Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members' Time Away from Home

In 1999, Congress required DOD to monitor the time that individual service members spend away from home and set a threshold to limit excessive time away. At the time, the threshold was no more than 220 days served away from home in a 365-day period. In the interest of national security, in 2001 DOD exercised a provision in the law and waived the requirement to limit time away for service members. Recently, DOD leaders have stated that the continued high pace of military operations have limited their ability to rebuild readiness.

Senate Report 114-255 includes a provision for GAO to review the root causes of degraded readiness, including reviewing DOD's management of perstempo. This report assesses the extent to which DOD, the services, and SOCOM have (1) policies with specific and measurable thresholds on perstempo and (2) reliable data to monitor perstempo.

GAO analyzed DOD, service, and SOCOM perstempo policies and analyzed DOD-wide perstempo data for fiscal years 2012-2016.

The Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) policies vary in identifying specific and measurable thresholds on the total time individual service members can be away from home, known as personnel tempo or “perstempo.” DOD's policy issued in 2013 states that service members should not be deployed for longer than they are at home. However, the policy does not set thresholds for perstempo, which includes time away from home for exercises and training in addition to deployment. Service members are sometimes away from home for long periods for training, exercises, or other activities. For example, Air Force officials told GAO that F-16 pilots participate in multiple exercises every year that require them to spend significant time away from home. The Navy and SOCOM set specific and measurable perstempo thresholds in policy in 2014 and 2016, respectively. However, the other services either are not enforcing or have not established specific and measurable perstempo thresholds in their policies. DOD has maintained the waiver of statutory perstempo thresholds since 2001, and officials have cited the effect of the high pace of operations and training on service members; however, DOD has not taken action to focus attention on the management of perstempo thresholds within the services and department-wide. Unless DOD ensures that perstempo thresholds are established and followed while statutory thresholds are waived, DOD will be unable to judge whether service members are spending too much total time away from home and, if so, whether this has resulted in any associated effects on military readiness.

DOD does not have reliable data to monitor perstempo because the data are incomplete. Based on available DOD-wide data, GAO estimated that for fiscal year 2016 at least 51,000 service personnel spent more than 7 months away from home. However, that number is conservative because the analysis is limited by incomplete data. Specifically:

DOD analysis shows that perstempo records are missing for at least 145,000 personnel who deployed in fiscal years 2014-2016.

For fiscal years 2012-2016, 30 percent of DOD's perstempo records were missing information that identifies service members' occupations, 14 percent were missing information that identifies the purpose of the perstempo events, and 8 percent were missing information that identifies the category of perstempo events.

The Navy identified about 13,000 personnel who spent more than 220 days away from home in fiscal year 2016 but were not accounted for in the DOD-wide data, and DOD officials could not explain why they were missing.

Without taking steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data, DOD will be limited in its ability to assess the amount of time service members are serving away from home for all perstempo events and in its ability to use that information to assist in gauging the stress on the force.

GAO recommends that DOD (1) clarify its policy to include specific and measurable department-wide perstempo thresholds for use while statutory thresholds are waived or ensure service-level policies are established and followed, and (2) take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

For more than a decade, Congress and the military services have  reported low readiness levels, which they attribute partly to the pace of  military operations. In 1999, Congress addressed the pace of military  operations at that time by codifying thresholds for the amount of time  individual service members serve on duty away from their homes—known  as “personnel tempo” or “perstempo.” The 1999 law required the  Secretary of each military department to provide extra pay for service  members who exceeded a certain threshold, required senior Department  of Defense (DOD) officials to provide approval for service members to  exceed these thresholds, and required the Secretary of each military  department to record the number of perstempo days for each service  member. However, in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist  attacks, the Deputy Secretary of Defense exercised a provision in the law  and issued a memorandum in October 2001 that waived the perstempo  thresholds and the requirement that senior DOD officials provide approval  when service members exceed the perstempo thresholds.

While senior DOD leaders have kept the waiver in place, they have also  expressed concern that the high pace of military operations has had a  negative effect on readiness. For example, in June 2017, the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that since September 11, 2001, the U.S.  military has had an extraordinarily high pace of operations, which has had  a negative effect on readiness. In February 2017, the Vice Chief of Staff  of the Army testified in a congressional hearing that the pace of  operations has had a negative effect on the Army’s readiness including  the readiness of Brigade Combat Teams and Combat Aviation Brigades.

In November 2017, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Air  Force testified that 26 years of operations had taken a toll on Air Force  personnel, which has affected the Air Force’s readiness. In May 2017,  the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)  testified that managing the pace of operations was essential to enabling  special forces to maintain their readiness. Finally, in September 2017, in  a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the  Navy ship collisions that occurred earlier that year, the Chief of Naval  Operations explained—and later investigations by the Navy confirmed— that the pace of operations had contributed to deadly accidents in the  Pacific.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness to monitor the tempo of the armed forces, and  DOD guidance requires the military services to track perstempo data.  Section 991 of title 10 distinguishes between unit operations and  individual service members’ time away from home when discussing  tempo. “Perstempo” refers to the amount of time individual service  members serve on official duty at a location or under circumstances that  make it infeasible for them to spend off-duty time in the housing in which  they reside. “Operational tempo” refers to the rate at which military units  are involved in all military activities, including contingency operations,  exercises, and training deployments. While DOD has made considerable  efforts to manage operational tempo for units, managing the impact of  perstempo on individual service members has been a long-standing issue  for DOD. Our work has shown that the department has faced challenges  establishing perstempo-related policies; determining the time individual  service members should spend away from home; and managing  perstempo data, as discussed later in the report.

Senate Report 114-255, accompanying a bill for the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for us to  address the root causes of degraded readiness, including reviewing the  way DOD has managed perstempo in mobilizing and deploying its  forces. This report assesses the extent to which DOD, the services, and  SOCOM have (1) policies in place with specific and measurable  thresholds on perstempo and (2) reliable data to monitor perstempo.

For both objectives, we interviewed officials responsible for perstempo  policies and data in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation, personnel and operations offices at the military services’  headquarters, SOCOM, and the Defense Manpower Data Center. In  addition, we compared the evidence we collected with criteria in the  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government related to  setting specific and measurable objectives and using quality information  to determine whether objectives are being achieved.

For objective one, we reviewed policies issued by the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the military services,  and SOCOM to determine whether each had specific and measurable  objectives related to perstempo thresholds. We reviewed policies issued  by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness because it is responsible for monitoring the perstempo of the  armed forces. We reviewed policies issued by the services and SOCOM  because each of these organizations is responsible for tracking and  reporting the amount of time service members serve away from home.  We also analyzed statements that senior DOD leaders have made in  congressional hearings about the relationship between perstempo,  operational tempo, and readiness.

For objective two, we assessed the reliability of perstempo data from the  Defense Manpower Data Center, which maintains a centralized database  of perstempo data. We obtained and analyzed perstempo data from the  Defense Manpower Data Center for active duty military personnel from  the four military services for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. We selected  this time period to maximize the amount of available data for us to  determine trends in rates of perstempo. To conduct reliability  assessments, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed  agency officials, including those who attempted but were not able to use  perstempo data in their analyses. We also analyzed the perstempo data  provided by the Defense Manpower and Data Center to identify the  number and percentage of records that were missing entries. Although  these analyses showed that the perstempo data were incomplete, we  found that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of providing a  conservative estimate of the minimum number of service members with  high rates of perstempo. Further, we analyzed perstempo data from the  Navy to determine whether the Navy’s data corresponded with the  perstempo data maintained by the Defense Manpower and Data Center.  We found that the Navy’s perstempo data were also incomplete but were  sufficiently reliable to provide a conservative estimate of the minimum  number of Navy personnel with high rates of perstempo. To mitigate the  limitations in both sets of perstempo data, we present perstempo  statistics rounded to the nearest thousands rather than the actual  statistics we calculated from the data.

In addition, we analyzed the reliability of the Navy’s perstempo waiver  data, and data from the Defense Manpower Data Center on the number  of service members who did not have a perstempo record but participated  in a perstempo event. To assess the Navy’s perstempo waiver data, we  compared data collected by the Navy on the number of personnel who  obtained a waiver to exceed the Navy’s perstempo threshold to data from  the Defense Manpower Data Center showing the number of Navy  personnel with high rates of perstempo to determine if the Navy waiver  data were complete. We found that these data were incomplete, but were  sufficiently reliable to provide a conservative estimate of the minimum  number of Navy personnel who had obtained a waiver to exceed the  Navy’s perstempo threshold. To mitigate the limitations in the Navy’s  perstempo waiver data, we present data rounded to the nearest  thousands rather than the actual data. Finally, we assessed the reliability  of data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center that indicated the  number of individuals who deployed in fiscal years 2014-2016 and should  have had a perstempo record. To obtain these data, the Defense  Manpower Data Center compared data from DOD’s Contingency  Tracking System with the perstempo database for fiscal years 2014  through 2016 to identify missing records. We assessed the reliability of  the relevant portions of the Contingency Tracking System and the  perstempo database needed to complete this analysis. We also reviewed  documentation of the analysis and interviewed the analysts who  performed the work. We concluded that the underlying data were  sufficiently reliable and the analysis was appropriate for reporting the  number of persons who participated in a perstempo event but did not  have a perstempo record for this time period.

We used the perstempo data we obtained from the Defense Manpower  Data Center to calculate the time service members served away from  home in fiscal year 2016. We calculated data for fiscal year 2016 because  these were the most recent data available for a complete fiscal year at the  time we conducted our review. To calculate the time service members  served away from home, we included time they served on operational  deployments, exercises, unit or home station training, and mission  support temporary duty. We compared the time served away from home  against the deployment perstempo threshold of 220 days in a 365-day  period that is established in law, but has been waived by DOD since  2001.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 to April 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD uses two related but distinct terms to differentiate between  individual service members’ time away from home versus unit  deployments:

Perstempo: The amount of time individual service members serve on  official duty at a location or under circumstances that make it  infeasible for them to spend off-duty time in the housing in which they  reside including for deployment events, such as operations, exercises,  and unit training, and non-deployment events, such as individual  training and hospitalization.

Operational tempo: The rate at which military units are involved in all  military activities, including contingency operations, exercises, and  training deployments.

Operational deployments are one type of deployment event, but do not  account for all of the time individuals spend away from home. As a result,  individual perstempo is typically higher than operational tempo.

Statutes and DOD Policy Regarding Perstempo

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 included a  provision that required the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to monitor the perstempo of the armed forces, and required  DOD to manage the number of days its service members are deployed.  Section 991 of title 10 defines “perstempo” as the amount of time  members of the armed forces are engaged in their official duties at a  location or under circumstances that make it infeasible for a member to  spend off-duty time in the housing in which the member resides. The law  establishes thresholds for deployment perstempo events—220  deployment perstempo days in a 365-day period and 400 deployment  perstempo days in a 730-day period. The law also requires the  Secretary of Defense or a delegated official to approve when service  members exceed these thresholds, and requires DOD to establish a  system for tracking and recording the number of deployment perstempo  days for each member of the armed forces. Additionally, DOD obtained  the statutory authority to pay service members an allowance for lengthy  or numerous deployment perstempo events. Congress authorized DOD  to waive the deployment perstempo thresholds and recordkeeping  requirement, which in turn would prohibit the payment of high-deployment  allowances, if the department found that the waiver is necessary in the  interests of national security. See figure 1 for a timeline of these and  additional congressional and DOD actions related to perstempo.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense issued a memorandum that suspended the requirements to  manage deployment days for service members and the payment of high- deployment allowances. As a matter of DOD policy, the memorandum did  not suspend the recordkeeping requirement included in section 991 of  title 10. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness issued an instruction that described policy, responsibilities,  procedures, and information requirements for reporting of active duty  military personnel records, and this instruction included requirements for  perstempo reporting. In 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness issued another instruction, DOD Instruction  1336.07, that was focused on the reporting of perstempo and the  instruction identifies responsibilities, procedures, and information- reporting requirements for perstempo. In particular, DOD Instruction  1336.07 states that the:

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is  responsible for providing overall policy guidance for DOD reporting of  all perstempo events;

Director of the Defense Human Resources Activity, through the  Defense Manpower Data Center, is required to maintain a perstempo  events database;

Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for  implementing these reporting requirements whenever service  members participate in or are associated with a perstempo event or  activity; and  services must record all perstempo events, including deployment  events such as operations, exercises, and unit training as well as non- deployment events such as individual training and hospitalization.

In November 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness issued a memorandum conveying that the amount of time that  a unit, detachment, or individual service member can be operationally  deployed should be equal to or less than the amount of time not  deployed. Operational deployments are one of the deployment  perstempo events. The memorandum also requires the military services  to register perstempo events. DOD’s stated intent in the memorandum  was for commanders at every level to ensure that individual service  members, regardless of unit assignment, are not repeatedly exposed to  combat, do not experience disproportionate deployments, and do not  spend extended periods of time away from home unless required by  operational necessity.

Prior Work on Perstempo and DOD Readiness

We have reported on perstempo and readiness in multiple prior reports.  For example, in 1996 we reported on DOD’s actions to mitigate the  impact of high perstempo, including efforts to create systems for  measuring perstempo. We reported that DOD had not issued  regulations for the long-term management of perstempo and had not  directed the services to have policies that limit perstempo. Further, we  reported that it was difficult for DOD to determine the amount of  perstempo time for military personnel for multiple reasons, including that  the services had different systems for tracking deployments. We  recommended that DOD (1) issue guidance on managing perstempo that  states whether each service should have a goal for the maximum  perstempo time for personnel and (2) issue regulations defining the  minimum perstempo data that each service must collect and maintain.  DOD concurred with these recommendations and, as we noted earlier,  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued  DOD Instruction 1336.5 in 2001 that described policy, responsibilities,  procedures, and information requirements for perstempo reporting.  However, our recommendation has not been fully implemented because  DOD Instruction 1336.5 did not include guidance on managing perstempo  that states whether each service should have a goal for the maximum  perstempo time for personnel, as discussed later in the report.

In 2007, we found that Army and Marine Corps perstempo data were  incomplete and inaccurate due to a lack of quality controls. We  recommended that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness provide guidance that directs the Army and  Marine Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the  accuracy of the perstempo data. DOD concurred with our  recommendation and in 2009 issued DOD Instruction 1336.07; however,  our recommendation has not been fully implemented because the  instruction did not provide guidance that directs the Army and Marine  Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the accuracy of  perstempo data, as discussed later in the report.

Finally, our work has identified several challenges with readiness  rebuilding due in part to the high pace of operations that drives up  perstempo. In 2016, we reported that the global security environment will  likely continue to require significant reliance on U.S. military forces to  respond to a range of demands, and the military services have attributed  low readiness levels to increasingly long and frequent deployments,  reduced force structure, and continuing and emerging demands. We also reported that DOD implementation and oversight of department-wide  readiness rebuilding efforts did not fully include key elements of sound  planning. We recommended, among other things, that DOD and the  services establish comprehensive readiness goals and strategies for  implementing them, as well as associated metrics that can be used to  evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended  outcomes. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and the  department has taken some steps to improve the readiness of the military  forces, but it has not yet taken steps to fully implement our  recommendations.

DOD, Service, and SOCOM Policies Vary in Identifying Perstempo Thresholds for Service Members

DOD, service, and SOCOM policies vary in identifying specific and  measurable thresholds on perstempo for individual service members.  DOD policy focuses on time away for deployment, which is a part of  perstempo but does not encompass the full range of activities that can  take service members away from home. Specifically, a 2013  memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness states that individual service members should not be deployed  longer than they are at their home station. However, the memorandum  describes perstempo only in general terms—stating that individual service  members should not serve extended periods of time away from their  homestation unless required by operational necessity. An official in the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness  acknowledged that the department has not defined DOD’s perstempo  threshold—to encompass non-deployment events—in specific and  measurable terms and has not directed the services to establish such  perstempo thresholds.

The Navy and SOCOM have established perstempo thresholds in their  policies and clarified which types of perstempo events apply to their  thresholds. While these policies vary slightly, both the Navy and SOCOM  describe in their policies the need to balance the pace of operations with  the quality of life of their service members. More specifically:

Navy: In 2014, the Navy issued an instruction that includes a  perstempo threshold that identifies the number of days that individual  Navy service members may serve away from home. The Navy’s  instruction established a threshold of 220 days in a 365-day period or  400 days in a 730-day period. The Navy’s instruction also identified  that the threshold applies to all deployment perstempo events—which  comprise operations, exercises, unit training, temporary duty, and  homestation training.

Special Operations Command: In 2016, SOCOM issued a policy  memorandum that establishes a perstempo threshold that identifies  the number of days that individual SOCOM service members may  serve away from home. The policy memorandum established a  perstempo threshold of 480 days in a 730-day period. SOCOM’s  policy memorandum also clarified that the threshold applies to both  deployment perstempo events (e.g., operational deployments and  exercises) and non-deployment perstempo events (e.g., serving as a  student or trainee at a school and performing administrative, guard, or  detail duties in garrison at the service member’s permanent duty  station).

In contrast, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are either not  enforcing or have not established a specific and measurable perstempo  threshold in their policies. Officials from these services told us that they  focus on managing the impact of deployments consistent with the 2013  memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, but noted that the memorandum does not set specific  perstempo limits. As a result, each service has taken a slightly different  approach:

Army: In 2015, the Army issued a regulation that identified the  number of days that a service member may spend away from home;  however, Army officials told us it is not being enforced. The regulation  updated the Army’s policy to include a perstempo threshold. The  regulation also defined the events that could be counted toward that  threshold and included a provision for the Army to manage its  personnel to that threshold. However, Army headquarters officials told  us that the Army is not enforcing this perstempo threshold and that  the Army only added these provisions to emphasize that collecting  perstempo data was a priority. According to the Army regulation, the  Secretary of the Army may suspend the applicability of this perstempo  program in the interest of national security, but Army headquarters  officials told us that the Secretary of the Army had not suspended the  perstempo program and the officials could not provide any official  action that suspended the requirement.

Air Force: The Air Force does not have a specific and measurable  perstempo threshold in policy. An Air Force personnel instruction  states that the Air Force considers service members who spend more  than 120 days on temporary duty to have a high perstempo.  However, Air Force headquarters officials told us that this policy does  not establish a threshold for the amount of time that Air Force  personnel may serve away from their homestation and that the Air  Force does not require units to manage the assignments of their  personnel to ensure that they do not spend more than 120 days on  temporary duty. Air Force headquarters officials told us that they did  not think they needed to include thresholds for perstempo in Air Force  policies expressed in specific, measurable terms because the Air  Force relies on unit commanders to manage the perstempo of  individual service members and they believed that a perstempo  threshold would affect a small number of their service members.

Marine Corps: The Marine Corps also does not have a specific and  measurable perstempo threshold in its policy, but its policy accounts  for perstempo time in determining individual service members’  eligibility for overseas deployments, among other things. For  example, Marine Corps Order 1300.8 adjusts and delays the date that  service members are scheduled to deploy overseas by the amount of  perstempo time accrued for those service members. The Marine  Corps also issued an administrative message directing unit  commanders to manage the perstempo of individual service  members. However, neither of these policies establishes a specific  and measurable perstempo threshold. Marine Corps officials told us  that it has studied the effects of high rates of perstempo on retention  and told us that these studies have not provided the Marine Corps  evidence that perstempo drives retention.

The approach taken by the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps— to focus primarily on deployments—reflects the focus placed on  deployments in DOD’s policy but this approach omits perstempo events,  such as training and exercises. Such activities can take service members  away from home for long periods. For example, Air Force officials told us  that F-16 pilots spend considerable amounts of time participating in  multiple exercises every year that require them to spend significant time  away from their homestation. Similarly, a 2011 study conducted by CNA  found that perstempo was very high for service members in the III Marine  Expeditionary Force in Okinawa and Hawaii because of the number of  exercises in which those service members participated. In particular, the  study found that service members in the III Marine Expeditionary Force  participate in over 70 exercises and training events per year. Additionally,  relying on unit commanders to monitor the perstempo of service members  without providing specific and measurable guidance leaves it to the  interpretation of unit commanders to define excessive time away.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  management should define objectives in specific and measurable terms  to enable it to identify risks to achieving those objectives. The standards  also state that specific terms are those that are fully and clearly set forth  so they can be easily understood, and measurable terms are those that  allow for the assessment of performance toward achieving objectives. As  we reported in 2007, shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, DOD  shifted its focus away from collecting and maintaining perstempo data  and began focusing on collecting and maintaining data to track  deployments related to major operations, which does not include the full  range of perstempo events. DOD continued this focus on managing  deployments versus perstempo in its issuance of the 2013 memorandum.

Furthermore, even as it has continued to waive the statutory perstempo  thresholds and cited the effect of the high pace of operations and training  on service members, DOD has not taken action to focus attention on the  management of perstempo thresholds within the services and DOD. As a  result, the services have taken differing approaches, with the Army, the  Air Force, and the Marine Corps having no specific and measurable  thresholds. Through providing specific and measurable department-wide  perstempo thresholds in DOD guidance or directing the services and  SOCOM to establish and follow service-specific thresholds for its service  members, DOD will be better able to judge whether service members are  spending too much total time away from home and, if so, whether there  have been any associated effects on military readiness.

DOD and the Services Do Not Have Reliable Data to Monitor Perstempo

DOD does not have reliable perstempo data, which limits its ability to  effectively monitor perstempo across the department. In part due to the  incompleteness of the perstempo data, an official within the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness told us that the  office cannot monitor perstempo even though section 136 of title 10  makes the office responsible for doing so. For example, a December  2017 Defense Manpower Data Center analysis indicated that perstempo  data are missing records for at least 145,000 individuals that deployed in  fiscal years 2014-2016. In addition, officials from the Office of Cost  Assessment and Program Evaluation told us that they attempted to  analyze the effects of high rates of perstempo on unit readiness in 2016  but that they were unable to draw conclusions from the analysis because,  among other things, the perstempo data were incomplete. Officials  explained that certain events were not captured in the perstempo data  consistently, such as Army rotations to a combined training center. Senior  service officials also told us that the analysis had limited usefulness due  to unreliable data.

Although data are incomplete, our analysis of available data indicates that  tens of thousands of service personnel experienced high rates of  perstempo in fiscal year 2016. Because the perstempo policies vary  widely, we anchored our analysis to the 220 days in a 365-day period  identified in the currently waived statutory threshold. Using that  benchmark, we estimate that at least 51,000 service personnel spent  more than 7 months away from their homestation in fiscal year 2016 (see  table 1).

Moreover, we believe these numbers may be far higher because our  analysis is limited by incomplete perstempo data as stated above.  Additionally, our estimate likely understates the number of  servicemembers as we excluded records from our analysis because they  were missing an end date in the data system for the perstempo event.

Further, we found that the perstempo records we analyzed for fiscal years  2012 through 2016 were also missing other information, which limits the  utility of the data for users and decision makers. For example, we found  that 30 percent of perstempo records for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  were missing information that identifies the service member’s occupation,  14 percent were missing information that identifies the purpose of the  perstempo event, and 8 percent were missing information that identifies  the category of perstempo event.

Incomplete and unreliable data have presented management problems,  particularly for the Navy and SOCOM as they have sought to manage the  perstempo of their service members. For example, a Naval Personnel  Command official who oversees the Navy’s perstempo program told us  that the 18,000 Navy personnel with more than 220 perstempo days in  fiscal year 2016—that we estimated using Defense Manpower Data  Center data—likely significantly understates the actual number of Navy  personnel with high rates of perstempo. The official stated that the Navy’s  data showed that more than 31,000 Navy service members were away  from home more than 220 days in fiscal year 2016—a difference of about  13,000 personnel. Officials from the Navy and Defense Manpower Data  Center were unable to explain the discrepancy. Moreover, Navy officials  told us that the Navy oversees perstempo by requiring subordinate  commands to obtain waivers when service members exceed 220 days in  a year. However, the Navy had waivers for about 6,000 personnel in  2016, or only about one-fifth of the personnel the Navy’s own data  indicated were gone more than 220 days. To address this, the Navy  Personnel Command official told us that the Navy plans to establish an  automated system to verify that Navy service members who have  exceeded the Navy’s 220-day perstempo threshold have a waiver.

In addition, a SOCOM headquarters official told us that the command  does not have reliable perstempo data on its service members because  of limitations in the command’s information technology system. As a  result, SOCOM does not currently have the ability to determine whether  its units are adhering to the SOCOM perstempo threshold. The official  told us that SOCOM is working to address the problem with this  information technology system.

We previously reported on challenges DOD has had with collecting  reliable perstempo data in 1996 and 2007. While the department has  made some progress, the reliability of perstempo data has remained a  persistent challenge for the department. In 1996, we reported that DOD  could not measure the increase in time away from home because no  department-wide data system existed to track it. DOD generally agreed  with our findings and recommendations and indicated that it had taken,  and would continue to take, initiatives to manage perstempo. In 2007, we  reported that Army and Marine Corps perstempo data were inaccurate  and incomplete because of the lack of quality controls. We  recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness provide guidance directing the Army and Marine Corps to  develop quality control procedures for validating the accuracy of the  perstempo data they collect and report to the Defense Manpower Data  Center. The department concurred with the recommendation and issued  an instruction in 2009 that required the services to report perstempo data  to the Defense Manpower Data Center. However, the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has not fully implemented our  recommendation because the instruction did not direct the Army and  Marine Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the  accuracy of their perstempo data.

The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that  management should use quality information to achieve its objectives and  that such information should be complete and accurate. The underlying  reason that perstempo data are not reliable is that DOD has not  emphasized the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data.  Specifically, an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness told us that the office last reviewed  perstempo data in 2012 and, at that time, determined that these data  were not fully reliable. The official also told us that to address this  challenge the office reiterated the requirement that the services must  collect perstempo data in its 2013 memorandum, but the memorandum  did not emphasize that the perstempo data collected should be complete  and reliable. Without taking steps to improve the quality of its perstempo  data, DOD will be limited in its ability to assess the amount of time service  members are serving away from home for all perstempo events and use  that information to assist them in monitoring and gauging the stress on  the force.

In the years since 2001, senior DOD leaders have expressed concern  about the impact of a high pace of military operations and the high pace  has continued for portions of the force. DOD has taken steps to limit  operational deployments for individual service members, but has been  less focused on the impact of total time away from home on personnel,  commonly called perstempo. Total time away from home includes the  training and other activities that can take service members away from  home for long periods.

DOD has two primary and long-standing challenges in managing  perstempo: setting clear policy and gathering reliable data. First, DOD  has not established a perstempo policy with specific and measurable  thresholds even as it has waived a statutory requirement that sets such  thresholds. In the absence of clear and specific guidance, the Navy and  SOCOM have set their own thresholds. By contrast, the Army set a  threshold but does not enforce it and the limits for Air Force and Marine  Corps service members are unclear. Unless DOD ensures that  perstempo thresholds are established and followed across the  department in specific and measurable terms, DOD will be unable to  judge when individual service members are spending too much time away  from home. Second, perstempo data are unreliable across the  department—primarily because they are incomplete—but high perstempo  is affecting tens of thousands of personnel. For example, available data  indicate that at least 51,000 active duty personnel spent more than 7  months per year away from home in fiscal year 2016, and the number  may be considerably higher. Incomplete perstempo data are a persistent  problem that continues to hamper efforts to oversee the impact of time on  duty away from home on individual service members. Until DOD and the  military services take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and  reliable perstempo data, DOD will be limited in its ability to oversee the  time its personnel are spending away from home or gauge the stress on  the force.

We are making two recommendations to DOD.

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries  of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine  Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, clarify its guidance on  perstempo thresholds as long as the statutory thresholds are waived by  either establishing specific and measurable department-wide perstempo  thresholds in DOD policy or ensuring that the Army, the Air Force, and the  Marine Corps establish and follow their own service-specific guidance on  thresholds. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries  of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine  Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, take steps to  emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data so that  DOD, the services, and SOCOM can monitor perstempo.  (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments, DOD concurred with our two recommendations. DOD  separately provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in  appendix I.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Personnel and Readiness; the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army,  and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Commanding General of SOCOM. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant  Director; Suellen Foth; Mae Jones; James P. Klein; Amie Lesser; Ricardo  Marquez; Shari Nikoo; Joshua Parr; and Michael Silver made key  contributions to this report.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet. GAO-17-809T.  Washington D.C.: September 19, 2017.

Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance,  Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-798T.  Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017.

Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk  without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2016.

Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency  of Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments.  GAO-15-571. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2015.

Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Perstempo Data and Needs  Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy. GAO-07-780. Washington,  D.C.: July 17, 2007.

Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of  Frequently Deployed Units. NSIAD-96-105. Washington, D.C.: April 8,  1996.