>

Ukraine will find a negotiated solution "palatable" about 15 minutes after the US cuts off military and economic aid.
The biggest issue to me is a negotiated peace where Russia doesn't lose significantly, is the massive risk for nuclear proliferation. If more powerful countries can once again just invade less powerful countries, many of these will start to see nuclear weapons as the sole means of protection. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Iran, Finland, etc. would all likely want to go nuclear. >


Japan... would likely want to go Nuclear

The other countries are debatable, but there's just no way the Japanese public would accept their leadership using any kind of nuclear attack or weaponry.  Only 14% of the Japanese public approves of the use of nuclear bombs during WWII.  Unless there's a radical opinion shift, the Japanese government may continue to rely on an alliance with the U.S as their preferred form of deterrence. >

I mean no one wants to get nuked, everyone would like to be the one nuking others though >

I don't want to nuke anyone. I am sure there are plenty of other people who feel the same way, especially in Japan of all places. >

So your average Japanese person would prefer to be under Chinese occupation than to have a nuclear stockpile? >

That is a strawman argument. There is no reason to expect Japan will fall under Chinese occupation just because the country chooses not to use nuclear bombs. They are still allies to the United States and we are an excellent deterrent to Chinese aggression. >

US can easily stop being a dependable ally if Americans elect someone like Trump as President again >

Ukraine points out that Russia just cannot be trusted in the negotiations as they have broken so many promises in the past. 
Russia will not back out easily from the taken territory and any negotiated peace time will be used by them to rebuild army strength to attack again in few years. >

I think it was Mark Milley that said that the only way Russia seriously comes to the negotiating table is if Ukraine can seriously threaten Crimea. Because at that point Ukraine would have real leverage because Russia is at risk of losing territory (in the pre-2022 sense), and it’s one thing to not have anything to show for this war, but it’s another to go backwards. >

How exactly would this work. If Ukraine gets the capabilities to kick the Russians out of Crimea, why would Ukraine want to negotiate unless its prepared to formally cede some territory for Russia? >

A good reason for this, and I say this with my own personal beliefs being that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine, is that Ukraine's Western allies are enabling the country to fight for it's territory. Threatening Crimea is likely a strong line for both Russia and those allies that neither may want crossed. 
Russia will likely be in a very bad spot at that point and willing to drag the fight out longer, because Crimea represents territory they had and were likely going to keep before they committed to taking the rest of Ukraine. Losing Crimea represents a point where even Russia's allies may back out. They'd do anything to avoid that. 
The West likely sees Ukraine's ultimate victory in keeping what it has before the 2022 invasion, not retaking Crimea. At that point they might feel that Russia is significantly deterred from future incursions because of it's losses that they demand Ukraine negotiate. Alternatively, the West might get Ukraine to agree to negotiate in exchange for increased military aid for a few years, as a deterrent to Russia, and some more favorable terms for Ukraine paying back the aid they received. 
Speculation, obviously. And I kind of hope they continue until Crimea is returned, but this may be why this ends before Crimea is retaken. >

Until Russia decides again to "annex" it's neighbor and what it believes, rightful territory, all of Ukraine... >

Which is precisely why Ukraine won't negotiate a West-friendly peace with Russia unless NATO membership is included in the deal. >

NATO membership won’t be extended to Ukraine for as long as they maintain any claims to areas occupied by Russia, as NATO doesn’t want to get sucked into a war with Russia because of those claims. >

That's not incompatible with what I said. Ukraine will not negotiate a peace with Russia that involves settling contested land disputes unless it coincides with immediate admission to NATO. This is why I don't see Ukraine having a peace deal done until Russia is purged from Crimea. Russia won't like the idea of NATO membership, but Ukraine has zero reason to accept a loss of territory.
If Russia can win this war (i.e. hold Crimea/Donbas and then push forward), then Ukraine can safely assume that peace only gives Russia enough time to prepare for the next stage of invasion. In that case, NATO protection is essential. If Russia can't win, then Ukraine has no reason to cede land to Russia AND fail to gain NATO membership for future security. 
Ukraine will either win the war and retake as much territory as they claim is disputed (Donbas + Crimea), or they will agree to a peace deal that secures them NATO membership. They know the West cannot tolerate Ukraine being absorbed into Russia, and therefore Ukraine knows that the West will want them in NATO just as much as they want to be there. >

I'm on board with just about everything you said, but whenever I think about the endgame, a couple of things always bug me.
Let's tackle that second scenario first. I really want Ukraine to restore its pre-2014 borders, but I'm just not sure how realistic that is right now. But if Ukraine keeps kicking Russia in the teeth so hard that the Kremlin acquiesces to NATO membership, would Ukrainians be okay with giving up on Crimea?
And with regard to Ukraine potentially retaking Crimea and the Donbas: that would very likely cause some sort of major escalation on Russia's part, or prolong the war by quite a bit, at the least. Do you think there's enough enthusiasm among Western leaders for that? Whether it's a war that lasts for another 2+ years or having to deal with the aftermath of Putin doing something crazy, do you think the West is up for that?
Again, I'm hoping Ukraine restores its borders, but these two things always bother me. The fact that no one really knows how Putin might react when backed into a corner and/or faced with losing "Russian" territory must keep Western leaders up at night too. How exactly do you picture either NATO membership or the liberation of Crimea playing out? >


if Ukraine keeps kicking Russia in the teeth so hard that the Kremlin acquiesces to NATO membership, would Ukrainians be okay with giving up on Crimea?

Ukraine already tried letting Russia have Crimea for peace and 2022 happened. Ukraine is going to retake its territory, which Russia signed recognition of in 1994 because Ukraine controls its sovereignty and not Russia. It's not Russia's business what Ukraine's domestic or international policy is. As long as Russia remains in Crimea it's indicated it will continue using that as a springboard into Ukraine. Within days of the coerced 'minsk protocol' its troops were already harassing Ukrainian people outside ceded Crimea.
The problem with NATO membership is two of its members, Hungary and Turkey, have become authoritarians heading towards dictatorship and purely to play to their domestic politics I think they'll thwart anything they can possibly touch. For that reason I think it's more likely (not that it's a very likely scenario) that Ukraine signs some form of new treaty agreement with friendly nations to dissuade Russia from yet another invasion attempt. >

Partially agree. While Ukraine’s territorial integrity may be something to be flexible on, the core issue with the Russian invasion is that it attempts to control Ukrainian sovereignty.
Russia wants Ukraine to guarantee it won’t join NATO and it won’t join the EU.
The problem here, is that Russia has officially created the conditions for Ukraine to want to seek membership in NATO. In fact, Russia has invaded or meddled into former Soviet Bloc countries since the collapse of the USSR. 
Which means, Ukraine was never safe to begin with. So is the expectation that Ukraine live under Russian “preferential rule” because it makes Russian oligarchs comfortable? 
This is not a acceptable arrangement from the Ukrainian perspective.
The war, in my view, wasn’t really about territorial integrity, although that matters. It’s about the sovereignty and future prosperity of Ukrainian people.
A long war might no be preferential. But Ukraine under Russian control is? How is this better? >

russia has full control over whether ukraine can join NATO. all they have to do is invade once every 14 years >

This is technically an incorrect statement but not for the reason you might think.
​
I am just here to remind everyone that Ukrainian sovereignty has been under attack for roughly two decades already. The Russians have occupied Ukrainian territory for many years now, and the "conflict" has only recently escalated into a full-blown ground war. The Russians don't "need to invade every 14 years" if they've simply never left in the first place...
​
It's a pretty dark reminder that many of the issues we're debating online in forums and subreddits are issues that Ukrainian leadership has been dealing with already for almost a decade. The only reason we're now REALLY talking about this is for 3 reasons:

Ukraine is a country and deserves full autonomy and freedom from Russian oppression and aggression.
Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons.
It's adding to the already-massive refugee crisis, and A LOT of us are hearing about/meeting/seeing actual Ukrainian refugees move to our own countries (Canada for instance, for me) and it brings the war really close to home, so it affects us more than other conflicts would.

​
This is also a full-blown conflict that (for the first time, really) we're seeing combat footage of REALLY up close firefights, attacks, drone footage, everything uploaded instantly to the internet right after it happens. It's a VERY new approach to uncensored war.  It's also a whole new style of warfare and it's changing the way that many organizations (like NATO) are approaching modern conflict. >

One of the main problems with a “negotiated peace” is that it sends the message that with sufficient firepower any country can take new land by force and the rest of the world will be okay with it. Russia may see this and begin to forcibly remake much of the world with countries around Russia forced to either submit to them or face invasion. Russia may not attack NATO but if they can get away with military force that opens the door to full invasions and annexations in places like Finland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia ect. 
This also goes beyond Russia and it China sees Russia get away with land grabs then it opens the door for them to invade a whole host of countries. If wars of conquest are legitimized again it could cause global trade to break down, the reintroducing of protectionism, massive increases in military spending around the world and a new reality that’s much more dangerous than what we see now. The consequences of a negotiated peace in Ukraine for the US is an exponentially more dangerous world than we have today. Even from a strictly amoral utilitarian US prospective legitimizing Russian conquests is incredibly dangerous. >

What do you think of Israel then? >

The unfortunate thing for Palestine is that they never got full diplomatic recognition of clear boundaries. As a result Israel has a broader ability to encroach on Palestinian territory than other nations. For instance Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and yet had to give it back to Egypt mainly because Egypt is an internationally recognized state with clear borders. Ukraine is internationally recognized with clear borders and those borders include Crimea. >

What about the Golan Heights, then? >

Super interesting read! I think I agree that the only way to realistically resolve the conflict is to craft a peace deal that makes it prohibitively expensive for Russia to reignite the conflict down the line, including building up the Ukrainian armed forces in peacetime with defensive arms, technology, and training. It feels a little slimy to start pushing Ukraine to the negotiating table at this point, though, and it's not clear that Russia would agree to an end to the conflict for anything less than a prohibitively costly deal. 
I am curious what the authors would make of the Abrams and Leopards being sent to Ukraine. That, to me, is exactly what they're talking about when they discuss walking the line between showing that the Western commitment to Ukraine is not going to falter anytime soon while not escalating the war to the point that it becomes WWIII. >


Super interesting read! I think I agree that the only way to realistically resolve the conflict is to craft a peace deal that makes it prohibitively expensive for Russia to reignite the conflict down the line

I agree with your point, but more in regards to OP article I think this commenter said everything I could have: it starts on a premise which makes many presumptions against Ukraine and for Russia, most of which do not hold up to objective reality. Ukraine's international policy is not for Russia to decide and the political motivation rests almost wholly on Putin who only has to withdraw to bring the whole conflict to a peaceful and stable end. Increasing support would enable Ukraine to win, at least materially, faster, which the article disregards.
This war has gone all the way into genocide against Ukraine, which started off one of the poorest nations in Europe, but it's becoming devastating to Russia which was already suffering brain drain and demographic collapse since Putin came to power - I give more details and links in my other comments. The sad truth is the longer this goes the worse it will be for the Russian people.
About the Abrams and Leopards - I know a couple ex-tankers and they've been talking about the horrific nightmare it must be in Ukraine since they're getting so many different munitions and equipment sets from different nations and while they can't really afford to turn any of that equipment down it means they're having to deal with not one set of ammunition and replacement parts but dozens. When this war's over, Ukraine's logistics managers deserve major accolades. >


Ukraine's international policy is not for Russia to decide

Exactly. This is Ukraine's war. If they want to negotiate for peace, then they will. If they want to keep fighting, then they will. It isn't up to us what they decide. It's up to us if and how we support their decision. >

I think this paper gives strong support to providing more weapons to Ukraine allowing them to retake their country. We need Ukraine to exit the war quickly, and to do that they need to win. >

But is there a point at which Russia considers providing weapons to Ukraine an act of war? Continuing to provide more and better weapons could lead to other countries being drug into the war, which is one reason why most countries have been hesitant to increase their supply of weapons. >

And? The alternative is the same mistake we made in 2014 that led to this invasion. You allow the Russians to keep territory from this invasion, you are telling them that they can invade anyone they want to, and that after a year or so the rest of the world will just put up with it. 
Yes, the world has to play a game of chicken with Russia. 
Yes, there is a risk that Russia will decide to launch nuclear war over losing this war. >


Yes, there is a risk that Russia will decide to launch nuclear war over losing this war.

They're not gonna launch nuclear weapons because an invasion failed.  They'd launch them if they felt like they were facing an immediate existential crisis. >

If you believe their propaganda machine, they are already at war with the West and  are facing an immediate existential crisis.
It's a lie, obviously, but one they're trying to perpetrate at this time. >

What they tell their people so increase morale is one thing.
The leadership knows Russia isn’t going to be destroyed and more important they know they won’t be killed if they settle now.l, so it’s not actually existential to them. >

Read the first five pages of the report and without even scrolling back up to the top knew it was going to be another banger from Charap, and I don't mean that in a good way.
This is the guy who preceded the Feb 24 invasion with this genius level analysis:

The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine, 2022 Jan 21
The nature of the reported Russian buildup suggests the expanded war, if it happens, will differ fundamentally from the past seven years of simmering stalemate. Russia has the ability to carry out a large-scale joint offensive operation involving tens of thousands of personnel, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of combat aircraft...
Ukraine does not have anywhere near enough forces to credibly defend against all the potential avenues of attack, which means it would have to choose between defending a select set of fixed strong points—ceding control of other areas—or maneuvering to engage Russian forces that outnumber them...
Mobile engagements would benefit Russian forces, which are far better trained and equipped to conduct coordinated air and land maneuver warfare than their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian military has repeatedly practiced the use of long-range strike and tactical fires cued by drones as well as other means of reconnaissance, both in training and in combat operations in Syria. Russia’s combat aircraft and strategic air defenses give Moscow many more options to control the air and to strike Ukrainian forces, and most Russian pilots have recent real-world experience in Syria...
In short, the military balance between Russia and Ukraine is so lopsided in Moscow’s favor that any assistance Washington might provide in coming weeks would be largely irrelevant in determining the outcome of a conflict should it begin. Russia’s advantages in capacity, capability, and geography combine to pose insurmountable challenges for Ukrainian forces tasked with defending their country.

Bold claim, that better and more weapons would make no difference in a war. Which, as we now know in hindsight, is false.
To be fair to him, this isn't substantially different from expert consensus at the time. Many other experts also made similar predictions that Russia had an overwhelming advantage and therefore NATO should just step back and let Ukraine lose. I would counter with two points:

Many of those experts quickly changed their opinions after the war and many now advocate for more weapons to Ukraine, not fewer.
A few people DID correctly predict the opposite. For example, actual retired military leaders like Gen. Mark Hertling and Ben Hodges. Maybe we should listen more to those people instead of people who have a bad track record.

To continue with the first point, Charap followed up this recommendation with one after another article on Foreign Policy or some other publication with essentially the same recommendation, with titles such as:

The Perilous Long Game in Ukraine: Compromising With Putin May Be America’s Best Option
The U.S. and Russia Need to Start Talking Before It’s Too Late
Ukraine’s Best Chance for Peace: How Neutrality Can Bring Security—and Satisfy Both Russia and the West
Don’t Rule Out Diplomacy in Ukraine: Biden’s Current Strategy Risks Escalation and Forever War

I won't summarize them all, but let's just say they don't look too bright in hindsight. In particular, the last article written in late October was somewhat skeptical of further Ukrainian counter-offensives and implied there was a chance they couldn't continue their re-gains because of Russian mobilization. Two weeks later, Ukraine retook the city of Kherson.
As for my problems with this report, one of the explanations he gives for there to be not enough benefit for continuing a long war against Russia are these:

Continued conflict also leaves open the possibility that Russia will reverse Ukrainian battlefield gains made in fall 2022. Moscow’s mobilization might stabilize the lines as of December 2022 and allow Russia to launch offensives in 2023. The intensity of the military assistance effort could also become unsustainable after a certain period. Already, European and some U.S. stocks of weapons are reportedly running low. There is thus reason to question whether a longer war will lead to further Ukrainian gains—losses are possible too.


Russia's mobilization didn't stabilize the lines in December. Ukraine is consolidating and not launching any major counteroffensives at the moment. That is not the same as stable lines or "frozen conflict".
The intensity of military assistance is not in doubt. Both the US and Europe have already budgeted and pledged far more military assistance than has been delivered to Ukraine so far.
The stocks of weapons running low are out of production weapons like Stingers or weapons the US has not traditionally focused on like the Javelin. Ukraine still has plenty of stocks of these weapons, and what matters to them now is the upcoming delivery of capabilities they don't have, like western MBTs and IFVs. Especially Bradleys.

There is no indication that western aid is faltering or slowing. Quite the opposite, the US has made commitments to long-term security assistance to Ukraine with the delivery of not just Abrams tanks (which will take place in months) but also of weapons with a long logistics tail like Patriot battalions, and are possibly considering the practicality of training Ukrainian pilots to fly American combat aircraft like F-16s (though the F-18 is probably a more prudent choice given battlefield conditions).
On the other hand, Russia's long-term prospects are not great. They aren't about to get an injection of new weapons from their allies. China isn't exactly excited to tie themselves to Putin in the dustbin of history. They have poor sustainment: mobilization has been chaotic and mostly can't improve their ability to conduct offensives. While their leadership has learned some lessons, infighting has also increased between factions vying for control. 
We are in a situation where Ukraine is replacing their losses with newer, better weapons from the mobilizing western military industrial complex and Russia is replacing their losses with conscripts and artillery shells from North Korea. The long-term prospects for Ukraine continuing this war are far rosier than he predicts, and I'd suggest that someone who was so wrong about the military reality on the ground last year is not the best person to listen to for projections on how they'd do in the coming months.
These facts do change the equation. The likelihood of massive territorial gains for Ukraine justify continuing the war. As he continues to remind everyone, this war must end at the negotiation table as all wars do, and the destruction of the Russian position in Ukraine will hasten that conclusion, not prolong it. Instead of developing neutrality policies in Ukraine or trying to start a negotiation with an enemy that doesn't seem to know it's lost yet, the US should provide longer range fire support capabilities to Ukraine to hit targets deep inside Russia (including in Moscow) so that they can deliver a much-needed dose of reality to the Kremlin and peanut gallery spectators like Samuel Charap. >

I think that analysis is mostly right. SpaceX didn't commit Starlink to the war until late February to mid March. That alone has changed the dynamics of the conflict tremendously.
Absent of this existence and intervention, the war likely would have gone as written in that report. It also bears mentioning that the assumption of Russia is a tiger ended up being proven untrue much later, around April/May timeframe, when it became revelatory that Russia is a paper tiger rather than an actual tiger. >

Russia still would not have gotten close to taking Kyiv if Ukraine didn't have Starlink. There's no single weapon or piece of equipment that flipped the war around but rather a combination of factors, the most important being that Ukraine was actually willing to fight. 
You simply can't overcome a modern urban city with a population of 4-5 million willing to fight, which was designed to resist invasion being the centerpiece of WW2 and an anticipated battleground in the Cold War, with a mere 20-30,000 troops. You just can't; not even the US military would pull that off. It invaded Iraq with 75-100% more troops than Russia did for the entire country of Ukraine, AND it didn't split its forces into four wildly distant axis of invasion that couldn't coordinate or support each other except maybe the Kharkiv one.
Any analyst who wasn't ready to declare the initial political objectives of Russia to be a pipe dream by week three is not someone who should be listened to. >

While I agree to your points regarding urban warfare, information free superiority is critical to war time measures and to combating propaganda. Both of which would have been very difficult without a stable network framework in and out of theater. >

I mean it’s a win win for the US either way. They fund a proxy war against an enemy that is significantly losing resources whilst not losing any of their own men. Also in terms of global relations it makes em look significantly better >

The biggest win is crippling the Sino-Russian axis before it even really gets going.
It's also a giant blazing sign to every aggressor country that invading other countries is actually really hard if you don't have serious international support. >


The biggest win is crippling the Sino-Russian axis before it even really gets going.

What about this war is crippling Chinese-Russian relations? China's been pretty displeased about the ~almost-hundred-billion $ it's invested in Ukraine as part of their one belt one road initiative, but it's been a major purchaser of minerals and coal from Russia and the only thing that's changed lately is other nation's weaning off Russian energy supply means China can now demand increased supply at a steep discount. Of course, a great deal of infrastructure would have to be created as there are currently no pipelines to cheaply get natural gas or oil overland to China. >

They're stuck with them now, russia is austria-hungary to china's Germany, "we are tethered to a corpse.". >

The objective of the war for the west is to protect Ukraine Sovereignty.  After WW2 order , it is become taboo and forbidden to wage war of annextations and conquests and to protect sovereignty of Nations . 
What Putin's want is complete annexation of Ukraine and it's complete destruction as a state and culture . He broke every treaty ge signed and appeasment only encourage him . From military experts , Putin's ambitions must die in Ukraine to stop him . Any peace treaty that allow him to keep Ukrainian lands will only give him respite to try later . >


The objective of the war for the west is to protect Ukraine Sovereignty.  After WW2 order , it is become taboo and forbidden to wage war of annextations and conquests and to protect sovereignty of Nations .

So if they just install a friendly government and kill the current leaders of the Ukrainian government, like we did to Iraq, it wouldn't be taboo? 
It seems like special pleading that the US can invade nations as it pleases and continue its drone war, but still try to claim there are norms that shouldn't be crossed. >

The rule is you can't invade liberal democracies. >

Defining Ukraine as such would be pretty generous by most reckonings. >

It is one by the only reckoning that matters: the opinion of the other liberal democracies. >

Actually not at all, most liberal democracies label it a hybrid regime, not safely a liberal democracy at all. And that was before all opposition parties were outlawed. 
It’s more of a liberal democracy the same way Russia is… which is to say, not much of one at all. >

Well, the other liberal democracies sure think Russia violated the don't invade liberal democracies rule, so I guess it's close enough. At least close enough to benefit from the arsenal of democracy. >

Sounds less like an actual rule and more like “whatever we feel serves our interests.” >

RAND is a US-based think tank started to offer solutions for the US military. You appear to be suprised they have a US-benefit focus.
In any case, I think you're asking the wrong questions. 
1 - What would have been acceptable to Ukraine on 1 March 2022 is very different than what will be acceptable to them on 1 March 2023. It will likely be different on 1 March 2024 as well 
2 - There are few actions that the United States could take to encourage Ukraine to make consessions that would not be seen as a betrayal. The Biden Administration is unlikely to be interested in doing so, and barring some significant changes by Nov 2024, no major party candidate is likely to achieve electoral success on such a platform. 
The fastest way to end the Ukraine War is to shovel arms into the country as quickly as possible. Russia has already done what they can from a conventional perspective, and Putin is unlikely to risk a direct conflict with NATO by popping off a nuke >


There are few actions that the United States could take to encourage Ukraine to make consessions that would not be seen as a betrayal.

Disagree wholeheartedly. If the US (and especially EU/NATO) tell Ukraine they will cut off all aid unless they negotiate, Ukraine will have no choice but to negotiate. >

Allow me to rephrase: would not be seen as a betrayal by the voters.
Helping Ukraine is overwhelming popular in the United States. >

What's right for Ukraine and in America's best interest aren't mutually exclusive. Speculation on the specifics is absolutely warranted and I hope the eventual outcome serves both nations and global stability. >

It seems to me that allowing Russia to gain territory this way will decrease stability in the long run.  It proves that committing atrocities is all it takes to conquer a neighbor.  No justification is necessary.
The NATO expansion is an invalid justification to me.  Russia has no right to dictate Ukrainian foreign policy, and their behavior since the end of the cold war have created the conditions that compelled Ukraine to seek the support of EU and NATO.  These efforts are absolutely in Ukraine’s national interest because of Putin. >

Any talk of Russia taking on NATO or using nukes is empty saber rattling. This was a war of annexation after Ukraine has found huge new deposits of oil and gas, that if harnessed, would be a direct threat to Russia’s energy dominance of the European market. Russia is a Petro state that, despite their vast resources, would fall into a failed state without the hydrocarbon sales. It’s the only cash cow that keeps their corruption afloat >

It's a widely agreed talking point that the basis of the war is economics rather than sentimentalism towards the old USSR ideals, even if Putin is spinning it as that. As the world largely moves towards renewables and battery/stationary/fission and fusion sources, the value of Russia as a petrostate more centralized than any other, is on the precipice of total market crash. 
However, Putin isn't going to live forever; there's no guarantee that the person who replaces him won't be as reasonable as him (aka is more radical and violent than him), and a cornered and wounded animal is where it's at its most dangerous.
Thus I think it's naive to discount nuclear talk as saber rattling. Putin violated every treaty he agreed to. Thus, you can't trust what he says, but you can trust what he does and he's made ample moves towards nuclear ideation though ultimately taken a step back from. >

Yes but there’s no indication of positioning of nuclear forces. So as you say believe what he does not what he says. A nuclear launch would introduce much risk for little or even negative rewards. Despite the portrayal in some circles, Putin is rational. >

Putin is rational to an extent. He's not going to live forever and he's not in a position to deal with a proxy war with the EU and US indefinitely. >

I don't think America's military industrial complex wants a short war. They want a long protracted war because, that requires more and more war materials, which they make and profit from.
This has been going on a very long time (centuries, really, but in earnest since WWII). RAND is full of shit. >

What America wants is for this war to drag on long enough for it to become deeply unpopular in Russia. When the Russian State loses control of the domestic narrative, that will be the point where Russia's government is truly neutered, and where launching nukes won't occur because it won't change the outlook. 
The West is sending tanks because (among other things) Russia has exhausted their capacity to facilitate anti-tank warefare. In six months, Russia will need a technological battlefield solution because 19th/20th century tactics regarding overwhelming numbers simply will not make a dent. Except Russia has no tech solutions, and China has no interest in facilitating the extension of the war by selling to Russia. 
The MIC wants money, but a tense peace and a standardizing NATO is still going to be great for business. >

It’s irrelevant because Ukraine won’t negotiate a peace simply because continuing the war is no longer in American interests. >

If the US stops the flow of arms, money, and intel they won't have much of a choice. >

Not really.  There’s enough guns in Ukraine now that Russia cannot win.  Even if they’re somehow able to occupy the territory with superior equipment, which seems doubtful, the ensuing insurgency would make Iraq/Afghanistan look like a quaint vacation in the countryside. >

A huge number of the advanced weapons systems Ukraine is using that are being credited with turning the tide are totally dependent upon ongoing western support for ammunition as well as spare parts. Cut western support and most of them are worthless within a week of two due to a lack of ammo.   
As far as an insurgency, that’s easily forestalled via the depopulation measures they’ve already been caught implementing. >

Ukraine can come out on top if the settlement enables them to move forward with westernization. >

The only real question: what will the allies provide to the war effort and when?  When Ukraine gets close to the goals the allies have established, the support could start to dwindle