Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and Activities

Recent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of using chemical weapons against the West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have raised concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS's chemical defense responsibilities include, among others, managing and coordinating federal efforts to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks.

GAO was asked to examine DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. This report examines (1) DHS programs and activities to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks and (2) the extent to which DHS has integrated and coordinated all of its chemical defense programs and activities. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from relevant DHS offices and components and reviewed DHS strategy and planning documents and federal laws and directives related to chemical defense.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic attacks using chemical agents (see figure). Some DHS components have programs that focus on chemical defense, such as the Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) chemical hazard characterization. Others have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their broader missions, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which interdicts chemical agents at the border. DHS recently consolidated some chemical defense programs and activities into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office.

However, GAO found and DHS officials acknowledged that DHS has not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities. Several components—including CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, the Office of Health Affairs, and S&T—have conducted similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction and coordination. As components carry out chemical defense activities to meet mission needs, there is a risk that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead to greater effectiveness addressing chemical threats. It is too early to tell the extent to which the new CWMD Office will enhance the integration of DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. Given the breadth of DHS's chemical defense responsibilities, a strategy and implementation plan would help the CWMD Office (1) mitigate the risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2) establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010. This would also be consistent with a 2012 DHS effort, since abandoned, to develop a strategy and implementation plan for all chemical defense activities, from prevention to recovery. DHS officials stated the 2012 effort was not completed because of leadership changes and competing priorities.

GAO recommends that the Assistant Secretary for the CWMD Office develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate, and coordinate chemical defense programs and activities. DHS concurred with the recommendation and identified actions to address it.

The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr.  Chairman  Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and  Communications  Committee on Homeland Security  House of Representatives  Recent chemical attacks in Malaysia and Syria, a thwarted chemical  attack in Australia, and the threat of using chemical weapons against the  West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have sparked concerns  about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the United States. In  March 2017, an exiled relative of the leader of North Korea was killed in  Malaysia after he was allegedly exposed to the chemical nerve agent VX.  In April 2017, a chemical attack in Syria using the nerve agent sarin killed  approximately 100 people and injured hundreds more. In July 2017,  Australian police foiled an alleged terrorist plot to bring down a plane by  using a device that would have generated an explosion and released a  toxic gas inside the plane. Similarly, according to Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) officials, ISIS has become increasingly  interested in conducting and inspiring chemical attacks in the West, with  the goal of increasing fear, enhancing the lethal nature of attacks, and  adding greater complexity into response efforts.

According to the National Academies and DHS, chemical attacks involve  releasing toxic chemicals with the intent to do harm. In addition,  according to DHS, ISIS-inspired homegrown extremists or other domestic  actors who choose to pursue chemical attacks could use toxic chemicals  and crude methods to release them, such as releasing toxic gases from a  pressurized tank by breaching the tank with an improvised explosive  device. For example, facilities containing toxic chemicals or the trucks,  vessels, or rail cars used to transport these chemicals could be attacked  to cause a chemical release. Toxic chemicals that could be used in an  attack include industrial and commercial chemicals, such as chlorine or  ammonia, and chemical toxins of biological origin, such as ricin.

DHS has a number of chemical defense responsibilities, programs, and  activities spread across its various components. They include, for  example, being responsible for managing domestic chemical incidents;  developing and implementing chemical detection technology; providing  chemical preparedness guidance and support to state, local, territorial,  and tribal partners; and regulating and supporting the security of facilities  that use or store certain chemicals. DHS’s efforts to address a terrorist  chemical attack involve a wide range of components including the  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, the National  Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Science and  Technology Directorate (S&T), the Federal Emergency Management  Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard.

In light of the range of DHS components involved in chemical defense  and concerns that some terrorist organizations have threatened to use  chemical agents to attack the United States, you asked us to examine  DHS’ chemical defense efforts and whether these programs and activities  are positioned to address the threat of chemical terrorism. This report  examines (1) DHS programs and activities to prevent and protect against  domestic chemical attacks and (2) the extent to which DHS has  integrated and coordinated all of its chemical defense programs and  activities.

To meet our two objectives, we reviewed and discussed with DHS  officials relevant legislation, presidential directives, and DHS  documentation to understand DHS’s responsibilities related to domestic  chemical defense. We reviewed, among others, the Homeland Security  Act of 2002; the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007; the Protecting and  Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014; the 2007  Homeland Security Presidential Directive on domestic chemical defense;  the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive on management of  domestic incidents; the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive on national  preparedness; the 2007 Homeland Security Presidential Directive on  medical countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction; the 2013  Presidential Policy Directive on critical infrastructure security and  resilience; the 2004 Homeland Security Presidential Directive on defense  of U.S. agriculture and food; the 2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland  Security Review; the Fiscal Years 2014–2018 DHS Strategic Plan; the  2013 DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan; and the 2016 DHS  National Response Framework.

To identify the programs and activities that DHS has to prevent and  protect against chemical attacks, we reviewed DHS documentation and  interviewed DHS officials. Specifically, we reviewed a 2016 DHS  presidential transition issue paper that identified DHS components as  having activities intended to reduce the risk of chemicals being used as  weapons. Also, we reviewed documentation provided by DHS and  interviewed officials from the following components: the Office of Health  Affairs (OHA), S&T, NPPD, FEMA, CBP, TSA, the Office of Intelligence  and Analysis, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service. For  example, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from  OHA’s Chemical Defense Program about chemical defense  demonstration projects it conducted from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal  year 2017 in five jurisdictions: Baltimore, Maryland; Boise, Idaho;  Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau County, New York.  We also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from S&T’s Chemical and Biological Defense Division on its chemical detection work  conducted in 2016 and 2017 in New York and New Jersey. In addition,  we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from S&T’s  Chemical Security Analysis Center on its work analyzing chemical threats  and risks, such as the Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment, which is  used to determine the risk associated with different terrorist scenarios and  to assess how proposed measures might reduce that risk. Further, we  reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from NPPD’s  Infrastructure Security Compliance Division on its Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, which regulates security at  certain chemical facilities, and reviewed our related body of work,  including recent reports. Moreover, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed officials from NPPD’s Office of Infrastructure Protection on its  Sector Outreach and Programs Division (SOPD) that represents DHS as  the sector-specific agency for the chemical sector and works in  conjunction with other NPPD divisions to assure the security of the  chemical sector. In addition, we reviewed documentation and  interviewed officials representing NPPD’s Federal Protective Service.  Moreover, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from the  new CWMD Office on its efforts to consolidate some of DHS’s chemical,  biological, radiological, and nuclear programs, including the status of  initial steps to establish the office’s mission, integrated strategic goals,  structure, plans, processes, and procedures.

To assess the extent to which DHS has integrated and coordinated all of  its chemical defense programs and activities, we reviewed DHS  documentation and interviewed DHS officials on the department’s efforts.  Specifically, we examined DHS’s 2017 action to consolidate some  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions into one office  and a 2012 DHS effort to develop a strategy and related implementation  plan to integrate and coordinate the department’s chemical defense  programs and activities. In so doing, we reviewed the 2012 DHS strategy  for responding to and recovering from a chemical attack, which the  department approved for limited departmental use and distribution. In  addition, we examined the extent of DHS’s efforts to integrate and  coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities relative to the  laws and presidential directives cited above that set forth DHS  responsibilities regarding chemical defense, national preparedness, and  critical infrastructure protection, and the DHS chemical response and  recovery strategy and other planning documents cited above. We also  compared the extent of these DHS efforts with criteria in the Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). This act provides guidance for  federal departments and agencies to establish strategies and plans for  achieving results, develop measurable goals and related measures, and  identify resources that will be required to achieve the goals.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2017 through August  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Chemical attacks have emerged as a prominent homeland security risk  because of recent attacks abroad using chemical agents and the interest  of ISIS in conducting and inspiring chemical attacks against the West.  DHS’s OHA officials have stated that nationwide preparedness for a  chemical attack is critical to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,  and recover from such an attack because it could occur abruptly, with  many victims falling ill quickly, and with a window of opportunity of a few  hours to respond effectively. Also, recent incidents in Malaysia and the  United Kingdom demonstrate that chemical agents can be used to target  individuals and can contaminate other individuals near the attack area.  Chemicals that have been used in attacks include chlorine, sarin, and  ricin, all of which can have deadly or debilitating consequences for  individuals exposed to them; see figure 1.

Laws and Presidential Directives Guiding DHS’s Chemical Defense Efforts

Various laws guide DHS’s efforts to defend the nation from chemical  threats and attacks. For example, under the Homeland Security Act of  2002, as amended, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the  Under Secretary for Science and Technology, has various  responsibilities, to include conducting national research and developing,  testing, evaluating, and procuring technology and systems for preventing  the importation of chemical and other weapons and material; and  detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist  attacks. Under former Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007,  DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify  chemical facilities and assess the security risk posed by each, categorize  the facilities into risk-based tiers, and inspect the high-risk facilities to  ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

DHS’s responsibilities with regard to chemical defense are also guided by  various presidential directives promulgated following the September 11,  2001, terror attacks against the United States; see table 1.

Our Work on Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation of Federal Programs

In 2010, Public Law 111-139 included a provision for us to identify and  report annually on programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either  within departments or government-wide—with duplicative goals and  activities. In our annual reports to Congress from 2011 through 2018 in  fulfillment of this provision, we described areas in which we found  evidence of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal  programs, including those managed by DHS. To supplement these  reports, we developed a guide to identify options to reduce or better  manage the negative effects of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation,  and evaluate the potential trade-offs and unintended consequences of  these options. In this report, we use the following definitions:

Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are  engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the  same beneficiaries.

Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in  similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar  beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations  beyond the agency’s control.

Fragmentation occurs when more than one agency (or more than one  organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of  national interest and opportunities exist to improve service delivery.

DHS Has Several Chemical Defense Programs and Activities Intended to Prevent and Protect Against Chemical Attacks

DHS manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and  protect against domestic chemical attacks. Prior to December 2017, for  example, three DHS components—OHA, S&T, and NPPD—had specific  programs and activities focused on chemical defense. In December 2017,  DHS created the CWMD Office, which, as discussed later in this report,  consolidated the majority of OHA and some other DHS programs and  activities intended to counter weapons of mass destruction such as  chemical weapons. Other DHS components—such as CBP, the Coast  Guard, and TSA—have chemical defense programs and activities as part  of their broader missions. These components address potential chemical  attacks as part of an all-hazards approach to address a wide range of  threats and hazards. Appendix I discusses in greater detail DHS’s  programs and activities that focus on chemical defense, and appendix II  discusses DHS components that have chemical defense responsibilities  as part of an all-hazards approach. Table 2 identifies the chemical  defense responsibilities of each DHS component, and whether that  component has a specific chemical defense program or an all-hazards  approach to chemical defense.

Figure 2 shows that fiscal year 2017 funding levels for three of the  programs that focus on chemical defense totaled $77.3 million.  Specifically, about $1.3 million in appropriated funds was available for  OHA for its Chemical Defense Program activities and S&T had access to  about $6.4 million in appropriated funds for its Chemical Security Analysis  Center activities. The CFATS program had access to about $69.6 million  in appropriated funds—or 90 percent of the $77.3 million for the three  programs—to regulate high-risk facilities that produce, store, or use  certain chemicals. OHA officials stated that their efforts regarding  weapons of mass destruction over the last few years had focused mostly  on biological threats rather than chemical threats. For example, $77.2  million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds supported OHA’s BioWatch  Program to provide detection and early warning of the intentional release  of selected aerosolized biological agents in more than 30 jurisdictions  nationwide. By contrast, as stated above, OHA and S&T had access to  about $7.7 million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds for chemical  defense efforts.

We could not determine the level of funding for components that treated  chemical defense as part of their missions under an all-hazards approach  because those components do not have chemical defense funding that  can be isolated from funding for their other responsibilities. For example,  among other things, CBP identifies and interdicts hazardous chemicals at  and between ports of entry as part of its overall mission to protect the  United States from threats entering the country.

A Chemical Strategy and Implementation Plan Would Enhance DHS Efforts to Integrate and Coordinate Its Chemical Defense Programs and Activities

DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented  and not well coordinated, but DHS recently created the CWMD Office to,  among other things, promote better integration and coordination among  these programs and activities. While it is too early to tell the extent to  which this new office will enhance this integration and coordination,  developing a chemical defense strategy and related implementation plan  would further assist DHS’s efforts.

DHS’s Efforts to Address Chemical Attacks Have Been Fragmented and Not Well Coordinated

DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented  and not well coordinated across the department. As listed in table 2  above, we identified nine separate DHS organizational units that have  roles and responsibilities that involve conducting some chemical defense  programs and activities, either as a direct mission activity or as part of  their broader missions under an all-hazards approach. We also found  examples of components conducting similar but separate chemical  defense activities without DHS-wide direction and coordination.

OHA and S&T—two components with specific chemical defense  programs—both conducted similar but separate projects to assist  local jurisdictions with preparedness. Specifically, from fiscal years  2009 to 2017, OHA’s Chemical Defense Program conducted chemical  demonstration projects in five jurisdictions—Baltimore, Maryland;  Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau  County, New York—to assist the jurisdictions in enhancing their  preparedness for a large-scale chemical terrorist attack. According to  OHA officials, they worked with local officials in one jurisdiction to  install and test chemical detectors without having department-wide  direction on these detectors’ requirements. Also, according to S&T  officials, the Chemical and Biological Defense Division worked with  three jurisdictions in New York and New Jersey to help them purchase  and install chemical detectors for their transit systems beginning in  2016 again without having department-wide direction on chemical  detector requirements.

The Secret Service, CBP, and the Coast Guard—three components  with chemical defense activities that are part of their all-hazards  approach—also conducted separate acquisitions of chemical  detection or identification equipment, according to officials from those  components. For example, according to Secret Service officials, the  agency has purchased chemical detectors that agents use for  personal protection of protectees and assessing the safety of  designated fixed sites and temporary venues. Also, according to CBP  officials, CBP has purchased chemical detectors for identifying  chemical agents at ports of entry nationwide. Finally, according to  Coast Guard officials, the agency has purchased chemical detectors  for use in maritime locations subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction.

Officials from OHA, S&T, and the CWMD Office acknowledged that  chemical defense activities had been fragmented and not well- coordinated. They stated that this fragmentation occurred because DHS  had no department-wide leadership and direction for chemical defense  activities.

We recognize that equipment, such as chemical detectors, may be  designed to meet the specific needs of components when they carry out  their missions under different operating conditions, such as an enclosed  space by CBP or on open waterways by the Coast Guard. Nevertheless,  when fragmented programs and activities that are within the same  department and are responsible for the same or similar functions are  executed without a mechanism to coordinate them, the department may  miss opportunities to leverage resources and share information that leads  to greater effectiveness.

DHS Has Begun to Consolidate Some Chemical Defense Programs and Activities

As discussed earlier, DHS has taken action to consolidate some chemical  defense programs and activities. Specifically, in December 2017, DHS  consolidated some of its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  defense programs and activities under the CWMD Office. The CWMD  Office consolidated the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the majority of  OHA; selected elements of the Science and Technology Directorate, such  as elements involved in chemical, biological, and integrated terrorism risk  assessments and material threat assessments; and certain personnel  from the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and the Office of  Operations Coordination with expertise on chemical, biological,  radiological, and nuclear issues. According to officials from the CWMD  Office, the fiscal year 2018 funding for the office is $457 million. Of this  funding, OHA contributed about $121.6 million and the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office contributed about $335.4 million. Figure 3 shows the  initial organizational structure of the CWMD Office as of June 2018.

As of July 2018, according to the Assistant Secretary of CWMD, his office  supported by DHS leadership is working to develop and implement its  initial structure, plans, processes, and procedures. To guide the initial  consolidation, officials representing the CWMD Office said they plan to  use the key practices for successful transformations and reorganizations  identified in our past work. For example, they noted that they intend to  establish integrated strategic goals, consistent with one of these key  practices—establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to  guide the transformation. These officials stated that the goals include  those intended to enhance the nation’s ability to prevent attacks using  weapons of mass destruction, including toxic chemical agents; support  operational components in closing capability gaps; and invest in and  develop innovative technologies to meet technical requirements and  improve operations. They noted that the latter might include networked  chemical detectors that could be used by various components to help  them carry out their mission responsibilities in the future. However, the  officials stated that all of the new office’s efforts were in the initial planning  stages and none had been finalized. They further stated that the initial  setup of the CWMD Office covering the efforts to consolidate OHA and  the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office may not be completed until the  end of fiscal year 2018.

It is still too early to determine the extent to which the creation of the  CWMD Office will help address the fragmentation and lack of coordination  on chemical defense efforts that we have identified. Our prior work on key  steps for assisting mergers and transformations shows that  transformation can take years to complete. One factor that could  complicate this transformation is that the consolidation of chemical  defense programs and activities is limited to certain components within  DHS, such as OHA, and not others, such as some parts of S&T and  NPPD. Officials from the CWMD Office stated that they intend to address  this issue by coordinating the office’s chemical security efforts with other  DHS components that are not covered by the consolidation, such as  those S&T functions that are responsible for developing chemical detector  requirements. These officials also stated that they intend to address  fragmentation by coordinating with and supporting DHS components that  have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their missions under an  all-hazards approach, such as the Federal Protective Service, CBP, TSA,  the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service. Furthermore, the officials stated  that they plan to coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts with other  government agencies having chemical programs and activities at the  federal and local levels.

DHS’s Prior Efforts and Recent Reorganization Offer an Opportunity for More Strategic Coordination

In October 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated FEMA  to coordinate the development of a strategy and implementation plan to  enhance federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies’  ability to respond to and recover from a catastrophic chemical attack. In  November 2012, DHS issued a chemical response and recovery strategy  that examined core capabilities and identified areas where improvements  were needed. The strategy identified a need for, among other things, (1)  a common set of catastrophic chemical attack planning assumptions, (2)  a formally established DHS oversight body responsible for chemical  incident response and recovery, (3) a more rapid way to identify the wide  range of chemical agents and contaminants that comprise chemical  threats, and (4) reserve capacity for mass casualty medical care. The  strategy also identified the principal actions needed to fill these gaps.

For example, with regard to identifying the range of chemical agents and  contaminants that comprise chemical threats, the strategy focused on the  capacity to screen, search for, and detect chemical hazards (and noted  that this area was cross-cutting with prevention and protection). The  strategy stated that, among other things, the Centers for Disease Control  and Prevention, the Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug  Administration, the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection  Agency, and DHS components, including the Coast Guard, provide  screening, search, and detection capabilities. However, the strategy  noted that “DHS does not have the requirement to test, verify, and  validate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) chemical detection equipment  purchased and fielded by its various constituent agencies and  components, nor by the first responder community.”

According to a November 2012 memorandum transmitting the response  and recovery strategy to DHS employees, the distribution of the strategy  was only to be used for internal discussion purposes and was not to be  distributed outside of DHS because it had not been vetted by other  federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. The  memorandum and the strategy further stated that DHS was developing a  companion strategy focused on improving the national capacity to  prevent, protect against, and mitigate catastrophic chemical threats and  attacks and noted that once this document was complete, DHS would  engage with its partners to solicit comments and feedback. The strategy  also stated that DHS intended to develop a separate implementation plan  that would define potential solutions for any gaps identified, program any  needed budget initiatives, and discuss programs to enhance DHS’s core  capabilities and close any gaps.

DHS officials representing OHA and S&T told us that DHS had intended  to move forward with the companion strategy and the accompanying  implementation plan but the strategy and plan were never completed  because of changes in leadership and other competing priorities within  DHS. At the time of our discussion and prior to the establishment of the  CWMD Office, OHA officials also noted that DHS did not have a singular  entity or office responsible for chemical preparedness. An official  representing S&T also said that the consolidation of some chemical,  biological, radiological, and nuclear efforts may help bring order to  chemical defense efforts because DHS did not have an entity in charge of  these efforts or a strategy for guiding them.

Now that DHS has established the CWMD Office as the focal point for  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear programs and activities,  DHS has an opportunity to develop a chemical defense strategy and  related implementation plan to better integrate and coordinate the  department’s programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate,  respond to, and recover from a chemical attack. The Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), includes principles for agencies to  focus on the performance and results of programs by putting elements of  a strategy and plan in place such as (1) establishing measurable goals  and related measures, (2) developing strategies and plans for achieving  results, and (3) identifying the resources that will be required to achieve  the goals. Although GPRAMA applies to the department or agency level,  in our prior work we have reported that these provisions can serve as  leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal  agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or  initiatives.

Our past work has also shown that a strategy is a starting point and basic  underpinning to better manage federal programs and activities such as  DHS’s chemical defense efforts. A strategy can serve as a basis for  guiding operations and can help policy makers, including congressional  decision makers and agency officials, make decisions about programs  and activities. It can also be useful in providing accountability and guiding  resource and policy decisions, particularly in relation to issues that are  national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions, such as chemical  defense. When multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the  same problem, there is a risk that duplication, overlap, and fragmentation  among programs can result in wasting scarce funds, confuse and  frustrate program customers, and limit overall program effectiveness. A  strategy and implementation plan for DHS’ chemical defense programs  and activities would help mitigate these risks. Specifically, a strategy and  implementation plan would help DHS further define its chemical defense  capability, including opportunities to leverage resources and capabilities  and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. By defining  DHS’s chemical defense capability, a strategy and implementation plan  may also better position the CWMD Office and other components to work  collaboratively and strategically with other organizations, including other  federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions.

Officials from the CWMD Office agreed that the establishment of the new  office was intended to provide leadership to and help guide, support,  integrate, and coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts and that a  strategy and implementation plan could help DHS better integrate and  coordinate its fragmented chemical defense programs and activities.

Recent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of ISIS to use chemical  weapons against the West have sparked concerns about the potential for  chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS components have  developed and implemented a number of separate chemical defense  programs and activities that, according to DHS officials, have been  fragmented and not well coordinated within the department. In December  2017, DHS consolidated some of its programs and activities related to  weapons of mass destruction, including those related to chemical  defense, by establishing the new CWMD Office. It is too early to tell  whether and to what extent this office will help address fragmentation and  the lack of coordination across all DHS’s weapons of mass destruction  efforts, including chemical efforts. However, as part of its consolidation,  the CWMD Office would benefit from developing a strategy and  implementation plan to guide, support, integrate, and coordinate DHS’s  programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,  and recover from a chemical attack. A strategy and implementation plan  would also help the CWMD Office guide DHS’s efforts to address  fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the  office’s aim to establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals.

The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction  should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the  Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support,  integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities;  leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for  addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1)

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix III and  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and noted that the Assistant  Secretary for CWMD will coordinate with the DHS Under Secretary for  Strategy, Policy, and Plans and other stakeholders to develop a strategy  and implementation plan that will better integrate and direct DHS  chemical defense programs and activities. DHS estimated that it will  complete this effort by September 2019. These actions, if fully  implemented, should address the intent of this recommendation.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV.

Appendix I: Department of Homeland Security Chemical Defense Programs

At the time our review began, the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) had three headquarters components with programs and activities  focused on chemical defense. These were the Office of Health Affairs’  (OHA) Chemical Defense Program; the Science and Technology  Directorate’s (S&T) Chemical and Biological Defense Division and  Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC); and the National Protection  and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism  Standards (CFATS) program and Sector Outreach and Programs  Division. Each component had dedicated funding to manage the  particular chemical defense program or activity (with the exception of the  Sector Outreach and Programs Division because this division funds DHS  activities related to all critical infrastructure sectors, including the chemical  sector). On December 7, 2017, DHS established the Countering  Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, which incorporated most  of OHA and selected elements of S&T, together with other DHS programs  and activities related to countering chemical, biological, radiological, and  nuclear threats. According to DHS, the CWMD Office was created to,  among other things, elevate and streamline DHS’s efforts to prevent  terrorists and other national security threat actors from using harmful  agents, such as chemical agents, to harm Americans and U.S. interests.

Office of Health Affairs, Chemical Defense Program

OHA, which was subsumed by the CWMD Office in December 2017, was  responsible for enhancing federal, state, and local risk awareness and  planning and response mechanisms in the event of a chemical incident  through the Chemical Defense Program. This program provided medical  and technical expertise to OHA leadership and chemical defense  stakeholders including DHS leadership, DHS components, the  intelligence community, federal interagency partners, and professional  and academic preparedness organizations. The program’s efforts focused  on optimizing local preparedness and response to chemical incidents that  exceed the local communities’ capacity and capability to act during the  first critical hours by providing guidance and tools for first responders and  supporting chemical exercises for preparedness. DHS’s Chief Medical  Officer was responsible for managing OHA.

The Chemical Defense Program expended about $8.3 million between  fiscal years 2009 and 2017 in chemical demonstration projects and  follow-on funding to assist five jurisdictions in their chemical  preparedness: Baltimore, Maryland; Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New  Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau County, New York. For example, in  Baltimore, OHA assisted the Maryland Transit Administration with the  selection and installation of chemical detection equipment to integrate  new technology into community emergency response and planning. In the  other four locales, OHA assisted these partners in conducting multiple  scenarios specific to each city based on high-risk factors identified by the  Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA), which is a risk  assessment produced by CSAC every 2 years. Such scenarios included  indoor and outdoor scenarios in which persons were “exposed” to either  an inhalant or a substance on their skin. Figure 4 summarizes the  scenarios conducted in each city and some of the lessons learned.

According to OHA summary documentation, a key finding from this work  was that timely decisions and actions save lives and manage resources in  response to a chemical incident. Since the completion of the five-city  project, OHA has been working to, among other things, continue to  develop a lessons learned document based on the project, as well as a  related concept of operations, that state and local jurisdictions could use  to respond to chemical incidents.

As of December 7, 2017, OHA was consolidated into the CWMD Office  and its functions transferred to the new office, according to officials from  the CWMD Office. The Chief Medical Officer is no longer responsible for  managing OHA but serves as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary for  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and as the principal advisor to  the Secretary and the Administrator of FEMA on medical and public  health issues related to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other  man-made disasters, among other things.

Science and Technology Directorate, Chemical Defense Activities

S&T’s Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency includes  the Chemical and Biological Defense Division, which supports state and  local jurisdictions by, for example, providing them help in modeling  potential chemical attacks. The Chemical and Biological Defense Division  worked with the City of New York to develop chemical detection modeling  by simulating a chemical attack. As a result of the simulation, New York  City officials wanted to implement mechanisms to prevent the potential  consequences of a chemical attack in a large city.

S&T’s Office of National Laboratories includes the CSAC, which identifies  and characterizes the chemical threat against the nation through analysis  and scientific assessment. CSAC is responsible for producing, among  other things, the CTRA, a comprehensive evaluation of the risks  associated with domestic toxic chemical releases produced every 2  years. CSAC officials chair the Interagency Chemical Risk Assessment  Working Group that meets to develop the CTRA, identify chemical  hazards, and produce a list of priority chemicals. This working group is  comprised of DHS components, federal partners, and private industry  officials that share industry information to ensure accurate and timely  threat and risk information is included in the CTRA. To complement the  CTRA, CSAC developed a standalone CTRA desktop tool that DHS  components can use to conduct risk-based modeling of a potential  chemical attack and provide results to DHS components, such as the  U.S. Secret Service, for advance planning of large-scale events.

In addition, CSAC conducts tailored risk assessments addressing  emerging threats such as fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that has caused  numerous deaths across the United States. CSAC sends these  assessments, along with other intelligence and threat information, to  relevant DHS components, federal agencies, state and local partners,  and private entities so this information can be used in planning and  decision making. Officials from eight DHS components we spoke with  said they use CSAC information in their work and that CSAC products are  useful.

CSAC conducted two exercises, known as Jack Rabbit I and II, to  experimentally characterize the effects of a large-scale chemical release  and to understand the reason for the differences seen between real-world  events and modeling predictions. These exercises were intended to  strengthen industry standards in chemical transportation, as well as  response and recovery plans. Outputs and data from these exercises  have been used to write first responder guidelines for these types of  events and are being taught in nationwide fire and hazmat courses. The  fiscal year 2018 President’s Budget request did not ask for an  appropriation to fund CSAC. However, the Consolidated Appropriations  Act, 2018, did provide funding for CSAC. Furthermore, in May 2018, the  Secretary delegated responsibility for conducting the non-research and  development functions related to the Chemical Terrorism Risk  Assessment to the CWMD Office.

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program and Other Chemical Facility Security Activities

The CFATS program uses a multitiered risk assessment process to  determine a facility’s risk profile by requiring facilities in possession of  specific quantities of designated chemicals of interest to complete an  online questionnaire. CFATS program officials said they also use CSAC  data as part of the process for making decisions about which facilities  should be covered by CFATS, and their level of risk. If CFATS officials  make a determination that a facility is high-risk, the facility must submit a  vulnerability assessment and a site security plan or an alternative security  program for DHS approval that includes security measures to meet risk- based performance standards. We previously reported on various  aspects of the CFATS program and identified challenges that DHS was  experiencing in implementing and managing the program. We made a  number of recommendations to strengthen the program to include, among  other things, that DHS verify that certain data reported by facilities is  accurate, enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all  elements of risk, conduct a peer review of the program to validate and  verify DHS’s risk assessment approach, and document processes and  procedures for managing compliance with site security plans. DHS  agreed with all of these recommendations and has either fully  implemented them or taken action to address them.

The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works to enhance the  security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be  considered high-risk under the CFATS program and plays a  nonregulatory role as the sector-specific agency for the chemical sector.  The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works with the chemical  sector through the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, the Chemical  Government Coordinating Council, and others in a public-private  partnership to share information on facility security and resilience. In  addition, the division and the coordinating councils help enhance the  security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be  considered high-risk under the CFATS program. The division and  councils are to collaborate with federal agencies, chemical facilities, and  state, local, tribal, and territorial entities to, among other things, assess  risks and share information on chemical threats and chemical facility  security and resilience. Further, the Protective Security Coordination  Division in the Office of Infrastructure Protection works with facility owners  and operators to conduct voluntary assessments at facilities.

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Components’ Chemical Defense Responsibilities as Part of an All-Hazards Approach

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components conduct various  prevention and protection activities related to chemical defense. These  activities are managed by individual components as part of their overall  mission under an all-hazards approach.

U.S. Coast Guard - The Coast Guard uses fixed and portable  chemical detectors to identify and interdict hazardous chemicals as  part of its maritime prevention and protection activities. It also  responds to hazardous material and chemical releases in U.S.  waterways. The Coast Guard also staffs the 24-hour National  Response Center, which is the national point of contact for reporting  all oil and hazardous materials releases into the water, including  chemicals that are discharged into the environment. The National  Response Center also takes maritime reports of suspicious activity  and security breaches at facilities regulated by the Maritime  Transportation Security Act of 2002. Under this act, the Coast Guard  regulates security at certain chemical facilities and other facilities  possessing hazardous materials.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) - CBP interdicts  hazardous chemicals at U.S. borders and ports of entry as part of its  overall mission to protect the United States from threats entering the  country. Among other things, CBP has deployed chemical detectors to  point of entry nationwide that were intended for narcotics detection,  but can also be used by CBP officers to presumptively identify a  limited number of chemicals. Also, CBP’s National Targeting Center  helps to screen and identify high-risk packages that may contain  hazardous materials at ports of entry. In addition, CBP’s Laboratories  and Scientific Services Directorate manages seven nationally  accredited field laboratories, where staff detect, analyze, and identify  hazardous substances, including those that could be weapons of  mass destruction. When CBP officers send suspected chemical  weapons, narcotics, and other hazardous materials to the labs, the  labs use various confirmatory analysis technologies, such as infrared  spectroscopy and mass spectrometry, to positively identify them. Also,  the Directorate has a 24-hour Teleforensic Center for on-call scientific  support for CBP officers who have questions on suspected chemical  agents.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - FEMA provides  preparedness grants to state and local governments for any type of  all-hazards preparedness activity, including chemical preparedness.  According to FEMA data, in fiscal year 2016, states used about $3.5  million, local municipalities used about $48.5 million, and tribal and  territorial municipalities used about $80,000 in preparedness grant  funding for chemical defense including prevention and protection  activities, as well as mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related  to a chemical attack.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) - I&A gathers intelligence  information on all homeland security threats including chemical  threats. Such threat information is compiled and disseminated to  relevant DHS components and federal agencies. For example, I&A  works with CSAC to provide intelligence information for the CTRA and  writes the threat portion of that assessment. I&A also receives  information from CSAC on high-risk gaps in intelligence to help better  inform chemical defense intelligence reporting. Also, the Under  Secretary of I&A serves as the Vice-Chair of the Counterterrorism  Advisory Board. This board is responsible for coordinating, facilitating,  and sharing information regarding DHS’s activities related to  mitigating current, emerging, perceived, or possible terrorist threats,  including chemical threats; and providing timely and accurate advice  and recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of  Homeland Security on counterterrorism issues.

NPPD’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) - FPS secures federally- owned and leased space in various facilities across the country.  Federal facilities are assigned a facility security level determination  ranging from a Level 1 (low risk) to a Level 5 (high risk). As part of its  responsibility, FPS is to conduct Facility Security Assessments of the  buildings and properties it protects that cover all types of hazards  including a chemical release, in accordance with Interagency Security  Committee standards and guidelines. FPS is to conduct these  assessments at least once every 5 years for Level 1 and 2 facilities,  and at least once every 3 years for Level 3, 4, and 5 facilities. FPS  conducts the assessments using a Modified Infrastructure Survey  Tool.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) - TSA efforts to  address the threat of chemical terrorism have been focused on the  commercial transportation of bulk quantities of hazardous materials  and testing related to the release of commercially transported  chemicals that could be used as weapons of mass destruction. TSA’s  activities with respect to hazardous materials transportation aim to  reduce the vulnerability of shipments of certain hazardous materials  through the voluntary implementation of operational practices by  motor carriers and railroads, and ensure a secure transfer of custody  of hazardous materials to and from rail cars at chemical facilities.  Also, in May 2003, TSA began requiring that all commercial motor  vehicle operators licensed to transport hazardous materials, including  toxic chemicals, must successfully complete a comprehensive  background check conducted by TSA. According to TSA documents,  approximately 1.5 million of the nation’s estimated 6 million  commercial drivers have successfully completed the vetting process.  Additionally, TSA has also recently partnered with five mass transit  and passenger rail venues, together with other DHS components such  as DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate and the U.S. Secret  Service, to test chemical detection technologies for such venues. In  addition, TSA is responsible for the Transportation Sector Security  Risk Assessment, which examines the potential threat, vulnerabilities,  and consequences of a terrorist attack involving the nation’s  transportation systems. This assessment’s risk calculations for  several hundred specific risk scenarios, including chemical weapons  attacks, are based on the elements of threat, vulnerability and  consequence using a combination of subject matter expert judgments  and modeling results.

U.S. Secret Service - The Secret Service is responsible for protecting  its protectees and designated fixed sites and temporary venues from  all threats and hazards, including chemical threats. For example, the  Secret Service conducts security assessments of sites, which may  involve chemical detection, and coordinates with other agencies for  preparedness or response to threats and hazard incidents. In addition,  the Secret Service has a Hazardous Agent Mitigation Medical  Emergency Response team, dedicated to responding to numerous  hazards, including chemical threats and incidents.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin (Assistant Director),  Juan Tapia-Videla (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Fejfar, Ashley Grant,  Imoni Hampton, Eric Hauswirth, Tom Lombardi, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi,  Claire Peachey, and Kay Vyas made key contributions to this report.

Recent attacks using chemical agents abroad have sparked concerns about potential similar attacks occurring in the United States. What is the Department of Homeland Security doing about it?

We found that DHS recently consolidated some of its chemical defense programs into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. But several agency's components, including Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, still run their own programs.

Sharing resources and information department-wide could make DHS's chemical defense more effective. We recommended developing a strategy and implementation plan to better manage chemical defense.


Summer Meals: Improvements Needed to Address Participation Estimates and Program Challenges

This testimony summarizes information contained in GAO's May 2018 report entitled Summer Meals: Actions Needed to Improve Participation Estimates and Address Program Challenges , GAO-18-369 . It addresses (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges.

For its May 2018 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; and surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia. GAO also visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations, and analyzed meal site data from these 3 states. In addition, GAO interviewed USDA, state, and national organization officials, as well as SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators.

Nationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016, according to GAO's May 2018 report. GAO noted that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directed states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, GAO found that participation estimates had been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directed states to use would continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes.

Other federal and nonfederal programs helped feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed for its May 2018 report. For example, GAO found that in July 2016, about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allowed school meal providers to serve summer meals, according to USDA data. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with SFSP meal providers and national organizations indicated the reach of such efforts was limited.

In GAO's May 2018 report, states and SFSP meal providers reported challenges with issues related to meal sites, participation, and program administration, though USDA, state, and local officials had taken some steps to address these issues. Seventeen states in GAO's survey and several providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites were in safe locations. To address this issue, USDA granted some states and providers flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, GAO found that USDA had not broadly communicated the circumstances it considered when granting this flexibility or reported to Congress on the use of flexibilities with respect to the on-site requirement in areas where safety was a concern, per requirements. As a result, neither USDA nor Congress knew whether these flexibilities were helping provide meals to children and meeting program goals. Further, officials from national and regional organizations GAO interviewed, as well as providers GAO visited, reported challenges related to the administrative burden associated with participating in multiple child nutrition programs. Although USDA had established program and policy simplifications to help lessen related burdens, the persistence of challenges in this area suggested that information had not reached all relevant state agencies, potentially limiting children's access to meals by discouraging provider participation.

In its May 2018 report, GAO made four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP, communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery, evaluate and annually report to Congress on its use of waivers and demonstration projects when granting these flexibilities, and disseminate information about existing flexibilities available to streamline administrative requirements for providers participating in multiple child nutrition programs. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Department of  Agriculture’s (USDA) Summer Food Service Program (SFSP). A federal  nutrition program created in 1968, SFSP is designed to provide food  service to children in low-income areas during periods when area schools  are closed for vacation. In fiscal year 2017, USDA spent $485 million to  provide 152 million meals to children through the SFSP.

USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) oversees the SFSP, which is  administered by the states and operated by a variety of public and private  nonprofit organizations and government entities that sponsor meals for  children at supervised sites such as schools, camps, parks, churches,  and libraries. FNS is responsible for issuing regulations, instructions, and  guidance; overseeing program administration; and reimbursing states for  meals served that meet program requirements. State agencies are  responsible for approving and monitoring sponsors who, in turn, are  responsible for monitoring and managing their meal sites.

SFSP meals must meet certain requirements in order to be eligible for  federal reimbursement; for example, the meal must be served and  consumed on-site at an approved meal site. States may approve  different types of meal sites, including open sites, closed enrolled sites,  and camps. For example, open sites operate in an area where at least  half of the children are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  (referred to as “area eligible”), according to data from entities such as  schools or the U.S. Census Bureau. Meals must also meet federal  requirements for menu components, meal times, and nutrition.

Some flexibilities are available to FNS in implementing the SFSP  program, under its waiver and demonstration authorities. For example,  the Secretary of Agriculture has statutory authority to waive, upon request  of a state or eligible service provider, certain child nutrition program  requirements, including some for the SFSP. To grant a waiver request,  the Secretary must determine that the waiver would facilitate the state or  service provider’s ability to carry out the purpose of the program, and that  the waiver will not increase the overall cost of the program to the federal  government, among other things. In the event a waiver request is  submitted, the Secretary is required to act promptly and state in writing  whether the waiver request is granted or denied, and why. The Secretary  is also required to periodically review the performance of waiver  recipients, and submit an annual report to Congress summarizing the use  of waivers and their effectiveness, among other details.

In addition to this waiver authority, the Secretary is also authorized to  carry out demonstration projects to develop and test methods of providing  access to summer meals for low-income children in urban and rural  areas, to reduce or eliminate the food insecurity and hunger of low- income children and improve their nutritional status. The Secretary is  required to provide for an independent evaluation of the demonstration  projects carried out under this authority, and submit an annual report to  Congress on the status of each project and the results of the  evaluations.

My testimony today summarizes the findings from our May 2018 report on  summer meals. This statement addresses (1) what is known about  SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children  over the summer, and (3) challenges in providing summer meals to  children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address  these challenges. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant  federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA’s SFSP data for  fiscal years 2007 through 2016; and surveyed state agencies responsible  for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia. We  also visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites,  selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and  rural locations, and analyzed meal site data from these 3 states. In  addition, we interviewed USDA, state, and national organization officials,  as well as SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators. Our  work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. More details on our scope and methodology can be  found in the issued report.

In brief, we found that although USDA collects information about the  actual number of meals served to children through the SFSP program— which is one indicator of program participation—USDA’s estimates of the  number of children participating in the SFSP were unreliable. As a result,  USDA’s understanding of children’s participation in the SFSP was limited,  impairing its ability to both inform program implementation and facilitate  strategic planning and outreach to areas with low participation.

Other federal and nonfederal programs helped feed low-income children  over the summer to some extent. These federal programs included the  National School Lunch Program’s Seamless Summer Option, which  provides nutrition assistance benefits solely in the summer, and several  federal programs that operate year-round. Nonfederal programs,  commonly operated by local faith-based organizations and foodbanks,  also helped feed low-income children in the summer, but states and local  organizations reported that these had limited reach.

Finally, there were gaps in USDA’s efforts to address reported challenges  related to SFSP meal site safety and program administration. Although  USDA had granted some states and sponsors flexibility from the  requirement that children consume meals on-site when safety at the site  was a concern, the agency did not broadly communicate the  circumstances it considers when granting this flexibility, hindering its  usefulness in ensuring safe summer meal delivery to children.  Additionally, while FNS had established program and policy  simplifications to help lessen the administrative burden on sponsors  participating in multiple child nutrition programs, challenges in this area  persisted. Some of these simplifications had not been shared recently  with states, potentially discouraging sponsor participation in child nutrition  programs and limiting children’s access to meals.

My statement will highlight four recommendations we made in our May  report that USDA should implement to help improve SFSP participation  estimates and address challenges reported by states and sponsors  related to meal site safety and duplicative paperwork. In oral comments,  FNS officials, including the Deputy Administrator for Child Nutrition  Programs, generally agreed with the recommendations in the report.

The Number of SFSP Meals Served Generally Increased from 2007 through 2016, but Estimates of Children Participating Were Unreliable

The total number of SFSP meals served nationwide during the summer— one indicator of program participation—increased from 113 million meals  in fiscal year 2007 to 149 million meals in fiscal year 2016, or by 32  percent. Although almost half of the total increase in meals served in the  summer months was due to increases in lunches, when comparing  across each of the meal types, supper and breakfast had the largest  percentage increases over the 10-year period, 50 and 48 percent,  respectively (see table 1). The increase in SFSP meals over this time  period was generally consistent with increases in the number of meals  served in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), the largest child  nutrition assistance program, during this period.

Although states reported the actual number of SFSP meals served to  FNS for reimbursement purposes, they estimated the number of children  participating in SFSP, and these participation estimates have been  calculated inconsistently, impairing FNS’s ability to inform program  implementation and facilitate strategic planning and outreach to areas  with low participation. Specifically, state agencies calculated a statewide  estimate of children’s participation in the SFSP, referred to as average  daily attendance (ADA), using sponsor-reported information on the  number of meals served and days of operation in July of each year.  However, according to our review of states’ survey responses and FNS  documents, states’ methods for calculating ADA have differed from state  to state and from year to year. For example, although FNS directed states  to include the number of meals served in each site’s primary meal  service—which may or may not be lunch—some states calculated ADA  using only meals served at lunch. In addition, five states reported in our  survey that the method they used to calculate ADA in fiscal year 2016  differed from the one they used previously.

While FNS clarified its instructions in May 2017 to help improve the  consistency of states’ ADA calculations moving forward, ADA, even if  consistently calculated, remained an unreliable estimate of children’s  daily participation in SFSP for at least two reasons. First, ADA did not  account for existing variation in the number of days that each site serves  meals to children. Specifically, because FNS’s instructions indicated that  sites’ ADAs were to be combined to provide a statewide ADA estimate,  differences in the number of days of meal service at each site were  disregarded. As a result, ADA did not reflect the average number of  children served SFSP meals daily throughout the month. Second, ADA  was an unreliable estimate of children’s participation in SFSP because it  did not account for state variation in the month with the greatest number  of SFSP meals served. According to FNS officials, the agency instructed  states to calculate ADA for July because officials identified this as the  month with the largest number of meals served nationwide. However,  according to our analysis of nationwide FNS data, in summer 2016, 26  states served more SFSP meals in June or August than in July.

Although FNS had taken some steps to identify other data that states  collect on the SFSP, at the time of our May 2018 report, FNS had not yet  used this information to help improve its estimate of children’s  participation in the program. In 2015, FNS published a Request for  Information, asking whether states or sponsors collected any SFSP data  that were not reported to FNS, and received responses from 15 states.  The responses suggested some states collected additional data, such as  site-level data, that may allow for an improved estimate of children’s  SFSP participation, potentially addressing the issues identified in our  analysis. FNS also followed up with several of these states in 2016 and  2017 to explore the feasibility of collecting additional data and improving  estimates of children’s SFSP participation. FNS stated in a May 2017  memo to states that it is critical that the agency’s means of estimating  children’s participation in the SFSP is as accurate as possible because it  helps inform program implementation at the national level and facilitates  strategic planning and outreach to areas with low participation. Yet, at  the time of our report, FNS had not taken further action to improve the  estimate. In our May 2018 report, we concluded that FNS’s limited  understanding of children’s participation in the SFSP impaired its ability to  both inform program implementation and facilitate strategic planning and  outreach to areas with low participation.

To improve FNS’s estimate of children’s participation in the SFSP, we  recommended that FNS focus on addressing, at a minimum, data  reliability issues caused by variations in the number of operating days of  meal sites and in the months in which states see the greatest number of  meals served. FNS generally agreed with this recommendation.

Other Federal and Nonfederal Programs Helped Feed Low- Income Children over the Summer to Some Extent

Other federal and nonfederal programs that operate solely in the summer,  as well as those operating year-round, helped feed low-income children in  the summer months. For example, in 2016, FNS data indicated about 26  million meals were served through the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option,  a separate federal program that streamlines administrative requirements  for school meal providers serving summer meals. Some children also  received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by  entities such as faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though the  reach of these efforts was limited, according to our state survey and  interviews with providers and national organizations at the time of our  report. For example, of the 27 states that reported in our survey  awareness of the geographic coverage of these nonfederal programs, 11  states indicated that they operated in some portions of the state—the  most common state response.

States and SFSP Providers Faced Challenges with Meal Sites, Participation, and Program Administration, and FNS Actions Had Addressed Some, but Not All Areas

States and SFSP providers reported challenges with issues related to  meal site availability, children’s participation, and program administration,  though federal, state, and local entities had taken steps to improve these  areas. For example, a lack of available transportation, low population  density, and limited meal sites posed challenges for SFSP  implementation in rural areas, according to states we surveyed, selected  national organizations, and state and local officials in the three states we  visited. In response, state and local entities took steps, such as  transporting meals to children by bus, to address these issues—efforts  that FNS supported through information sharing and grants.

States and SFSP providers also reported challenges with meal site  safety, and FNS’s efforts to address this area were limited. Seventeen  states reported in our survey that ensuring summer meal sites are in safe  locations was moderately to very challenging. Some states and  sponsors took steps to help address this issue, and FNS also used its  available authorities to grant some states and sponsors flexibility with  respect to the requirement that children consume summer meals on site,  such as when safety at the site is a concern. However, our review of FNS  documentation showed FNS had not clearly communicated to all states  and sponsors the circumstances it considers when deciding whether to  grant this flexibility. These circumstances—described in letters the  agency sent to requesting states—generally included verification that  violent crime activities occurred within both a 6-block radius of the meal  site and 72 hours prior to the meal service. Although FNS officials  explained that they reviewed state and sponsor requests for flexibility due  to safety concerns on a case-by-case basis, they also acknowledged that  the set of circumstances they used to approve state and sponsor  requests for flexibility, which we identified in their letters to states, had  been used repeatedly. Further, states and sponsors reported challenges  obtaining the specific data needed for approval of a site for this type of  flexibility, including inconsistent availability of timely data, which  hampered some providers’ efforts to ensure safe delivery of meals.

We concluded that unless FNS shared information with all states and  sponsors on the circumstances it considered when deciding whether to  grant flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume  summer meals on site, states and sponsors would likely continue to be  challenged to use this flexibility, hindering its usefulness in ensuring safe  summer meal delivery to children. We therefore recommended that FNS communicate to all SFSP stakeholders the circumstances it considers in  approving requests for flexibility with respect to the requirement that  children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas that have experienced  crime and violence, taking into account the feasibility of accessing data  needed for approval, to ensure safe delivery of meals to children. FNS  generally agreed with this recommendation.

We also found that while FNS had issued reports to Congress evaluating  some of its demonstration projects, as required under its statutory  authorities, the agency had not issued any such reports to Congress  specifically on the use of flexibilities with respect to the on-site  requirement in areas where safety was a concern. As previously  discussed, the agency is required to annually submit certain reports to  Congress regarding the use of waivers and evaluations of projects carried  out under its demonstration authority. FNS officials told us that they had  not evaluated or reported on these flexibilities, in part, because they had  limited information on their outcomes.

We concluded that without understanding the impact of its use of these  flexibilities, neither FNS nor Congress knew whether these flexibilities  were helping provide meals to children—the goal of the program.  Accordingly, we recommended that FNS evaluate and annually report to  Congress, as required by statute, on its use of waivers and demonstration  projects to grant states and sponsors flexibility with respect to the  requirement that children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas  experiencing crime or violence, to improve understanding of the use and  impact of granting these flexibilities on meeting program goals. FNS  generally agreed with this recommendation.

Although FNS had established program and policy simplifications to help  lessen the administrative burden on sponsors participating in multiple  child nutrition programs, challenges in this area persisted, indicating that  information had not reached all relevant state agencies. According to  officials we spoke with from a national organization involved in summer  meals, management of each child nutrition program and the processes  related to applications, funding, and oversight were fragmented in many  states. For example, in one of the states we visited, a sponsor that  provided school meals during the school year told us they had to fill out  60 additional pages of paperwork to provide summer meals, which they  described as significant burden. FNS officials told us that some of the  duplicative requirements might have been a function of differences in  statute, and although FNS provided guidance to states on simplified  procedures for sponsors participating in more than one child nutrition  program, some states might have chosen not to implement them.

We concluded that without further efforts from FNS to disseminate  information on current options for streamlining administrative  requirements across multiple child nutrition programs, overlapping and  duplicative administrative requirements may limit children’s access to  meals by discouraging sponsor participation in child nutrition programs.  We recommended that FNS disseminate information about the existing  streamlining options, and FNS generally agreed with this  recommendation.

Chairman Rokita, Ranking Member Polis, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Kathryn A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key  contributions to this testimony include Rachel Frisk, Melissa Jaynes, and  Claudine Pauselli.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.