Afghanistan Security: Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces' Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment

Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future.

House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan.

This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted.

Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years.

While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable.

GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan.

GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.

Developing self-sustaining Afghan National Defense and Security Forces  (ANDSF) is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to counter  terrorist threats and create long-term security and stability in Afghanistan.  In January 2015, the ANDSF—comprising mainly the Afghan National  Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—formally assumed  security responsibilities for all of Afghanistan. Since this shift, the United  States has continued to aid the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty  Organization (NATO)-led mission, Resolute Support. The United States  is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to the coalition effort  through which it provides and maintains equipment for these forces, and  offers training, advising, and assistance intended to enable the ANDSF to  sustain the equipment in the future. In total, the United States has  allocated approximately $84 billion for Afghan security in the 17-year  period spanning fiscal years 2002 through 2018, according to the Special  Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In August  2017, the United States announced its South Asia Strategy, renewing its  commitment to helping the ANDSF become more effective and self- sustaining. The strategy removed any timelines for the United States to  withdraw support for the ANDSF and committed approximately 3,500  additional U.S. military personnel—an increase of 33 percent—to bolster  the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts in Afghanistan, according to  DOD reporting.

House Report 114-537, accompanying the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for us to  review the ANDSF’s capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.- purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report is a public  version of a sensitive report that we issued on September 20, 2018. Our  September report included three objectives, including one on the extent to  which DOD considers ANDSF input and meets their needs when  identifying equipment requirements. DOD deemed the information related  to that objective to be sensitive, requiring that it be protected from public  disclosure. Consequently, we removed that objective and a related  recommendation from this public report. This version includes information  on the other two objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF  capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has  information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.- purchased equipment. Although the information provided in this report is  more limited, the report uses the same methodology for the two  objectives as the sensitive report.

To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and  capability gaps as well as the steps DOD has taken to try to address those gaps, we reviewed NATO and DOD documents and reports—such  as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress (which we  hereafter refer to as “DOD reporting”)—created after the start of Resolute  Support on January 1, 2015. We also reviewed DOD-commissioned  assessments of ANDSF capabilities conducted by the Center for Naval  Analyses and reporting from SIGAR and the DOD Office of Inspector  General, and interviewed Center for Naval Analyses representatives and  DOD officials, including DOD officials at the Combined Security Transition  Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and in the Office of the Undersecretary  of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) who helped create the DOD reporting we  reviewed.

To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the  ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain equipment, we reviewed DOD  documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in the United States  and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF. We also  reviewed federal internal control standards to determine what  responsibilities agencies have specifically related to information  collection. To provide illustrative examples of what information DOD has  about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased  equipment and what that information indicates about the ANDSF’s  abilities and challenges we interviewed and analyzed written responses  from DOD officials, including DOD officials who provide procurement and  lifecycle management for some ANDSF aircraft and vehicles, about three  equipment types—MD-530 helicopters, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles  (MSFV), and radios. We selected these three equipment types from a list  that we developed, for an August 2017 report, of key ANDSF equipment  the United States purchased from fiscal years 2003 through 2016. (See  app. I for more information about our objectives, scope, and  methodology.)

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from August 2016 to September 2018 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to  provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our  audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We subsequently worked with DOD from September 2018 to  October 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report  for public release. This public version was also prepared in accordance  with those standards.

Since 2001, the United States has made a commitment to building  Afghanistan’s security and governance in order to prevent the country  from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. To achieve its  security objectives, the United States currently has two missions in  Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission that it leads and the NATO-led  Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, which it participates in  with other coalition nations. The objective of Resolute Support, according  to DOD reporting, is to establish self-sustaining Afghan security ministries  and forces that work together to maintain security in Afghanistan. The  United States is conducting these missions within a challenging security  environment that has deteriorated since the January 2015 transition to  Afghan-led security. The United Nations reported nearly 24,000 security  incidents in Afghanistan in 2017—the most ever recorded—and, despite a  slight decrease in the overall number of security incidents in early 2018,  the United Nations noted significant security challenges, including a spike  in high-casualty attacks in urban areas and coordinated attacks by the  insurgency on ANDSF checkpoints.

DOD provides both personnel and funding to support its efforts in  Afghanistan. DOD documents indicate that the United States contributes  more troops to Resolute Support than any other coalition nation. As of  May 2018, the United States was contributing 54 percent of Resolute  Support military personnel, according to DOD reporting. Of the  approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan as of June  2018, about 8,500 were assigned to Resolute Support to train, advise,  and assist the ANDSF, according to DOD reporting. For fiscal year 2018,  Congress appropriated about $4.67 billion for the Afghanistan Security  Forces Fund—the primary mechanism of U.S. financial support for  manning, training, and equipping the ANDSF. Other international donors  provided about $800 million, and the Afghan government committed to  providing about $500 million, according to DOD reporting.

Under Resolute Support and the International Security Assistance Force  mission that preceded it, CSTC-A is the DOD organization responsible for  (1) overseeing efforts to equip and train the ANA and ANP; (2) validating  requirements, including equipment requirements; (3) validating existing  supply levels; (4) submitting requests to DOD components to contract for  procurement of materiel for the ANDSF; and (5) ensuring that the Afghan  government appropriately uses and accounts for U.S. funds provided as  direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. OSD-P  is responsible for developing policy on and conducting oversight of the  bilateral security relationship with Afghanistan focused on efforts to  develop the Afghan security ministries and their forces.

In August 2017, we reported that the United States had spent almost $18  billion on equipment and transportation for the ANDSF from fiscal years  2005 through April 2017, representing the second-largest expenditure  category from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. In that report, we  identified six types of key equipment the United States funded for the  ANDSF in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, including approximately:

600,000 weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers,  shotguns, and pistols;

163,000 tactical and nontactical radios, such as handheld radios and

76,000 vehicles, such as Humvees, trucks, recovery vehicles, and  mine resistant ambush protected vehicles;

30,000 equipment items for detecting and disposing of explosives,  such as bomb disposal robots and mine detectors;

16,000 equipment items for intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance, such as unmanned surveillance drones and night  vision devices; and

208 aircraft, such as helicopters, light attack aircraft, and cargo  airplanes.

The Ministry of Defense oversees the ANA, and the Ministry of the Interior  oversees the ANP. According to DOD reporting, the authorized force level  for the ANDSF, excluding civilians, as of June 2018 was 352,000:  227,374 for the Ministry of Defense and 124,626 for the Ministry of  Interior. The ANA includes the ANA corps, Afghan Air Force, Special  Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command, and Ktah Khas  (counterterrorism forces). The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed  Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Afghan Border Police, Public Security  Police, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and General Command  of Police Special Units.

The ANA Special Mission Wing, Ktah Khas, ANA Special Operations  Command, and ANP General Command of Police Special Units are  collectively referred to as the Afghan Special Security Forces. In this  report, we refer to the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security  Forces as specialized forces, and the other components of the ANDSF as  conventional forces. According to DOD reporting, the combined  authorized force level for the specialized forces as of June 2018 was  approximately 34,500, or about 10 percent of the ANDSF’s total  authorized force level of 352,000, compared with the conventional forces,  which make up about 74 percent of the total authorized force level for the  ANDSF. Figure 1 shows the ANDSF’s organization.

Resolute Support Advising Strategy and Goals

U.S. and coalition advisors from Resolute Support focus on capacity  building at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANDSF  regional headquarters, according to DOD reporting. Ministerial advisors  are located at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul. At the ministerial  level, advisors provide assistance to improve institutional capabilities,  focusing on several functional areas. Table 1 summarizes the indicators  of effectiveness that ministerial advisors are to use to measure ministerial  progress in developing functioning systems that can effectively execute  each of the functional areas.

Regional Resolute Support advisors from seven advising centers located  throughout Afghanistan provide support to nearby ANA corps and ANP  zone headquarters personnel, according to DOD reporting. Some  advisors are embedded with their ANDSF counterparts, providing a  continuous coalition presence, while others provide less frequent support,  based on proximity to and capability of their ANDSF counterparts.  Regional advisors are to track ANDSF capability development by  assessing the progress of the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters  based on five capability pillars (see table 2). DOD and other Resolute  Support advisors are to document the results of these assessments each  quarter in an ANDSF Assessment Report.

According to DOD reporting, in addition to ministerial and regional  advising, two tactical-level advisory commands provide continuous  support for the ANDSF’s specialized forces: Train, Advise, and Assist  Command–Air (TAAC-Air) advises the Afghan Air Force down to the unit  level, and NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan  (NSOCC-A) primarily provides tactical-level special operations advising  for the Afghan Special Security Forces. TAAC-Air and NSOCC-A  assess capabilities at the headquarters level based on the five capability  pillars described above in table 2, and these assessments are included in  the quarterly ANDSF Assessment Report. Figure 2 shows the levels of  advising each Resolute Support advisory command type provides for the  ANDSF conventional forces and specialized forces.

ANDSF Capabilities Reportedly Continue to Improve; DOD Has Identified Several Capability Gaps and Initiated Efforts to Address Them DOD Has Reported the ANDSF Generally Continue to Improve Their Capabilities but Rely on Coalition Forces to Fill Several Critical Capability Gaps

Since Resolute Support began, the ANDSF have improved some  capabilities related to the functional areas and capability pillars described  above, but face several capability gaps that leave them reliant on coalition  assistance, according to publicly available DOD reporting. DOD defines  capability as the ability to execute a given task. A capability gap is the  inability to execute a specified course of action, such as an ANDSF  functional area or a capability pillar (see tables 1 and 2 above). According  to DOD guidance, a gap may occur because forces lack a materiel or  non-materiel capability, lack proficiency or sufficiency in a capability, or  need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap  from occurring.

According to DOD reporting on the Afghan security ministries, ANA corps,  and ANP zones, the ANDSF generally have improved in some capability  areas since Resolute Support began, with some components performing  better than others. For example, DOD has reported that the Afghan  ministries have improved in operational planning, strategic  communications, and coordination between the Ministry of Interior and  Ministry of Defense at the national level. In general, the ANA is more  capable than the ANP, according to DOD reporting. According to DOD  officials and SIGAR reporting, this is due, in part, to the ANA having more  coalition advisors and monitoring than the ANP. DOD officials also noted  that the Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP, and Afghanistan’s  justice system are both underdeveloped, hindering the effectiveness of  the ANP. Corruption, understaffing, and training shortfalls have also  contributed to the ANP’s underdevelopment, according to DOD and  SIGAR reporting. The Afghan Special Security Forces are the most  capable within the ANDSF and can conduct the majority of their  operations independently without coalition enablers, according to DOD  reporting. DOD and SIGAR reports have attributed the Afghan Special  Security Forces’ relative proficiency to factors such as low attrition rates,  longer training, and close partnership with coalition forces. The Afghan Air  Force is becoming increasingly capable, and can independently plan for  and perform some operational tasks, such as armed overwatch and aerial  escort missions, according to DOD reporting.

However, DOD has reported that the ANDSF generally continue to need  support in several key areas. For example, as of December 2017, DOD  reported several ministerial capability gaps, including force management;  logistics; and analyzing and integrating intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance information. DOD also reported that, as of December  2017, the ANA and ANP continued to have capability gaps in several key  areas, such as weapons and equipment sustainment and integrating fire  from aerial and ground forces. The ANDSF rely on support from  contractors and coalition forces to mitigate capability gaps in these key  areas. For some capability areas, such as aircraft and vehicle  maintenance and logistics, the ANDSF is not expected to be self- sufficient until at least 2023, according to DOD reporting.

According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, coalition and contractor  support helps mitigate ANDSF capability gaps in the immediate term but  may make it challenging to assess the ANDSF’s capabilities and gaps  independent of such support. For example, vehicle and aircraft  maintenance contractors are responsible for sustaining specific  operational readiness rates for the equipment they service. While this  helps ensure that ANDSF personnel have working equipment to  accomplish their mission, thereby closing an immediate capability gap, it  may mask the ANDSF’s underlying capabilities and potentially prolong  reliance on such support, according to DOD officials and SIGAR  reporting.

DOD and the ANDSF Have Plans and Initiatives in Place to Address Some ANDSF Capability Gaps

DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans and initiatives that  aim to strengthen ANDSF capabilities. These include the following,  among others:

ANDSF Roadmap. In 2017, the Afghan government began  implementing the ANDSF Roadmap—a series of developmental  initiatives that seek to strengthen the ANDSF and increase security  and governance in Afghanistan, according to DOD reporting. The  Roadmap is structured to span 4 years, but DOD has reported that its  full implementation will likely take longer than that. According to DOD  reporting, the Roadmap aims to improve four key elements: (1)  fighting capabilities; (2) leadership development; (3) unity of command  and effort; and (4) counter-corruption efforts.

Under the Roadmap’s initiative to increase the ANDSF’s fighting  capabilities, DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans to  increase the size of the specialized forces. Specifically, DOD reports  that the ANDSF plans to nearly double the size of the Afghan Special  Security Forces by 2020 as an effort to bolster the ANDSF’s offensive  reach and effectiveness. The Afghan Special Security Forces are to  become the ANDSF’s primary offensive force, the conventional ANA  forces are to focus on consolidating gains and holding key terrain and  infrastructure, and the conventional ANP forces are to focus on  community policing efforts. In addition, to provide additional aerial fire  and airlift capabilities, the ANDSF began implementing an aviation  modernization plan in 2017. The aim is to increase personnel strength  and the size of the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing fleets  by 2023.

Enhanced vehicle maintenance efforts. To help improve the  ANDSF’s vehicle maintenance abilities, DOD awarded a National  Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract, which,  according to DOD officials, became fully operational in December  2017. The National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support  contract consolidated five separate vehicle maintenance and training  contracts into a single contract and contains provisions for building the  capacity of ANDSF and Afghan contractors to incrementally take  control of vehicle maintenance over a 5-year period.

Additional U.S. military personnel. As part of the South Asia  strategy, the United States committed 3,500 additional military  personnel to increase support to its missions in Afghanistan.  According to DOD reporting, most of the additional personnel will  support the Resolute Support mission, providing more advising and  combat enabler support to the ANDSF. Additionally, in March 2018,  the United States began deploying a Security Force Assistance  Brigade—a new type of unit made up of U.S. Army personnel with  expertise in training foreign militaries—to Afghanistan. The Security  Force Assistance Brigade will advise conventional and specialized  forces at and below the corps and zone levels and will accompany  and support ANA conventional forces at the battalion level in ground  operations as needed, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting.

DOD Has Some Information on ANDSF Specialized Forces’ Ability to Operate and Maintain U.S.-Purchased Equipment but Has Limited Reliable Information on Its Conventional Forces

DOD Advisors Embedded with Specialized Forces Provide Some Information on Those Forces’ Capabilities

DOD collects some reliable information about the operation and  maintenance abilities of ANDSF specialized forces, in part because  advisors are embedded at the tactical level with the specialized forces,  according to DOD officials. Specifically, U.S. and coalition forces advise  specialized forces at the tactical level under Resolute Support because  building ANDSF aviation and special operations abilities are considered  particularly important, according to DOD reporting. DOD officials told us  that since U.S. and coalition forces are embedded at the tactical level for  specialized forces, they can monitor, assess, and report on tactical  abilities, including the ability to operate and maintain equipment.

Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the Afghan Air  Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters illustrates that  DOD has some detailed information about specialized forces. TAAC-Air  advisors help train Afghan pilots and maintainers and collect information  on their tactical abilities. For example, TAAC-Air advisors track the  percentage of maintenance performed by Afghan Air Force maintainers  and aircraft operational readiness rates, according to DOD officials.  According to DOD reporting and officials, as of December 2017, the  Afghan Air Force could independently conduct MD-530 helicopter  operations for short intervals without contractor support but relied on  contractors to perform the majority of maintenance and sustainment  activities. See appendix II for more information on the Afghan Air Force’s  ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters.

DOD Advisors Have Limited Contact with Conventional Forces in the Field, Yielding Little Information on Their Ability to Operate and Maintain Equipment

U.S. and coalition forces perform high-level assessments of the ANDSF  conventional forces’ capabilities at the corps and zone levels but do not  assess their tactical abilities, such as the ability to operate and maintain  equipment, according to DOD officials. For example, U.S. and coalition  forces assess the ANA and ANP conventional forces in quarterly ANDSF  Assessment Reports, but these reports are at the corps and zone  headquarters levels, and are not meant to provide an evaluation of the  entire ANDSF, according to DOD reporting. DOD officials stated that  other U.S.- and coalition-produced reports and assessments, such as  DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, semiannual  periodic mission reviews, and annual Afghanistan Plans of Record,  provide some information on the ANDSF’s high-level capabilities.  However, according to DOD officials, these reports do not routinely  assess the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain  equipment.

According to DOD officials, DOD does not assess conventional forces’  tactical abilities because advisors have had little or no direct contact with  conventional units below the corps and zone levels, and thus do not  collect such information on conventional forces. Specifically, under  Resolute Support, U.S. and coalition forces have not embedded with the  conventional forces below the corps and zone levels except in limited  circumstances.

Since U.S. and coalition forces do not collect firsthand information on the  conventional units’ tactical abilities, they rely on those units’ self-reporting  for information on ANDSF abilities below the corps and zone levels,  which, according to DOD officials, may be unreliable. ANDSF reporting is  not verified by U.S. officials and can be unreliable in its consistency,  comprehensiveness, and credibility, according to DOD officials and  SIGAR. For example, the ANDSF produce a monthly tracker on vehicle  availability, maintenance backlog, repair times, and personnel  productivity, but DOD officials told us that the trackers are of questionable  accuracy.

Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to  operate and maintain tactical and nontactical radios illustrates the limited  amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical  abilities. Specifically, DOD officials could not say how well ANDSF  personnel on the front lines operate radios in the field and had only  limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to maintain radios. For  example, the officials noted that the ANA conventional forces can perform  some unit-level radio repairs but that complex ANA radio maintenance  and all ANP radio maintenance is conducted by contractors. DOD officials  at Resolute Support headquarters told us that they provide ministerial- level advising on how to manage ANDSF radio systems and do not  provide tactical advising or inventory control for radios. See appendix III  for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain  radios.

Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to  operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) highlights the  limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’  tactical abilities compared with specialized forces. DOD officials were  able to provide operation and maintenance information for MSFVs that  had transferred to the specialized forces as of January 2018 but were  unable to provide operation and maintenance information for any other  MSFVs. The ANDSF began transferring one of the ANDSF’s two MSFV  brigades from the conventional to specialized forces in August 2017,  according to DOD officials. As part of this transfer, NSOCC-A  advisors—who provide tactical-level advising for the Afghan Special  Security Forces—assumed oversight for the first brigade from Resolute  Support headquarters advisors. DOD officials stated that the ANDSF’s  ability to operate and maintain MSFVs in this brigade prior to the transfer  was unknown, as neither Resolute Support headquarters nor the ANA  had assessed this. The operation and maintenance abilities of the second  brigade, which is still in the conventional forces, remains unknown. DOD  officials at NSOCC-A were able to provide information such as inventory  and mission capability rates for the MSFVs that had transferred, but only  for the short period of time the vehicles had been under the control of the  specialized forces. DOD officials told us that NSOCC-A plans to collect  more information on the specialized forces’ ability to operate and maintain  MSFVs as they are transferred. See appendix IV for more information on  the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs.

In the absence of embedded advisors at the tactical level, DOD has not  implemented alternative approaches to collect reliable information about  the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment.  Federal internal control standards state that U.S. agencies should obtain  and process reliable information to evaluate performance in achieving key  objectives and assessing risks. DOD officials acknowledged that some  of the plans described above that DOD and the ANDSF have begun  implementing to address capability gaps may provide opportunities for  DOD to collect more reliable information on the conventional forces’  ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. For example,  the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract  requires that contractors regularly report the total work orders received,  work in progress, and completed maintenance work performed by ANDSF  personnel as well as vehicle availability rates, which may be more reliable  than the ANDSF’s monthly report on vehicle availability. In addition, the  Security Force Assistance Brigade may be able to collect and report on  the tactical abilities of units they advise and accompany on missions  since they are being deployed at or below the corps and zone levels.  However, as of June 2018, DOD officials had not decided which, if any, of  these options to pursue. Without reliable information on the equipment  operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF conventional forces, which  represent nearly 75 percent of the ANDSF, DOD may be unable to fully  evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in  Afghanistan.

The United States invested nearly $84 billion in Afghan security in the 17- year period spanning fiscal years 2002 through 2018, but DOD continues  to face challenges to developing a self-sustaining ANDSF. While DOD  has reported the ANDSF have improved in several capability areas, they  continue to face critical capability gaps, impeding their ability to maintain  security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U.S. and coalition  forces. Moreover, DOD lacks reliable information about the degree to  which conventional forces—which make up about three-quarters of the  ANDSF—are able to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.  This limits DOD’s ability to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise,  assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan.

The Secretary of Defense should develop and, as appropriate, implement  options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional  forces’ ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.  (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. DOD  declined to provide written comments specifically on this public version of  the report, but DOD’s comments on the sensitive version of this report are  reprinted in appendix V. The sensitive version of this report included two  recommendations, which DOD cited in its comments on the draft of the  sensitive report. One of those recommendations related to information  that DOD deemed to be sensitive and that must be protected from public  disclosure. Therefore, we have omitted that recommendation from DOD’s  comment letter in appendix V. This omission did not have a material  effect on the substance of DOD’s comments. In its comments, DOD  concurred with the recommendation we made in this version of the report  and stated it will take steps to implement it. DOD also provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of  State had no comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this  report please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key  contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

House Report 114-537 associated with the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us to  review the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF)  capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon  systems and equipment. This report is a public version of a sensitive  report that we issued on September 20, 2018. Our September report  included three objectives, including one on the extent to which DOD  considers ANDSF input and meets their needs when identifying  equipment requirements. DOD deemed the information related to that  objective to be sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure.  Consequently, we removed that objective and a related recommendation  from this public report. This version includes information on the other two  objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and  capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about  the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.  Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report  uses the same methodology for the two objectives as the sensitive report.

To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and  capability gaps, we reviewed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  and DOD documents and reports, such as DOD’s semiannual Section  1225 reports to Congress, produced after the start of the NATO-led  Resolute Support mission on January 1, 2015. To determine what steps  DOD and NATO have taken to try to address gaps, we reviewed reports  the Center for Naval Analyses produced for DOD, as well as DOD and  NATO documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015, and  reports from GAO, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan  Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the DOD Inspector General. We also  interviewed Center for Naval Analyses representatives and DOD officials  in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials at the  Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and in  the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) who  helped create the DOD reporting we reviewed.

To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the  ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, we  reviewed DOD documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in  the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF. We also reviewed federal internal control standards to  determine what responsibilities agencies have specifically related to  information collection. To provide illustrative examples of information  DOD has about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.- purchased equipment and what that information indicates about the  ANDSF’s abilities and challenges, we interviewed and analyzed written  responses from DOD officials, including DOD officials who provide  procurement and lifecycle management for some ANDSF aircraft and  vehicles, about three equipment types—MD-530 helicopters, Mobile  Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), and radios. We selected these three  equipment types from a list that we developed, for an August 2017 report,  of key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased from fiscal years  2003 through 2016. We made our selections after reviewing DOD  documentation and interviewing DOD officials regarding a number of  considerations, such as (1) how critical the equipment is to the ANDSF’s  ability to achieve its mission; (2) which ANDSF component uses the  equipment (i.e., Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, or both);  (3) whether DOD intends to continue procuring the equipment for the  ANDSF; and (4) whether the equipment had been in use at least 5 years.

We collected detailed information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate  and maintain MD-530 helicopters, MSFVs, and radios, as well as other  key statistics DOD provided about the equipment, such as inventory,  average lifespan, average cost, role, and training. This information was  based mainly on DOD responses collected from January 2018 to  February 2018 as well as DOD documents and reports produced after  January 1, 2015. The total amount of MD-530s and radios authorized for  procurement was based on DOD data that we collected for our August  2017 report on key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased in  fiscal years 2003 through 2016, which we supplemented with additional  data DOD provided on U.S.-purchased equipment from October 1, 2016,  through December, 31, 2017.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from August 2016 to September 2018 in accordance with generally  accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that  we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence  to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a  reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We subsequently worked with DOD from September 2018 to  October 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report  for public release. This public version was also prepared in accordance  with those standards.

U.S. Program Management  Office: U.S. Army, Non-Standard  Rotary Wing Aircraft Project  Management Office  Program Advising: Train Advise  Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air)

The United States originally procured 6 unarmed MD-530s for the AAF for  rotary wing training in 2011. In 2014, the United States purchased 12 armed  MD-530s and began retrofitting the 5 remaining trainer helicopters with  armament for operational missions to address a close air attack gap. MD- 530s were chosen to fill the gap over other aircraft, in part because they  could be delivered relatively quickly as the AAF awaited A-29 light attack  aircraft that were experiencing procurement delays, according to Department  of Defense (DOD) officials. The United States procured additional MD-530s  in 2015, 2016, and 2017 because of the aircraft’s positive impact on the  battlefield, according to DOD officials (see fig. 3).

Key Statistics   Variants: All can be armed with  .50-cal machine gun pods and/or  2.75 inch rocket pods.

Total Authorized for  Procurement: 60 as of December  31, 2017  Inventory: 25 as of January 2018  (30 are scheduled for delivery;  attrition of 5 due to crashes and  enemy fire)

Average Lifespan: Absent  mishaps, and with good  maintenance, there is no defined  lifespan limit for MD-530s,  according to DOD officials.

National Army and Afghan National Police, depending on the mission, in  all but one region of Afghanistan, which is supported by other aircraft.

MD-530s are typically tasked two at a time for missions, according to  DOD officials.

An MD-530 crew consists of a pilot and co-pilot, according to DOD.

Average cost: $6.3 million per  aircraft, including all electronic  devices, weapons management  systems, and weapons (excluding  ordnance), according to DOD  officials. o  Division of labor is based on the individual crew members'  capabilities, with one pilot handling navigation and communication  while the other identifies targets and operates the weapon systems.

Army pilot advisors at Kandahar Air Field, according to DOD officials.  o  MD-530 pilot training takes about 3 years (see fig. 4).

1. The GAO report number cited in DOD’s letter refers to a draft of the  sensitive version of this report, which we issued on September 20, 2018.  Prior to issuing that version, we changed its report number to GAO-18- 662SU to reflect its sensitive nature. That version of this report included  two recommendations. The second recommendation has been omitted  from DOD’s letter in this public version because it was related to  information that DOD deemed to be sensitive.

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Joyee Dasgupta (Assistant  Director), Kara Marshall, Katherine Forsyth, and Bridgette Savino made  key contributions to this report. The team also benefitted from the expert  advice and assistance of David Dayton, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher,  Ashley Alley, Cary Russell, Marie Mak, James Reynolds, Sally  Williamson, Ji Byun, and J. Kristopher Keener.

The United States has invested about $84 billion since 2002 to help create long-term security in Afghanistan—including providing and maintaining equipment for the Afghan defense and security forces.

We reviewed the capacity of these forces to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. We found that DOD lacks reliable information on how well most Afghan forces operate and maintain this equipment because it has little direct contact with the front-line units that make up about three-quarters of the Afghan forces.

We recommended DOD develop options to collect more reliable information about this equipment.