Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Close Stations Identified as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative

The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with preventing loss of life, injury, and property damage in the maritime environment through its SAR mission. It maintains over 200 stations with various assets, such as boats and helicopters (depending on the station), along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out this mission, as well as its other missions such as maritime security. Resource limitations and changes to operations require the Coast Guard to periodically reexamine the need for these stations. GAO was asked to review these efforts.

This report addresses, among other objectives, the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) a sound process for analyzing the need for its boat stations and (2) taken actions to implement its boat station process results. GAO reviewed Coast Guard laws, standards, and guidance; analyzed Coast Guard data on station locations and SAR coverage; and analyzed the process and criteria used to evaluate its station needs and compared it with established evaluation design practices and internal control standards. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials.

GAO found that the U.S. Coast Guard has a sound process for analyzing its boat stations that includes clear and specific steps for analyzing the need for stations using terms that can be readily defined and measured. In 2013, following this process, the Coast Guard and its contractor identified 18 unnecessarily duplicative boat stations with overlapping coverage that could be permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 2-hour search and rescue (SAR) response standard and other mission requirements. The process was designed to ensure the Coast Guard met or exceeded requirements to maintain SAR coverage and to account for such factors as boat downtime and surge capacity to respond to certain incidents. Further, the boat station analysis did not consider potential SAR responses by the Coast Guard's air stations and facilities, which can provide additional overlapping coverage. Coast Guard officials said that the closures would, among other things, help improve operations by consolidating boat station caseloads to help ensure personnel were active enough to maintain training requirements.

In 2017, the Coast Guard affirmed that its leadership believes the 2013 study remains valid, but so far the agency has not taken actions to implement the closures identified by its sound process. Instead, the Coast Guard is recommending conversion of some year-round stations to seasonal stations that would operate during the summer. Coast Guard officials stated that seasonal closures are preferable to no action, given its limited resources, the significant overlapping SAR coverage, and potential to improve operations. However, permanently closing unnecessarily duplicative stations may better position the Coast Guard to improve its operations. It could also achieve up to $290 million in cost savings over 20 years, if stations were permanently closed.

GAO is making three recommendations, including one recommendation that the Coast Guard close unnecessarily duplicative stations that its analysis identified. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated it plans to act to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), within the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with  preventing loss of life, injury, and property damage in the maritime  environment through its search and rescue (SAR) mission, which it  conducts along with 10 other missions including marine environmental  protection and drug interdiction. To fulfill its SAR responsibilities, along  with its other missions, the Coast Guard maintains multimission boat  stations, air stations, and air facilities, with associated assets such as  boats, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft, along our coasts and inland  waterways. While some missions conducted out of these stations, such  as ports, waterways, and coastal security, have increased in recent years,  annual Coast Guard search and rescue caseloads have decreased from  about 32,000 cases per year in 2004 to about 17,000 in 2016, a reduction  of 47 percent. The need to balance a broad array of missions, while  operating under constrained budgets in recent years, underscores the  importance for the Coast Guard to ensure its stations are needed and  optimally located.

Many factors help determine the placement of stations and the allocation  of Coast Guard resources for their operations. These include population,  historical factors, environmental conditions such as water temperature,  and the availability of other rescue resources and partners. For example,  some geographic regions have boat stations in closer proximity because  when many of them were established, the crews used rowboats (which  moved at slow speeds for shorter distances) to conduct search and  rescue cases. In 1990, we reported that the Coast Guard and its  predecessor agencies had established over 400 stations since 1844, and  that about 200 of these stations had since been closed, destroyed by  storms, or transferred to other government entities. Since that 1990  report, the Coast Guard has attempted to close additional stations it  considered unnecessary, but met resistance from impacted communities  and others. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the  Coast Guard was tasked with expanded security-related mission  responsibilities and subsequently established eight additional stations.  However, the need for stations at particular locations has generally  decreased with changes in boating activity, boating equipment, and the  capabilities of other search and rescue providers such as local police and  fire departments.

Changes to Coast Guard operations, such as additional mission  requirements to address emerging security issues, and resource  limitations, require the Coast Guard to periodically review the allocation of  these resources, including those directed toward stations to ensure they  are positioned to meet the Coast Guard’s missions while not  unnecessarily duplicating efforts. Given the importance of the Coast  Guard’s SAR and other missions, you asked us to review whether its  efforts to optimize station locations and allocate resources were sound  (i.e., defendable). This report addresses the extent to which the Coast  Guard (1) has a sound process for analyzing the need for its boat  stations, and the outcomes of the process; (2) has a sound process for  analyzing the need for its air stations and air facilities, and the outcomes  of the process; and (3) has taken actions to implement the results of its  process for analyzing the need for stations.

To identify the extent to which the Coast Guard has a sound process for  analyzing the need for its boat stations, we reviewed laws, policies, and  procedures related to its SAR mission. We reviewed Coast Guard  documentation of processes it used to analyze the need for boat stations,  including a 2013 study documenting a contractor analysis that followed  the Coast Guard process, reviewed resource and budget factors, and  analyzed station activity levels. We also reviewed prior GAO reports on  the Coast Guard’s previous attempts to close stations. To verify and  validate the Coast Guard’s specific analytical process used to determine  overlapping SAR coverage among these stations, we obtained and  analyzed the Coast Guard’s analytical assumptions, the operational  parameters of the assets assigned to the stations (e.g., boat speeds), and  station locations. This analysis also allowed us to verify the soundness of  the Coast Guard’s model used to identify overlap. We then independently  recreated and visually depicted overlapping SAR coverage provided by  the boat stations, based on Coast Guard data, assumptions, and  documentation, and compared it with SAR case data by geographic area.  We then analyzed Coast Guard data on single-boat SAR responses  (sorties) by station for fiscal years 2010 through 2016, the most recent  data available at the time of our review. We visited a nongeneralizable  sample of 12 boat stations we selected from within Coast Guard districts  where the Coast Guard had identified overlap, and interviewed Coast  Guard officials to identify local policies, station characteristics, local  coordination with emergency responders and federal agencies, and local  input to the Coast Guard’s process for assessing station needs and  implementing changes to the locations of boat stations, if any. We  compared Coast Guard actions to evaluate boat stations against criteria  for sound evaluation design practices established in GAO’s Designing  Evaluations guidance, the Coast Guard’s SAR response standard, and  statutory requirements to conduct public outreach.

To assess the reliability of Coast Guard SAR data, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials, reviewed documentation, and electronically  tested the data for obvious errors and anomalies. We interviewed Coast  Guard officials to discuss the reliability issues we identified, and officials  informed us of ongoing actions to resolve the issues. We determined that  the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report to  demonstrate selected station caseloads. Details of our scope and  methodology are described in appendix I.

To identify the extent to which the Coast Guard has a sound process to  analyze the need for its air stations and air facilities, we reviewed laws,  policies, and procedures related to its SAR mission. We reviewed Coast  Guard documentation of processes it used to analyze the need for  selected air facilities in 2014. We obtained and analyzed Coast Guard air  station and air facility locations and assumptions made for determining  overlapping SAR coverage in 2014 and used a mapping program to  visually depict overlapping coverage provided by aviation assets, based  on Coast Guard data, assumptions, and documentation. Additionally, we  interviewed Coast Guard officials to obtain information on the extent to  which the Coast Guard used findings and recommendations from  selected studies, strategies, and plans in its analyses of the need for and  locations of its air stations and air facilities. We also compared Coast  Guard actions to evaluate air stations and air facilities against criteria  established in GAO’s Designing Evaluations guidance.

To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to  implement the results of its analyses of its need for stations, we analyzed  Coast Guard documents and reports to identify proposals put forth by the  Coast Guard for permanently or seasonally closing stations it has  identified as overlapping and unnecessary. We analyzed these proposed  actions to determine whether proposed plans or decisions regarding  permanent and seasonal station closures aligned with the results of the  Coast Guard analyses. Specifically, we reviewed the 2013 contractor  study, memoranda detailing field input on the results of the study and  their verification of the stations the study identified as unnecessarily  duplicative, and compared the recommended closures from the various  analyses to determine if the outcomes were consistent. We also  compared Coast Guard actions against its response standard and  statutory requirements for conducting public outreach. Finally, we  reviewed documents and information on these proposals and compared  them against criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and leading practices identified in the Project Management  Institute’s Standard for Program Management.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 through October  2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Coast Guard is required to develop, establish, maintain, and operate  rescue facilities for the promotion of safety and may aid distressed  persons, and protect and save property in waters subject to the  jurisdiction of the United States. To carry out its responsibilities, the  Coast Guard maintains a search and rescue system on the Atlantic,  Pacific, and Gulf coasts; the Great Lakes; and other inland lakes and  waterways. This system consists of about 190 boat stations, 183 of which  are located in the contiguous United States. The Coast Guard also  operates aircraft from 24 air stations and four air facilities. As of August  2017, these stations and facilities operated about 700 boats and about  200 aircraft. In fiscal year 2016, the Coast Guard reported that its SAR  operations saved 5,174 lives and protected more than $63 million in  property from loss.

Laws Governing the Optimization of the Coast Guard’s Boat Station, Air Station, and Air Facility Locations

The Coast Guard’s boat stations, air stations, and air facilities are subject  to laws which require the Coast Guard to maintain specific minimum  capabilities—such as a requirement to maintain at least one vessel at  each station that is fully capable of operating within the prevailing weather  and marine conditions in that station’s area of responsibility. In addition  to maintaining capabilities requirements, if the Coast Guard reevaluates  its station location needs and intends to close a boat station, air station,  or air facility, it also must follow a statutorily defined process, which  includes making a determination that adequate SAR coverage will remain  in place. To close an air facility, the Coast Guard must also submit a  proposal to close the facility to Congress in the President’s annual budget  and notify members of Congress who represent the impacted  communities, as well as certain committees.

The Coast Guard’s Structure and Stations That Conduct Search and Rescue

The Coast Guard’s field structure is divided into two Area Commands,  Atlantic and Pacific, within which are nine Districts consisting of 37  Sectors and the stations within them (see figure 1).

Stations are traditionally associated with search and rescue but they may  perform the full range of Coast Guard missions. Coast Guard personnel  live and work at or near their stations so they can rapidly respond to  emergencies as they arise. This model facilitates the Coast Guard’s  search and rescue response resource planning standard. Under this SAR  standard, Coast Guard plans for its units with SAR responsibilities to  arrive on the scene of a case within 2 hours of receiving a distress call.  Stations vary in their mission mix and pace of operations (i.e., operational  tempo) by geographic region or District, and by season. For example,  Coast Guard boat stations in D7 (Florida, Puerto Rico, South Carolina,  and the Caribbean) commonly conduct migrant interdiction operations,  whereas boat stations located along the Great Lakes (D9) rarely conduct  this mission. In some locations, SAR cases may be more common during  the summer boating season than in the winter. Stations in D9 have a  shorter boating season than stations in D7. According to Coast Guard  officials, while D7 has more total SAR cases than D9, cases in D9 are  concentrated in a shorter time period than in D7 (i.e., shorter boating  season). Boat stations also vary widely in size and function. For example,  Station New York in New York City has an authorized strength of 88  personnel, whereas Station Frankfort in Frankfort, Michigan, has an  authorized strength of 15 personnel. Both stations perform SAR and  other missions, but Station New York also conducts a high level of  homeland security missions, while Station Frankfort provides ice rescue  capability during the winter. Additionally, the Coast Guard operates 18  seasonal boat stations called “Stations (Small),” which are detached  subunits of larger parent stations; the Coast Guard generally operates  these during the summer boating season.

How the Coast Guard Conducts a Search and Rescue Mission

When the Coast Guard receives notification of a distressed mariner, a  search and rescue mission coordinator evaluates the case and assigns  assets, such as boats or aircraft, to respond. Cases may involve  multiple assets depending on the complexity of the case, such as the  need to locate a mariner whose position is only generally known or to  operate in severe weather conditions. Figure 2 depicts the general steps  for conducting a SAR case.

The Coast Guard uses several different types of assets to carry out its  search and rescue and other missions. These assets include boats, rotary  wing aircraft (helicopters), fixed wing aircraft (planes), and cutters  (including patrol boats and ships). Additional details regarding some of  these assets, including boat speeds, are described in appendix II.

Over time, the need for Coast Guard stations at particular locations has  changed due to changes in Coast Guard asset capabilities, boating  activity, boating equipment, safety technology, and the capabilities of  other search and rescue service providers, such as private towing firms.  However, the Coast Guard’s decisions to close or reduce operations at  boat stations based on changing conditions or budget reductions have  been sensitive. We previously reported that these sensitivities were  based on the perception that reducing operations or closing stations  would reduce the agency’s ability to save lives and property. In 1990, we  reported that the Coast Guard’s attempts to close stations in 1988 were  not successful because the Coast Guard did not have policies or  procedures for what criteria should be used or how the criteria should be  applied, and because the Coast Guard applied its evaluation criteria to a  limited universe—only 34 stations instead of all stations. We also found  that the Coast Guard did not adequately address how closing stations  would impact the Coast Guard’s effectiveness in saving lives or  performing other missions.

In 1994, we reported that the Coast Guard had created a new process for  determining the need for boat station changes. We also found that the  new process included detailed criteria to evaluate the appropriate need  for stations, such as boating and economic trends and the availability of  alternative SAR resources. The Coast Guard then unsuccessfully  attempted to close stations in 1995 using this process, and again in 2008,  efforts which we describe later in this report.

Prior Work on Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication

In 2010, federal law required that we identify programs, agencies, offices,  and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and  government-wide, and report annually. The annual reports describe  areas in which we have found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or  duplication among federal programs and have resulted in $136 billion in  financial benefits for the federal government. Figure 3 outlines the  definitions we have used since 2011 in our work to address  fragmentation, overlap and duplication.

Coast Guard Has a Sound Process for Analyzing the Need for Boat Stations and the Results Identified Overlap and Unnecessary Duplication

The Coast Guard has a sound process for analyzing the need for boat  stations that is consistent with GAO’s Program Evaluation guidance,  which calls for choosing well-regarded criteria against which to make  comparisons in order to achieve strong, defensible conclusions. The  primary criteria Coast Guard subject matter experts established,  consistent with statutory requirements that the Coast Guard make a  determination that adequate SAR coverage would remain in place, were  (1) a minimum threshold of overlapping SAR coverage had to be  maintained and (2) the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its nationwide 2-hour  SAR response standard had to be maintained. By applying these  criteria, the Coast Guard’s process identified overlapping search and  rescue coverage where three or more stations can respond to a single  SAR case within 2 hours, and unnecessary duplication where stations  could be closed without negatively impacting the Coast Guard’s ability to  meet mission requirements, such as its 2-hour SAR response standard.

In June 2012, the Coast Guard established a Station Optimization  Process Charter that called for the Coast Guard to develop a defendable  process with criteria for analyzing stations for potential closure. The  charter stated and Coast Guard officials confirmed that the process was  developed to ensure that closure recommendations would be based on  solid justifications for stations selected, and would stand up to rigorous  scrutiny. The charter called for (1) the process to be data driven; (2)  criteria to be applied consistently; (3) consideration of previous GAO  recommendations on assessing stations for closure; and (4) adherence to  statutory requirements to conduct outreach to affected communities.

The Coast Guard then established a working group of subject matter  experts who developed a Station Optimization Process with nine  analytical steps. The Station Optimization Process included criteria for  analyzing the need for boat stations based on data analysis, consistent  application of criteria, and legal requirements. Figure 4 shows the Station  Optimization Process and its nine steps.

Coast Guard Used Its Station Optimization Process to Analyze Boat Stations and Identified Overlap and Unnecessary Duplication

In April 2013, the Coast Guard initiated its 9-step Station Optimization  Process to analyze its boat stations, and the results identified 18 stations  that could be closed because they provide overlapping and unnecessarily  duplicative SAR coverage. The Coast Guard hired a contractor to carry  out the analysis and identify potential cost savings from permanent  closures of such stations. Although focused on SAR coverage, the  process also included consideration of all Coast Guard missions carried  out at these stations. The contractor followed the 9-step process, with  certain steps conducted by the Coast Guard––such as step 1, which  analyzed the system and identified overlapping SAR coverage––and  developed and ranked different closure options to maximize cost savings.  Coast Guard officials provided additional district input on unique  characteristics of certain stations to further refine the closure options. The  final study identified 18 stations for closure that it estimated would  achieve cost savings without impeding the Coast Guard’s ability to meet  its SAR response standard and carry out its other missions. We discuss  this further later in this report.

The Coast Guard considers some overlap or redundancy to be  necessary, to account for such things as operational challenges, boat  maintenance downtime, personnel training requirements, and the need  for surge capacity to respond to certain incidents. Therefore, the Coast  Guard directed the contractor to analyze areas with triple or greater  station coverage as its baseline for analyzing whether stations were  unnecessarily duplicative. Based on the Coast Guard’s review of this  coverage, it determined that the greatest extent of overlapping coverage  existed in Districts 1, 5, and 9, and directed the contractor to focus on  stations in those areas. Figure 5 shows the extent of overlapping Coast  Guard boat station SAR coverage as of September 2013 that was used  for the contractor study and is still accurate as of May 2017. It shows for  Districts 1, 5, and 9, up to quadruple or greater SAR coverage provided  by boat stations with overlapping response capabilities. According to the Coast Guard, in an attempt to be conservative in maintaining SAR  coverage, the optimization process did not consider the use of Coast  Guard air assets such as helicopters—an additional layer of coverage— nor did it consider the availability of some local agencies that respond to  SAR cases, such as police departments and emergency responders.  Therefore, overlapping coverage depicted in figure 5 excludes air asset  responses and any responses or assistance provided by state and local  agencies. The extent of coverage in 2017 was the same as the Coast  Guard’s 2013 contractor study reported.

We determined that the actions taken to complete the station optimization  process are sound, consistent with our Program Evaluation guidance  which calls for, among other things, evaluating programs based on well- regarded criteria to achieve strong, defensible conclusions. In addition to  using the 2-hour response standard as a criterion, the optimization steps  identified actions to systematically analyze quantitative measures using a  documented ranking system to remove critical stations from consideration  for closure. For example, step 4 of the process evaluated the number of  security boardings conducted by selected stations, among other metrics,  and removed certain stations for consideration from closure based on a  systematic application of criteria related to other mission responsibilities.  Further, as described in table 1, the process began with consideration of  all boat stations in the contiguous United States, included steps to ensure  that data were reliable and appropriate, clearly identified limitations of the  analysis, and conducted simulations to assess how well the Coast Guard  would be prepared to carry out its responsibilities under different closure  alternatives, such as whether a station closure reduces or changes the  Coast Guard’s ability to meet its response standard—all actions included  in our Program Evaluation guidance. Table 1 provides details of actions  taken by the contractor and the Coast Guard to complete the 9-step  station optimization process.

Additional District Input Helped Refine List of Closure Recommendations

Consistent with the 9-step optimization process and to validate the  closure scenario results, the contractor and Coast Guard Headquarters  obtained regional input from district officials to gain context about the  stations under consideration for closure such as unique rescue  characteristics that were not quantifiable. Coast Guard officials within  Districts 1, 5, and 9 generally supported the contractor recommendations  to close some stations, with a few exceptions. For example, District 1’s  input stated that one station recommended for closure by the contractor  analysis had a unique surf rescue capability that was not available at  adjacent or other nearby stations and thus this station did not provide  unnecessarily duplicative SAR coverage since no nearby station could  provide this capability. Thus, District 1 recommended that the station remain open. Given this input, the contractor removed this station from  consideration for closure. In another example, District 5 officials reported  that closure of one of its stations would increase response times from  adjacent stations due to the presence of shoaling and barrier island  conditions that could not be accounted for in the quantitative modeling.  Therefore, the contractor eliminated that station from consideration for  closure and recommended an alternative station for closure. This process  of obtaining regional input and validation from district officials was carried  out such that if a station identified for closure would negatively impact  critical missions, it was removed from closure consideration. This  additional district input resulted in a final contractor study that  recommended station closures that would achieve the greatest cost  saving without negatively impacting the Coast Guard’s ability to meet  mission requirements.

In addition to identifying stations with unique characteristics that  warranted keeping them open, additional district input also confirmed  contractor recommendations that some stations should be permanently  closed. For example, District 5’s input concurred with the closure of six  stations, including one where officials we interviewed on site confirmed its  steadily diminishing SAR caseload. Our analysis of Coast Guard data  validated this station’s low workload showing an average of seven single- boat response SAR cases annually from fiscal years 2010 through  2016. We also found that this station had been recommended for  closure in the past. In another example, District 9 input sought an  additional, seasonal closure of one station that the contractor analysis did  not evaluate for permanent closure due to one criterion applied by the  process. District 9’s input provided additional context for this station,  saying that seasonal closure was preferable to taking no action because  there was significant response redundancy in this region. Moreover, the  district input noted that the acquisition of modern boats has increased the  range and reduced the response time of many stations. District input also  noted that improvements in public education and awareness of safe  boating practices, technology and availability of communications  equipment, and the increase in non-Coast Guard response resources has  resulted in a steady and dramatic decline in the stations’ SAR workloads.  Our analysis of all Coast Guard single-boat response data for cases  within the contiguous United States for fiscal years 2010 through 2016  confirmed this decline, showing an annual average of 46 cases per  station in 2010 to an annual average of 39 cases per station in 2016, a  decline of about 15 percent. Appendix IV provides details from our  analysis of the number of single-boat response SAR cases conducted by  selected stations.

A 2014 Analysis of Selected Coast Guard Air Stations and Air Facilities Identified Unnecessary Duplication but Coast Guard Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Process

In 2014, the Coast Guard contracted for an analysis of selected air  stations and air facilities that identified overlap and unnecessary  duplication but it did not comprehensively review all air stations and air  facilities. Specifically, the criteria-based analysis reviewed search and  rescue capabilities, operational case data, and other mission  requirements, and determined that certain air facilities provided  overlapping search and rescue coverage, some of which was  unnecessarily duplicative. Coast Guard officials said they used the results  of this analysis to support proposed closures of air facilities in Newport,  Oregon, and Charleston, South Carolina, in the President’s Fiscal Year  2014 Budget. Subsequent appropriations for fiscal year 2014 also did  not include funding for the operation of the two air facilities. However,  shortly before their planned closure date, the Coast Guard encountered  strong opposition to the closures at the local, state, and Congressional  levels, and did not close them.

As with boat stations, the Coast Guard considers some overlapping  coverage among air stations and air facilities desirable to mitigate  potential risks such as those posed by asset maintenance downtime,  limitations in the number of qualified personnel, restrictive weather  conditions, or case complexity. Coast Guard officials stated that the 2014  analysis considered many factors to address potential impacts of the  closure of the Newport and Charleston air facilities. For example, the  Coast Guard used modeling tools to determine the operational impact of  altering facility locations and the availability of aviation assets. Coast  Guard officials told us they also conducted outreach to the affected  communities and their political representatives in advance of the  proposed closure date, as required by law.

Further, Coast Guard officials explained that the fiscal outlook at the time  (e.g., sequestration) required changes to optimize assets, and their  proposal accomplished this without sacrificing operational capability  because the response time of neighboring SAR units would remain within  the Coast Guard’s SAR standards. The 2014 analysis also determined  that the majority of SAR cases involving these two facilities occurred  close to shore, with boat responses generally arriving on scene and  conducting the search and rescue instead of air assets. Circles in figure  6 represent air asset response capabilities nationwide, as of August 2017,  with darker shades reflecting greater overlapping coverage.

In 2014 and 2016, two laws were enacted that required the Coast Guard  to keep the air facilities open for a specific period of time, and  established a number of requirements the Coast Guard is required to  follow if it proposes closing or terminating operations at its air facilities.  Thus, the two air facilities remained open. As of May 2017, Coast Guard  officials told us they have no plan to close air facilities or air stations, nor  do they plan to develop a process to comprehensively review air stations  or facilities to optimize their locations because previous attempts to close  stations or facilities have been prohibited by law or subject to certain  requirements. However, the Coast Guard has responsibility for evaluating  the need for its air stations and air facilities to ensure that it is using  resources as effectively and efficiently as possible. The Coast Guard’s  station optimization charter calls for a defendable (i.e., sound) and data- driven analysis of boat stations that meets statutory requirements. This  charter could be a template for establishing a parallel process for  comprehensively analyzing the need for its air stations and air facilities.

GAO’s Program Evaluation guidance calls for evaluating programs based  on well-regarded criteria to achieve strong, defensible conclusions.  Program evaluations can also provide accountability for the use of public  resources (e.g., to determine the “value added” by the expenditure of  those resources), such as whether scarce resources are being spent on  unnecessarily duplicative air facilities. Having a sound and reproducible  process for comprehensively analyzing the need for air stations and air  facilities will better position the Coast Guard to make decisions to  enhance the efficiency of its operations and more effectively allocate its  resources. These actions will also better inform Congress as to the status  of the Coast Guard’s resource needs and the efficiency of its operations.

Coast Guard Has Not Taken Actions nor Developed a Plan to Close Unnecessarily Duplicative Stations Its Analyses Identified

The 2013 analysis of Coast Guard stations identified unnecessary  duplication and recommended certain stations for potential closure;  however, as of August 2017 the Coast Guard had not closed any stations,  nor developed a plan with time frames for closing stations. In their input to  the station optimization process, Coast Guard officials in affected districts  supported recommended station closures to achieve operational  improvements, and Coast Guard leadership continues to believe the  study results are valid. Implementing station closures could also result in  costs savings.

Coast Guard Has Attempted to Close Stations At Least Eight Times since 1973

The need to close some Coast Guard stations that provide unnecessarily  duplicative SAR coverage to efficiently respond to changed  circumstances such as improved technology is not a new issue. Coast  Guard officials reported, and our prior work has shown, that the Coast  Guard has attempted to permanently or seasonally close stations at least  eight times since 1973. However, closing unneeded stations has  historically been difficult due to public concern about the effect of closures  on local communities and other factors. In some cases over the years,  Congress has intervened and enacted federal laws that have affected  Coast Guard’s proposed closures. For example, in 1988 the Department  of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989,  required the Coast Guard to reopen boat stations 1 year after they had  been closed, and at the same time provided that GAO was to evaluate  the methods behind the Coast Guard decision. Responding to this  provision in 1990, we reported that the Coast Guard’s 1988 closure  decisions were based on flawed methods, incomplete analysis, and  incomplete data. The Coast Guard subsequently updated its process and  by 1994 we reported that that it was using a reasonable approach to  recommend stations for closure.

Despite the improved Coast Guard process, no stations have been closed  since 1988. Coast Guard officials reported that Congress continues to  oversee and manage the closure of stations, such as by establishing new  requirements in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, which must  be met to change any boat stations, after the Coast Guard attempted to  close 23 stations in 1995. Similarly, after the Coast Guard attempted to  close two air facilities in 2014, legislation was passed in 2014 and 2016  that prohibited Coast Guard air facility closures until January 2016 and  2018, respectively.

Figure 7 provides a timeline of Coast Guard station change proposals or  actions, including at least eight Coast Guard attempts to close stations  between 1973 and 2014. The figure also includes statutory requirements  established in 1989, 1996, 2014, and 2016, and two data-driven analyses  and studies with recommendations to address unnecessary duplication,  among other information.

Past Coast Guard efforts to analyze and close stations have frequently  identified the same stations as candidates for closure. For example, prior  to the 2013 contractor study, at least two Coast Guard districts conducted  their own station analyses to identify opportunities to improve their  stations’ operations. These analyses also recommended permanent and  seasonal closures of some stations. Specifically, in 2010, Coast Guard  District 9 began conducting a data-driven analysis of its stations to  optimize its boat forces. District 9 officials told us they initiated the  analysis due to budget constraints, the challenges they had in fully  staffing their stations, and their awareness of overlapping SAR coverage  within the district. District 9’s analysis reviewed more than 16,000 SAR  cases over a 5-year period (2008–2012) to understand and quantify  potential response inefficiencies. According to Coast Guard officials, their  analysis determined that overall SAR caseload in District 9 was extremely  high in the summer months, but there was little or no SAR caseload for  some stations during the winter, a factor which also affected training  proficiency as personnel were not able to respond to enough cases to  maintain required qualifications. Based on the results of this analysis, in  December 2012, District 9 requested approval to permanently close five  stations and seasonally close three stations to achieve more effective  operations and improve maritime safety in the Great Lakes region.

According to Coast Guard district officials, these recommended closures  provided no calculated savings to taxpayers because they involved  movement of personnel positions and assets to other stations, not their  elimination. Instead, the recommendations showed an effort to improve  operational efficiency and conserve Coast Guard resources. Furthermore,  among those stations in Districts 1, 5, and 9 recommended for permanent  closure in 2013, at least five—Ashtabula, Ohio; Frankfort, Michigan;  Harbor Beach, Michigan; Shark River, New Jersey; and Block Island,  Rhode Island—were also recommended for closure between 1985 and  1988.

When we compared the 2012 recommendations from the District 9  analysis, the 2013 contractor analysis recommendations that used the 9- step Station Optimization Process, and additional 2013 district input, we  found similar results among the various analyses with respect to which  stations should be permanently or seasonally closed. Based on our  review of documentation and interviews with District 9 officials, as well as  our comparison of the results of the District 9 analysis with the results of  the contractor analysis, the 2013 recommendations are affirmed by the  District 9 analysis. We provide a comparison of selected  recommendations and Coast Guard Headquarters’ tentatively planned  actions in table 2.

District 9 and Station Input Supported Recommended Permanent and Seasonal Station Closures

Input from District 9, which had the greatest number of affected stations in  the 2013 analysis, supported recommended changes and stated that “the  existing unnecessary redundancies, unsustainable complexities, and  unacceptable resource gaps negatively affected mission execution in the  Great Lakes, where staffing shortfalls exist.” District 9’s input further  stated that in some regions, four stations could respond to SAR cases  within the Coast Guard’s SAR standard, and that while some redundancy  is merited, these areas demonstrate redundancy that is operationally  unnecessary, inefficient, and detrimental to the training needs of station  personnel.

Our interview with officials at one affected station confirmed some of the  complexities facing the region. For example, officials told us that because  one station recommended for seasonal closure does not operate a boat  capable of offshore SAR responses, adjacent stations are already  directed to respond to certain offshore SAR cases in that station’s area of  responsibility to meet the Coast Guard’s 2-hour SAR standard. Officials  we interviewed from each of the seven stations we visited in District 9  noted their station’s high SAR caseload concentration during the summer  months and the low or nonexistent SAR caseload during the winter. For  example, officials from two stations that the Coast Guard would like to  seasonally close during the winter told us that their stations had not  responded to an ice rescue in more than 7 years. Officials we interviewed  at one station recommended for permanent closure noted that  commercial boating traffic and the local population have been declining  for many years, that the station was not busy during the winter season,  and that the station had not conducted an ice rescue since 2002.

In 2017, the Coast Guard affirmed that its leadership believed that the  results of the 2013 study remained valid as station workloads have  remained relatively consistent. Headquarters officials also told us that the  2013 study criteria and subsequent recommendations for permanent  closures were conservative because of previous unsuccessful attempts to  close stations, and to meet statutory requirements to maintain a certain  level of SAR coverage. They also told us that the analysis did not  consider additional layers of response even though these layers could  provide some additional SAR response backup for Coast Guard stations.  For example, the contractor’s analyses of boat stations did not consider  SAR support provided by Coast Guard aviation assets, which generally  provide an additional layer of SAR coverage for boat stations. Moreover,  district officials told us that aviation assets in District 9 were recently  realigned to provide even greater response capability, including longer  range helicopters with de-icing capability to improve winter response  capability.

The contractor analysis also did not take into account the potential SAR  capabilities of commercial towing operators and local first responders  which can also provide another layer of coverage to assist Coast Guard  stations with SAR coverage. For example, officials from each of the seven  stations we visited in District 9 told us that they coordinate with other  entities, such as commercial towing operators, who can conduct  responses for non-life-threatening incidents, such as providing fuel to or  towing disabled boats in their station’s area of responsibility. Officials from  one station also told us that the local fire department has performed ice  rescues in the past, because people who require ice rescues tend to dial  911 first rather than call the Coast Guard, and thus local emergency  responders are able to respond faster than the Coast Guard. Officials  from another station told us that the local sheriff has two response boats,  and that the Coast Guard coordinates with local government and  responders.

Station Closures Could Achieve Cost Savings

Station closures could also achieve cost savings in addition to the  aforementioned efficiency improvements. For example, based on our  analysis of the contractor study, if its recommendations to permanently  close the 18 stations from D1, D5, and D9 were implemented, and  personnel and boat assets were moved or reduced in accordance with  the study recommendations, the study reported that these closures could  achieve potential cost savings of about $290 million over 20 years. In  addition, land disposition estimates were excluded from the study, which  could result in one-time proceeds from the sale of the land on which the  stations are sited, if the land value exceeded remediation costs.

In addition to lost opportunities to improve operational efficiency and  effectiveness because stations were not closed previously, some of these  stations have also fallen into physical disrepair and will require funding for  repairs if the stations remain open, even if they are only operated  seasonally. For example, officials at one station we visited showed us a  boat dock that was improperly installed and thus was subsequently  damaged by waves and will need to be repaired or replaced. At this same  station, officials informed us that the furnace system requires daily,  manual adjustments to address temperature fluctuations that could cause  damage to the station. One official also told us that this station’s building  structure is too big and costly, and its condition too poor, to be worth  keeping. Therefore, even if this station were seasonally closed, as  currently recommended—despite the analysis results suggesting  permanent closure—the station will continue to require personnel to be at  the station on a daily basis year round. Another station, which multiple  studies recommended for permanent closure because of unnecessary  duplication and a caseload insufficient to sustain the training  requirements of personnel stationed there, was rebuilt as a result of  extensive damage from Hurricane Sandy. According to Coast Guard  budget data, more than $2.3 million was expended to restore this station  as of March 2017 using funds appropriated by the supplemental  appropriations act enacted in response to Hurricane Sandy.

Actions Needed to Address Unnecessary Duplication

Given the extent of overlapping SAR coverage identified by the Coast  Guard’s analyses and its attempts to address unnecessary duplication,  we considered the stations’ levels of overlapping coverage in the context  of the definitions we use for identifying overlap and duplication. Figure 8  depicts the extent of the Coast Guard’s overlapping boat and air station  SAR coverage, with darker shading representing greater overlapping  coverage, some of which the Coast Guard determined to be  unnecessarily duplicative. Boat station coverage is represented by  shading while aviation coverage is shown by the largest circle sizes.

In April 2016, the Coast Guard completed statutory requirements  associated with closing eight stations in District 9 by conducting outreach  to regional and local communities that would be affected by seasonal  closures. The Coast Guard held these meetings to explain why it was  necessary to optimize station locations and reallocate personnel from  closed stations to their adjacent stations; address overlapping SAR  coverage; and seasonally close unnecessarily duplicative stations. Coast  Guard officials from one station told us they held a public meeting with the  local fire department, police, and commercial towing operators to describe  planned changes for seasonal operations at the station, despite this  station having been recommended for permanent closure by studies and  district input. According to Coast Guard officials, while some local  responders in the District 9 area expressed some concerns, they  understood the need for change. In addition, according to headquarters  officials, the Coast Guard has also completed outreach efforts with  members of Congress who represent these communities. They further  stated that they plan to follow the same outreach process when they  finalize decisions about whether to permanently or seasonally close  stations in Districts 1 and 5.

The Coast Guard has not taken action to implement the results of its  analyses which recommended closures even though it has completed  requirements to pursue station closures in District 9. Officials stated that  the Coast Guard has not implemented the results of its sound process  because past station closure efforts have been met with resistance from  affected communities. As a result, Coast Guard leadership decided to  pursue a more cautious approach by maintaining seasonal daily  operations rather than closing stations outright as recommended in  multiple analyses.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  agencies should have policies and procedures for ensuring that findings  of audits or other reviews, such as the Coast Guard’s 2013 station  optimization study, are promptly resolved. The guidance further states  that managers are to (1) correct identified deficiencies, (2) produce  improvements, or (3) demonstrate that the findings and recommendations  do not warrant management action.

Coast Guard officials stated they recognize that their planned actions do  not fully match the identified recommendations, but given historical  challenges with closing stations, seasonal closures are preferable to  taking no action. In March 2017, Coast Guard officials told us they  intended to begin the process for seasonal closures of stations in District  9 at the end of the 2017 boating season while actions in Districts 1 and 5  are pending as the Coast Guard has not finalized its decisions about  these stations.

The Project Management Institute’s Standard for Program Management  describes, among other things, how resource planning, goals, and  milestones are good practices that can enhance management for most  programs. By executing decisions to close stations based on the results  of its analyses and developing a plan with milestones to execute actions it  has identified to address unnecessary duplication, the Coast Guard will  be better positioned to follow through with both permanent and seasonal  closures of unnecessary stations, can improve its operational and training  proficiency by consolidating the remaining stations’ workloads to allow for  sufficient training, and may realize cost savings.

The Coast Guard’s 2013 analysis, based on a sound, data-driven process  that applied established criteria—its 2-hour SAR response standard— supports permanently closing some boat stations. Nevertheless, Coast  Guard officials do not intend to follow the recommendations to  permanently close the stations the study recommended, due, in part, to  views expressed by community representatives. The Coast Guard’s 2014  air station and air facilities study also supported closing two air facilities  and was criteria-based, but was not comprehensive. An optimization  process similar to that applied to boat stations could make a better case  for closing selected air stations and air facilities, if it is methodologically  sound.

The need to close Coast Guard stations that provide unnecessary  duplication of SAR coverage, in response to changing circumstances, is  not a new issue. Closing unneeded stations has historically been difficult,  but with improvements in technology, severely decreased workloads, and  continuing budget constraints, the importance of reevaluating the  operations of these stations is even greater. In addition to lost  opportunities to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness that  would be gained by closing unnecessary stations, some of these stations  have fallen into physical disrepair and will require funding for repairs if  they remain open. Given these factors, Coast Guard action is clearly  warranted.

We are recommending the following three actions to the Coast Guard:

The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish and follow a  sound air station optimization process similar to its process for  analyzing boat stations to allow it to comprehensively analyze its need  for air stations and air facilities and determine what changes may be  needed. (Recommendation 1)

The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a plan with  target dates and milestones for closing boat stations that it has  determined, through its 9-step process and subsequent analysis,  provide overlapping search and rescue coverage and are  unnecessarily duplicative. (Recommendation 2)

The Commandant of the Coast Guard should take action to close the  stations identified according to its plan and target dates.  (Recommendation 3)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its  comments, reproduced in appendix V, DHS concurred with our  recommendations. DHS, through the Coast Guard, also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

DHS concurred with our first recommendation that the Coast Guard  establish and follow a sound air station optimization process similar to its  process for analyzing boat stations so it may comprehensively analyze its  air station and air facility needs. DHS further stated that the Coast Guard  would utilize its fiscal year 2020 Planning, Programming, Budget, and  Execution cycle to identify efficiencies in air station optimization using  best practices employed in its boat station optimization efforts. DHS  expects this effort to be completed in September 2019.

DHS concurred with our second recommendation that the Coast Guard  establish a plan with target dates and milestones for closing boat stations  that it has determined provide overlapping search and rescue coverage  and are unnecessarily duplicative.  DHS stated that Coast Guard  headquarters and appropriate district commands will continue to analyze  operational coverage across the nation through the 9-step optimization  process and recommend closures or seasonalization (e.g., seasonal  closures) of boat stations to eliminate unnecessary duplication and  overlap in search and rescue coverage. The Coast Guard’s internal  analysis is expected to be completed in September 2020.

DHS concurred with our third recommendation that the Coast Guard take  action to close the identified stations according to its plan and target  dates, stating that Coast Guard headquarters personnel and appropriate  district commands will continue to analyze closing or seasonalizing  operations at boat stations identified according to its plan and target  dates. DHS further stated that it must complete implementation of the  second recommendation before beginning to implement the third and that  the estimated completion date for the third recommendation was to be  determined.  Given the robustness of the Coast Guard’s review process  and the clear results showing unnecessary duplication among some boat  stations, in addition to other valid analyses completed in previous years  supporting the closure of unneeded boat stations, the Coast Guard  should move forward with minimal delay to implement this third  recommendation, once the plan as outlined in the second  recommendation is completed. We will continue to monitor the Coast  Guard’s actions to close unnecessarily duplicative stations in a timely  manner through our annual report on duplication, overlap, and  fragmentation in the federal government.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

To identify the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) has a  sound process for analyzing the need for its boat stations, we reviewed  laws, policies, and procedures related to its search and rescue (SAR)  mission. We reviewed Coast Guard documentation of processes it used  to analyze the need for boat stations, reviewed resource and budget  factors, and analyzed station activity levels. We also reviewed prior GAO  reports on the Coast Guard’s resource allocation process and its previous  attempts to close stations. To verify and validate the Coast Guard’s  specific analytical process used to determine overlapping coverage, we  obtained and analyzed the Coast Guard’s analytical assumptions,  including the operational parameters of the assets assigned to the  stations (e.g., boat speeds), and station locations. This analysis also  allowed us to verify the soundness of the Coast Guard’s model used to  identify overlap. We then independently recreated and visually depicted  overlapping SAR coverage provided by the stations, based on Coast  Guard data, assumptions, and documentation, and compared it with SAR  case data by geographic area. We then analyzed Coast Guard data on  single boat SAR responses (sorties) by station for fiscal years 2010  through 2016, the most recent data available at the time of our review.  We visited a nongeneralizable sample of 12 stations we selected from  within districts where the Coast Guard had identified overlap, and  interviewed officials to identify local policies, station characteristics, local  coordination with emergency responders and federal agencies, and local  input to the Coast Guard’s process for assessing station needs and  implementing changes to the locations of stations, if any.

Additionally, we interviewed Coast Guard officials, including field and  headquarters personnel, to determine the extent to which the Coast  Guard had assessed maritime activity trends and leveraged resources  from outside entities, such as local first responders, federal agencies, and  private industry. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to obtain  information on the extent to which the Coast Guard used findings and  recommendations from selected studies, strategies, and plans in its  analyses of the need for its boat stations.

To assess the reliability of Coast Guard SAR data, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials, reviewed documentation, and electronically  tested the data for obvious errors and anomalies. We interviewed Coast  Guard officials to discuss the reliability issues we identified, such as the  inability to attribute multi-boat SAR case responses to individual stations,  as well as inconsistent data related to the types of boats used to conduct  SAR cases. Regarding attributing multi-boat responses to individual  stations, Coast Guard officials told us that some cases involve multiple  boats and that the outcome of a SAR case may not be attributable to an  individual station. Regarding boat assets used to conduct SAR cases, in  February 2017, officials informed us that in 2015 the Coast Guard  implemented changes to its Marine Information for Safety and Law  Enforcement (MISLE) system and added around 500 controls, such as  built-in data entry checks, to prevent potential data entry errors. Officials  told us that this change could have caused some inconsistences in how  the data is captured, but that the implementation of the changes includes  testing and ongoing actions to resolve the issues. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report to  demonstrate selected station caseloads in our report. We compared  Coast Guard actions to evaluate stations against criteria established in  GAO’s Designing Evaluations guidance, which call for adhering to  established evaluation design practices in order to achieve reliable  results, the Coast Guard’s SAR response standard, and statutory  requirements to conduct public outreach.

To identify the extent to which the Coast Guard has a sound process to  analyze the need for its air stations and air facilities, we reviewed laws,  policies, and procedures related to its SAR mission. We reviewed Coast  Guard documentation of processes it used to analyze the need for  selected air facilities in 2014. We obtained and analyzed Coast Guard  assumptions and station locations for determining overlapping SAR  coverage in 2014 and used a mapping program to visually depict  overlapping coverage provided by aviation assets, based on Coast Guard  data, assumptions, and documentation. Additionally, we interviewed  Coast Guard officials to obtain information on the extent to which the  Coast Guard used findings and recommendations from selected studies,  strategies, and plans in its analyses of the need for and locations of its air  stations. We compared Coast Guard actions to evaluate air stations and  air facilities against criteria established in GAO’s Designing Evaluations  guidance which calls for adhering to established evaluation design  practices in order to achieve reliable results, to determine if the Coast  Guard’s methodological steps were sound.

To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to  implement the results of its analyses of its need for boat and air stations,  we analyzed Coast Guard documents and reports to identify proposals  put forth by the Coast Guard for permanently or seasonally closing  stations it has identified as overlapping and unnecessary. We analyzed  these proposed actions to determine whether proposed plans or  decisions regarding stations aligned with the results of the Coast Guard  analyses. Specifically, we reviewed the study reports, memoranda  detailing district input on the results of the 2013 contractor study and their  verification of the stations the study identified as unnecessarily  duplicative, and compared the recommended closures from the various  studies to determine if the outcomes were consistent. We also compared  Coast Guard actions against its response standards and statutory  requirements to conduct public outreach. Finally, we reviewed documents  and information on these proposals and compared them against criteria in  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and leading  practices identified in the Project Management Institute’s Standard for  Program Management.

Appendix II: Selected Coast Guard Assets

The U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) uses several different types of  assets to carry out its missions, including search and rescue. Coast  Guard assets include boats, rotary wing aircraft (helicopters), fixed wing  aircraft (planes), and cutters (including patrol boats and ships).

The Coast Guard’s primary boat station search and rescue (SAR) assets  are its boats, which it uses to conduct searches near shore and on inland  waterways, such as harbors and bays that are too shallow for its larger  cutters to access. Different boats have different capabilities (see table 3).  For example, 47-foot motor life boats are slower than other boats, but can  operate in heavy weather and up to 50 nautical miles offshore.

The Coast Guard operates two types of aircraft: rotary wing (helicopters)  and fixed wing (airplanes). Rotary wing aircraft operate from air stations,  air facilities, cutters equipped with flight decks, and other locations that  can support flight operations. The Coast Guard uses its rotary wing  aircraft for search and rescue in coastal waters, among other mission  uses. Rotary wing aircraft can hover and are equipped with hoists, which  can allow rescue of distressed individuals from the water. Fixed wing  aircraft operate from Coast Guard air stations, air facilities, and airports,  and are used to conduct over-water searches and other missions.

Coast Guard cutters are ships 65 foot or longer. They operate under the  control of District or Area commands. According to the Coast Guard,  cutters are suitable for conducting extended search and rescue  operations because of their high endurance, communications systems,  and ability to operate in heavier weather than other assets. Cutters carry  boats that can directly rescue mariners in distress. Cutters with flight  decks can serve as launch platforms for helicopters, which can help with  SAR operations.

The Coast Guard generally allocates boats to stations based on the  needs and conditions of those stations. The Coast Guard also has other  types of boats in its inventory that are used for a variety of missions that  may include SAR missions. Table 3 provides details of selected boats  used for search and rescue.

Appendix III: Extent of Search and Rescue Coverage by Coast Guard Boat Stations in the Contiguous United States

Figures 9 through 12 show the extent of search and rescue coverage by  U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) boat stations in the contiguous United  States and selected Coast Guard districts reported in September 2013.  The extent of coverage in 2017 was the same as the Coast Guard’s 2013  contractor study reported.

Appendix IV: Reported Single-Boat Search and Rescue Responses by Selected Stations, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2016

Table 4 provides details of selected U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard)  stations recommended for permanent or seasonal closure and the search  and rescue (SAR) caseloads they reported for fiscal years 2010 through  2016, as well as estimated fiscal year 2015 annual operating costs. Our  analysis of Coast Guard SAR single-boat response case data from fiscal  years 2010 through 2016 found that the 18 stations recommended for  closure reported an average of about 15 single-boat SAR responses  annually, compared to an annual average of about 41 single-boat  responses for all boat stations. These numbers are based on station  reported data in the Coast Guard’s Marine Information for Safety and Law  Enforcement (MISLE) case management system, and only include cases  in which a single boat was launched to conduct a SAR mission. Some  SAR missions result in multiple stations launching due to factors such as  close proximity of stations, case complexity such as weather conditions,  or other factors such as boat availability or training. Including multilaunch  cases could result in double counting of SAR cases and therefore these  cases were excluded from our analysis. Due to flexibility in how Coast  Guard stations report SAR responses, some seasonal stations, which are  detached subunits of larger parent stations, report the number of cases to  which they respond in combination with the parent station. Because we  could not disaggregate this information, we do not report on individual  cases from these stations.

Table 5 provides details of selected stations recommended for permanent  or seasonal closure and the SAR caseloads they reported during the  winter months, for fiscal years 2010 through 2016.

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact above, Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), Andrew  Curry (Analyst-in-Charge), Chuck Bausell, Dorian Dunbar, Michele Fejfar,  Peter Haderlein, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King, John Mingus, Claire  Peachey, and Christine San all made key contributions to this report.