UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation

To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually.

The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.

GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way.

Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period.

Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements.

UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.

To promote international peace and security, the United States supports  United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide. As of June 30,  2017, the United Nations had 16 such operations ongoing with a total  budget in UN fiscal year 2017 of almost $8 billion. These operations  deployed over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more  than 120 contributing countries in UN fiscal year 2017. The United States  is the single largest financial contributor to these operations, contributing  on average approximately 28 percent of total funding annually.

To compare the costs of a current UN peacekeeping operation with the  costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United  States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization  Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study.  Using UN data for MINUSCA, we developed a comparable scenario for a  hypothetical U.S. operation. The scenario assumes deployment of  roughly the same number of U.S. military, civilian, and police personnel in  the Central African Republic (CAR) as the UN deployment for MINUSCA  over the same approximately 3-year period. We did not attempt to  determine how many military or civilian personnel the United States would  deploy if it implemented a peacekeeping operation in CAR. We selected  MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN  peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and  has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping  operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U.S. and UN officials. In  addition, established in 2014, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN  peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are  relatively current.

To identify the costs of MINUSCA, we analyzed relevant UN budget and  expenditure data, as well as relevant UN reports related to MINUSCA for  the start-up and first 3 full UN fiscal years of the operation, from April 10,  2014, to June 30, 2017. We assessed these data through discussions  with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN  budgetary information and found them reliable for our purposes. For the  military portion of the hypothetical U.S. operation, we worked with the  Department of Defense (DOD) and the Institute for Defense Analyses  (IDA) to develop a cost estimate using IDA’s Contingency Operations  Support Tool (cost estimating tool). DOD uses this tool to develop cost  estimates for all military contingency operations. We assessed the  applicability of DOD’s cost estimating tool to developing a hypothetical  cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with  DOD and IDA officials and compared the tool to the accurate and  comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as  described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. While we  found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost  estimate for a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation, we did not  assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate  accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U.S. operations.

For the civilian portion of the U.S. operation, we determined the number  of Foreign Service officers, locally employed staff and civilian police  based on deployment levels of UN international and national civilian staff,  and individual UN civilian police officers serving in CAR as part of  MINUSCA. We based the costs of U.S. civilian personnel on average  salaries published by the Department of State (State) and the Office of  Personnel Management and various allowances, published by State, for  serving in CAR, such as cost-of-living adjustments, danger pay, and post  hardship differential. We also met with State officials to estimate other  costs, including for housing, administrative support, and travel, but did not  assess the reliability of these costs provided by State.

To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and the  hypothetical U.S. operation, we identified cost categories where  differences between MINUSCA and the U.S. estimate were significant  and interviewed U.S. and UN officials regarding UN standards and  policies that explain these differences.

To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S.  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping  operations and interviewed U.S. and UN officials. In addition, we  reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs and relative strengths  of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U.S.  operation. See appendix I for a complete description of our objectives,  scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to February  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Overview of UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1948

As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations  since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide.  Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa  (see fig. 1).

In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military  in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing  situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve  conflicts. Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which  conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as  deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly  “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to  military personnel. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to  create a secure and stable environment while working with national  authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political  process is implemented. According to the UN, multidimensional  peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often  assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former  combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote  human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law. Figure 2 shows  examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of  MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR.

Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks,  is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution. The operation’s  budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval. The  UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal  year 2017 was about $7.9 billion. Individual operation budgets ranged  from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more  than $1.2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic  Republic of the Congo (see table 1).

The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed  peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and  1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world.  According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are  generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while  police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to  participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping  operations.

U.S. Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping  operations. From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed  an average of about $2.1 billion per year to these operations. The UN  General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member  contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years. The United  States’ assessment has averaged about 28.5 percent of the UN  peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with  appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U.S. fiscal years 2014 through  2016, and 25 percent for U.S. fiscal year 2017.

In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established  MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in  the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2.5 million  people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of  humanitarian aid, according to a UN report. The conflict also resulted in  174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to  neighboring countries, according to the UN report. MINUSCA’s tasks  include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights,  and political crisis in CAR;  supporting the implementation of the transition process, including  efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity;  facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and  protecting human rights;  supporting justice and the rule of law; and  facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and  repatriation processes.

On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017)  extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15,  2018.

MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised  10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed  police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696  national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report. Table  2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the  number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the  operation.

Cost Estimate for a Hypothetical U.S. Operation in CAR Exceeds Actual Costs for a Comparable Ongoing UN Operation in CAR, as Well as U.S. Contributions to That UN Operation

Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate  that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would  cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to  MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic  (CAR). In addition, the estimated cost of a U.S. operation in CAR far  exceeds U.S. contributions to MINUSCA.

Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation in CAR Is More than Twice the Cost of a Comparable Ongoing UN Operation in CAR

Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State  officials, a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation would likely cost  nearly $5.7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing  UN operation in CAR. Our comparison covers the time from which  MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal  year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3  months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA. Over this time period, UN costs  for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2.4 billion. Using roughly the same  basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of  military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation  with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical  U.S. operation would likely cost nearly $5.7 billion, more than twice the  UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated  U.S. costs and actual UN costs). This estimate does not include, among  other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for  civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total  estimated U.S. cost for such an operation.

Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation in CAR Far Exceeds U.S. Contributions to MINUSCA

During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017,  the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to  support MINUSCA. Therefore, the estimated cost of a U.S. operation  (nearly $5.7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United  States’ contribution to MINUSCA. See figure 3 for a comparison of these  costs with the U.S. estimate.

Various Factors Affect Differences between the Actual Cost of MINUSCA and the Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical, Comparable U.S. Operation

Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN  expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U.S.  operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of  sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and  compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and  communications and intelligence systems. These disparities reflect  operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United  States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation,  should such an operation be deemed in the U.S. national interest.

Different Methods for Sourcing and Transporting Equipment and Other Supplies Contribute to Higher Estimated U.S. Costs

High U.S. costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the  Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our  cost estimate for the hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation and the  UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA. In the hypothetical U.S. operation, based  on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost  estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable  supplies from outside CAR. Specifically, materials such as water, ice,  food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a  supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given  its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN  global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe. The  estimated U.S. cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period  for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million. The United  States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the  United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million. Transportation of  equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated  $316 million.

In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same  scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation. Instead,  the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables.  Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and  police-contributing countries. The UN reimburses these countries for  equipment at set rates. The UN cost of reimbursing countries for  deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount  the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone.  For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country  reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was  approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June  2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U.S. cost of deploying  equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million  more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014  through August 2016).

Differing Staffing and Compensation Practices for Military and Police Personnel Contribute to Higher U.S. Costs

The United States would staff and compensate its military and police  personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the  estimated U.S. costs and actual UN costs. While neither the hypothetical  U.S. cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for  active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries,  respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries  for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves. According to  DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been  reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation, based  on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the  United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time  period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA. As a result, the total estimated  cost of the hypothetical U.S. operation reflects the additional U.S.  expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U.S. reservist  military personnel. The estimate also includes the incremental costs the  United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel,  including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are  in the United States. For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN  pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing  countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not  the cost of troops’ salaries.

U.S. costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs.  The United States would pay over $167 million for U.S. civilian police for  the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million  on its individual police officers over the same time frame. The U.S.  estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of  deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do  not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries.

U.S. Standards for Facilities, Communications and Intelligence Systems, and Medical Capability Contribute to Higher Estimated U.S. Cost

Higher U.S. standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical  peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed  those of MINUSCA.

Facilities. The higher estimated U.S. costs reflect higher U.S.  standards for facilities, according to State officials. The U.S. cost  estimate includes more than $1.1 billion for facilities and related costs,  which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry,  management and administration, and residential leases for civilian  personnel. In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of  MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period.

Communications and intelligence systems. The United States incurs  costs associated with meeting U.S. intelligence standards that are not  part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities.  The U.S. cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence  Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher  U.S. standards for U.S. communications and intelligence capabilities.

Medical capability. Higher U.S. standards for medical care and  medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another  factor that would contribute to higher U.S. medical costs for a  hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials. Some  UN hospitals may not meet U.S. minimum standards for medical care,  according to DOD officials. Although medical costs do not constitute a  significant portion of the U.S. cost estimate, estimated U.S. medical  costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8  million) over the same time period.

Officials Cited Relative Strengths of UN and U.S. Peacekeeping Operations

UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths,  according to U.S. and UN officials we met with. Relative strengths of UN  peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance,  access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from  multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials.  Relative strengths of U.S. peacekeeping operations would include faster  deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence,  and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U.S. and UN officials.

Relative Strengths of UN Peacekeeping Operations Include Acceptance, Global Expertise, and Ability to Leverage Multilateral Assistance

According to U.S. and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit  from greater international and local acceptance, access to global  expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors  and development banks. UN peacekeeping operations also provide  indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries.

International and local acceptance. As a multilateral organization, the  UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its  peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials.  These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes  to a reputation for local impartiality. Conversely, the United States  acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face  challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for  peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials.

Global expertise. UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched  convening power and access to expertise and experience from across  the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional  peacekeeping operations. The UN is able to bring in people with  subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of  local customs to work for these operations, according to U.S. and UN  officials.

Leveraging multilateral assistance. U.S. officials told us that the UN is  better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and  multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance  provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations. For  example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the  UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to  elections, police, courts, and prisons. The report also noted that the  UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African  Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and  Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and  development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN  peacekeeping operation.

Developing international military capacity. U.S. officials told us that  UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to  professionalize the military units from many developing countries that  contribute troops to the UN. We have previously reported that building  military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats  is an important goal of U.S. national security strategy and foreign  policy.

Relative Strengths of U.S. Peacekeeping Operations Would Include Faster Deployment and Superior Command and Control, Logistics, Intelligence, and Counterterrorism Capabilities

According to U.S. and UN officials, the relative strengths of U.S.  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior  command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism  capabilities.

Deployment speed. State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the  United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping  operations more quickly than the UN. Unlike the U.S. military, which  can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek  troops from UN member states, which takes time. UN officials told us  that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which  slows deployment. Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel  on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient  forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced  uniformed capabilities.” The report also stated that aviation, medical,  and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in  advance of infantry units.

Command and control. State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U.S.  operations would enable the U.S. military to have direct command and  control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational,  face challenges with command and control over troops from several  different countries. The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN  peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known  constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake.

Logistics support. U.S. and UN officials told us that U.S. operations  have superior logistics systems. U.S. procurement likely would be  faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and,  therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials. In  addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping  operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under  severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations.

Intelligence capability. U.S. and UN officials agreed that U.S.  operations would involve superior intelligence capability. The UN only  recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having  recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in  fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and  complex threats. However, UN officials acknowledged that the  scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited.

Counterterrorism capability. DOD officials told us that a U.S.  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a  counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use  of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats. UN peacekeeping  operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized  military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations,  according to the UN High-level Panel report. The UN report stated  that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a  capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN  Security Council. According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping  operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to  protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive  force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally  different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security  Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review  and comment. DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which  stated that it had no comments. State did not provide comments. The UN  provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as  appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a  specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated  costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United  States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify  stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping  operations.

To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation  to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation  implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional  Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic  (MINUSCA) as a case study. We compared the reported UN expenditures  for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with  estimated costs for a hypothetical U.S. operation with a similar level of  military and civilian personnel. Our comparison covers a total of 3 years  and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through  June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017. We selected MINUSCA  because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping  operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical  scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in  sub-Saharan Africa, according to U.S. and UN officials. In addition,  MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus,  initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current. Because the  results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they  cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations.

To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and  expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June  2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017). We  spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations,  Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New  York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the  different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures. We  assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN  officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and  found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also analyzed data  on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years  2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of  International Organization Affairs to determine total U.S. contributions to  MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall.

To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation  implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario  for a U.S. operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting  documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military,  civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over  the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017). To estimate the  military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense  (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a  DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost  estimates for U.S. contingency operations. The Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost  estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical  operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost  estimating tool). DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all  military contingency operations. The cost estimate included only the  incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the  operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place.  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not  include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would  be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to  undertake the hypothetical operation. We assessed the cost estimating  tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the  purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials,  and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics  of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating  and Assessment Guide. While we found the DOD cost estimating tool  generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U.S.  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the  tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for  future U.S. operations.

To generate our estimate of U.S. military costs using the DOD’s  estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline  for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation,  while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered  appropriate for the U.S. military, according to DOD and IDA officials. We  based the hypothetical U.S. operation, and hence the cost estimate, on  the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with  MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments:

Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR)

Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017

Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel  Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90  percent active duty / 10 percent reserves

Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit

Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit

Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit

Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per

Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel

Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack  helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit

Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit

Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special  operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit

Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel

Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit

Operational tempo: 1.0 for all phases of operation and units,  except aviation units (set at 1.5)

Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including  14 days for predeployment (e.g., training), 5 days for deployment,  180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for  reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for  reconstitution

Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing

Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift  from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material  (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift  from Italy  We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the  cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of  the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the  Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials. However, the  military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate  have some limitations. As a result of rounding for some units, U.S. military  personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment  levels. In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to  select military units that would provide an essential function per U.S.  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level  as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level. An actual U.S.  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of  differences between U.S. and UN military operations, structure, doctrine,  and circumstances at the time of the operation.

To estimate U.S. civilian costs, we matched the number of U.S. civilian  police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA. We then  estimated the costs of deploying these U.S. civilian personnel in CAR for  the same time period as MINUSCA. We did not attempt to determine how  the U.S. government would actually implement civilian components of a  peacekeeping operation in CAR.

To estimate U.S. civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify  State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and  technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on INL’s input we  assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5  on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables  for federal employees. In addition to the average base salary, we  identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others,  personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published  allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship  differential, danger pay, and living quarters. We applied the average cost  per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in  MINUSCA.

To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of  Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers  and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and  national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively. We matched  the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U.S. cost estimate to  the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to  align the grade levels. The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers  include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables  and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post  hardship differential, and danger pay. We also met with State Bureau of  Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service  officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post  assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings,  and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability  of these additional costs provided by State. In addition, State’s Bureau of  Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential  leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we  used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR. We  also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of  UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries  and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the  Comptroller and Global Financial Services.

While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an  annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials  told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers  through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR. Therefore,  we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate.  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided  personnel serving in MINUSCA. In addition, UN expenditures included  about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government  infrastructure and civil society initiatives. We did not include comparable  costs for quick-impact projects in our U.S. cost estimate because we did  not have a basis for matching these costs.

To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a  hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we  reviewed the U.S. cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA,  and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United  States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors  specified by U.S. officials that drive those costs. We compared the U.S.  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to  identify differences. We interviewed U.S. and UN officials regarding U.S.  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between  MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U.S. operation.

To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S.  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping  operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials. In addition, we  reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths  of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U.S.  operation.

We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant  Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin  de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth  Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report.

The UN reported a cost of about $2.4 billion to carry out 39 months of peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic.

What if the U.S. had carried out that operation instead? How might costs differ?

We estimated it would have cost the U.S. more than twice as much, nearly $5.7 billion, to carry out a comparable operation. Higher U.S. costs would result from higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services, and greater airlifting of supplies and equipment.

We also found that while U.S. peacekeeping operations would have greater military capability, the UN would have greater international acceptance.