Delay time of Transmitting the information from one neuron to another in brain Inside the brain the electrical signals are transmitted from one neuron to another by using special chemicals, called "neuro-transmitters" from the axon terminals.

Could anyone can tell me how to calculate the approximate value of the delay time of transmitting the information from one neuron to another.
I am thinking that it will less than pico-seconds!

If there are any relevant articles/research papers related to it then I really appreciate it.
Thanks

You mentioned the neurotransmitters released at the synaptic cleft, but seem to be interested in the complete picture. An action potential is actually very slow to propagate down an axon with a conduction velocity from 0.5 to 150 m/s, depending on how myelinated the axon is (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK10921/). A toddler can run faster than the slowest signals! The length of axons in the brain varies greatly as well, from a few micrometers to a few centimeters, but only a fraction of a percent actually grow longer than one centimeter.

We will make a very rough calculation. Pretending the average axon length is half a centimeter (5 millimeters), and the average conduction velocity is 25 meters/second (or 25,000 millimeters/second), then the delay incurred from the action potential down the axon will be 0.005 seconds (or 5 milliseconds).

This doesn't include the time it takes the presynaptic cell to release neurotransmitters, the postsynaptic cell to absorb the neurotransmitters and transduce them into electrical impulse again, and propagate the electrical impulse to the soma for integration. For that, the delay is somewhere around 0.5 to 4 milliseconds (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14980200).

Obviously there are lots of variations in all these numbers. So how long does it take for a signal to be transmitted from the soma to the neuron's axon terminal to another? A few milliseconds. How long does it take for release and absorption of neurotransmitters? Perhaps another few milliseconds. If you're the type who wants a simple, idealized, singular number that ignores the complexity of the facts, then I would estimate something like 7 milliseconds for the total process.


Uses of the Brief Anxiety Scale I am currently completing my undergraduate research thesis on self-affirmations measured with anxiety. I am trying to see if the self-affirmation task reduces anxiety after. I found the Brief Anxiety Scale and am trying to find out what it is best used with, but my search of articles has not made the uses clear to me.

For what is the scale best used? Are there different scales that might instead be recommended for my research?

Thank you in advance to anyone who can provide assistance!

Short Answer

The Brief Anxiety Scale is one of many Pychometric Rating Scales (Tyrer, et al. 1984) used to assess necessary Routine Outcome Measures (BACP, 2016; Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert and Shimokawa, 2011; Simon et al., 2012).

The scale which is recommended for your research will depend on your reseach requirements.  Some scales are quick to complete as they are shorter than others, but longer ones can provide more detail where you feel they are needed.  You need to assess for yourself which scale suits the requirements and then use the one most appropriate.

More Detailed Answer

Routine Outcome Measures

After gaining informed consent from the client, it is a good idea to obtain routine outcome information and devise outcome measures:

before any therapy begins,
after each session, and
after therapy ends

because Routine outcome measures support the therapeutic process by enabling the therapist and the client to monitor progress (BACP, 2016; Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert and Shimokawa, 2011; Simon et al., 2012), and can play an important role in measuring service quality and lead to improvements.

You especially need to implement Routine Outcome Measures when dealing with severe anxiety as your duty of care to your client extends outside the therapy room as far as reasonably practicable. Post-therapy measures may need to include post therapy talks to calm the client at the end of the session if they are particularly anxious due to something which they have brought forward towards the end of the session.

Pychometric Rating Scales for Anxiety

The rating of anxiety is a long-established psychometric exercise and there are more than 20 instruments available (Tyrer, et al. 1984).  There are subject completed scales and observer completed scales. The authors of these scales emphasise that they are not diagnostic instruments and should only be used with patients who are diagnosed as having anxiety states. However, in clinical practice anxiety is often mixed with other emotions and it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the anxiety element (Tyrer, 1984).

Subject Completed Rating Scales

These rating scales take the form of questionnaires which the client in therapy would fill in.  The Brief Anxiety Scale (Tyrer, et al. 1984) is one of these rating scales suitable for recording anxious symptoms.

Patient Health Questionnaires (Spitzer, et al., n.d.) can also be used for rating scales in order to form a basis for devising outcome measures.  All of the questionnaires can be used but the GAD-7 questionnaire — a 7 question sheet — is designed specifically for anxiety.  These come with an instruction manual on how to interpret the results.

Observer Completed Rating Scales

These rating scales take the form of questionnaires which the therapist would fill in as a record for future reference.  One observer scale for anxiety is the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (Hamilton, 1959). However, Hamilton did not consider the scale to be in its final state and Snaith, et al. (1982) modified the scale, which afterwards only contains six items.  Other observer scales for anxiety include the Buss Rating Scale (Buss, et al. 1955) and the Anxiety Status Inventory (Zung, 1971) but they have never achieved the popularity of the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (Tyrer, et al. 1984).

Which scale might be recommended for your purposes?

The scale which is recommended for your purposes will depend on your requirements.  Some scales are quick to complete as they are shorter than others and may be more beneficial due to the short time needed to complete them.  Would it seem to be too laborious to the client? But on the other hand longer ones can provide more detail where you feel they are needed.  You need to assess for yourself which scale suits the requirements and then use the one most appropriate.

References

BACP (2016). Children and Young People Practice Research Network (CYP PRN): A toolkit for collecting routine outcome measures [PDF] Available at: https://www.bacp.co.uk/media/2355/bacp-cyp-prn-toolkit-for-collecting-routine-outcome-measures.pdf

Buss, A. H., Wiener, M., Durkee, A., & Baer, M. (1955). The measurement of anxiety in clinical situations. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 19(2), 125-129. DOI: 10.1037/h0048964

Hamilton, M. A. X. (1959). The assessment of anxiety states by rating. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 32(1), 50-55. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1959.tb00467.x

Harmon, S. C., Lambert, M. J., Smart, D. M., Hawkins, E., Nielsen, S. L., Slade, K., & Lutz, W. (2007). Enhancing outcome for potential treatment failures: Therapist–client feedback and clinical support tools. Psychotherapy research, 17(4), 379-392. DOI: 10.1080/10503300600702331

Lambert, M. J., & Shimokawa, K. (2011). Collecting client feedback. Psychotherapy, 48(1), 72. DOI: 10.1037/a0022238 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jose_Garrido13/post/the_cooperation_between_empathy_and_congruence_in_the_therapeutic_relationship/attachment/59d6365fc49f478072ea42e3/AS:273673120878601@1442260164528/download/Norcross_evidence-based_therapy_relationships.pdf#page=23

Simon, W., Lambert, M. J., Harris, M. W., Busath, G., & Vazquez, A. (2012). Providing patient progress information and clinical support tools to therapists: Effects on patients at risk of treatment failure. Psychotherapy research, 22(6), 638-647. DOI: 10.1080/10503307.2012.698918 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lambert_Michael/publication/236664707_Effects_of_providing_patient_progress_feedback_and_clinical_support_tools_to_psychotherapists_in_an_inpatient_eating_disorders_treatment_program_A_randomized_controlled_study/links/0c96051969ab0c091b000000.pdf

Snaith, R. P., Baugh, S. J., Clayden, A. D., Husain, A., & Sipple, M. A. (1982). The clinical anxiety scale: an instrument derived from the Hamilton anxiety scale. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 141(5), 518-523. DOI: 10.1192/bjp.141.5.518

Spitzer, MD, R. L., Williams, J. B. & Kroenke, MD, K. (n.d.) Patient Heath Questionnaire (PHQ) Screeners. [Online] Available at: http://www.phqscreeners.com/

Tyrer, P. (1984). Classification of anxiety. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 144(1), 78-83. DOI: 10.1192/bjp.144.1.78 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Tyrer/publication/16504411_Classification_of_anxiety/links/54a52c1b0cf267bdb906ff78/Classification-of-anxiety.pdf

Tyrer, P., Owen, R. T., & Cicchetti, D. V. (1984). The brief scale for anxiety: a subdivision of the comprehensive psychopathological rating scale. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 47(9), 970–975. PMCID: PMC1028000 PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1028000/pdf/jnnpsyc00125-0082.pdf

Zung, W. W. (1971). A rating instrument for anxiety disorders. Psychosomatics, 12(6), 371-379. DOI: 10.1016/S0033-3182(71)71479-0


How do cooperative vs. competitive activities impact the learning patterns of an individual? To what extent does cooperative versus competitive learning influence personality development or even pathological behaviors?

If these activities need to be narrowed down to a specific category, I'm more interested in gaming patterns or gamified activities used in education. Still, I would prefer a broad answer if there was one. Still, ideally, these would include sports, games of any type, common activities and everything which can be compared from the cooperative vs. competitive point of view.

So far, my searches are only returning results that focus on the effectiveness of such learning strategies, but not on the imprinting effect that it may have on the individual, specially if short-lived.

If particular research or studies cannot be founds, I can settle for an answer explaining hypothesis on how these would work towards building personality and behaviors.

The question arises from trying to draw a parallel with AI and general game playing, where cooperative/competitive behaviors can be "trained" through heuristics. These heuristics and the balance between cooperation/competitiveness (for mixed activities) usually display a personality, a "strategy" that depends on the coder or designer, unless the algorithm is self-taught. At that point, I would like to see if the behaviors seen by the self-taught algorithms can parallel in any way those nuances by human strategies, but I don't know how those are to be expected in humans at all - hence the question.

In this question are mixed different topics that are not very well categorized, to find documents or specific tests is better to adapt certain topics, is not usually talk of cooperative versus competitive activities, but individual versus group activities.

In research on the judgment or solution of group problems, the hypothesis is implicit that the interaction brings to the product of the group something other than the mere combination of the individual products (Shaw in the book of 1981, Group dynamics, about individual learning and group learning). Look for high performance groups. In social psychology an enormous amount of variables have been studied, many of it in relation to learning and personality.

In relation to the field of AI:
Different programs could establish contact, store, learn and put into practice different ways of solving the problem.

Interesting books:

Ferber, J. Multi-Agent System: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence.
Grace, D. and Zhang, H. Cognitive Communications, Distributed Artificial Inteligence.


Effects of aerobic vs. resistance training on cognition The beneficial effects of exercise are well documented on cognitive ability (1, 2) and reducing cognitive decline (1). However, has the type of exercise ever been analysed?

In healthy adults, is there a difference on the effects of aerobic (running) and resistance training (lifting weights) on cognitive ability?

I tried to do a little research myself and like you observed, there is not much research being done on adults relating to this topic.

What I did find was research done by M.B. Pontifex et al. (2009). Although this research was done on healthy 21 year olds (Young Adults).

They researched the effects of aerobic exercise and resistance excercise on reaction time of tasks as well as accuracy of tasks amongst other things.

This data was collected via the following method:

  Twenty-one young adult participants completed a cardiorespiratory fitness test and maximal strength tests. On
  subsequent days, task performance measures of reaction time (RT) and accuracy were collected while participants completed a modified
  Sternberg working memory task before the start of, immediately after, and 30 min after an intervention consisting of 30 min of either
  resistance or aerobic exercise and a seated rest control.

Their observation was that after aerobic excercise their response time latency (reaction time) was decreased directly after or 30 minutes after the excercise. This was not observed after or 30 minutes after doing resistance excercise.

They stated:

  The current findings indicated shorter RT latency during
  a working memory task that was performed immediately
  and 30 min after an acute bout of aerobic exercise, relative
  to the pretest. Similar effects were not observed after acute
  resistance exercise or seated rest, indicating that different
  modes of exercise have differential effects on the executive
  control of working memory. Further, shorter RT latency
  was observed for task conditions requiring increased
  working memory capacity after aerobic exercise, relative
  to the pretest, providing support for the view that changes in
  cognitive function after acute exercise are disproportionately
  larger for tasks requiring greater amounts of executive
  control.

References:
M.B. Pontifex, C.H.Hillman, B. Fernhall, K.M. Thompson and T.A. Valentini (2009) The Effect of Acute Aerobic and Resistance
Exercise on Working Memory. Med. Sci. Sports Exerc 41(4):927–934


Spike Timing Dependent Plasticity interpretation A paper I'm looking at titled "Synaptic Modifications in Cultured Hippocampal Neurons: Dependence on Spike Timing, Synaptic Strength, and Postsynaptic Cell Type" (can be found here) showed a relationship between spike timing and LTP/LTD. However, I'm having a bit of difficulty understanding what Figure 7 shows:

Since this photo I've seen published in multiple textbooks and reviews, it seems like a very important figure to understand what is going on. According to what they wrote in the introduction:

"Our results showed that postsynaptic spiking that peaked within a time window of 20 msec after synaptic activation resulted in LTP, whereas spiking within a window of 20 msec before synaptic activation led to LTD"

My understanding is that you have two neurons, a presynaptic neuron and a postsynaptic neuron and then based on their relative firing timings, that tells you whether or not there is an increase or decrease in the synaptic weight provided that the timings are close enough together. What confuses me as a non-biologist is how a postsynaptic spike could occur before the presynaptic spike does? I would think the only way a postsynaptic spike occurs is when the presynaptic neuron fires into the postsynaptic one. And then this time interval... is it from when the timing of the last presynaptic spike to the first spike of the postsynaptic one? Or from the first presynaptic spike since you would need multiple of them to induce a spike from the postsynaptic one? I'd mainly like to ask for more clarity over how to interpret what is happening.

The best explanation for STDP that I've ever seen is Nicky Case's Neurotic Neurons. In this Explorable Explanation, I think you'll find that your misunderstanding lies in the fact that both the pre-synaptic (Neuron A) and the post-synaptic neuron (Neuron B) exist in a network of other neurons. They are not only connected to each other. You are correct in saying that it often takes more than one incoming spike to make a neuron fire. These spikes are usually coming from other neurons (Neuron C, D, E... etc). So it's incorrect to think that "the only way a postsynaptic spike occurs is when the presynaptic neuron fires into the postsynaptic one".

So, to summarize, yes the time interval is the time difference between the last pre-synaptic spike to the first spike of the post-synaptic spike. These neurons exist in a network of neurons. It's probably best to think of STDP as a coincidence detector.


Can neural spiking in an organism temporarily cease? I'm interested in modeling human brain spiking activity.

Are there cases in which neural spiking completely ceases in an organism and yet later resumes?

I've considered:

hypothermic drowning, but medical reports (e.g., here) on the topic suggest that recording a patients' EEG or other indicators of spiking activity is not a priority when trying to revive a patient.
cryptobiosis, but haven't found any relevant studies.

Your link to Wikipedia's cryptobiosis article mentions that Tardigrades are capable of reducing their metabolic activity to 0.01% of normal levels, and their water content to 1%, a state which they can maintain for up to 10 years. Possessing a considerable nervous system, it is almost certain that Tardigrade neurons are not active at all during that period, especially since neurons are some of the most energy-demanding cells. Some nematodes, which apparently are also cryptobiotic, would be a similar case.

Another relevant context would be hypoxic insults to brain tissue. Hypoxia-induced neurological damage results partly from a cascade of glutamate-release that is caused by diminished ATP production in neurons. According to a study by Bickler and Donohoe (2002), some animal's neurons, in order to preserve ATP levels, are equipped to block action potentials at the onset hypoxic incidents. See the section "Why does the lack of O2 kill typical neurons rapidly?"--they even cite a study that performed EEGs (as you suggested) on anoxic turtles.

Whether it is anything-but-rare for spike trains to be completely inhibited during the course of regular nervous system function is another question, and I wish I knew the answer.

Bickler, P. E., & Donohoe, P. H. (2002). Adaptive responses of vertebrate neurons to hypoxia. Journal of experimental biology, 205(23), 3579-3586. [PDF]


Can creativity be taught? I have heard of classes that teach 'creativity'. To me, the whole concept is absurd. I approached a student of the aforementioned class and asked him why he chose to learn creativity. He stated that creativity is a process in which you learn the basics and the rules and then extrapolate it. I argued that real creativity is innate, and it depends on the surroundings of which you are a part.

And then a thought struck me: What if no one is 'naturally' creative? After birth, a baby knows only what he sees. Whatever a person knows has been absorbed from the surroundings in the form of opinions and experiences. On these lines, anybody can be creative, provided he is exposed to the 'correct' stimulus. Ideas and philosophies are personal interpretations of experiences and opinions. It wasn't our creativity as a race that has made us who we are today, but it was actually necessity that propelled our species forward. What else would possibly stimulate our creativity as a race other than our necessity as a species to survive?

In short, after an hour or so of arguments to and fro, my question: Can creativity be taught? I don't mean by giving a kid a crayon and telling him how to draw an apple. I mean creativity at its most absolute form. Can creativity be inherited?

The first Google hit for "creativity training psychology" (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2013) seems to answer your question pretty thoroughly. Prof. Chamorro-Premuzic is a pretty formidable psychologist, so it's no surprise coming from him! To quote the post:

  In short, creativity is not 100% malleable, but it can be affected by deliberate interventions. People's generic creative potential is more dependent on personality than contextual factors, but domain-specific creativity depends more on acquired expertise and our inspiration to be creative is both dispositional and situational. In simple terms, if you want to be more creative there's a lot you can do to achieve this - the only difficulty is to achieve the same results with people who don't want to be more creative (once again, it is a case of the rich getting richer and...)

Here's one particularly promising way to learn creativity: have other cultures teach you! Psychology Today (Markman, 2010) offers a nice review of a study of multicultural experience and creativity (Maddux, Adam, & Galinsky, 2010) that found creative improvements among travelers abroad. Good excuse for a vacation!

References

- Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2013, May 18). Training creativity: Can psychology boost our creative potential? Psychology Today: Mr. Personality. Retrieved from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mr-personality/201305/training-creativity-0.
- Maddux, W. W., Adam, H., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). When in Rome... Learn why the Romans do what they do: How multicultural learning experiences facilitate creativity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(6), 731–741. Retrieved from http://psp.sagepub.com.uncensor.it/content/36/6/731.full.pdf.
- Markman, A. (2010, June 26). Can living abroad make you more creative? Learning to live in another culture has real benefits. Psychology Today: Ulterior Motives. Retrieved from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ulterior-motives/201006/can-living-abroad-make-you-more-creative.


Can I use other softwares than Linger to run a self-paced reading task I want to run an SPR experiment where participants will read sentences at their own pace. My problem lies in the fact of using  2 different languages English and Arabic at the same time. I tried it with Linger, but I failed to upload the files.
Could any one of you suggest another software by which I can run SPR tasks in Arabic and English?

You can use Ibex, if you want to run it online: http://spellout.net/ibexfarm/

But in any case you should be able to upload the files in Linger, you'll need to do it centered since Linger doesn't support right-to-left languages. And you should check the encoding of the files. It should be ISO 8859-15 and not UTF-8.


Bereavement Grief and Loss Nice and quick and simple, there are a few ideas on how people go through the process of bereavement, grief and loss, such as Kübler-Ross' five stage model of grief so I am wondering what makes them diferent and what idea is a best representation?

Bereavement and loss can be different from person to person due to society, culture and religious beliefs; and different situations of loss can result in different reactions and death can result in different reactions depending on the relationship with the person affected and how the death occurred.

Take for example, a hospital surgeon fighting to save the life of someone on their operating table.  They know that their life can be saved but complications arise which result in their death.  Also for another example, a train driver strikes and kills a person on the line.  There can be feelings of guilt and anger with themselves as well as grief, and in the case of the train driver, there can be anger felt towards the dead person, especially if the situation was a suicide.  Whilst working on the railway I have heard comments such as “Suicide is selfish”, “They don’t think about the poor driver”, and “Now the driver is having to live on sick pay whilst he is dealing with the death in his head”.

Grief can also affect a large population of people with the death of some people, for example the death of Princess Diana in 1997 and Robin Williams in 2014 (Connor, 2014)

Bereavement, loss and grief can also be evident as a result of the loss of a job, sudden loss of physical or mental abilities, loss of material things, or loss of relationships through separation, divorce or death.  Catherine Jackson commented in the editorial at the front of March 2016 edition of BACPs journal ‘Therapy Today’ that,

  Dementia is often seen as stealing the person and leaving only a body
  behind.

With death, someone who has religious and/or spiritual beliefs may believe in an after-life of varying kinds, which can add a different dimension to the therapeutic work needed as these beliefs can create different outlooks on death in all sorts of ways.

There are 3 representations of bereavement, loss and grief I know of, which were reported by the people related to those representations which were:

Colin Murray Parkes,
William Worden, and
Elizabeth Kübler-Ross.

William Worden was different because he only covered the tasks involved with dealing with grief following death, however, this can be used whilst dealing with other forms of grief, and the following table I put together shows how the representations combine and overlap each other.

References

Connor, J., 2014. In Practice - Thinking about dying. Therapy Today, October, 25(8), p. 6


What it is called when a mother has sexual desires towards her son? I know about Oedipus complex.

What is it called when a mother has sexual desires towards her son?
Is the term reserved for single mothers or does it include married mothers?

Jocasta complex syndrome is what you are referring to.

  In psychoanalytic analysis, the Jocasta complex is the incestuous
  sexual desire of a mother towards her son. SOURCE


What is so "potential" about action potentials? When an action potential is propagating through a neuron, it seems to me that the time for "potential of action" is over, and that we are now just in a state of "action". Why don't we just call action potentials "action"? Where is the potential for action when the neuron itself is undergoing action? In fact, when a neuron is at rest, it is said to have a "resting potential". To me this seems more like a "resting state" and an "action state". So what is so potential about "action potentials"?

There are other meanings of "potential" than the regular meaning "having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future" (source: Google Translate).

In case of "resting potential" it refers to the voltage difference across the cellular membrane. Every cell maintains a voltage difference across the membrane (see a related question here: https://biology.stackexchange.com/questions/17840/resting-and-action-membrane-potential). The voltage difference is used for various purposes, including the transport of nutrients and ions, and it is crucial for action potentials to occur.

In case of "action potential" it refers to a series of successive changes in the voltage difference across the membrane, which occurs when an excitable cell is triggered (see a related question here: https://biology.stackexchange.com/questions/91/how-do-the-brain-and-nerves-create-electrical-pulses/110#110).


Re-arrangement of brain's functions In a neuroscience class, I was told that if some part of the brain gets damaged somehow and it's early enough, the functionalities of that part of the brain are rearranged to another part of the brain. This was used to prove that all parts of the brain utilize the same general mechanism.

Now my questions are:

1. How does the brain get assigned these locations initially? Is it genetics?
2. If the functionality is reassigned, won't it affect the place where it is now put?
3. How does the brain decide where to put it? Is the brain self aware?

This was used to prove that all parts of brain utilize same general mechanism.

This is not quite true. While a good deal of reorganization can happen post-damage, brain function will not be re-localized to anywhere. Instead, what often happens is that, if a location on one hemisphere is damaged, the function is taken over by the corresponding location on the other hemisphere. In the extreme, some children have an entire hemisphere removed (to treat seizure disorders), and the remaining hemisphere takes over nearly all the function of the removed hemisphere. Hopefully this partially answers your second question.

To answer your first question, both genetics and environmental input shape how functions get localized in brain tissue. We know environmental input is important because people that are deprived of some kind of input (e.g., vision or sound) will re-assign the brain tissue to processing input that is received (so for a Deaf person, auditory regions in temporal lobe may be repurposed for processing visual input). I can't, off the top of my head, think of concrete cases to illustrate how genes influence function localization, but hopefully it's obvious enough that this is the case / how this might work.

Re: your last question about the brain being self-aware...well, in one sense the brain is self-aware since you are self-aware and you are your brain. But we must be careful about what exactly we mean by "self-aware". It can be easy to fallaciously invoke the homunculus.


Why do humans enjoy works of fiction? Why humans (most of them, and certainly all those around me) enjoy fictional stories in one form or the other - novels, films, theater performances?

The starting assumption is that there must be an evolutionary advantage to it. Related, might be the question of why humans do and enjoy music.

Why don't we stick to hard facts, true stories and the like?

According to the article "A feeling for fiction: becoming what we behold" (Miall and Kuikan, 2002), suggest 4 levels of how reading stories/fiction affect us:

The first is a satisfaction and enjoyment

  are reactions to an already interpreted text

The second level is when the feelings and engagement start kicking in:

  feelings such
  as empathy or sympathy with an author, narrator, or narrative figure are involved in the
  interpretive processes by which a representation of the fictional world is developed and
  engaged

So, in this second stage, we are starting to get 'drawn in' to this fictional world.

The third level involves

  feelings of fascination, interest, or intrigue are an initial moment in readers’
  response to the formal components of literary texts (narrative, stylistic, or generic).

Now, these first 3 levels are more or less aesthetic, it is the fourth level (and the focus of the linked paper) that links the aesthetic and narrative feelings together that

  interact to
  produce metaphors of personal identification that modify self-understanding. We also argue
  that the concept of catharsis (the conflict of tragic feelings identified by Aristotle) identifies
  one particular form of a more general pattern in which aesthetic and narrative feelings evoked
  during reading interact to modify the reader.

This last point is also discussed in the article "Why fiction may be twice as true as fact: Fiction as cognitive and emotional stimulation" (Oatley, 1999) with the statement:

  in the simulations of fiction, personal truths can be explored that allows readers to experience emotions - their own emotions - and understand aspects of them that are obscure, in relation to the contexts in which the emotions arise.

From that, fiction is not just 'escapism' and affects us on psychological and cognitive levels beyond aesthetic levels.  This would be true for any form of fiction, and potentially for music and visual art.

A possible evolutionary advantage is that this type of activity takes us away from the 'here and now' to places that we have never known, yet (according to the articles) have a sense of familiarity for us, emotionally and cognitively.


Have any drugs been shown to increase the neuroplasticity of adult brains? I read recently in the book "meet your happy chemicals" that the hormones of puberty are neurochemicals that cause your neurons to connect and myelinate more easily.

If this is true have any studies been done to see if injecting those same hormones into the body of an adult enables a similar rate of accelerated learning?

I read recently in the book "meet your happy chemicals" that the hormones of puberty are neurochemicals that cause your neurons to connect and myelinate more easily.

I will presume that you're referring to brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) which is involved in neurogenesis and neuroplasticity.

If this is true have any studies been done to see if injecting those same hormones into the body of an adult enables a similar rate of accelerated learning?

You may want to look into Cerebrolysin which is an injectable preparation of fractionate porcine brain. Essentially they take pig brains, spin them in a centrifuge and extract the heavy fraction that contains the neuropepties, including BDNF.
Enclosed is some of the research. There is evidence that Cerebrolysin facilitates neurogenesis and neuroplasticity, but to my knowledge, does not promote learning or cognitive performance in healthy individuals.
Properties of Cerebrolysin
Here's a brief summary Cerebrolysin's effects on the brain:

Cerebrolysin (Cbl) is the only drug available for clinical use containing active fragments of important neurotrophic factors. The active fragments are small neuropeptides which cross the blood-brain barrier (BBB) and mimic the action of endogenous neurotrophic factors such as BDNF, GDNF, CNTF and NGF and others. The neurotrophic action of the Cbl helps in the survival of neurons and prevents the cell death. In addition, several reports suggest that Cbl induces neuroprotection when there is a damage of the brain and also induce neurogenesis. These two actions (neuroprotection and neurogenesis) maintain... In addition, recent reports suggest that Cbl increases synaptic communication by increasing dendritic arborization as well as the number of dendritic spines in cortical regions such as PFC and hippocampus.

Flores, G., & Atzori, M. (2014). The potential of cerebrolysin in the treatment of schizophrenia. Pharmacology & Pharmacy, 5, 691–704. https://doi.org/10.4236/pp.2014.57079
Pharmacotherapy in Alzheimer's disease
Here's one on Alzheimer's disease:

Cerebrolysin is a neuropeptide preparation mimicking the action of
endogenous neurotrophic factors. Positive effects of Cerebrolysin on
β-amyloid- and tau-related pathologies, neuroinflammation,
neurotrophic factors, oxidative stress, excitotoxicity,
neurotransmission, brain metabolism, neuroplasticity, neuronal
apoptosis and degeneration, neurogenesis and cognition were
demonstrated in experimental conditions... The clinical efficacy of Cerebrolysin in Alzheimer's disease
was evaluated in several randomized, double-blind, clinical trials,
showing consistent benefits on global clinical function and cognition,
improvements in behavior at high doses, and minor effects on daily
living activities in patients with mild to moderate Alzheimer's
disease, as well as in subgroups of moderate to moderately severe
patients.

Alvarez, X. A., & Fuentes, P. (2011). Cerebrolysin in Alzheimer’s disease. Drugs of Today, 47, 487. https://doi.org/10.1358/dot.2011.47.7.1656496
The main problem with all the studies with Cerebrolysin or other candidate drugs is that even though the study findings may be statistically significant the effect sizes are nothing to write home about. Though granted, to some, even incremental benefit is better than no benefit at all.
Recovery from stroke
This one demonstrates efficacy in recovery of motor control following stroke:

Cerebrolysin is a neuropeptide preparation with neuroprotective and neurorestorative effects. Combining Cerebrolysin
treatment with a standardized rehabilitation program may have a
potential synergistic effect in the subacute stage of stroke. This
study aims to evaluate whether Cerebrolysin provides additional motor
recovery on top of rehabilitation therapy in the subacute stroke
patients with moderate to severe motor impairment...
In the stroke patients with severe motor
impairment, the Cerebrolysin group exhibited significantly more
improvement in motor function compared with the placebo group. Effects of Cerebrolysin were demonstrated as restricted
increments of corticospinal diffusivity and as recovery of the
sensorimotor connectivity... The combination of standard rehabilitation therapy with Cerebrolysin treatment in the subacute stroke has shown additional benefit on motor recovery and plastic changes of the corticospinal
tract in patients with severe motor impairment.

Chang, W. H., Park, C., Kim, D. Y., Shin, Y.-I., Ko, M.-H., Lee, A., … Kim, Y.-H. (2016). Cerebrolysin combined with rehabilitation promotes motor recovery in patients with severe motor impairment after stroke. BMC Neurology, 16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12883-016-0553-z
Recovery from traumatic brain injury
And it seems to improve recovery from TBI as well:

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a leading cause of death and
disability for which there is currently no effective drug therapy
available. Because drugs targeting a single TBI pathological pathway
have failed to show clinical efficacy to date, pleiotropic agents with
effects on multiple mechanisms of secondary brain damage could
represent an effective option to improve brain recovery and clinical
outcome in TBI patients... Compared to standard medical care alone
(control group), both doses of Cerebrolysin were associated with
improved clinical outcome scores at 10 days post-TBI in mild patients
and at 10 and 30 days in moderate and severe cases. A dose-dependent
effect of Cerebrolysin on TBI recovery was supported by the
dose-related differences and the significant correlations with
treatment duration observed for outcome measures... In
conclusion, the results of this large retrospective study revealed
that early Cerebrolysin treatment is safe and is associated to
improved TBI outcome.

Muresanu, D., Ciurea, A., Gorgan, R., Gheorghita, E., Florian, S., Stan, H., … Alvarez, A. (2015). A Retrospective, Multi-Center Cohort Study Evaluating the Severity- Related Effects of Cerebrolysin Treatment on Clinical Outcomes in Traumatic Brain Injury. CNS & Neurological Disorders - Drug Targets, 14, 587–599. https://doi.org/10.2174/1871527314666150430162531


Validity of limerance as a romantic evolutionary stage I was looking into the concept of limerence as a stage of evolution in a romantic relationship, however I can't find any sources for it other than its origin in the book "Love and Limerence: The Experience of Being in Love" by Dorothy Tennov. Has there been any criticism of this as a concept, not as diagnosis for abnormal psychology? I'm somewhat skeptical of any psychological concept put forth by a single part without external validation.

The theme of love is and will be a very broad subject in psychology. As on other occasions I have always focused on variables to take into account in this theme: attachment, attraction, sexual behavior, esthetics (philosophical theme), likes, interests, etc (as always keep in mind also that there may always be more variables than those considered).

In broad themes:

Certain facts can be studied as phenomena.
A set of facts about a phenomenon can be established in a construct in a theory (here it is not so much about terms or concepts) these constructs have different realities (reality as individual mental state, reality through the influence that causes In the social or interpersonal domain), can not be directly observed, its characteristics must be studied through other objects.
In many cases it is difficult to limit the construct due to its limits, for example other processes or even other social phenomena (for example, how to determine the limit of the stereotype construct in any investigation).

Addressing the issue of validity in a broad sense (beyond validity in psychometry) (epistemological validity) can refer to many things, to perform a certain analysis, to apply a methodology, a hypothesis, an experiment, at in the end can be understood as the correct scientific procedure.

The term limerance has validity in that it is a concept that refers to a construct whose effects are registered by an investigator and seem to be found other sources that handle it (it is not strictly necessary for the construct to be labeled in this way in other sources , It does not matter as much the sources as the methodological validity of the scientific process, in any case if that seems to be a construct that other investigators handle)

Further reading:

"Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment process", Hazan, Cindy; Shaver, Phillip(DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.52.3.511)
"Attachment Style as a Predictor of Adult Romantic Relationships", Judith A. Feeney, Patricia Noller(DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.281)
"Romantic love: An fMRI study of a neural mechanism for mate choice", Helen Fisher, Arthur Aron, Lucy L. Brown(DOI: 10.1002/cne.20772)


In an experiment with animated stimuli, should I accept answers during Animation Time and count it into the Response Time? In an experimental task where the response time is an important variable to compare two groups with different conditions, and there are animated stimuli (movement), should the response be accepted during the movement and the animation time be included in the response time measurement?
For instance, suppose that I have a categorization-like task where there are two kinds of movements for the objects, and those movements are presented through a 500ms animation. If a participant manages to notice the expected answer before the animation ends and press the button in, like, 450ms, should I accept this response?
I'm worried that some participants might wait until it's finished to answer while some others might not, and that might add some noise which I'm not sure about the significance (maybe for lack of experience).

You could solve this problem telling your participant that they have to answer as soon as they spot the right answer or if you do not want them to answer before the end of the stimuli you can disable answers before the end of the stimuli (normally you write what you expect in the experiment introduction screen).
If you let (want) your participant to answer as soon as they spot the right answer then you should consider as time response the time they took to answer. In concrete:
if the stimuli are presented at time 0 and last 200ms and your participant answer at time 50ms you should record them as answer time 50ms.
As far as I understood you are interested in seeing how long it takes for your participants to spot the right answer. So if you wait till the end of the stimuli for recording their answer you might just see how fast they are in pressing the bottom and not how fast they spot the right answer.


What does daytime actigraphy reveal about an active and awake brain? I have interest in the study of human motion (
Actigraphy), and have built a couple of smartphone apps using its principles. The apps look at gross motor activity of an individual. Up until now, most of my reading into the field has been focused on the study of sleep. With Actigraphy, there are clear ~90 minute activity patterns visible over the course of the night that roughly correlate with the 4 stages of sleep. There are algorithms by Cole and Sadeh which describe how to score sleep using activity counts.

Are there any uses of actigraphy for awake patients?
Are there any investigations of the correlation between the overall activity pattern/level and the brain wave frequency (alpha/beta/...)?
Are there any wake-related actigraphy algorithms?

Update thank you for answers and comments! Let me clarify the question. I'm interested in comparing a rather long history of events for the same individual wearing an actigraph.

For example we have a person who's both an athlete and also does meditation. I'm interested in using actigraphy to determine the length of the meditation sessions, along with any increase/decrease of overall activity pattern that may accompany meditation activity (ex: deeper concentration moves the brain to a different brainwave and relaxes the body, or nervousness and fidgeting rising, the person cannot get to the correct brainwave and cuts the session short).

Lets say the same person is a runner. Wearing an actigraph during sessions displays two important characteristics:
When the person is and is not running. (going out to run is an action that requires conscious action.
How long the person is running.  If a person is feeling "negative", the person may not go out to run). If a person does go out to run, the running session may be cut short if a person is not in the right state of mind.

Combined with self-reported events (ex: running session started, meditation session started), such actigraphy data may be plotted day by day. I'm interested if there have been studies of such data.

It's obvious that people will move more when awake or doing exercise compared to being asleep or resting, however actigraphy provides a quantitative way to measure that. Therefore actigraphy is useful for studying sleep-wake cycles, activity-rest cycles and circadian rhythms. They have been shown to be reliable in determining when a subject is awake or asleep, so that's why they are generally used for that. Although there still needs to be more standardization and consistency of analysis and reporting in scientific literature to make comparison between studies more useful (Berger et al., 2008).

In order for actigraphy to be useful for understanding brain activity while awake, there needs to be a way to monitor brain activity. When exercise is involved methods such as fMRI, PET, TMS are not suitable since subjects need to stay still. EEG and EMG are really the only options. Winkler et al., 2003 has correlated short-term actigraphy with awake EEG patterns, and results suggest that they can be used to indicate CNS arousal. It probably doesn't affect the results, but you should note that the study was with psychiatric patients who were taking medication. It would have been more thorough to do this with normal population as a control to ensure generalizability. The software/algorithm they used was "Actiwatch Sleep Analysis 2001" (Cambridge Neurotechnology). Maybe you can look that up to find out more, although I'm not sure the algorithm would be published.

References

Berger, A.M., Wielgus, K.K., Young-McCaughan, S., Fischer, P., Farr, L. & Lee, K.A. (2008). Methodological challenges when using actigraphy in research. Journal of pain and symptom management, 36, 191-199.
Winkler, D., Pjrek, E., Pezawas, L., Presslich, O., Tauscher, J. & Kasper, S. (2003). Relationship between power spectra of the awake EEG and psychomotor activity patterns measured by short-term actigraphy. Neuropsychobiology, 48, 176-181.


How does neuron stimulation work? Neurons are excited via an external electrode by passing current through it. A neuron at rest is at -70 mV, it needs additional charge amounting to around 15 mV to initiate an action potential. But the external electrode only gives electrons, which are negatively charged, how can they increase the potential inside the neuron? Does the electrode provide charge to the outside of the membrane of the neuron?

The electric field of an external electrode provokes the opening of sodium channels, which in turn has the effect that the positive charged sodium ions travel into the cell body and invoke the wanted change to the Membran potential…

reference: Simulation Neuronaler Netze [("Simulation of Neural Networks")] / Andreas Zell. - Bonn; Paris; Reading, Mass [u.a.]: Addison-Wesley, 1994, first edition


Is there an explanation for concepts or situations that are repeated within a short amount of time? I know that the title is not really clear. That's because I don't know what i'm searching for, unfortunately.
Let me explain with an example:
Yesterday i was watching a youtube video , more precisely a lecture from MIT. Looking through the comments i found out that the professor from that lecture studied computer science at the University of Waterloo. I have never heard about the University of Waterloo before (until yesterday).
Today, while checking my emails i was surprised to see that i got a suggestion to read an answer to a question : "How valuable is the University of Waterloo's computer science program? "
I know that with computers may not be so mysterious since they know what content we see on the internet and may use it for making suggestions.
The thing is that these kind of situations occur really often even without technological "help".

For example:
Some time ago my sister told me about neutron stars. It was fascinating.
The next day, during a lecture, my physics professor used neutron stars as an example for a problem.

I had never heard about neutron stars before my sister told me about them and i was shocked to hear my professor that day. I haven't heard about those stars since then.

Or even everyday things: there is a song you didn't listen to for a very long time. Let's say a year. One day you think about that song. Some hours later you hear it playing randomly in a tv show you are watching.

My question is : do these situations have a name ?
It happens so often that i already gave it a name but i would like to know if there is some official version

Do they have an explanation from a psychological point of view or they are just fortunate coincidences?

Short answer
The repeated encounter of a word or object after just having been introduced to it is linked to the frequency illusion, also called the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon.

Background
It may be an example of the frequency illusion:

  The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that has recently come to one's attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterward

It's also referred to as the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon, colloquially described as

  [T]he phenomenon where one stumbles upon some obscure piece of information—often an unfamiliar word or name—and soon afterwards encounters the same subject again, often repeatedly.

It's also related to things like buying a brand new car that was just newly released and suddenly it pops up all around the neighborhood.

The Frequency Illusion is thought to be the result of two psychological processes:  selective attention (noticing things that are salient to us, disregarding the rest) (Yantis, 2008), and confirmation bias (looking for evidence that supports a hypothesis and disregarding counterevidence). source: Stanford University

Reference
- Yantis, Curr Dir Psychol Sci (2008); 17(2): 86–90


What is the most comprehensive system of describing human emotions or states of mind? Reading about the human mind, I sometimes come across attempts to classify human emotions using various scales. The one that comes to mind most often is the 6 scale circle model shown below.

Is there one or more models of human states of mind or emotions that as of 2014 is most accepted or best regarded by the fields of cogsci/psychology/psychiatry?

To clarify my question - using a model like that, any ordinary experience of "being" can be identified as consisting of various shades of different emotions represented by the model. ?

or

or even an attempt to create a periodic table:

There a are globally two perspectives

the discrete perspective uses a categorization system. There are many different systems, with more or less core emotions and sub-emotions. As the one shown in your post.
the dimensional perspective considers one, mainly two, sometimes more, scales to identify an emotional value. Valence (happy/sad) and arousal (sleepy/excited) are quite frequent for those models.

It's not so easy to choose between the two perspectives. And there are different models for each perspective. Discrete based models are easier to handle by anyone because they make use of usual names. But it suffers a bias of interpretation of those names meaning.
In this way, indicating a level of valence or arousal is maybe more accurate,  but less user-friendly.

For the dimensional perspective, Scherer's Component Process Model version (2005) is quite comprehensive,  based on the updated model of Russell (2003).

Depending of the model, some tools are developed to assess the emotion.

References:

Scherer, K. (2005) What are emotions and how can they be measured?

Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological Review, 110, 145-172.


Benefits of using more complicated neuron models in NEF models The NEF allows you to use almost any neuron model as long as it has an equation for it's activity and it's spikes in some way. Usually, a simple leaky-integrate-fire (LIF) neuron model is used, but even in the software Nengo there are various neurons available for modelling, such as adaptive LIF neurons and Poisson neurons. What are the benefits of using these more complex neurons and how have these benefits been leveraged in the past?

As seen in "Neural Engineering" by Eliasmith et al. Chapter 4, complicated neuron models have greater computational abilities and match neural data more realistically.

Computational Capabilities

As seen in the following table (taken from Neural Engineering) Adaptive LIF neurons, by virtue of their temporally varying firing patterns (i.e. a constant input will cause different spike patterns over time) encode more information per spike:

As seen in this table, there's a trade-off between the complexity of the information represented by the neuron and it's computational cost. However, this cost is calculated on traditional Von-Neumann CPUs. It is possible to create neuromorphic hardware to minimize this cost while maximizing computational ability. For more information, see "Nonlinear synaptic interaction as a computational resource in the Neural Engineering Framework" which shows how non-linear dendrites can allow for powerful forms of computation with minimal additional neuromorphic hardware cost.

Matching Biological Data

The aforementioned temporal variance of the Adaptive LIF is also used to matching neural data as seen in this model of working memory, which would have not been possible with regular LIF neurons. Using even more complicated models can allow for matching the effects of drugs, as shown in "Effects of Guanfacine and Phenylephrine on a Spiking Neuron Model of Working Memory".


Does super-intelligence necessary lead to consciousness, self awareness, freewill or emotion After seeing this talk, the question popped in my mind. The idea is that as soon as a system is complex enough or intelligent enough, it able to act on its own. It seems to be a common belief. For example, you can find it in the movie Terminator, where skynet, an advanced computer, becomes self aware and decide to eradicate humanity. The same is true with the  HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey, where the computer decides to act despite receiving the opposite orders from the astronaut.

I believe what is said in this ted talk, where Antonio Damasio explains that consciousnesses is not a great product of the neocortex, but rather a trick achieved by other older parts in the brain (essentially the brainstem). If, in addition, you believe that human intelligence and cognition takes place in the neocortex (as in the Memory-prediction framework model, introduced in On Intelligence by Jeff Hawkins), it doesn't make sense that intelligence is linked to consciousness, self awareness, freewill or emotion.

So my question is: is there any scientific evidence for this link, is there any paper about it ?

As the other response noted, a lot of the answers will depend on how you define the terms. Here, I will use Legg & Hutter's (2007) definition of intelligence, where an agent is intelligent if it can achieve a large variety of goals in a large variety of environments. For instance, a chess-playing robot is great at achieving the goal of winning at chess when it is in the environment of a chess game where nobody cheats or does anything else odd, but it fails miserably at just about everything else. So it has low intelligence. In contrast, a human can achieve many different goals in many different environments, from hunting food in a rainforest, to repairing solar panels while wearing a space suit on Earth's orbit. So a human has a considerably higher intelligence. See the paper for a formalization of this intuitive definition.

Note that a system can be exceedingly complex, or good at one thing, without necessarily being intelligent in this sense. Complexity does not imply intelligence by itself. But let's suppose that a system were intelligent in this sense? Well, let's tackle each of your terms in turn.

Self-awareness. One widely-used definition for self-awareness is being "aware of themselves as a differentiated and unique entity in the world". For instance, Rochat (2003) discusses the development of self-awareness in babies and very young children:

  All parents also notice an important change at around 2 years of age when children
  manifest ‘‘self-consciousness,’’ the so-called secondary emotions such as embarrassment or pride
  in very specific situations such as mirror exposure or competitive games (Kagan, 1984; Lewis,
  1992). Prior to the second year, an infant placed in front of a mirror will typically smile, coo, and
  explore in apparent delight of the perfect contingency between acted and seen movements
  bouncing back at them from the polished surface of the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972). By 2 years, the
  specular image is associated with radically different behaviors. Toddlers become typically frozen
  and sometime behave as if they wanted to hide themselves by tucking their head in their shoulders
  or hiding their face behind their hands. They show embarrassment. This is a robust phenomenon
  and one is naturally tempted to ask what it means psychologically for children in their development. [...]

  It appears indeed that by 2–3
  years young children do start to have others in mind when they behave. The expression of embarrassment
  that children often begin to display in front of mirrors at around this age is the
  expression of such ‘‘self-consciousness.’’ They behave not unlike criminals hiding their face to the
  cameras. Their behavior indicates a drive to vanish from the public eyes, as if they came to grip via
  the experience of their own specular image of how they present themselves to the world. Not only
  do they discover in the mirror that it is themselves, they also realize that it is themselves as
  perceived by others. The malaise might come from the realization of a fundamental discrepancy
  between how the child represents herself from within, and how he or she is actually perceived by
  others as reflected in the mirror.

So self-awareness implies an understanding of the fact that there is such a thing as a "me", which is separate from the world as a whole, and which others will perceive differently than it will perceive itself. There can also be varying levels of self-awareness, ranging from the level 1 self-awareness that newborn infants have ("immediately after birth, infants are capable of demonstrating
already a sense of their own body as a differentiated entity: an entity among other entities in the
environment") to level 5 self-awareness involving a theory of mind and an understanding of the fact that others may have false beliefs about something while you yourself have a true belief of it.

Would a superintelligence necessarily need to be self-aware, in any of these senses? I'd say that it would. While there are lots of goals that could plausibly be solved without any kind of self-awareness (proving mathematical theorems, for instance), many seem impossible to solve without it. Pretty much any social activity requires you to have a model about others as distinct from yourself, as well as an ability to model their beliefs and attitudes towards yourself. So in order to really be capable of solving many goals, you need to be self-aware. On the other hand, if it was a narrow intelligence that had been built to only solve theorems of math, it probably wouldn't need self-awaraness.

Emotion. There are many theories of emotion. For instance, the Information Principle says that emotional feelings provide conscious information from unconscious appraisals of situations (Clore et al. 2001). Your brain is constantly appraising the situation you happen to be in. It notes things like a passerby having slightly threatening body language, or conversation with another person being easy and free of misunderstandings. There are countless of such evaluations going on all the time, and you aren't consciously aware of them, because you don't need to. Your subconscious mind can handle them just fine on its own. The end result of all those evaluations is packaged into a brief summary, which is the only thing that your conscious mind sees directly. That "executive summary" is what you experience as a particular emotional state. The passerby makes you feel slightly nervous and you avoid her, or your conversational partner feels pleasant to talk with and you begin to like him, even though you don't know why.

So this theory says that emotions are both a source of information about unconscious appraisals, and a way to bias your behavior on the basis of circumstances. For instance, in happy moods (when things are presumably going well), we tend to rely more on our pre-existing routines and heuristics, while in sad or frustrated moods (when things aren't going so well), our minds switch to a more analytical mode of thought where we're more likely to take apart our existing beliefs and routines to find whether there's something wrong with them (Schwarz, 2010).

Would a superintelligence have something that we would consider to be akin to "emotions"? I would think that it might or might not, depending on its architecture. Thinking for a moment about humans, maybe a human with a vastly larger working memory capacity wouldn't need to have the subconscious appraisals packaged into summaries in the form of emotions, but could just constantly review their un-summarized conclusions while also thinking about other things. Maybe such a human could also learn to consciously control the style of their information processing, and adapt either heuristic or analytical thought as seemed reasonable. Arguably, such a human wouldn't need emotions. So it seems plausible that a superintelligence wouldn't necessarily have them either.

Free will. Okay, now we are getting into tricky territory. There are lots of definitions about free will, so I'll merely say that the computational theory of mind seems to be the majority view in cognitive science. If you accept the computational theory of mind, then you also consider the human mind to be a kind of a computer executing certain algorithms. Then on most accounts, if you would consider a human to have free will, you would probably also consider a machine intelligence to have free will, and vice versa.

Consciousness. This is another vague term, and people mean different things by it. Copeland (1993) notes at least three possible meanings:

Baseline sense: an entity is conscious if it is capable of perceiving the world via sense organs of some sort, and if it is capable of performing inner activities such as reasoning, deliberating, judging, hypothesing, planning, and so on.
Consciousness as internal monitoring: an entity is conscious if it is capable of observing and reporting on itself. For instance, I am not simply thinking looking up Copeland's definitions and typing a summary of them: I also know that I am doing so, and can think about this fact.
Phenomenological consciousness: an entity is conscious if there's something that being that entity "feels like". Pain and pleasure are not just algorithmical responses that modify an entity's behavior: they feel painful or pleasant. This is the hardest category to really express in words, but hopefully everyone understands what's meant.

A superintelligence would most definitely need to be conscious in the baseline sense: if it couldn't collect information from the world and make plans on that basis, it wouldn't be much of an intelligence. It would probably also need be conscious in the sense of being capable of internal monitoring, for otherwise it might not really be self-aware, and we already concluded that self-awareness is necessary for (broad) intelligence.

What about phenomenological consciousness? Chalmers (1995) has a pretty convincing (to me) thought experiment, where he says that a human who was changed into a robot, replacing one neuron at a time with an artificial one, would remain phenomenally conscious. But that argument presumes that the human retains their mental architecture unchanged. If we built a mind that had an entirely different mental architecture as humans did, would it exhibit phenomenal consciousness? There are lots of arguments, but the essential gist is that nobody knows.

Indepedent goal-directed behavior. But there's one more thing that your question seems to be implying, which wasn't fully covered by any of the terms above. You seem to also be asking whether an intelligent system might start doing things which conflict with the desires of its creators.

The answer seems to be yes. Omohundro (2008) argues that even a chess-playing robot, if it were intelligent enough and if it were not designed carefully enough, "will resist being turned off, will try to break into other machines and make copies of itself, and will try to acquire resources without regard for anyone else’s safety". Suppose that the robot has "winning at chess" as its goal. Now, it will exhibit these behaviors because, if it is turned off it might not be able to play any more chess, if it can make copies of itself those copies can continue to play chess even if some were turned off, and extra resources will help it in making sure that it can always win at chess. Omohundro also mentions a number of other drives which will arise as natural subgoals of almost any other goal.

Armstrong et al. (forthcoming) have an extensive discussion about "Oracle AI", an artificial intelligence which would be built to be safe, as it was built to only answer questions and not do anything else. But even this is harder to do than it might seem. Even trying to program the Oracle AI to want to stay within a specific physical box requires a number of definitions about what constitutes its physical location and what constitutes the Oracle AI itself (is it still staying within the box if it makes remote copies of itself?), and it might plausibly discover theories of physics in which those definitions became meaningless. Note that all of this presumes that we actually understand the OAI well enough to be able to specify its goals with such detail. If we don't, then that plan fails right away. Probably the best existing review article about this topic is Muehlhauser & Helm (forthcoming).

References

Armstrong, S. & Sandberg, A. & Bostrom, N. (forthcoming) Thinking inside the box: using and
controlling an Oracle AI. http://www.aleph.se/papers/oracleAI.pdf

Chalmers, D.J. (1995) Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Metzinger, T. (Ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html

Clore, G.L. & Gasper, K., & Garvin, E. (2001). Affect as information. In Forgas, J.P. (Ed.), Handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 121–144). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Copeland, J. (1993) Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Blackwell.

Legg, S. & Hutter, M. (2007) Universal Intelligence: A Definition of Machine Intelligence. Minds & Machines, 17:4 391-444. http://arxiv.org/abs/0712.3329

Muehlhauser, L. & Helm, L. (forthcoming). The Singularity and Machine Ethics. http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Muehlhauser-Helm-The-Singularity-and-Machine-Ethics-draft.pdf

Omohundro, S. (2008) "The basic AI drives," in Wang, P. Goertzel, P. and Franklin,
S. (eds.), Proceedings of the First AGI Conference. Frontiers in Articial Intelli-
gence and Applications, Volume 171 (IOS Press) 483-494. https://selfawaresystems.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/ai_drives_final.pdf

Rochat, P. (2003) Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 717-731. http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/lab/5%20levels%20of%20self-awareness.pdf

Schwarz, N. (2010) Feelings as information. In Van Lange, P. & Kruglanski, A. & Higgins, E.T. (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology, Sange. http://people.ict.usc.edu/~gratch/CSCI534/schwarz_feelings-as-information_7jan10.pdf


Where does Freud say, "The unconscious mind can only wish?" Where does Freud say, "The unconscious mind can only wish?" I've been tasked with either agreeing or disagreeing with this statement, but I cannot find exactly where Freud is said to have made this statement, thus no context.

Paco Mitchell at Depth Insights lists the following reference for “the unconscious can only wish”:

  For an informed critique of Freud’s comment and of psychoanalytic theory in general, see C. G. Jung, The Theory of Psychoanalysis (New York: Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1915).

Full text is available at Archive.org.
You may also want to search for "can only wish" on Scribd's copy of Jung's Freud and Psychoanalysis, and Archive.org's full text of William White's Mechanisms of Character Formation: An Introduction to Psychoanalysis. These provide plenty more context, though I'm not seeing a direct reference to the original source of the quote...


Kahneman's add one / three exercise In his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman describes a mental exercise which he calls Add One:

To start, make up several strings of 4 digits, all different, and write each string on an index card. Place a blank card on top of the deck. The task you will perform is called Add-1. Here is how it goes:
Start beating a steady rhythm. Remove the blank card and read the four digits aloud. Wait for two beats, then report a string in which each of the original digits is incremented by 1. If the digits on the card are 5294, the correct response is 6305. Keeping the rhythm is important.

This description is a bit vague and I'm wondering how the exercise is supposed to work exactly. He does not mention to cover up the card before reporting the modified digits. This would allow to perform the transformations on-the-fly digit by digit. This does not sound challenging at all and does not fit to Kahneman's following statements of loading the working memory, in particular:

Few people can cope with more than four digits in the Add-1 task.

My assumption was that he means something like that:

Beat 1: Uncover card
Beat 2: Read aloud first digit
Beat 3: Read aloud second digit
Beat 4: Read aloud third digit
Beat 5: Read aloud fourth digit
Beat 6: Wait + cover card
Beat 7: Wait
Beat 8: Say first digit + 1
Beat 9: Say second digit + 1
Beat 10: Say third digit + 1
Beat 11: Say fourth digit + 1

However, a quick Google search reveals a few implementations, for instance:

This blog post resulting in a YouTube video of the exercise.
An Android app slow thinking trainer.

To my surprise both attempts use the dull version of reporting the transformed digits while seeing them.
My question: Is there a better description of the exercise which was originally used in the scientific studies?

I just came across the same section you referenced above in Kahneman's fascinating book. Like you, I was curious how to actually perform it. You are absolutely right, Add-1 (and Add-3 for that matter) seems relatively trivial if you can see the digits while performing the arithmetic.

So I searched for the author's actual study and found a more detailed description of it summarized in another book of his, Attention and Effort (1973). See page 20, which reveals that the experiment was actually harder than described in Thinking, Fast and Slow because the digits were spoken one at time (as opposed to visually seeing all 4 together), thus each digit had to remembered for several seconds until the arithmetic was required.

  The primary task involved the transformation of a digit string: the subject heard a series of four digits (e.g., 3916) at a rate of one digit/second, and he was instructed to pause for a second, then to respond with a transform of that series (4027), adding 1 to each digit of the original set.

I believe a more accurate way to recreate the original experiment with index cards would be to write only 1 digit on each card.


How much red/orange is needed to stimulate hunger? A common claim thrown around is that red and orange are great for restaurants because it stimulates hunger. However, I've heard time and time again that this does not work in web design because you need a whole room to be red/orange to stimulate hunger; one such claim is here but I can never find an academic source to back this up.

How much of a color is necessary to actually provoke this reaction? Is it feasible for on-screen design to actually evoke hunger or is that a misapplication of this finding?

I tried to find a source to back up the claim that 'red' stimulates hunger. I couldn't, and in fact I found a study that suggests the exact opposite: the color red reduces food intake, because it acts like a stop signal (Genschow et al., 2012).

This also reminded me of a study by Brian Wansink and colleagues at Cornell, who had study participants consume Pringles in which every 7th chip was dyed red. They found that these people actually consumed fewer chips than controls (where none of the chips were dyed red). This may be due to the color of the chip, but another likely hypothesis is that  changing colors gave participants an implicit signal of how many chips were eaten. (i.e., if all chips were red, their intake would be the same as controls)

If red/orange does stimulate hunger, it is likely a very weak effect, and highly context-specific. Therefore, asking "how much red" might not be the appropriate question to ask.

  Genschow, O., Reutner, L., & Wänke, M. (2012). The color red reduces
  snack food and soft drink intake. Appetite. LINK

  Geier, A., Wansink, B., & Rozin, P. (2012). Red potato chips:
  Segmentation cues can substantially decrease food intake. Health
  Psychology, forthcoming. PDF


Is it possible for non-BDSM relationships to learn anything from slave-master relationships? I am interested in research on slave-master relationships within the BDSM spectrum.
This questions concerns people who do not just engage in BDSM recreationally, but rater  define their relationship by this type of relationship.

Master-slave relationships is one of reciprocated devotion and requires much forethought in planning activities. This includes both psychological and physical punishments,  play and games. Many people take their roles in their relationship very seriously. There are clearly defined rules and boundaries that must be respected. This is held in high regard amongst the community.

Is it possible for non-BDSM relationships to learn anything from slave-master relationships?

BDSM relationships are generally very clear on the respective roles of the individuals. Thus, they provide a refuge from the "war of the sexes" that is being fought in most non-BDSM relationships.

In non-BDSM relationships today, men and women are usually extremely confused about their roles. Men and women both have difficulties accepting women as (co)providers; both partners are expected to partake in child-rearing and household chores, which does not relieve one partner from the tedium of the job, but double the stress by leading to conflicts and an unclear diffusion of responsibility; sex is a minefield where men are afraid to "use" their women, and women can no longer "let go"; etc.

BDSM relationships are reactionary in that they return to the clarity and emotional safety of pre-feminist relationships, only without the patriarchal roles. As both Skippy (user3267) in her question and MingYue in his answer have described, BDSM relationships are often less about specific forms of sexuality, but about a specific from of relationship: one with clearly defined roles, and both partners being able to relax and be themselves in the secure knowledge of what is expected of them, how to behave, and where the limits of their agreement lie – because every relationship is a contract, only non-BDSM relationships make the mistake of tabooing this fact and clogging the free flow of an honest exchange with a thick layer of romantic spirituality.

What non-BDSM relationships can learn from BDSM relationships is to communicate clearly, to define the roles of each partner, and to stop feeling guilty about not loving in a politically correct way. Equal rights don't apply inside the bedroom.

Since there has been some debate concerning the dangers and pathology of sadism, I would like to append a paraphrase of a section in a textbook on sexual deviance (Fiedler, 2004, p. 267f.):

  Research has shown that an inclination to sexual sadism is a mostly safe and harmless preference. Practices of sexual sadism are usally performed with the utmost caution and care, so that injury or trauma is extremely rare (Scott, 1983; Weinberg & Kamel, 1983).

  Studies with persons egaging in sadistic practices with their partners have repeatedly found that these persons are socially well integrated, valued by their friends and neighbors and successful (Spengler, 1977; 1979; Scott, 1983; Moser & Levitt, 1987; Baumeister & Butler, 1997). Some authors attest that the social adjustment and psychic health of individuals engaging in sadistic practices with their partners are above average.

  Since an inclination towards sexual masochism is about four times as common as an inclination towards sexual sadism (Baumeister & Butler, 1992), we may conclude that some persons practicing sadism in their relationships are not sadistic at all but rather complying with the needs of their loved ones.

  In sum, a majority of persons performing sadism in their relationships have no psychological disorder.

Sources:

Baumeister, R. F., & Butler, J. L. (1997). Sexual masochism: Deviance without pathology. In D. R. Laws & W. T. O'Donohue (Eds.), Sexual Deviance: Theory, Assessment, and Treatment (pp. 225-239). New York: Guilford.
Fiedler, P. (2004). Sexuelle Orientierung und sexuelle Abweichung [Sexual Orientation and Sexual Deviance]. Weinheim: Beltz.
Moser, C., & Levitt, E. E. (1987). An exploratory-descriptive study of a sadomasochistically oriented sample. Journal of Sex Research, 23, 322-337.
Scott, G. G. (1983). Erotic power: An exploraton of dominance and submission. Secausus, NJ: Citadel.
Spengler, A. (1977). Manifest sadomasochism of males: Results of an empirical study. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 6, 441-456.
Spengler, A. (1979). Sadomasochisten und ihre Subkulturen. Frankfurt: Campus.
Weinberg, T. S., & Kamel, W. L. (Eds.) (1983). S and M: Studies in sadomasochism. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.


Does our consciousness die when we go to sleep or fall into a coma? I have sometimes wondered if our consciousness dies when we go to sleep at night or perhaps when we enter a deep coma, like from brain damage, for example.  When we wake, or are woken, a new consciousness is booted up with the memories of the previous consciousness, so that it gives the illusion of one continuous consciousness.   This question may be partly philosophical as well as scientific, because it looks at some of the assumptions about the nature of consciousness.

A possibly unfair analogy might be to a computer, when its running it has a memory-set like a consciousness.  And if you shutdown and reboot the computer, then it can continue running as it did before, as if it had never been shut down.  However, once a computer is shut down, its largely inert, though I know there are unimportant edge cases exceptions to this.  The computer is effectively dead when its shut down, its ram has largely dispersed.  We can start the computer back up, but it will really be loading the ram from disk.  The original electrical activity that made up the 'consciousness' of the computer before it was rebooted is effectively dead.

How do we know we don't die when we go to sleep? I mean even if our consciousness doesn't wholly die, we may suffer a partial death of sorts. I could be wrong, but I believe its possible for victims of brain damage to show minimal neural activity.  Rarely, but occasionally some of these victims recover, but perhaps their brain has rebooted their mental ram (if you will). And they may not technically be the same consciousness who fell into the coma, but merely a copy of that consciousness reconstituted from data held in the brain.

Surely plenty have considered this question, has there been any research?  Do we have any kind of answer to this question?

Q: Does our consciousness die when we go to sleep or fall into a coma?

A: No, neuroscientifically speaking, the consciousness does not die when we are sleeping or are in a coma; it is just in a sleep mode or in a severely depressed mode. This is because the group of neural circuits that function to create consciousness (ref 1, 2, 3) does not die when we are in those conditions; it is just functioning in the mentioned modes, which are different from the mode when we are fully conscious. This is unlike the case when one actually dies or when one has a brain death. In such cases, this group of neural circuits actually dies. So, neuroscientifically speaking, the consciousness that comes from the function of this group of neural circuits dies too.

(Philosophically speaking, this question may be answered differently, depending on what one means by the word “die”, which can be different among different philosophers. But this is a neuroscience forum, so I won’t get into that discussion and use the word “die” in the neuroscientific sense.)

It should also be noted that consciousness is not an all-or-none phenomenon but is a graded phenomenon. There can be graded different levels of consciousness, such as (from high to low) heightened alertness, normal alertness, drowsiness, sleeping (from light to deep), stupor, and coma, depending on the stimulation/facilitation of the consciousness neural circuits from the ARAS (ascending reticular activating system, which arises from the rostral brainstem)(ref 4,5), and the ARAS stimulation can be affected by stimulants, physiological diurnal sleep-wake cycle, depressants, and various pathological conditions (such as trauma, brainstem hemorrhage, and tumor). Also, even if a person is/appears alert,  there can be graded different consciousness states in that person. These different consciousness states have different consciousness content, such as normal conscious awareness, confusion, akinetic mutism, minimally conscious state (MCS), and vegetative state (VS), depending on the severity of damages to the consciousness neural circuits, which can be affected by similar pharmacological and pathological causes just mentioned. In these conditions, patients may appear alert (i.e, opening eyes, blinking, and chewing spontaneously) but have abnormal content of consciousness (deranged in confusion, retarded in akinetic mutism, minimal in MCS, and none or almost none in VS).(ref 6,7)

So, consciousness during sleep or coma is just consciousness in one of these various physiological/pathological states. And, as long as the consciousness neural circuits are still functioning, albeit in an abnormal mode, and living, it can be considered that, neuroscientifically, consciousness is still living too (albeit in an abnormal mode).

Q: When we wake, or are woken, a new consciousness is booted up with the memories of the previous consciousness, so that it gives the illusion of one continuous consciousness. …

I could be wrong, but I believe its possible for victims of brain damage to show minimal neural activity. Rarely, but occasionally some of these victims recover, but perhaps their brain has rebooted their mental ram (if you will). And they may not technically be the same consciousness who fell into the coma, but merely a copy of that consciousness reconstituted from data held in the brain.

A: You are right. And actually, technically speaking, our present-moment consciousness is just a slightly different copy of the previous-moment one. Our brain cells are in continuous metabolic activities, which continually change both their structural components and functional components. So, technically speaking, we this moment are a biologically different entity from we a moment ago. It’s been always like this since we’re born. Yet, we feel that we are the same person with same consciousness and the same “self” all along.

It can be argued that this feeling of same consciousness and same “self” is an evolved function to enhance the survival of an organism that has this feeling. Theoretically,  comparing two types of animals, one with this sense, and the other without this sense, with all other things identical, the one with this sense obviously has more drive to avoid danger, to seek happiness, to stay alive, and to procreate (all for the sake of its "self") than the one without this sense. So, it is logical to conclude that the sense of same consciousness and same “self” is just the evolved function to help increase the survival chance of the being and the species that possess it. (more detailed discussion in ref 8, 9)

References:

Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tononi G. Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 2016;17: 307-321. The full pdf file can be downloaded from here.
Song X, Tang X. An extended theory of global workspace of consciousness.
Progress in Natural Science. 2008 Jul;18(7):789–793.
Ukachoke C. Chapter 6 – Consciousness.  In: The Basic Theory of the Mind. 1st ed, 2018. p 8-18. Charansanitwong Printing Co. Bangkok, Thailand.
Yeo SS, Chang PH, Jang SH. The ascending reticular activating system from pontine reticular formation to the thalamus in the human brain. Front Hum Neurosci. 2013;7: 416.
Wikipedia. Function of the ARAS
Bernat JL. Chronic disorders of consciousness. Lancet 2006;367:1181–1192.
Cavanna AE, Cavanna SL, Servo S, Monaco F. The neural correlates of impaired consciousness in coma and unresponsive states. Discov Med. 2010 May;9(48):431-438.
Fabbro F, Aglioti SM,Bergamasco M,Clarici A,Panksepp J. Evolutionary aspects of self- and world consciousness in vertebrates. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9: 157.  doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00157
Ukachoke C. Chapter 11 Self. The Basic Theory of the Mind. 2018.


Sexual arousal when studying science I'm interested in the phenomenon of people getting sexually aroused while studying science (math, physics, etc.). In particular, I've heard from a friend who's a psychologist, that it could be an extremely rare side effect of some antidepressants. I did a quick search but haven't found any articles on the topic.

I would be grateful if you could point me to the relevant literature.

Higgins, et al. (2010) linked to in the comments states that sexual dysfunction is a common side effect of antidepressants, particularly of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRIs) and serotonin norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRIs) medications.  The reason from what the article points out is that:

  Sex is more than a physical act. It also includes emotional and psychological dimensions. The normal sex cycle consists of four successive phases: desire, arousal, orgasm, and resolution. These phases are facilitated by the interplay of neurotransmitters, hormones, and peptides. Different classes of antidepressants impact on all phases of the sexual response cycle to varying degrees.

The details pertaining to each class of antidepressant are summarised in Table 1 in the article.

Switching from SSRIs

Taylor, et al. (2013) reported that switching from sertraline to nefazodone was significantly less likely to result in re-emergence of the sexual dysfunction and was not associated with any worsening depression. Zajecka (2001) suggests that nefazodone, bupropion, and possibly mirtazapine have minimal or no negative impact on sexual functioning. However, individual responses to this strategy may vary.

  Firstly, the sexual dysfunction may recede but the depressive illness reasserts itself. Secondly, the change of medication may result in other associated side effects which may be more debilitating as they are present throughout the client’s day, not just when they want to have sex. Thirdly, the client who has experienced both the depression and the sexual dysfunction may feel that a ‘little’ depression is preferable to sexual dysfunction (Higgins, et al., 2010).

References

Higgins, A., Nash, M., & Lynch, A. M. (2010). Antidepressant-associated sexual dysfunction: impact, effects, and treatment. Drug, Healthcare and Patient Safety, 2, 141–150. DOI: 10.2147/DHPS.S7634PMCID: PMC3108697 (Full Text Accessible for Disabled)Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3108697/pdf/dhps-2-141.pdf

Taylor, M. J., Rudkin, L., Bullemor‐Day, P., Lubin, J., Chukwujekwu, C., & Hawton, K. (2013). Strategies for managing sexual dysfunction induced by antidepressant medication. The Cochrane Library 5. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD003382.pub3

Zajecka, J. (2001). Strategies for the treatment of antidepressant-related sexual dysfunction. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 62, 35-43. PMID: 11229451


Anonymity creates an environment full of bullies? The Stack Exchange websites has people anonymously up vote or down vote whether questions and answers are good or bad and everyone builds their reputation based on this alone. I saw a question on the mathematics board that was not off topic but, in the beginning, was being down voted due to either being too elementary or perceived as what I consider people to be saying as a "stupid question". Do you think that removing this shawl of anonymity would change the way people interact with each other on Stack Exchange? For better or For Worse?

Of course it would change the way people interact with one another. Social and situational settings strongly affect behaviour.

It's funny you see it this way. One can argue that it's exactly the opposite! Like with parliamentary elections, anonymity means that people act based on their own beliefs without being swayed by social pressure.

What's more without anonymity, people may start keeping score, which will further bias the objectivity of the votes.

When it comes to services like Stack Exchange, the general idea is that the various opinions will eventually regress to the mean - so the majority has it. Sure, for this to happen you need quite a lot of votes, but my experience is that usually gross down/up votes are justified.


Where are intrinsically bursting neurons found in the mammalian brain? There are neurons in the brain that exhibit bursting behaviour. In some cases, this is due to interactions with the surrounding neural network. In other cases, it is due to intrinsic biological properties of the neurons.

In the case where it is intrinsic, where are these neurons found in the brain and what function to do they serve? How is their intrinsic bursting behaviour identified?

One very notable example of intrinsically bursting neurons are the thalamocortical relay cells.  They have a hyperpolarization-activated calcium channel which leads to periodic bursting at delta frequency.  The hyperpolarization activation allows these neurons to switch from tonic firing (esp. during wakefulness) to burst firing (esp. during sleep).  The bursting of these neurons has been associated with schizophrenia (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802545/) and have even been fingered as the root of consciousness (see the work of Rodolfo Llinas).


Do characters in a dream have their own separate thoughts or identity? I am very curious as to if any research has been done in this area, or if such a question even can be researched given the current tools and methods available to cognitive scientists. When one dreams, one may experience interactions with other characters, be those characters based on people one knows in their waking life or characters new to the dreamer. I'm interested to understand more about how the interactions between the dreamer within the dream state and these characters inside the dream work.

Do the characters in one's dream actually have their own thoughts? That is, does the mind "sandbox" each character, keeping track of what each dream character is thinking? When characters in a dream speak or act, what determines what actions they will take? Are their words and actions simply based upon a sense of empathy, or does the mind somehow maintain separate "conscious states" for each dream character? (A better word for that is appreciated, if there is one)

Or, as I suspect, is this concept simply too abstract for us to research given our current level of technology and understanding about how dreams work at a fundamental level?

Edit: As an alternative way of asking this question, has any research been done looking for possible relationships between characters within a dream and other better-understood areas of personality, for example multiple personality disorder?

EDIT:  To address the changed question:

Similar to how mental visualization stimulates the same neurons/blood flow that actually seeing something does, I suspect that brain scans will show similar processing occuring during the dream interaction as occur during real interactions.

The difference is that the brain is creating the entire subjective experience.

The crazy thought is that there isn't a difference though: subjective experience is ALWAYS completely constructed by the brain, though it's constructed through nerve impulses from external inputs such as electromagnetic waves (sight) or physical waves (sound).  During sleep, the body is paralyzed to prevent us from acting out our dreams (which WILL happen if the paralysis is lifted), which implies that sensory data is still coming in (or being generated) and we are simply mis-perceiving it and then trying to catch up.

This was my answer to @alan2here's original question.  It mostly still applies, though is also a mixture of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive neurophilosophy (EDIT: i.e. uncited, lol)
Take this as you will:

First off, this is definitely a philosophy question, but I'll try to stay within the bounds of Cog Sci. No promises though...

From my understanding, the mind does not create consciousness. While this is a very thorny issue, and one I'm not super familiar with, I believe a generally accepted view is that consciousness is a (by-)product of the sheer complexity of the human brain coupled with governing systems and feedback loops (and a hell of a lot more of course!).

Furthermore, the perceived barrier between the self and separate beings is just that: perception. Differences in physical properties aside, there are no real barriers between anything. Air is just as much a molecule as plastic, and behaves in a remarkably similar manner. The difference is semantics (not unimportant to subjective beings, but objectively the difference is inconsequential). We just can't see it, and we're conditioned to ignore it, so we see a vast gulf of nothingness where there is actually incredible hidden complexity. Also, the notion of self is a misguided one that we're given through culture. As many Eastern philosophies will tell you, the self is a lie! (just like cake).

To address the actualy question though (kinda), I think you unintentionally answered it yourself with this phrase: sentient seeming entities. The 'people' in your dreams are amalgamations of 'people'-like semantic attributes your brain has constructed from your experiences. These seem like real people and can act like real people, but that's because you've met and experienced real people. If you have never met real people, it's very doubtful that any people-like dream constructs will be created (unless generated from mirror reflections).

Lastly, I have to add this caveat: dreams and dream science is still an incredibly unexplored black box. We still don't have a clear idea about why dreams occur and until then, this question is literally unanswerable. In fact, everything I've said may turn out to be false, but we don't really know. That's why this falls under philosophy.

However, I'll leave you with this: assuming that the human mind is an individual entity (and cannot connect with other people through undiscovered mental (physical, likely subatomic and certain microscopic) means), then the people in your dreams do not exist anywhere else nor to anyone else. Therefore: does it matter? It's a completely subjective experience, so only you can decide how to perceive it.