial officials were notified  that copies of their reports had been requested.

A judicial official may request a redaction of information when his or her  financial disclosure report is filed or after receiving a notification of a  request for a copy of his or her financial disclosure report. When  requesting a redaction, the judicial official must state specifically what  information is sought to be redacted and the justification for the redaction.  The Committee on Financial Disclosure will determine, in consultation  with the USMS, if the information could endanger the judicial official or an  immediate family member. For redaction requests involving information  pertaining to the unsecured location of (1) a spouse’s employer, (2) a  child’s school, or (3) a primary or secondary residence, a separate  security consultation is not required based on an agreement AOUSC  reached with the USMS memorialized in a 2004 letter that, in essence,  serves as a security consultation. For all other types of information  requested to be redacted, a further USMS security consultation is  required.

Taking into account the information provided by the judicial officials, as  well as results from the USMS security consultations, members of the  Subcommittee on Public Access and Security, a subcommittee under the  Committee on Financial Disclosure, decide—by majority vote—to either  grant (in whole or in part) or deny each redaction request. Such  redactions are good until the end of the calendar year in which they are  granted. The Committee on Financial Disclosure notifies the judicial  official if the information requested to be redacted has been granted,  granted in part, or denied. Judicial officials can appeal a redaction  decision; however, according to AOUSC officials, there were no appeals  from 2012 through 2016, the time period covered by our review.

The Judicial Conference Has Developed Procedures to Ensure Judicial Officials File Financial Disclosure Reports, and More Than 4,000 Reports Are Filed Annually

The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Financial Disclosure has  developed an electronic report filing system, written guidance, and a  compliance process to help ensure judicial officials file their financial  disclosure reports. Specifically, in 2011, AOUSC switched from having  judicial officials file financial disclosure reports in hard copy to electronic  filing through an online electronic depository, Financial Disclosure Online  Filing System (FiDO). AOUSC also uses a separate internal electronic  database (LEGO) to track compliance with financial disclosure report  filings. LEGO contains the entire database of judicial filers, including  what reports should be filed, the dates financial disclosure reports are  due, and which are in process. The Committee on Financial Disclosure  stated in September 2014 that FiDO had been upgraded, but committee  members continued to experience limitations with the system. For  example, according to AOUSC officials, FiDO does not keep track of  which reports are in process or when they are due. Accordingly, the  committee members authorized an assessment to look for an alternative  system that would meet their needs and, by 2016, had selected software  currently being used by the government to be customized for the  judiciary. According to AOUSC officials, the plan is for the Judiciary  Electronic Filing System (JEFS) to replace both FiDO and LEGO and be  used for filing financial disclosure reports and tracking compliance with  filing requirements beginning in 2019.

The Committee on Financial Disclosure also provides guidance to judicial  officials to ensure that financial disclosure reports are filed correctly. The  types of guidance provided include the Guide to Judiciary Policy, Filing  Instructions for Judicial Officers and Employees, and a Step by Step  Guide for the Preparation and Electronic Filing of Financial Disclosure  Reports. Additionally, members of the Committee on Financial Disclosure  are to review each filed financial disclosure report to confirm that required  items have been sufficiently reported and that the filer is in compliance  with applicable laws and regulations. In addition, for some sections,  members of the committee will compare information provided in a filed  report with what was reported in a prior year’s report to ensure the  information reported is accurate and consistent.

The Committee on Financial Disclosure also provides guidance on the  process to be followed if a judicial official fails to file a required financial  disclosure report. Specifically, the Guide to Judiciary Policy states that a  late filing fee of $200 will be assessed if a report is filed more than 30  days after the report is due. Further, the Chairman of the Committee on  Financial Disclosure is to write a letter to any noncompliant filer.

In addition to the guidance described above, in 2013, the Committee on  Financial Disclosure reported that it would establish specific procedures  for securing filer compliance with all reporting requirements and the late  filing assessments. In 2014, the Committee reported on the successful  implementation of these new policies. Part of this effort included  developing templates for three successive communications that are to be  provided to a noncompliant filer. The communications reflect a  progressively increasing level of urgency in language and content,  culminating in explicit warnings that if a noncompliant filer does not  comply, the matter can be referred to the Attorney General.

From calendar years 2012 through 2016, more than 4,000 financial  disclosure reports were required to be filed each year by judicial officials,  as shown in table 2. Most of the reports filed were annual reports.

According to AOUSC officials, as of March 2018, all annual financial  disclosure reports required to be filed from calendar years 2012 through  2016 were filed, except for one for calendar year 2015. Additionally, all  nominee and initial financial disclosure reports required to be filed during  this time period were filed, and all but one final financial disclosure report,  for calendar year 2016, were filed. The AOUSC officials stated that the  remaining final report is still pending and the compliance process is being  followed to ensure the report will be filed.

The Judiciary is Complying with Procedures for Responding to Requests for Financial Disclosure Reports and the Number of Reports Released Has Varied from 2012 through 2016

The judiciary is complying with the Judicial Conference’s Guide to  Judiciary Policy (Volume 2, Part D, Chapters 3-4), which sets forth the  process for releasing financial disclosure reports. First, members of the  public may request financial disclosure reports by submitting Form AO  10A (see appendix II for a blank copy of the Form AO 10A). The  Committee on Financial Disclosure notifies the judicial official that a Form  AO 10A has been received and provides the official with a copy. At that  time, the judicial official has up to 10 days to decide whether or not to  request that information from the financial disclosure report be redacted.  Once the members of the Subcommittee on Public Access and Security  have reviewed any redaction requests and any accompanying USMS  security consultation results, the members vote on whether or not to grant  redactions and then forward the results to AOUSC staff for final  processing. In March 2017, the Judicial Conference approved the release  of financial disclosure reports by electronic storage device free of charge  in order to expedite the release of requested reports. As a result, once  AOUSC staff receive the redaction decisions from the Subcommittee,  AOUSC staff are to ensure that approved redactions are made to the  financial disclosure reports, and then download the reports to electronic  storage devices to mail to the requesting parties.

The AOUSC received, on average, about 70 requests for copies of  judicial officials’ financial disclosure reports each year from calendar  years 2012 through 2016 using the AO 10A request form. The form can  include a request for the financial disclosure report of one judicial official,  or for multiple judicial officials. Additionally, the form could include a  request for multiple years of financial disclosure reports. Based on the AO  Form 10As received from calendar years 2012 through 2016, AOUSC  released approximately 16,000 financial disclosure reports. The number  of financial disclosure reports released each year varied during this time  period, as shown in table 3.

According to AOUSC officials, the number of financial disclosure reports  released each year varies based on the number of requests received and  the time of year the requests are submitted. For example, a requester  might submit a Form AO 10A late in the calendar year and the requested  reports could be released the following calendar year based on how long  it takes to process the request. AOUSC officials noted that there are two  organizations that have requested copies of the financial disclosure  reports for all federal judges every year. In 2016 AOUSC received the  requests late in the year and, therefore, were not able to release the  reports until 2017.

Few Judicial Officials Requested Redactions and They Pertained Mostly to the Unsecured Location of Family Members, but the Judiciary Has Not Reported Redaction Results to Congress in a Timely Manner

On Average, 3.2 Percent of Judicial Officials Requested Redactions from 2012 through 2016

The number of judicial officials who requested redactions represents a  small percentage of the total number of financial disclosure reports filed in  recent years. As shown in table 4, the number of redaction requests  ranged from a low of 112 in 2014 to a high of 162 in 2012 and 2015.

For calendar years 2012 through 2016, there were a total of 716 requests  for redaction of information from judicial officials’ financial disclosure  reports—711 from judges and 5 from judicial employees—with a yearly  average of about 143 redaction requests. In particular, for calendar years  2012 through 2016, judicial officials’ redaction requests accounted for, on  average, 3.2 percent of the total financial disclosure reports filed during  this time period, as shown in table 5. When we segregated the results by  judges and judicial employees, we found that, on average, 5.8 percent of  judges requested redactions compared to 0.1 percent of judicial  employees over the 5 year time period.

Of the 3.2 percent of financial disclosure reports that included redaction  requests made from 2012 through 2016, on average, about 85 percent  were granted, 3 percent were partially granted, and 12 percent were  denied, as seen in figure 2.

Most Redaction Requests Pertained to the Unsecured Location of a Judicial Official or Immediate Family Member

We analyzed AOUSC data on redaction requests made from calendar  years 2012 through 2016 by type of information requested to be redacted  and found that the majority (about 76 percent) of the requested redactions  pertained to information related to the unsecured location of a judicial  official or an immediate family member. The next biggest category of  information requested to be redacted was the “other” category, with 10.4  percent. Three categories—asset value, gifts, and reimbursement—each accounted for less than 1 percent of the redaction requests, as  shown in Figure 3.

AOUSC Has Not Submitted Required Annual Redaction Reports to Congress in a Timely Manner

We requested copies of the annual redaction reports submitted to  Congress for calendar years 2012 through 2016 and determined that  AOUSC had not submitted the annual redaction reports to congressional  committees of jurisdiction in a timely manner. Specifically, we found that  AOUSC submitted the annual report covering 2012 in May 2014 and  submitted four annual reports (for calendar years 2013 through 2016) in  February and August of 2017, as shown in table 6. For the 2013 and  2014 annual reports, AOUSC prepared and submitted them to the  congressional committees of jurisdiction after we asked for them.

AOUSC officials told us that they could not find evidence that they had  submitted the annual reports for calendar years 2013 and 2014 to the  committees of jurisdiction in a timely manner. However, AOUSC staff sent  a 5-year report to congressional committees of jurisdiction in March 2017  that included information on redaction requests and results for calendar  years 2012 through 2016. Thus, the congressional committees of  jurisdiction had received no reports from AOUSC on redaction requests  and results from May 2014 to February 2017. While the Ethics in  Government Act of 1978, as amended, does not set a specific submission  date, it requires that AOUSC submit an annual report (i.e., occurring once  every year) to congressional committees of jurisdiction on the operation of  the judiciary’s redaction authority. As shown in table 8 above, AOUSC did  not submit an annual report every year, and there was an interval of  almost three years (from May 2014 to February 2017) in which there is no  record of AOUSC providing any annual redaction reports to Congress.

AOUSC officials stated that although there are no reporting time frames  specified in legislation for preparing and submitting the reports to the  congressional committees of jurisdiction (other than annual submission),  beginning in 2016, AOUSC staff began to work on preparing the redaction  report for the previous year by February of the following year. The  AOUSC officials acknowledged, though, that they have not implemented  a formal process, with designated steps and time frames, to ensure they  consistently produce the annual redaction reports in a timely manner. The  AOUSC officials also stated that since 2013, the Financial Disclosure  Office—the office responsible for preparing the reports—had experienced  a series of changes in management, as well as staff turnover in key  positions, which contributed to the inconsistent process for developing  and completing the annual redaction reports in a timely manner. Given  that AOUSC experienced staff turnover in the past, and could experience  it in the future, it is important that AOUSC has the necessary controls in  place to overcome staffing issues and ensure that it consistently prepares  and submits the annual redaction reports to the committees in a timely  manner.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  management should implement control activities by documenting  responsibilities through policies for each unit. With guidance from  management, each unit determines the policies necessary to achieve the  desired objectives. Management should also define objectives in specific  terms so they are understood at all levels. This involves clearly defining  what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and  the time frames for achievement. AOUSC officials stated that the annual  reports cannot be compiled until after the close of the previous calendar  year and after all data have been reviewed. While this is true, without a  formal process for ensuring that staff complete the reports in a timely  manner, there are no assurances that the process will consistently occur  on a regular schedule, or at all. Implementing a more formal process, with  specified steps and time frames, would ensure staff are fully informed of  their responsibilities and allow AOUSC to be better positioned to provide  the congressional committees of jurisdiction with timely redaction reports  that can be used to conduct oversight of the federal judiciary’s use of its  redaction authority.

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, serves the public  interest by providing access to selected information from financial  disclosure reports filed by judicial officials that could represent conflicts of  interest for these officials. At the same time, the law accounts for the  security threats faced by judicial officials and grants the judiciary authority  to redact personal and sensitive information from their financial disclosure  reports if a finding is made that the release of the information could  endanger these officials or members of their families. Thus, the Judicial  Conference has a responsibility to balance the goals of safeguarding  judicial officials’ information and providing timely public access. The  Judicial Conference developed a compliance process to ensure judicial  officials were filing financial disclosure reports that adhere to applicable  laws and regulations, and also had procedures in place to ensure the  public had access to copies of judicial officials’ financial disclosure reports  when requested. While the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as  amended, provides the Judicial Conference with authority to redact  information that could pose a security threat to judicial officials, this  authority has been used sparingly. From 2012 through 2016, about 3.2  percent of financial disclosure reports included a redaction request and  about 85 percent of those were approved. Nevertheless, the law requires  AOUSC to submit an annual report to congressional committees of  jurisdiction on the operation of the judiciary’s redaction authority, including  information on the total number of reports with redactions and the types of  information redacted. Our review of available guidance and  documentation shows that AOUSC has not implemented a formal process  for producing annual redaction reports and has not submitted these  reports to Congress in a timely manner. Implementing a more formal  process, with specified steps and timeframes, would allow AOUSC to be  better positioned to provide congressional committees of jurisdiction with  the required annual redaction reports that can be used to conduct  oversight of the federal judiciary’s use of its redaction authority. This is  particularly important given that Congress recently passed an extension  to the judiciary’s redaction authority through the end of 2027.

The Director of AOUSC should develop and implement a formal process,  with specified steps and associated time frames, to better ensure that  required annual redaction reports are completed and submitted to  Congress within the following year.

In April 2018, we requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ,  USMS, and AOUSC. Neither DOJ nor USMS had any comments.   AOUSC provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report, as appropriate. In particular, based on AOUSC comments, we  amended the report title to provide greater clarity into the subject matter  of the report and added additional text to the conclusions section to better  address all aspects of the report’s findings. In addition to its technical  comments, AOUSC provided an official letter for inclusion in the report,  which can be seen in appendix III. In its letter, AOUSC stated it concurred  with the recommendation and will determine how best to implement a  more formalized process to better ensure it can submit annual redaction  reports to Congress in a timely manner.

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrative Office of the  U.S. Courts, the Attorney General, the United States Marshals Service,  selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. In  addition, this report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. Key contributions to this reported are listed  in appendix III.

Appendix I: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Form AO 10: Blank Financial Disclosure Report for Calendar Year 2016

Appendix II: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Form AO 10A Used for Requesting Copies of Judicial Officials’ Financial

Appendix III: Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant  Director) and Valerie Kasindi (Analyst-in-Charge) managed this  assignment. Kristiana Moore, Dominick Dale, Melissa Hargy, Eric  Hauswirth, Amanda Miller, Jerry Sandau, and Janet Temko-Blinder made  key contributions to this report.