Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Continues to Address Challenges but Needs to Better Define Roles and Responsibilities and Approaches to Collaboration

In 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. These reviews identified problems with leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. The reviews also made recommendations to address these problems. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on NC3 systems, which resulted in additional recommendations.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which DOD and the military services have (1) made progress in the implementation, tracking, and evaluation—including identifying and documenting risk—of the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report and (2) improved oversight of the defense nuclear enterprise and managed roles, responsibilities, and collaboration among various organizations. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed agency officials from DOD and the military services.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in implementing the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and a 2015 nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) review and has improved its tracking and evaluation of this progress. For example, since GAO last reported—in October 2017—an additional 74 of the 247 sub-recommendations from the 2014 reviews have been closed; 96 remain open. In January 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) issued guidance to aid the military services in identifying, assessing, and documenting risks associated with the 2014 recommendations, such as unintended consequences from their implementation. The guidance calls on them to update their risk assessments periodically as new data become available. The Air Force and Navy have begun to provide risk information in CAPE's and their own tracking tools. In July 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, DOD's Chief Information Officer issued guidance to improve tracking and evaluation of progress in implementing the 2015 recommendations.

DOD and the military services have taken steps to improve oversight of the nuclear enterprise in response to the 2014 reviews but lack clear roles and responsibilities and methods for collaboration. The Secretary of Defense created the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) in 2014 to ensure the long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and enterprise policy issues. However, DOD guidance has not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG or provided methods for the NDERG to communicate and collaborate with other nuclear oversight organizations, including those shown in the figure. Nor has NC3 oversight guidance been updated to reflect changes in roles and responsibilities and to include methods for communication and collaboration among NC3 oversight groups. In the absence of defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies and methods for how the NDERG and NC3 oversight groups are to communicate and collaborate, senior leaders may not be in a position to effectively manage resourcing and risk across the department.

GAO makes four recommendations for DOD to clarify roles, responsibilities, and methods of communication and collaboration for both the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and provided information about planned actions to implement them.

In 2014, as a response to incidents involving the nation’s nuclear forces  and their senior leadership, the Secretary of Defense directed an internal  review and an independent review of the Department of Defense (DOD)  nuclear enterprise. Together, the two reports and a memorandum from  the U.S. Strategic Command Commander with additional areas for  improvement (hereafter referred to collectively as the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews) identified problems with leadership, organization,  investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other  shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. In  2015, DOD conducted a review focused on nuclear command, control,  and communications (NC3) systems, which resulted in a report (hereafter  referred to as the 2015 NC3 report) with recommendations to address  diffused responsibility, accountability, and authority for the NC3  enterprise; ineffective life-cycle management programs; and a lack of  institutional training and personnel management programs.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017  includes a provision for us to review—during each of fiscal years 2017  through 2021—DOD’s processes for addressing the recommendations of  the nuclear enterprise reviews. We are also to review DOD’s process for  implementing recommendations from other assessments of the nuclear  enterprise, including the 2015 NC3 report, and to provide a briefing to the  congressional defense committees on the results of our review. In July  2016, we reported that the process DOD had developed for tracking the  2014 review recommendations generally appeared consistent with  relevant criteria from Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government—including using and effectively communicating quality  information and performing monitoring activities. In October 2017, we  recommended that the Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation (CAPE) develop additional guidance on the identification of  risks and the documentation of these risks in DOD’s centralized tracking  tool for the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. We  also recommended that the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) develop  guidance to improve the tracking and evaluation of DOD’s progress in  implementing the recommendations of the 2015 NC3 report. DOD  concurred with these recommendations, and we discuss its efforts to  address them later in this report.

This report addresses the extent to which  1.  DOD and the military services have made progress in the  implementation, tracking, and evaluation—including identifying and  documenting risk—of the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report and  2.  DOD and the military services have improved oversight of the defense  nuclear enterprise and managed roles, responsibilities, and  collaboration among various organizations.

For objective one, we reviewed key documents, including the centralized  DOD tracking tool for 2014 recommendations, the military services’  internal tracking tools for the 2014 recommendations, and the DOD CIO’s  tracking tool for the 2015 recommendations. We also interviewed officials  responsible for implementing the recommendations, to verify that the  content captured in the tracking mechanisms reflected progress accurately. We determined that the information in the tracking tools was  reliable for our purposes by reviewing the contents of the tracking tools  and comparing this information with source documents—including the  internal and independent nuclear enterprise reviews, U.S. Strategic  Command’s action plan, and the 2015 NC3 report—and documentation of  actions taken by the military services and other organizations to  implement the recommendations. We also reviewed applicable guidance,  such as the Secretary of Defense’s 2014 memorandum (Nuclear  Enterprise Review Corrective Action Implementation), the 2016 Deputy  Secretary of Defense memorandum (Transition of Nuclear Enterprise  Review Tracking Responsibilities, which includes CAPE’s Nuclear  Enterprise Review Tracking Analytic Guidance Overview), and CAPE’s  January 2018 updated guidance on risk (Additional Guidance for Nuclear  Enterprise Review Recommendation Tracking).

For objective two, we reviewed key documents—including the  independent and internal nuclear enterprise reviews—and guidance such  as the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum (Nuclear Enterprise Review  Corrective Action Implementation). We also reviewed the statutes  establishing roles and responsibilities for the Nuclear Weapons Council  and the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command,  Control, and Communications System (NLC3S Council). We obtained  and analyzed lists of attendees at meetings of the Nuclear Deterrent  Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), the Nuclear Weapons Council, and  the NLC3S Council that were held from January 2014 through March  2018 to identify offices and senior DOD leaders that participated in more  than one of these organizations. Finally, we interviewed cognizant DOD  officials about their participation in defense nuclear enterprise oversight  organizations. We compared the roles and responsibilities of these  oversight organizations with relevant criteria from Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government and with our selected leading  practices for collaboration.

To conduct our work on both objectives, we interviewed officials from the  following offices to discuss progress in implementing the  recommendations to improve the nuclear enterprise:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,  Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (Nuclear Matters)

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of the Inspector General

Air Force Headquarters: Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear  Integration (A10)

Chief of Naval Operations: Nuclear Policy (N514) and Undersea  Warfare (N97)

U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering-Weapons of Mass Destruction  We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to November  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Oversight of 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews’ Recommendations

In November 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to address  the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and  directed CAPE to track and assess these implementation efforts. The  Joint Staff, the Navy, the Air Force, offices within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Strategic Command have supported  CAPE’s efforts. CAPE compiled the recommendations from the 2014  nuclear enterprise reviews. In total, CAPE identified 175 distinct  recommendations from the three documents. CAPE then identified 247  sub-recommendations within those recommendations, which were  directed to multiple military services or other DOD components. For  example, if a recommendation was directed to the Air Force and the  Navy, then one sub-recommendation was made to the Air Force and one  to the Navy.

CAPE then worked with the military services to identify offices of primary  responsibility for implementing actions to address the recommendations,  any offices with coordinating responsibility, and any resources necessary  to implement each recommendation. CAPE has developed a centralized  tracking tool to collect information on progress in meeting milestones and  metrics. As shown in figure 1, the tracking tool includes fields for the  underlying problem statement, or root cause, for the recommendation;  time frames with milestones for implementing the recommendation; and  performance measures (referred to as metrics in the tracking tool) to  assess the effectiveness of the actions taken.

The tracking tool currently contains hundreds of unique milestones and  metrics and, according to CAPE officials, additional milestones and  metrics are added as they are identified. The Air Force and the Navy also  have developed their own methods of tracking their service-specific  recommendations. In December 2016, the Deputy Secretary of Defense  issued a memorandum that directed the transition of the tracking and  analysis responsibilities related to implementing the recommendations of  the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews from CAPE to the military  departments and other DOD components. However, CAPE remains  responsible for providing guidance to inform the analyses conducted by  other DOD entities, overseeing these analyses, and assessing  recommendations for closure. The aim of these changes was to enhance  ownership and embed the principles of robust analysis, continuous  monitoring, and responsibility throughout the department.

NC3 is a large and complex system comprised of numerous land-, air-,  and space-based components used to ensure connectivity between the  President and nuclear forces. NC3 is managed by the military  departments, nuclear force commanders, and the defense agencies; it  provides the President with the means to authorize the use of nuclear  weapons in a crisis.

NC3 systems support five important functions:

Force management: assignment, training, deployment,  maintenance, and logistics support of nuclear forces before,  during, and after any crisis.

Planning: development and modification of plans for the  employment of nuclear weapons and other options.

Situation monitoring: collection, maintenance, assessment, and  dissemination of information on friendly forces, adversary forces  and possible targets, emerging nuclear powers, and worldwide  events of interest.

Decision making: assessment, review, and consultation that  occur when the employment or movement of nuclear weapons is  considered.

Force direction: implementation of decisions regarding the  execution, termination, destruction, and disablement of nuclear  weapons.

Oversight of the 2015 NC3 Report Recommendations

As recommended in the 2015 NC3 report, the NLC3S Council has taken  a lead role in providing oversight and making the final determination on  the implementation status of that report’s 13 recommendations. The  NLC3S Council is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition and Sustainment and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff. Members of the council include the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander,  North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command;  the Director, National Security Agency; and the DOD CIO. The DOD CIO  also serves as the Secretariat for the NLC3S Council and tracks the  implementation of recommendations from the 2015 NC3 report, among  other activities. Additional organizations, such as the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, may participate in the NLC3S  Council’s meetings to provide subject matter expertise. Regular  participants in the NLC3S Council include the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); senior leaders from the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; the Defense Information Systems Agency; the  White House Military Office; and CAPE.

DOD has established or participated in a number of oversight  organizations that aid in the management of the defense nuclear  enterprise. These organizations include the following:

NDERG: Established in 2014 by the Secretary of Defense to  ensure the long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by  addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and enterprise  policy issues identified in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. The  NDERG consists of a group of senior officials chaired by the  Deputy Secretary of Defense, including the Vice Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NDERG is supported by a Nuclear  Deterrent Working Group, which meets biweekly and reviews the  status of the recommendations of the nuclear enterprise reviews,  and a Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group, which meets  quarterly and reviews any recommendations that the Working  Group believes are ready for the NDERG to close. The Nuclear  Deterrent Senior Oversight Group also receives annual briefings  on component assessments, reviews organizational changes, and  discusses other cross-service issues. The Deputy Secretary of  Defense updates the Secretary of Defense on the NDERG’s  progress as requested.

NLC3S Council: A DOD council established by statute that is  responsible for the oversight of the command, control, and  communications system for the national leadership of the United  States. Additionally, as recommended in the 2015 NC3 report,  the NLC3S Council reviews the recommendations from the report  and assesses them for closure. The NLC3S Council is supported  by the National Leadership Command Capabilities Executive  Management Board, which comprises a Senior Steering Group  and four working groups—Stakeholders, Resources,  Assessments, and Nuclear Command and Control Issues. The  Executive Management Board ensures that the Council is  informed of and presents issues that need principal-level  decisions.

Nuclear Weapons Council: A joint DOD and Department of  Energy council established by statute that is responsible for  managing aspects of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and  programs. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and  Sustainment is designated as the chair of the Nuclear Weapons  Council, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,  Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs serves as the staff  director of the Council. The Nuclear Weapons Council is  supported by a senior executive-level Standing and Safety  Committee and a subordinate, working-level Action Officers  Group. The Action Officers Group performs detailed analyses of  issues and provides those analyses to the Standing and Safety  Committee, which reviews them and formulates decision  packages for final Council review and decision.

Nuclear Matters: An office under the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs;  it is headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear Matters and serves as a focal point for DOD activities and  initiatives to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent  and counter the threat from nuclear terrorism and nuclear  proliferation.

Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy: An office supporting the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary  of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. Nuclear and  Missile Defense Policy participates in the development of  strategies, creation of policies, and conduct of oversight of  national nuclear policy, treaty negotiations, and missile defense  policy.

U.S. Strategic Command: DOD functional combatant command  responsible for planning for and employment of U.S. nuclear  weapons and for certain matters related to NC3.

DOD Has Made Progress in Implementing and Tracking Recommendations, Including Evaluating and Documenting Key Risks

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and has made improvements in  tracking and evaluating this progress. Specifically, the military services  and other DOD components have begun identifying and documenting  risks associated with implementing recommendations from the 2014  reviews, based on guidance that was issued by CAPE in January 2018.  DOD has also made progress in implementing the recommendations from  the 2015 NC3 report. For example, the DOD CIO issued guidance in July  2018 to improve the tracking and evaluation of DOD’s progress in  implementing the recommendations of the NC3 report.

DOD Has Made Progress Implementing Recommendations from the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. As of our last report, in October  2017, DOD had closed 77 sub-recommendations. Based on our review of  CAPE’s centralized tracking tool, the NDERG has closed 74 additional  sub-recommendations since then. As a result, according to the CAPE  tracking tool, the NDERG has closed 151 of the 247 sub- recommendations as of September 2018 (see fig. 2).

Since October 2017, DOD has closed sub-recommendations related to a  number of issues identified in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. For  example, in January 2018, the NDERG closed a sub-recommendation  originating from the Internal Assessment of the Department of Defense  Nuclear Enterprise that the Air Force should ensure its nuclear inspection  teams are properly sized and that inspection efforts are coordinated. In  response to the recommendation, the Air Force worked to reduce the  footprint of inspectors, to the extent possible, and improve consolidation  of inspections to avoid redundancy. Meanwhile, in January 2018, the  NDERG also closed a sub-recommendation that originated from the  Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise  that the Navy improve its readiness reporting system to provide better  information about manning and personnel costs. In response to the  recommendation, the Navy has made improvements in its readiness  reporting by having ballistic missile submarine fleet commanders report  additional readiness information about manning and personnel costs  through the Navy’s readiness reporting.

The Air Force, the Navy, and CAPE have described some of the  remaining open recommendations as enduring issues for the enterprise,  and tracking progress toward these recommendations will aid in  monitoring the overall health of the defense nuclear enterprise. These  recommendations include ongoing sustainment and maintenance efforts  and improving the morale of the nuclear forces. As we have previously  reported, CAPE officials stated that it would take years to implement the  great majority of these recommendations and measure whether they have  had their intended effect. For example, CAPE and military service  officials have noted that it would take years for some of the recommended  cultural changes to manifest.

Military Services Have Begun to Track and Evaluate the Risks Associated with Open 2014 Recommendations

The military departments and other DOD components are responsible for  tracking and evaluating the implementation status of the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews’ recommendations; CAPE is providing guidance to aid  these efforts. As we previously reported, CAPE had been responsible for  tracking this progress until, in December 2016, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense issued a memorandum that transitioned this responsibility from  CAPE to the military departments and other DOD components. However,  CAPE remains responsible for providing guidance to inform the analyses  conducted by other DOD entities, overseeing the analyses, and  assessing recommendations for closure. In January 2018, in response to  our 2017 recommendation, CAPE issued additional guidance to improve  the identification, assessment, and documentation of risks related to  implementing the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’ recommendations.

CAPE’s January 2018 guidance includes specific instructions that military  departments and other DOD components should follow when identifying,  assessing, and documenting risks. Specifically, the guidance instructs the  responsible components to identify any key risks associated with the  open recommendations and to document those key risks. The January  2018 guidance defines key risks as those that require mitigation by the  leadership of the DOD component (e.g., a risk that requires mitigation by  senior Air Force or Navy leadership) or those that cannot be mitigated  within a component’s existing authorities and resources (e.g., a risk that  cannot be mitigated within the Air Force or Navy that must be raised to a  higher authority). Additionally, the guidance indicates that risks that do not  rise to the level of being key risks should also be tracked according to the  component’s own assessment methodology and, if a component’s  approach to a recommendation does not carry any key risks, this should  be documented.

The guidance identifies some risk assessment tools for components to  use, as appropriate, but specifically states that components should  consider the following questions:

What are the risks if the recommendation is not implemented?

What are the risks in the approach to implementing the  recommendation?

What flexibility does the approach have to respond to unintended  consequences?

What are the controls and actions needed to mitigate risk to an  acceptable level?

The guidance also notes that components should update risk  assessments periodically as progress is made and new data become  available.

According to the CAPE tracking tool, as of September 2018, key risks—or  the absence of key risks—are documented for 85 of the 96 open sub- recommendations in the centralized tracking tool. Of the 85 sub- recommendations for which risk information is identified in the centralized  tracking tool’s “Key Risks and Issues” field, key risks are identified for 50.  For the remaining 35, no risks are identified as rising to the level of being  a key risk. Based on information in the tracking tool, the Air Force and the  Navy have lead responsibility for the 85 sub-recommendations for which  risk information is identified in the tracking tool. U.S. Strategic Command,  Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have not yet  included any risk information for the remaining 11 open sub- recommendations for which they have lead responsibility.

In addition to updated risk information in CAPE’s central tracking tool, the  Air Force has updated its internal tracking tool. According to Air Force  officials, the Air Force tracking tool includes both key risks—risks that  require Air Force leadership to mitigate them—and low-level risks—risks  that do not rise to the level where Air Force leadership should mitigate  them—for each of the 60 remaining sub-recommendations for which it  has the lead. For example, for the recommendation concerning Air Force  nuclear personnel shortages, the Air Force’s internal tracker notes the  risk that over-prioritizing the nuclear enterprise could affect the Air Force’s  ability to conduct conventional operations. Additionally, the Air Force has  identified areas where there is no key risk. For example, for the  recommendation concerning intercontinental ballistic missile sustainment,  the Air Force’s internal tracker noted that there was no key risk but that  there was a low-level risk that using limited resources to support legacy  systems could lead to underfunding modernization efforts.

The Navy, in addition to documenting risk information in CAPE’s  centralized tracking tool, has documented risks for many of its open sub- recommendations in an internal document called the Navy Nuclear  Deterrent Review Plan of Actions and Milestones, which tracks the Navy  recommendations by categories that the Navy created. For example,  when discussing risks for maintaining Navy NC3 systems, the Navy  Nuclear Deterrent Review Plan of Actions and Milestones states that the  Navy monitors availability across several levels, including sustainment  and modernization efforts. Additionally, controls are in place at various  levels to manage risks to the availability of NC3 assets. The Navy Nuclear  Deterrent Review Plan of Actions and Milestones acknowledges that if the  Navy does not continue to use these controls, the risk to the NC3 mission  may be unacceptable. According to Navy officials, risk is also examined  during the Navy’s internal process for closing recommendations through a  review by the Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission Oversight Council. For  example, the Council was briefed on actions to mitigate the risk that  insufficient personnel strength at some maintenance facilities poses to the  operational availability of Ohio-class submarines.

DOD Has Made Progress in Implementing Recommendations from the 2015 NC3 Report

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  of the 2015 NC3 report. Since we last reported, in October 2017, DOD  has closed 3 additional recommendations. In total, as of August 2018, the  NLC3S Council has closed 5 of the 13 recommendations from the NC3  report (see fig. 3).

According to tracking information from the DOD CIO, the Navy has  completed its portion of two of the open recommendations, but the Air  Force still has tasks it needs to complete before each recommendation  can be reviewed and closed by the NLC3S Council. As a result, these two  recommendations will remain “in progress” until the Air Force also  completes its portion of the implementation. In addition, a DOD  component has recommended that an additional 2 of the 13  recommendations be closed; however, these have not yet been reviewed  by the NLC3S Council.

In July 2018, in response to our October 2017 recommendation, the DOD  CIO issued guidance to improve the tracking and evaluation of DOD’s  progress in implementing the recommendations of the 2015 NC3 report.

This guidance provides instructions to the military departments and DOD  components with responsibility for implementation of the 2015 NC3 report  recommendations to identify and provide key milestones, metrics utilized  to track progress, and information about recent progress—including an  assessment of progress, required decisions and guidance, and key risks  and other issues.

Information on the status of the 2015 NC3 report’s recommendations is  collected in a layout similar to that developed by CAPE for the 2014  recommendations. The responsible organizations are in the process of  updating the information they have provided to the DOD CIO to respond  to the new guidance. The guidance directs the responsible organizations  to provide quarterly updates on the remaining, open recommendations  beginning in August 2018. According to a DOD CIO official, these regular  updates will continue until the recommendations are closed.

DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise, but Key Oversight Groups Lack Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and Methods for Communication and Collaboration Military Services Have Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise

DOD and the military services have taken steps to improve oversight of  the defense nuclear enterprise, in part in response to recommendations  from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. DOD plans to use the NDERG  to oversee long-term and enduring issues affecting the nuclear enterprise.  However, the NDERG does not have formally defined roles and  responsibilities, and DOD has not established methods for how the  NDERG will communicate and collaborate with the other nuclear  enterprise oversight organizations. Further, DOD NC3 oversight guidance  has not been updated to reflect evolving NC3 oversight roles and  responsibilities and to include methods for communicating and  collaborating with other nuclear enterprise oversight groups.

The military services have taken steps to improve oversight of the nuclear  enterprise in response to the concerns raised by the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews. The reviews noted a lack of comprehensive oversight  of the defense nuclear enterprise and a need for increased visibility for  senior leaders. Specifically,

Since 2014, the Air Force has realigned responsibilities,  authorities, and accountability for its nuclear forces to  improve oversight of the nuclear enterprise. For example, the  Air Force implemented two recommendations from the Internal  Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise to  elevate senior Air Force leadership positions in the nuclear  enterprise. Air Force Global Strike Command was upgraded from  a three-star to a four-star major command. According to officials  from Air Force Global Strike Command, the elevation of the  command to a four-star major command has helped ensure  support from the Air Force for funding and management of the  nuclear enterprise. In 2016, Air Force Global Strike Command  created the Air Force NC3 Center to manage portions of the Air  Force NC3 weapon system that are owned by the command  and—according to Air Force NC3 Center officials—to provide  oversight of the organize, train, and equip function for all of the Air  Force’s NC3 missions. The Air Force also upgraded the position  of Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear  Integration, Headquarters Air Force, from a two-star to a three-star  position. The elevation of both the Air Force Global Strike  Command and A10 leadership was authorized by the Secretary of  Defense to ensure that their rank is commensurate with the  importance of the nuclear mission.

The Navy oversees its leg of the nuclear triad using the Navy  Nuclear Deterrent Mission Oversight Council. The Council is a  senior Department of the Navy forum that is responsible for  coordinating the Navy’s nuclear weapon activities (safety, security,  reliability, and nuclear weapons incident response), operations,  personnel, policy, material support, and oversight functions.  According to Navy officials, the Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission  Oversight Council addresses long-term issues affecting the Navy’s  nuclear enterprise and identifies and monitors risks associated  with those issues, including the actions taken in response to the  2014 nuclear enterprise reviews.

The NDERG Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and Approaches for Communicating and Collaborating with Other Nuclear Oversight Groups

While the Deputy Secretary of Defense was designated as chairman of  the NDERG, DOD guidance does not define the membership, roles, and  responsibilities of the NDERG or identify methods for how the NDERG  and its working and oversight groups should communicate and  collaborate with other nuclear enterprise oversight groups. In July 2018,  the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing a  series of changes intended to make the NDERG an enduring, principal- level forum to track risks, issues, and opportunities associated with the  health of the defense nuclear enterprise. The memorandum directed the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological  Defense Programs to serve as the NDERG secretariat and, with the  Director of CAPE, co-chair the Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group.  In addition, within 60 days of the issuance of the memorandum, the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological  Defense Programs is to provide a draft NDERG charter for coordination.  The charter will serve as an interim step while the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs  prepares a DOD directive; it will also specify the NDERG’s functions,  organization, and responsibilities. The new role as secretariat of the  NDERG and co-chair of the Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group  will expand the current responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense  Programs with regard to nuclear enterprise oversight.

However, it is not clear whether the charter under consideration will  adequately incorporate the roles and responsibilities of the entities on the  NDERG, particularly given the new long-term role of the NDERG.  According to DOD officials, they have not determined to what extent  NDERG roles and responsibilities will be articulated in the charter.  Further, prior to issuance of the July 2018 memorandum, officials stated  that they had not created a charter for the NDERG because senior  leaders within the department were still deciding what ongoing role the  NDERG should take in monitoring the health of the nuclear enterprise.  The July memorandum helps to clarify this role, but it does not make clear  all of the associated roles and responsibilities of the NDERG and its  participants. For example, DOD has not determined whether the charter  will identify the NDERG’s responsibilities for issues that are not directly  related to the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews or what the NDERG’s long- term role will be once most or all of the recommendations from the 2014  nuclear enterprise reviews are implemented. The July memorandum does  indicate that the charter will include a plan to confirm that NDERG- approved actions have the expected effects and do not result in  unintended consequences or recurrence of the initial issue. However, the  memorandum does not specify how or when the NDERG should address  new issues and does not indicate that the charter or DOD directive will do  so either.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  management should establish an organizational structure, assign  responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve an entity’s objectives.  Specifically, the standards call for management to develop an  organizational structure with an understanding of the organization’s  overall responsibilities and assign these responsibilities to enable the  organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner, comply with  applicable laws and regulations, and reliably report quality information.  In the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews, DOD identified a lack of  comprehensive oversight of the defense nuclear enterprise. To ensure  greater awareness among senior DOD leaders, the internal review  recommended that DOD create a single, senior-level position to oversee  the nuclear enterprise, provide the Secretary of Defense with additional  routine visibility into the nuclear enterprise, and marshal the authority of  the Secretary to resolve identified issues. DOD did not implement the  internal review team’s recommendation to establish a senior oversight  position for the nuclear enterprise because, according to CAPE officials,  the Secretary of Defense considered the NDERG to be sufficient to  address the recommendation. However, four years after it was  established, the roles and responsibilities of the NDERG have not been  clearly articulated. DOD now plans to develop a charter and subsequent  DOD directive for the NDERG, but it remains unclear whether these  documents will provide clear roles and responsibilities for the NDERG to  effectively function as the comprehensive oversight body for the  enterprise—in part because, according to officials, they are in the early  stages of development.

In addition, DOD has not clearly defined how the NDERG will  communicate and collaborate with the other oversight groups. DOD uses  other groups, such as the Nuclear Weapons Council and the NLC3S  Council, to oversee portions of the nuclear enterprise and coordinate  among various DOD entities and with the Department of Energy. Many of  the same individuals and organizations are represented in two or all three  of the oversight organizations. For example, four DOD senior leaders— the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy; and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command—participate in  both the Nuclear Weapons Council and the NLC3S Council, which are  statutorily responsible for oversight of aspects of the defense nuclear  enterprise. Figure 4 shows the roles and responsibilities of some of the  nuclear enterprise oversight groups and DOD components.

The NDERG, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the NLC3S Council  have lower-level management and working groups that include  participants from many of the same organizations. For example, the Air  Force’s Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration is  represented in the NDERG’s Nuclear Deterrent Senior Oversight Group  and on the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Standing and Safety Committee.  The Army, Navy, and Air Force also participate in all three oversight  groups’ working groups. Unlike the NDERG—which will have no formally  defined roles and responsibilities until its charter and the eventual  directive are finalized—the Nuclear Weapons Council and the NLC3S  Council are statutorily responsible for overseeing specific aspects of the  nuclear enterprise.

According to officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Nuclear Matters, in response to updated presidential  guidance, a charter is being drafted for a new nuclear enterprise oversight  group—the Security Incident Response Council. According to these  officials, the council will be an interagency group that will have oversight  of plans for responding to potential security incidents involving nuclear  weapons and will bring together officials from across all relevant  departments and agencies.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense’s July 2018 memorandum, previously  discussed, does not address how the NDERG should collaborate with  other nuclear enterprise oversight groups with overlapping  responsibilities. According to the memorandum, issues falling under the  purview of other existing nuclear enterprise oversight groups will be  addressed by those groups, but the memorandum acknowledges that the  groups may interact. Specifically, the memorandum states that the  Nuclear Weapons Council, the NLC3S Council, the Nuclear Posture  Review Implementation group, and the Security Incident Response  Council may recommend issues for the NDERG. However, the  memorandum does not describe how the NDERG should communicate  the necessary quality information with other oversight groups, including  criteria for determining which issues should be recommended or  otherwise communicated to the NDERG or when those groups should go  about recommending issues for consideration to the NDERG. Further, the  other oversight groups will not fall under the authority of the NDERG  charter, so stating that the groups may recommend issues for the  NDERG does not ensure that they will do so. As previously stated, it is  not clear whether these issues will be addressed in either the NDERG’s  charter or the subsequent DOD directive.

As we have previously reported, leading practices for enhancing  interagency collaboration include agreeing on roles and responsibilities  and having written guidance and agreements. Specifically, collaborating  agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective  roles and responsibilities. In doing so, agencies can clarify who will do  what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision  making. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that management should use quality information to  achieve an entity’s objectives and internally and externally communicate  the necessary quality information to achieve the objectives. These  standards call for management to communicate quality information with  appropriate methods of communication and consider a variety of factors  in selecting an appropriate method of communication, such as the  audience and the nature of the information.

The 2014 independent nuclear enterprise review found that the difficulty  of defining the defense nuclear enterprise complicates senior DOD  leaders’ ability to take ownership of the enterprise. Specifically, the  independent review noted that senior leaders within the Office of the  Secretary of Defense and the military services referred to the “nuclear  enterprise” as if there were a coherent, integrated structure and set of  activities supporting the nuclear forces. However, the review team did not  find a coherent, integrated structure and synchronized set of activities that  could be characterized as a DOD “nuclear enterprise.” Further, the  independent review team found that there was a loose federation of  separate nuclear activities scattered across multiple organizations with no  clearly defined responsibility or accountability.

In response to the challenges the independent review identified in 2014,  the review recommended that the loosely federated nuclear activities  within OSD and the Air Force be brought together into a coherent and  synchronized structure that focuses on direction and support for the  nuclear forces. In addition, the internal review noted as one of its most  important findings that the problems of the nuclear enterprise did not exist  in isolation and would require a coordinated, holistic approach to resolve.  In particular, the internal review team concluded that, because the issues  they identified in each of the military services were interdependent, the  ultimate solutions in many instances would have to be cultural, structural,  and sustained over the long term. Identifying oversight groups’ roles and  responsibilities and identifying and establishing methods for  communicating and collaborating among groups could help mitigate the  problems identified in the 2014 reviews.

In the absence of defined roles and responsibilities or methods for how  the NDERG is to communicate and collaborate with other existing  oversight organizations, the NDERG may be unable to effectively oversee  the defense nuclear enterprise in a coordinated, holistic manner that  would address problems identified by the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews  or other issues it may need to address in the future. Additionally, clear  roles and responsibilities and methods for communication and  collaboration could better position senior leaders to effectively manage  resourcing and risk across the department. Officials from CAPE; the  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and  Biological Defense Programs; and the military services agreed that  clarifying roles and responsibilities and identifying methods for  communication would be helpful in addressing long-standing issues and  guiding the NDERG in the future.

Additionally, with increased funding and prioritization of the nuclear  enterprise, as called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, there is an  increased need for the kind of coordinated, holistic oversight of the  nuclear enterprise that was recommended in the 2014 Internal  Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise. For  example, the Nuclear Posture Review’s goal of replacing legacy nuclear  systems beginning in the mid-2020s will require senior leaders from  across the defense nuclear enterprise to make decisions regarding  resource allocation and prioritization—for both the new systems and the  existing systems that are not being replaced. Collaboration among the  various nuclear enterprise oversight groups can help to make this  resource allocation and prioritization effective.

DOD Guidance Does Not Reflect Evolving NC3 Oversight Roles and Responsibilities and Methods for Communicating and Collaborating with Other Nuclear Oversight Groups

As a result of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, NC3 roles,  responsibilities, and authorities are evolving as DOD is in the process of  making changes to the NC3 governance construct. The Nuclear Posture  Review directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a  plan to reform NC3 governance to ensure its effective functioning and  modernization. The following key documents outline the proposed  changes to NC3 roles, responsibilities, and authorities:

2018 Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018: To improve NC3  governance, the Nuclear Posture Review directed the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with key DOD  stakeholders, to deliver to the Secretary of Defense, no later than  May 1, 2018, a plan to reform NC3 governance to ensure its  effective functioning and modernization.

NC3 Governance Reform Initiative, February – May 2018: In  response to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Joint Staff  conducted a review of NC3 governance identifying problems with  the current NC3 enterprise governance construct and suggested  changes to address these problems.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, May  2018: Following the NC3 Governance Reform Initiative review, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary of  Defense a memorandum recommending a new NC3 governance  construct that would make the Commander of U.S. Strategic  Command the operational commander of the NC3 enterprise.  Under this new construct, specifically, the Commander of  Strategic Command would be designated as the NC3 enterprise  lead and would have increased responsibilities for operations,  requirements, and systems engineering and integration. In  addition, to support the new role of the Commander of U.S.  Strategic Command, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition and Sustainment would be designated as the NC3  enterprise capability portfolio manager and given increased  responsibilities for resources and acquisition. The memorandum  also proposes that the Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of  Defense would provide leadership and oversight, which would  include providing enterprise-level guidance to the department.

U.S. Strategic Command Commander’s Estimate, May 2018:  At the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.  Strategic Command developed the NC3 Governance Reform –  Commander’s Estimate (Commander’s Estimate) with a  recommended course of action to implement the new NC3  governance roles, responsibilities, and authorities. This  Commander’s Estimate was provided to the Secretary of Defense  along with the Chairman’s May memorandum. Concurrently, U.S.  Strategic Command is developing an implementation plan.

U.S. Strategic Command NC3 implementation plan, expected  fall 2018: According to a Strategic Command official, an NC3  implementation plan is currently being drafted to implement the  proposed changes to NC3 governance. Initial operating capability  for the new roles, responsibilities, and authorities is expected to  occur within six months of the approval of U.S. Strategic  Command’s implementation plan.

If the changes to NC3 governance are approved, as proposed in the  Commander’s Estimate, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command  would have the operational lead for NC3 and would be delegated the  authorities and assigned the resources necessary to perform the following  functions: operating the NC3 enterprise assessing and managing NC3 enterprise operational performance defining NC3 enterprise requirements and prioritization  conducting systems engineering and analysis to integrate current  and future NC3 enterprise architectures approving NC3 enterprise developmental tests and operations overseeing NC3 enterprise acquisition and service/national  programs  leading NC3 enterprise advocacy across DOD’s processes and  governance forums, such as the NLC3S  Changes to NC3 roles, responsibilities, and authorities would necessitate  changing existing NC3-related guidance documents. The current NC3  oversight structure is documented in statutes and presidential and  departmental guidance. For example, the NLC3S Council’s roles and  responsibilities are defined in statute and in charters for the Council and  its National Leadership Command Capability Executive Management  Board. DOD issuances also establish policy and assign responsibilities  for matters related to the NC3 system to organizations throughout DOD,  including U.S. Strategic Command. The changes proposed in the  Commander’s Estimate, if implemented, would result in DOD having to  update its own guidance and determine whether there is a need to  request a change in the statutory language or presidential guidance.  According to a U.S. Strategic Command official, work still needs to be  done to help align authorities within the NC3 enterprise. The  Commander’s Estimate states that any changes to NC3 oversight  authorities that may result from implementing the suggested changes in  the Commander’s Estimate will be annotated in existing applicable policy  and guidance documents.

As we have previously reported and as we have noted in this report,  leading practices for enhancing interagency collaboration include  agreeing on roles and responsibilities and having written guidance and  agreements. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government calls for management to develop an organizational structure  with an understanding of the organization’s overall responsibilities, and  assign these responsibilities to enable the organization to operate in an  efficient and effective manner, comply with applicable laws and  regulations, and reliably report quality information. To achieve this,  management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key  roles throughout the organization. Further, federal internal control  standards call for identifying appropriate methods for communicating both  internally and externally. However, DOD has not clearly defined roles and  responsibilities. Additionally, DOD has not developed written guidance  and agreements that establish how the NLC3S Council, U.S. Strategic  Command, and other organizations responsible for NC3 governance will  collaborate with each other, or identified methods of communication.  Further, DOD has not determined how these entities will collaborate with  other oversight groups that need to have visibility over any problems or  resourcing decisions related to the NC3 enterprise, such as the NDERG  and other entities with responsibility for the nuclear enterprise as a whole.

The 2015 NC3 report made recommendations to address diffused  responsibility in the NC3 enterprise; however, based our interviews with  officials, these issues still persist. According to DOD officials, 3 years later  there continues to be a problem with the management of the NC3  enterprise that resulted in the Secretary of Defense including the need to  reform NC3 governance in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.  Specifically, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recognized the broad  diffusion of NC3 system governance authority and responsibility within  DOD as an area of particular concern. To address these concerns, the  department is increasing the oversight roles of a number of organizations.  However, these changes may further complicate long-standing issues  associated with the governance of the NC3 enterprise unless the  department clearly articulates how all of the NC3 oversight bodies are to  collaborate.

As DOD identifies changes that must be made to guidance for  implementing the new NC3 governance construct, it has an opportunity to  make improvements to enhance collaboration and communication among  NC3 oversight groups and other nuclear enterprise groups. Updating its  guidance to clarify changes to the roles and responsibilities of the many  entities involved in the oversight and governance of NC3—and  establishing methods for how those entities should communicate and  collaborate—would better position senior leaders to effectively manage  resourcing and risk across the NC3 enterprise. The NC3 enterprise is a  large and complex system, and without clearly identified roles and  responsibilities for an effective oversight structure, problems similar to  those identified in 2014 as negatively affecting the management of the  entirety of the defense nuclear enterprise may continue to limit effective  management of the NC3 enterprise.

DOD has continued to take steps to improve the defense nuclear  enterprise in response to the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the  2015 NC3 report. By including risk identification, assessment, and  documentation, CAPE has strengthened its framework for monitoring the  department’s efforts to address the many issues identified in 2014— including those enduring issues that must be watched for years to come.  The DOD CIO’s adoption of a similar framework to monitor the  implementation of recommendations from the 2015 NC3 report has also  set up a structure to track and evaluate progress. The responsible military  services and DOD components’ use of these structures should aid them  in assessing their efforts, including providing means to reassess and re- evaluate individual efforts and their relationship to the health of the  defense nuclear enterprise as a whole. The efforts the department has  taken and has under way should improve senior leaders’ visibility into  these issues and better position them to ensure that progress continues  to be made, underlying problems are addressed, and risks mitigated or  accepted after considering the predictable and desirable results.  However, for these changes to be effective, the department must clearly  articulate the roles and responsibilities for a comprehensive oversight  structure. Unless DOD is able to align the roles and responsibilities of the  many entities now charged with oversight functions, the department’s  leadership may not be in a position to be informed of issues affecting the  nuclear enterprise or the NC3 enterprise and may be unable to make  effective resourcing decisions. The creation of both a charter and DOD  directive for the NDERG as well as DOD’s efforts to reform NC3  governance provide DOD with opportunities to create comprehensive  oversight structures—with defined roles and responsibilities and methods  for communication among oversight groups—for the defense enterprise to  address enduring leadership problems and help the department to move  forward in its governance of the nuclear enterprise. Further, by  establishing methods for communication and collaboration among these  organizations, the department could better avoid unnecessary overlap  and duplication of effort, important issues falling through the seams  between organizations, or enterprise-wide risks not being identified or  addressed through a holistic approach.

We are making four recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:  The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of  Defense—in coordination with the military departments; U.S. Strategic  Command; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and  Biological Defense Programs; CAPE; and other relevant components of  DOD—identify in the planned charter and DOD directive clear roles and  responsibilities for the members of the NDERG. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of  Defense—in coordination with the military departments; U.S. Strategic  Command; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and  Biological Defense Programs; CAPE; and other relevant components of  DOD—establish in the planned charter and DOD directive methods for  the NDERG to communicate and collaborate with other organizations that  have oversight responsibilities for portions of the nuclear enterprise.  (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of  Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in coordination with  the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (as NLC3S Council co-chairs),  and U.S. Strategic Command—update the applicable DOD guidance  (such as the NLC3S Council’s and Executive Management Board’s  charters) and identify whether there is a need to request changes to  statutory or presidential guidance in order to clarify changes to roles and  responsibilities for NC3 oversight. (Recommendation 3)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of  Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in coordination with  the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (as NLC3S Council co- chairs),and U.S. Strategic Command—update the applicable guidance to  establish methods for communication and collaboration among  organizations that have oversight responsibilities for portions of the  nuclear enterprise as changes are considered for charters, guidance, and  laws to reflect the changes to NC3 oversight. (Recommendation 4)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its comments,  reproduced in appendix I, DOD concurred with all four of our  recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

In concurring with our first and second recommendations, DOD stated  that it will clearly identify roles and responsibilities in the NDERG charter  and stated that the charter will also direct NDERG stakeholders to  coordinate on the prioritization of issues that involve other organizations  that have oversight responsibilities for portions of the nuclear enterprise.

In concurring with our third and fourth recommendations, DOD stated that  U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with other DOD components,  has developed an NC3 Governance Improvement Implementation Plan  that outlines the required updates and revisions that need to be requested  for statutory guidance as well as implemented for NC3 governance body  charters, DOD issuances, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  issuances to clarify the new roles and responsibilities for NC3 oversight.  Further, DOD noted that these updates and revisions will establish  methods and provide direction for communication and collaboration  among organizations that have nuclear enterprise oversight roles and  responsibilities.

We are encouraged that DOD is planning to take these actions to address  all four of our recommendations. We believe that, once DOD implements  our recommendations, the department’s leadership will be better  positioned to be informed of issues affecting the nuclear enterprise or the  NC3 enterprise and better organized to make effective resourcing  decisions.

We are providing copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, and to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air  Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command; the Department of Defense Chief Information  Officer; and the Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9971 or KirschbaumJ@gao.gov.Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  were Penney Harwell Caramia, Assistant Director; R. Scott Fletcher;  Jonathan Gill; Susannah Hawthorne; Brent Helt; Joanne Landesman;  Amie Lesser; K. Ryan Lester; Ned Malone; and Michael Shaughnessy.

Defense Nuclear Enterprise: Processes to Monitor Progress on  Implementing Recommendations and Managing Risks Could Be  Improved. GAO-18-144. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2017.

Nuclear Weapons Sustainment: Budget Estimates Report Contains More  Information than in Prior Fiscal Years, but Transparency Can Be  Improved. GAO-17-557. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2017.

Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic  Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Force. GAO-16-740.  Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2016.

Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Has Established Processes for  Implementing and Tracking Recommendations to Improve Leadership,  Morale, and Operations. GAO-16-597R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016.

Nuclear Weapons Council: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration Could  Help with Implementation of Expanded Responsibilities. GAO-15-446.  Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2015.