Can psychosomatic reactions be completely unconcious? I had always considered that psychosomatic reactions, such as Psychogenic pain, while "real" to the person experiencing them, would be a concious reaction at some level.  That is to say, if the person told themselves "this isn't real" - they would be able to tell that the reaction was "in their head".

However, after some recent research on Couvade Syndrome I became curious if a person could have completely unconscious physchosomatic reactions that they could not suppress with "will".  Assume in this case we're talking about an otherwise mentally healthy individual who isn't hearing voices or anything like that.

Good question and this is very big topic mate. Short answer is - every psychosomatic disorder is unconscious in the sense that it's coming from psychological tension but reflects itself in some unpleasant somatic/bodily reaction (e.g. headache, lower back pain, high blood pressure). In general, even if you are conscious of the source of psychosomatic reaction (e.g. stressful job causing evening headaches) you can't really talk yourself out of it. But you still can make some short term changes (pop a pill) or long term changes that (quit a job, meditate) to reduce the psychosomatic effects (Grossman et al., 2004).

  Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S., Walach, H. (2004)
  Mindfulness-based stress reduction and health benefits - A
  meta-analysis. JOURNAL OF PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH, 57 (1): 35-43

But it's probably not that simple. While we can say that psychosomatic disorders are by default unconscious, we need to consider wider range of factors that causes them and ask more questions.

One such question is why people get psychosomatic disorders? Stress is the best, most popular, most studied, most quoted, and most mysterious, simple, single answer to this question. Ulcers, asthma, chronic fatigue syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis - you name it. In general terms, increase in cortisol due to stress punches holes in your body, although the lack of cortisol has been argued to have impact too (Heim et al. 2000).

  Heim, C., Ehlert, U., Hellhammer, DH., (2000) The potential role of
  hypocortisolism in the pathophysiology of stress-related bodily
  disorders. PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY, 25 (1): 1-35.

But you see, the longer I think about it, the more complicated it becomes. So I stop here.


Brain network datasets I am a student from Computer Science and interested in graph theory. I was looking for datasets for brain networks (structural and functional) for graph analysis.
I have found brain image datasets such as HCP and nilearn but I was wondering if there are raw graph datasets to work with. It would be great if these brain networks are designed for also tagged with phenotype or disease because I am looking to perform graph analysis.

If you create an (free) account at: https://db.humanconnectome.org , I believe you should be able to find connectomes through here.
It seems like a bit of a hassle to download the files though (and they only seem to come in very large packs).
Another perhaps easier method, if you just want some simple and easily accessible files to work with right away is:
https://neurodata.io/project/connectomes/
which you can read more about in this article.
There you can just download some graphs directly in .graphml format. Then you can use them in e.g. python with networkx. For example, to construct a graph object from a graphml file, plotting it and getting the adjacency matrix, you'd simply write:
import networkx as nx

G = nx.read_graphml("/rhesus_brain_2.graphml")
M = nx.adjacency_matrix(G)
nx.draw(G, node_size = 10, width = 0.1, arrowsize = 2, pos = nx.spring_layout(G))

This is just a simple example, but I hope it helps. It sounded as if that was perhaps just what you needed: something raw and simple to get you started; and those datasets are sometimes the hardest to find.
(I am myself on the lookout for more specific types of connectomes; see my question here. If you happen to come across anything more, I'd be really grateful if you'd let me know.)


What is the consensus on the Golden Rectangle? What is the concensus (if there is one) in modern psychology regarding the well-known dubious belief that the Golden Rectangle is the rectangle that is most aesthetically pleasing to any given individual (as opposed to other rectangles - say ones with simple side ratios such as 1:2)?

I have only been able to find a few papers on this topic, but all of them were from the 19th and 20th centuries. I would like to know what modern psychology has to say about this topic.

A quick search found a 2015 paper titled "Time to let go? No automatic aesthetic preference for the golden ratio in art pictures."

  The golden ratio is a frequently studied topic in many scientific disciplines, and, in psychology, it has been proposed as being a (universal) law governing aesthetic preferences. Empirical evidence for the golden ratio is equivocal and typically demonstrated through explicit (i.e., conscious, deliberate) evaluations using direct measurement methods (e.g., surveys). Here, we examined whether the golden ratio reflects an automatically elicited preference using the Implicit Association Test. We used real art images, with the foreground object presented in the golden ratio as well as either in the center (Studies 1 and 2) or ¾ ratio (Study 3). Both explicit and implicit evaluations did not reveal a clear preference for the golden ratio over other ratios. A possible preference for the golden ratio does not seem to be automatically elicited and may, rather, be driven by art expertise. This again calls into dispute the universality of a preference for the golden ratio.

So based on this it's disputable, at the very least, that the golden ratio is as pleasing as the received wisdom claims. I could not find something like a meta-analysis.


How to view or download an open access article from ARVO journals? I would like to read or download this ARVO Journal's article, but I just cannot find any button on the website with this functionality: https://jov.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2139676
I have already registered and logged on, but the situation has not changed. Could you please help me find a way?

The paper you are linking to is an abstract presented on the Vision Sciences Society Annual Meeting of 2011. Study abstracts are submitted to the conference organizers and often appear in the conference program and/or on the conference web site. They describe the work that will be/has been presented as an oral or poster presentation on a conference. Often the abstract is the only written record that remains of a conference prezzo. In other words, the abstract you are seeing is the paper itself, there is no further material to be downloaded, which explains the absence of the download button. If you click on the specific 2011 issue, you'll see hundreds of prezzo abstracts listed there, including yours. On the website of VSS there's unfortunately only information about the last conference held, I believe in May 2020.
You can contact the study authors and ask if they are willing to share the poster or the slides of the prezzo. In my experience, authors are often happy to share their research. Perhaps the results have been published in a journal paper in the meantime.


Where should I place a reference electrode? This site gives basics of how to place electrodes for action potential recording. What I understand is that in order to get better signal, the reference electrode must be placed where there is minimum electrical activity. So, does that mean we can leave it hanging in the air, or attach it to a wooden surface?

Short answer
In general, a reference electrode should be placed in a well-conducting medium close, or some distance away from the recording electrode.

Background
The idea of a reference electrode is that it picks up any unwanted signals, such as artifacts, that are also present on the recording electrode. Background noise and artifacts can ruin the electrophysiological signal.

As your linked web page explains nicely, a well-placed reference electrode can mitigate noise and artifacts. In the linked page they take the example of recording motoneurons in muscle. If you would place the active electrode in the nerve close to the muscle, and the reference electrode away from the nerve but still close to the muscle, any artifacts arising from, e.g., muscle activity are picked up by the active and reference electrodes simultaneously. The closer the reference electrode is to the recording electrode, the larger the similarity of the artifact will be and the lesser the contamination. This effect can be achieved using a differential amplifier. The subtraction of the reference signal is referred to as common-mode rejection (Kappenman & Luck, 2011).

The terminology encountered is often referred to as monopolar recording and bipolar recording setups (e.g. Beck et al., 2007). Monopolar recordings use a distant reference electrode. This setup comes in handy when the potentials of interest are small and the preparation is devoid of artifacts. Because the distant reference electrode will almost pick up none of the signal, the signal is nicely preserved. However, any local artifacts will not be cancelled out. In case of artifacts and background noise, a bipolar setup is preferred by placing the reference close to the recording electrode. The signal amplitude may drop, but the added benefit of noise cancellation may outweigh that loss. Basically it is a trade-off to optimize the signal-to-noise ratio.

An electrophysiology amplifier records potentials (or currents). This requires a closed system that allows the passage of current through the system (Fig. 1). Large impedances will result in current flow to be minimal and hence the potentials cannot be picked up anymore. As a rule of thumb, in case of EEG recordings and other compound-action potential recordings as in your linked page, low-impedance measurements are best. Therefore, placing the reference on a high-impedance surface as suggested in the question (suspended in air or fastened to an insulator like wood) is the worst thing you can do.

Fig. 1. Diagram of an electrophysiological recording setup. source: InTech. Note that the reference electrode here is called a reference electrode. The terminology on your linked web page is likewise confusing as they call the reference electrode the ground electrode. A ground electrode is,
 however, different from the reference electrode, as the ground electrode is used to reduce outside influences on your signal, like the 50-Hz mains power or other electrical field emanating from equipment and so forth.

In addition, for the most optimal recordings, impedances should be matched between active and reference electrode (Kappenman & Luck, 2011). When there is a large mismatch between them, common-mode rejection works less effectively and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) will decrease. Therefore, placing the active electrode in tissue (low impedance) and the other one in a high-impedance medium will result in the common-mode rejection to fail.

References
- Beck et al., J Neurosci Methods (2007); 166(2): 159-67
- Kappenman & Luck, Psychophysiology (2010); 47(5): 888–904


What is the difference between solving a problem and acquiring a skill? Within the confines of cognitive psychology, what is the difference between these two tasks? In the literature, playing chess is generally seen as the exemplar of problem solving. But recently (thanks to this site), I've stumbled upon quite a few articles expounding the merit of using video game playing to study complex skill acquisition. This difference in terminology (i.e. chess is a problem to be solved whilst playing a video game like pacman is a skill to be acquired) has me completely confused as to when completing a task is considered a skill acquired/mastered vs. a problem solved.

To take your concrete examples, there are several broad distinctions relevant to comparing a task like chess and a task like playing Pac Man.
Cognitive versus psychomotor skill

Research on learning and task performance is divided into various domains of tasks. Two such domains are cognitive, of which chess would be an example, and psychomotor, of which Pac Man would be an example. Video games vary in the relative importance of cognitive versus psychomotor skill.

You might want to read the Annual Review of Psychology article by Rosenbaum, and Carlson, and Gilmore, 2001, PDF "Acquisition of intellectual and perceptual-motor skills". The article provides an overview of the similarities and differences between cognitive and psychomotor skill acquisition.

Traditionally, the word "skill" has had psychomotor connotations. But ultimately the defining feature of a skill is that it is acquired through practice, and this applies well to cognitive as it does to psychomotor tasks.

Learning versus performance

Some research focuses on how learning occurs, whether it be studying the relationship between practice and performance, examining changes in the errors made over time, and so forth (e.g., see this review by Heathcote et al PDF, called "The power law repealed: The case for an exponential law of practice" which is on the mathematical functional form of the learning curve).
Other research focuses on performance itself. What are the cognitive processes that underlie performance? In such studies, learning is often a nuisance factor.
Thus, in the case of both Chess or Pac Man you could focus on either the process of learning or on performance itself (whether it be of a novice or expert).

Task complexity and time frames of learning

Research in skill acquisition can broadly be distinguished in terms of the typical time frame it takes to acquire the skill of interest.
Typical skill acquisition research that is done in the lab involves tasks where meaningful learning can be observed in hours or perhaps days.
Some other skills can take years to acquire, and this is broadly studied in what is sometimes referred to as the "expertise literature". There have been many studies of chess within the expertise literature. See for example this paper on "the role of deliberate practice in  chess expertise" PDF by Charness, Tuffiash, Krampe, Reingold, & Vasyukova, (2005).
With regards to this distinction, Pac Man presents some difficulty. No doubt one could study meaningful learning in the short term, but also that it might be possible to focus on the learning that might occur for a true Pac Man master who had devoted years to perfecting the art of escaping ghosts and eating little pellets.


How does this experiment prove a causal relation between coherence and good feelings? I'm reading Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman and I came across the following text:

The Remote Association Test has more to tell us about the link between cognitive ease and positive effect. Briefly consider the two triads of words:
$$\text{sleep mail switch}\\\text{ salt deep foam}$$ You could not know it of course, but measurements of electrical activity in the muscles of your face would probably have shown a slight smile when you read the second trial, which is coherent (sea is the solution). This smiling reaction to coherence appears in subjects who are told nothing about common associates; they are merely shown a vertically arranged triad of words and instructed to press the space bar after they have read it. The impression of cognitive ease that comes with the presentation of a coherent triad appears to be mildly pleasurable in itself. The evidence that we have about good feelings, cognitive ease, and the intuition of coherence is, as scientists say, correlational but not necessarily causal. Cognitive ease and smiling occur together, but do the good feelings actually lead to intuitions of coherence? Yes, they do. The proof comes from a clever experimental approach that has become increasingly popular. Some participants were given a cover story that provided an alternative interpretation for their good feeling: they were told about music played in their earphones that "previous research showed that this music influences the emotional reaction of its individuals". This story completely eliminates the intuition of coherence. The finding shows that the brief emotional response that follows the presentation of a triad of words (pleasant if the triad is coherent, unpleasant otherwise) is actually the basis of judgments of coherence. There is nothing here that system 1 cannot do. Emotional changes are now expected, and because they are unsurprising they are not linked causally to the words.

(Kahneman refers to the automatic and intuitive way of thinking as system 1)
My Question: Why does the adding of the cover story in this experiment show that good feelings lead to intuitions of coherence (that there is a causal relation)? I find this conclusion rather strange. I'm probably mistaken but it seems to me that Kahneman is saying: the fact that there was no intuition of coherence when these participants were expecting to respond emotionally to music, shows that there is a causal relation between the good feelings and the intuition of coherence. Why would this make sense?

This excerpt refers to an experiment described in Topolinski & Strack (2009) and Topolinski & Strack (2009), and is part of a series of experiments that used a variety of different methods to demonstrate the causal relation between affect and coherence, of which only 1 is described above, so even if it isn't convincing by itself, a lot of additional evidence would need to be questioned to thwart the conclusion.

This particular experiment uses a popular paradigm developed by Schwarz & Clore (1983) (which in turn is based on a previous experiment by Zanna & Cooper (1974); for reviews see Schwarz & Clore (1988), Schwarz & Clore (1996), Schwarz (2012), and Wikipedia), that has been used many times to demonstrate a causal relation between affective experience and intuition or metacognition.  The premise behind this experimental paradigm is that once an affective experience is attributed to a particular cause, it is no longer used as information for subsequent judgments.  This assumption has been demonstrated in many experiments, but contrast it with Payne et al (2005) and Allen et al (1989) who report that attempts to correct misattribution failed in their studies, suggesting that affective experience information can be reused in some circumstances.  Luckily, this latter possibility does not impact the experiment in question.

The authors of this experiment propose a detailed mechanism for how subjects make judgments of coherence: As the word triad is read, the processing fluency (cognitive ease, or the rate that the words are processed) causes an affective response (subtle smiling reaction), that subjects become aware of, and attribute to subsequent intuitive judgments (such as coherence).

This particular experiment tests the hypothesis by manipulating subjects to misattribute the affective response (to background music).  Thus, if affect does not inform coherence judgments, then misattributing it to another source should have no effect on results.  On the other hand, if affect does cause coherence judgments, then attributing affective response to another cause should eliminate it as a source of information for coherence judgments, resulting in poorer performance.  The control group listened to the same music, and was also directed to misattribute something to it, but it was fluency rather than affect.

The results of the experiment indeed demonstrated that once subjects reattribute positive affect to background music, they no longer use it for coherence judgments, and this results in a significant reduction of correct responses, leading to the conclusion that affect is an important indicator (cause) of coherence.


Do dissatisfaction with a job and relationships share the same mental mechanism? The modern world has two new ways of finding abundance of employment and relationships:

Job boards, career sites and recruiters for finding jobs
Online dating sites for finding dates

While seemingly different, they share a couple similarities ~ 20% top performers and 20% top attractive people have really easy time finding the next job or romantic partner.

For example, a talented engineer working at Apple may have 50 recruiters knocking on his door, trying to "poach" him to the next hottest job or startup. An attractive woman on Tinder would match with just about any guy she wants and be swamped with messages from guys. Both of these people can find a great (but not perfect) job or a partner easily

From what I've been reading and observing, the ease with which the needs for job/partner can be fulfilled by top percentile of people makes these people devalue the experience. The good things are overlooked once negatives start to show up. This can make a person experience rapid build up of dissatisfaction with the current situation and want to "trade up".

This makes me ask: Are the experiences of dissatisfaction with job and relationships, as experienced by people who "have it easy" related? Do they use the same mental mechanism?

In a sense, this question is a continuation of this one: How long can a person stay happy, excited and motivated about something new? I'm asking if there's a universal mechanism by which a person starts to seek "something better"

In general, personality traits correlate with most measures of satisfaction. Most notably, there is a large literature showing that personality correlates with life satisfaction (see Steel et al). In general, neuroticism is the biggest correlate followed by extraversion and conscientiousness.

The following table from Grant et al summarises two major meta-analyses on the correlation between big 5 personality and various measures of well-being including life satisfaction:

From a theoretical perspective, personality represents an interpretative lens through which people experience the world. Some people are generally more positive or more negative. Some people focus on problems, others focus on what they have. Of course, eve

Personality and Job Satisfaction

I've seen similar correlations looking at personality and job satisfaction (see Judge et al), although in general these correlations are smaller than for life satisfaction. This may reflect the greater role of context. Here is the table of meta-analytic correlations from Judge et al between big 5 personality and job satisfaction.

Personality and Relationship Satisfaction

Here is the meta-analytic estimate of the correlation between personality and intimate partner relationship satisfaction from Malouff et al (2008).

General Comments

In general, the two tables above look somewhat similar to each other. Neuroticism correlations are the largest in both (r = -.22, r = -24).
However, extraversion and conscientiousness may be slightly more relevant to job satisfaction.

References

Grant, S., Langan-Fox, J., & Anglim, J. (2009). The big five traits as predictors of subjective and psychological well-being 1.Psychological reports, 105(1), 205-231.
Judge, T. A., Heller, D., & Mount, M. K. (2002). Five-factor model of personality and job satisfaction: a meta-analysis. Journal of applied psychology, 87(3), 530.
Steel, P., Schmidt, J., & Shultz, J. (2008). Refining the relationship between personality and subjective well-being. Psychological bulletin, 134(1), 138.
Malouff, J. M., Thorsteinsson, E. B., Schutte, N. S., Bhullar, N., & Rooke, S. E. (2010). The five-factor model of personality and relationship satisfaction of intimate partners: A meta-analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 44(1), 124-127.


What is the matrix of self and the outside world, evil and good? I remember that there is a matrix in my textbook when I studied the basic psychology in colleage. The four 4 quadrants are 1) self is good and the outside world is also good; 2) self is evil but the outside is good; 3) self is good but the outside is evil; 4) self is evil and the outside is also evil. I have searched it for days but cannot find it.

Could anyone please tell me what that matrix is? Thanks!

This may not totally match your description (the person's worldview, the evilness of the viewed objects), but it's quite analogous to the table of style of attachment, so I put it here.

I do notice that the major topic in the attachment theory is about relationship, while the topics in your description seem to be about moral in general, but I suspect that yours discusses about interpersonal relationships as well.

The image is captured from the book Interpersonal Communication: Everyday Encounters, 8th Edition. The original research is Butzer & Campbell, 2008.

One minor note: I see that many people use the word "matrix" as a synonym of "table". Technically, a matrix is a table of numbers, but not a table of ideas.


What to call measures obtained between pre-test and post-test? We term pre-test as the data collection/measures before conducting an experiment and post-test is data collection/measures after the experiment. How do we term the process of data collection/measures during the experiment (such as physiological measures)? I am looking for a specific "term" to describe the "during-test" event.

People use a wide range of language to describe measurement points in repeated measures design.

For example if you measured some dependent variable on multiple occasions you might have something like:

baseline (B)
treatment week 1 (T1)
treatment week 2 (T2)
post treatment (F0)
six month follow up (F6)
one year follow (F12)

Obviously such a design has aspects that are consistent with a pre-post test design, but it has more time points than just that. So my suggestion is to just have clear descriptive labels for the measurement points.


How many sparring partners should I choose for the most effective motivation in the gym? Question is simple.

Will I be more motivated with one good friend or with a group of the same interested people during group exercise?

Does group size affect our internal motivation? (starting by size of 2 people up to X)

Where are bounds for the worst motivation, average motivation and the best motivation for physical workout? (or we can discuss other activities as well)

My input: I'm just thinking about competition feelings in bigger group of people when my brain is saying something like this: "I have to be better than everyone else."

This question doesn't need to be exclusively bound to the gym workout.

The Ringelmann effect may be useful to you in this question; he found that "the addition of co-workers in a rope-pulling task leads to a linear decrement in the individual group member's average performance."  It has been examined experimentally here, and was found to occur with the addition of second and third group members, but adding members beyond that didn't have a significant effect.  There was a second experiment that tried to control for the possibility of intermember coordination, but it found the same thing.

(Of course, this leaves out entirely the possibility of differing group dynamics across groups of the same size but with different members. It also does not speak to individual differences--that some people may do better with a larger group, or with varied activity partners, while others do better with smaller groups or more consistent activity partners.)

Alan G Ingham, George Levinger, James Graves, Vaughn Peckham
The Ringelmann effect: Studies of group size and group performance
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 10, Issue 4, July 1974, Pages 371–384


Are there shapes defined by 3 (or more) generative parameters whose mapping to psychological similarity space is known? I am trying to generate 4 shapes that are equidistant in psychological similarity space - meaning that they are all equally discriminable from one another - which differ in 3 parameters, such that those parameters have a known mapping between objective and psychological space.

A simple example may help.  We might define an object in terms of its width, height, and depth.  The four objects A, B, C and D would have values as follows:

    height   width    depth

A.    2        2        1

B.    1        1        1

C.    2        1        2

D.    1        2        2

These points are equidistant in 3d euclidean space (they are actually the vertices of a tetrahedron).  However, an increment of 1 in height may not be perceived psychologically as distinct as an increment of 1 in depth (in principle).  More problematically, going from 1 to 1.5 may not be psychologically the same as going from 1.5 to 2 on any dimension, meaning that while these values are continuous, they are not linear in psychological space. In other words, objects equidistant in the metric of the parameters I'm using to generate them may not actually be equidistant in the eye/mind of an observer.

This is particularly true for this example, as point B is clearly more visually distinct from the others - it's the only cube!

I am therefore looking for 3 shape parameters where the mapping from objective space to psychological space is known, and in which there is not a loss of dimensionality in this mapping to below 3 dimensions in psychological similarity space.

I suspect this is not known, but I would like to avoid reinventing the wheel (not to mention running the complex pilot experiment this would require - it's not even my question of primary interest!)

Consider the colour visual system. Take 3 monochromatic (in the physics sense) light sources of wavelength $420 \; nm$, $534 \; nm$, and $564 \; nm$; i.e. the peaks of spectral sensitivity for cones. Your 3 physical parameters are then 3 knobs $b$, $g$, $r$ that control the intensity of each light source as they shine on the same white surface. If you want more physical parameters, you can just add more knobs for other monochromatic lightsources, however 3 is sufficient. Colour perception is extremely well studied, so this comes as close as I can think of to a known mapping between between objective and psychological space. Unfortunately, you will run into some culture and language specific issues for judging the similarity of perceived colours.


Running on autopilot Sometimes, people say that they are "running on autopilot", meaning that they are doing the things that they normally do, without any real conscious involvement. I have read that it is not uncommon for people to drive routes that they regularly drive without any conscious memory of it - I have occasionally done this myself, and it is very unnerving.

But how do we do this? How can we achieve the level of co-ordination and reaction that is required to drive a vehicle for a significant period without involving our conscious mind? I realise that we do a lot of things sub-consciously, but it seems that learned tasks like driving should require at least a minimal conscious engagement.

Incidentally, I am not suggesting that this is dangerous in any sense. I don't think it is. I am just surprised as the level of functioning we are capable of achieving sub-consciously.

What you describe is the textbook definition of a habit: routines of behavior that are repeated regularly and tend to occur subconsciously. These are triggered by some external (say, being behind the driver's well of a car) or internal (say, being upset) stimuli. This activates chunks of procedural memory, which attempts to carry out a task that was usually associated with the stimuli (keeping the car on the road; eating a cake).
Although chunking is best understood for factual memories, a similar procedure is believed to apply for how procedural memories become a habit. Obviously, this is a highly researched topic, mostly because of the connection to addiction.
A final minor point is to be careful with terminology. Subconscious is a vague term that should typically be replaced by unconscious or preconscious.

Annotated references
Wood, W., & Neal, D.T. (2007) "A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface." Psychological Review, 114(4): 843-863. [pdf]

A relatively well know article that shows a model of how habits are shaped and interfere with or aid conscious goals.

Barnes, T.D., Kubota, Y., Hu, D., Jin, D.Z., & Graybiel, A.M. (2005) "Activity of striatal neurons reflects dynamic encoding and recoding of procedural memories." Nature 437, 1158-1161 [pdf]

A look at the neurobiology of chunking of procedural memory and habit formation in rats. Stresses how easy it is to reactivate old habits.

Graybiel, A.M. (2008) "Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain." Annual Review of Neuroscience 31: 359-387 [pdf]

Reviews evidence for the involvement of basal ganglia–based circuits in procedural chunking and habit formation. Show that habits form for both overt behaviors (say, backing your car out of the driveway) and cognitive behavior (say, general route planning).

Dehaenea, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccachea, L., Sackura, J., and Sergent, C. (2006) "Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(5): 204-211. [pdf]

Explains the difference between unconscious, preconscious, and subliminal and how to test for them.


What does dorso, ventro, and orbital mean in prefrontal cortext? The prefrontal cortex has 3 parts:

Dorso prefrontal cortex
Ventro prefortal cortex
Orbital prefrontal cortex

What does dorso, and ventro mean?

I thought orbital means back?

Those are anatomical terms of location.

The orbits are the cavities in the skull that hold the eyes. You can easily remember this if you remember that an orbit, in English, is a circular object or path: the Moon orbits the Earth. So

"orbito-" means "towards the eyes", i.e. on the underside of the prefrontal cortex

In a four footed animal like a dog or horse

dorsal means towards the back (i.e. where a rider would sit on a horse)
ventral means towards the belly (underside)

Because human beings no longer walk on all fours, their neuraxis is bent, with the bend between the brain stem and the diencephalon:

in the torso and old brain parts, dorsal means towards the back, ventral towards the belly and face
in the cerebrum and diencephalon, dorsal means towards the top, ventral towards the bottom of the skull

Here is an illustration ("oder" means "or" in German):

I find English a bit confusing as to what the word "back" denotes. In other languages, like Latin, the words for the spinal side of the torso (dorsum, back) and the tail end of the body (posterior, back) are distinct. In English, they are the same, and this makes an explanation of these anatomical terms confusing in English.


What is the appropriate action when using poorly worded scales from previous literature? I work with questionnaire data and am fairly sensitive to good practice in questionnaire construction. Usually I generate my own, but when I draw on existing literature to use reliably reproduced measurement scales, sometimes the items are poorly worded or vague enough that I would not consider them appropriate or valid. Consider the item:

"Weeds should be eradicated because they inhibit the full development of useful and ornamental plants."

A participant can say that they disagree with this item. So do they think weeds shouldn't be eradicated? Or that they should be eradicated, but not for the reason given. Maybe they think that weeds do inhibit the full development of useful plants, but that is not sufficient cause for eradication of weeds. The question is vague enough that it doesn't confer any useful information about the participant's broader view on weeds except in the one fringe case where they agree with it as stated. Clearly it should be split into two items and already the scale is much improved by it.

There are other examples that are much more shockingly bad, but have been reproduced enough times that they form reliable scales. Is it better to use them as-is, with all their flaws, or to use them as fully as possible while fixing any glaring errors, or not to use them at all?

If you change the items in a questionnaire, you have a different questionnaire. All the psychometric properties such as reliability or validity and the normative data no longer apply. You need to be able to compare your measurement to a normative sample to receive a meaningful measurement. If you change a questionnaire, you have to test it against your construct, calculate its reliability etc., and normalize it over a large representative sample. Otherwise any conclusions you draw from your experiments will be at best tentative and potentially false.

The meaning of a questionnaire item is not the literal meaning you make of that "sentence", but the relation that the behavior of answering this item has with other behavior that you know represents your construct. For example, the item "Weeds should be eradicated because they inhibit the full development of useful and ornamental plants." is from a questionnaire on environmental attitudes (Milfont & Duckitt, 2004) and measures "necessity of development" (NoD). If a significant number of your sample answer "yes" to the question about weeds, and they also rate high in NoD in a valid NoD task, then this item can be used to measure NoD. If you change the words, this correlation might no longer hold.

Milfont, T. L., & Duckitt, J. (2004). The structure of environmental attitudes: A first- and second-order confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 24, 289–303. Available online at http://gip.uniovi.es/gdiyad/docume/arti_jep01.pdf.


Effect of paper type on evaluation of resumes I heard about an experiment that have shown an effect of the type of paper a resume was printed on, on the evaluation of the resume. If I remember correctly, resumes printed on heavier paper, or attached to heavier writing pads were evaluated as better.

I may have some of the details wrong (for example, it may have been some other job application forms, and not resumes), but hopefully the gist is right.

I tried to look for the reference, but couldn't find it. Does anyone know of a reference presenting such an experiment?

Some findings:

http://job.sagepub.com/content/21/3/5.full.pdf
http://www.xavier.edu/appliedhrmresearch/1990-Winter/Henson%20_1_%202.pdf
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.2164-585X.1979.tb00080.x/abstract (Abstract only)

These articles all seem to deal with paper color (white vs off-white), not quality, and the advent of personal computers and laser printers after this research was completed clearly outdates some of the research questions (e.g. typeset vs typewritten resumés).


Is "doing everything in your head" a good proxy for intelligence? Suppose Bob never takes notes in class and just mentally "gets" a subject. Is this ability of mentally learning a subject without actively recording the information a good proxy for intelligence?

Subject performance is not intelligence: Doing well in a single subject is a weak measure of intelligence. While the correlation between IQ and GPA is fairly high. The correlation for a given subject will typically be much lower. So another way of framing this subject is whether doing a subject in your head is a good proxy for subject understanding.

More broadly, your question implies a few other questions:

Does note taking improve learning?
Are students who are either more generally intelligent or more capable in the subject less likely to take notes?
Is there an interaction such that the benefits of note taking is less for more skilled students?

1. Is note taking effective?
I assume that note taking is generally effective and helping students to retain the information presented in a lecture. It encourages students to focus on the material. Deeper information processing increases depth of learning and retention. It also provides a means of revision, which in turn should increase retention.

That said, there are a lot of different types of note taking. In particular, part of the skill of note taking is working out what is important and what is not important.

There are also many different pedagogical contexts. For example, in some settings note taking is required for keeping a record whereas in other settings slides or recordings of the lecture may be provided. Logic says that if note taking is the only record, then it would be more important. Similarly, lectures vary in the degree to which the specific material needs to be mastered as opposed to providing an overview and relying on textbooks or other activities to hone skills. I would assume that where a subject requires students to repeat or apply information presented in the lecture, then taking notes will be more effective.

2. Are students who are either more generally intelligent or more capable in the subject less likely to take notes? I don't know of specific research into this, but I think there would be two key factors operating. First, less capable students are more likely to use poor study skills. So this might involve either no note-taking or poor note taking (e.g., taking down too much information). Second, more capable students are likely to know more material and also be able to absorb the material better. So in some cases, they may have less need to take notes, which in turn may lead them not to take notes.

It might also be related to self-efficacy beliefs which are only partially grounded in reality. So for example, the student might think that they are understanding more of the subject than they are, and fail to see the benefit that they would derive from taking notes.

3. Is there an interaction such that the benefits of note taking is less for more skilled students? Certainly at a certain extreme level of prior understanding where the student already knows all the material, then there may be little benefit from note taking. Likewise, as mentioned previously many features of the context may influence the need for note taking.  However, in contexts where the material is somewhat new to all students, and the test is on the material presented in the lecture, and there are no slides or other material I imagine that note taking would be fairly valuable for all students.

Some research:

It seems there is quite a lot of research on note-taking. Check out "note taking" on google scholar.

Hartley and Davies (1978) review note taking looking at why students take notes and the research on note taking.

Kiewra (1989) provides another review of the learning benefits of note-taking:

  This review article investigates the encoding and storage functions of
  note-  taking. The encoding function suggests that the process of
  taking notes, which  are not reviewed, is facilitative. Research
  specifying optimal note-taking behaviors is discussed as are
  several means for facilitating note-taking, such  as viewing a lecture
  multiple times, note-taking on a provided framework,  or generative
  note-taking activities. The storage function suggests that the  review
  of notes also is facilitative. Research addressing particular review
  behaviors, such as organization and elaboration, is discussed as
  are the advan-  tages of reviewing provided notes, borrowed notes, or
  notes organized in  a matrix form. In addition, cognitive factors
  related to note-taking and review  are discussed. The article
  concludes with an alternative means for defining  and investigating
  the functions of note-taking, and with implications for edu-  cation
  and for research.

References

Hartley, J., & Davies, I. K. (1978). Note‐taking: A critical review. Programmed Learning and Educational Technology, 15(3), 207-224.
Kiewra, K. A. (1989). A review of note-taking: The encoding-storage paradigm and beyond. Educational Psychology Review, 1(2), 147-172.


How are activities involving toy blocks linked the development of intelligence in children? I'm looking for a peer reviewed article that links the development of intelligence to any form of block building activities.

For example a child playing with wooden blocks can improve their sensory-motor and communication skills while learning to solve problems.

Has anyone got any suggestions?

Found what I consider to be the best reference here

Hirsch, E. S. (1996). The block book (Third ed.). Washington, DC: National Association for the Education of Young Children.

It's certainly going in the thesis after glancing through it.  Thought posting it here might helps others too.


Basic Question on Jungian Archetypes I am reading "Psychology by Sandra E. Hockenbury, 7th ed.". The question asked What form might Jungian archetypes take in the brain? takes a deeper look at jungian archetypes but I am not able to understand the definition of the archetypes. The book defines the term as follow:

  Contained in the collective unconscious are the archetypes, the mental images of universal human instincts, themes, and preoccupations.

I understood the term collective unconscious as the deepest part of psyche shared by all humans which contain our collective evolutionary history. The book goes on and give examples as:

  Common archetypal themes that are expressed in virtually every culture are the hero, the powerful father, the nurturing mother, the witch, the wise old man, the innocent child, and death and rebirth. Two important archetypes that Jung (1951) described are the
  anima and the animus—the representations of feminine and masculine qualities.

Let's take one example "powerful father" it says that it is the mental image of human instinct. But at the same time he mentions "collective unconscious" but not everyone share the same image of father. I know that he proposed this example around 80 years before but still not all the humans have the same instinct or do we? What I am missing?

All this verbage, without a single answer. The archetypes are the forms with which we populate our psyches. They are only outlines. The context is filled in individually, and therefore differs individually. To use your example of "father." We can all agree upon the existence of "fatherness," the condition of being a father. Thus, the archetype "Father" arises. Yet, since we've all had different experiences of who and what that father is, and what he (to speak genetically) looks like, and how he acts, including those who have had an absent father, we fill in the archetype with that personal data. In brief, archetype equals form and is universal, context is personal and is unique.

That's as concise as I can make it. I hope this solves your dilemma. For depth, go to Jung's Collected Works, etc.

PS, to Community: I am not interested in debating this definition, and even less interested in debating whether it should exist. Oh, come now!


Brain anatomy- hippocampus and amygdala positions I'm trying to teach myself about the structure of the brain and am slightly confused as to whether the hippocampus and amygdala are parts of the temporal lobe or whether they are just parts of the cerebrum which are close to the temporal lobe. Any help would be much appreciated. Thank you :)

The hippocampus and the amygdala is neither part of the temporal lobe or the cerebrum, it part of the limbic system located at the top of the brain stem and is cover by the cerebral cortex that the temporal lobe is a part of.


Why do people make rants on Meta Stack Exchange sites? Meta stackexchange sites are often the venue for immature rants authored by disgruntled members of the site. The Math stackexchange and meta stackoverflow includes a lot of this behavior. During a recent instance of this, one site member pointed out the unconstructive nature of ranting on meta and the ranter (after calming down) responded a joke that why we do this would be a question for the Psych SE.

What do people engage in rants on meta stack exchange site?
Is there something about math/computing people that causes this behavior?
What psychological theories are relevant?

rant, n. 1. a. An extravagant, bombastic, or declamatory speech or utterance; (now esp.) a long, angry, or impassioned speech; a tirade. (OED)

Why do people make rants on Meta SE? translates to What makes people get emotionally upset in a social situation and then express their emotions?

I'm not going to go into this, because the answer is at the same time banal and overwhelmingly complex.

The only aspect that differs between social life online and away-from-keyboard is the higher level of anonymity online. Otherwise it is a common fallacy to think of the internet as being somehow not like "real life".


What is the null hypothesis, when there is no research hypothesis? (a) Apples grow to different sizes, from small to average and large. Farmers want large apples.

(b) There is this rare bug, the apple bark bug, which lives in the bark of apple trees. Due to its rarity, the apple bark bug is not well understood.

(c) Agronomists are divided about the effect the apple bark bug has on the size of apples. Some believe that apples from trees that have been infested with colonies of this bug are smaller than on trees without such an infestation; others believe that in fact they are larger.

The ministry for agriculture has commissioned a study on the effects of the apple bark bug on apple size. Based on the results of this study they want to either exterminate the apple bark bug, ignore it, or cultivate it. There is no scientific literature on the matter, there is no reliable data, and the research institute commissioned with this study now wonders:

What should be the null hypothesis?

As natural scientists they know they cannot present their limited observations as general fact, but only falsify a hypothesis. But what should it be?

The third semester student apprentice from the nearby university, who has just finished a course in the theory of measurement, suggests:

H0 : Applebug = Appleno bug

H1 : Applebug ≠ Appleno bug

His friend, who has heard the same lecture, rolls her eyes and suggests:

H0 : Applebug ≤ Appleno bug

H1 : Applebug > Appleno bug

The research group leader smiles and compliments them on their attentiveness.

What does he suggest?

This is, of course, an example, illustrating a question relating to psychological research: How do we define the null hypothesis, if we have no presupposition about the effects of an intervention?

So your independent variable is the bug, and your dependent variable is apple size.

The question asks whether you are testing a directional hypothesis.
Given that researchers are divided about the direction of the effect of the IV on the DV, it makes more sense to treat it as a non-directional hypothesis:

i.e., H0 is that apple size is equal with and without bugs.
The alternative hypothesis is that they are not equal. Or in some senses, there are two alternative hypotheses, one suggesting an increase and another suggesting a decrease.

Of course, you ultimately want to conclude whether there is a difference and if so what is the direction of the effect. Thus, confidence intervals from a frequentist perspective or a posterior density from a bayesian perspective might be more useful in understanding the direction and degree of any effect.

You may also want to read about suggestions for testing the hypothesis of no group differences.


Where to get psychology assessment resources to put into my website? I'm not a psychologist and would like to know how to get a psychological assessment to put into my website? Is there a public assessment with question data and scoring logic?

I'm sorry if the question is obvious to psychologists, and feel free to close the question.

I'm initially looking for assessment for students to help them choose a career path. I Googled "student career path quiz" and found numerous assessments, they're free as well, though I don't have the resources to create those assessments in my own website. So I guess my question is:

is there a public resource for psychological assessments, including questions, answers, scoring logic, and reporting?

To be clear: I want to put an psychological assessment in my website to assess students for choosing a career path (e.g. their personality model) one example is the IPIP Big-Five Factor Markers by OpenPsychometrics for the big five personality.

I'm coming from a programming background, so I'll code the assessment myself. But to do it, I need the list of questions, answers, scoring functions, and reporting standard. The ones that I found have questions and answers, but I couldn't find the scoring logic and how to generate reports for such questionnaires. I'm asking if there are public questionnaires that can I take to put into my own website.

There's nothing too deep about IPIP scoring. It just uses the standard Likert scale.

From https://ipip.ori.org/newScoringInstructions.htm

  Converting IPIP Item Responses to Scale Scores

  Here is how to score IPIP scales:

  For + keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value of 1, "Moderately Inaccurate" a value of 2, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, "Moderately Accurate" a 4, and "Very Accurate" a value of 5.

  For - keyed items, the response "Very Inaccurate" is assigned a value of 5, "Moderately Inaccurate" a value of 4, "Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate" a 3, "Moderately Accurate" a 2, and "Very Accurate" a value of 1.

  Once numbers are assigned for all of the items in the scale, just sum all the values to obtain a total scale score.

  Easy, no? (If you are having problems, you might contact the IPIP consultant. [j5j@psu.edu])

And they do have a scoring key for the 50-question version meaning it links questions to Big Five factors; I'm not quoting that whole thing there, but here's a snippet:

Big-Five Factor Markers

Factor I (Surgency or Extraversion)

10-item scale (Alpha = .87)
+ keyed
    Am the life of the party.
    Feel comfortable around people.
    Start conversations.
    Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
    Don't mind being the center of attention.

– keyed
     Don't talk a lot.
     Keep in the background.
     Have little to say.
     Don't like to draw attention to myself.
     Am quiet around strangers.

Factor II (Agreeableness)

10-item scale (Alpha = .82)
+ keyed
    Am interested in people.
    Sympathize with others' feelings.
    Have a soft heart.
    Take time out for others.
    Feel others' emotions.
    Make people feel at ease.

– keyed
    Am not really interested in others.
    Insult people.
    Am not interested in other people's problems.
    Feel little concern for others.

And so on for the other three factors. Alpha refers to Cronbach alpha. It's not relevant for your purposes, but only for a reliability evaluation of the test-design itself. (The 100-question variant, also contained in that parge, obviously has higher Alpha.)

If you want a facet-level test, which further subdivides each of the Big Five factors, look at their 120-question NEO PI-R; it has a similar key. They also have a HEXACO key, which adds a sixth main factor (also faceted).

I'm not sure what you mean by "reporting standard". I suspect you want to relate the raw scores to population averages and standard deviations. To get such tables you need to read the original papers on which is based. Here's the one for HEXACO, for instance (this one is even broken down by gender):

The IPIP  master key page has a list of references in which you can find the publication for the specific test you are interested in.

The initial IPIP test you mentioned/found (the 50-q one) is based on Goldberg's paper, but that one doesn't seem to contain either the IPIP-modified questions nor even population level means and standard deviations. (The population-based statistics are prone to change a bit if the questions are altered.) So if you pick a test like that you need to gather a sample of subjects first, have them complete the questionnaires, and then compute your own mean & variance distribution tables! Experimental psychology is (hard) work at times.

Luckily, there's a newer paper, on the mini-IPIP (just 20 q's), (also has key available) which also reports that population data for the older 50-q test.

N.B.: normally a percentile in the distribution would be reported to the user; see this math.SE question for the conversion from raw score to percentile in the normal distribution; basically use a Z-table.


What is restriction of range correction formula when you don't know standard deviation of unrestricted group? What is the restriction of range formula if you don't know the standard deviation of the unrestricted group is?

For instance, you run a selection process, 1st stage is a cognitive ability test and as a result you would not know the standard deviation of the population.

My Answer
In this scenario, the unrestricted group is the population of individuals who are in the selection process. For example, Held and Foley (1994, Table 3) https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/116989/v18n4p355.pdf shows the consequences of different selection ratios on validity coefficient estimations.
To summarize, the unrestricted group is the entire pool of applicants who take your test. The restricted group is the ones who are selected based on your selection criteria.
Alternative
Any cognitive ability test should have a manual, and that manual should contain validity information, including SD of the population. Many of them are normed in such a way as to make it simple (e.g., the SD of WAIS is 15, the SD of Stanford-Binet is 10). Obtain and use the values in the test manual.
However, I don't think this should be done in practice. The population of concern here isn't all working-age adults in the world/region, the population is all working-age adults in the world/region who have applied to work at the organization.


Implementation of Bayesian inference on cognitive science research question To clarify, I am not talking about Bayesian model of cognition. That model refers to the theory that the human learning and inference approximately match Bayesian inference reasoning. (The two topics are not unrelated though).

What I am talking about is the choosing of one hypothesis over another in explaining sets of data obtained. I recently read this paper (Jefferys & Berger 1992) that applies Bayesian inference to quantitatively explain Ockham's razor (the rule of thumb that simpler hypotheses are better).

Here is the link to the article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/29774559

Bayesian inference description

In the paper, the author implemented Baye's theorem to calculate the probability of a hypothesis being correct when new data is presented. The equation is as follows:

Where $P(H_i|D\&I)$ is the probability of a certain hypothesis being true given prior information (I) and new data (D).
$P(D|H_i\&I)$ is the probability of new data (D) occurring given prior information (I) and the hypothesis being true (Hi).
$P(H_i|I)$ is the prior probability ascribed to the hypothesis (Hi). $P(D|I)$ is the probability of new data (D) occurring given prior information (I) no matter whether the hypothesis is true.

In the paper, the author applied the Bayesian inference to show how data given for each trial can lead to weighing of one hypothesis vs another.

The example he gave compared two hypotheses: 1st hypothesis (H1) states that the coin has one head and one tail. 2nd hypothesis (H2) states that the coin has two heads. Initially, probability of each hypothesis being true is likely (there has not been a coin flip, and the experimenter does not know the coin at all). Thus, $P(H_1|\emptyset) = P(H_2|\emptyset) = 0.5$.

1st trial occurs, and the coin lands head.
The probability of each hypothesis is modified.

For 1st hypothesis (1 head 1 tail), $P(Head|H_1\&\emptyset) = 0.5$, $P(H_1|\emptyset)=0.5$, and $P(Head|\emptyset)=unknown$. Thus, $P(H_1|Head)=\frac{0.25}{P(Head|\emptyset)}$.

For 2nd hypothesis (2 heads), $P(Head|H_2\&\emptyset) = 1$, $P(H_2|\emptyset)=0.5$, and $P(Head|\emptyset)=unknown$. Thus, $P(H_2|Head)=\frac{0.5}{P(Head|\emptyset)}$.

$P(Head|\emptyset)$ is normalization factor, and we are only comparing two hypotheses. Thus, $P(H_1|Head) + P(H_2|Head) = 1$. Thus, $P(H_1|Head) = 1/3$ and $P(H_2|Head) = 2/3$.

Flipping the coin multiple times and getting head each time decreases $P(H_1|Head)$ while increasing $P(H_2|Head)$ to near 1.

Applications to cognitive science and specifically neuroimaging or EEG

I found this method of hypotheses weighting to be very insightful and was wondering if there were applications of Bayesian inference to cognitive science in determining one hypothesis over another. Examples on neuroimaging or EEG data processing would be preferred since I am interested in that field, but any other example would be a good starting point.

A good starting point is probably Alex Etz's Understanding Bayes blog post series. He also co-authored a related paper that should be a great starting point: How to become a Bayesian in eight easy steps: An annotated reading list (link is to pre-print).

Richard Morey's BayesFactor blog is great resource for understanding the Bayesian model comparison approach. He has authored many papers that are relevant, but the blog is the best starting point for learning about the approach.

For a really accessible textbook, John Kruschke's Doing Bayesian Data Analysis is an excellent and thorough treatment of the use of Bayesian parameter estimation in data analysis.  This approach is a bit different from the model comparison approach, but the conceptual ideas are the same. A related paper that motivates the approach in the book is available here.


What is the difference between feeling sad and feeling unhappy? The first two questions on the Burns Depression Checklist ask about (1) Feeling Sad and (2) Feeling Unhappy. Specifically, they ask how much you have experienced:

Feeling sad or down in the dumps
Feeling unhappy or blue

What is the difference between these two questions?

References

The BDC is from the book Feeling Good, by David Burns.

It is common for psychological tests to include multiple items with similar meaning. These items are then combined to form an overall scale score (e.g., depression or depressed thoughts). Multiple items with a similar meaning are used to increase the reliability of measurement, which is also important for validity.

I don't think there is a huge difference in meaning between the two items, and presumably they are highly correlated. However, they may provide slightly different connotations to different people. Thus, by having multiple items, the scale may have improved reliability.


Is the hippocampus responsible for storing or creating memories? I've heard that severe damage to the hippocampus results in the inability to form new memories but still remember old ones. Am I mistaking something? Is the hippocampus responsible for storing memories, creating memories or both?

It's fair to say storing new memories is an important function of the hippocampus. The most famous example is the case of HM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Molaison, possibly that's where you heard this?

The hippocampus is also heavily involved in navigation, so memory is not the only thing it does, and there are memory systems that don't seem to involve the hippocampus (for example, working memory and motor skill learning. There's some ongoing discussion around how best to classify different kinds of memory, to be able to say more specifically which kinds belong to this hippocampus system). So as always, the story is complicated. But HM's story shows that "severe damage to the hippocampus can result in the inability to form new memories, but still leave old ones intact" is a fair-enough claim.


Why do people who stutter have less difficulty singing than speaking? From what I have read, stutterers tend to have much less trouble singing than speaking.  Do we know why this is the case?

Short answer
Singing increases the duration of voiced intervals in stutterers.

Background
Singing is an example of one of the most effective methods to decrease stuttering* (Stager, 2003). It is a so-called fluency-increasing (FI) condition in stutterers and reduces stuttering by more than 90%. Some of the few, subtle acoustic differences between song and speech are the more isochronous rhythm and greater fundamental frequency stability within each syllable in songs (Tierney et al., 2012). Other effective fluency-evoking conditions are speech pacing (e.g., with a metronome), chorus speaking, speech slowing, and whispering (Andrews et al., 1982).

The main effects of FI conditions (including singing) are an increase in phonation duration and speech slowing. The reduction of stuttering seems most directly related to phonation. Phonation is the production of vocal sounds, i.e., vowels. Specifically, the frequency of very short (in the range of 30–150 ms) phonated intervals is decreased, and the longer duration phonated intervals are increased when stutterers are singing. Indeed, it has been suggested that the most effective FI conditions, and perhaps therefore the most effective treatments for stuttering, might share the common property of reducing the number or proportion of short intervals of phonation, or of quick transitions between phonated and nonphonated speech production, and/or might be associated with an increased number or proportion of longer, slower, or more consistent phonation. Among the best supported treatment approaches for stuttering are those that emphasize increased, prolonged, or continuous phonation and/or slower initiation of speech (referred to as prolonged speech treatment programs) (Ingham, 2012).

Most fluency-evoking conditions, however, have only temporary effects. Moreover, normal fluency has been defined for stuttering in terms of four variables or characteristics: the absence of stuttering events, speech rate within a normal
range, normal overall naturalness of speech, and normal levels of physical and cognitive effort on the part of the speaker. Of the various methods used, only chorus speaking meets these four demands (Ingham, 2012).

References
- Andrews et al., J Speech Hear Res (1982); 25(2): 208-16
- Ingham et al., J Comm Disorders (2012); 45: 198–211
- Stager et al., J Fluency Disorders (2003); 28: 319–36
- Tierney et al., Cereb Cortex (2012); 23(2):249-54

Note
* Being a stotterer myself, I wish to emphasize that when the speech therapist at primary school instructed me to sing my presentation to my class mates to reduce my stuttering I chose the less embarrassing alternative, namely stammering unintelligibly for half an hour about the planets in the solar system instead of singing about them. One can quickly envision the utter non-practicality of the singing approach in everyday life. The effect of FI conditions is scientifically interesting, and they are useful tools for speech therapists, but they are not practical treatments, unfortunately.


Cases of psychopathy According to this Learning-Mind website, the 3 basic behaviors of a person  which indicate likely psychopathy are

Unhealthy obsession around arson
Cruelty to animals
Bed wetting after the age of five years old

This has been described as the MacDonald triad.

So if 2 out of the 3 behaviors are found in one person, does that mean that he/she is certainly a psychopath? How predictive is the MacDonald triad?

How treatable is psychopathy? How can one if they have three of the MacDonald triad and have been diagnosed with psychopathy to not to behave like that?

This 2012 question discussed the definition of psychopathy - Are there any standard tests to measure psychopathy?

And so does this 2009 question - What is the proper definition of psychopathy?

Psychopathy and the MacDonald triad

Just keep in mind that psychopathy is often used as a more popular term for the characteristics of Anti-Social Personality Disorder (Davey, 2014). The three behaviors described by the website were indeed studied in the scientific community (see MacDonald). First of all, this research was retrospective and descriptive which in no way provides a causal link between the three factors and psychopathy. In other words, those three factors (or even two of them) are by no means the cause of psychopathy. In order to establish a true causal link between those three factors and psychopathy an experiment would be necessary (Passer, 2019) which is virtually impossible in this case.

Subsequent research has also criticized the validity of the MacDonald triad, suggesting that it likely has low predictive power for Psychopathy (Parfitt & Alleyne, 2018; Ryan, 2009). People who show all three factors of the MacDonald triad may very well not be psychopaths.

Treatment of psychopathy

As for treatment of psychopathy, clinicians have experienced that treatment of psychopathy is very difficult if not impossible. When psychopaths are caught after a crime they often have to participate in rehabilitation programs but these are general ineffective (Butcher, Mineka & Hooley, 2017). Some studies show that treatments which are effective for other criminal offenders actually lead to higher reoffending in psychopaths (Harris & Rice, 2006). Especially treatment focused on social skills and empathy seem to have counterproductive results because it makes the psychopath even more charming and socially cunning (Vitale & Newman, 2008).

Biological treatments such as drug therapies have not been systematically studied but so far show modest changes at best, leading scientist wondering whether these are worth studying more systematically. Overall these biological treatments seem to have little impact on the indivudal with psychopathy. Also, even if these treatments could help, psychopaths are still likely to be unmotivated to take medicines for example (Butcher et al., 2017).

Lastly, cognitive behavioral therapies seem to be most promising. These therapies often focus on a few specific factors, as can be read in Butcher et al. (2014):

  Common targets of cognitive-behavioral interventions include the following: (1) increasing self-control, self-critical thinking, and social perspective taking; (2) increasing victim awareness; (3) teaching anger management; (4) changing antisocial attitudes; and (5) curing drug addiction.

However, even CBT is relatively (to other disorders) not very effective for psychopathy, as Butcher et al. (2017) write:

  Even the best of these multifaceted, cognitive- behaviorally oriented treatment programs generally produce only modest changes, although they are somewhat more effective in treating young offenders (teenagers) than older offenders, who are often hard-core, lifelong psychopaths

For further reading about treatment see chapter 10 of Butcher et al. about personality disorders.

I personally believe psychopathy is one of the more serious disorders (do not get me wrong, all disorders negatively affect people), mainly because hatred and incomprehension for these individuals is very high even though in most cases there is hardly anything they can do about it.

References

Butcher, J. N., Mineka, S., & Hooley, J. M. (2017). Abnormal psychology (17th ed.). Boston: Pearson.

Davey G. (2014). Psychopathology: Research, Assessment & Treatment in Clinical Psychology (2nd ed). British Psychological Association and John Wiley & Sons LTD.

Harris, G. T., & Rice, M. E. (2006). Treatment of psychopathy: A review of empirical findings. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of the psychopathy (pp. 555–72). New York: Guilford Press.

Parfitt, C., & Alleyne, E. (2018). Not the sum of its parts: A critical review of the macdonald triad. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, (2018). doi:10.1177/1524838018764164

Passer, M. (2019). RESEARCH METHODS: Concepts and connections. S.l.: WORTH PUB.

Ryan, K. (2009). The Macdonald triad: Predictor of violence or urban myth?.

Vitale, J. E., & Newman, J. P. (2008). Psychopathy
as psychopathology: Key developments in etiology, assessment, and treatment. In W. E. Craighead, D. J. Miklowitz, & L. W. Craighead (Eds.), Psychopathology: History, diagnosis, and empirical foundations (pp. 565–97). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.


What is the difference between psychophysics and neurophysiology? I'm an engineering student who is doing some subjective tests.

What are the difference between psychophysics and neurophysiology?
Is it correct that in the latter case, we have to implant to read the brain signals?

I'm glad you asked! The two fields are really quite different, but I think people get them confused since the terms both make reference to physics and something vaguely mental.

Psychophysics is basically the measurement of subjective percepts corresponding to physical stimuli (e.g. measuring pain thresholds or visual acuity). So here the 'physics' refers to the physical reality we're trying to represent in our mind.

Research here is almost exclusively behavioral, with the classic paradigm being to try and determine the 'just noticeable difference' between two stimuli. Signal detection theory has also been hugely influential for data analysis in the field. I find it helpful to think of psychophysics as experimental cognitive psychology at its least abstract.

Neurophysiology, on the other hand, investigates the anatomical structures underlying the brain (e.g. categorizing the types of neuron, figuring out what glia are made of). Thus the 'physics' referred to here is the physical structures underlying the brain.

Here the methodology involves various sorts of neuroimaging, tissue sampling, and other ways of probing human and animal brains at various levels of intrusiveness.

Note that these definitions paint the two fields with very broad strokes, so I'd do further research if you want to differentiate say, neurophysiology from neurobiology, but I think this suffices for the purposes of your question.

Hope that helps!


Reaction when light is turning on and off This question comes from a personal experience I've had over the last few days, 'experimenting' on my own.
I have a light bulb in a room that is turning on and off periodically, let's say per second. If I am standing in the room with my eyes open, after some time I get dizzy. Then I thought to check what will happen if I could close my eyes in sync with the light turning off; each time the light was gone I would close my eyes and then opened them again when it was on.
After some practice I managed to achieve this. What I noticed was that, although I was again moving between a period of light and a period of darkness, I was not getting dizzy anymore.
It seems to me that somehow the brain is able to differentiate between an external source of change in light and when my eye-lids also participate ( so having so too say two stimuli, light and eye-lids).
I would like more information or thoughts on what exactly may happen in this situation, perhaps even with some reading recommendations on similar research. I admit that catching this "filter" on how the brain ( or the eyes??) understands and behaves when changes in the light happen, caught my interest.

In neurophysiology we refer to "efference copy". In short, efference copy is when the brain area that sends a signal to cause a movement also sends some "copy" of that signal to the sensory part of the brain. This copy signal helps the sensory brain areas predict what to expect from your own movements, and therefore lets your perception be driven by changes in the world rather than your own self-motion.
You can also frame this in predictive coding models of brain function, in which brains are said to create model of the world and respond primarily to violations of this model/relatively unexpected events (for example, if a filing cabinet remains motionless in the corner, you don't notice it; your model is that filing cabinets are inanimate objects that stay still. If it moves forward a few centimeters, you will notice it quite quickly). A light flashing on and off is a somewhat "unexpected" stimulus: ordinarily, lights stay either on or off. However, if you blink such that when your eyes are open only when the light is on, nothing unexpected is happening to the light: it's on when your eyes are open, and you expect to see nothing of the world when your eyes are shut so the absence of the light with eyes closed is expected.
For another example that's easy to test out, if you move your head side to side, you won't perceive other objects as "moving" (the vestibular system helps inform this perception of the world as stationary as well, by measuring rather than predicting your head movement). You may notice that your visual perspective changes, but you don't sense that objects are really moving in the environment. Same when you change your visual gaze from one target to another: you'll blink briefly and the image that lands on your retina will be completely different from the one you just saw, but you still perceive the world as having stayed the same, not as if everything in front of you has just jumped by a meter or more.
Other applications include understanding why it is difficult to "tickle yourself", and how an echolocating bat can differentiate between its own calls and the reflected echos.
The Wikipedia page I linked to at the start has a lot more to say about efference copy, and you can also use that phrase as a search term to find out more about the specific circumstance you're describing.


Is there some effect that forces humans to judge things and people according to the conception of their own image? I remember of having read that such effects do exist, but I don't remember where.

If that is true or if the hypothesis exist, I'd like to have references about it.

Judging something by your standard is evaluating another's culture based on your shared and differing experiences. Its commonly called ethnocentrism. Originating in the field of anthropology, the word is equally used in psychology as a bias for many theories originating in America and the West.

  Ethnocentrism is judging another culture solely by the values and standards of one's own culture. Ethnocentric individuals judge other groups relative to their own ethnic group or culture, especially with concern for language, behavior, customs, and religion. These ethnic distinctions and subdivisions serve to define each ethnicity's unique cultural identity.[2] Ethnocentrism may be overt or subtle, and while it is considered a natural proclivity of human psychology, it has developed a generally negative connotation.
  -wikipedia


What are the neurological and psychological bases for chromophobia According to this amusing, yet informative Cracked article, Phobia-source article and Chromophobia: do you have a fear of colours website, chromophoba is a fear of bright colours.  This condition is also known as chromatophobia

There are no Wikipedia references for the alternate name and checking Wikipedia for chromophobia only reveals a movie by the same name, which is in a small part, why I am asking.

What are the neurological and psychological bases for this phobia?

Chromophobia has at least two distinct meanings in the sciences:

in cultural studies it denotes a (supposed) cultural deprecation of colors in general or of specific colors (e.g. http://www.academia.edu/1100717/Late_Antique_Aesthetics_Chromophobia_and_the_Red_Monastery_Sohag_Egypt);
in histology it denotes a tissue that does not stain when preparing samples (e.g. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC503209/pdf/jnnpsyc00293-0005.pdf).

I was unable to locate any reliable source on a psychological fear of colors. I searched the most relevant digital databases: Web of Science, Academic Search Premier, PsychINFO, and Psyndex (the latter listing publications in German). And I went through all the handbooks on mental disorders that we have at our university library and the institute of psychology. There is not even anecdotal evidence. Chromophobia as a mental disorder appears only in lists of phobias on the internet that have been created by laypeople.

Or in a list of 273 phobias compiled by Jack D. Maser as an appendix to the handbook on Anxiety and Anxiety Disorders (Tuma & Maser, 1985):

But as you can see from this top part of page 807 of his list, his Latin is not the best. Probably he couldn't decipher his own (or someone else's) handwriting, mistaking "col" for "od". But the basic problem with this list, which might well be the grandmother of all the lists of phobias found on the internet today, is that Maser does not provide any sources for his phobias. And if you look at the fears of time, food, or defecation, listed in it, it seems quite unlikely that anyone might actually be able to suffer from these.

Eminent expert Richard J. McNally, a member of the specific phobia and posttraumatic stress disorder committees of the DSM-IV task force, thinks (1997, p. 183) that in Maser's list "terminological proliferation has been driven more by etymology than by etiology. ... In fact, suffer[er]s of hellenologophobia (i.e. fear of 'pseudoscientific terms') will surely tremble to contemplate many of [the] entities uncovered by Maser in his search through the literature."

In the DSM, phobias, or "specific phobias" as they are classified (to distinguish them from social phobias and other anxiety disorders) are subclassified by their trigger:

objects, sometimes called: blood-injection-injury (syringes, blood, medical procedures)
situations (being in an elevator)
animals (snakes, spiders)
environments (heights, water)
other

The category that would interest us here, is the "other" category. The standard examples given in the manual and expansively discussed in McNally's article on "Atypical Phobias" (McNally, 1997), are: "phobic avoidance of situations that may lead to choking, vomiting, or contracting an illness; in children, avoidance of loud sounds like balloons popping or costumed characters like clowns".

I'm not a specialist on phobias, but from my perusal of quite a volume of literature today, I have the impression that in adult phobias all triggers are either potentially harmful, or are related to similar objects that are harmful: all animals are either predators or poisonous or look like them (a cat might be essentially harmless to an adult human, but it is an animal that can cause pain; there is no lamb phobia); all "situations" involve technical appliances that might fail (airplanes, elevators) or harm you by their characteristics (getting stuck in a narrow tube); all environments can cause death (drowning, falling from a height, getting struck by lightning). Phobias are essentially reasonable in their choice of a trigger, they never choose triggers that are always and totally harmless. From this (non-specialist) result of my search, a fear of color appears impossible.

Of course this is only my personal, non-specialist impression, after a short research, and it will be falsified as soon as someone can come up with a reliable source.

But I admit that I was not truthful in my summary, and have lied to you when I wrote that I found no reference to chromophobia as a psychological disorder. PsycINFO turned up one result, an article published in Italian in a journal that unfortunately is not available online:

Gebhardt, E., & Giorgini, L. (2007). La ragione non ha colore: ipotesi sulla cromofobia [Reason has no colour: Hypotheses on cromophobia]. Il Sogno Della Farfalla: Rivista Di Psichiatria E Psicoterapia, 16(4), 35-57.

An English abstract is given:

  Stemming from an analysis of a case study this research proposes to study a symptomatology where the sight of colour provokes anguish, known in literature as chromophobia, in order to allow us to develop the correct nosography and to identify the underlying psychic dynamics. The immediacy with which an unaltered perception in itself can be given an abnormal meaning to the point of becoming a terrible anguish brings us to consider chromophobia as an example of delusional perception and as such falling within the psychotic syndromes. As far as the object perceived is concerned, that is colour, it is worth noting that Western thought views it as negative for a twofold reason. Religious dogma views colour as dangerous given that it is alien to man, belonging to the body of another who is different from oneself and as such it has been given female, infantile, primitive or pathological attributes. Rationalist thought has, on the other hand, underestimated the importance of colour viewing it as superficial, supplementary and not warranting serious study. Colour has always been subordinate to the drawn figure. Both these approaches have proposed a dichotomy between line and colour attributing the former to the world of rationality and the latter to the non-conscious world. This splitting, according to the authors, can be overcome only if we consider that in the theory of birth the ego is not split at its origin and as such neither is perception. Line and colour therefore are connected to birth and the first year of life.

I admit, that I don't consider this source reliable. The journal, Il sogno della farfalla, as described in a Wikipedia article, is focussed on the psychotherapeutic theory and practice of its founder, the famous but controversial Italian psychiatrist, screenwriter and movie director Massimo Fagioli. This is not the place to discuss Fagioli or the authors of the article (who are both members of the journal's editorial board), but we should note that the journal appears not to have a peer review process.

Sources:

Maser, J. D. (1985). List of phobias. In A. H. Tuma & J. D. Maser (eds.), Anxiety and the Anxiety Disorders (pp. 805-813). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
McNally, R. J. (1997). Atypical phobias. In G. C. I. Davey (ed.), Phobias: A handbook of Theory, Research and Treatment (pp. 183-199). Chichester: Wiley.

With this last edit my research is now complete.


Effects of subliminal messaging From what I've read up thus far, subliminal messages do have some sort of 'influence' over our decisions or atleast our thought process, to some extent. To what extent if any is the human mind or psyche affected by subliminal messages, and are the extents variable based on the means ie. Textual, verbal, auditory or visual?

The below links are of sources written by authors without substantial credentials:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-athletes-way/201504/subliminal-messages-can-fortify-inner-strength%3famp

https://visme.co/blog/subliminal-messages/

A very generic question

It is very hard to answer this question because it is very generic.

In order to get a clearer answer you'd have to narrow down your definition of what exactly constitutes subliminal message and what exactly constitutes an effect.

Once done, you can now talk about specific types of stimuli processed purely by the subconscious, and their specific effect and related variables.

Here are some examples of what might constitute 'subliminal messages':

A metaphor
Asking someone to hold a warm cup of coffee
Putting an image of eyes in the room
'planting' a video frame in a sequences of other frames

The effect (and the extent) of all of these depends on the 'message' itself and the specifics of the experiment.

You can read further about this 'complexity' simply by reading Wikipedia's entry on Subliminal Stimuli (and the references therein).

A very generic answer

Without specifics, you can argue the following:

  There is mounting evidence that pure subconscious processing can affect our behaviour, albeit often short lived.

Resources

I could point you to many resources dealing with specific cases, but I think you'll find much of what you're after (or at least a good subset/overview) in the first couple of chapters of this book:

Dehaene, S., 2014. Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. Penguin.


System 1 and unconsious Kahneman (2011) apparently suggests there is system 1 and system 2 in decision making.

If I am not wrong he says system 1 is more prone to errors because it is automatic. Is this correct assumption of mine?

If yes, next question I have is: Is system1 related to unconcious? If yes, then isn't there a conflict between above assumption and this one:

that unconscious thought (UT) is better at solving complex tasks,
where many variables are considered, than conscious thought.

So if UT is related to System 1, then doesn't it contradict Kahnemans view that System 1 is more prone to errors (because if it is prone to errors according to Kahneman how is it better at decision making according to Wiki)? Needless to say there are articles which don't agree with wiki article I linked. This one for example: Acker (2008).
References
Acker, F. (2008). New findings on unconscious versus conscious thought in decision making: Additional empirical data and meta-analysis. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(4), 292-303.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

You are correct in System 1 being more prone to errors as it relies on emotional experiences in the moment along with stereotypes and frequency of event.
System 2

You wouldn’t expect someone to  quickly ( in a matter of seconds ) spit out the answer to the question “calculate the mass of this (random) object” if the person has never experienced this object before.

System 1

You would expect someone to apply the brake when they see a red light.

According to Kahneman (2011) System 1 is brought on by emotional experience and in the moment thought. This is a stronger and faster experience than that of which system 2 is capable of overriding. System 2 takes time to meditate a plan or course of action whereas system 1 is more of an immediate response. This delay in response would therefore suggest the latency between the workings of both systems.
This is of course my interpretation of his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow” and has room for subjective debate.
He does provide wonderful examples pertaining to stock brokers and their tendency to follow the hype of the crowd and sell when it is often best to ride it out. I do not have the book currently on hand but will comment the reference when i have it.
References
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux


Does an action potential abolish an excitatory postsynaptic potential? From some sources, I've read that excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) decay over time, which would imply that they aren't abolished by action potentials. However, other sources seem to indicate the opposite (although I may be misunderstanding them). Plus, the classical leaky-integrate-and-fire neuron model implies that EPSPs are abolished by action potentials (although this could well be a simplification). Does the refractory period of an action potential affect its originating EPSP? Or is it a separate phenomenon?

While model neurons like the leaky integrate and fire may use a simplification in which the neuron forgets all previous information when it emits a spike, in a biological neuron, the synapse and the soma are relatively electrically isolated from each other, so the voltage activity of the action potential does not make the synapse "forget" the EPSP.  Although see back propagating action potentials for a mechanism for somatic action potentials to affect dendritic processing.  (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8107777)


What happens in the brain that allows access to a previous unavailable memory? What happens in the brain that allows you access to a memory previous unavailable?

For example I forgot the name of someone I've known for years. Two weeks later, without notice, "Diana" popped up.

Why was it not accessible when I found I couldn't remember?

What was the chemistry that occurred that allowed it to happen later?

(Secondarily, is this the same breakdown in dementia and alzheimer's? That is, a breakdown of the 'search memory' mechanism? Or is that the memories themselves are 'losing coherence.')

These kinds of research questions are interesting, but notoriously hard to investigate empirically, because:

You need human subjects that are able to provide complex feedback, i.e., you can't use invasive, long-term recordings in animals;
You need subjects to undergo long-term experiments, as your example indicates in the order of weeks, for one single measurement;
You need subjects that experience this regularly and frequently;
You need a way of faithfully time-stamping the exact moment of recall and somehow establish a procedure to grasp what's happening inside the brain against a variable, uncontrolled background.

In essence, it's next to impossible to find out.

There is, however, a large body of literature around memory recall in general, including detailed imaging studies, e.g., Heckers et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2001), Liu et al. (2012) and I'm sure there will be much overlap between spontaneous and deliberate memory recall.

References
- Heckers et al. Arch Gen Psychiatry (1999); 56(12): 1117-23)
- Hall et al. J Neurosci (2001); 21(6): 2186-93
- Liu et al. Nature (2012); 484: 381–5


Is there any evidence for a bias towards perceiving darker surfaces as 'figure' rather than 'ground'? Given that surfaces which capture attention are more likely to be perceived as figures (or figures attract attention more than ground does?), is there a bias associated with the luminance of a surface? For example, we often see dark figures (e.g., text) on white paper.

Do you know of any literature to suggest a bias where darker surfaces are shown to attract attention more effectively than lighter surfaces (or vice versa)?

Or, alternatively, is there data available on a possible bias where figure-ground segmentation is more likely to occur for a dark figure on a white ground (or vice versa)?

Short answer
From my personal experience, I do not think darker surfaces are regarded preferably as the object, and light surfaces as the background.

Background
I have been pondering on this question for so long that I decided to post an answer. Perhaps it will draw attention from others who can give a more definitive answer.

This answer was inspired by this question on the Rubin Vase Illusion. It is an ambiguous figure/ground illusion which is thought to depend on the visual system analyzing scenes in terms of object (figure) and background (ground). You can see a vase when you regard the faces as background and vice versa. In the Fig. 1 below I have posted two versions of this illusion where the black and white portions are reversed. Personally, and hence anecdotally, I do not perceive a clear difference in the perception of the vase versus faces between both figures. Hence, based on this anecdotal evidence I tend to believe that the definition of figure and ground is independent on color (shades of gray in this case). I couldn't find references for the flip-flop rates or vase-versus-face perception time on the two stimuli, unfortunately. In all, what a great question!

Fig. 1. Contrast-inverted Rubin Illusions. sources: Winkler et al. (2006) (left panel) and Russel & Dowey (2014) (right panel)

References
- Russel & Dowey, Psychology: An Introduction (2014)
- Winkler et al. Eur J Neurosci (2006); 24(2): 625–34


The Ben Franklin effect and cognitive dissonance The Ben Franklin effect is the phenomena that if a person does a favor toward another person, there is an increased likelihood that the person will do another favor for that person. The same is true for acts of harm. A person who has inflicted harm on another person is more likely to repeat an act of harm.

It is theorised this is to relieve cognitive dissonance and the gap between feelings towards the person and the act.

How can the Ben Franklin effect best be explained, what research has been done about this, is it adequately explained in cognitive dissonance theory or other theory?

The Benjamin Franklin Effect is generally cited as being an example of cognitive dissonance, which is when your brain struggles to reconcile your beliefs with your actions.

So let’s say your beliefs about your job are that you deserve to be paid a higher rate, you deserve to be treated more respectfully by your employer and your skills are being wasted in your current role

For every day that you go to work in that same job, your brain has to deal with cognitive dissonance. Your brain is thinking, “you believe this, but you do that—the two don’t gel. What’s going on?”

Dissonance means literally “lack of harmony between musical notes.” In this case, it’s a lack of harmony inside your brain—the thing that controls everything you think and do! So you feel uncomfortable, or uneasy. You carry around a lot of tension. Your body doesn’t like this, and neither does your brain.

David McRaney describes it like this:

“When you experience this arousal it is as if two competing beliefs
 are struggling in a mental bar fight, knocking over chairs and smashing bottles
 over each other’s heads. It feels awful, and the feeling persists until
 one belief knocks the other out cold.”

To compensate, your brain changes your beliefs—after all, your actions can’t be undone. You’ve already gone to work. You’re sitting at your computer, banging your head on the desk. But your thoughts can change. Your beliefs about yourself can change. Because your brain is malleable.

So all of a sudden you find yourself rationalizing your behavior.

Jecker and Lendy verified the phenomenon in a study that challenged participants to an intellectual contest.  The winners were subsequently either:

1. Asked to return their prize money by the researcher
   because he had been using his own money and was running short
2. Asked by a secretary to return their prize money
   because it was from the department and budget was running low
3. Allowed to keep their prize money (i.e. not approached).

Everyone was then surveyed to see how they liked the researcher.

Consistent with the Franklin effect, group 1 rated him higher than group 3 showing that a personal request for a favor increases likeability.

In addition, group 2 rated the researcher lower than group 3 suggesting that an impersonal request decreases likeability.

Dale Carnegie's book, How to Win Friends and Influence People  where the request for help is explained as a subtle but effective form of flattery.

As Carnegie suggests, when we ask a colleague to do us a favor, we are signalling that we consider them to have something we don't, whether more intelligence, more knowledge, more skills, or whatever.

This is another way of showing admiration and respect, something the other person may not have noticed from us before. This immediately raises their opinion of us and makes them more willing to help us again both because they enjoy the admiration and have genuinely started to like us.