National Security: Ongoing Review of the Military Selective Service Process Could Benefit from Additional Information

The Military Selective Service Act established the Selective Service System whose mission, among other things, is to be prepared to provide trained and untrained manpower to DOD in the event of a national emergency when directed by the President and the Congress. In the NDAA for FY 2017, Congress included a provision requiring that DOD submit a report on the current and future need for a centralized registration system under the Military Selective Service Act. In addition, the act established a Commission to review, among other things, the military selective service process and report on it.

The act also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's procedures for evaluating selective service requirements. In this report, GAO compared the information DOD included in its report with the act's required elements and identified additional information that could benefit the Commission as it further reviews the military selective service process.

GAO reviewed DOD's report and the statutory elements and interviewed officials involved in the military selective service process to identify additional information that could benefit the Commission's ongoing review.

In its July 2017 report to Congress and the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (i.e., “the Commission”), the Department of Defense (DOD) provided information regarding each of the six required reporting elements contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Specifically, DOD provided information on:

1. the direct and indirect benefits of the military selective service system;

2. the functions performed by the Selective Service System that would be assumed by DOD in the absence of a national registration system;

3. the systems, manpower, and facilities needed by DOD to physically mobilize inductees in the absence of the Selective Service System;

4. the feasibility and the utility of eliminating the focus on the mass mobilization of primarily combat troops in favor of a system that focuses on the mobilization of military occupational specialties, and the extent to which such a change would impact the need for both male and female inductees;

5. DOD's personnel needs in the event of an emergency requiring mass mobilization; an analysis of any additional critical skills that would be needed in the event of a national emergency; and a timeline for when DOD would require the first inductees to report for service; and

6. a list of the assumptions used by DOD to conduct its analysis.

GAO identified additional information that may benefit the Commission's ongoing evaluation of the military selective service process. The fifth required reporting element required DOD to analyze its personnel needs in the event of an emergency requiring mass mobilization and a timeline for obtaining these inductees. In response, DOD provided the personnel requirements and timeline that were developed in 1994 and that have not been updated since. DOD officials stated that they did not conduct additional analysis to update these requirements because the all-volunteer force is of adequate size and composition to meet DOD's personnel needs. In 2012, GAO recommended that DOD establish a process to periodically reevaluate DOD's requirements for the Selective Service System. Although DOD concurred with this recommendation, it has not yet implemented it. GAO believes this recommendation is still valid. Having updated DOD Selective Service System requirements and timelines for a potential draft may be useful in supporting the ongoing evaluation of the military selective service process by the Commission.

Further, military service officials told GAO that their perspectives on how selective service processes that could affect them had not been solicited in the preparation of DOD's report. Since the military services are to receive, train and integrate the inductees; provide support to the Selective Service System during a national emergency; and could help identify critical skill sets needed to meet emerging demands and the impact a draft could have on meeting those demands, the military service officials' perspectives could be useful to the Commission. DOD officials stated that they are currently collecting these perspectives and plan to provide this information to the Commission.

GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO believes its 2012 recommendation to DOD to periodically reevaluate its requirements for the Selective Service System, which DOD concurred with, is still valid. DOD had no additional comments on this report.

The Military Selective Service Act established the Selective Service  System whose mission, among other things, is to be prepared to provide  trained and untrained manpower to the Department of Defense (DOD) in  the event of a national emergency when directed by the President and the  Congress. The Selective Service System, an independent executive  branch agency with a budget of about $25 million, maintains a registration  database of individuals who could be drafted into the service of our  nation, if needed, in the event of a national emergency.

In 2012, we reported on the military necessity of the Selective Service  System and examined alternatives to its current structure. We found that  because of DOD’s reliance and emphasis on using the all-volunteer force,  DOD had not reevaluated requirements for the Selective Service System  since 1994, even though the national security environment had changed  significantly since that time. In our report, we recommended that DOD (1)  evaluate DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service System in light of  recent strategic guidance and report the results to Congress; and (2)  establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD’s requirements for  the Selective Service System in light of changing threats, operating  environments, and strategic guidance. DOD concurred with these  recommendations and in response implemented the first recommendation  in February 2013. At that time, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Readiness and Force Management reported that it had  reevaluated the mission and military necessity for the Selective Service  System and concluded that the all-volunteer force was of adequate size  and composition to meet the department’s demands, and that there were  no operational plans that envision mobilization at a level that would  require conscription. Additionally, the reevaluation showed that although  there was no longer an immediate “military” necessity for the Selective  Service System, there continued to be a “national” necessity for it  because it provides the structure that would allow the military services to  more rapidly increase their size if that became necessary. As of  November 2017, DOD had not implemented our second  recommendation, as discussed later in this report.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017  established the National Commission on Military, National, and Public  Service (the “Commission”) to, among other things, review the military  selective service process. Composed of 11 members, the Commission is  to submit a report to the President and Congress no later than 30 months  after its establishment date on its findings, conclusions, and  recommendations regarding the need for a military selective service  process and a means by which to foster a greater propensity to serve  among U.S. youth, among other things. To inform the Commission’s  efforts, the NDAA for FY 2017 also included a provision that the Secretary  of Defense report to Congress and the Commission on the current and  future need for a centralized registration system under the Military  Selective Service Act. Specifically, DOD’s report was to address six  elements related to the Selective Service System process. DOD  submitted its report to Congress and the Commission in July 2017.

The NDAA for FY 2017 also included a provision for us to review DOD’s  procedures for evaluating selective service requirements. Specifically, we  compared the information that DOD included in its report with the act’s six  required reporting elements and identified additional information that  could benefit the Commission in its ongoing review of the military  selective service process.

To address our objective, we compared the six reporting elements  required by the NDAA for FY 2017 with the report DOD produced to meet  the congressional mandate. We also discussed with officials within the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve  Affairs, who developed the report, what information they used and what  analysis they performed to support their responses to each of the  required reporting elements. Additionally, we examined documentary  evidence cited in the report or that was provided by officials. Further, we  interviewed officials with whom the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs consulted to prepare the  report. Specifically, we met with officials from the Office of the Deputy  General Counsel for Personnel and Health Policy, the Joint Advertising  and Market Research Service, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Military Entrance  Processing Command, and the Selective Service System and discussed  the extent and nature of the information they provided and their  involvement in the development of the report. We also reviewed  documents, such as selected instructions, regulations, and  memorandums.

To identify any additional information that could benefit the Commission in  its ongoing review of the military selective service process, we spoke with  officials in organizations responsible for operating and maintaining the  selective service process, as well as those that would be involved in any  mass mobilization if a draft were utilized, to discuss topics that they  thought the report had not addressed. Further, we spoke with personnel  officials from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps to  obtain their assessment of DOD’s report and their insights into the  selective service and mass mobilization processes. We also reviewed a  previously issued GAO report regarding the Selective Service System  and related documents to determine whether DOD had implemented all  applicable recommendations. Finally, we interviewed the Chair and the  two Vice-Chairs of the National Commission on Military, National, and  Public Service to obtain their perspectives on DOD’s report.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to January 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Military Selective Service Act established the Selective Service  System whose mission is to be prepared to provide trained and untrained  manpower to DOD in the event of a national emergency when directed by  the President and the Congress. Additionally, the Selective Service  System is to be prepared to implement an alternative service program  within the civilian community for registrants classified as conscientious  objectors during a draft. The Selective Service System is an independent  agency, and it maintains a database that includes the names, birthdates,  social security numbers, and mailing addresses of men ages 18 through  25 who could be drafted into the service of our nation, if needed, in the  event of a national emergency. Further, the Selective Service System  also is to conduct peacetime activities, such as public registration  awareness and outreach; responding to public inquiries about registration  requirements; and providing training and support to its workforce of  career, non-career, full-time and part-time employees, uncompensated  employees, and selected military personnel.

The Military Selective Service Act does not currently authorize the use of  a draft for the induction of persons into the armed forces. In order to meet  a national emergency requiring a mass mobilization, Congress and the  President would be required to enact a law authorizing a draft to  supplement the existing force with additional military manpower. In the  event of a draft, the regulation governing the Military Entrance Processing  Stations would have the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, with input from the military services, provide the Director of  the Selective Service System with the number of personnel needed to be  drafted. The Selective Service System would then conduct a lottery and  send induction notices to selected draftees to supply the personnel  requested by the Secretary of Defense. Each draftee would be required to  report to one of DOD’s 65 Military Entrance Processing Stations  throughout the country at a specific time and date to undergo  assessments of their aptitude, character, and medical qualifications in  order to determine whether they are fit for military service based on  standards set by each military service. Fully qualified draftees would  receive induction orders and would be transported from one of the Military  Entrance Processing Stations to the appropriate military service’s entry- level training location. According to DOD, the Selective Service System  must deliver the first inductees within 193 days from when the President  and the Congress authorize a draft, and the military services then are to  train, equip, and accommodate in other ways the new inductees.

The military services are generally smaller today than they have been in  many years. In fiscal year 2003, for example, DOD’s total active military  end strength was approximately 1.5 million, while in fiscal year 2017 the  number was 1.38 million. Additionally, DOD’s total workforce mix has also  changed. For example, in late 2003 DOD directed the military services to  convert certain military positions to federal civilian or contract positions  based on evaluations that showed that many military personnel were  being used to accomplish work that was not military essential and that  civilians could often perform these tasks in a more efficient and cost- effective manner than military personnel. In May 2013, we reported that  DOD officials stated that about 50,000 military positions were converted  to DOD federal civilian positions or to contractors since fiscal year 2004 in  order to devote more military positions to the support of ongoing military  operations.

Under current law, women may serve voluntarily in the armed forces but  are not required to register with the Selective Service System. In the  1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg, the Supreme Court of the United  States upheld the constitutionality of our nation’s practice of registering  only men. Recognizing the purpose of registration was to prepare for a  draft of combat troops and since women were excluded from combat, the  Supreme Court ruled that Congress could exclude women from  registration. DOD gradually began to eliminate prohibitions on the  assignment of women to direct ground combat positions and on January  24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff rescinded a 1994 rule preventing women from serving in  direct ground-combat positions and directed the military services to  open all closed positions and occupations to women by January 1, 2016.  In December 2015, the Secretary of Defense announced that all military  occupational specialties were open to women and removed all final  restrictions on the service of women in combat. As part of the  congressional notification process when DOD decided to open previously- closed positions and occupations to women, the department was required  to provide a detailed legal analysis of the implications of the proposed  change with respect to the constitutionality of the Military Selective  Service Act to men only. DOD’s July 2017 report on the purpose and  utility of a registration system for military selective service stated that in  December 2015, DOD advised Congress that the opening of all positions  and occupations to women “further alters the factual backdrop” to the  Supreme Court’s ruling on a challenge to the exemption of women from  selective service registration. However, the report stated that DOD took  no further stance on the legal issues raised by the then-Secretary of Defense’s decision to open all military positions to women. Further, DOD  stated that it would consult with the Department of Justice as appropriate  regarding these issues.

DOD Included Information on the Six Required Reporting Elements but Additional Information May Benefit the Commission’s Ongoing Review

DOD Included Information on the Six Required Reporting Elements in Its Report

DOD included information on each of the six required reporting elements  in its July 2017 report to Congress and the Commission on the purpose  and utility of a registration system for military selective service, as shown  in table 1. In preparing the report, officials within the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated  that they coordinated and consulted with subject matter experts at the  Selective Service System and the Joint Staff as well as with officials from  selected organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  including the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command. Further, the  DOD report references internal DOD documents, a policy publication from  the Congressional Research Service regarding Selective Service  issues, statements from former DOD executives, and publications from  contributing authors on web-based foreign policy and national security  discussion sites for additional support.

Additional Information May Be Useful for the Commission’s Ongoing Review of the Military Selective Service Process

While DOD included information on the six required reporting elements in  its report, we identified additional information that may be useful in  supporting the ongoing review of the military selective service process by  the Commission. Specifically, based on our review of DOD’s report and  our prior work, the Commission could benefit from additional information  on (1) DOD’s requirements and timelines for the induction of individuals  into the military services who are selected through a draft, and (2) the  perspectives of the military services on the military selective service  processes.

First, one of the six required reporting elements in the NDAA for FY 2017  required DOD to provide a detailed analysis of its personnel needs in the  event of an emergency requiring a mass mobilization, along with a  timeline for obtaining these inductees. In response, DOD provided the  personnel requirements and a timeline that was developed in 1994 and  that have not been updated since. These requirements state that, in the  event of a draft, the first inductees are to report to a Military Entrance  Processing Station in 193 days and the first 100,000 inductees would  report for service in 210 days. DOD’s report states that the all-volunteer  force is of adequate size and composition to meet DOD’s personnel  needs and it has no operational plans that envision mobilization at a level  that would require a draft. Officials stated that the personnel requirements  and timeline developed in 1994 are still considered realistic. Thus, they  did not conduct any additional analysis to update the plans, personnel  requirements, or timelines for responding to an emergency requiring  mass mobilization. Further, they said that they were limited in the amount  of time that they were given to respond to the congressional mandate and  that they believed it would be most helpful to produce a report that  provided basic information that could serve as a starting point for the  Commission to begin a more in-depth review of the military selective  service process. As previously discussed, in 2012, we reported that  changes in the national security environment require DOD and the  services to reassess their force structure requirements, including how  many and what types of units are necessary to carry out the national  defense strategy. We reported that these changes represented  junctures at which DOD could systematically reevaluate service  personnel levels to determine whether they are consistent with strategic  objectives. As such, we recommended that DOD establish a process of  periodically reevaluating DOD’s requirements for the Selective Service  System in light of changing operating environments, threats, and strategic  guidance. Since DOD did not perform additional analysis to reevaluate its  requirements or timelines for obtaining inductees to respond to this  mandate and the most recent requirements were determined based on  assumptions developed in 1994, we continue to believe our 2012  recommendation is valid. An updated analysis would also benefit the  Commission by informing their study and recommendations.

Second, the military service officials that we met with told us that their  perspectives on the selective service processes that would affect them  had not been solicited in the preparation of DOD’s report. For example,  while the military services are responsible for training inductees upon  their mobilization and integrating them into the force, service officials  expressed concerns to us regarding whether, for example, they would  have the training facilities, uniforms or funding to receive, train, equip, and  integrate a large influx of inductees in the event of a draft. Additionally,  the services are expected to provide support to the Selective Service  System during a national emergency. A 1997 memorandum of  understanding between the Selective Service System and DOD indicates,  among other things, that the Department of the Army will provide 1,500  enlisted Army retirees to augment the Selective Service System within 72  hours after a draft is initiated. According to officials within the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness-Military  Personnel Policy, this memorandum of understanding was reviewed and  revalidated in 2014. However, Army officials told us that they believed  some of their service-specific procedures might require updates  identifying individuals to augment the Selective Service System’s staff,  especially the retired personnel that would need to be recalled to duty.  They thought it would be beneficial for officials within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense to conduct a thorough, top-down review, and lead  an update of service instructions related to supporting a draft to ensure  the services are prepared to provide their share of personnel if needed.  These Army officials said, however, that their higher Army headquarters  saw no operational reason to review their policies and procedures related  to mass mobilization given that DOD has no operational plans that  envision mobilization at a level that would require a draft.

As discussed previously in this report, DOD’s workforce mix has been  changing. For example, over the last decade, the use of unmanned aerial  systems has emerged as an integral part of warfighting operations and  the demand for their use has outpaced the Air Force’s ability to produce  pilots to operate them. Additionally, each of the services has reported  critical skill gaps in such areas as various military medical specialties.  Further, challenges exist in identifying cyber capabilities of all National  Guard units, as required by law, which could be used for the support of a  cyber-related emergency. Officials from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness-Military Personnel  Policy stated that critical skills identified as necessary today may not be  the critical skills needed in future crises. Additionally, they said that  creating and maintaining tools, such as databases of individuals with  these needed critical skills, is costly and may become outdated quickly.  We agree that the requirements for critical skills will evolve over time;  however, any discussion of a draft using the selective service process— as presented in DOD’s July 2017 report—that focuses on specific military  occupational specialties would benefit from the perspectives and input of  officials from the military services and the impact a draft may have on  meeting those demands. Specifically, these officials would be helpful in  identifying the needed critical skill sets for their emerging mission  demands and the impact a draft may have on meeting those demands.

DOD officials within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that they are currently collecting  the perspectives of the military services on the selective service process  and plan to provide this information to the Commission. DOD officials explained that they did not incorporate information from the military  services into their report because DOD’s involvement in any potential  decision to initiate and implement a draft is mostly centralized within the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, not within the individual military  services. They further stated that information regarding the level of  additional personnel that would be needed using a draft in the event of a  national emergency comes from the war plans that are developed and  maintained by the Joint Staff. Additionally, they said that they primarily  produced a report that characterized the overall processes and was a  factual account of how DOD interacts with various aspects of the  Selective Service System.

Another provision within the NDAA for FY 2017 required the Secretary of  Defense and other Cabinet-level government officials, along with any  experts designated by the President, to submit to the Commission and  Congress recommendations for the reform of the military selective service  process not later than 7 months after the Commission’s establishment  date. To accomplish this, officials from the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs said that they  initially developed a questionnaire on which the Commission provided  feedback. These officials stated that they sent it to 18 organizations,  including the Cabinet positions listed in the act and to additional  organizations that were recommended by the National Security Council or  that had some role or responsibility in the event of a draft. In order to  produce the Secretary of Defense’s submission, these officials further  stated that they requested each of the military services and the Joint Staff  to complete the questionnaire by November 2017. Further, these officials  viewed the questionnaire as an opportunity for the respondents—the  military services in the case of DOD—to provide their ideas regarding  military selective service processes, both current and future.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In an  email, the Director of Accession Policy within the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy stated that  the military services concurred with the report and DOD had no additional  comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees; the National Commission on Military, National, and Public  Service; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Commander, U.S.  Military Entrance Processing Command; the Secretaries of the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the  Director, Selective Service System. In addition, the report is available at  no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix I.

In addition to the contact named above, Kimberly Seay, Assistant  Director; Rebecca Beale; Vincent Buquicchio; Mae Jones; Kevin Keith;  Jordan Mettica; and Amber Sinclair made key contributions to this report.