Inter-American Organizations: U.S. Share of Assessed Contributions and U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Monitor Assistance Agreements

The United States belongs to several inter-American organizations, including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, security, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange in the Western Hemisphere. The United States helps finance these organizations' operating expenses through assessed contributions. The United States also provides voluntary contributions through the federal funding of assistance agreements to OAS, PAHO, and IICA.

This testimony is based on GAO's June and December 2017 reports that, among other things, (1) determined the amounts and percentages of U.S. assessed contributions to the four organizations, (2) assessed the extent to which U.S. agencies included and documented key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements, and (3) assessed the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies.

GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, HHS, USAID, USDA, and the four organizations. GAO analyzed the four organizations' audited financial reports and a nongeneralizable sample of 12 assistance agreements awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA active in calendar years 2014 through 2016.

While the United States' assessed contributions constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member states to four inter-American organizations from 2014 to 2016, the U.S. share may be reduced in the near future (see table). In response to a statutory requirement, the U.S. Department of State (State) said it submitted to Congress a strategy that included working with the Organization of American States (OAS) member states toward ensuring that the OAS would not assess any single member state a contribution amounting to more than 50 percent of all OAS assessed contributions. At the OAS General Assembly in June 2017, OAS member states voted to draft a proposal to modify its system for determining member states' assessed contributions to potentially reduce the maximum assessed contribution to below 50 percent. The other three organizations use OAS's system for setting assessed contributions. Hence, any change in contributions at OAS should also be reflected at Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH).

State, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide voluntary contributions to OAS, PAHO, and IICA in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements). In December 2017, GAO reported that its review of 12 such agreements across the four agencies found that State and USDA did not include all key monitoring provisions in their agreements as called for by applicable guidance. State has since taken corrective action. GAO also found that all four U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed. For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities, and USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of its 11 required activities. State and HHS said they initiated corrective action before our review. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions.

GAO found that the strategic goals of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that assistance agreements with these organizations align with U.S. goals.

In its December 2017 report, GAO recommended that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.

I am pleased to be here to discuss our work regarding U.S. assistance to  inter-American organizations. The United States belongs to several inter- American organizations that, among other things, promote democracy,  security, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange in  the Western Hemisphere. These organizations include the Organization  of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization  (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture  (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History  (PAIGH). The United States uses its membership in these organizations  to promote U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. According to the  Department of State (State), the OAS is the premier multilateral forum in  the Western Hemisphere for regional dispute resolution and promotion of  democratic governance. The United States also works with PAHO, IICA,  and PAIGH to provide technical support and guidance in areas including  public health, agriculture, and cartography.

State provides the United States’ assessed contributions to these four  organizations’ regular budgets. State, the Department of Health and  Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Agency for International Development  (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) also provide  project-specific voluntary contributions to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA  through assistance agreements, which include grants and cooperative  agreements. For calendar year 2016, the United States’ assessed  contributions to these four organizations totaled over $130 million, and  voluntary contributions to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA totaled $32 million.  OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for  overseeing their use of these funds, such as external auditors and  internal audit boards as required by the standards of the Institute of  Internal Auditors. State and USDA have directly supported these  oversight mechanisms.

My testimony today summarizes the findings from our June 2017 report  and our December 2017 report on U.S. assistance to inter-American  organizations. This testimony addresses, for calendar years 2014  through 2016, (1) the amounts and percentages of U.S. assessed  contributions to the four organizations, (2) the extent to which U.S.  agencies included and documented key monitoring provisions as part of  their assistance agreements, and (3) the extent to which the  organizations’ strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies.

For our reports, we analyzed strategic planning and budget  documentation from the four organizations for calendar years 2014  through 2016. We also interviewed officials from the four organizations,  as well as officials from State, HHS, USAID, and USDA, which provide  contributions to these four organizations. To assess U.S. agencies’  oversight of assistance agreements, we identified 60 active assistance  agreements that these agencies awarded to OAS, PAHO, and IICA  during calendar years 2014 through 2016 and selected a  nongeneralizable sample of 12 agreements, three each from HHS, State,  USAID, and USDA. We selected the three agreements from each agency  based on the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. We assessed  whether the agencies’ agreements included key monitoring provisions  implementing applicable agency guidance. We identified key monitoring  provisions agencies are to include as part of their agreements as  provisions that ensure oversight of the use of funds by requiring  monitoring activities, such as financial and progress reports. We then  assessed the extent to which the agencies had documentation of the  required monitoring activities and examined the documentation of  monitoring activities that they provided. More detailed information on our  scope and methodology can be found in the two reports cited above.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.

According to State, the OAS is the primary inter-American political forum  through which the United States engages with other countries in the  Western Hemisphere to promote democracy, human rights, security, and  development. While PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH are independent  organizations, the Charter of the Organization of American States directs  them to take into account the recommendations of the OAS General  Assembly and Councils. PAHO, a specialized international health  agency for the Americas, works with member countries throughout the  region to improve and protect people’s health and serves as the Regional  Office for the Americas of the World Health Organization, the United  Nations agency on health. IICA, among other things, supports its member  states’ efforts to achieve agricultural development and rural well-being  through consultation and the administration of agricultural projects  through agreements with the OAS and other entities. PAIGH specializes  in regional cartography, geography, history, and geophysics and has  facilitated the settlement of regional border disputes.

U.S. Assessed Contributions to Inter- American Organizations and the Reform Act

Member states collectively finance these organizations by providing  assessed contributions in accordance with the organizations’ regulations.  The member states’ assessed contributions are intended to finance the  organizations’ regular budgets, which generally cover the organizations’  day-to-day operating expenses, such as facilities and salaries. The  budgets are based on each organization’s total approved quota  assessment and other projected income. Member states of each  organization meet to review and approve the organizations’ budgets. The  exact dollar amount each member state is responsible for providing  corresponds to its assessed percentage of the total approved quota  assessment for any given year.

In October 2013, the United States enacted the Organization of American  States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (Reform Act). The Reform  Act directed the Secretary of State to, among other things, submit “a  multiyear strategy that…identifies a path toward the adoption of  necessary reforms that would lead to an assessed fee structure in which  no member state would pay more than 50 percent of the OAS’s assessed  yearly fees.” According to the Reform Act, it is the sense of Congress  that, among other things, it is in the interest of the United States, OAS  member states, and a modernized OAS that the OAS move toward an  assessed quota structure that (1) assures the financial sustainability of  the organization and (2) establishes, by October 2018, that no member  state pays more than 50 percent of the organization’s assessed fees.

The United States Contributed Over Half of Total Assessed Contributions to the Four Organizations, but OAS Member States Have Voted to Consider a Reduction of the U.S. Share

In June 2017, we reported that the United States’ assessed contributions  constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member  states to four inter-American organizations from 2014 through 2016 (see  table 1). During this time, the annual U.S. percentages (or quotas) of  these organizations’ assessed contributions have remained about the  same. Therefore, the actual amounts assessed to the United States  generally remained the same.

All four organizations apply a similar assessed quota structure that uses  the relative size of member states’ economies, among other things, to  help determine each member state’s assessed contributions. The OAS  determines the assessed quota for each member state based on the  United Nations’ methodology, as adapted for the OAS, using criteria that  include gross national income, debt burden, and per capita income. The  other three organizations use OAS’s system for determining member  states’ quotas to calculate their member states’ assessed contributions.  Thus, any change in the OAS’s assessed quota structure should be  reflected at PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, according to their respective  processes regarding the determination of assessed contributions.

The U.S. share of assessed contributions may be reduced in the future.  The Reform Act required State to submit a strategy identifying, among  other things, a path toward the adoption of necessary reforms to the  OAS’s assessed quota structure that would lead to a structure in which no  member state would pay more than 50 percent of OAS assessed  contributions. In response to that requirement, State told us that they  submitted to Congress a strategy that included working with OAS  member states toward ensuring that the OAS would not assess any  single member state a quota of more than 50 percent of all OAS  assessed contributions. State officials informed us that they worked with  other OAS member states, including Canada and Mexico, to explore  assessed quota reform options. For example, State officials consulted  with their counterparts from Mexico to review the OAS’s assessed quota  structure and to consult on alternatives that would adjust all member  states’ quotas so that no member state’s quota exceeds 50 percent of the  OAS’s assessed contributions. Subsequent to our June 2017 report, at  the OAS General Assembly in June 2017, OAS member states voted to  draft a proposal to modify the quota structure to potentially reduce the  maximum assessed quota to below 50 percent. According to State  officials, the modification to the quota structure, if approved, would be  gradual and would not be implemented until 2019.

U.S. Agencies Provided Voluntary Contributions to OAS, PAHO, and IICA through Assistance Agreements but Could Enhance Their Monitoring of These Agreements

State, HHS, USAID, and USDA fund activities at OAS, PAHO, and IICA in  the form of assistance agreements. In our December 2017 report, we  reviewed 12 such agreements across the four agencies and found that  State and USDA did not include all key monitoring provisions in their  agreements as called for by applicable guidance. State has taken  corrective action since the grants were awarded. We also found that all  four agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring  activities required by the 12 assistance agreements we reviewed. State  and HHS both initiated corrective action prior to our review of the grants.

U.S. Agencies Provided Voluntary Contributions through Assistance Agreements to OAS, PAHO, and IICA

The United States provided voluntary contributions to OAS, PAHO, and  IICA through project-specific assistance agreements, such as grants and  cooperative agreements. According to U.S. agency officials, the  organizations’ regional knowledge and technical expertise make them  effective implementing partners for projects serving U.S. national interests  and priorities throughout the hemisphere. From calendar years 2014  through 2016, the United States provided voluntary contributions totaling  about $105 million to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA, as shown in table 2. In  2016, for example, the United States contributed $32 million, or  approximately 22 percent of the total of $143 million from all member  states. According to U.S. officials, levels of U.S. voluntary contributions  vary year-to-year due to factors that include the schedule of multiyear  agreement disbursements, sudden crises, and member states’ priorities.  For example, in 2016, USAID approved an assistance agreement for $2  million to OAS to support international observation of government  elections in Haiti.

U.S. Agencies Could Enhance Their Monitoring of Assistance Agreements

In our review of 12 selected assistance agreements from State, HHS,  USAID, and USDA (out of a total of 60 active agreements during calendar  years 2014 through 2016), we found that none of the agencies had both  consistently included all the key monitoring provisions for their  agreements and fully documented the monitoring activities required by  those provisions. For example, USDA did not have full documentation,  such as financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities,  and USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of its 11 required  monitoring activities (financial and performance reports). U.S. agencies  could have greater assurance that the organizations are using these  funds as intended if they enhanced their monitoring of their assistance  agreements.

Two of Four U.S. Agencies Did Not Include All Key Monitoring Provisions in the Agreements We Reviewed

Each of the four agencies has established applicable guidance that calls  for agencies to conduct monitoring activities as part of their oversight of  their assistance agreements. The agencies implement their guidance by  including key provisions to carry out required monitoring activities as part  of their agreements. Federal standards for internal control call for  agencies to include in agreements all key provisions delineating the  parties’ responsibilities. For the 12 agreements we reviewed, the number  of key monitoring provisions per agreement varied depending on when  the agency issued and updated its guidance relative to when the  agreements were approved.

Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to document  internal controls, transactions, and significant events. Specifically,  internal control standards state that agency management should include  internal control activities (e.g., monitoring activities) in policies or  directives for transactions such as assistance agreements.

For the 12 assistance agreements we reviewed, USDA and State did not  include provisions implementing 6 of the 55 total (11 percent) monitoring  activities required by applicable guidance (see table 3). For example,  State did not include two of the key monitoring provisions (a risk  assessment and a monitoring plan) in one of its agreements. State took  corrective action in 2015 by issuing a standard operating procedure.

The agencies specify the requirements to fulfill the key monitoring  provisions in the individual assistance agreements, such as by requiring  financial reports on a quarterly basis or including specific information in  performance reports. Grants officers, if they deem it necessary or  appropriate, include additional monitoring provisions requiring activities  beyond those required by the applicable guidance, such as site visits.

Federal standards for internal control call for agency management to  design monitoring activities, such as financial and performance reporting,  so that all transactions are completely and accurately recorded.  Recording these activities maintains their relevance and value to  management in controlling operations and making decisions. Without  access to complete monitoring documentation, the agencies risk  weakening the effectiveness of these controls.

None of the four U.S. agencies had full documentation of all of the  monitoring activities required by their agreements we reviewed (see table  4). The agencies did not have full documentation of monitoring activities  for 9 of the 12 agreements we reviewed. For the 42 monitoring activities  identified across all of the individual agreements, the four agencies did  not have full documentation of 18 of the activities (43 percent). However,  State took corrective action in May 2017 to address its gaps in  documentation, and according to HHS officials, the Food and Drug  Administration addressed its gap in documentation by implementing its  agreement monitoring program in fiscal year 2018.

The Strategic Goals of the Four Inter- American Organizations Are Predominantly Aligned with U.S. Agencies’ Strategic Goals

In our December 2017 report, we found that the strategic goals of the four  inter-American organizations are predominantly aligned with the high- level strategic goals for the Western Hemisphere documented by State,  USAID, HHS, and USDA, as shown in table 5. For example, four of the  five goals in State and USAID’s Joint Strategy correspond with goals at  the OAS, IICA, and PAIGH. According to officials, the agencies all  consider U.S. strategic goals when deciding which projects to fund at  OAS, PAHO, and IICA. U.S. agencies, on an ongoing basis, evaluate  each inter-American organization to ensure U.S. and organization goals  are aligned. For example, according to USAID officials, USAID’s  assistance project design and approval policies and procedures ensure  that all USAID-funded activities are linked to applicable U.S. and USAID  strategies.

In conclusion, monitoring the implementation of U.S. assistance  agreements and fully documenting the results of such monitoring are key  management controls to help ensure that U.S. agreement recipients use  federal funds appropriately and effectively. The agencies risk weakening  the effectiveness of these controls by not including in their assistance  agreements all the key monitoring provisions called for by applicable  agency guidance. Further, if the agencies do not have full documentation  of the agreements’ required monitoring activities, they may not be able to  effectively manage federally funded projects that support U.S. strategic  goals. In addition, agencies may not have all the information they need to  make budgetary and programmatic decisions.

In our December 2017 report, we recommended that (1) USDA ensure  inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2)  USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. The  agencies concurred with these recommendations and indicated that they  will take actions to address them. For example, USAID said it would issue  an agency notice to remind all agreement officers to maintain complete  files for each agreement.

Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Thomas Melito, Director, International Affairs and Trade at (202)  512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony  include Pierre Toureille (Assistant Director), Julia Jebo Grant (Analyst-in- Charge), Leslie Stubbs, Paul Sturm, Alana Miller, Shirley Min, Kira Self,  and Rhonda Horried. In addition, David Dayton, Martin de Alteriis, Neil  Doherty, Jeff Isaacs, and Alex Welsh provided technical assistance.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

The U.S. belongs to several multilateral organizations of North and South American countries, the largest of which is the Organization of American States.

In a report on which this testimony is based, we found that the U.S. paid over 57% of total assessed contributions for these organizations between 2014 and 2016. The State Department is working with OAS to reform its fee structure so that no country pays more than 50%.

In another report, we examined how U.S. agencies monitor organizations' activities, for example to guard against misuse of funds. Our recommendations included that agencies fully document monitoring activities.


This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training ( GAO-17-789 ).

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations–related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services—naval integration—for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.

The Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our recent  report on Navy and Marine Corps training for amphibious operations. As  you know, the Navy and the Marine Corps (collectively referred to as U.S.  naval forces) maintain forces that are capable of conducting an  amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea  by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft, with the primary  purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned  mission. Training forces for amphibious operations requires extensive  coordination and integration between the Navy and Marine Corps. For  example, the services must schedule amphibious ships to be used for  training, develop operational concepts, and design and execute  exercises. This training also requires significant resources, including  access to Navy ships, and an adequate amount of range space to  realistically conduct live-fire training exercises. The Marine Corps, as well  as the other military services, has stated that the use of virtual training— including simulators or computer-generated simulations—could help  overcome some of the difficulties associated with training in a live-only  environment.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the future security  environment will require forces to train across the full range of military  operations—including types of operations that have not been prioritized in  recent years, such as amphibious operations. However, over the last 15  years, continued operational deployments have required U.S. naval  forces to focus training for stability and counterinsurgency operations,  while limiting training in amphibious operations, among other areas. The  Navy has stated that the high demand for presence has put pressure on a  fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Our recent testimony on Navy  readiness highlighted that the Navy has increased deployment lengths,  shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet  high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions  and a worsening trend in overall readiness.

In this context, my testimony today discusses the findings from our recent  September 2017 report on Navy and Marine Corps training for  amphibious operations. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) the  Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to complete training for amphibious  operations priorities and factors limiting that training; (2) steps taken by  the Navy and Marine Corps to mitigate any training shortfalls, including  the Marine Corps’ use of selected virtual training devices; and (3) efforts  to improve naval integration for amphibious operations. In addition, I will  highlight several key actions that we recommended in our report that the  Navy and Marine Corps could take to help mitigate training shortfalls and  improve the integration between these services for amphibious  operations.

To conduct this work, we analyzed unit-level readiness data from fiscal  year 2014 through 2016 and deployment certification reports and  compared those data against the services’ training requirements;  reviewed service training initiatives; interviewed a nongeneralizable  sample of officials from 23 Marine Corps units that were selected based  on their training plans; and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six  Marine Corps virtual training devices to review based on factors such as  target audience. Our September 2017 report includes a detailed  explanation of the methods used to conduct our work. We conducted the  work on which this testimony is based in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards.

In summary, Navy and Marine Corps units completed training for certain  amphibious operations priorities but not others due to several factors. The  most prevalent factor we found that hampered training completion was a  lack of available amphibious ships on which to train. The Navy and  Marine Corps have taken some steps to identify and address amphibious  operations training shortfalls, but these efforts are incomplete.  Specifically, the services’ current approach does not incorporate strategic  training and leading risk management practices. Further, the Marine  Corps has not fully integrated virtual training devices into operational  training. The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  coordination, but the services have not fully incorporated leading  collaboration practices that would help drive efforts to improve naval  integration. We made recommendations to address these issues and  DOD concurred with them.

An amphibious force is comprised of an (1) amphibious task force and a  (2) landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized,  and equipped for amphibious operations. The amphibious task force is a  group of Navy amphibious ships, most frequently deployed as an  Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The landing force is a Marine Air- Ground Task Force—which includes certain elements, such as command,  aviation, ground, and logistics—embarked aboard the Navy amphibious  ships. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the most-commonly  deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Together, this amphibious force  is referred to as an ARG-MEU.

An ARG consists of a minimum of three amphibious ships, typically an  amphibious assault ship, an amphibious transport dock ship, and an  amphibious dock landing ship. Navy ships train to a list of mission- essential tasks that are assigned based on the ship’s required operational  capabilities and projected operational environments. Most surface  combatants, including cruisers, destroyers, and all amphibious ships,  have mission-essential tasks related to amphibious operations. Figure 1  shows the current number of amphibious ships by class and a description  of their capabilities.

An MEU consists of around 2,000 Marines, their aircraft, their landing  craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days’ worth of supplies. The  MEU includes a standing command element; a ground element consisting  of a battalion landing team; an aviation element consisting of a composite  aviation squadron of multiple types of aircraft; and a logistics element  consisting of a combat logistics battalion. Marine Corps units also train to  accomplish a set of mission-essential tasks for the designed capabilities  of the unit. Many Marine Corps units within the command, aviation,  ground, and logistics elements have an amphibious-related mission- essential task. To be certified in the mission-essential task of amphibious  operations, Marine Corps units must train to a standard that may require  the use of amphibious ships.

The Marine Corps’ use of virtual training devices has increased over time,  and advances in technology have resulted in the acquisition of simulators  and simulations with additional capabilities designed to help individual  Marines and units acquire and refine skills through more concentrated  and repetitive training. For example, the Marine Corps utilizes a  constructive simulation that provides commanders with training for  amphibious operations, among other missions. The Marine Corps has  introduced other virtual training devices to prepare Marines for  operational conditions and for emerging threats, such as devices to  replicate a variety of vehicles for driver training and egress trainers,  among others. The Navy stated it does not utilize virtual training devices  that simulate amphibious operations, including ship-to-shore movement.

Navy and Marine Corps Units Completed Training for Certain Amphibious Operations Priorities but Not Others Due to Several Factors

In our September 2017 report, we found that Navy and Marine Corps  units deploying as part of ARG-MEUs completed required training for  amphibious operations, but the Marine Corps has been unable to  consistently accomplish training for other service amphibious operations  priorities. Specifically, based on our review of deployment certification  messages from 2014 through 2016, we found that each deploying Navy  ARG completed training for the amphibious operations mission in  accordance with training standards. Similarly, we found that each MEU  completed all of its mission-essential tasks that are required during the  predeployment training program. These mission-essential tasks cover  areas such as amphibious raid, amphibious assault, and noncombatant  evacuation operations, among other operations.

However, we also reported that based on our review of unit-level  readiness data from fiscal year 2014 through 2016, Marine Corps units  were unable to fully accomplish training for other amphibious operations  priorities. These shortfalls include home-station unit training to support  contingency requirements, service-level exercises, and experimentation  and concept development for amphibious operations. For example,  Marine Corps officials cited shortfalls in their ability to conduct service- level exercises that train individuals and units on amphibious operations- related skills, as well as provide opportunities to conduct experimentation  and concept development for amphibious operations.

In our September 2017 report, we identified several factors that created  shortfalls in training for amphibious operations priorities. Based on our  analysis of interviews with 23 Marine Corps units, we found that all 23 units cited the lack of available amphibious ships as the primary factor  limiting training for home-station units. The Navy’s fleet of amphibious  ships has declined by half in the last 25 years, from 62 in 1990 to 31  today, with current shipbuilding plans calling for four additional  amphibious ships to be added by fiscal year 2024, increasing the total  number of amphibious ships to 35 (see fig. 2).

Marine Corps officials from the 23 units we interviewed also cited other  factors that limit opportunities for amphibious operations training,  including the following:

Access to range space. Seventeen of 23 Marine Corps units we  interviewed identified access to range space as a factor that can limit  their ability to conduct amphibious operations training. Unit officials  told us that priority for training resources, including range access, is  given to units that will be part of a MEU deployment, leaving little  range time available for other units.

Maintenance delays, bad weather, and transit time. Ten of 23  Marine Corps units told us that changes to an amphibious ship’s  schedule resulting from maintenance overruns or bad weather have  also reduced the time available for a ship to be used for training. The  transit time a ship needs to reach Marine Corps units has further  reduced the time available for training.

High pace of deployments. Five of 23 Marine Corps units told us  that the high pace of deployments and need to prepare for upcoming  deployments limited their opportunity to conduct training for  amphibious operations.

The Navy and Marine Corps Have Taken Some Steps to Identify and Address Amphibious Training Shortfalls, but These Efforts Are Incomplete

Services’ Approach Does Not Incorporate Strategic Training and Leading Risk Management Practices

In our September 2017 report, we identified some steps that the Navy  and Marine Corps have taken to mitigate the training shortfall for their  amphibious operations priorities, such as by better defining the amount of  amphibious operations capabilities and capacity needed to achieve the  services’ wartime requirements. However, we found these efforts are  incomplete because the services’ current approach for amphibious  operations training does not incorporate strategic training and leading  risk-management practices. Specifically, we found that:

The Marine Corps does not prioritize all available training  resources. For Marine Corps units not scheduled for a MEU  deployment, officials described an ad hoc process to allocate any  remaining available amphibious ship training time among home- station units. Specifically, officials stated that the current process  identifies units that are available for training when an amphibious ship  becomes available rather than a process that aligns the next highest- priority units for training with available amphibious ships.

The Navy and Marine Corps do not systematically evaluate a full  range of training resource alternatives to achieve amphibious  operations priorities. Given the limited availability of amphibious  ships for training, the Navy and Marine Corps have not systematically  incorporated selected training resource alternatives into home-station  training plans. During our review, we identified a number of  alternatives that could help mitigate the risk to the services’  amphibious capability due to limited training opportunities. These  alternatives could include utilizing additional training opportunities  during an amphibious ship’s basic phase of training; using alternative  platforms for training, such as Marine Prepositioning Force ships;  utilizing smaller Navy craft or pier-side ships to meet training  requirements; and leveraging developmental and operational test  events.

The Navy and Marine Corps have not developed a process or set  of metrics to monitor progress toward achieving its amphibious  operations training priorities and mitigating existing shortfalls.  Current reporting systems do not allow officials to assess the services’  progress in achieving amphibious operations priorities or to monitor  efforts to establish comprehensive amphibious operations training  programs. For example, we found that the Marine Corps does not  capture complete data on the full demand for training time with Navy  amphibious ships that could be used for such assessments.

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Navy and  Marine Corps develop an approach to prioritize available training  resources, systematically evaluate among training resource alternatives  to achieve amphibious operations priorities, and monitor progress toward  achieving them. DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Secretary of the Navy would develop an amphibious operations  training construct capitalizing on the application of primary and alternative  training resources.

The Marine Corps Has Not Fully Integrated Virtual Training Devices into Operational Training

While the Marine Corps has stated that the use of virtual training could  help mitigate some of the limitations of training in a live-only environment  and taken some steps to integrate these devices into operational training,  we identified gaps in its process to develop and use them. Specifically,  based on our review of a selection of 6 virtual training devices, we found  weaknesses in three key areas:

Front-end planning. The Marine Corps’ process for conducting front- end planning and analysis to support the acquisition of its virtual  training devices does not include consideration of critical factors for  integrating virtual training devices into operational training, such as  the specific training tasks the device is intended to address, how the  device would be used to meet proficiency goals, or available time for  units to train with the device. As a result, the Marine Corps does not  have a reasonable basis to ensure that it is acquiring the right number  and type of virtual training devices to meet its operational training  needs.

Expected and actual usage data. The Marine Corps does not  consistently consider expected and actual usage data for virtual  training devices to support its investment decisions. In the absence of  these data, the Marine Corps risks sustained investment in virtual  training devices that do not meet operational training needs.

Training effectiveness. The Marine Corps does not consistently  evaluate the effectiveness of its virtual training devices to accomplish  operational training. Without a well-defined process to consistently  evaluate the effectiveness of virtual training devices for training, the  Marine Corps risks investing in devices whose value to operational  training is undetermined.

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Marine Corps  develop guidance for the development and use of virtual training devices  to address these gaps. DOD concurred with the recommendation and  stated it would work with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in its  development and implementation actions associated with the use of  virtual training devices.

Incorporating Collaboration Practices would Further Naval Integration Efforts for Amphibious Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  coordination between the two services, to include issuing strategic  documents that discuss the importance of improving naval integration and  establishing mechanisms to coordinate their amphibious operations  training capabilities. However, in our September 2017 report we found  that the services have not fully incorporated leading collaboration  practices that would help drive efforts to improve naval integration. Our  prior work on interagency collaboration has found that certain practices  can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. I  would like to highlight a few practices that would especially benefit the  Navy and Marine Corps’ efforts to improve integration for amphibious  operations.

Common outcomes and joint strategy. The Navy and Marine Corps  have issued strategic documents that discuss the importance of  improving naval integration, but the services have not developed a  joint strategy that defines and articulates common outcomes to  achieve naval integration. This first critical step will enable them to  fully incorporate other leading collaboration practices aimed at  achieving a common purpose.

Compatible policies, procedures, and systems. The Navy and  Marine Corps have not fully established compatible policies and  procedures, such as common training tasks and standards and  agreed-upon roles and responsibilities, to ensure their efforts to  achieve improved naval integration are consistent and sustained. We  also found that some of the Navy and Marine Corps’ systems for  managing and conducting integrated training are incompatible,  leading to inefficiencies in the process to manage unit-level training  events.

Leverage resources to maximize training opportunities. The  services are looking to better leverage available training resources for  amphibious operations. However, we identified examples of potential  training opportunities during surface warfare tactical training and  community relations events where enhancing the services’  collaborative efforts could take greater advantage of available training  time for amphibious operations.

Mechanisms to monitor results and reinforce accountability. The  Navy and Marine have not developed mechanisms to monitor,  evaluate, and report on results in improving naval integration and to  align efforts to maximize training opportunities. Service-level strategy  documents establish critical tasks to improve naval integration, but do  not constitute a process or mechanism to jointly reinforce  accountability for their naval integration efforts.

In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Navy and  Marine Corps clarify the organizations responsible and set time frames to  define and articulate common outcomes for naval integration, and use  those outcomes to develop a joint strategy, more fully establish  compatible policies, procedures, and systems, better leverage training  resources, and establish mechanisms to monitor results. DOD concurred  with the recommendation and stated it will develop mutual service naval  integration terminology, and training resource application and  organizational monitoring constructs to achieve common amphibious  operations training outcomes.

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

For questions about this statement, please contact Cary Russell at   (202) 512-5431, or at russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony  are Matt Ullengren and Russell Bryan. Other staff who made contributions  to the report cited in this testimony are identified in the source product.

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Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits

The federal government faces a long- term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. While addressing this imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term opportunities exist in a number of areas to improve this situation, including where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.

To call attention to these opportunities, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to identify and report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or government-wide—that have duplicative goals or activities.

GAO also identifies areas that are fragmented or overlapping and additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collection. GAO's 2018 annual report is its eighth in this series ( GAO-18-371SP ).

new areas identified in GAO's 2018 annual report;

the progress made in addressing actions GAO identified in its 2011 to 2017 reports; and

To identify what actions exist to address these issues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration.

GAO's 2018 annual report identifies 68 new actions that Congress or executive branch agencies can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 23 new program areas. For example:

The Department of Defense (DOD) could potentially save approximately

$527 million over 5 years by minimizing unnecessary overlap and duplication in its U.S. distribution centers for troop support goods.

The Department of Energy may be able to reduce certain risks and save tens of billions of dollars by adopting alternative approaches to treat a portion of its low-activity radioactive waste at its Hanford Site.

The Department of Veterans Affairs could potentially save tens of millions of dollars when acquiring medical and surgical supplies by better adhering to supply chain practices of leading hospitals.

The Coast Guard should close its boat stations that provide unnecessarily duplicative search and rescue coverage to improve operations and potentially save millions of dollars .

Significant progress has been made in addressing many of the 724 actions that GAO identified from 2011 to 2017. As of March 2018, Congress and executive branch agencies have fully or partially addressed 551 (76 percent) of these actions. This has resulted in about $178 billion in financial benefits, of which $125 billion has been realized and at least an additional $53 billion is estimated to accrue. These estimates are based on a variety of sources that considered different time periods, assumptions, and methodologies. GAO estimates that tens of billions of additional dollars could be saved should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address the remaining 365 open actions, including the 68 new ones identified in 2018.

Further steps are needed to fully address these remaining actions. For example:

Congress and the Internal Revenue Service could realize hundreds of millions of dollars in savings and increased revenues by enhancing online services and improving efforts to prevent identity theft refund fraud.

Medicare could save $1 to 2 billion annually if Congress equalized the rates paid for certain health care services, which often vary depending on where the service is performed.

DOD could achieve billions of dollars in savings over the next several years by continuing to employ best management practices on its weapon systems acquisition programs.

Congress could consider modifying how Medicare pays certain cancer hospitals to achieve almost $500 million annually in program savings.

The Social Security Administration could help prevent the loss of billions of dollars by preventing overpayments to beneficiaries of the Disability Insurance program and improper waivers of beneficiaries' overpayment debt.

Congress could consider modifying tobacco tax rates to eliminate significant tax differentials between similar products to address future revenue losses caused by manufacturers and consumers substituting tobacco products. Federal losses ranged from $2.6 to 3.7 billion between April 2009 and February 2014.

The federal government faces an unsustainable long-term fiscal path  based on an imbalance between federal revenue and spending, primarily  driven by health care spending and net interest on the debt. Addressing  this imbalance will require long-term changes to both spending and  revenue and difficult fiscal policy decisions. In the near term, however,  opportunities exist to take action in a number of areas to better manage  fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative federal agencies or programs;  achieve cost savings; or enhance revenues.

To call attention to these opportunities, Congress included a provision in  statute for us to identify and report to Congress on federal programs,  agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or  government-wide—that have duplicative goals or activities. These  reports are issued annually to the House and Senate.

In our first seven annual reports issued from 2011 to 2017, we presented  724 actions in 278 areas for Congress or executive branch agencies to  reduce, eliminate, or better manage fragmentation, overlap, or  duplication; achieve cost savings; or enhance revenue. To date,  Congress and executive branch agencies have partially or fully addressed  551 (76 percent) of the actions we identified from 2011 to 2017, resulting  in about $178 billion in financial benefits. We estimate that tens of billions  more dollars could be saved by fully implementing our open actions.

Our 2018 report, which we released on April 26, 2018, presents 68 new  actions across 23 new program areas for Congress or executive branch  agencies to reduce, eliminate, or better manage fragmentation, overlap,  and duplication and achieve other financial benefits. My testimony today  describes (1) new issues identified in our 2018 annual report; (2) the  progress made in addressing actions identified in our past reports; and (3)  examples of open actions directed to Congress or executive branch  agencies.

My comments are based upon our 2018 annual report, as well as our  update on the progress made in implementing actions that we have  suggested in our previous annual reports. These efforts are based on  work we previously conducted in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. More details on our scope and  methodology can be found in the full report.

Figure 1 outlines the definitions we use for fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication for this work.

On April 26, 2018 we released the latest updates to our Action Tracker  (see sidebar). Our tracker includes a downloadable spreadsheet  (available in XLSX or CSV formats) that users can sort and filter based on  their specific needs or interests. For example, areas and actions can be  sorted by the year identified, mission area name, implementation status,  and implementing entities (Congress or specific agencies).

GAO’s Action Tracker, a publicly accessible  w ebsite, allows Congress, executive branch  agencies, and the public to track the  government’s progress in addressing the  issues w e have identified. GAO updates the  Action Tracker twice a year, in the spring and  fall.  Click here to access GAO’s online Action  Tracker and downloadable spreadsheet  (available in XLSX or CSV formats).

Over 25 of the 68 new actions we identified in our annual report concern  fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in government missions and  functions (see table 1).

In addition, our 2018 report presents over 30 new opportunities for  Congress or executive branch agencies to reduce the cost of government  operations or enhance revenue collections for the U.S. Treasury across  10 areas of government (see table 2).

In addition to these new areas, we identified seven new actions that relate  to six existing areas presented in our 2011 to 2017 annual reports (see  table 3).

Since our 2018 report was issued, we reported in April 2018 that four of  the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare prior  authorization programs potentially reduced spending by as much as $1.9  billion from September 2012 through March 2017. However, most of  these programs, which ensure that Medicare coverage and payment rules  have been met before the agency pays for selected items and services,  such as certain wheelchairs, are either paused or will end in 2018. CMS  does not have plans to extend these programs or expand the use of prior  authorization to additional items and services.

We recommended that CMS should take steps, based on results from  evaluations, to continue prior authorization. The Department of Health  and Human Services (HHS) neither agreed nor disagreed with the  recommendation but said it would continue to evaluate prior authorization programs and take our findings and recommendations into consideration  in determining next steps. We believe continued use of prior authorization  for certain items and services—determined by lessons learned from  existing prior authorization programs—could significantly reduce  unnecessary Medicare spending.

Congress and Executive Branch Agencies Continue to Address Actions That Span the Federal Government

We monitor the progress that Congress and executive branch agencies  have made in addressing the issues we identified in each of our last  seven annual reports. As shown in table 4, Congress and executive  branch agencies have made consistent progress in addressing many of  the actions we identified from 2011 to 2017. As of March 2018, 376 (52  percent) of the actions we identified from 2011 to 2017 have been fully  addressed. See our online Action Tracker for the status of all actions.

Billions in Financial Benefits Due to Actions Taken by Congress and Executive Branch Agencies

The progress Congress and executive branch agencies have made in  addressing our open actions has resulted in $178 billion in financial  benefits, including roughly $125 billion in financial benefits from 2010  through 2017, with at least an additional $53 billion in estimated benefits  projected to accrue in 2018 or later. Table 5 highlights examples of  these results.

These financial benefits continue to grow as we identify and document  additional agency actions that respond to our recommendations. For  example, in recent months CMS has formalized changes to its oversight  of spending allowed for large Medicaid demonstrations, which allow  states to test new ways to deliver or pay for care. These demonstrations,  by HHS policy, should not raise federal costs over what the program  would have cost without the demonstration—that is, they should be  budget neutral. But our past work has shown that the spending HHS had  authorized for these demonstrations was much higher than what was  justified, as HHS had allowed states to use questionable methods when  proposing spending for their demonstrations.

CMS’s new policy partially responds to a longstanding recommendation  we have made to better ensure that valid methods are used to  demonstrate budget neutrality. We anticipate that CMS’s recent actions  could potentially reduce the federal government’s liability for Medicaid by  billions, or tens of billions, annually.

While not all actions result in financial benefits to taxpayers, all of our  suggested actions, when implemented, can result in other benefits—for  instance, they make government more efficient or eliminate, reduce, or  improve management of fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative  programs. For example, such benefits can be seen in the results of our  work on the government’s acquisition of space programs. For over two  decades, we and others have reported on problems caused by  fragmented leadership and a lack of a single authority in oversight of  these multibillion dollar programs.

In 2012, we made a recommendation aimed at strengthening leadership  and authority of space systems acquisitions. In response, in 2017 the  President revived the National Space Council to provide a coordinated  process for developing and monitoring the implementation of national  space policy and strategy. Separately, in the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Congress made changes to  certain DOD space leadership positions and required the department to  conduct a review and identify a recommended organizational and  management structure for its national security space components, and  submit related reports. The act also required DOD to contract with a  federally funded research and development center not closely affiliated  with the Air Force to develop a plan to establish a separate military  department responsible for DOD national security space activities.  These actions could reduce fragmentation and speed decision making in  the development of a substantial investment in space systems.

Action on Remaining and New Areas Could Yield Significant Additional Benefits

While Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress  toward addressing the 798 total actions we have identified since 2011,  further steps are needed to fully address the 365 actions that are partially  addressed or not addressed. We estimate that tens of billions of dollars  in additional financial benefits could be realized should Congress and  executive branch agencies fully address open actions. In addition to  producing financial benefits, these actions make government more  efficient; improve major government programs or agencies; reduce the  risk of mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse; and increase  assurance that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent.

Significant Open Actions Directed to Congress

Congress has used our work to identify legislative solutions to achieve  cost savings, address emerging problems, and find efficiencies in federal  agencies and programs. Our work has contributed to a number of key  authorizations and appropriations. In addition, congressional oversight of  agencies’ efforts has been critical in realizing the full benefits of our  suggested actions addressed to the executive branch, and it will continue  to be critical in the future.

In our 2011 to 2018 annual reports, we directed 100 actions to Congress,  including the 3 new congressional actions we identified in 2018. Of the  100 actions, 58 remain open (11 of which were partially addressed and  47 were not addressed or new) as of March 2018. Table 6 highlights  areas with significant open actions directed to Congress. Appendix I has  a full list of all open congressional actions.

Significant Open Actions Directed to Executive Branch Agencies

In our 2011 to 2018 annual reports, we directed 698 actions to executive  branch agencies, including 65 new actions identified in 2018. Of the 698  actions, 307 remained open as of March 2018. Of these open actions,  164 were partially addressed and 143 were not addressed or new. While  these open actions span the government, a substantial number of them  are directed to seven agencies that made up 83 percent—$3.7 trillion—of  federal outlays in fiscal year 2017 and have the largest number of open  actions (see figures 2 and 3).

As shown in figure 3, seven agencies have at least 25 open actions.

The following sections highlight examples of open actions across those  seven major agencies.

More Efficiently Targeting Defense Resources

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 176 actions to DOD in areas that  center on DOD’s effectiveness in providing the military forces needed to  deter war and to protect the security of the United States. As of March  2018, 74 of these 176 actions remained open. DOD represented about 14  percent of federal spending in fiscal year 2017, with outlays totaling about  $635.5 billion. Our work suggests that effectively implementing these  open actions, including those related to areas listed in table 7, could yield  substantial financial benefits and improve DOD’s effectiveness.

Improving the Efficiency of Health Care Programs

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 111 actions to HHS in areas that  contribute to HHS’s mission to enhance the health and well-being of  Americans. HHS provides health coverage for over 145 million Americans  through three principal programs—Medicare, Medicaid, and the  Children’s Health Insurance Program—as well as the health-insurance  marketplaces. HHS also operates other public health-related agencies  such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease  Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health.

HHS represented about 27 percent of the fiscal year 2017 federal budget,  with outlays totaling about $1.2 trillion. As of March 2018, 56 of HHS’s  111 actions remained open. Our work suggests that effectively  implementing these actions, including those related to areas listed in table  8, could reduce costs, provide services more efficiently, and yield  substantial financial benefits.

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 91 actions to the Internal  Revenue Service (IRS) in areas that contribute to effectively and  efficiently providing high-quality service to taxpayers and enforcing the  law with integrity and fairness to all. As of March 2018, 38 of these 91  actions remained open. The funding of the federal government depends  largely upon IRS’s ability to collect taxes legally owed. Our work suggests  that effective implementation of our open actions, including those related  to areas listed in table 9, could increase revenues through better  compliance or reduce costs.

Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Homeland Security Operations

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 79 actions to the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) in areas that contribute to the effective  implementation of its mission. In fiscal year 2017, DHS spent about $63.6  billion, about 1.4 percent of federal outlays. As of March 2018, 31 of the  79 actions to DHS remained open. Fully implementing these actions,  including those related to areas listed in table 10, could result in financial  benefits and substantial improvements in agency operations.

Advancing the Implementation of Government-Wide Policies and Performance

Many of the results the federal government seeks to achieve require the  coordinated effort of more than one federal agency, level of government,  or sector. OMB manages and coordinates many government-wide efforts.  In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 66 actions to OMB in areas to  improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government-wide programs  and activities. As of March 2018, 30 of the 66 actions to OMB remained  open. Fully implementing these actions, including those related to areas  listed in table 11, could yield significant financial benefits and substantial  program improvements across government.

More Efficiently Administering Services to Retirees and Citizens with Disabilities

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 32 actions to the Social Security  Administration (SSA) in areas that contribute to SSA providing financial  assistance to eligible individuals through Social Security retirement and  disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments. As  of March 2018, 27 of these 32 actions remained open.

In fiscal year 2017, SSA spent about $1 trillion, roughly 22 percent of  federal outlays. While most of SSA’s funding is used to pay Social  Security retirement, survivors, and disability benefits from the Old-Age  and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust  Fund, our work suggests that effective implementation of these actions,  including the examples listed in table 12, could result in significant  benefits.

Improving Support and Services for Veterans

In our 2011 to 2018 reports, we directed 54 actions to the Department of  Veterans Affairs (VA) in areas that contribute to VA effectively and  efficiently achieving its mission to promote the health, welfare, and dignity  of all veterans by ensuring that they receive medical care, benefits, and  social support. As of March 2018, 25 of these 54 actions remained open.  In fiscal year 2017, VA spent about $183.0 billion—about 4 percent of  federal outlays—for veterans’ benefits and services. Our work suggests  that effective implementation of these actions, including those related to  areas listed in table 13, could yield cost savings and efficiencies that  would improve the delivery of services to the nation’s veterans and their  families.

We will continue to look for additional or emerging instances of  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and opportunities for cost savings  or revenue enhancement. Likewise, we will continue to monitor  developments in the areas we have already identified. We stand ready to  assist this and other committees in further analyzing the issues we have  identified and evaluating potential solutions.

Thank you, Chairman Enzi, Ranking Member Sanders, and Members of  the Committee; this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to answer questions.

For further information on this testimony or our April 26, 2018 report,  please contact J. Christopher Mihm, Managing  Director, Strategic Issues,  at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov, and Jessica Lucas-Judy, Director,  Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-9110 or lucasjudyj@gao.gov. Contact  points for the individual areas listed in our 2018 annual report can be  found at the end of each area in GAO-18-371SP. Contact points for our  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs offices may be found on the  last page of this statement.

Appendix I: Open Congressional Actions, by Mission

In our 2011 to 2018 annual reports, we directed 100 actions to Congress,  of which 58 remain open. Of the 58 open congressional actions, 11 are  partially addressed and 47 are not addressed or new, as of March 2018.  See table 14.

Every year, we identify and report on federal agencies, programs, and initiatives with fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative goals or activities; and ways to reduce costs or enhance revenue. The government saves money when it takes the actions we've proposed—an estimated $178 billion so far by taking 52% of previously recommended actions.

We testified on our 8th annual report, in which we identified 68 new actions that Congress and executive branch agencies could take to improve operations across government.

Fully addressing these and remaining actions from our prior reports could lead to tens of billions of dollars of additional savings.