Identity Theft: IRS Needs to Strengthen Taxpayer Authentication Efforts

Strong preventive controls can help IRS defend itself against identity theft refund fraud. These controls include taxpayer authentication—the process by which IRS verifies identities before allowing people access to a resource; sensitive data; or, in some cases, a tax refund. The risk of fraud has increased as more personally identifiable information has become available as a result of, for example, large-scale cyberattacks on various entities. IRS's ability to continuously monitor and improve taxpayer authentication is a critical step in protecting billions of dollars from fraudsters.

GAO was asked to examine IRS's efforts to authenticate taxpayers. This report (1) describes the taxpayer interactions that require authentication and IRS's methods; (2) assesses what IRS is doing to monitor and improve taxpayer authentication; and (3) determines what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen taxpayer authentication in the future.

To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed IRS documents and data, evaluated IRS processes against relevant federal internal control standards and guidance, and interviewed IRS officials and state and industry representatives.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has identified over 100 interactions requiring taxpayer authentication based on potential risks to IRS and individuals. IRS authenticates millions of taxpayers each year via telephone, online, in person, and correspondence to ensure that it is interacting with legitimate taxpayers. IRS's estimated costs to authenticate taxpayers vary by channel.

IRS has made progress on monitoring and improving authentication, including developing an authentication strategy with high-level strategic efforts. However, it has not prioritized the initiatives supporting its strategy nor identified the resources required to complete them, consistent with program management leading practices. Doing so would help IRS clarify relationships between its authentication efforts and articulate resource needs relative to expected benefits. Further, while IRS regularly assesses risks to and monitors its online authentication applications, it has not established equally rigorous internal controls for its telephone, in-person, and correspondence channels, including mechanisms to collect reliable, useful data to monitor authentication outcomes. As a result, IRS may not identify current or emerging threats to the tax system.

IRS can further strengthen authentication to stay ahead of fraudsters. While IRS has taken preliminary steps to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) new guidance for secure digital authentication, it does not have clear plans and timelines to fully implement it by June 2018, as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, IRS may not be positioned to address its most vulnerable authentication areas in a timely manner. Further, IRS lacks a comprehensive process to evaluate potential new authentication technologies. Industry representatives, financial institutions, and government officials told GAO that the best authentication approach relies on multiple strategies and sources of information, while giving taxpayers options for actively protecting their identity. Evaluating alternatives for taxpayer authentication will help IRS avoid missing opportunities for improving authentication.

GAO is making 11 recommendations to IRS to estimate resources for and prioritize its authentication initiatives, address internal control issues to better monitor authentication, develop a plan to fully implement new NIST guidance, and develop a process to evaluate potential authentication technologies. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations.

Our prior work has found that strong preventive controls can help the  Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defend itself against tax fraud. These  controls include taxpayer authentication—in general, the process by  which IRS verifies people’s identities before allowing them access to  sensitive data (such as tax return information from a prior year) or, in the  case of a suspicious tax return, a refund. IRS also uses authentication to  verify a person’s identity before allowing access to a resource, such as an  information technology (IT) system.

The risk of fraud has increased as more personally identifiable  information (PII) has become readily available as a result of, for example,  large-scale cyberattacks on entities including IRS, the Office of Personnel  Management (OPM), and, recently, Equifax. In May 2015, IRS  temporarily suspended its Get Transcript service after fraudsters used  personal information obtained from sources outside IRS to pose as  legitimate taxpayers and access tax return information from up to 724,000  accounts. In June and July 2015, OPM announced two data breaches  affecting approximately 22.1 million current or former federal employees  and contractors and their family members. Among the data stolen were  Social Security numbers (SSN) and financial and personal health  information. In September 2017, Equifax announced that criminals had exploited a vulnerability in its systems and obtained PII on 145.5 million  individuals including names, SSNs, birth dates, addresses, and in some  cases, driver’s license information. In March 2018, Equifax announced,  after further investigation, that criminals stole partial driver’s license  information for an additional 2.4 million individuals. The proliferation of  stolen PII poses a threat to the tax system by making it difficult for IRS to  distinguish legitimate taxpayers from fraudsters. This threat is particularly  acute during the filing season when IRS and taxpayers interact the most.

IRS estimates that at least $12.2 billion in identity theft (IDT) tax refund  fraud was attempted in calendar year 2016, and that it prevented the theft  of at least $10.5 billion of that amount. However, IRS reports that at least  $1.6 billion was paid out to fraudsters. IRS’s ability to continuously  monitor and improve its approach to taxpayer authentication is a critical  step in defending the agency against evolving cyber threats and fraud  schemes and in protecting billions of taxpayer dollars. To further address  IDT refund fraud, IRS held a Security Summit in March 2015 with state  tax administrators and industry partners, including tax preparation and  software firms and financial institutions. This ongoing effort is intended to  improve information sharing and collaboratively address critical issues,  including authentication and fraud detection.

Within this context, you asked us to examine IRS’s efforts to authenticate  taxpayers. This report (1) describes the taxpayer interactions that require  authentication, including the general rationale behind the requirements,  and IRS’s authentication methods; (2) assesses what IRS is doing to  monitor and improve its authentication methods, both internally and  collaboratively through the Security Summit, to secure taxpayer  information and reduce IDT refund fraud; and (3) determines what else, if  anything, IRS can do to strengthen its authentication methods while  improving services to taxpayers in the future.

To describe the interactions that require taxpayer authentication and  IRS’s authentication methods, we reviewed IRS documents, policies and  procedures, and IRS-reported information related to taxpayer  authentication volume and costs per transaction for fiscal years 2016 and  2017. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our  purposes. We also interviewed IRS officials knowledgeable about the  agency’s authentication programs and services offered to taxpayers  through various channels. For this report, we focused on the following  four IRS programs and services because they require taxpayer  authentication, verify a significant number of taxpayer identities each  year, and illustrate IRS’s different approaches to authentication:  the Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP),  Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN), and  IRS’s online services.

To assess IRS’s efforts to monitor and improve authentication internally  and through the Security Summit, we reviewed IRS policies, procedures,  authentication risk assessments, and information on authentication  performance. To better understand IRS’s efforts to authenticate taxpayers  via telephone and in-person and how customer service representatives  (CSR) record data for authentication, we selected a random,  generalizable sample of records from IRS’s Account Management  Services (AMS) to create estimates about IRS’s authentication outcome  data for TPP. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for  the purpose of our review based on discussions with knowledgeable IRS  officials and by checking key data elements for out-of-range or logically  inaccurate data. (See appendix I for more information.) We also  compared IRS’s efforts to applicable activities in the IRS Identity  Assurance Strategy and Roadmap (Roadmap), IRS’s Strategic Plan  Fiscal Years 2014-2017 (Strategic Plan), Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government, GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in  Federal Programs, and relevant National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) guidance.

We interviewed IRS officials in Return Integrity and Compliance Services  (RICS), Identity Assurance Office (IAO), and IT knowledgeable about the  agency’s taxpayer authentication programs. We also interviewed IRS,  state, and industry co-leads from two Security Summit workgroups to  understand IRS’s collaborative efforts to improve taxpayer authentication.

To evaluate what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen its  authentication methods while improving services to taxpayers, we  interviewed IRS officials knowledgeable about the agency’s plans for  taxpayer authentication. We also met with officials from the General  Services Administration (GSA) who are developing a government-wide  authentication platform; officials from the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) who were involved in developing IRS’s Secure Access  platform; and officials from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) who  are working with a third-party identity proofing service to authenticate  veterans applying for benefits online. Further, we met with knowledgeable  officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to  discuss its guidelines for online identity-proofing and authentication.  Based on referrals from NIST and Security Summit workgroup co-leads  and our prior work in this area, we also interviewed a nongeneralizable  selection of representatives from state revenue offices, industry, and  financial institutions. In total, we met with representatives from five state  departments of revenue and one association representing state tax  officials, three financial institution organizations, one financial service  industry association, three identity-proofing/authentication organizations,  and four tax industry organizations. We compared IRS’s authentication  programs and plans for future improvements to its Strategic Plan and  Roadmap, federal internal controls, guidance from NIST and OMB,  principles for project planning, our prior work on the Government  Performance and Results Act, our Information Technology Investment  Management framework, and our Cost Estimating and Assessment  Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program  Costs. For a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and  methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to June 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Authentication Provides IRS Reasonable Assurance That It Is Interacting with Legitimate Taxpayers

IRS authenticates taxpayers to provide the agency with reasonable  assurance that it is interacting with the legitimate taxpayer. IRS verifies  that it is interacting with the legitimate taxpayer through identity proofing  and authentication. Identity proofing is the process of first establishing  that people are actually who they claim to be. Authentication is the  process of verifying that returning users are who they say they are by  requiring the use of one or more authenticators—such as a password, a  cryptographic key, or a fingerprint—before allowing them access to  sensitive data or a resource. In this report, we refer to both steps  collectively as “authentication.”

For high-risk interactions, such as access to prior year tax information,  authentication can help IRS avoid improperly disclosing PII or issuing a  fraudulent refund. Authentication is particularly important for combatting  IDT refund fraud, which occurs when a fraudster obtains an individual’s  SSN, date of birth, or other PII and uses it to file a fraudulent tax return  seeking a refund. IDT refund fraud can also affect businesses.  Specifically, fraudsters can use business information to file a fraudulent  corporate return requesting a refund. According to IRS officials, fraudsters  can file false employer Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statements (W-2) to  support fraudulent individual returns seeking refunds. We have previously  reported that when IRS suspects that a tax return is fraudulent, it will stop  the return from further processing, and attempt to notify and authenticate  the taxpayer before issuing the refund.

Authentication can be accomplished using different methods depending  on the risk of the interaction.

Single-factor authentication: Useful when someone wants to  access a low-risk system or service, this method may require only a  user name and password.

Multi-factor authentication: For high-risk interactions such as  access to systems that include PII or financial information, this  method requires at least two of the following: “something you know”  (e.g., a user name and password); “something you have” (e.g., a  mobile phone or cryptographic key); or “something you are” (e.g., a  fingerprint or other biometric data).

Designing authentication programs involves a balancing act—IRS needs  to prevent fraudsters from passing authentication using stolen taxpayer  information, but it must balance that against the burden on legitimate  taxpayers who must also authenticate. If IRS makes the authentication  process too stringent, legitimate taxpayers may not be able to  successfully authenticate to, for example, access their prior year tax  information or have IRS release a frozen refund. Conversely, if the  process is too easy, fraudsters will likely be able to authenticate as easily  as legitimate taxpayers.

Industry representatives told us that identity proofing and authentication  are becoming more difficult with the wide availability of PII. Further,  according to NIST, it is challenging for organizations to authenticate users  remotely via a web application because the processes and technologies  to establish and use digital identities offer multiple opportunities for  impersonation or other attacks. These interactions may become even  more difficult and risky for organizations like IRS, who may interact with a  taxpayer only once a year.

As shown by the data breaches discussed at the beginning of this report,  fraudsters are persistent in their efforts to exploit weaknesses in online  systems and, in the context of IRS, access sensitive taxpayer information.  For example, IRS reported that, between January and March 2017,  fraudsters were able to use PII to access information from 100,000  taxpayer accounts through IRS’s Data Retrieval Tool. According to the  Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, identity thieves may  have used PII obtained outside the tax system to start the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) application process and  access tax information through the Data Retrieval Tool. Further, we have  previously reported that fraudsters can use PII obtained in a data breach  to more easily create fraudulent returns that resemble authentic tax  returns, making it more difficult for IRS to detect potential fraud.

Even as IRS has adapted its IDT defenses, fraudsters have developed  more complex and sophisticated methods to bypass those defenses and  commit fraud undetected. IDT refund fraud affects IRS, state revenue  offices, tax preparers, tax software companies, and financial institutions.  According to industry representatives, as these entities improve security  in one area prone to fraud, fraudsters’ methods evolve to target a weaker  area. For example, in March 2016, IRS alerted payroll and human  resource professionals of a phishing e-mail scheme in which fraudsters  posed as company executives and requested personal information on  employees via e-mail, including W-2s. With this information, fraudsters  can imitate the legitimate taxpayer and file fraudulent tax returns seeking  refunds. In January 2018, IRS reported that the agency received about  100 reports of W-2 phishing schemes in 2016 and about 900 reports in  2017. IRS also reported that more than 200 employers, affecting  hundreds of thousands of employees, were victimized by W-2 phishing  schemes in 2017.

IRS Has Broad Efforts Underway to Address IDT and Authentication Challenges

IRS is working to address these challenges, in part, by collaborating with  industry—including tax software companies, the tax preparer community,  and financial institutions—as well as state partners. In March 2015, the  former IRS Commissioner convened a Security Summit with industry and  states to improve information sharing and fraud detection and to address  common challenges. The Summit led to the creation of seven workgroups  to combat IDT refund fraud across multiple platforms. Each workgroup is  led by three co-leads—one each from IRS, state departments of revenue  or state associations, and industry partners. These workgroups  collaborate on initiatives to improve IDT refund fraud prevention and  detection, including authentication.

In 2015, IRS also established the Identity Assurance Office (IAO) to  increase insight into authentication and fraud detection needs agency- wide, including authentication services delivered via four channels:  telephone, online, in-person, and correspondence (i.e., postal mail— hereafter referred to as mail—or fax). Among other responsibilities, IAO  works with stakeholders across IRS to review the agency’s various  authentication programs, including assessing risks of current and planned  authentication efforts across the four channels and identifying ways to  mitigate these risks. In December 2016, IAO released its IRS Identity  Assurance Strategy and Roadmap (Roadmap) for developing a modern  and secure authentication environment for all taxpayers, regardless of  how they interact with IRS.

NIST Established New Requirements for Digital Authentication

Among other things, the National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) develops and maintains standards, guidelines, recommendations,  and research on the security and privacy of information and information  systems. In June 2017, NIST released guidance on digital authentication  to help agencies improve the security of their identity-proofing and  authentication programs. In its new guidance, NIST breaks down the  digital identity environment into three separate components of assurance:  1.  Identity proofing: establishing that the person is actually who they  2.  Authentication: establishing that the person attempting to access a  service is in control of one or more valid authenticators associated  with that person’s identity; and  3.  Federation: the concept that one set of user credentials can be used  to access multiple systems.

The guidance directs agencies to assess the risk for each component of  identity assurance, rather than conducting a single risk assessment for  the entire process. According to NIST officials, this new approach  provides flexibility in choosing identity proofing and authentication  solutions; aligns with existing, standards-based market offerings; is  modular and cost-effective; and enhances individual privacy.

In addition to NIST’s new requirements for authentication, recent  technology advances and private-sector innovation are providing new  options for identity proofing and authenticating users, including in cases  where, for example, IRS interacts with taxpayers once a year. Some  examples of these technologies include physical biometrics, such as  facial recognition, as well as behavioral biometrics, such as voice  patterns, computer keystroke or mouse use patterns, swipe patterns, and  gait analysis.

IRS Incorporates Risk and Other Factors to Guide Authentication Decisions for Taxpayer Interactions

IRS Identifies Interactions that Require Authentication and Estimates Risk to Determine Authentication Approach

According to IRS documents and discussions with officials, the agency  considers risks to both the taxpayer and IRS when making decisions  about how to approach authentication, which is consistent with federal  guidelines. In making these decisions, IRS considers how individuals  would be affected by the unauthorized release of sensitive information.  IRS also considers the impact on the agency, including the potential for  financial loss or harm to IRS programs or services, and loss of public  trust.

In 2016, IRS identified over 100 interactions between the agency and  taxpayers that require authentication. The interactions range in risk level  and IRS categorized them based on the potential for incorrect payment of  refunds, disclosure of taxpayer information, and critical impacts on IRS  operations. High-risk interactions include when an individual taxpayer  establishes an online account with IRS, which provides access to prior  year tax information and other PII, or when a taxpayer is asked to confirm  his identify before IRS processes what the agency considers to be a  potentially fraudulent tax return. Lower-risk interactions include paying a  tax bill online. According to IRS, as the risk level of taxpayer interactions  increases—for example, interactions that involve sensitive financial  information—the authentication process becomes more rigorous. This  enhanced security helps reduce the possibility that a fraudster can  successfully authenticate. Further, if tax professionals want to conduct  business with IRS online, such as when working on behalf of a client to  file a return or request a prior year’s tax transcript, they must establish an  account and authenticate their identity.

IRS Can Authenticate Taxpayers through One or More Channels

According to IRS, the agency determines the means by which a taxpayer  or tax professional can authenticate his or her identity and what data are  required during the authentication process to appropriately minimize risk  to the agency. IRS officials told us that the agency works to balance  potential risks against its resources and mission to provide all taxpayers  access to IRS services and support. IRS performs authentication through  the following channels.

Telephone. Taxpayers can authenticate via telephone with a customer  service representative (CSR) for selected higher-risk interactions with  IRS, such as in cases of suspected IDT refund fraud. Telephone  authentication can require taxpayers to respond to knowledge-based  questions that a fraudster would not likely know. For example, for high- risk interactions, taxpayers must answer additional tax return-related  questions. Taxpayers who fail to respond correctly to these questions are  then required to authenticate in person at a Taxpayer Assistance Center.  For certain lower-risk interactions, taxpayers can authenticate through an  automated telephone system.

In-person. For some interactions with IRS, taxpayers can authenticate  their identity directly with an IRS employee at 1 of IRS’s approximately  400 Taxpayer Assistance Centers located throughout the country.  Taxpayers may need to present one or more government-issued forms of  identification and other documents, such as a utility statement, depending  on the level of authentication required for the specific interaction.

Online. IRS authenticates taxpayers online for both high-risk and lower- risk interactions. For high-risk interactions such as requesting a tax  transcript or looking up an Identity Protection Personal Identification  Number (IP PIN), taxpayers must pass a multi-factor authentication  process using IRS’s Secure Access platform. IRS launched Secure  Access in June 2016 following the Get Transcript data breach and, as of  April 2018, was using it for 11 applications including authentication for  Get Transcript, IP PIN, and the online account. Officials told us they plan  to implement Secure Access for other IRS applications in 2018.  Taxpayers authenticating through Secure Access establish an account by  providing IRS with a valid e-mail address, basic personal information, and  personal financial information. Taxpayers then provide IRS a mobile  phone number and IRS sends the phone an activation code that the  taxpayer enters online. This step validates that the taxpayer possesses  the mobile phone. IRS authenticates returning users via a security code.  For lower-risk interactions, taxpayers may authenticate online by  answering several knowledge-based questions, such as questions about  their current return to learn the status of their refund.

Correspondence. In some cases, taxpayers can submit documents or  request tax information via correspondence, which are then reviewed by  IRS and authenticated by matching against information in IRS’s systems.  This method can require that IRS send the requested documents (such  as a tax transcript) only to the taxpayer’s address of record, or require the  taxpayer to include a photocopy of identification. For example, in some  instances, taxpayers who cannot authenticate via telephone and cannot  travel to a Taxpayer Assistance Center in person may be able to  authenticate by mail.

Each authentication channel requires different IRS resources. These  resources include IRS staff and overhead; contracts with vendors that  provide identity verification services; and costs inherent to the specific  channel, such as mailing costs. Figure 1 summarizes IRS’s authentication  channels and illustrates a number of the interactions that taxpayers or tax  professionals can accomplish through one, or several, channels. It also  illustrates the differences in costs per transaction. According to IRS data,  in-person authentication at a Taxpayer Assistance Center is the most  expensive way to authenticate taxpayers (about $89 per interaction),  followed by telephone (about $54 per interaction). Online authentication  costs the least, at less than $1 per interaction. According to the National  Taxpayer Advocate, while requiring the appropriate level of authentication  is necessary to protect IRS against fraudsters, the agency also needs to  offer taxpayers a range of options for interacting with IRS.

IRS’s Authentication Programs and Services Are Designed to Reduce Fraud

In this report, we focus on four key IRS programs and services that  require authentication:

Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP). Through TPP, IRS reviews tax  returns that are flagged by IRS’s IDT filters as potentially fraudulent,  such as when a return includes characteristics of known fraud  schemes. IRS sends a letter notifying taxpayers that they must  authenticate their identity before IRS will process the return or issue a  refund. According to IRS, in fiscal year 2017, more than 1.9 million  taxpayers received such a notification, and IRS authenticated about  1.17 million of them. These taxpayers could verify their identity via  telephone, in-person, and correspondence. In August 2016, IRS  suspended its TPP online authentication service because of potential  system security weaknesses. In mid-March 2018, IRS relaunched the  first phase of a more secure TPP online authentication service, which  is discussed later in this report.

Get Transcript. This service allows individual taxpayers to request  and receive a copy of their prior years’ tax information. The transcript  contains information from the taxpayer’s tax filing history, such as  information from Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, that  can be used, for example, when applying for a mortgage or student  loan, or to electronically file (e-file) an upcoming tax return. Taxpayers  can request the transcript online or in-person (to be delivered online  or via mail); over the telephone (to be delivered via correspondence);  or by correspondence (to be delivered via mail). Taxpayers must  provide authentication information before IRS will process their  request. According to IRS, in fiscal year 2017, IRS delivered about  26.4 million transcripts, with about 59 percent of transcripts delivered  online.

IP PIN. IRS assigns each victim of IDT a single-use identification  number to be used to file a future electronic or paper tax return. IRS  also offers taxpayers in Florida, Georgia, and the District of Columbia  the option to request an IP PIN to help prevent IDT in these high tax- related IDT locations. IRS automatically rejects e-filed returns if they  do not include the IP PIN and will delay paper returns for extra  examination when taxpayers file without the IP PIN. According to IRS,  the agency mailed 3.5 million IP PINs to be used during the 2017 filing  season.

IRS’s Online Services. IRS has developed a number of online  services that require taxpayers and tax professionals to authenticate  before accessing information online. For example, taxpayers who  have established a verified online account can set up an online  payment plan. Taxpayers can also check the status of their refund, as  well as update their address of record. Taxpayers can also use IRS’s  mobile application for some of these actions, such as checking the  status of a refund or making a payment to IRS. Similarly, through  IRS’s e-Services, tax professionals who have been vetted and  approved by IRS can manage their e-file accounts, file tax returns on  behalf of clients, and view their clients’ tax return information.

As noted in figure 2, the volume of taxpayers authenticated for each IRS  program or service varies by channel. Further, although TPP costs IRS  more than Get Transcript and affects far fewer taxpayers, IRS reported  that TPP helped prevent $5.3 billion in lost tax revenue in calendar year  2016.

IRS Has Made Progress on Its Authentication Efforts, but Has Not Prioritized Authentication Improvements and Is Not Sufficiently Assessing and Monitoring Risks for All Channels

IRS Has Begun to Implement Its Authentication Strategy, but Has Not Articulated Priorities and Resource Needs

IRS has identified high-level strategic campaigns, or efforts to enhance  identity assurance, in its Identity Assurance Strategy and Roadmap  (Roadmap) and has established a business process to support these  efforts. However, IRS has not articulated relative priorities for the  foundational initiatives supporting its strategic efforts or the resources it  will require to complete them. As discussed earlier, IRS’s 2016 Roadmap  is the agency’s plan for developing a modern and secure authentication  environment for all taxpayers regardless of how they interact with IRS.  The Roadmap outlines six core authentication objectives, followed by 10  high-level strategic efforts, and 14 foundational initiatives to help IRS  address its authentication challenges and identify opportunities for future  investment. (See appendix II.) Further, IRS has identified about 90  activities to support its foundational initiatives and the responsible  organizations and general duration to complete them. These initiatives  include, for example,  implementing a risk assessment framework that can be applied  across all authentication channels and services; developing a framework of identity proofing and authentication  requirements for third parties accessing and using IRS data and  services; and  improving taxpayer assurance by sending automated electronic alerts  to taxpayers, such as when they file a return.

To support implementation of these initiatives, IRS established a 12- member executive governance board. Board members are senior  executives from business units across IRS, including the Identity  Assurance Office (IAO), IT Applications Development, IT Cyber Security,  and Wage and Investment. The board helps to monitor progress, risks,  and challenges associated with implementing its Roadmap, and has  generally met monthly since January 2017.

Our prior work on government performance has identified several leading  practices for planning at the program or initiative level. Among other  things, these practices call for strategic plans to contain the goals and  objectives of a program and the human, financial, and information  resources required to complete them. Leading practices also call for  agencies to develop estimates of benefits and costs to help prioritize new  investments. Following these practices can help agencies establish  priorities in a complex environment.

IRS has made progress on some of the strategic efforts identified in its  Roadmap. For example, consistent with its core objectives, IRS has taken  steps to enhance fraud detection by improving telephone authentication  procedures and expanding its online authentication services. In October  2016, IRS implemented a new process for high-risk telephone  authentication, which includes generating questions for the taxpayer  using data from internal IRS systems instead of from third-party data or  credit reporting agencies. In addition, in March 2018, IRS launched the  first phase of its improved online authentication service for TPP, called ID  Verify. According to IRS officials, the first phase of the service will be  available to taxpayers who did not file the return in question and appear  to be victims of IDT refund fraud. The second phase, which IRS plans to  implement later in 2018, will expand the service to all taxpayers selected  for TPP.

While IRS’s Roadmap demonstrates the breadth of the agency’s strategic  vision and core objectives, it does not articulate the resources IRS needs  to implement any of its 14 foundational initiatives and their supporting  activities. For example, one of IRS’s foundational initiatives is to send  event-driven notifications to taxpayers, such as when they file a return or  request a tax transcript. Such notifications could help IRS detect  potentially fraudulent activity at the earliest stage and improve  authentication of tax returns. The Roadmap identifies seven supporting  activities for this foundational initiative. One is to provide taxpayers with  greater control over their online accounts. Another supporting activity is to  determine methods for sending notifications to taxpayers about activity on  their account. However, IRS has not identified the resources required to  complete these activities, and the Roadmap notes that six of the seven  activities will take between 6 months to 3 years to complete. In December  2017, IRS officials stated that they had developed business requirements  for the foundational initiative to give taxpayers greater control over their  online accounts. However, IRS has not identified funding for the  initiative’s other supporting activities—such as developing requirements  to send push notifications to taxpayers—and implementing them will  depend on the availability of future resources.

Further, while IRS has developed a business process that would help the  agency prioritize initiatives, the process has not been fully implemented.  In 2015, we recommended that IRS estimate and document the costs,  benefits, and risks of possible options for taxpayer authentication, in  accordance with OMB and NIST guidance. Consistent with our  recommendation and its Roadmap, IRS developed a process to assess  the costs, benefits, and risks of current and potential authentication tools.  In May 2017, IRS implemented its business decision model to analyze  and improve its online taxpayer authentication services and provided us  with results from an analysis for implementing a text-to-voice functionality  for IRS’s Secure Access online authentication platform. This function  would allow taxpayers the option of receiving an automated voice code  for authentication on a verified landline (instead of a text message on a  mobile phone). As a result of this analysis, IRS approved the proposal to  implement this tool. However, in December 2017, IRS officials stated that  the text-to-voice tool is not moving forward because of other competing IT  improvements and funding constraints. Further, IAO has not yet applied  the business decision model to other potential authentication initiatives,  such as those identified in its Roadmap.

In December 2017, IRS officials stated that each of the strategic efforts  and foundational initiatives identified in the Roadmap are a high priority,  and they are working to address them concurrently while balancing the  availability of resources against the greatest threats to the tax  environment. We recognize that a strategy is necessarily high-level and  that IRS must remain flexible and use necessary resources to respond to  unexpected threats. At the same time, clearly identifying resources and  prioritizing its initiatives and activities will help clarify the relationships  between IRS’s authentication efforts and resource needs relative to  expected benefits. Further, such efforts may also help IRS establish  clearer timelines and better respond to unexpected events.

IRS Has Not Established a Policy to Assess Risks for Telephone, In-Person, and Correspondence Authentication

While IRS has generally performed regular risk assessments on its online  authentication applications, it does not perform comparable assessments  to identify, assess, and mitigate risks for its telephone, in-person, and  correspondence authentication channels. Federal guidance directs  agencies to regularly assess and address the risks of government IT  systems. Specifically, OMB requires agencies to conduct annual risk  assessments on IT systems performing remote authentication. The  assessments should also be conducted when the agency plans to modify  its business processes or technology. This includes reviewing new and  existing electronic transactions to ensure that authentication processes  provide the appropriate level of assurance outlined in NIST guidance.  While federal guidelines broadly require agencies to identify and manage  risks and establish specific requirements for programs using online  authentication, no corresponding federal guidelines exist for telephone,  in-person, and correspondence authentication, although we have  previously reported that federal guidance and standards are applicable to  IRS’s phone authentication.

Similarly, our Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs  directs agencies to conduct fraud risk assessments at regular intervals  and when there are changes to the program operating environment, as  assessing fraud risks is an iterative process. Previously, such risk assessments have helped IRS identify security weaknesses and, in some  cases, have led the agency to take an authentication service offline. For  example, in response to a recommendation we made in May 2016, IRS  performed an updated risk assessment on TPP’s online authentication  service, a key defense against IDT refund fraud. Based on the results of  this assessment, IRS disabled its online authentication service until it  could appropriately address the security weaknesses that it identified.

Consistent with federal guidance, IRS has identified and analyzed risks  associated with services and programs requiring online authentication,  including TPP, Get Transcript, and IP PIN, among others. Further, IRS  has made recent progress in updating risk assessments and improving  security for its online authentication applications. Specifically, between  June 2017 and April 2018, IRS reassessed authentication risk levels for  some online applications, mitigated risks by moving additional  applications behind its Secure Access authentication platform, and  identified other compensating controls to appropriately protect its  systems. In December 2017, IRS officials stated that they were working  to bring remaining authentication applications in line with their most  recent risk assessment. They expected to complete this work by the last  quarter of fiscal year 2018.

IRS has efforts underway to identify risks for telephone, in-person, and  correspondence authentication, but has made limited progress  implementing its process for assessing risks for all taxpayer  authentication channels. As previously discussed, in 2016, IRS identified  over 100 interactions that require taxpayer authentication and categorized  these into three high-level risk outcomes. According to IRS’s risk  assessment process, the next step is for IRS business units to assess the  effects of incorrect authentication for each interaction or program, identify  gaps in existing processes, and develop options to address the gaps. IRS  officials stated that this process involves conducting scenario-based  workshops with subject matter experts.

However, as of March 2018, this process has only been applied to TPP  and one other IRS business practice. In early 2017, IRS conducted a 2- day, internal, scenario-based workshop to assess risks and impacts and  to identify gaps for TPP authentication. Workshop participants identified  45 short-, medium-, and long-term potential enhancements to TPP’s  authentication processes. However, IRS had not performed similar risk  impact assessments for other programs that rely on telephone, in-person,  and correspondence authentication—including Get Transcript and IP  PIN—and officials do not have a plan or timeline for conducting these  assessments. Further, IRS has not developed a plan with time frames to  address the deficiencies it identified for TPP. In December 2017, IRS  officials stated they are reviewing the 45 TPP enhancements identified by  workshop participants, but have no clear plans to implement them  because of resource constraints.

IRS has made limited overall progress on this front because it does not  have a policy that requires regular assessments and timely mitigation of  identified issues for telephone, in-person, and correspondence  authentication, as is required for online authentication programs and  services. IRS also does not have guidelines for mitigating authentication  risks to these channels in a timely manner. In late November 2017, the  Director of IAO stated that IAO alone does not have the authority to  create and implement a policy that compels other IRS business units to  use its risk assessment process or mitigate issues in a timely manner.  Officials from other IRS business units stated that they continually assess  risks to telephone, in-person and correspondence authentication, even  without a policy to do so. However, IRS could not provide evidence of  such prior risk assessments or risk mitigation plans. IRS’s Roadmap  states that it will implement a secure authentication platform for taxpayers  regardless of how they interact with IRS—online, via telephone, in- person, or correspondence—to help ensure that information is secure and  that the agency is interacting with a legitimate taxpayer. Without a policy  for conducting risk assessments for these channels and addressing  deficiencies in a timely manner, IRS may underestimate known risks and  overlook emerging threats to the tax environment. As a result, these  channels may be more vulnerable to fraudulent activity, including  unauthorized attempts to access taxpayer information.

IRS Lacks Internal Controls to Effectively Monitor Telephone, In- Person, and Correspondence Authentication

IRS has established internal controls including procedures and  mechanisms to monitor performance of online authentication, but does  not have similar controls in place to monitor the performance of  telephone, in-person, and correspondence authentication. Federal  standards for internal control call for agencies to design their information  systems in a way that meets operational needs and allows the agency to  respond to risks. Further, agencies are to collect and use quality  information to make informed decisions. Quality information is  appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a  timely basis. Further, to have an effective internal control system,  agencies should also establish procedures to monitor and evaluate the  performance of programs and systems as part of the normal course of  operations. To this end, monitoring should be performed on an ongoing  basis, and any deficiencies the agency has identified should be  addressed in a timely manner. Monitoring activities are even more critical  in an environment where the risk of fraud is high because such efforts  allow an agency to quickly respond to emerging risks to minimize the  impact of fraud. Further, IRS’s Strategic Plan calls for its organizations  to use analytics and research to improve program effectiveness and  foster a timely, data-driven decision-making environment.

According to IRS documentation and discussions with officials, the  Secure Access online authentication platform allows IRS to conduct near  real-time monitoring of taxpayer authentication outcomes. Specifically,  for each online service using Secure Access, IRS is able to monitor on a  daily basis how many taxpayers registered for an account; rates of  successful and unsuccessful identity proofing and verification; and  suspicious user patterns, such as multiple login attempts. IRS is also able to monitor system error codes for specific steps in the authentication  process, such as when the secure messaging process fails. IRS officials  stated that this enhanced performance monitoring of online authentication  began in June 2016, and it is helping IRS determine where in the  authentication process taxpayers may be having difficulties and potential  causes of the problem.

However, IRS does not have comparable procedures and mechanisms to  monitor authentication outcomes for telephone, in-person, and  correspondence authentication, particularly for TPP, one of IRS’s key  defenses against IDT refund fraud. Further, since August 2016,  taxpayers have been able to authenticate using only these channels. IRS  currently uses its Account Management Services (AMS) to capture  telephone and in-person authentication outcomes for TPP; however, as  discussed below, this is not an effective mechanism for monitoring  authentication outcomes.

AMS is IRS’s primary application for recording, storing, and retrieving  information on all types of taxpayer interactions over time. IRS’s customer  service representatives (CSR) use AMS to, among other things, record  information related to taxpayer authentication performed over the phone  or in person for TPP. According to IRS documentation, AMS includes a  field where the CSR is to enter the authentication outcome and also an  area where the CSR enters notes on the details of the taxpayer  interaction. In the context of TPP, IRS officials stated that CSRs use the  notes field to record, for example, the reason why the taxpayer failed the  authentication process, and other information important for other CSRs to  know. IRS also relies on another application to review the status of TPP  cases, such as if a case is open or closed.

To better understand how CSRs are implementing procedures to capture  TPP authentication outcomes in AMS, we analyzed data in AMS from  January through October 2017. The result of our analysis and related  discussions with IRS officials indicate three primary internal controls  issues. First, IRS does not have a reliable, direct mechanism to collect  data on the number of taxpayers who pass and fail telephone, in-person,  and correspondence authentication. Second, data quality issues make it  difficult for IRS to understand why taxpayers may be failing these  authentication processes. Third, the IRS organizations responsible for  monitoring these channels do not have access to complete AMS data,  making it difficult for IRS to identify potential authentication issues and  develop solutions to address them.

No mechanism to collect reliable, direct data on authentication  passes and failures. As previously discussed, when a taxpayer calls IRS  or visits a Taxpayer Assistance Center in regard to a TPP letter, the CSR  is to enter the result of the authentication (i.e., pass or fail) into AMS with  one of nine codes that accurately reflects the authentication outcome.  However, AMS does not have a separate, discrete field where the CSR is  to enter this information. The field available to capture authentication  information is shared with 68 other issue codes, increasing the likelihood  that the CSR may select a more generic issue, such as “identity theft”  instead of one of the nine codes designated for TPP. Further, one of the  TPP outcome codes, called “other issue,” may be too broad for useful  analysis. Of the data we reviewed, we found that about one-third of TPP  authentication cases were categorized as “other issue,” which provides  no information on the authentication outcome. According to IRS’s  procedures, this category is to be used in various scenarios, including  when IRS does not have enough information to generate questions for  authenticating the taxpayer, and in other cases when a taxpayer fails  telephone authentication and must go to a Taxpayer Assistance Center.  However, by combining all of these issues into one broad category, IRS  has limited insight into the size of each particular problem and may be  underestimating the number of taxpayers who fail TPP authentication.  Further, IRS does not directly capture the results of correspondence- based authentication in AMS and is therefore unable to monitor pass and  failure rates for this channel.

Issues with data quality. We selected a generalizable random sample of  AMS cases identified as TPP authentication failures for January through  October 2017 and identified several data quality issues based on our  analysis. First, we found that an estimated 19 percent of cases were  categorized as an authentication failure, but the content of the CSR notes  indicated otherwise. Further, we could not determine a clear match  between the TPP authentication outcome and the CSR notes in an  additional estimated 18 percent of cases. For example, in these  instances, the CSRs’ notes provided no information on why the taxpayer  failed authentication, or the notes were clearly unrelated to TPP.

Second, we found that CSRs do not consistently enter useful information  in the notes explaining why a taxpayer failed authentication, which could  provide IRS management with valuable feedback on characteristics of  potential fraud or problem areas for legitimate taxpayers. Specifically, our  analysis showed that in an estimated 63 percent of cases, CSRs’ notes  contained information that was useful or somewhat useful for helping IRS  understand why a taxpayer failed authentication. In the estimated 37  percent of cases where we determined that the notes were not useful,  CSRs generally documented the outcome (i.e., authentication failure) but  not the details on why the taxpayer failed. We recognize that a portion of  the TPP authentication failures may represent fraudsters trying to  authenticate as a legitimate taxpayer. However, given that IRS’s fraud  detection systems have a history of high false positive rates, these  failures may also represent legitimate taxpayers who may be having  trouble authenticating.

Further, while the CSR notes could provide IRS potentially valuable  information on why taxpayers may be failing authentication, further data  analysis may prove difficult. This is because this information is captured  in a free-text notes field, rather than in a drop-down list or other  standardized way to record data that can then be analyzed. Further,  during our analysis of AMS data, we found variation in the way CSRs  enter notes, particularly in their use of abbreviations and shorthand on  why a taxpayer failed authentication. Such variation makes systematic  data analysis difficult.

According to IRS officials and documents we reviewed, there may be  several causes for the data quality issues. For example, as noted earlier,  CSRs may not be selecting the correct TPP authentication outcome code  because there are too many options and procedures may be unclear. IRS  officials also noted that when a taxpayer contacts IRS about TPP  authentication, they may want to discuss multiple issues. In these cases,  the CSR may choose to record information on another issue instead of  the authentication outcome.

Complete AMS data sets are not readily available for analysis. In  addition to the issues described above, the organizations responsible for  monitoring TPP telephone and in-person authentication data do not have  access to complete AMS data for TPP. IRS officials responsible for  managing TPP told us that they do not have direct access to AMS data  reports because they are not the system’s business owner. Instead, they  receive a weekly extract of AMS data from IRS’s IT department. However,  officials stated that this weekly data extract is limited to approximately the  first 5,000 records for each issue area or outcome code, including the  codes for TPP. IRS IT officials stated that they limited the file size of the  AMS weekly report because it became too large to share internally via e- mail. IT officials stated that the free-text notes entries in AMS were the  main cause for large file sizes. However, this procedure of emailing an extract of the data, rather than providing direct access to AMS, makes it  difficult for IRS to perform comprehensive analyses and ongoing  monitoring for TPP using AMS.

To put this into further context, IRS officials reported that in fiscal year  2017, they authenticated about 1.13 million taxpayers for TPP via  telephone and at Taxpayer Assistance Centers. However, we found  only about 471,600 records with a TPP outcome code in the AMS data  IRS provided to us. This represents only about 42 percent of the records  we were expecting to see in AMS. IRS officials stated that the  discrepancy was likely due to the AMS record limit described above. Yet,  in the course of our analysis, we found that only a small number of  outcome codes over 42 weeks appeared to be affected by this record  limit. (See appendix I for details.) IRS officials could not confirm additional  explanations for the discrepancy in the number of records.

IRS’s Office of Research, Applied Analytics, and Statistics (RAAS)  performs research and quantitative analysis on TPP and has studied  authentication performance. For example, in April 2017, RAAS reported  results of a newly implemented TPP authentication procedure and found  that while the new procedures helped to reduce call times, CSRs were  not following the procedures correctly in an estimated 44 percent of the  calls. According to IRS officials, RAAS’s research efforts provide IRS  management with insight into TPP performance and officials have  identified areas where TPP can be improved. However, officials face  similar data limitations we described above. Further, officials from IRS’s  RAAS division stated that they must submit a formal data request with IT  in order to receive additional data beyond what is included in the AMS  weekly extract. While valuable, these research efforts are not a substitute  for ongoing monitoring using complete, reliable data, which would allow  IRS to identify and address potential problems in a more timely manner.

IRS officials acknowledged that AMS has limitations and stated that they  are in the process of planning a new capability in another system to  analyze how taxpayers perform on specific questions during the high-risk  authentication process. However, this capability will not address the  issues in AMS we described above. Further, as of late November 2017,  officials were uncertain when this capability would be implemented  because of IT funding constraints. Without effective internal control  procedures and mechanisms for collecting authentication outcome data,  ensuring data quality, and using these data to perform comprehensive  analyses and ongoing monitoring of TPP, IRS will continue to have limited  insight into its taxpayer authentication operations. As a result, IRS may be  challenged in identifying current and emerging threats to the tax system.

IRS Is Working with Security Summit Partners to Improve Taxpayer Authentication

Through the Security Summit, IRS is working with states, software  companies, and financial industry partners to identify how best to address  IDT and refund fraud. In February 2018, IRS announced that its key  indicators for IDT dropped for the second year in a row and the number of  taxpayers who reported they were victims of IDT in 2017 fell by about 40  percent, in part because of the Security Summit’s ongoing efforts to stop  suspected fraudulent returns from entering tax processing systems. IRS  has also included key efforts led by the Security Summit in its Roadmap.

The Security Summit’s authentication workgroup leads several initiatives  aimed at verifying the authenticity of the taxpayer and the tax return at the  time of filing. One initiative involves analyzing data elements that are  collected during the tax return preparation and filing process. In filing  season 2017, the authentication workgroup collected data on 62  elements, 37 of which were new for that year. These elements included,  for example, trusted customer requirements and other characteristics of  the return. In addition, in 2016 the authentication workgroup worked with  software providers to improve authentication procedures to protect  taxpayers against their accounts being taken over by criminals. According  to IRS officials, these improvements were some of the most visible to  taxpayers because they included new password standards to access tax  software and required the use of security questions.

Authentication workgroup leaders also described their efforts to  collaborate with industry to address authentication challenges. For  example, in 2017, IRS, payroll service providers, and tax software  providers expanded the Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statements (W-2)  verification code pilot program. The goal of this program is to verify W-2  data submitted by taxpayers on e-filed individual tax returns, using a  unique 16-character verification code printed on the form. According to  IRS, verification codes appeared on more than 60 million W-2s issued for  tax year 2017, compared with about 27.5 million W-2s issued for tax year  2016.

Overall, co-leads from each of the sectors expressed positive views about  the level of commitment and cooperation guiding the Security Summit  authentication efforts. Officials with whom we spoke stated that they are  dedicated to continuing to address authentication issues collaboratively  because they all have an interest in improving authentication to reduce  tax refund fraud.

IRS Has Improved Its Authentication Methods, but Additional Actions Could Help Enhance Security

IRS Has Taken Preliminary Steps to Adopt NIST’s New Guidance, but Does Not Have a Timeline or Detailed Plans for Full Implementation

As described above, in June 2017, NIST released guidance related to  online authentication that agencies will need to implement to ensure they  are authenticating users in a secure manner. NIST’s guidance is  designed to (1) describe the risk management process for selecting  appropriate digital identity services and (2) help agencies implement  authentication programs that provide reasonable risk-based assurances  that a returning user is the same user that previously accessed the  service. Adherence to the NIST guidance will help IRS provide  reasonable risk-based assurance that the person accessing IRS services  is who they claim to be. Further, OMB guidance states that federal legacy  systems have 12 months to comply with a new NIST publication, while  systems under development or undergoing a major transformation need  to use the current revision when deployed.

IRS officials told us they have met with NIST officials and plan to update  IRS systems and applications to comply with the new security guidelines.  IRS officials also noted that the agency has taken preliminary steps to  implement the new guidelines. For example, in December 2017, IRS  implemented a more secure authentication option through its mobile app,  IRS2Go. After taxpayers link their online account with the mobile app,  they can use the app to generate a security code to log into their online  account. This option is in line with NIST’s new guidance and provides  taxpayers with an alternative to receiving the security code via a text  message. IRS has also taken other preliminary steps to implement the  new NIST guidance, including  forming a task force to guide the implementation of NIST guidance, working with the Security Summit to develop an authentication  framework that incorporates the new guidance for state and industry  partners,  starting an analysis to identify gaps between IRS’s current  authentication procedures and the new NIST guidance, and updating authentication procedures.

However, IRS has not yet established detailed plans, including timelines,  milestone dates, and resource needs, for fully implementing the new  guidance. IRS officials cited several reasons for the delay. They said the  agency will have to balance maintaining current authentication programs  with developing IT infrastructure to support technologies that are  compliant with the new guidance. In addition, officials stated that they will  need to take a slower, incremental approach to updating authentication  programs because of resource constraints. In March 2018, IRS officials  provided us a draft, high-level analysis of IRS systems relative to the new  NIST guidance, including some action items to address potential gaps.

This preliminary analysis is a first step to help IRS identify gaps between  IRS’s current authentication methods and the new NIST guidance.  However, it does not include steps needed to implement the high-level  action items, a timeline with milestones, or the resources needed to  implement improvements to bring IRS into compliance with the new NIST  guidance. IT officials stated that IRS intends to develop its  implementation roadmap through 2018 and begin implementing technical  solutions in 2019. However, those officials did not identify the technical  solutions nor did they have a prioritization plan or documentation of a  timeline to fully implement the new NIST guidance.

Implementing the new NIST guidance and updating authentication  programs to be protected by the appropriate level of assurance is  consistent with federal standards for internal control and IRS’s Roadmap.  Standards for Internal Control notes that agencies should identify,  analyze, and respond to risks, as well as assess whether risk response  actions sufficiently reduce risk to an acceptable level. Further, one of  IRS’s initiatives in its Roadmap is to strengthen e-authentication and  ensure it is in compliance with federal regulations, which includes  guidance from NIST.

Developing a plan that includes timelines with specific milestones and  resource needs to implement the new NIST guidance is consistent with  leading practices for effective planning and management. Specifically, in  our prior work on the Government Performance and Results Act, we  found that developing and using specific milestones and timelines to  guide and gauge progress toward achieving an agency’s desired result is  a leading practice for effective strategic planning and management.  Further, our body of work on IRS has noted that developing project plans  with measurable goals, schedules, and resources can help the agency  more effectively plan new projects and initiatives.

According to IRS officials, IRS must balance the needs of its existing  authentication efforts against potential new investments. IRS’s gap  analysis on current authentication procedures relative to the NIST  guidance may help IRS prioritize which improvements are most critical.  However, without clear plans, timelines, and milestones for performing  this work, IRS may not be positioned to address the most vulnerable  areas in a timely manner. IRS’s timely implementation of NIST’s new  guidance is critical, as it can help the agency mitigate potential security  weaknesses in its existing online authentication programs.

IRS Does Not Have a Comprehensive Process to Evaluate Technologies That Could Help It Improve Authentication

While IRS has made some progress in improving its authentication  programs, the agency lacks a comprehensive, repeatable process to  identify and evaluate potential new authentication technologies and  approaches. IRS’s planning documents have noted a commitment to  identify and leverage authentication best practices from outside  organizations to protect taxpayer data and support IRS business needs.  Specifically, IRS’s Roadmap states that the agency will leverage leading  technology and implementation practices from the private and public  sectors through a repeatable environmental scan process and, when  appropriate, collaborate with partners to address its authentication needs.  Similarly, IRS’s Strategic Plan notes that the agency will invest in  innovative, secure technology needed to protect taxpayer data and  support the business needs of the agency and its partners.

IRS officials told us the agency continuously researches new identity  assurance processes and technologies and has talked with other  agencies, industry groups, and vendors to better understand how  particular technology solutions could apply to IRS’s environment. Further,  according to officials, IRS plans to work with an outside organization to  analyze third-party identity proofing and authentication services; however,  IRS is in the initial phases of this effort. IRS also recently established the  Commissioner’s Identity Assurance Executive Steering Committee to help  oversee IRS’s authentication efforts agency-wide. This committee is  intended to serve as an advisory body, creating a forum for agency-wide  collaboration, as well as providing guidance and direction for identity  assurance implementation. IRS provided us documentation that it  reviewed some available authentication technologies and their pros and  cons in February 2016, and told us that this research helped them  develop their Roadmap. However, IRS officials could not provide  documentation on more recent evaluations of the broader authentication  environment, or evidence of a repeatable, comprehensive process to  identify and evaluate available authentication technologies and services.

IRS officials stated that one way the agency evaluates potential  technologies is through limited pilots or “innovation studies.” For example,  from October 2017 to January 2018, IRS conducted a limited pilot to  explore the feasibility of having a third-party identity assurance service  provider authenticate taxpayers on behalf of IRS. Officials stated that  this pilot was possible because it required little upfront investment by IRS.  Specifically, IRS received a grant from NIST to implement it, and officials  stated that it required minimal integration with IRS’s IT infrastructure. In  January 2018, IRS officials stated they were reviewing the results of the  pilot, but had not decided on any next steps. Further, IRS officials stated  that the agency is considering other pilots, including one to assist with  IRS’s telephone authentication and one to enhance security checks  during the Individual Taxpayer Identification Number application  process. However, while IRS has completed preliminary planning for  these pilots, it has not established priorities or timelines because each  pilot requires IT support, for example, to ensure the application can be  integrated with IRS’s infrastructure and to make any technical changes.  Further, in December 2017, IRS officials stated that all innovation studies  were on hold until resources become available.

IRS may benefit from considering new ways of approaching its  authentication efforts, as other public and private entities face similar  challenges of authenticating users. Our discussions with representatives  from industry and financial institutions and with government officials  indicate that there is no single, ideal taxpayer authentication solution that  will solve IRS’s challenges related to IDT refund fraud. Further,  representatives from industry and financial institutions and government  officials with whom we spoke advocated a layered approach to  authentication that relies on multiple strategies and sources of  information, while giving taxpayers options for further protecting their  information. Based on our discussions with representatives from industry and state departments of revenue and government officials, some options  IRS could consider include the following:

Expanding existing IRS services to further protect taxpayers. As  discussed earlier, IRS’s online account offers taxpayers several  services, including the ability to set up a payment plan and make  payments to IRS and view their tax history. In fiscal year 2017, about  808,000 taxpayers created online accounts, and IRS expects this  number to grow. IRS’s Roadmap has identified enhancing taxpayer  assurance by expanding authentication, such as generating and  sending event-driven notifications to taxpayers to help IRS  authenticate returns, which could help IRS quickly validate legitimate  returns.

With this option, IRS may be able to further protect taxpayers from  IDT refund fraud. For example, IRS could develop additional  functionality for the online account that allows the taxpayer to  designate a bank account or a preference for a paper check for  receiving a tax refund. If a fraudster filed a return with different  information, the return would automatically be rejected. In February  2018, IRS officials stated that their strategic vision includes  empowering taxpayers to manage their online account; however,  when these services offer the ability to change personal or financial  information, there is greater potential for fraudsters to exploit them.

Federated model. A federated authentication approach allows an  organization to rely on trusted authentication credentials from another  entity to log into its systems, potentially without needing to save  information from the trusted source. (See figure 3.) One example of  a federated authentication model is when people use their Google or  Facebook credentials to log into a different website or mobile  application. IRS could use a trusted authentication credential from the  private or public sector, or another federal agency. The General  Services Administration (GSA) has developed a single sign-on  authentication platform for federal agencies called Login.gov. In  March 2018, GSA officials told us that the Office of Personnel  Management and Customers and Border Patrol were using Login.gov  and that several other agencies plan to use the authentication  platform. According to IRS officials, IRS and Department of the  Treasury officials have met with GSA to discuss whether Login.gov  could meet IRS’s authentication needs. In December 2017, IRS IT  officials said they are tracking Login.gov’s progress and capabilities  and want to ensure that GSA officials understand IRS’s requirements.  IRS officials said that the agency is interested in being able to  federate with different organizations, but does not want to limit  federating to one entity, since different taxpayers will want to use  different credentials. IRS officials also noted that the agency will need  to implement additional IT infrastructure to support a federated model  for authentication.

Possession-based authentication. This type of authentication offers  users a convenient, added layer of security when used as a second  factor for accessing websites or systems that would otherwise rely on  a username and password for single-factor authentication. As  shown in figure 4, Universal Authentication Framework (UAF)  solutions use biometrics, such as an embedded fingerprint, facial  recognition, or voice recognition sensor on a computer or smart  phone, eliminating the need for a password. Similarly, authentication  with a Universal Second Factor (U2F) uses a trusted device or  “security key” for authentication in addition to a username and  password. According to a representative from the Fast Identity Online  (FIDO) Alliance, UAF standards and U2F devices comply with NIST’s  new guidance for digital authentication. While IRS is not likely to  provide the devices to taxpayers, it could enable its systems to accept  these types of standards-based authentication technology for  taxpayers who elect to use UAF or U2F devices. For example,  taxpayers could use a UAF or U2F device when logging into their IRS  online account for additional protection.

States’ strategies for authentication. When we met with  representatives from five states to discuss how they authenticate  taxpayers, representatives from three states volunteered that they use  driver’s license information to help authenticate taxpayers and tax  returns. One state we met with compares driver’s license information  to other state agency data to help authenticate returns. IRS could  investigate making driver’s license information, or other government  identification, a requirement when filing a federal return, and work with  states and other outside organizations to assist with authentication.  This information could be a key factor in verifying that the legitimate  taxpayer is filing the return. While some industry representatives told  us driver’s license information is a good credential for identity- proofing, this information can be compromised. For example,  fraudsters can use stolen PII to obtain fraudulent driver’s licenses.

Contracting with outside organizations. Several private-sector  organizations offer identity proofing and authentication services. We  spoke with officials from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and  representatives from the State of Alabama’s Department of Revenue,  both of which are currently using such services. VA is using a third-  party service to identity proof and authenticate veterans accessing  services through www.vets.gov. For the 2018 filing season, Alabama  has contracted with a third-party organization to offer taxpayers a  service that sends them an alert when a return is filed using their  name, and authenticates the return as legitimate using a selfie. This  photo is then digitally compared to their driver’s license photo. IRS  could evaluate these services to see if any meet their needs.

Working with trusted partners. IRS could partner with organizations  it trusts that are accessible to taxpayers and enable the partners to  identity-proof and authenticate taxpayers. Trusted partners could  include tax preparers, financial institutions, or other federal agencies.  In November 2017, IRS officials told us that they had been discussing  an in-person identity proofing study with the Social Security  Administration (SSA), where SSA would identity proof taxpayers and  transmit the authentication data to IRS. However, in June 2018, IRS  officials stated that discussions with SSA are ongoing, and they have  not made a decision about next steps because SSA is concerned  about resources. IRS is also exploring working with the U.S. Postal  Service on an information-sharing initiative that could help IRS identify  potential IDT.

Throughout the course of our work, IRS officials stated that improving the  security of IRS’s online authentication applications is a high priority and  further noted that IRS must ensure that the highest-risk authentication  improvements are completed first. In January 2018, IRS officials stated  that the agency’s priority is implementing tax reform, which will use IRS’s  limited IT resources. Further, officials noted that priorities, including  resources required to develop project estimates, are determined by IRS’s  appropriate executive steering committees.

Developing a repeatable, comprehensive process to identify and evaluate  different alternatives for taxpayer authentication, such as the ones  described above, is consistent with leading practices and can help IRS  ensure that it has a sound rationale for its investment decisions. It can  also help ensure that IRS has the resources it needs to make  authentication improvements in a timely manner. For example, these  evaluations may involve developing and documenting a business case for  selected initiatives in IRS’s Roadmap. Such a process could compare  options for in-house authentication solutions with solutions available in  the private sector based on estimates of cost, schedule, and benefits, as  applicable. By identifying options and performing such an evaluation, IRS  may find, for example, that an authentication technology available in the  private sector already complies with the new NIST guidelines, offers IRS  additional fraud detection capabilities, or is less expensive than  developing a similar capability in-house. On the other hand, the process  may show that minor improvements to a technology IRS is already using  can provide the most secure option in relatively short time, given  appropriate resources. This information could be communicated to IRS’s  executive steering committees, as well as to Congress, to help IRS  identify resource needs and ensure it is pursuing the most efficient and  effective authentication improvements to protect IRS and taxpayers  against evolving threats.

IRS’s authentication environment is one component of a broad, complex  IT infrastructure, and the agency faces many challenges as it modernizes  its tax systems. However, given the availability of PII and the prevalence  of cyberattacks, developing a repeatable, comprehensive process to  identify and evaluate alternative options for taxpayer authentication and  implementing improvements can help IRS ensure it is authenticating  taxpayers in the most secure manner. IRS documentation acknowledges  that a hybrid authentication approach using in-house solutions, third-party  services, and working with trusted partners is the best approach to  implementing the new NIST guidance and expanding IRS’s authentication  coverage. However, without a process to comprehensively identify and  evaluate available or emerging authentication technologies and models,  IRS may be missing an opportunity to implement the most secure, robust  technologies to authenticate and protect taxpayers. Further, including  these authentication options and prioritizing them with other initiatives  included in IRS’s Roadmap would help IRS ensure it is working on the  highest priority authentication improvements first. It also provides a way  for IRS to communicate its strategy and plan for authentication to IRS  management and external stakeholders.

Each year, IRS authenticates millions of taxpayers via telephone, online,  in-person, or correspondence to verify potentially fraudulent tax returns,  provide taxpayers access to a tax transcript, or issue a replacement IP PIN. IRS’s cost to authenticate taxpayers varies widely, with in-person  authentication at a Taxpayer Assistance Center costing about $89 per  interaction and online authentication costing less than $1 per interaction.  The challenge for IRS is to provide taxpayers with options to interact with  the agency, while providing IRS with reasonable assurance that it is  authenticating the legitimate taxpayer.

In its Roadmap, IRS has identified high-level strategic efforts and  numerous foundational initiatives to address its most pressing  authentication challenges. IRS has made progress in several areas  identified in its Roadmap. However, identifying the resources the agency  will need to complete its foundational initiatives and further prioritizing  them would help IRS better understand the relationship between its  competing priorities and limited IT resources. Further, while IRS has  made progress in identifying risks and establishing internal control  activities to monitor online taxpayer authentication, it has not established  equally rigorous controls for telephone, in-person, and correspondence  authentication. First, IRS does not have a policy for identifying, assessing,  and mitigating risks for these authentication channels. Second, IRS does  not have effective internal controls for collecting reliable, useful data on  telephone, in-person, and correspondence authentication outcomes for  TPP and for using these data to monitor authentication operations.  Without effective controls for collecting these data and using it for  monitoring, IRS may not be positioned to identify potential vulnerabilities  in its operations and the necessary improvements.

Given the widespread availability of PII that fraudsters can use to  perpetrate tax fraud, it is essential for IRS to strengthen taxpayer  authentication to stay ahead of fraudsters’ schemes. Completing an  analysis of IRS’s current authentication procedures relative to new NIST  guidance may help IRS identify and prioritize which improvements are  most critical. Developing a timeline with milestones and resource needs  to implement NIST’s new guidance can help guide IRS’s implementation  and help officials gauge progress and ensure the most critical  improvements are made in a timely manner. Further, implementing  NIST’s new guidance can help IRS ensure its online authentication  applications are appropriately protecting IRS information. While improving  IRS’s current authentication programs would help IRS further protect  taxpayer information and identify and prevent fraud, IRS may not need to  conduct all of its taxpayer authentication activities in-house nor build IRS- specific authentication solutions: there are many additional tools and  partners IRS could consider. Further, developing a repeatable,  comprehensive process to identify and evaluate potential authentication  technologies and services will help IRS avoid missing opportunities for  improving authentication. Further, including and prioritizing these  authentication technologies and services in IRS’s Roadmap could provide  useful information to decision makers given IRS’s concerns over  competing IT priorities and limited resources.

We are making the following 11 recommendations to IRS:  The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should direct the Identity  Assurance Office, in collaboration with other IRS business partners, to  estimate the resources (i.e., financial and human) required for the  foundational initiatives and supporting activities identified in its Identity  Assurance Strategy and Roadmap. (Recommendation 1)

Based on the estimates developed in Recommendation 1, the  Commissioner of Internal Revenue should direct the Identity Assurance  Office to prioritize foundational initiatives in its Identity Assurance  Strategy and Roadmap. (Recommendation 2)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should establish a policy for  conducting risk assessments for telephone, in-person, and  correspondence channels for authentication. This policy should include,  for example, the frequency of assessments to be performed and  timeframes for addressing deficiencies. (Recommendation 3)

Consistent with the policy developed in Recommendation 3, the  Commissioner of Internal Revenue should direct the Identity Assurance  Office and IRS business owners to develop a plan for performing risk  assessments for telephone, in-person, and correspondence channels for  authentication. (Recommendation 4)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should establish a mechanism to  collect data on outcomes for telephone, in-person, and correspondence  authentication, consistent with federal standards for internal control.  (Recommendation 5)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should revise or establish, as  appropriate, procedures to ensure data quality in the Account  Management Services (AMS) consistent with federal standards for  internal control. (Recommendation 6)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should ensure that IRS business  units have access to complete AMS data to monitor authentication  performance and identify potential issues. (Recommendation 7)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should direct the Identity  Assurance Office and other appropriate business partners to develop a  plan—including a timeline, milestone dates, and resources needed—for  implementing changes to its online authentication programs consistent  with new NIST guidance. (Recommendation 8)

In accordance with the plan developed in Recommendation 8, the  Commissioner of Internal Revenue should implement improvements to  IRS’s systems to fully implement NIST’s new guidance.  (Recommendation 9)

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop a repeatable,  comprehensive process to identify and evaluate alternative options for  improving taxpayer authentication, including technologies in use by  industry, states, or other trusted partners. (Recommendation 10)

Based on the approach developed in Recommendation 10, the  Commissioner of Internal Revenue should include and prioritize these  options, as appropriate, in IRS’s Identity Assurance Strategy and  Roadmap. (Recommendation 11)

We provided a draft of this report to the Commissioner of Internal  Revenue for review and comment. In its written comments, which are  summarized below and reproduced in appendix III, IRS agreed with our  11 recommendations and stated that it is taking action to address them.

IRS agreed with our recommendations to identify resources and prioritize  the foundational authentication initiatives identified in its Roadmap. IRS  noted that the Roadmap is a concept document outlining potential  strategic initiatives and IRS has not finalized its approach. IRS stated that  once it finalizes its authentication approach, it will estimate the resources  required for each initiative and prioritize them, consistent with our  recommendation. As stated earlier, we recognize that a strategy is a high- level plan and may need to change based on agency needs.  Nevertheless, IRS’s timely attention to identifying resources and  prioritizing its approved authentication initiatives will better position the  agency to respond to known and unknown threats to the tax system.

Further, IRS agreed with our recommendations to develop a plan for fully  implementing NIST’s new authentication guidance and make the  necessary improvements to its systems. In its written comments, IRS  noted that its ability to complete these efforts will depend on the  availability of resources. As noted throughout our report, we recognize the  challenge of balancing competing IT priorities and limited resources, but  given the importance of implementing authentication improvements  consistent with NIST’s guidance, we continue to believe it should be a  high priority. Additional actions, including addressing our  recommendations, will help IRS further mitigate potential security  weaknesses in its existing online authentication programs and help  prevent potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in fraudulent refunds  from being issued.

IRS also agreed with our other seven recommendations, but did not  provide additional details on how it plans to address them.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and  Ranking Members of other Senate and House committees and  subcommittees that have appropriation, authorization, and oversight  responsibilities for IRS. We will also send copies of the report to the  Commissioner of Internal Revenue and other interested parties. In  addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of this  report. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe the taxpayer interactions that require  authentication, including the general rationale behind the requirements,  and the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) authentication methods; (2)  assess what IRS is doing to monitor and improve its authentication  methods, both internally and collaboratively through the Security Summit,  to secure taxpayer information and reduce identity theft refund fraud; and  (3) evaluate what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen its  authentication methods while improving services to taxpayers.

To describe the interactions that require taxpayer authentication and  IRS’s methods to do so, we reviewed IRS documents, policies and  procedures, IRS data and information on the number of taxpayers  authenticated by channel, and interviewed knowledgeable IRS officials.  IRS documents and policies we reviewed included IRS’s Authentication  Strategy: Current State Touchpoints, IRS’s Identity Assurance Strategy  and Roadmap (Roadmap), and Internal Revenue Manuals related to  taxpayer authentication. For this report, we focused on the following four  IRS programs and services because they require taxpayer authentication,  verify a significant number of taxpayer identities each year, and illustrate  IRS’s different approaches to authentication: the Taxpayer Protection  Program (TPP), Get Transcript, Identity Protection Personal Identification  Number (IP PIN), and IRS’s online services. We reviewed IRS-reported  data and information on taxpayer authentication volumes and per  transaction costs for these programs for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. To  assess the reliability of this data, we examined it for errors and talked with  knowledgeable IRS officials. We determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed knowledgeable  IRS officials on the agency’s authentication programs and services to  understand different authentication options offered to taxpayers through  various channels: in-person, online, telephone, and correspondence.

To assess IRS’s efforts to monitor and improve authentication internally  and through the Security Summit, we reviewed IRS policies, procedures,  authentication risk assessments, and data from IRS systems on  authentication performance. We compared IRS’s efforts to applicable  activities in the Roadmap, IRS’s Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2014-2017  (Strategic Plan), Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal  Programs, and relevant National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) guidance. We interviewed IRS officials in IRS’s Return Integrity  and Compliance Services (RICS), Identity Assurance Office (IAO), and  Information Technology (IT) knowledgeable about the agency’s taxpayer  authentication programs. For additional context and informational  purposes, we visited IRS’s Andover, Massachusetts call center to  observe IRS customer service representatives (CSR) authenticating  taxpayers for TPP. We also interviewed IRS, state, and industry co-leads  from the Security Summit’s Authentication workgroup and Strategic  Threat Assessment and Response workgroup to understand IRS’s  collaborative efforts to improve taxpayer authentication.

To better understand IRS’s efforts to authenticate taxpayers via telephone  and in person, and how CSRs record data for TPP authentication, we  obtained data from IRS’s Accounts Management System (AMS) for the  weeks January 1, 2017, through October 23, 2017. This was the most  recent and complete set of data at the time of our review. We reviewed  AMS records coded with any of the nine TPP authentication outcome  codes for tax years 2015, 2016, or with “0.” We assessed the reliability of  the data by: (1) performing electronic testing of key data elements,  including checks for missing, out-of-range, or logically inaccurate data; (2)  reviewing documents for information about the data and IRS’s systems;  and (3) interviewing officials knowledgeable about the data to discuss any  limitations. During these discussions, IRS officials stated that the AMS  data we received may not include all available records in AMS. This is  because the IRS office that creates the weekly AMS data report includes  only the first 5,000 records for each outcome code. To assess whether  this was an issue for our data set, we reviewed record counts for each of  the nine TPP outcome codes for the 42 weeks of data IRS provided us.  We found 12 out of these 378 instances (3 percent) where the data  appeared to be affected by the 5,000 record cutoff. Each of these  instances occurred in the “TPP- Other – Sent to TAC” issue code for  which we planned no further analysis. Specifically, we did not include this  issue code in the generalizable random probability sample described  below. As a result, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of our report.

To assess the quality and usefulness of the data CSRs enter into AMS for  TPP, we selected a random, generalizable sample of records CSRs  coded as a TPP authentication failure. We stratified the population into  two groups: (1) high-risk authentication failures, and (2) all other  authentication failures. From each population, we drew a random sample  of 96 records independently, reflecting the population size of each  stratum and to be able to detect a 10 percent difference in absolute value  between the sample estimate and true population number with a 95  percent confidence level; that is, a 1 out of 20 chance of failure. Because  we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our  sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have  drawn. Each sample record was subsequently weighted in the analysis to  account statistically for all the cases in the population, including those  which were not selected.

Two analysts independently reviewed each sample record to determine  (1) whether the TPP authentication outcome code generally aligned with  the CSR’s notes and (2) the extent to which the CSR notes were useful in  understanding why a taxpayer failed authentication. First, the analysts  categorized each record in the sample as “aligned” (authentication  outcome code and content of CSR notes are clearly aligned); “not  aligned” (authentication outcome code and content of CSR notes are  clearly not aligned); or “cannot determine” (if the content of the CSR  notes was unclear and the analyst could not confidently determine that  the record was aligned or not aligned). Next, for each record in the  sample, the analysts categorized the content of the notes as one of the  following:

Useful: CSR notes provided a clear explanation of why the taxpayer  failed authentication (e.g., question failed; taxpayer did not have  proper identification; or taxpayer did not have copy of tax return during  the call/visit).

Somewhat Useful: CSR notes provided some information on where  in the process or why a taxpayer failed, but no clear explanation of the  specific reason (e.g., taxpayer passed disclosure, but could not  answer high risk questions).

Not Useful: CSR notes were blank, or provided no useful information  on where in the process or why a taxpayer failed authentication.

Cannot Determine: This was selected when the content of the CSR  notes was unclear and the analyst could not determine if information  was useful.

After the independent review, the analysts discussed their results and  resolved any disagreements. Based on these results, we determined how  many records in the sample were “aligned,” “not aligned,” or “unable to  determine.” Further, we analyzed records categorized as “aligned” to  determine how many included CSR notes that were useful, somewhat  useful, or not useful.

To evaluate what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen its  authentication methods while improving services to taxpayers, we  interviewed knowledgeable officials from IRS and reviewed  documentation to understand IRS’s current authentication methods,  future plans for authentication, and challenges IRS faces in taxpayer  authentication. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials at the  General Services Administration/18F to understand their work on a  government-wide authentication platform, Login.gov, and how IRS may  be able to use this technology in the future. We also interviewed  Department of Veterans Affairs officials to understand how they  authenticate veterans applying for benefits at www.vets.gov. Further, we  met with knowledgeable officials from NIST on their guidelines for online  identity-proofing and authentication, which were released in June 2017.  To understand current and emerging authentication strategies and  technologies, we interviewed representatives from state departments of  revenue and from industry. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials  from the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) U.S. Digital Service  to understand their work with IRS in 2016 in launching IRS’s Secure  Access online authentication platform and to understand any emerging  technologies and standards for authentication. We interviewed a  nongeneralizable selection of knowledgeable state and industry  representatives based on referrals from NIST officials, and other  government and industry representatives knowledgeable on tax issues,  including co-chairs from the Security Summit’s Authentication workgroup.

In total we met with representatives from five state departments of  revenue, one association representing state tax officials, three financial  institution organizations, one financial service industry association, three  identity-proofing/authentication organizations, and four tax industry  organizations. Finally, we compared IRS’s authentication programs and  plans for future improvements to its Roadmap, Standards for Internal  Control, GAO’s Information Technology Investment Management  framework, principles for project planning, GAO’s prior work on the  Government Performance and Results Act, GAO’s Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital  Program Costs, and NIST and OMB guidance to determine ways IRS  could strengthen its authentication methods, while improving taxpayer  service.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to June 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Overview of IRS’s Identity Assurance Strategy and Roadmap

Prioritize technology and processes for e- Authentication to enhance identification,  verification, and authorization capabilities as  taxpayers continue to shift toward electronically  filing.

Establish a central authentication policy across  the enterprise (i.e., channels and functions)

Appendix III: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Neil Pinney (Assistant Director),  Dawn Bidne, Matthew Bond, Mark Canter, Jehan Chase, Heather A.  Collins (Analyst-in-Charge), Michele Fejfar, Robert Gebhart, Steven Flint,  Dae Park, and Robert Robinson made significant contributions to this  report.

Tax Fraud and Noncompliance: IRS Can Strengthen Pre-refund  Verification and Explore More Uses. GAO-18-224. Washington, D.C.:  January 30, 2018.

Identity Theft: Improved Collaboration Could Increase Success of IRS  Initiatives to Prevent Refund Fraud. GAO-18-20. Washington, D.C.:  November 28, 2017.

Financial Audit: IRS’s Fiscal Years 2017 and 2016 Financial Statements.  GAO-18-165. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2017.

Information Technology: Management Attention Is Needed to  Successfully Modernize Tax Processing Systems. GAO-18-153T.  Washington, D.C., October 4, 2017.  2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,  Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.  GAO-17-491SP. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.

High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial  Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2017.  2016 Filing Season: IRS Improved Telephone Service but Needs to  Better Assist Identity Theft Victims and Prevent Release of Fraudulent  Refunds. GAO-17-186. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2017.

Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Address Aging  Legacy Systems. GAO-16-468. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016.

Identity Theft and Tax Fraud: IRS Needs to Update Its Risk Assessment  for the Taxpayer Protection Program. GAO-16-508. Washington, D.C.:  May 24, 2016.

Information Security: IRS Needs to Further Improve Controls over  Taxpayer Data and Continue to Combat Identity Theft Refund Fraud.  GAO-16-589T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2016.

Information Security: IRS Needs to Further Improve Controls over  Financial and Taxpayer Data. GAO-16-398. Washington, D.C.: March 28,  2016.

Information Security: IRS Needs to Continue Improving Controls over  Financial and Taxpayer Data. GAO-15-337. Washington, D.C.: March 19,  2015.

Identity Theft and Tax Fraud: Enhanced Authentication Could Combat  Refund Fraud, but IRS Lacks an Estimate of Costs, Benefits and Risks.  GAO-15-119. Washington, D.C.: January 20, 2015.

Identity Theft: Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large,  Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud. GAO-14-633. Washington, D.C.:  August 20, 2014.

Internal Revenue Service: 2013 Tax Filing Season Performance to Date  and Budget Data. GAO-13-541R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2013.

IRS estimates that in 2016 criminals used false identities to try to claim billions in tax refunds. IRS kept $10.5 billion out of their hands, but criminals got at least $1.6 billion. To help address this high risk issue, IRS works to verify the identities of millions of taxpayers each year.

We reviewed IRS’s taxpayer authentication efforts and made 11 recommendations to help IRS stay ahead of fraudsters, including:

prioritizing its authentication initiatives,

estimating the funding and other resources it will need to implement these initiatives, and

developing a process to evaluate potential authentication technologies.