>

Which is precisely why Ukraine won't negotiate a West-friendly peace with Russia unless NATO membership is included in the deal.
The biggest issue to me is a negotiated peace where Russia doesn't lose significantly, is the massive risk for nuclear proliferation. If more powerful countries can once again just invade less powerful countries, many of these will start to see nuclear weapons as the sole means of protection. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Finland, etc. would all likely want to go nuclear. >


Japan... would likely want to go Nuclear

The other countries are debatable, but there's just no way the Japanese public would accept their leadership using any kind of nuclear attack or weaponry.  Only 14% of the Japanese public approves of the use of nuclear bombs during WWII.  Unless there's a radical opinion shift, the Japanese government may continue to rely on an alliance with the U.S as their preferred form of deterrence. >

I mean no one wants to get nuked, everyone would like to be the one nuking others though >

I don't want to nuke anyone. I am sure there are plenty of other people who feel the same way, especially in Japan of all places. >

So your average Japanese person would prefer to be under Chinese occupation than to have a nuclear stockpile? >

That is a strawman argument. There is no reason to expect Japan will fall under Chinese occupation just because the country chooses not to use nuclear bombs. They are still allies to the United States and we are an excellent deterrent to Chinese aggression. >

US can easily stop being a dependable ally if Americans elect someone like Trump as President again >

Ukraine points out that Russia just cannot be trusted in the negotiations as they have broken so many promises in the past. 
Russia will not back out easily from the taken territory and any negotiated peace time will be used by them to rebuild army strength to attack again in few years. >

I think it was Mark Milley that said that the only way Russia seriously comes to the negotiating table is if Ukraine can seriously threaten Crimea. Because at that point Ukraine would have real leverage because Russia is at risk of losing territory (in the pre-2022 sense), and it’s one thing to not have anything to show for this war, but it’s another to go backwards. >

How exactly would this work. If Ukraine gets the capabilities to kick the Russians out of Crimea, why would Ukraine want to negotiate unless its prepared to formally cede some territory for Russia? >

A good reason for this, and I say this with my own personal beliefs being that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine, is that Ukraine's Western allies are enabling the country to fight for it's territory. Threatening Crimea is likely a strong line for both Russia and those allies that neither may want crossed. 
Russia will likely be in a very bad spot at that point and willing to drag the fight out longer, because Crimea represents territory they had and were likely going to keep before they committed to taking the rest of Ukraine. Losing Crimea represents a point where even Russia's allies may back out. They'd do anything to avoid that. 
The West likely sees Ukraine's ultimate victory in keeping what it has before the 2022 invasion, not retaking Crimea. At that point they might feel that Russia is significantly deterred from future incursions because of it's losses that they demand Ukraine negotiate. Alternatively, the West might get Ukraine to agree to negotiate in exchange for increased military aid for a few years, as a deterrent to Russia, and some more favorable terms for Ukraine paying back the aid they received. 
Speculation, obviously. And I kind of hope they continue until Crimea is returned, but this may be why this ends before Crimea is retaken. >

Until Russia decides again to "annex" it's neighbor and what it believes, rightful territory, all of Ukraine...