Does NMDA-receptor activation depend on neighboring AMPA-receptor activity? This question is coming out of a couple points of confusion after I learned about about NMDA receptors' role in LTP.

I got the impression that after AMPA receptors were activated enough, which depolarizes the cell, that nearby NMDA receptors will allow Na and Ca to come into the cell.

Is it the local membrane potential, around those receptors that matter for a given voltage-gated NMDAR to open up? Or is there no such thing as 'local membrane potential', and the whole cell body is about the same amount of negative or positive voltage?
If there's no such thing as 'local membrane potential', does it matter if the AMPA receptors are activated or if other receptors are activated? Does a single neuron usually respond to more than one type of excitatory neurotransmitter? If so, couldn't the activation of any receptor that results in cell depolarization eventually cause NMDAR to open up?

Yes, there most certainly is "local membrane potential".  There are two major levels of compartmentalization in dendritic processing.  For one, most excitatory synapses occur onto "spines", which have a somewhat segregated environment from the rest of the dendrite.  The spine neck has been estimated to have a resistance of up to 1GOhm, although measurements are very difficult, so discussion spans orders of magnitude.  The other level of compartmentalization is that different dendritic branches can function somewhat independently.

It is actually extremely important that there be "local membrane potential" and that AMPA receptors only activate neighboring NMDA receptors.  That is because Ca2+ coming through NMDA receptors leads (through many steps) to LTP (long-term potentiation) at that synapse.  We want LTP to be synapse-specific (only the activated synapse should be strengthened).  This requires that NMDA currents be specific to the synapse that had the AMPA current.

Wikipedia has an excellent article on this subject: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dendritic_spine.  See especially "Modeling spine calcium transients" for discussion of the extent to which NMDA mediated Ca2+ transients are local.


Can a friend become a therapist? According to the article Can Clients and Therapists Be Friends?, a therapist shouldn't be a friend because dual relationship will interfere the efficiency of the therapy, and the imbalance power formed in therapy will never fully disappear. However, would it be true in the opposite direction? That a friend does therapy to a friend? This time, the friend relationship comes first, so there will be no worry about the imbalance power.

I think there are two scenarios:

The therapist-friend is just a friend with more knowledge, and the therapy is just a talk with more advice from one side
The therapist-friend cannot become an authority that is necessary in certain cases (personality disorders, for example)

The person can also be a family member, a partner, a colleague, or even an acquaintance. The point is that the relationship is not formed in a professional therapeutic setting.

The article you linked to (Holmes, 2018) is talking about both senarios.  The therapist must not be a friend before or during therapy sessions.  Dual relationships can interfere with the efficiency of the therapy due to the fact that it can create transference and counter-transference issues.

Transference

Transference as a psychological concept refers to the redirection of feelings about one individual to another individual (Short & Thomas, 2015).
Another definition would be

  Transfer of feelings originally experienced in an early relationship to other important people in a person’s present environment (Luborsky et al., 2008)

Transference is feelings about another person (including the therapist) being transferred (maybe acted out) towards the therapist.

Imagine a therapist, who is also a friend, says something which upsets the client unintentionally because

  (s)he shouldn't say that. (S)he is my friend!

This is where the friendship can affect the client/therapist relationship.

Counter-transference

  The term ‘counter-transference’ has been applied to a large number of psychological concepts in the therapeutic setting (Little, 1951)

  Counter-transference refers to a specific unconscious attitude towards the client in response to transference from the client (objective transference – responding to
  transference from client)
  Counter-transference refers to repressed elements of previous events leading to the
  displacement of past feelings from the source to the client (subjective transference
  – similar to transference in the client but acting in the opposite direction) (Short & Thomas, 2015).

Counter-transference is feelings about another person (including the client) being transferred (maybe acted out) towards the client.

Imagine something is said by the client, who is also a friend, which changes the therapist's view about that friend.  Maybe the revelation changes the dynamics within the friendship they have.  This can affect client/therapist relationship through both counter-transference (feelings about the revelation from the client being bounced back to the client) and transference (resulting feelings from the client being bounced back to the therapist).

Dual relationships, no matter how and when they form cause big problems within ethics and efficacy of the therapy sessions, and therefore they are not to occur.

A friend (or family member) should never give therapy to another friend or family member.  If dual-relationships do form during sessions, this must be discussed immediately (or as soon as reasonably practicable) with the clinical supervisor in order for discussion to take place regarding signposting and transfer to another therapist.

References

Little, M. (1951). Counter-transference and the patient’s response to it. In: Langs, R.J. (ed.) Classics in psychoanalytic technique, pp. 143-151.

Luborsky, E.B., O’Reilly-Landry, M. & Arlow, J.A. (2008) Psychoanalysis. In: Corsini, R.J. & Wedding, D. (eds) Current Psychotherapies. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Short, F. & Thomas, P. (2015). Core Approaches in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Hove: Routledge


Name of the psychological phenomenon of doing something just because you've already started doing it? I feel like people really often do things just because they've already started doing it.

One example could be the Electronic Evidence of Sales just established in Czechia. It's a system monitoring all the sales in the country by receiving electronic bills. Now, in order to launch it, every shop in the country had to buy a special cash register so we already invested a lot in it but some say it's ineffective so we should cancel it. And, of course, everyone says that would be dumb once we're using it but they don't realise that our past decisions are irrelevant for what we choose now, that is, a system with less effectivity. Note this story is just an example of a bad argument and might not be true.

The closest phenomenon I could find is the naturalistic fallacy and appeal to tradition fallacy. Among friends, I call it "the finishing syndrome", isn't there a more widely used term?

Although Cognitive Inertia (as mentioned by hexadecimal) is a nice, broad way to point to the phenomenon, people have also studied it from other points of view. Two of them are from economic and cognitive angles.

From an economic level, what you are referring to is called the Sunk Cost Fallacy. Here is an example from Wikipedia that explains it from a business perspective:

  In business, an example of sunk costs may be investment into a factory
  or research that now has a lower value or no value whatsoever. For
  example, \$20 million has been spent on building a power plant; the
  value at present is zero because it is incomplete (and no sale or
  recovery is feasible). The plant can be completed for an additional
  \$10 million, or abandoned and a different but equally valuable
  facility built for \$5 million. It should be obvious that abandonment
  and construction of the alternative facility is the more rational
  decision, even though it represents a total loss of the original
  expenditure—the original sum invested is a sunk cost. If
  decision-makers are irrational or have the wrong incentives, the
  completion of the project may be chosen. For example, politicians or
  managers may have more incentive to avoid the appearance of a total
  loss.

On a more personal level, this can be generally explained as the Zeigarnik effect, which states that "people remember uncompleted or interrupted tasks better than completed tasks".

Although there are some issues with the reliability of the effect, it is generally extrapolated to say that the phenomenon "compels humans to finish a task that they've already started, and that when we don't finish a task we experience discomfort and intrusive thoughts about it." (from an AsapSCIENCE video on "The science of Productivity")


Does evidence support Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs? Maslow's Heirarchy of Needs (shown below) is a popular concept and is often taught in basic psychology courses, and often less objectively taught in Business and Marketing courses.

A common problem with Maslow's Hierarchy is the difficulty of testing the theory and the ordering and definition of needs.

The Wikipedia article and most general sources about the topic do not discuss experimental tests regarding the Hierarchy nor am I familiar with any despite the theory's popularity.

What research exists that investigates Maslow's Hierarchy directly?

Mahmoud A. Wahba, Lawrence G. Bridwell, Maslow reconsidered: A review of research on the need hierarchy theory (1976), or a free pdf scan here

Its abstract says:

  The uncritical acceptance of Maslow's need hierarchy theory despite the lack of empirical evidence is discussed and the need for a review of recent empirical evidence is emphasized. A review of ten factor-analytic and three ranking studies testing Maslow's theory showed only partial support for the concept of need hierarchy. A large number of cross-sectional studies showed no clear evidence for Maslow's deprivation/domination proposition except with regard to self-actualization. Longitudinal studies testing Maslow's gratification/activation proposition showed no support, and the limited support received from cross-sectional studies is questionable due to numerous measurement problems. The difficulties with testing the theory are discussed and the conceptual, methodological, and measurement problems of the studies reviewed are detailed. The implications of the findings and future directions for research are outlined.


Understanding fear as a response in classical conditioning I have difficulties to understand fear as a response to a stimuli. In my view fear occurs as a anticipation of a possible threat in the (nearby) future. Fear prepares the organism so that it can react faster to the threat (eg. fight or flight response). Thus, the order of the stimulus (threat) and the response (fear) is changed ("fear -> threat" instead of "threat -> fear"). So I would describe this connection as "preparation -> stimulus" instead of "stimulus -> response".

I would argue that stimuli which cause fear (eg. loud noise) are predictors of a threat. Thus for the reaction "loud noise -> fear" we have a second order conditioning since the association "loud noise -> threat" was created before.

In a similar way I would describe other fear conditioning processes. When for example a student develops a test anxiety, after multiple exams a student often experience (extremely) negative responds which he / she experience as a threat. Thus he / she learns the connection "exam -> threat" and responds with fear at upcoming exams in order to prepare herself / himself for the anticipated threat.

My Questions:

Is this a valid description of fear conditioning?
Is it in general possible that in classical conditioning the order "stimulus -> response" is changed to "preparation behavior -> stimulus"?

Short answer

You are almost there.  The 5F (fright/flight/fight/freeze/fawn) response to threats is an unconscious reflex which in brief follows as Threat → Fear → Response.

With classical conditioning, this occurs when an unconditioned response (an unlearned reflex response e.g. salivation) is turned into a conditioned response (a learned reflex response) (Source).  Therefore a conditioned response of fear would be consciously created initially through stimulus → fear → learned threat, which after successful conditioning will change to the normal unconscious 5F response.

Long answer

The 5F (fright/flight/fight/freeze/fawn) response to threats

As you can see from the info-graphic below, The 5F (fright/flight/fight/freeze/fawn response) to threats, is initiated from Threat → Brain Receiving Signals → Brain Reacts (Fright) → Cortisol and Adrenaline is released → Physical Reactions occur (see quote below) from the release of hormones → Bodily response (Fight, Flight, Freeze or Fawn)

(
(Source: Wikipedia)

  The reaction begins in the amygdala, which triggers a neural response in the hypothalamus. The initial reaction is followed by activation of the pituitary gland and secretion of the hormone ACTH. The adrenal gland is activated almost simultaneously, via the sympathetic nervous system, and releases the hormone epinephrine. The release of chemical messengers results in the production of the hormone cortisol, which increases blood pressure, blood sugar, and suppresses the immune system. The initial response and subsequent reactions are triggered in an effort to create a boost of energy. This boost of energy is activated by epinephrine binding to liver cells and the subsequent production of glucose. Additionally, the circulation of cortisol functions to turn fatty acids into available energy, which prepares muscles throughout the body for response. Catecholamine hormones, such as adrenaline (epinephrine) or noradrenaline (norepinephrine), facilitate immediate physical reactions associated with a preparation for violent muscular action and:

  Acceleration of heart and lung action
  Paling or flushing, or alternating between both
  Inhibition of stomach and upper-intestinal action to the point where digestion slows down or stops
  General effect on the sphincters of the body
  Constriction of blood vessels in many parts of the body
  Liberation of metabolic energy sources (particularly fat and glycogen) for muscular action
  Dilation of blood vessels for muscles
  Inhibition of the lacrimal gland (responsible for tear production) and salivation
  Dilation of pupil (mydriasis)
  Relaxation of bladder
  Inhibition of erection
  Auditory exclusion (loss of hearing)
  Tunnel vision (loss of peripheral vision)
  Disinhibition of spinal reflexes
  Shaking.

All of this occurs without conscious thought as analysis of the signal doesn't takes place until after action has been taken.

Classical Conditioning

With classical conditioning (also known as Pavlovian or respondent conditioning), this occurs when an unconditioned response (an unlearned reflex response e.g. salivation) is turned into a conditioned response (a learned reflex response) after

  a conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US). Usually, the conditioned stimulus is a neutral stimulus (e.g., the sound of a tuning fork), the unconditioned stimulus is biologically potent (e.g., the taste of food) and the unconditioned response (UR) to the unconditioned stimulus is an unlearned reflex response (e.g., salivation).(Source)

A conditioned response of fear would initially be consciously created through stimulus → unpleasant sensation maybe this will have to occur 2 - 3 times or more before the next stage which is learnt fear → learned threat, which after successful conditioning will change to the normal unconscious 5F response.


Duration-independent intelligence tests Being able to measure intelligence (or the problem-solving aspect of it) quantitatively could be indispensable in fields like cognitive science or artificial intelligence. Obviously, IQ tests aren't culture neutral (questions are stated in an informal language, and often rely on prior knowledge). Ideally I am looking for these characteristics:

measure problem solving ability
be culture neutral
be of unrestricted duration

Raven's Progressive Matrices look almost perfect for the job (variations can be developed for testing animals or even computer programs) but they, like EVERY intelligence test i know of, require test to last not more than a specific amount time, thus, failing to satisfy the third requirement. So I guess the question is whether such a test can be constructed at all. In other words, is there a category of problems that require some minimal intelligence level to solve them no matter how long one might try. Like the problem that could be solved in a minute by a smarter person but is impenetrable to you no matter how many years you spend thinking about it?

Actually, standard IQ tests, such as Raven's matrices, tend to assess intelligence better if they are not timed. In this paper by Philip Vernon (1988) it was found that the g-factor extracted slightly more variance for the same test if the test was not timed than if it had a time limit. This means if you ask yourself: "What is this test measuring?", you can answer: "Intelligence" with more confidence if it was administered in an untimed setting.

IQ tests measure a host of other things, such as how well you are feeling on the day of the test, whether you are nervous when it comes to test-taking, how aquainted you are with this type of questions, etc. Giving people more time can attenuate some of these factors a bit. Timed variants are more prevalent for reasons of convenience, and also because it's easier to standardize the test situation.

It has been argued that there is little difference between timed and untimed tests because intelligence closely corresponds to working memory capacity (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990):

  Confirmatory factor analysis yielded consistently high estimates of
  the correlation between working-memory capacity and reasoning ability
  factors (r = .80 to .90). We also found differentiation between the
  two factors: Reasoning correlated comparatively highly with general
  knowledge; working-memory capacity correlated comparatively highly
  with processing speed.

Some IQ tests even have subtests which measure this capacity directly: repeating a row of numbers in the same order or backwards. Giving you additional time will not help you reproduce the row of numbers, if it was initially too long for you to remember.

From the high correlation between working memory capacity and processing speed, it was concluded that IQ tests largely measure the ability to vary features of multiple items at the same time, i.e. to manipulate multiple objects in working memory. Crucially, during administration an IQ test such as Raven's matrices, you are not supposed to use pencil and paper or other cultural crutches: you work on the items 'online' in your head (Engle et al., 1999). The more objects you can hold 'online', the better you will do. Recent research (Colom et al, 2008) goes even further to say that processing speed is not a good predictor on its own, once working memory capacity is removed:

  The findings are consistent with the view that simple short-term
  storage largely accounts for the relationship between working memory
  and intelligence. Mental speed, updating, and the control of attention
  are not consistently related to working memory, and they are not
  genuinely associated with intelligence once the short-term storage
  component is removed.

And of course, as always with measures of individual differences, it is important to keep in mind that IQ doesn't measure how many questions you completed - it measures how you rank in a group of peers which has done the same test under the same conditions.

References:

Vernon, P. A. (1989). The generality of< i> g. Personality and
Individual Differences, 10(7), 803-804.
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is
(little more than) working-memory capacity?!. Intelligence, 14(4),
389-433.
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R.
(1999). Working memory, short-term memory, and general fluid
intelligence: a latent-variable approach. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128(3), 309.
Colom, R., Abad, F. J., Quiroga, M. Á., Shih, P. C., &
Flores-Mendoza, C. (2008). Working memory and intelligence are highly
related constructs, but why?. Intelligence, 36(6), 584-606.


Are there any systems in the brain that are responsible for monitoring energy For example, the amount of energy that is available for the brain to use, or the amount that the brain consumes with respect to time?

This is a very broad question. I'll simplify greatly.

Like most systems, the brain regulates it's moment-to-moment energy needs through control of it's vascular supply. While the vascular supply (to the heart and brain) is regulated (by both baroreceptors and other) to protect against decreased blood flow (that is, the heart and the brain will be preferentially protected against decreased blood flow), the day-to-day energy need fluctuations are still met by brain parenchymal vasodilation/vasoconstriction, often mediated by ion concentration in response to CO2 levels, etc. There are a host of local and peripheral vasodilators. The most instantaneous of these are a result of Ca++ and K+.

  The matching of blood flow to regional brain function, called functional hyperemia or neurovascular coupling, involves the coordinated activity of neurons, astrocytes, and parenchymal arterioles. Under physiological conditions, localized neuronal activation leads to elevated astrocyte endfoot Ca(2+) and vasodilation, resulting in an increase in cerebral blood flow. (see also Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2012 May 22;109(21):E1387-95. for Ca2+-activated K+ (BK) channels.).

The simplest answer to your question of how the energy needs are met by the brain is through vascular control of the supply of nutrients.


Online data repository of research in the cognitive sciences Sharing data is an important part of science (e.g., see APA discussion). It's also often useful to be able to have access to datasets when teaching students how to analyse data in the cognitive sciences.

What online data repositories for research are available in the cognitive sciences (e.g., psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, etc.)?

Ideally, it would be good to include:

a link to the repository
an overview of the size of the repository
the disciplinary content of the repository
whether there are restrictions on access and use

The ADNI project (2004–ongoing) aims at characterizing change in cognitive functions and brain structures with age, with a particular emphasis on Alzheimer's disease and neuroimaging.

From the website,

  The overall goal of this huge project is to define the rate of
  progress of mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease, to
  develop improved methods for clinical trials in this area, and to
  provide a large database which will improve design of treatment
  trials. We expect that this project will provide information and
  methods which will help lead to effective treatments for Alzheimer’s
  disease, leading to effective prevention.

Data that are collected include: demographics, clinical data, neuroimaging (MRI/PET) data, and a wide range of cognitive tests. (More on ADCS website.)
Details about protocols, available data can be found under ADNI Scientist's Home. In particular, data are available on ADCS. Please note that you must write an application to get the data (as is often the case).


Is exercise considered a 'fight-flight' situation by our brain? When you do heavy exercise like running, your heart rate, and breathing increases, is it because of the sympathetic nervous system controls it? Or the Sympathetic nervous system only activates on the fight-flight situation? Or is the exercise considered a fight-flight situation by our brain?

Interestingly, intense exercise elevates levels of cortisol, which is the primary stress hormone. However, since this intense exercise usually only lasts for a short time (except maybe for ultra-marathon runners), it is considered acute rather than chronic stress. Other "intense" activities, like sex, also elevate levels of stress hormones. This just goes to show you that some stress is good. Generally, only chronic stress is bad (or brief very intense stress from trauma).


Are older people more likely to be politically conservative and why? J.Campbell suggest that the difference between age groups on being politically conservative is small. But F.Glamsers article concludes:

  there was a significant positive correlation between age and conservative opinions even when social class, education, father's SES, and the size of the respondent's childhood community were controlled.

While these articles are quite old (1981 & 1974) a more recent poll indicates that old people tend to be more conservative.

I'm wondering whether there is an neurological and psychological explanation of that phenomena.

As a neuroscientist, I would be highly doubtful of any neuroscientific 'evidence' about this phenomenon (if it exists). In fact, I think there is no reason to look further than the mere exposure effect:

  The mere-exposure effect is a psychological phenomenon by which people tend to develop a preference for things merely because they are familiar with them.

Conservative attitudes are by definition more traditional, i.e. those who have been around for a longer time... just like older people. Older people have, therefore, had more chance to become familiar to conservative attitudes through exposure.


What are the benefits of transformational over transactional leadership? Transformational leadership is sometimes recommended as a way of motivating and inspiring followers in contrast to more transactional styles of leadership.

There is a large pop-psych literature on leadership, but I'm specifically interested in scientifically rigorous empirical evidence supporting or not supporting the value of transformational leadership.

What is the empirical support for transformational leadership?

Here is one meta analytic comparison:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15506858

Bernard M. Bass is one of the most cited researchers on this field:
Here is one of his articles but there are plenty on the net:

http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/apl-882207.pdf

I think he is also author of MLQ - multifaceted survey of leadership.

There is also revised theory by Bass and Avolio:
The implications of transactional and transformational leadership.

And also: Re-examining the components of transformational and transactional leadership using the Multi-factor Leadership; Journal of Occupational and organizational psychology. 2010.


What is the difference between principal neurons and pyramidal cells? I am reading Kandel's "Principals of Neural Sciences". There the book sometimes refers to excitatory neurons as principal cells, and sometimes as pyramidal cells.

Can anyone tell me the difference? I mean, are there pyramidal neurons which are not projection neurons? And are there projection neurons which are not pyramidal?

Short answer
In the cortex, pyramidal cells and projection neurons can be used interchangeably, as both terms refer to the same cells.

Background
One way to classify neurons is based on their function. Two functionally distinctive types of neurons have been classified, namely

Projection neurons, which send an axon out of the structure where their soma is located, and
Intrinsic neurons, which make synapses only within the structure where their soma is located.

Hence, projection neurons cover some distance, whereas intrinsic neurons act more locally. Projection neurons are also called principal cells, and intrinsic neurons are also called interneurons (Masland, 2004).

In the cortex, projection neurons are pyramidal neurons, and account for approximately 80% of all cortical neurons Han & Šestan, 2013. They often send their axons for long distances, sometimes out of the brain altogether Beckers, 2011. They serve as both the sole output from and the largest input system to the cortex. Interneurons, in contrast, represent approximately 20% of all cortical neurons and form local synaptic connections (intrinsic) that play critical roles in shaping cortical network activity patterns Han & Šestan, 2013.

In the periphery, the term projection neuron is not used as far as I know. That doesn't mean there aren't neurons that cover great distances in the periphery; in fact, the longest axons in the human body are thought to be situated in the sciatic nerve, which runs from the base of the spinal cord to the big toe of each foot. However these cells are not referred to as projection neurons, but simply as spinal neurons.

References
- Beckers, Curr Biol (2011); 21(24): PR975
- Han & Šestan, Neuron (2013), 80(5): 1103–05
- Masland, Curr Biol (2004); 14(13): R498


What is "required reading" in training that describe mechanisms behind learning? I've previously studied spiking neural networks in the context of machine learning applications and I'm interested in gaining a better understanding of the biology of the brain. My goal is to investigate different models for learning.
I am looking for a book within training material that describes the low level bio-chemistry of neurons and how the learning process works. I'm not sure if that is a well understood topic yet; I would also be interested in papers discussing the topic.
There are a few questions which I'm interested in and hope to answer by reading said material:

Does the brain use local or global information for learning?
What brain functions are important to learning?
What are the advantages of having a neural gap?
Can neural transmitters produced by a synaptic cleft affect nearby neurons?
How does myelination affect how babies learn?

The questions you list are incredibly broad and diverse. You will find basic textbooks that may touch on aspects of all of these, but otherwise will not find answers to them all in one book. Some may not be answerable at all at the textbook level; others like "How does myelination affect how babies learn?" I feel are not really well-posed questions but some background will help you understand why.
I'd recommend starting with a broad undergraduate-level neuroscience textbook. These will assume you have some prior knowledge of the basics of molecular and cell biology, as well as physics (electricity and magnetism in particular; at least enough to be comfortable with basic circuits: voltage and current, resistors and capacitors, etc).
The two I would recommend (pick just one or the other) are:
Neuroscience, by Purves et al
and
Principles of Neural Science, by Kandel et al


Is there a term for compulsively thinking the whole world "hates" you? Is there a term beyond 'low self esteem' or 'neurotic' that describes a person that is compulsive in thinking the entire world is looking down on them?

Consider persecutory delusion. They are compulsive in that they manifest as extreme, irrational suspicions with little or no basis in reality. The irrational components often involve absurdly elaborate conspiracy theories, so this is probably close enough to "the entire world", but it often goes much further than "looking down" into more severe forms of persecution. I don't know what you mean by "beyond" though. Persecutory delusions will probably enhance neuroticism and may erode self-esteem or arise from problems with it, but they have somewhat separate etiology.
Response to your comment
Persecutory delusions are a prominent feature of paranoid schizophrenia, but they are not unique to that disorder. IMO, ordinary people may experience them. What you describe in your comment below doesn't sound like a delusion though, or even a compulsion necessarily. It sounds more like projection of the person's own self-deprecating thoughts. I would rather call this a habitual reliance on a classic defense mechanism than call it a compulsion, which has a subtly different technical meaning.
It seems the person is seeking external confirmation of his/her self-perceptions, or maybe seeking help in refuting them somewhat manipulatively. By putting harsh words in your mouth, the person urges you to deny them, and in the process fishes for affirming words to the contrary from you. It's hard to tell whether any of these words represent stable beliefs or just momentary thoughts and appeals for reassurance.


Brain and General Sections Whereabouts in the brain gets triggered/switched on when an addictive substance is ingested/taken. I'm doing an addiction study with a couple of colleagues and would like some help with it.

It depends on the type of addictive substances (i.e., opioid, amphetamine, LSD, etc). Different types bind to different sets of receptors of neurotransmitters (i.e., dopamine, serotonin, GABA, etc.) in the nervous system. And different receptors have different distribution in the nervous system. So the affected regions are different for different addictive substances.

The easy-to-read, entry-level references that you can use are probably How Drugs Affect the Brain and Central Nervous System and Drugs and the Brain. For in-depth references, you can search for the literature on each specific drug at NCBI.


Clear definition of ego Is there a clear definition of the ego which is accepted by the neuroscientific community?

I have seen a previous post (What do id, ego and super-ego exactly mean?) but this definition is for the Freudian concept of the ego. In neuroscience, the concept of ‘ego depletion’ is used (Baumeister) - but this has a different connotation.

I've read this opinion in Quartz

Axel Cleeremans pointed out that Freud’s Id-Ego-Superego structure roughly matches onto the Unconscious-Conscious-Metacognition structure of the mind studied in neuroscience today.
“The ‘id’ is what we call the unconscious today or the idea that there’s a vast reservoir of representations that sits there and influences ongoing processing but without being available to conscious awareness,” he says. “The ‘super-ego’ in a sense is connected with meta-cognition, with the idea that in addition to first-order awareness, the technical movie that we have as soon as we wake up and the field of sensations we experience and thoughts we have, there’s an additional monitoring and control system.”
Cleeremans believes that much of Freud’s work has scientific value today. “I think he’s wrongly discredited. He’s discredited for all sorts of political reasons that have nothing to do with the ideas,” he says. While Freud’s work on sexuality and women, for example, are largely dismissed, there’s still considerable value in broad structure of his work. “The core set of ideas hold up,” adds Cleeremans.

YMMV how correct or widely shared that view is. As far as I can tell Cleeremans is a psychologist, not a neuroscientist.
Also Freud's ideas are still pretty popular in France; I don't know about Belgium, but... it's close geographically; Cleeremans holds a professorship at a Francophone Belgian university.
You could also read Rizzolatti et al. "Linking psychoanalysis with neuroscience: the concept of ego." for more details. Looking at the authors' list of this paper, it does seem an interdisciplinary approach (one of the co-authors is affiliated with a neuroscience department). They seem to advance roughly the same analogy as Cleeremans:

We maintain that, in order both to act coherently and to have a basic, first person, understanding of the behavior of others, it is necessary to posit the existence of a neurophysiological "motor" ego similar to the "rider" of the Freudian metaphor. We review then a series of neurophysiological findings showing that the systems underlying the organization of action and conscious perception are both mediated by a cortical motor network formed by parieto-frontal circuits. In conclusion, we show that the activity of this network has strong similarities to that postulated by Freud for the conscious part of ego. We also propose that the default-mode network might represent that part of ego that is mostly involved in unconscious processes.


How does hPES compare to the learning rates of ANNs? The primary learning mechanism of artificial neural networks (ANN) is back-propagation, which is not biologically plausible [2].

Trevor Berkolay created an alternative to this learning with the Neurological Engineering Framework (NEF) and Nengo called hPES (Homeostatic Prescribed Error Sensitivity) [1]. But how does it's learning capabilities compare to the standard supervised and unsupervised learning of ANNs in terms of computational power required and speed of learning?

[1] See also, "How to Build a Brain" by Chris Eliasmith chapter 6.4

[2] Further details around this claim can be found in the question "Is back-prop biologically plausible?"

Note: This question portrayed ANNs and the NEF as adversarial, which really isn't the case. Spaun the brain model, which is kind of the poster child of the NEF, uses ANNs (Convolutional Neural Networks specifically) converted into spiking neurons in it's vision system.

According to the paper, the advantage of this new approach over conventional ANNs, Deep Belief  Networks (DBN) and Self-Organising Networks (SON) are:

  Remains functional during online learning.
  Requires only two layers
  connected with simultaneous supervised and unsupervised learning
  Employs spiking neuron models to reproduce central features of
  biological learning, such as spike-timing dependent plasticity
  (STDP)

So arguably, hPES is superior to ANNs in terms of capability, but in terms of performance, you'll have to compare the code from his experiments with ANNs meant to accomplish the same task, but since both methodologies are designed with different purposes in mind, it might not be worth comparing. Additionally, it should be noted that although the author claims to have created a SON, the validation of this claim in the paper (and his master's thesis) is pretty weak. In the paper he only proves that the SON increases sparsity, which is not what SONs (for example Kohonen networks) are generally used for.

Finally, note that although hPES is more biologically plausible, it still has some of the same problems that ANNs have. Namely, the parameters that it takes in must be optimized for the specific task it's learning (some approaches for solving this with ANNs include Genetic Algorithms) even if it is less sensitive to parameter modification. The author mentions this investigation of parameters as being part of future work.


When I got aware of some ability, I couldn't do it that well anymore Every time I got aware of something I could do well, it got a little bit worse.

Examples:

I could immitate a lot of accents or people, but when I thought about it "Hey, I am very good at immitating something", I couldn't do it that well anymore.
I could sing a tone nearly the same it was played to me, but when I thought about it ( that I could do it well ), I couldn't do it that well anymore.
I was able to have a good conversation with nearly everyone, but when I thought about it, that I am good at it, ......
and so on....

I know that I wasn't thinking I could do those better than I could in reality! ( because than it would be logically why it seemed to me that it got worse )

And when I wasn't thinking, that I am good at for example immitating, I was able to do it that well again.

My question is: Why does this happen?

I mean, either I am good at it or not right?

It makes sense that you should either be good at something or not, but in fact our abilities vary a lot under different conditions.
It sounds like what you are experiencing is loss of automaticity. There are things we do best without the interference of the conscious mind, like playing sports or driving or any skill that we have practiced a lot of times. When we pay attention to what we are doing, we may not be able to do the action as quickly or as well.
It might also have something to do with "choking" under pressure to do things well. There was no pressure before you decided you are good at it, then it became harder to do it well after that.
There's an older paper that explores these ideas. Shiffrin, R.M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing. II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84(2), 127-190.


Can motivation for sex be transformed into productive motivation? Sex seems to be a fundamental drive. To satisfy sexual desire, a person will often masturbate or have sex.

What happens if a person abstains from anything sexual?
Can this drive be "transferred" to other areas of an individual's life?
That is, can sexual energy be transformed into productive energy?

In Freudian Psychoanalysis, sublimation is the transformation of unacceptable sexual desires into mental achievements or culturally accepted behaviors. Sublimation is one of the mature defense mechanisms of the Ego. Freud believed that human culture as a whole is a result of sublimation. He sees especially in artistic expression and scientific research the conversion of base desires to a higher realm.

In their review of recent studies in social psychology for evidence relevant to seven Freudian defense mechanisms, Baumeister, Dale and Sommer (1998)

  have found nothing at all to suggest that people can defend themselves
  against unacceptable feelings or desires by transforming them into
  socially desirable activities, thereby producing superior achiement in
  those activities. The best available data concern education and sex,
  and those findings consitently fail to support sublimation theory (and
  in some cases are in the opposite direction). At present, our best
  educated guess is that sublimation is not a genuine or effective
  defense mechanism, and it seems doubtful that anything resembling
  sublimation occurs at all.

The question "What is the effect of sexual abstinence on intellectual and artistic achievment?" has specifically been answered by studies on celibacy, which show either no or a negative effect (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998).

Sources

Baumeister, R. F., Dale, K., & Sommer, K. L. (1998). Freudian defense mechanisms and empirical findings in modern social psychology: Reaction formation, projection, displacement, udoing, isolation, sublimation, and denial. Journal of Personality, 66, 1081–1124. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00043 Available online at http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/vollarj/baumesiter%20roy%20-%20freudian%20defense%20mechanisms.pdf


What is the modern definition for problem solving? Apart from Polya's definition of problem solving in 1981, "finding a way out of a difficulty, a way around an obstacle, attaining an aim that was not immediately attainable.", is there a better modern definition that would reflect the systematic nature of problem solving?

Reference

Polya, G. (1981). Mathematics discovery: An understanding, learning, and teaching problem solving (combined edition). New York: John Willey & Son.

The definition of problem solving can be different between researchers and regions of the world for various reasons. Frensch & Funke (2014) stated that:

  researchers adopt definitions that they perceive as useful, that is, that are consistent with their beliefs, knowledge and theoretical goals. A definition can therefore be neither static, nor commonly accepted. Rather, for any domain of research, a number of meaningful definitions co-exist.  In the area of problem-solving research, the current theoretical goals are different for North American and European researchers. The primary goal adopted by many North American researchers is to understand task performance and learning in natural knowledge domains.  The primary goal adopted by many European researchers, in contrast, is to understand how people deal with complex, novel task situations.  Because the theoretical goals differ for the two traditions, the definitions that have been adopted differ as well. Consequently, the two traditions are not  concerned with the same phenomenon, and any comparison of research findings runs the risk of being meaningless.

Reasons for their statement is given in the whole section of the book (pages 13-19), which is readable via the Google Books website

In order to try to come up with an integrated definition, they came up with the definition of:

  overcoming barriers between a given state and a desired goal state by means of behavioural and/or cognitive multistep activities (page 18).

Reference

Frensch, P. A., & Funke, J. (2014). Definitions of Problem Solving: The European Approach. In: Complex problem solving: The European perspective. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 13-19


Do we need a pre-test to compare the effectiveness of two treatments? Assume, I want to evaluate how effective two teachers are in teaching English to German children. Both teachers have been teaching at the same high school for twenty years, and both use a distinctly different pedagogical methodology. In fact a small competition has arisen between them: they have published and discussed their ideas and practise in journals relevant to their profession, and they have now called in a data analyst (you) to conduct this evaluation which, so they hope, will decide their contest and reconcile the former friends.

The school, where they both work, is the only school for its small town. When pupils enter this school, they are randomly assigned classes: one half of the children are assigned to one class (and one maths teacher), the other half to the other class (and the other maths teacher).

The two teachers are tired of not knowing which method is best. In the interest of their pupils they want to finally decide on the better one and both use this from now on. They hope, that you don't need to test one cohort of children when they finish elementary school, have them taught for the 8 years from 5th grade until they graduate from high school, and then measure their mathematical ability again, to come to a conclusion. Therefore they ask you:

Is it enough to compare the levels of the dependent variable post-intervention? Or do you need to measure it pre-intervention as well? Why?

Answer based on your original depression example

Note that this answer was originally written based on your initial example, where you asked:

  Assume, I have developed a new intervention for people with light
  depression. I want to compare the effectiveness of this intervention
  (E) with an existing intervention (C). For this, I recruit test
  subjects from the local psychotherapeutic ambulance and randomly
  assign them to either the experimental (E) or control group (C). The
  interesting dependent variable is of course depressivity.

In general, you don't need to measure pre-treatment for the dependent variable. In the limit random assignment ensures that the groups are equal. Or to put it another way, random assignment ensures that the groups are not biased to be higher or lower on the dependent variable at baseline.  A typical between-subjects t-test comparing post-treatement scores would typically provide an unbiased test of whether the intervention had an effect on dependent variable (i.e., depression) relative to control intervention.

That said, there are many benefits to including a baseline measure:

Including a baseline measure of depression will almost always give you more statistical power because you are able to control for much of the stable individual differences in the dependent variable (i.e., depression).
If you participants drop out during the intervention, it can be helpful to see whether this is related to baseline levels.
You can begin to assess individual differences in the effect of the intervention.
Where there are questions about whether random assignment was performed correctly, you can test for baseline differences.

Note there are several options for analysing pre-post treatment-control designs including ANCOVA, difference scores, and interaction effects. See this discussion for further ideas.

Note also that there are good reasons to assess an intervention by measuring more than two time points. For example, you might obtain (a) multiple baseline measures to get a sense of the stability pre-intervention (b) multiple  you might measures during the intervention to assess depression during the intervention, and (c) multiple follow-up measures particularly to see both the immediate and the longer term effect of the intervention.

Updated points based on the teaching example

It is an empirical question whether first letter of last name is related to the effect of the teaching intervention or baseline differences. In general, it would be better to have a better form of randomisation of participants to groups.
Where there are questions about the randomisation procedure, the presence of a pre-test measure can be beneficial to check this.
There are several particular issues related to assessing the effectiveness of interventions relating to children in class rooms even when students have been randomly assigned to classrooms. (a) With just one classroom each, it is difficult to tease out what is the effect of the teacher and what is the effect of the curriculum; (b) there will typically be a lack of independent observations. Thus, for example, students within the classroom may influence each other. Thus, your effective sample size is not as great as it may seem.


I need good introductory texts/publications on brain networks and functional integration/segregation I am a soon to be graduating applied mathematician interviewing for a research position soon in a lab considered with neurological imaging and association of brain networks with things like aging, combined tasks, etc.

In my opinion, I believe I have a strong repertoire of applied mathematics and research experience in applied mathematics/computation relevant to the task at hand, and I can talk comfortably about the skills advertised (data analytics, programming, experimental design, etc.). My background is in graph theory, computational biology, and systems modeling. However, I want to be able to communicate about brain networks and integration/segregation of the brain while factors such as aging, task completion, injury, etc. change during the interview. Therefore, I would love to skim some introductory texts or read some landmark papers about this field so I can sell myself as competent for the job.

While the job itself does not require the research assistant to be equipped with such information, I think it would be best to up the ante in terms of how I present myself. Could anyone recommend such texts or literature?

If it helps, I have an undergraduate degrees in biology/biochemistry so I'm relatively familiar with the nomenclature surrounding neurophysiology, neurotransmitters, etc. and I have a working knowledge of an introductory neuroscience and psychology course so I am familiar with theories of memory, and the different parts of the human brain.

A good introductory book is "Networks of the Brain" by Olaf Sporns. It will give you a general overview of the ideas and theories in the field. For more details consult the bibliography or read some of the journal articles by Dr. Sporns.

https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/networks-brain

http://www.indiana.edu/~cortex/index.html


Environmental factors that predict theism Are there any environmental factors which can predict atheism or theism?

Your question specifically asks environmental factors which predict theism/atheism. Although your question is quite simple, it actually raises quite a few complexities.

Firstly, are we referring to religiosity, or specifically a belief in god? Many studies examining the psychology of the religion fail to make this distinction clear. Most probably because belief in a god is implied by active participation in religion - though I would say not an exclusive rule. It would be interesting to consider the multitude of pathways in which people get drawn into religion (a cultural institution) compared to a belief in god.

Secondly, your question specifies only the predictors of religious belief that are environmental. From my limited experience, this really closes off several of the most important predictors of religiosity (e.g. personality, attitudes). This makes it difficult to answer the question effectively. Most probably, religious belief can be predicted by a range of both individual level variables (e.g. personality) and environmental (e.g. parents religiosity) - and these variables likely interact with each other (i.e. some personality traits increase likelihood of being influenced by parents religious views).

Finally, the question is complicated as the predictors for belief in god may not be related to predictors of atheism. For instance, if low-socioeconomic status predicts theism, high-socioeconomic status may not be a good predictor of atheism.

I conducted a google scholar review using terms such as: "predictors of religiosity" "predictors of religious". From this, I focused on longitudinal studies and those which focused not simply on personality/cognitive traits. Examples of studies which I found were Predictors of Religiosity Among Youth Aged 17–22: A Longitudinal Study of the National Survey of Children which found

  The best predictors of youth religiosity were ethnicity and peers'
  church attendance during high school. Other predictors were, in order
  of decreasing magnitude: residence in the south, gender, religious
  schooling during childhood, maternal religiosity, church attendance
  during childhood, the importance mothers placed on childhood religious
  training, and an interaction variable identifying religious mothers
  who were very supportive.

and Explaining religiosity: towards a unified theoretical model.

  Individuals had a much
  higher probability of showing Christian religiosity if they had been strongly
  socialized by their parents, if they came from a mono-religious household and
  if they had Christian peer-socialization. Deprivation, social control, religious
  tradition of the canton as well as gender and age also played a certain role.
  Individuals with less education and income, living in smaller and rural communities
  and in traditionally Catholic (or mixed) cantons had a higher likelihood
  of showing Christian religiosity. The latter finding is very similar to that
  by Norris and Inglehart (2004) who were also able to show that religious
  culture was important on a collective (national) level. Furthermore, the study
  shows that especially older women had a much higher probability than
  younger women to be religious, while age was much less important for men.

A major criticism of the literature (as it currently stands) is that a large proportion of the quantitative work focuses on western, predominately Christian samples (see Vassilis and colleagues for more information). I would argue the book is open on this one. Clearly, thought has been placed into this field and there are some logical environmental predictors (i.e. parents religious views); however, few of these have been replicated in representative samples.


Is there a term for individuals who can "visualize" numbers and advanced mathematics? I recently saw an episode of 60 Minutes about Jacob Barnett, a 13 year old boy who is currently attending advanced physics classes at a local university and was portrayed by the show as being a child prodigy/genius. In the interview, he demonstrates how he's able to perform mathematical transformations in his head by visualizing the numbers as colored shapes. As he explains in the linked clip:

  This is 2 * 27:

He visualizes multiplying 2 by 27 as a series of colored triangles.

Is this a known phenomenon, and if so, does it have a name? Do other individuals visualize mathematics like this? Or is this just a 12-year old kid... embellishing (to be polite) his thought process?

Sounds like a form of Synesthesia, in particular it sounds like Number Form Synesthesia mixed with Grapheme-color Synesthesia:

  A number form is a mental map of numbers, which automatically and involuntarily appears whenever someone who experiences number-forms thinks of numbers. Number forms were first documented and named by Francis Galton in "The Visions of Sane Persons". Later research has identified them as a type of synesthesia. In particular, it has been suggested that number-forms are a result of "cross-activation" between regions of the parietal lobe that are involved in numerical cognition and spatial cognition

It doesn't seem exactly like what he does but it could be a form of it. It's hard to imagine just how it would be to perceive the world as a synesthesic person does.

It sounds like he's learned to apply his visual-spatial skills to "arrange" the number forms to aid his calculations.

Synesthesia is covered in detail in the book Synesthesia: a union of the senses, though I'm not aware of any specific case studies on individuals with this exact set of skills.

A term to describe people with Synestesia is Synesthesic.


What effects does spending a lot of time in online communities have on interpersonal skills? There are quite a few users who are pretty much addicted to the Stack Exchange network and spend over 3-4 hours per day here. Time spent here will result in lower amount of social interactions, and lesser time for other activities as well.

What are the effects that this has on the social skills of a person ?

In a way, we are all interacting with other individuals on this platform as well, but the communications are mostly textual and in a way, buffered (for lack of a better term). So, its safe to say that spending half an hour interacting with individuals here will be very different from interacting with individuals face-to-face. In such a scenario, what are expected and/or observed effects on communication abilities.

There seems to be a difference between social community users and non-users (e.g. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.01.026), but these are only correlative data, not causative, but in a recent study "Facebook usage was found to interact with measures of psychological well-being, suggesting that it might be beneficial to students experiencing low self-esteem and low life satisfaction." (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2010.550063)

This is just a quick hint and doesn't comprehensively answer your question, but maybe the articles contain references to other research.

Follow the links to get to the original publications and a short abstract describing the study and results.

More stuff I found through a Google Scholar search for "online communities effects":

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC411092/
http://repository.maestra.net/valutazione/MaterialeSarti/articoli/Johnson-Survey.pdf
etc.

I don't know, if any of this is relevant, I just want to give you ideas to do your own research.

If you access Google Scholar through a university network, you'll get links to most of the articles, otherwise you'll still be able to read most of the abstracts.


How does knowledge about a subject aid in its recall? I've experienced it many times with my students and also with myself. Let me illustrate with example:

When I'm teaching, I say something like this:

  Gastrointenstinal Track has following sections

  Buccal Cavity
  Pharynx
  Esophagus
  Stomach
  Duodenum
  Jejunum
  Ileum
  Caecum

To help them remember I repeat above thing multiple times. But still they don't remember much of the list.

Alternatively instead of just saying those things (even though that's all I need my students to remember), I spoke about each of the above item for few minutes. i.e. I gave more details of about each of those things. Result is that, now my students do not remember most of the details about each of those items, but they could remember the list. Which is exactly I want.

Whats happening here? Whats the science behind it? Is there more to what I'm describing?

The first method (repeat the terms over and over) is called rote rehearsal. It's not actually a very good way to learn, though it has the benefit that it always "works" because you can always repeat a list. You may be unable to perform certain other encoding tricks such as elaborative rehearsal due to the context of the items, like a list of random words. Consider it more of a fallback than a learning strategy.

The second method (talking about the item at length) is elaborative rehearsal, which, as Cheatboy2 points out, benefits from the levels of processing effect. The deeper you know something the more "connections" you can make, which has the advantage of making things easier to remember in general and easier to remember in the context of specific, related items.

Elaborative rehearsal has the benefit of creating understanding rather than simple knowledge of a term. Buccal Cavity is just a word until you realize what it means. Once you know what it means you can additionally draw connections between related words, which, in this case, is very helpful as all the words on the list to remember are in fact connected in various ways. If you don't elaborate on the connections between them in your own memory, you won't benefit from that effect.

I suggest giving both articles (in bold) a read to understand the deeper intricacies of both, but those are the general ideas behind why elaborative rehearsal is preferred. Note that a Mnemonic device may be a more effective method of teaching lists where the list is what's important, not a deeper understanding, or where there is little to elaborate on, such as ROYGBIV to remember the colors of the rainbow.


Is there any justification for viewing neurons as self-interested agents? There are aspects of cognition that are vaguely reminiscent of markets within an economy. For example, there is specialization as well as integration within both brains and economies. One of the problems posed by specialization is how the output of the specialized module or function can be integrated seamlessly with the whole, and this is one place where economics has an answer: through the price system.
(An analogue in the brain could be the amount of secretion of a neurotransmitter or growth factor.)
However, economies are made up of agents with self-interest.
Is it too far a stretch to think that neurons may be self-interested in a similar way? To justify the reasoning a little bit in biological terms, neurons are eukaryotic cells. There are a host of single-celled eukaryotic animals in the wild. These animals need to function in a self-interested manner, or else they wouldn't survive. Could neurons, therefore, have co-opted the self-interested "outlook" of such animals? After all, the basic DNA may still be there, right?

EDIT:
If anybody is interested, this video was the inspiration behind my question.

The answer to "is there any justification" is pretty much always "yes", but that can be a quite uninteresting "yes" if those justifications are poor. People justify bad or unsupported ideas all the time.
A big difference between single cells of a whole organism and single-celled organisms is that only the single-celled organisms reproduce on their own. Natural selection helps optimize that process to preserve the cells (and organisms) which are best able to make new copies of themselves. In that sense, even multicellular organisms aren't really self-interested, they are "my next generation interested", which explains a lot of animal behavior that cannot be explained by self interest.
There are models of brain function that involve competition between neurons (like winner-take-all decision making, used both in artificial neural networks and to understand biological brains), but these algorithms aren't really "self-interest", they're just the way that a whole brain arrives at a conclusion. There is also competition in development of neurons and synapses (and in other cell types as well), but it's not really right to think of this as "self-interest", in particular because the "losers" undergo apoptosis - that's the opposite of self-interest, it's explicitly a behavior selected in cells that kills the cell for the benefit of the organism.
Could one still use a model of self-interest to understand these behaviors of cell survival and neural computation? Yes, probably, but it would be important to think of it as an analogy. The neurons in such a model might behave like a self-interested agent, but that doesn't mean they are one.
Sometimes cells in a multicellular organism do develop tendencies towards self-interest, when the genes that limit and control the cells' growth are not behaving properly. These cells start to do a great job of replicating themselves rather than functioning for the survival of the whole organism. We call this cancer, and it ultimately becomes self-defeating since once the whole organism dies, the tumor does as well.


Which equation is Ebbinghaus's forgetting curve and what do the constants represent? First off, I've come across two different forgetting curve equations.

$$R = e^{-\large \frac{t}{s}}$$ where $R$ is retention, $t$ is time and $s$ is strength can be found on Wikipedia. And $$b = \frac{100k}{c\log(t) +k}$$ where $b$ is retention, $t$ is time, $k = 1.48$ and $c = 1.25$, can be found in Ebbinghaus's study chapter 7.  I've also seen it here and here also.

My first question is which forgetting curve is correct?  And if both or the latter is, where did the constants $k$ or $c$ come from?  What do they represent?

The question which of these two descriptions is correct? is perhaps natural in the context of, say, someone studying for an examination. Epistemologists might suggest that a better formulation would be is either of these  correct?

However, as stated here there are clear reasons for preferring the first formulation to the second. I shall first explain why, and then attempt to reconstruct a more useful form for the second approach.

By substituting the value $t=0$, a time value (however the time variable is scaled) at which we would expect retention to be a maximum, we obtain:
$$ R_0 = 1 \\
b_0 = 0
$$
Another peculiarity of the second equation is that if $T=0.4297...$ we have:
$$
b_T = \pm \infty
$$
The latter is shorthand for the fact that as $t$ approaches $T$ from below then $b_t \rightarrow -\infty$, whilst $b$ then flips to $+\infty$ as soon as $t \gt T$ and thereafter decreases.

The factor of $100$ in the numerator of the fraction in equation $2$ suggests this was intended to be adapted to percentage correct, and should be dropped to make the two formulations more easily comparable.

The least changed version of eq. $2$ which makes some kind of sense would be:
$$ R_t = \frac1{1 + a \; ln(1+ \lambda t)}$$

This yields $R_0 = 1$, whilst $R_t$ is now a convex, strictly decreasing function of $t$. Surely both of these features are desiderata for any expression for retention.

Note that now (what we may term) model $1$ ($M1$) is a 1-parameter model, whereas $M2$ has two parameters, which might be preferred for an empirical data-fitting exercise. Both models have a linear approximation for small values of the time variable, namely:

$$ (M1) \; \; \; R_t = 1 -\frac{t}{s} $$

$$(M2)  \; \; \;  R_t = 1 - a \lambda t $$

So that we require $ \frac1s = a \lambda$ for compatibility. This suggests that a more useful form of $M2$, retaining the strength factor from the first model, is:
$$ R_t = \frac1{1 + \frac1{\lambda s} ln(1 + \lambda t)}$$

Where now $\lambda$ is clearly seen to be a scaling factor which must be applied to both variables, time and strength. This is perhaps a slight conceptual clarification, since the intervening variable strength is shown to be dimensionally equivalent to time. A strong memory is one that lasts for years, whereas, with the possible exception of the type of mnemonist studied by Professor Luria, few of Ebbinghaus' experimental subjects would retain any memory of his deliberately unmemorable nonsense syllables after the passage of more than a few weeks.

This observation also has a bearing on experimental methodology. Some nonsense syllables might be more memorable for a given subject - for example if, by chance, the syllable happened to match the subject's own initials etc. Such effects should, however, merely contribute a small addition of random noise to the experimental data.


Why does society interpret "manliness" differently? If, by definition, manliness is "the traditional male quality of being brave and strong," why does most of society perceive it differently? For example, a person who watches My Little Pony and is not afraid to admit it, thus being brave. However, society would think of this person as not manly because he is watching a show meant for little girls. Do our minds perceive being manliness based on what other people think of as manly? Is this why society thinks of manliness differently than what it really is? And, if so, why do we base our opinions on those of others? Also, is manliness what it is defined as or what we have made it to be through society?

Most of society can't agree entirely on how to define manliness. Two broad ways come to mind as to how it might be done though. The first way would be to use gender or sex (depending on one's reasons for asking, I suppose) as a criterion variable for exploratory analysis of related variables. A statistical analysis like multiple logistic regression could be used to identify what information about people's other characteristics can help predict whether they're men or women. This would be the more objective, empirical way of defining what it means to be a man (or woman), at least probabilistically. The second way is by defining gender roles, as @caseyr547 did.

The second way definitely implies a choice to attend primarily to social constructs rather than empirical reality. It's important to appreciate that gender roles do not define the actual behavior of people, so the extent to which people really follow their gender roles is limited; the first way I mentioned would produce a better description of actual behavioral profiles and sex/gender differences.

However, it's also important to appreciate that gender roles are, by definition, socially normative expectations based on gender, and therefore society imparts causal force to these constructs. People generally (society) want other people to fulfill their expectations, so gender roles also define what is socially desirable. Socially normative attitudes about what behaviors are desired, not merely expected, may even define gender roles, depending on whom you ask. People have very many ways of motivating others to care about their opinions, and to ultimately agree with and adopt/"internalize" them, so there is overlap in and feedback between the empirical reality of sex differences and the cultural context of gender roles.  That is, gender roles, being defined as expectations, change to suit how the genders actually behave, and people change the ways they behave to suit their cultures' gender roles. Thus some overlap is maintained dynamically, but still limited by human error, among other factors.

Besides human error (failing to calibrate expectations to reality, and failing to calibrate behaviors to expectations), one major factor that limits the overlap of expectations and reality is cross-cultural variation. Gender roles may vary widely across cultures, but mostly operate within cultures (due to too much ethnocentrism and not enough travel, among other factors), so each culture's specific gender roles may generalize poorly to other cultures realities, and influence them very weakly. If I had to choose one reason to bet you're right in saying "most of society" perceives manliness differently, it would be cultural differences. Still, there are other reasons.

Another major factor that limits the applicability of gender roles is counterculture, which does not simply represent the alternatives that society rejects. Counterculture is better defined as representing those who reject their cultural norms for various reasons. When imperfect norms are especially popular, their popularity may actually reinforce the popularity of the opposition as well, because exposure to an idea increases opportunities to become opinionated, explore counterarguments, and either agree or disagree rather than remaining neutral by default. Therefore subpopulations of intentional norm-violators are also maintained dynamically. Some may disagree simply because they like to disagree or differentiate themselves from others. Others may have principled objections to specific norms; their viewpoints gain popularity among dissenters when the majority exerts conforming pressure (which it pretty much always does). In this way, countercultural movements can become very stable and widely influential.

However, many may only be as stable as the norms they oppose. If the norm changes (and not necessarily for the better), the opposition may change in the opposite way to remain directly defiant. This may not suit the original principles of the opposition, but when such movements are dominated by leaders who focus more on defiance than their principles, they may sacrifice integrity to maintain popularity through their parasitic relationship with the mainstream. This sort of power motivation further reinforces a limited amount of norm violation regardless of what norm is in question. Note also that power carries sex appeal, so even if women didn't have other reasons to find effeminate men attractive, they would be attracted to effeminate men who belong to a powerful counterculture (and vice versa regarding men's attraction to masculine women). This (and other influences) means countercultures find support among people who may nevertheless adhere to norms in their own behaviors (e.g., feminine men may attract women regardless of the women's own femininity).

These dynamic processes make manliness very hard to pin down by the second way that focuses on gender roles. To recap, reality influences them somewhat, so they reflect reality somewhat, and real people try to follow them somewhat, so reality reflects them somewhat...but some people also try not to follow them. This all plays out somewhat independently within separate cultures, so plenty of "errors" in the accuracy and influence of gender roles arise naturally from these two factors alone (not to mention others). Thus plenty of disagreement exists, and even gives rise to bizarre inversions of the normative archetype, such as the brave and (not so) thoroughly manly Brony meme, which like many countercultures is commonly, thoroughly misunderstood.

Nevertheless, this is not to say psychologists haven't tried to pin down gender roles. A fair amount of consensus may even exist on some essential aspects, especially in Western culture (probably because America and Europe have particularly active psychology programs). An interesting list of gender-linked traits by a philosophy author with a fairly sophisticated perspective on gender-personality literature gives a decent picture of how gender roles might be measured in detail (among other ways, which probably are less detailed), as well as an opportunity to assess one's own alignment with Western gender roles. There are also Wikipedia pages on masculine and feminine psychology, which may be of interest. If nothing else, I find it funny that the masculine psychology page is tagged with disputes that suggest an egotistical tone, and the feminine psychology page is tagged for cleanup in a way that suggests scatter-brained writing. Both "egotistical" and "scatter-brained" fall under Park's respective lists of "regrettable" gender-linked personality traits! I'll let you decide whether you think they're manifesting on Wikipedia through real differences in the writing, or maybe through some other influence like stereotyping and confirmation bias (maybe even on my own part)!


How to fit averaged data to obtain a single psychometric function? I have psycho-physical data from a motion discrimination task in order to obtain PSE (point of subjective equality). I am using psignifit and have constructed individual psychometric logistic functions. How can I construct a distribution with averaged data?

Short answer
Averaging psychometric curves may not be the preferred way to pool psychophysical data.
background
Typically, extracted gold-standard outcome measures from the psychometric curves will be pooled and averaged to perform statistical analyses and so on.
For example, in the visual sciences a much-used outcome measure is the visual acuity where, for example, gratings in four orientations are shown using standard psychophysical tests. Since it's a 4AFC task, the 62.5% correct score will be taken as a measure of the threshold, where the gratings will be varied in their width, measures in cycles per degree (cpd) or related measure of visual angle.
To pool and average individual subject scores the acuity scores will be averaged, measured in cpd, and not the psychometric curves. For examples see Nau et al. (2013) and Bach et al. (1996).
If you would really insist, you could pool every measurement in case the method of constant stimuli or related paradigm was used. Then one single psychometric fit could be performed on the congregate data. Problem with this approach, as opposed to the preferred method described above, is that the fit will yield awesome outcomes in terms of superbly small variances in the fitted outcome parameters, as well as favorable descriptive statistical parameters, such as the correlation coefficient, simply because there are so many data points and hence many degrees of freedom. Further, random errors occurring in one, or a few subjects will now affect the overall fit and 'weird' data points will tend to be obscured by the multitude of data points per x value.
A better approach in terms of statistical descriptive outcomes would be to first average every data point and then do the fit. However, also here outliers will be obscured because of the averaging procedure. The power of psychometric fits is that individual subjects can be analyzed.
In case an adaptive method is used above procedure won't hold as each subject will have different x values. Adaptive procedures in general do not lend themselves very well for curve fitting as the data points around threshold are dense, but the trials targeting chance level or 100% correct are sparse or nonexistent altogether. Hence the asymptotes are ill-defined. You could average these data, if you insist, by averaging each of the fitted parameters and generate a 'master' fit out of those. Beware of logarithmic values, though, as averaging those is not arbitrary. Again, descriptive statistical parameters become obscure in such a master fit, and statistical analyses become difficult.
In all, my advice is to stick with pooling the single outcome measures obtained from the psychometric curve, i.e, stick to pooling your PSE outcomes.
References
- Nau et al., Transl Vis Sci Technol (2013); 2(3): 1
- Bach et al., optom Vis Sci (1996); 73(1): 49-53


Is low self esteem pushing person toward maximizing (instead of being easily satisfied) See the answer to this question: Is there a term that describes the personality trait of always desiring more?

  Schwartz and colleagues (2002) have proposed that people fall into two
  groups: those who seek to maximize their decision by finding the very
  best option out of choices presented (maximizers), and those who have
  an idea in mind of what would be an "acceptable" option and settle for
  the first choice that surpasses their expectations (satisficers).
  Maximizers are always on the look out for "the best," are less
  satisfied with their choices, more likely to "socially compare" their
  options to others, and more likely to experience regret (Ma & Roese,
  2014). Another recent publication proposed that when individuals
  experience "choice closure," and stop re-evaluating the non-selected
  alternative options, satisfaction with choice can increase (Gu, Botti,
  & Farro, 2013).

Is it possible to state that looking for challenges and being a maximizer can be correlated to a low selfesteem?

There seems to be indeed some correlation between maximization and self-esteem (as can be seen even in the wikipedia page). However it doesn't necessarily predicts low self-esteem.

Quoted from wikipedia:

  Initial research on maximizing showed uniformly negative outcomes
  associated with chronic maximizing tendencies. Such tendencies were
  associated with lower happiness, self-esteem, and life
  satisfaction;2 with greater depression and regret;2 with lower
  satisfaction with choices;[8][9] with greater perfectionism;3[10]
  and with greater decision-making confusion, commitment anxiety, and
  rumination ... However, as disagreement over the definition of maximizing
  grew, research began to show diverging effects: some negative, some
  neutral, and some positive

Interestingly, those results closely resembles studies regarding correlation between "perfectionism" and "self-esteem" (perfectionism being a similar concept to maximization which you described).

There have been many studies, but in general, perfectionism can be detrimental only when it's maladaptive/ neurotic. On the other hand, positive/adaptive perfectionism tend to correlate with positive emotions, which can factors in a more positive self-esteem.

Some studies further classified that perfectionism coming from one-self is associated with adaptive aspect of perfectionism, and thus more related to positive emotions. While perfectionism that comes form social environment (imposed/prescribed by others), is more associated to the maladaptive aspect. As discussed in this article.

It somewhat make senses considering the definition of "self-esteem". In general, self-esteem is defined as how we evaluate our own worth, which starts early in infancy. It affected by many factors which may changes across lifetime (for example in childhood and teens), but in general it's largely affected by social factors.

So in summary, it's possible that being a maximizer (or being perfectionist in general) correlated to low-self esteem. But it depends on how exactly the maximizing is.


Is the Rubin Vase illusion an example of inattentional blindness? Generally, people looking at an example of a Rubin Vase see either the vase, or the faces. The brain seems to make a decision on which one is being viewed, but both cannot be focused-on at the same time.

Is the Rubin vase a form of inattentional blindness, caused by the same brain function that only allows us to focus on certain objects in our field-of-view, but not others? The Gorilla-in-the-Room is another example.

Short answer
The Rubin Vase is a visual illusion, which can be traced down to the way the visual system analyzes visual scenes in terms of objects and background. Inattentional blindness is not an illusion, it is the failure to detect stimuli when the mind is focused on something else. It has to do with the limitations in the capacity of the visual system to extract relevant information from a visual scene.

Background

The Rubin Vase illusion (Fig. 1) is an example of an ambiguous figure/ground illusion. The visual system interprets patterns in terms of external objects. To do this, the visual system distinguishes objects (figure) from background (ground). In the Rubin Vase illusion, when the faces are considered background, you will see the vase as figure, and vice versa.

Fig. 1. Rubin vase illusion. source: TU Dresden

The visual system represents objects primarily in terms of their contours. Also, elements that are close together, or share certain features, or are homogeneous in certain respects tend to be grouped together (grouping). The sudden reversal one may perceive is thought to be due to a shift of attention on the shape of the contour. The observer's "perceptual set" and individual interests can also bias the situation. Biasing the shapes or contours can make one interpretation stronger than the other one. This particular illusion involves higher cortical processing, because previously stored information about vases and faces are resourced (source: TU Dresden).

The Invisible Gorilla (see a video clip here) (Fig. 2) is the effect where people instructed to focus on a particular target are prone to miss other salient, sometimes striking stimuli. The classic, familiar example being subjects shown a basketball game and they are instructed to keep count of how many times the ball is passed between players in the black team. When the subjects watch the video clip and attentively count the number of passes, about half of the subjects totally miss the scene in the video where a man in a giant gorilla suit walks slowly into the middle of the screen, beats his chest and then wanders off, because they were so focused on counting the passes (that’s not to mention the other deliberate mistakes in the video) (source: Life in the Fast Lane). A newer version hits home even harder; 24 experienced radiologists were asked to perform a familiar lung-nodule detection task. A gorilla, 48 times the size of the average nodule, was inserted in the last case that was presented. Eighty-three percent of the radiologists did not see the gorilla. Eye tracking revealed that the majority of those who missed the gorilla looked directly at its location. Thus, even expert searchers, operating in their domain of expertise, are vulnerable to inattentional blindness (Drew et al.,, 2013).

Fig. 2. Invisible Gorilla. source: Persuasion Blog

The Invisible Gorilla is an example of inattentional blindness. Inattentional blindness can be defined as:

  The failure to notice unexpected objects or events when attention is focused elsewhere [...] (source: Simons).

Reference
- Drew et al., Psychological Science (2013); 24(9): 1848–53


What is the scientific term for unexpected, spontaneous dream recall? I'm interested if there's a term for spontaneous dream recall. I will try to define the phenomenon I'm talking about.

Over 10 years ago, I started to notice that I can spontaneously recall dreams, and clearly label them as dreams. I may recall 3 dreams from the past night, then more dreams from weeks or months ago. Some of these dreams I have written down, others were "forgotten" upon awakening, only to be recalled much later. That's a lot of dreams. When in this state of spontaneous recall, I can consciously guide the recall process once the original dream is recalled and recall a number of additional dreams that may or may not be loosely connected to that one.

Just to clarify, these are not fantasies and neither waking memories. I can clearly distinguish a waking memory from a dream memory. The entire dream memory is recalled in a flash with all the details: place, action, characters present. All of this over a second or so, similar in duration to the Deja-vu.

I've looked up and found Cryptomnesia, which is defined as:

  Cryptomnesia occurs when a forgotten memory returns without it being
  recognised as such by the subject, who believes it is something new
  and original.

What I'm describing is similar to Cryptomnesia, except that the memory is immediately recognized as a previously seen dream.

This phenomenon makes me believe that I do not really "forget" dreams. Normally, such memories are "blocked" from ordinary awareness, but can be recalled at random times of the day, or when laying in bed and preparing for sleep. Just to clarify: I calculated that I potentially see up to 1600 dreams in a year, and can recall many of them this way.

Is there a search term I can use to look at scientific literature that deals with the phenomenon of unbidden, spontaneous (dream)memory recall? Maybe there's something that deals with real memory recall that sounds similar?

This could be an example of what is termed "involuntary memory" or "involuntary autobiographical memory".  Mainly it is due to subtle and obvious prompts.


what causes an action potential to propagate exactly and why should it propagate? Hello I am taking a neurophysiology course and learned about the action potential and that it propagates in one direction from axon hillock down along the axon.
I understand that action potential is simply the voltage difference caused by influx of Na+ ions causing the inside of the cell relatively more positive

My questions is why/how does action potential propagate? why should it propogate?

If at one site where a sodium channel opens to depolarize, and k+ channel polarize the cell to membrane potential at that site, how does this affect the next neighboring ion channels down the axons to open and close? Why doesn't it just cause an action potential at one section of the membrane and stop? What exactly causes the neighboring ion channels to open continuously as well after the previous one open and closes?

Textbooks just says 'it propagates down the axon' but never mentions why it should and why should the previous ion channel configuration affect the next region of the membrane. I guess this might be a rather dumb question but I hope I did not confuse you, I realize my questions is a bit odd?

When a sodium (Na) channel is stimulated by a strong-enough stimulus (such as from an electrical stimulus or from an incoming action potential), it will open and let a lot of Na+ ions influx rapidly into the cell at that channel, creating an action potential there. The locally high concentration of Na+ ion inside the cell at that channel will cause Na+ ions there to spread around immediately. This will cause depolarization and openings of the nearby Na channels, resulting in new actions potentials occurring at the nearby channels. This whole process will repeat itself again at these channels, causing more new action potentials to spread out further. In each cycle of an action potential, the potassium channel opens after the sodium channel does about 1 msec. Although the opening of the potassium channel causes repolarization,  it doesn’t have any effects on the concentration of Na+ ion and does not stop the spreading out of the Na+ ions. Therefore, an action potential inevitably spreads out and out.

If the axon is stimulated at its trunk, the action potential will spread out both ways, up and down the axon. Figure 3.1 A shows a schematic diagram of an axon and the charge distribution along the membrane of that axon. More positive charges exist on the outside of the axon, and more negative charges on the inside. Now consider the consequences of delivering some stimulus to a point in the middle of the axon, Figure 3.1 B. If the depolarization is sufficiently large, voltage-dependent sodium channels will be opened, and an action potential will be initiated, and the sodium ion (Na+) will influx into the cell.
The influx positive charges Na+ will spread to the adjacent regions of the membrane. As the charges move to the adjacent regions of the membrane, the adjacent regions of the membrane will depolarize. If they depolarize sufficiently, voltage-dependent sodium channels in the adjacent regions of the membrane will be opened and "new" action potentials will be initiated, Figure 3.1 C. This perturbance of charge distribution will then spread to the next regions and initiates other "new" action potentials, Figure 3.1 D to 3.1 F.
[The above text and the figure are adapted from Reference 1]

Now, if the action potential spreads down from the axon hillock (which is located to the left side of the axon and is not shown in the picture) as in Figure 3.12 above, it will spread only one way to the distal end of the axon [inset 2, 3, and 5] because the previously depolarized channels will still be inactive (or in refractory period) for a while after the action potential ends [inset 4].
[The above text and the figure are adapted from Reference 2]
References:

Byrne JH. Chapter 3: Propagation of the Action Potential. Neuroscience Online. The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UTHealth). McGovern Medical School.

Augustine GJ. Chpater 3. Voltage-dependent membrane permeability. In: Purves D, Augustine GJ, David Fitzpatrick D, Hall WC, Lamantia AS, McNamara JO, Williams SM, editors. Neuroscience. 3rd ed. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates Inc; 2004. ISBN-13: 9780878937257 ISBN-10: 0878937250.


What functional purpose does a cortical column serve? The Blue Brain project led by Henry Markram focused on simulating cortical columns under the idea they form basic processing units of the brain/cognitive function.

What functional purpose does a cortical column serve?

I am looking for (synapses) of mathematical, conceptual, & scientific models. What is a leading theory, what is the evidence for it, etc?

I have worked with the theory that the column is the binary unit involved in all cortical processing and memory for many years. Articles are available at my profile page (Robert Moss) at researchgate.net and academia.com. The first article was published in 2006 with an update in 2012. I have published several non-peer-reviewed, more easily understandable articles that are also posted at those sites. One major paper has been recently published that explains the possible microcircuitry of dynamically formed columns.


Can you become "mentally" bilingual after 8? Is it possible to learn a second language good enough to be able to think in it the same way we think in our first language after the critical language learning period?

Anecdotally speaking yes, I moved to another country where I couldn't practice my native one and after some years I started thinking in the once foreign one. I am now back to my original country and the process is playing out in reverse with some interesting quirks, I translate words rather than retrieve the original ones, something that at one point I did in the foreign language.

Strictly speaking, my understanding of how speech and language works in the context of thinking, is that word selection is heavily influenced by both internal and external cues, ( this goes in line with how memory and conditioning work), further, models of speech generation ( both internal and external) support the idea of a general store of meaning (semantic meaning, syntactic rules,cadence,etc) generally dispersed around the NC and more locally near speech producing areas and a separate but heavily connected speech generating system (lateral sulcus: Wernicke- Broca Area).

While speaking a foreign language, working memory areas are conceivably recruited ( this is my speculation ) to translate and then produce speech, something that takes a perceivable time and is noticed by native speakers and sometimes the speaker.

With time and due to plasticity, foreign speech networks get strengthened to the point of not needing any more translation and both internal (what you might call thinking) and external speech are more efficiently generated.

Native speech networks can also face extinction due to the competing foreign language and disuse, but thankfully are still available ( what was once learned is easier to re-learn) so retaking or even thinking in both languages is possible.

As for age, there is a marked advantage of being young due to known efficiencies that happen earlier in life as well as possibly being primed for foreign languages. Still,due to how plastic the brain is even into adulthood, you can become mentally bilingual at practically any age but at a different rate.

Sources:

Kemmerer, D. (2014). Cognitive neuroscience of language. Psychology Press.
Gluck, M. A., Mercado, E., & Myers, C. E. (2013). Learning and memory: From brain to behavior. Palgrave Macmillan.