Is doubting a claim more taxing in terms of energy spent by the brain? I was at a conference some time ago in a university near my city, a Neurologist was part of the various talks held there, and in his words:

"There is a, let's call it Neuro-Psychologic interpretation of belief, that is actually supported by evidence, which in essence says we really, really don't like doubting what we believe.
Because not only does it take slightly more energy to doubt any given claim, but by default we are believers. We believe things said to us, and then subject them to scrutiny in a second moment; this according to research conducted in Harvard using an fMRI. Now, if we add to this- in Piagetian terms which most of you are familiar with- the notion of a Schema, so, linked thoughts and expectations placed on the world to simplify actions and problem solving, we are in big trouble. Daniel Kahneman, a known researcher and Psychologist has basically set in stone the fact that we are lazy thinkers. We like to take shortcuts, we don't really like hard challenges and Confirmation Bias would rather us keep believing things we already do.

If we were to pick between rational discourse with the opposite side, or lash out or ignore them, we'd pick any options that would let us avoid confrontation, because it's really exhausting for the brain to take head on, a waterfall of information that disagrees with more or less your whole worldview, it's too much energy. So true skeptics who enjoy doubting are anomalous, lying or masochists if you ask me."

I translated this in English because it isn't the original language of the talk.
Do his claims have any weight? It would be a stroke of luck if there was some researcher from Harvard to confirm what he said about the fMRI case. He mentioned Daniel Gilbert was part of it, but i can't find the actual published paper for some reason.

Overall, the claim seems to be that people prefer holding their current beliefs. This is well-documented, for example in a big literature on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance . Note that this may be culturally dependent; some Buddhist traditions explicitly value holding contradictory beliefs.

It's possible the study being referred to in the quoted passage is reported in this paper: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02226.x 'When the Truth Is Not Too Hard to Handle: An Event-Related Potential Study on the Pragmatics of Negation' (One author is at Harvard).

If so, the quoted speaker's comments are inconsistent with the findings. There was earlier work suggesting statements with negations might be more difficult to understand, but this paper doesn't find that. Their results "...suggest that negation poses no principled obstacle for readers to immediately relate incoming words to what they hold to be true."

I think it's fair to say that humans limit the mental effort they put in; this perspective is also summarized in the theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_miser

A word of caution: the quoted text seems to rely heavily on vague appeals to authority (e.g., Harvard) rather than references to specific empirical findings. This can be a red flag for argument quality.


Why do people bid on online auctions sooner than a few seconds before it ends? This is something that has always puzzled me about human behavior on online auction platforms. I am talking about a specific platform where you can sell almost any item you want with a starting bid and a fixed time until the auction ends. People then can place a bid at any time, thus increasing the current price. The current price is always last bid + 0.5 currency. When the auction ends the highest bidder gets the item for the current price, with a percentage going to the platform. E.g. if the starting bid is 1 currency and someone bids 50 currency, the price is at 1.5 currency, until someone else places another bid, e.g. 20 currency, which would push the price to 20.50 currency, with the first bidder still being in the lead.

And that's exactly the crux. No one except the highest bidder knows what the highest bid is. People tend to place a bid, see it's not high enough and then increase their own bid in small currency steps, often going beyond what they originally were willing to pay. Also anyone who bids early risks that someone else tries to bid more than them, while when they bid late that chance is reduced, especially because there isn't any time for anyone to bid again.

For the platform this is good. For sellers this is good. For buyers, not so much. It's super irrational. They just drive the price up by bidding.

If buyers would just wait till a few seconds before the auction ends, and then place exactly the highest amount they are willing to pay, the item would sell for less, and they wouldn't be drawn into a bidding war that escalates the amount they are willing to pay. Even if it slightly decreases their chance of getting the item, unless it's a super rare thing there are so many items from different sellers, it would still be rational to behave this way until they succeed on one of the items. If unsuccessful too often, they could then conciously decide to increase the amount they are willing to pay - to adjust to the market price, not escalate in a bidding war.

Of course the platform wouldn't profit as much then, but I doubt buyers behave this way out of charity for them. So the question is: Why are people behaving this way? Are they really not aware of this? Do they not care? Is bidding to them just fun? Is this in some way related to gambling?

(I have asked this same question a few years ago on a Q&A in my native language, and the unanimous answer was: "Bidding is how that platform works, you obviously don't understand it," which leads me to believe that the answer is people really are not aware, but I don't get why not.)

I have been selling items on a particular platform for over a decade and absolutely profited from this irrational behavior, but at the same time I am so confused by my fellow humans.

One advantage of auctions, to the seller, is that buyers can get caught up in bidding wars and spend more than they intended to.  Any auction platform that gets paid by what the auction takes in is going to want or hope for that.

I assume you're referring to eBay-style auctions.  eBay encourages bidding frenzies.  If you bid on an item and are outbid, they will notify you and encourage you to bid more.  As the auction draws to a close, they will notify bidders who aren't currently in the lead.  They're hoping at least some bidders will think bidding is fun, and will think of winning the auction as succeeding.  The thrill may be that of gambling or similar.

I don't see any advantage in waiting for the last few seconds.  I decide how much I'm willing to pay for something, and enter that amount whenever.  The only way someone will find out how much I bid is to outbid me, and then I don't want to win the auction.  Trying to time my bid for the end of the auction would sometimes be very inconvenient.  If there's going to be a bidding frenzy at the end, the price will either go over mine or not, and I think it very unlikely that when I bid makes much difference in that.  It should be clear that I don't think bidding by itself is fun, and that I don't want to win the auction by paying more for an item than I value it, which as you've seen isn't the universal approach.


Physiological differences between brains of Conservatives and Liberals I work for a non-profit research organization and I have been assigned to do research on this topic.  I have been doing my best to find studies on this topic but every website and article seems to only reference the study by Amodio et al (2007).

What other research has examined physiological differences between brains of Conservatives and Liberals?
What is the current understanding of what, if any, brain differences exist?

References

Amodio, D. M., Lost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism, Nature Neuroscience. PDF

The easiest way to work forward from a well-cited article is to do a forward Google Search. My answer is almost completely based on such a search and concentrates on three brain regions: amygdala, insula cortex, and the  anterior cingulate cortex; note that all three regions are linked to emotion.

Keep in mind: when you take any two groups of people that differ significantly in behavior, socio-economic background, age, education-level, etc. It is not difficult to find differences between them on many fronts, and certain brain-structures is one of them. The difficulty of these studies, is two-fold: (1) the researchers have to do very good controls to make it believable that the difference loads on political ideology and not one of the many other things differences in political ideology usually correlates with, and (2) provide (or at least make believable to exist) some sort of causal relationship between the brain-structures they observe and the relevant behavior (i.e. political leaning). When you read these papers, these are the two points you should carefully check.

Oxley et al. (2008) showed that you don't need a brain scaner to observe correlations between physiological differences and political ideology:

  [I]ndividuals with measurably lower physical sensitivities to sudden noises and threatening visual images were more likely to support foreign aid, liberal immigration policies, pacifism, and gun control, whereas individuals displaying measurably higher physiological reactions to those same stimuli were more likely to favor defense spending, capital punishment, patriotism, and the Iraq War.

The nice thing about these measurements, is that a mechanism for the correlation is easier to establish: if you are more likely to react strongly in your experiencing and
processing environmental threats, then you are more likely to have that reflected in your political ideology.

Schreiber et al. (2009) followed a similar line of thought by studying how Republicans and Democrats perform in a risk-taking tasks. While the 54 participants were evaluating risks, the researchers used an fMRI to look at the activation in their amygdala. This is a natural brain region to look at, since it is believed to be important for emotional processing. They concluded:

  a two parameter model of partisanship based on amygdala and insula activations achieves better accuracy in predicting whether someone is a Democrat or a Republican than a well established model in political science based on parental socialization of party identification.

The importance of the amygdala has also been tested across culturues. Rule et al. (2010) conducted a study in snap judgements in voting decisons of American and Japanese natives and showed analogous activation of the amygdala in both groups even though the traits that lead to judgments differ across the two cultures.

The importance of the insula is also not surprising, since this brain region is associated with processing of social emotions such as disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), reacting to norm-violation in ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003), and empathy (Singer, 2006). Chiao et al. (2009) showed that activation in the left anterior insula (and anterior cingulate) cortex is linked with preference for hierarchical rather than egalitarian social relations; something of importance for differentiating the Conservative/Liberal mindset.

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is involved in the experience of anxiety, and empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Recently, Inzlicht et al. (2009) linked activity in the ACC to religiousness; in a behavioral task they showed:

  Results showed that stronger religious zeal and greater belief in God were associated with less ﬁring of the ACC in response to error and with commission of fewer errors. These correlations remained strong even after we controlled for personality and cognitive ability. These results suggest that religious conviction provides a framework for understanding and acting within one’s environment, thereby acting as a buffer against anxiety and minimizing the experience of error.

Since religion is often an important distinguishing factor between conservatives and liberals, it is not surprising for activity in the ACC to also be distinguishing for political ideology.


What is the relationship between post-traumatic stress disorder and fugue states? The introduction of the new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders ("DSM-5") is on the horizon.  With it are coming some new, evidence-based diagnoses for dissociative disorders [1], which include conditions such as dissociative fugue (which will now be classified as dissociative amnesia) and dissociative identity disorder.

Fugue states have always been fascinating to me, Wikipedia states that they are

  a rare psychiatric disorder characterized by reversible amnesia for personal identity, including the memories, personality and other identifying characteristics of individuality...Fugues are usually precipitated by a stressful episode, and upon recovery there may be amnesia for the original stressor.

Post-traumatic stress disorder is also precipitated by a stressful (and potentially life threatening) episode, and causes anxiety and autonomic hyperexcitablity.

I've never seen anything written about the level of stressor that can induce a fugue state, but based on their common etiology, I would assume that PTSD and fugue states are related psychologically and neurologically.

To what extent is this true, are these two seemingly different end products of the same initial event?  Is there an anatomical substrate that is common to both?  Does changing the status of "dissociative fugue" -> "dissociative amnesia" mean they should be considered in isolation?

  [1] Spiegel, D., Loewenstein, R. J., et al. (2011), Dissociative disorders in DSM-5. Depress. Anxiety, 28: E17–E45. doi: 10.1002/da.20923

Dissociative Disorders are really fascinating to me as well. Fugue states/episodes as well as dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality disorder) in particular.

PTSD must be differentiated from disorders that can exhibit phenomenological similarities, such as borderline personality disorder and dissociative disorders (including dissociative amnesia). I include borderline personality disorder because it is [particularly] difficult to distinguish from PTSD, and the two can coexist or even be causally related!

A stressor or traumatic event is the causative factor in the development of PTSD, by definition. As people respond to events as being traumatic differently, the stressor alone is not sufficient enough to cause the disorder. In this case, the presence of intense fear or horror is necessary. The clinical features of PTSD include avoidance and emotional numbing, among other things, and patients may present dissociative states, which is the focus of this topic.

  "Patients with dissociative disorders do not usually have the degree
  of avoidance behavior, autonomic hyperarousal, or history of trauma
  that patients with PTSD report."

An essential feature of dissociative amnesia is "an inability to recall important personal information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature". As in this (as well as borderline personality disorder and PTSD) disorder, many patients have histories of prior abuse or trauma.

Symptoms found only in dissociative amnesia include features of recurrent blackouts, fugue states/episodes, fluctuations in skills, habits, and knowledge. Patients presenting PTSD and/or with borderline personality disorder usually don't present these symptoms. The common factor/symptom is the possible presence of dissociative episodes/states, though they may be precipitated by differing presentation of stressors.

Patients with borderline personality disorder can present transient or short-lived dissociative (or even psychotic) episodes that are almost "circumscribed, fleeting, or doubtful".

Sorry, now I worry I may not have properly answered your question(s). Liken to how different stressors or traumatic events can be experienced in varying degrees in different people, different people can cope or respond differently to them as well. PTSD (like hypervigilance), borderline personality disorder (intense black-and-white thinking, emotional lability), and dissociative disorders (amnesia, blackouts, etc.).

References

DSM-V Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
DSM-V Dissociative Amnesia
Kaplan and Sadock's Synopsis of Psychiatry


How do I interpret an effect of electrode position in ERP research? The example I have in my research is that both conditions show greater amplitude and latency in the parietal electrode sites than in the occipital ones.

I'm not sure how meaningful this is for my research question, which is primarily concerned with how processing of the two conditions potentially differs (spoiler: no effects of condition!). The effect of electrode sites does not interact with anything, so is just the case that there is greater activity in the parietal sites - can I argue something about the processing involved in both conditions based on this finding?

The question is quite vague, as it is unclear what the sample size is and whether OP is talking about an anecdotal experiment or the outcome of a well-powered statistical analysis. Moreover, there is mention of two conditions, but I fail to see what the difference is between the two.

Assuming a normal sample size, I can say that the measured amplitudes of electrophysiological signals are often unreliable. This is due to a variety of factors.

Impedances affect signal size, as high impedances reduce the measured potentials. Impedances can vary between subjects, but also between sessions within subjects, due to for example differences in the effectiveness of the scrubbing and whether enough conductive paste is used in case of EEG.
Impedance differences between active and reference electrode affect noise level. Noise may vary from day to day and even within a session due to interfering background electric fields.

In contrast to amplitude, peak latencies are often far more reliable.

So it all depends on the power of your analysis. If there is truly a difference in amplitude, then you should look at the physiology involved in your task and see whether brain mechanisms can be involved.


Does music affect heart-rate? I've read that the body attempts to match its heart-rate with the tempo of music being listened to.

  Rhythmic Entrainment: 'This refers to a process whereby an emotion is evoked by a piece of music because a powerful, external rhythm in the music influences some internal bodily rhythm of the listener (e.g. heart rate), such that the latter rhythm adjusts toward and eventually 'locks in' to a common periodicity. The adjusted heart rate can then spread to other components of emotion such as feeling, through proprioceptive feedback. This may produce an increased level of arousal in the listener.'

Is this true?

Music and the autonomic nervous system:

There have been studies linking the effects of music on well being, by affecting heart rate and blood vessel dilation.

There has been much research linking the effects of music on Autonomic Nervous System (ANS), which affects heart rate. The emotional nature of the music, be it restful or stressful, is linked with changes in the ANS.

  Music emphasis and rhythmic phrases are tracked consistently by physiological variables. Autonomic responses are synchronized with music, which might therefore convey emotions through autonomic arousal during crescendos or rhythmic phrases. (1)

Effects of music on brain function:

It has been demonstrated that music  can affect brain function through increased arousal or relaxation, depending on the tempo.

  Music induces an arousal effect, predominantly related to the tempo. Slow or meditative music can induce a relaxing effect; relaxation is particularly evident during a pause. Music, especially in trained subjects, may first concentrate attention during faster rhythms, then induce relaxation during pauses or slower rhythms. (2)

Effects of music on the heart

Music tempo or style also produces responses to heart rate and blood flow; relaxing or pleasant music producing results equivalent to studies showing the positive effects of laughter on the ANS.

  Music, selected by study participants because it made them feel good and brought them a sense of joy, caused tissue in the inner lining of blood vessels to dilate (or expand) in order to increase blood flow. This healthy response matches what the same researchers found in a 2005 study of laughter. On the other hand, when study volunteers listened to music they perceived as stressful, their blood vessels narrowed, producing a potentially unhealthy response that reduces blood flow. (3)

Rhythmic entrainment and heartrate:

Human beings are naturally disposed toward rhythmic entrainment. (4)

There has been some research suggesting that the body will synchronise with musical rhythm.  I say this with a disclaimer that this would need to be  music played with a regular tempo over a prolonged period, as for the heart beat to synchronise within a mathematical relationship with the music tempo, this would require stability and an absence of other external distraction for the body to achieve this state. Or better put, listening to a variety of music styles, with varying tempos, will affect the ANS, but will not create such a rhythmic coordination between the music and the ANS.

  • Entrainment is the process through which periodic events, i.e.
  oscillators, become coordinated through interaction. When oscillators
  come regularly into phase or of beginning their cycles  together, way
  say that they have synchronized.
    • Entrainment in music has been
  suggested by Juslin et al. (2010) as an emotion mechanism where the
  music causes an increase in arousal “because the powerful, external
  rhythm of the  music interacts with an internal body rhythm of the
  listener *…+, such that the latter rhythm adjusts towards and
  eventually ‘locks in’ to a common periodicity.” The adjusted body
  rhythm  then spreads through proprioceptive feedback to the
  subcomponents of emotion such as cognitive, neurophysiological,
  motivational, expressive, and subjective feelings components. (5)

References:

(1) Dynamic Interactions Between Musical, Cardiovascular, and Cerebral Rhythms in Humans
Luciano Bernardi, et al
doi: 10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.108.806174
(2) Cardiovascular, cerebrovascular, and respiratory changes induced by different types of music in musicians and non‐musicians: the importance of silence
L Bernardi, C Porta, and P Sleight
doi:  10.1136/hrt.2005.064600
(3) Music & Cardiovascular System
University of Maryland Medical Center
(4) The ecology of entrainment: Foundations of coordinated rhythmic movement
Jessica Phillips-Silver, C. Athena Aktipis, and Gregory A. Bryant
doi:  10.1525/mp.2010.28.1.3
(5) Rhythm, entrainment and musical emotions
Carolina Labbé & Didier Grandjean
Neuroscience of Emotion and Affective Dynamics (NEAD)
Department of Psychology
University of Geneva
Answers to Sensory Challenges, edited by Kathleen Morris. MS CCC/SLP. 2010.(Originally published in SI Focus Magazine, Fall 2008) Article by Jeff Strong


What are the consequences of prolonged cognitive dissonance? We know that situations that induce cognitive dissonance cause a variety of interesting behaviors in humans.

But do we know why relieving cognitive dissonance is such a powerful motivator? What happens if that dissonance is not relieved?

Are there any known cases from history or animal experiments where humans or animals were subjected to prolonged cognitive dissonance? If so, what happened in those cases?

Summary (copied from last paragraph)

It appears that extended exposure to cognitive dissonance ignites an initial emotional reaction that is then mediated by the rationalization process. If no rationalization can be made, or if the emotion cannot be effectively controlled by the individual, then the initial emotional reaction may grow more powerful, resulting in mood-regulation disorders such as depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder. [5]

Details

Cognitive dissonance is thought to reveal a human's internal desire for consistency. Those who experience cognitive dissonance become psychologically uncomfortable, and thus may take measure to reduce situations that may induce cognitive dissonance. [1]

Humans have a tendency to want to explain how the world works. There is a discomfort in not 'knowing'. In cognitive dissonance theory, there are several underlying themes, most notably that of religion in cognitive dissonance. Insofar as the theory goes, religion is one helpful mechanism for avoiding cognitive dissonance, as religion often provides an explanation for the nature and generation of the world, as well  as a set of guidelines to follow. This provides humans with internal consistency. Skepticism/loyalty to the 'objective' nature of the scientific method can be another form of avoiding cognitive dissonance. [2] Rejection of any sort of method of navigation (or purpose) in the world often lends itself to a feeling of nihilism, though this is not always related to cognitive dissonance as it is defined.

Sigmund Freud himself observed several instances of what he coined as "Das Unheimliche" -- German for 'the opposite of what is familiar', and translated into English as 'the uncanny'. He describes it as the experience of that which is strangely familiar, not just mysterious. Though the term is not an adequate synonym for 'cognitive dissonance', it is nonetheless relevant in the reaction it produces:

  Because the uncanny is familiar, yet incongruous, it has been seen as creating cognitive dissonance within the experiencing subject, due to the paradoxical nature of being simultaneously attracted to yet repulsed by an object. This cognitive dissonance often leads to an outright rejection of the object, as one would rather reject than rationalize, as in the uncanny valley effect.

This initial emotional response is supported by neuroscientific literature when we consider cognitive dissonance as an observable phenomenon. College students who were told to write an argumentative essay in support of a stance that they did not agree with showed increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. Next, the left frontal cortex was activated, which is known to activate the 'approach motivational system'. [3] The motivational directions model asserts that this system regulates one's response to their own anger. If the situation cannot be controlled or changed by the person, they may have less motivation to reduce or regulate their anger, and other emotions may arise. [4]

Thus, it appears that extended exposure to cognitive dissonance ignites an initial emotional reaction that is then mediated by the rationalization process. If no rationalization can be made, or if the emotion cannot be effectively controlled by the individual, then the initial emotional reaction may grow more powerful, resulting in mood-regulation disorders such as depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder. [5]

Sources:

[1] Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. California: Stanford University Press.

[2] R. A. Wicklund, J. W. Brehm. (1976). Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance.

[3] Beauvois, J. L., Joule, R. V., 1996. A radical dissonance theory. London: Taylor and Francis.

[4] Harmon-Jones, E., Mills, J., Cognitive Dissonance: Perspectives on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology. American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, pp. 71–99.

[5] Hull, A.M. (2002). Neuroimaging findings in post-traumatic stress disorder. The British Journal of Psychiatry 181: 102-10.


Why are most people not persuaded by rational arguments? The sentence could look as a provocation for many people, but the thoughts are not always rational and linear. But why this happens? Is it possible to give a short answer?

"Counter to what you might think consciously, few people are really persuaded by logical and rational arguments"

source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLFhCrTt-ZA&t=1m20s

You may be thinking of the Backfire Effect. When presented with logical and rational evidence disputing a strongly-held belief, most people's natural tendency is to hold on even tighter to those beliefs rather than to reassess their position.

As for why it happens... that's a matter of some debate (surprise, surprise), but the general thinking seems to be that it's a mental reaction to avoid cognitive dissonance. The page I linked contains references to several studies on the subject, though as you might expect, the results vary.


Is positive self-talk beneficial for those with low self-esteem? According to the paper Positive Self-Statements: Power for Some, Peril for Others by Wood (2009) positive self-talk is beneficial when the person has a reasonable level of self-esteem in the statement, but harmful when they don't. The PsychCentral article, "Got Low Self-Esteem? Don’t Ditch the Positive Self-Talk Just Yet" by Summer Beretsky points out a few issues with the methodology:

Limited sample size
Short "bursts" rather than more concentrated time to convince themselves
Not controlling for whether they believe in the statement they are proclaiming

Are there any other studies that deal with these issues?

Wood, J., Elaine Perunovic, W., & Lee, J. (2009). Positive Self-Statements: Power for Some, Peril for Others Psychological Science DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02370.x

Just to be clear, Wood et al (2009) summarise their propositions on page 861:

  Thus, we propose that positive self-statements have the potential to
  make one feel worse if they lie outside one’s latitude of acceptance,
  are self-discrepant and thereby highlight one’s failures to meet one’s
  standards, and arouse self-verification motives. We further propose
  that positive self-statements are especially likely to backfire for
  the very people they are meant to benefit: people with low
  self-esteem. Such people, by definition, see themselves as failing to
  meet standards in more domains or in more important domains than do
  people with high self-esteem. Moreover, self-verification motives
  should bias people with low self-esteem to reject positive
  self-statements, but encourage people with high self-esteem to
  accept them.

In the literature review, Wood et al cite several articles related to attitude formation and self-relevant feedback. They mention one particular study, where

  Eisenstadt and Leippe (1994) asked participants to identify a trait
  they would like to possess but believed they lacked. When Eisenstadt
  and Leippe later told participants that they actually did possess that
  ideal trait, participants felt worse, rather than better.

References

Eisenstadt, D., & Leippe, M.R. (1994). The self-comparison process
and self-discrepant feedback: Consequences of learning you are
what you thought you were not. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 67, 611–626.
Wood, J., Elaine Perunovic, W., & Lee, J. (2009). Positive Self-Statements: Power for Some, Peril for Others Psychological Science DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02370.x


Classification of EEG Signals I am working on a project related to Brain-Computer Interface & I came across this problem.

What are the tools and techniques used to classify the EEG signals which are extracted from brain using a device which in my case is Neurosky Mindwave Mobile Headset.   I needed an abstract view of what should be the design of the system?

The signal which are extracted using the electrode planted on the brain consists all type EEG signals present in the EEG Spectrum i.e delta, alpha, beta, gamma, mu. How can I classify it?

I read about some of the techniques like using Discrete Fast Fourier Transform and then extraction of band powers but I didn't understand it quite well so can someone point me in right direction. I really appreciate your help.

Thank You.

BCI has rougly two different approaches to extract features. I will address them both.

When EEG is recorded, you can see an pattern of activity in a particular channel over time. This is the time-domain. The time domain is predominantly used to analyze Event Related Potentials. One application within BCI is the P300 speller. A matrix of letters is shown and letters are highlighted one at a time. Whenever the letter you thought of (i.e. attended to, i.e expected) a component called the P300 will show a larger deflection.

The P300 (or P3) is a positive deflection around 300-400 milliseconds after presentation of a stimulus. The amplitude of the P300 is highers when you perceive something you expected, and smaller when something unexpected (or unattend) is seen. The P300 speller is a neat and simple way to spell out one letter at a time thus (see also Brain-computer interface with EEG: how to name imaginary movement of a non-self object?)

The Fast Fourier Transform (FTT), which you asked for, is used to transform the time-domain to the frequency domain. Every signal in the time-domain can be subdivided in simple sinusoids with different frequencies, amplitudes and phases. The amplitudes are also referred to as the power of the frequencies. The frequencies are grouped (see also Does stimulus-independent ERP make sense/ exist?) and the power is correlated to many many different cognitive states (sleepiness, attentiveness, etc. See also Are brain waves electromagnetic waves?)

BCI in the frequency domain makes use of the power of a frequency band. By focussing more or less attention, thereby de- or increasing the power in the alpha band, you can for instance move a cursor over a screen (also discussed here: Brain-computer interface with EEG: how to name imaginary movement of a non-self object?).

There is a third domain, namely the time-frequency domain (see How to compare brain waves?) and there are many more other ways to look at the data, such as coherence and synchronization, and I bet (but do not know) that it is used for BCI applications.

For some more reading on BCI see Is EEG brain-computer interface reliable?


Is the ability to discern between living and non-living things learnt or innate? This question   What optical features do we use to distinguish “life” from “non-life”?  on Philosophy SE prompted me to write this question.

The question poses, do we recognise a living thing, from what we already know to be a living thing.  I am posting some of this to give a background of what prompted this question.

I quote from the original question:

  Imagine you see a picture of a tiger: You instantly recognize it being
  a living thing, more specific: Something you call "tiger". You have
  seen tigers before (or at least heard of them and saw pictures or so).
  You have some kind of (vague) concept of what a tiger might be and this
  thing fits perfectly in it. And you know that a tiger is a living
  thing and you believe that what you see is a tiger: So you believe
  that the thing you see is a living thing called tiger.
  ...

  What exactly are the features we all recognize living things kind of accurate (even though when they don't exist in reality and are, just like the Nasobēm, just imaginary animals someone invented)?

I have modified this question to ask:

Is the ability to discern between living and non-living things learnt or innate?

In the original question the OP includes an image of a 'Nasobēm', a make believe creature that looks a little squid like.

Imagine you see a picture of a tiger: You instantly recognize it being a living thing, more specific: Something you call "tiger". You have seen tigers before (or at least heard of them and saw pictures or so). You have somekind of (vague) concept of what a tiger might be and this thing fits perfectly in it. And you know that a tiger is a living thing and you believe that what you see is a tiger: So you believe that the thing you see is a living thing called tiger.

Human beings are wired to innately discern living from non-living things. It does not need to be taught. There are no particular features, other than it is living and human beings are capable of perceiving this.
It would appear it has nothing to do with conditioning or experience (except for the sake of providing words of other similar things to provide a description).

As to why this is innate, requires further investigation.

There are two theorised models of memory which pertain to the recognition and distinction between living and non-living things, both involving semantic memory.

A category-specific  model and a modality-specific model.

What optical features do we use to distinguish “life” from “non-life”? perhaps is a little ambiguous, but we do process a lot of information and memory through our visual cortex.

Semantic memory is created through the vision, naming and functionality. Non-living things tend to be remembered semantically for their function. Whilst living things are processed more through vision and the names attached, and learned semantically.

When there is damage to the visual part of semantic memory, the ability to  name living things is substantially damaged, whilst the ability to name non-living things, is  affected on a much smaller curve. Whilst damage to the functional part of semantic memory, has no effect on the ability to recall names, when being shown images of living things, but does impair the ability to name non-living things (though not as severely as the damage to the visual semantic memory and name recall for living things).
It's not the ability to discern living and non-living things that is affected, but identifying the name them.

Given this, it would seem, our brains are wired to automatically perceive and discern the difference between living and non-living things. So, even when shown a picture of a living creature, never be seen before, it is still instantly recognizable as a living creature. Just as the a person first recognizes each living creature they encounter in their lives, either in real life of through images.

There is a first time to see a tiger or a squid and the human being innately distinguishes this as a living thing. Just as they would the first time they see an image of a Nasobēm. Even mould, moss, fungus can be perceived as living (an eclectic example of unusual contenders).

Conversely, the first time an individual sees a rock, or a rocket, they can distinguish this as a non-living thing. Just as the first time someone sees an image of a flying cars. It does not have to exist to be distinguishable from living/non-living.

  ... the most straightforward interpretation of the double dissociation between knowledge of living and nonliving things is that these two bodies of knowledge are represented by two separate category specific components of the functional    architecture  of  semantic memory.  (1)

image courtesy of Neural Network Models and Cognitive Neuropsychology (1)

  For example, our knowledge of an animal  such as a  leopard, by which we distinguish it from other similar creatures, is predominantly visual. In contrast, our knowledge of a desk, by which we distinguish it from other furniture, is predominantly functional (ie, what it is used for). Thus, the distinctions between impaired  and  preserved   knowledge in the cases reviewed earlier may not be "living/ nonliving" distinctions   per se,  but   "sensory/ functional"  distinctions ...  (1)

image courtesy of Neural Network Models and Cognitive Neuropsychology (1)

This being said, convoluted or abstract art work, could, possibly, be an area of crossover depending upon the individual's cognitive processes and so interpretation of lines and movement and what may appear out of a mess, as threatening. This is totally another topic altogether and my own hypothesis.

References:

(1) Neural Network Models and Cognitive Neuropsychology
by MARTHA J. FARAH , PhD, and JAMES L. McCLELLAND, PhD PDF


What is the study which shows that babies can teach young children empathy? I saw a fascinating segment on the PBS NewsHour which said that studies have shown that young children (ages 5 - 8 years of age) can be taught empathy by having a class where they observe and learn to care for an infant. The segment stated that this study showed the children would experience increased attention in class and a decreased likelihood that they would bully other children.

However, the report did not mention the actual name of the study. I'd like to read it to get further information. What is the study which shows that babies can teach young children empathy?

I found the actual report on the PBS NewsHour. The program which teaches children empathy using infants is known as Roots of Empathy. It's Wikipedia article states:

  The Roots of Empathy program effectiveness has been evaluated nine different times by independent reviewers. Overall, the results were positive. The results showed that students who participated in the demonstrated several qualities including an increase in social knowledge, a decrease in aggression, an increase in sharing/inclusive/helping behavior, and an increase in emotional perception. These effects appeared to be lasting.

It does not, however, name these nine different reviews. It does name three publications:

  Roots of Empathy: Changing the World Child by Child Gordon, Mary. Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2005.
  Family Literacy in Canada: Profile of Effective Practices, Edited by Adele Thomas. Chapter: "Parenting and Family Literacy Centres of the Toronto District School Board" by Mary Gordon, editions Soleil publishing inc., 1998.
  Child Honoring: How to Turn This World Around, Edited by Raffi Cavoukian, Sharna Olfman. Chapter: "The Power of Empathy" by Mary Gordon, Homeland Press, 2006.

On the Roots of Empathy website I was able to find a PDF Report on Research, which states:

  Researchers at the University of British Columbia have taken a lead role in
  early evaluations of ROE, under the direction of Dr. Kimberly SchonertReichl. Starting in 2000, the team conducted several studies across
  different grades and populations

and it also mentions eight "Research outcome evaluations to date":

  UBC 2000-2001 Primary Grade Evalution,1-3
  HCMO 2001-2004 Randomized Controlled Trial
  UBC 2001-2002 National Evaluation
  UBC 2002-2003 Rural/Urban Evaluation
  UBC 2003-2004 Randomized Controlled Trial
  UA 2006 Whole Schools Project
  UA 2006 Grade One Project
  UBC 2008 Fifth and Sixth Grade Evaluation

But does not provide actual links to the methods, data and results of those evaluations. I was able to find one of them: searching Google for "HCMO 2001-2004 Randomized Controlled Trial" yielded Effectiveness of School-Based Violence Prevention for children and Youth (Robert G. Santos, Mariette J. Chartier, Jeanne C. Whalen, Dan Chateau, Leanne Boyd) which appars to be one of the studies I was seeking.

I would still welcome a complete list with links, but I expect I might not be able to get that, the articles might be behind paywalls.


Could the basis of love be the expectation of a future benefit? Say you meet an attractive person of the opposite gender (or of the same gender, as the case may be). You are attracted to this person because of one or more salient qualities, intelligence, personality, or good looks. You revel in this discovery and look forward to being able to enjoy this person's desirable qualities. More to the point, you expect that your appreciation of someone will help generate an appreciation of you by that person, with your other qualities doing the rest. Even if this person doesn't fully reciprocate, if s/he agrees to spend time with, and perhaps "date" you, this might be the beginning of love.

But suppose the object of your affection studiously ignores you, or worse, seems to date everyone except you, not noticing, or downplaying your attention and your good qualities. You no longer have any reasonable expectation of benefiting from whatever desirable qualities this person may have. Does your potential love now turn into hate, or at least jealousy?

Some people will poinr to the love of parents and children, and the fact that a parent may seem to blindly love a worthless child (or in a few cases, the opposite). But the fact is that the parent-child relationship is bound by real ties; each person possesses roughly half of the other's genes. That would probably create a strong expectation that whatever benefits the other person produces in life will accrue to you at some point.

Can love exist in a seeming vacuum, that is with the realization that the beloved does not have the power to benefit you in any way, or worse, has no intention of ever benefiting you in any way?

Can love ever be without expectation of benefit? It would seem that the actual experience of love, itself has a reward.

  According to licensed psychologist Dr. Rachel Needle, specific chemical substances such as oxytocin, phenethylamine, and dopamine, have been found to play a role in human experiences and behaviors that are associated with love. They function similar to amphetamine, making us alert, excited, and wanting to bond.

This is less of an answer, and more an expansion on the notion of altruism and human motivation. This question deals with the concept of morality, and embraces many concepts, including the Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest. (ie finding a suitable mate)

A superficial glance at this would suggest that any human interaction is based on fulfilling our needs, as a species.

I don't believe there is a definitive answer to this question. This question, crosses into philosophical realms, in defining love and the true nature of mankind, as a creature. The concept that  the individual seeks to benefit from a "relationship" when they love another person, also addresses the entire notion, of whether, as a species, we are motivated by any other than self interest.

  Can love exist in a seeming vacuum, ...

Nothing in the realm of humanity truly occurs within a vacuum. People's feelings, translate into actions, which cause ripples. (See ripple effect, butterfly effect, causality; as an indicator of my reasons for making this statement. It is more of a sociological discussion and so I won't go into it further).

  ... with the realization that the beloved does not have the power to benefit you in any way, or worse, has no intention of ever benefiting you in any way?

I do believe that many would say this is the definition of unconditional love. Which is where this becomes a philosophical debate over the concept of altruism.

  More to the point, you expect that your appreciation of someone will help generate an appreciation of you by that person, with your other qualities doing the rest. ...//... this might be the beginning of love.

The motivations behind attraction are complex. Yes, there is the instinct to find a partner and within this, there would be an expectation of benefit.

  You no longer have any reasonable expectation of benefiting from whatever desirable qualities this person may have. Does your potential love now turn into hate, or at least jealousy?

How people manage perceived rejection is a question on it's own. For some people, yes, unrequited love can turn into a poison, many move on and become indifferent.  This reaction, may have less to do with the concept of the loss of potential benefits from this person, than the complex nature of human relationships and the effects of rejection.

  But the fact is that the parent-child relationship is bound by real ties; each person possesses roughly half of the other's genes. That would probably create a strong expectation that whatever benefits the other person produces in life will accrue to you.

This again brings us back to the notion of our behaviour as a species. To a degree it is self interested to protect one's gene pool.

As to the attraction style of individuals, and whether they form patterns of seeking unavailable or unobtainable prospective partners, is another discussion in itself.


Do antidepressants provide a permanent solution for depression and anxiety? Antidepressants works temporarily (as long as you take them), and also affects the cognitive behaviour. Should they be seen as a permanent solution for depression? Shouldn't we find a solution at the psychosocial level, which actually works rather than suppressing the thoughts?

Your assumption that antidepressants works by "suppressing the thoughts" is not supported. Arguably it's quite the opposite. But let us not comment any further.

Now onto your question

Do anti depressant provide permanent solution for depression and anxiety?

At least for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), they normally do.

According to a brochure from the Boynton Health Service of the University of Minnesota:

  Once you respond to an antidepressant, we recommend that you
  continue to take the medication for at least six months. If you stop
  taking the antidepressant before six months have passed there is an
  increased chance that your depression will return. For depressions
  that have lasted a long time (a year or longer), or for a recurrent
  depression, longer periods of treatment should be considered. If you
  wish to discontinue your medication, we recommend that you do this
  during times of decreased demands, such as during breaks or during the
  summer months.

  Source: "Common Questions About Antidepressants" (2005) - page 2

According to an article available from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology healthcare service MIT Medical:

  Clinicians usually recommend that people continue taking
  antidepressants for about six months after they begin feeling better.
  Although it is tempting to stop taking the medication as soon as you
  feel better, abruptly stopping will greatly increase your risk of
  relapse.

  Source: "FAQ: Antidepressants" question #7: "How long should I continue to take antidepressants?"

From an article published by the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, doctor David Louis Dunner has this to say:

  According to the AHCPR Practice Guidelines(1) for the treatment of
  major depression, acute episodes of depression should be treated for
  almost a year and recurrent episodes should be treated somewhat
  longer.

However, Dr. John M. Zajecka states:

  Clinicians should perceive depression as potentially being a lifelong
  illness that may require treatment indefinitely in many patients
  rather than as an illness that can usually be cured with a single,
  short course of treatment like an antibiotic.

Dr. Michael Edward Thase notes:

  There is a difference between “forever” and “indefinitely.” In the
  future, treatments that target the altered pathologic mechanisms of
  recurrent depression may be available and may have a more curative
  effect than the present medications, which suppress illness activity.

While it's debatable whether all "present medications" simply suppress depressive symptoms, consider that this article was published in 2007.

--

Source: "Preventing Recurrent Depression: Long-Term Treatment for Major Depressive Disorder" - PMC 1911177. PMID 17388700.

References:

(1) Clinical Practice Guideline. Number 5: Depression in Primary Care, vol 2. Treatment of Major Depression. Rockville, Md: US Dept Health Human Services, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research; 1993. AHCPR Publication 93-0551.

Last but not least, from Wikipedia:

  Studies have shown that 80% of those suffering from their first major
  depressive episode will suffer from at least 1 more during their
  life,(1) with a lifetime average of 4 episodes.(2) Other general
  population studies indicate that around half those who have an episode
  recover (whether treated or not) and remain well, while the other half
  will have at least one more, and around 15% of those experience
  chronic recurrence.(3) Studies recruiting from selective inpatient
  sources suggest lower recovery and higher chronicity, while studies of
  mostly outpatients show that nearly all recover, with a median episode
  duration of 11 months. Around 90% of those with severe or psychotic
  depression, most of whom also meet criteria for other mental
  disorders, experience recurrence.(4)(5)

  Recurrence is more likely if symptoms have not fully resolved with
  treatment. Current guidelines recommend continuing antidepressants for
  four to six months after remission to prevent relapse. Evidence from
  many randomized controlled trials indicates continuing antidepressant
  medications after recovery can reduce the chance of relapse by 70%
  (41% on placebo vs. 18% on antidepressant). The preventive effect
  probably lasts for at least the first 36 months of use.(6)

  Those people experiencing repeated episodes of depression require
  ongoing treatment in order to prevent more severe, long-term
  depression. In some cases, people must take medications for long
  periods of time or for the rest of their lives.(7)

  References:

  (1) Fava GA, Park SK, Sonino N (2006). "Treatment of recurrent
  depression.". Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics. 6 (11): 1735–1740.
  doi:10.1586/14737175.6.11.1735. PMID 17144786.

  (2) Limosin F, Mekaoui L, Hautecouverture S (2007). "Stratégies
  thérapeutiques prophylactiques dans la dépression unipolaire
  [Prophylactic treatment for recurrent major depression]". La Presse
  Médicale. 36 (11–C2): 1627–1633. doi:10.1016/j.lpm.2007.03.032.
  PMID 17555914.

  (3) Eaton WW, Shao H, Nestadt G, Lee HB, Lee BH, Bienvenu OJ, Zandi P
  (2008). "Population-based study of first onset and chronicity in
  major depressive disorder". Archives of General Psychiatry. 65
  (5): 513–20. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.65.5.513. PMC 2761826.
  PMID 18458203.

  (4) Holma KM, Holma IA, Melartin TK, Rytsälä HJ, Isometsä ET (2008).
  "Long-term outcome of major depressive disorder in psychiatric
  patients is variable". Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. 69 (2):
  196–205. doi:10.4088/JCP.v69n0205. PMID 18251627.

  (5) Kanai T, Takeuchi H, Furukawa TA, Yoshimura R, Imaizumi T,
  Kitamura T, Takahashi K (2003). "Time to recurrence after recovery
  from major depressive episodes and its predictors". Psychological
  Medicine. 33 (5): 839–45. doi:10.1017/S0033291703007827. PMID
  12877398.

  (6) Geddes JR, Carney SM, Davies C, Furukawa TA, Kupfer DJ, Frank E,
  Goodwin GM (2003). "Relapse prevention with antidepressant drug
  treatment in depressive disorders: A systematic review". Lancet. 361
  (9358): 653–61. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(03)12599-8. PMID
  12606176.

  (7) "Major Depression". MedlinePlus. 10 March 2014. Retrieved 16
  July 2010.


How to analyze reaction choice experiments? What are the state-of-the-art approaches to analyze reaction choice experiments?

Example of a reaction choice trial:

Fixation cross (randomized length between 500 and 1500ms)
Choice stimulus: Indicates to press left or right button (200ms)
Response: Which and if one of the two buttons is pressed (max 1000ms after stimulus onset)

This procedure produces the following types of data:

Response times, of

correct responses
incorrect responses
both

Correctness of responses
Omitted responses

What are valid ways to analyze these interdependent yet disjunct types of results? Ideally including references to examples.

Omitted responses are not usually analyzed (what does that even mean, no response before a deadline?, a "does not want to respond" button?).

If you want to analyze jointly choices and RTs, you need a model. I would say the most admitted model right now is the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), which models choice and RTs as the accumulation of noisy evidence toward a decision boundary. These models are actually quite old (the late 50s), but they regained a lot of interest in the past 10 years. Some toolbox (e.g. Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008) will do that for you. Note that these models originally predict equal RTs for correct and incorrect choices, which is typically not what is found. You'll have to add parameters to predict these aspects which will require more data do produce good fits. You can also tweak the model to predict opt-out choices (Kiani, Corthell & Shadlen, 2014). You can tweak it some more to make it predict trials that failed to produce a response before a deadline, but I doubt any toolbox will do it out of the box.

These models are especially usefull if you have various conditions on the same scale (for example 5 levels of luminance), because that will strongly constrain your fits. If you want to analyze differences between a small number of conditions, especially if they are not on the same scale, I would avoid using them. (1) Fitting a 10+ parameter model to compare just 2 conditions is highly dubious (despite that people do it all the time), and (2) your results become model dependent. What if the model is wrong, are your conclusions still valid? What you can do is simply compare z-transformed ratio correct responses and median of RTs (because the are not normally distributed, you can also take their inverse which make them more or less normal) in your favorite statistical test and make sure there is no speed-accuracy tradeoff.

Ratcliff, R., & Rouder, J. N. (1998). Modeling response times for two-choice decisions. Psychological Science, 9(5), 347-356.

Vandekerckhove, J., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2008). Diffusion model analysis with MATLAB: A DMAT primer. Behavior Research Methods, 40(1), 61-72.

Kiani, R., Corthell, L., & Shadlen, M. N. (2014). Choice certainty is informed by both evidence and decision time. Neuron, 84(6), 1329-1342.


What do we call the "middle" variables in a complex research model? Basic theory building goes like this: you create a theory which has an independent variable and a dependent variable. I have also been taught to use "explanatory variable" as synonym for "independent variable" and "goal variable" and "response variable" as synonyms for "dependent variable". Then you do empirical research and measure the connection strength, or find out that there is no connection after all :(

As this is rarely complex enough for theories in disciplines where humans are involved, there is also the option to create a multivariate model, where many independent variables will explain a dependent (or goal) variable. There, the terminology is still unambiguous.

But many models from recent publications are more complex than this. Consider this path model:

Continuance intention seems to be the goal variable, because it doesn't lead to any other variables. Interaction and User value are certainly independent variables in this model, because they don't depend on others. But what are Satisfaction and Flow experience? They depend on lots of other variables, but they are not our goal variable, because this model is about Continuance intention, not about Satisfaction or Flow experience.

So, what is the proper terminology for such variables stuck in the middle of a multi-level model?

Citation for the picture: Examining users′ intention to continue using social network games: A flow experience perspective
Chiao-Chen Chang (2013)
Telematics and Informatics  30 (4) p. 311-321

I've always found it difficult to pack up real-world data into the neat boxes of methodology textbooks, but if you really need a label for these, I'd go with mediator variable.

From a famous article on these variables:

  Specifically, we differentiate between two often-confused functions of
  third  variables: (a) the moderator function of third variables, which
  partitions a focal independent variable into subgroups that establish
  its domains of maximal effectiveness in regard to a given dependent
  variable, and (b) the mediator function of a third  variable, which
  represents the generative mechanism through which the focal
  independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of
  interest.

Reference:

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 51(6), 1173.


Differentiations of Imposter Syndrome How can Imposter Syndrome be differentiated from actually possessing its symptoms? For example, one of the symptoms is the feeling that the person does not possesses extra intelligence, but that they have tricked their peers into such false perceptions.

Perhaps either one is true, either they posses special skills in scamming the public, so to say. Or they have imposter syndrome, but how can one truly know? Especially after coming across the fact that descriptions of such states exist.

In short, how do we differentiate imposter syndrome from [one who feels like] an actual imposter?

Please comment for clarifications

It sounds like two measurements are needed:

1) Perception of competence. This could be measured using self-report for large studies, or semi-structured interviews for individuals or small samples. For example, individuals could use semantic differential scales to rate global or specific aspects of quality at characteristics or tasks that are key to that activity.

2) Objective measurement of competence. This will be specific to the domain. I work in science, and there are increasing (although flawed) metrics to measure quality such as the H-index for publishing impact. One could also use a basket of other measures, and they could include subjective input like peer ratings. Similar studies have been run in personality psychology.

In an individual, it would be difficult to know whether an observed difference between 1) and 2) is meaningful (e.g., not due to chance). This would be easier in populations, where two distributions could be compared using a method like correlation.

On a less methodological note, many beliefs about the self are not strictly accurate. A general summary is that most beliefs about the self are MORE positive than they should be: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_superiority However, people seem to underrate their abilities for rare tasks: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worse-than-average_effect

The original post mentioned scamming others into a belief. Keep in mind that some qualities don't have precise scientific content, or are defined in a huge amount of conflicting ways (e.g., "leadership"), and so it would be difficult to objectively verify. That is, the imposter syndrome will be easier to verify for specific, concrete tasks and well-studied abilities (including intelligence).


How can someone asleep recognize a very brief sound? I have a snoring girlfriend. To interrupt her snoring, I make a sound similar to the very brief sound gas makes when opening a soda can or bottle (had a snoring brother, I know this technique works very well):
Here is a recording of the slound:
https://instaud.io/3hJH

Sometimes her snoring wakes me up in the middle of the night (eg 3AM), so I make that sound, and she immediately wakes up and asks me from a very clear and aware voice: "why did you just pshiiished me?".
The sound I make is around 150 ms long, so I don't understand how someone who is being awakened and transitioning from sleep into consciousness would have the ability to distinctively recognize it.
Sometimes she'll even complain that I interrupted a nice dream she was in, which leads me to believe her sleep level was quite deep.
Can someone explain how a snoring/dreaming person can be awakened by a very brief sound (~ 150 ms long) and be able to distinctively recognize that sound as she transitions from sleep into consciousness?

Short answer
The auditory system remains active during sleep.

Background
Filtering of sensory input during sleep is a recognized phenomenon and indeed the senses are typically lulled during sleep. This phenomenon is, at least partly, caused by thalamic gating. Thalamic gating is caused by the thalamus entering a state in which slow-wave activity disrupts or even blocks incoming sensory input (Coulon et al., 2012). However, the auditory system remains active during sleep and during the full sleep/wake cycle auditory stimulation will evoke responses in various parts of the central auditory system beyond the thalamus (Issa & Wang, 2008).

In fact, when supra-threshold stimuli are intense enough, they invariably result in wakefulness. Auditory stimuli result in so-called K-complexes in the cortex, which are believed to be functional and specialized sensory responses during sleep (Velutti, 1997).

Hence, when you ask...

  The sound I make is around 150 ms long, so I don't understand how
  someone who is being awakened and transitioning from sleep into
  consciousness would have the ability to distinctively recognize it.

...the answer is that the auditory system is active enough to process and recognize the sound. Further, the typical modulation frequency of speech is about 4 Hz (Leong & Goswami, 2014), i.e., the typical syllable length is about 250 ms, meaning that sounds with a duration of 150 ms are long enough to be processed.

References
- Coulon et al., Pflugers Arch (2012); 463(1): 53-71
- Issa 7 Wang, J Neurosci (2008); 28(53): 14467–480
- Leong & Goswami, Front Hum Neurosci (2014)
- Velutti, J Sleep Res (1997); 6: 61–77


Why our brain can't fool itself to constantly produce dopamine? There are experiments [1] showing that our brain tries to maximize amount of dopamine. At the same time it is the brain who controls the dopamine level, because the reward system is located in the brain and if we'll stimulate specific brain areas, our body will produce dopamine.

My question is: why can't our brain learn to constantly stimulate this "reward system" area? Why it learns such complex things like doing math, playing chess, helping other people, etc., which in the far end increase dopamine level (by feeling "evrika" moment, winning a competition, seeing other people grateful) when it can just fool its reward system and manually send electrical signals into it? It is a much more easier and    lucrative task.

P.S. I am not a biologist at all and will be very thankful if you formulate your answers easier than wikipedia articles which are a big struggle for me to comprehend.

P.P.S. I'd like to conduct some research in machine learning (neural networks, to be precise) and was thinking about how our brain prevents such devastating overfitting because underlying concepts can be very useful.

[1] Wikipedia page on the 'Reward system', History

Short answer
Continuous activation of the reward system leads to habituation and hence a downregulation of the pleasure feelings. Further, a continuous euphoric state is a potentially harmful state, as behaviors essential to life are undermined.

Background
I'm having some difficulty what you mean with a brain fooling itself. A brain cannot fool itself. More importantly for the question, however, is that in case of the reward system it definitely doesn't want to 'fool itself'. Below I outline why from two different angles.

The evolutionairy perspective
In its very essence, the reward system is one of the most ancient parts of the brain and the use of dopamine neurons to mediate reward-driven behavior is also seen in worms and flies, which evolved around 1 billion years ago (Mount Sinai Medical School). Indeed, it's evolutionary role is to stimulate behaviors essential to the survival of an individual such as eating, but it is also essential for the survival of the continuity of an entire species by stimulating the drive for sexual reproduction (Melis & Argiolas, 1995). Reward should follow beneficial behaviors - continuous activation wouldn't aid anything other than a continuous euphoric state. An individual being euphoric wouldn't survive long as it wouldn't pursue anything any longer. That would quickly lead to a discontinuation of that trait as the individual would not be fit to reproduce (Darwin's survival of the fittest).

The physiological perspective
Continuous activation of the dopamine pathways quickly results in habituation (increasing resistance to the drug's effects) and, in the case of illicit drugs, to dependence (craving/compulsory drug seeking), together referred to as addiction (compulsive drug use despite harmful consequences). The downregulation of the receptors for dopamine (mainly D2) is a physiological reason reward sensations should be transient and uncommon, otherwise the reward system is being tuned down.

Reference
- Melis & Argiolas, Neurosci Biobehav Rev (1995); 19(1): 19-38


If 10 words are presented at the same time, is it still considered a 'free recall' test? I'm a little bit confused about the definition of a free recall test. According to Wikipedia:

  Items are usually presented one at a time for a short duration, ...

If 10 items are presented at the same time for a short duration and subjects are asked to recall them later, could you still say this is a free recall test?

Free recall refers to not being given exemplars during the retrieval task. For example, multiple choice would be called recognition here, not recall. The format of the presentation such as simultaneous vs. serial, or format of the recall in terms of ordering or grouping, would not affect the term free recall.


What triggers people to do competitive activities? From my past I have seen some people who like to compete in games and try to be first(by games I mean all kind of games or hobbies such as video-games, sports etc. in which competition is included). I assume this kind of activity is needed when people have the need to know that they are equal with the others or to stay above average and be satisfied for what they can achieved.

What is your research is there about this and what actually triggers some people to compete more than others. Is it a nature or a nurture thing?

This obviously has to do with psychological matters which can't be analyzed to a detail and is some kind of a philosophical question but even though which is your opinion also links and studies on this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Culture, psychology and physiology (gender) all play an important role is determining ones willingness and ability to compete.

In one sense your nationality influences your desire to compete. Competition and conflict does not originate with Americans but we have fostered via our culture a society of those who compete. Human nature outside of modern social forces was largely communal and cooperative based.

Psychologically speaking on an individual basis what techniques you know to handle competition will help you perform under the stress of competition but will not itself cause you to be a better performer. It seems the challenge or resistance causes development; not competition.

Testosterone and the male gender roles make competition easier for men. Men are less anxious to start competition. Being easier to start will cause more men to engage in competitive behavior than woman. (Even though women are equally competitive once they begin). Men also outperform women on higher competitive test like college entrance exams where as women outperform men on high school exit exams.

  (a) attitudes toward competition (although men may feel comfortable performing in a competitive setting, women may be more anxious about such prospects), (b) beliefs about relative performance (men may be more confident that they are among the highest-performing participants and thus be more inclined to compete), and (c) risk and feedback aversion (the tournament is not only competitive but is also more uncertain and provides more information about relative performance than the piece-rate scheme; if women are more averse to such factors, they may be less inclined to select
  competitive compensation).

-Gender and Competition: Why do woman shy away from competition.


Can I use data taken in a 5-point Likert Scale, and convert it as if it were taken as a 4-point Likert? I made an error in my qualtrics survey, and used a 5-point Likert scale, when the measure was supposed to use a 4-point scale. I have collected a lot of my data for my dissertation, and am now very nervous.  Do I have to go back and collect all of my data again?

In general, from my extensive experience, using a four or a five point response scale is not going to change much the psychometric properties of a typical psychological self-report scale (e.g., reliability and factor loadings). I also imagine that if you were to measure a multi-item scale with a four point version and a five point version that the correlation would be very close to the test-retest correlation you get with the five point scale.

More extreme changes (e.g., using a 2-point instead of a 5-point) or radically altering the response options would eventually start to create issues, but in the 4 to 7 point range, I think the effects would be subtle, especially if you are dealing with a multi-item scale.

The main issue you will have is that you wont be able to compare your descriptive statistics (e.g., means and standard deviations) with other authors who have used the standard 5-point scale. Whether this is an issue, depends on the aims of your analyses. If you are focused on relationships between variables (e.g., correlations, regressions, group differences, SEM, and so on), then whether you use a 4 or a 5-point scale is not going to make much difference. If you want to compare the means of your sample to the means of previous samples, or if there are particular scoring rules that involve the original metrics (e.g., some tests have cut-off scores used for classification), then you have more of a problem.

There are ways to approximate a rescaling. I.e., estimating what the means and SDs would have been had you used the 5-point instead of the 4-point scale.

rescaled_old_score =  (old_score - OLD_MIN) / (OLD_MAX - OLD_MIN)
new_score = rescaled_old_score * (NEW_MAX - NEW_MIN) + NEW_MIN

Here's what the function looks like in R:

rescale_item <- function(old_score, old_min = 1, old_max = 4, new_min = 1, new_max = 5) {
    rescaled_old_score <-  (old_score - old_min) / (old_max - old_min)
    rescaled_old_score * (new_max - new_min) + new_min
}

template <- data.frame(original = 1:4)
template$new <- round(rescale_item(template$original, 1, 4, 1, 5), 2)
template

which leads to the following rescaling:

  original  new
1        1 1.00
2        2 2.33
3        3 3.67
4        4 5.00

Of course, this is only an approximation. Better estimates of the mapping values could be obtained by administering the tests using both scales to the same sample.


Could a failure of condensed inner speech be linked to slowed cognition? Could a failure of "condensed inner speech" be linked to slowed cognition? It is a type of inner voice, and as conceptualized by Fernyhough it

  involves the capacity to think in terms of pure meaning without the
  need to put thoughts into words in order to grasp the meaning of the
  thought.

I'm just wondering whether, either in healthy or psychopathological cognition, condensed inner speech has been shown to be more difficult when thinking is slowed for some reason, such as psychotropic medication. I have read that people tend to use expanded (as opposed to condensed) inner speech when under stress.

I did not find a study trying to test your idea. I suppose your hypothesis could be tested by comparing the results Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire (VISQ) on the expanded/condensed dimension of participants with induced slower condition to a control group.

McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough (2011) studied the correlations between the dimensions and psycho-pathological variables. They found the expanded/condensed dimension was not predictive of psychopathology.

McCarthy-Jones, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2011). The varieties of inner speech: Links between quality of inner speech and psychopathological variables in a sample of young adults. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1586–1593. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.005


What is the current gold standard in double locked storage of therapeutic records? I am asking this question in the context of a U.S. (Massachusetts) psychologist performing IPA studies. The interviews will be conducted through Zoom mostly. The recorded interviews will be stored the only way they can be, which is digitally. Has anyone found a specific resource describing how psychologists have dealt with the confidentiality concerns of digital information storage? It used to be that the gold standard for double-locked storage of therapeutic records was to put them in a locked file cabinet or locked room in a locked building. Now that we have electronic records, what are people doing about that? Is it enough to:

Put the electronic storage device (laptop, hard drive, flash drive, whatever) inside a locked room in a locked house?
Password protect the storage device, and put it in a locked building
Password protect the storage device, and password protect the folder/file
Something else?

And what about files in the cloud? Is that a no-no, or is the password protection there sufficient for one of the locks?

I cannot find a defined "Gold Standard" within the US, but there is ISO27001:2013 here in the UK and the European Union. More can be found from this IT Governance website.
There is also suggestion that you should also follow ISO27018:2014 if you are storing data in public cloud systems.
In absence of any defined "Gold Standard", you can choose to follow these standards, and if you are not following the "Gold Standard", you need to be able to justify your data protection procedures to any governing body who may be auditing you for compliance with their rules and regulations or when investigating any data breach.
Some say that just following a "Gold Standard" is not enough.
The one thing you should do is regularly review your procedures to ensure you are doing everything reasonably practicable to ensure personally identifiable data is kept secure from unauthorised access. Do you have a copy of your data protection policy and procedures which you personally follow and regularly review and sign off as reviewed? If not, I would put one together and sign it off regularly at review as that would demonstrate your commitment to protecting client's personal information.
One major key point you need to remember with data protection is that you must protect the data from unauthorised access at all points of access.
The following is in response to your individual questions.

Is it enough to put the electronic storage device (laptop, hard drive, flash drive, whatever) inside a locked room in a locked house?

When reviewing your data protection policy and procedures, you should ask this question to yourself along with who has access to the keys to the locked room?
If anyone not authorised to access the personal data has access to the keys then the answer in my view is that it is not enough. Otherwise, how are you going to prevent unauthorised access by others who have access to the keys to the locked room?

Is it enough to password protect the storage device, and put it in a locked building

With regard to locking the storage device in a building, that is covered in the previous question. Password protection can add further protection, but is it enough? This goes with your 3rd question

Is it enough to password protect the storage device, and password protect the folder/file

This is not straight forward to answer and will depend on many different factors.
If the password is strong, the storage device remains in the one room, and is always locked away when unattended then passwords will provide extra protection but will it be enough protection from theives who might break in and steal the storage device?
Windows 10 provides device encryption, but not Windows 10 Home it needs to be Windows 10 Pro or Enterprise. Encryption will prevent data from being read if the harddrive was removed and transferred to another computer.
There is 3rd party software available for device encryption and each one is different to the other on strength of encryption, security and cost.
If you are talking about files such as Microsoft Word documents or Excel files, you can password protect the file from being read, and in this case, Microsoft Office encrypts the file. If stored on an encrypted device, this double encrypts the file from access.
These are things to think about.

And what about files in the cloud?

In response I would ask Do you really need to store the data in the cloud?
If so, then I would be very picky as to what cloud service you choose to use.
Ask yourself:

Who can access your data in the cloud?
Can the cloud service provider(s) access the data?I only know of one cloud service provider who has no access to your data. With them, the files are encrypted their end and if you forget your password, you have lost access to your data for good. There may be others but I don't know them if there are.
If the cloud service provider can access your data, what is their policy with regard to Privacy and Data Protection? Is it in line with yours? - Keep an up-to-date copy with your policy and procedures.
Is the data encrypted in the cloud?
Is the data transfer encrypted end-to-end when transferred between the cloud server and your storage device, and if so, how strong is that encryption?

These are just some questions you will need to find the answers to, and there may be others you feel need addressing.
Protection of digital data is not straight forward but if you think things through thoroughly and seek professional advice where needed you can devise a robust protection procedure which can be justified to any governing body.
Links to sources provided in this answer

https://www.waterstons.com/articles/achieving-the-gold-standard-in-information-security
https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/iso27001
https://www.iso.org/standard/61498.html
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/18/protect_your_digital_enterprise_iso_27001_explainer
https://www.howtogeek.com/195430/how-to-create-a-strong-password-and-remember-it
https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/help/4028713/windows-10-turn-on-device-encryption


Introductory resources on bayesian modeling for cognitive sciences On Cross Validated there is a great question about best introductory books for bayesian statistics. Also, Jeromy Anglim blogged recently about use of JAGS, rjags, and Bayesian Modelling, with some very nice collection of tutorials relevant to the above question. Lots of those resources are single-shot tutorials, covering just some limited scope of programming and modelling.

In terms of resources that cover a broader range of topics with some background information and coding tutorials, only two sources stand out from the list:

Michael Lee and Eric Wagenmakers Course in Bayesian Graphical Modeling for Cognitive Science, and

free and aimed at the beginners, but it's a bit rough (looks like a draft, which authors kind of confirm on their website).

John Kruschke Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R and BUGS.

I can't check (cause' someone stole it from my library), but opinions about it are highly positive.

Those two books could potentially hit the spot in terms of sufficient coverage of basic needs for beginner bayesian acolyte.

What else do you advise as a simple, practical, compact, and thorough introduction to bayesian modeling for a cognitive scientist?

+1 to Speldosa's suggestion. Griffiths and colleagues have written several primers on the use of Bayesian  models in cogsci. Many of them can be found on Griffiths' website under 'Foundations':

http://cocosci.berkeley.edu/publications.php?topic=Foundations

e.g.

  Perfors, A., Tenenbaum, J.B., Griffiths, T. L., & Xu, F. (2011). A
  tutorial introduction to Bayesian models of cognitive development.
  Cognition, 120, 302-321.

  Griffiths, T. L., & Yuille, A. (2008). A primer on probabilistic
  inference. In M. Oaksford and N. Chater (Eds.). The probabilistic
  mind: Prospects for rational models of cognition. Oxford: Oxford
  University Press.


List of research paper meta information sites Note: So-called "big-list" questions are occasionally tolerated here; I'm hoping this one will pass muster.

I'm looking to compile a list of existing post-publication meta-sites.  These would be sites that list research papers (as does any online publication), but instead of just linking to content, they list meta information about the articles.

Most online publications (eg, PsychNET) and search engines (eg, Google Scholar) already list a variety of common meta-information, such as: Abstract, authors, journal, date of publication, citations, etc.  I'm not interested in meta-information already provided by authors upon submission, unless that information is listed on the site in a normalized, searchable format (eg, with a query API).

Rather, I'm looking for meta-information that requires analysis (typically involving human intervention) to compile.  Examples might be: The list of experiments, the "n" of each experiment, the results and significance (p-values), the type of each experiment (RCT, blindness, population study, pre-registered, etc), research field search tags, responses and replications, meta-analyses that the paper is included in...

Examples that I'm aware of to get this list started:

ShortScience.org: Lists layman abstracts for AI papers.
scite_: Check if papers have been supported or contradicted.

What else is out there?

Very interesting question! I would mention https://www.semanticscholar.org/, they do something similar to scite. They classify citations into e.g. "Cites Results" or "Cites Background", they describe their method in this paper.


System 1 thinking and ADHD I'm interested in learning if there is any connection between System 1/System 2 thinking and ADHD. The former is a theory about the process underlying decision making, and the latter is a mental disorder. Thus defined, the two do not seem related. But there appear to be similar behavioral manifestations between the two.

My question is: Do individuals with ADHD rely more on System 1 thinking? Relatedly, I would also like to know if tests for ADHD (in particular T.O.V.A.) are a valid means of measuring the extent to which an individual relies on System 1 thinking.

Pointers to the relevant literature would be especially appreciated.

I think there's very likely a connection between the two, but not a direct one.

The first difficulty will be visible when you dig into the literature on Dual Process Theory — that's the overarching theory that describes what is commonly referred to as System 1/System 2. The long list of descriptors in the table on that Wikipedia page will hint at the problem: variations on the theory have been used to explain so much that it has been difficult for researchers to agree on a neurological basis.

Two good academic articles:

Keith Stanovich and Richard West coined the "System 1/System 2" term in a 2000 paper: Individual difference in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate? in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, which was accompanied by a broad response of peer comments.

A dozen years later, Jonathan Evans and Stanovich wrote Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate. There are undoubtedly important papers which are more recent, but I think what you'll discover is that the theory, while useful, is controversial.

The connection that bridges the two probably resides in Executive Function. Just to pull a paragraph from a paper that illustrates this:

  The dual-process theory suggests that less efficient dopamine-mediated
  reinforcement processes and deficient extinction of previously
  reinforced behavior may explain behavioral changes often described as
  poor executive functions or as response disinhibition.

That invocation of a dual-process theory probably won't sound familiar to anyone whose exposure to the theory was by way of Kahneman's book, but you can see that the connection is via executive functions.

If you amend your search to connections between Executive Function and ADHD, you'll hit pay dirt quite quickly. A good article to start with is Thomas Brown's ADD/ADHD and Impaired Executive Function in Clinical Practice (2008).

And it becomes fairly clear that there probably is a connection: ADHD probably interferes with either or both of System 1 or System 2. But which, and how?

Getting to your explicit question: Do individuals with ADHD rely more on System 1 thinking? Since System 1 thinking is, broadly speaking, subconscious, the answer is probably not. Maybe a little. It seems more likely (to me) that ADHD shifts the focus of thinking in ways that, perhaps, disconnects some System 1 processing from the System 2 thinking which we might expect to have followed it, but that doesn't mean that less System 2 thinking is taking place. A very different hypothesis could assert that some System 1 process is degraded, leading to a larger amount of poorly directed System 2 thinking. There doesn't seem to be much research targeting this question yet.

With respect to the Test of Variables of Attention, note this text from the "About" page:

  The duration of testing is a significant factor, since subjects who
  are older and more intelligent can compensate for mild or moderate
  attention problems for 5, 10, even 15 minutes.

That word "compensate" should give you pause. Is it plausible that some automatic System 1 response is detecting attentional drift and correcting it? Or that, with age, some subjects will have compensated by consciously directing (System 2) themselves to refocus?

The 2013 blog post you link to is interesting, but appears to be a little haphazard. The blogger seems to believe that a fast or "global thinker" could trigger a false-positive for ADHD. I'd suggest looking into the research connecting ADHD and high IQ. There's not too much of it, but it is interesting. Two articles you might start with: Executive Function Impairments in High IQ Adults With ADHD (2009) (although the focus is on adults, not children) or Co-Occurrence of ADHD and High IQ (2010).


How to fit an ex-wald distribution model with R? I'm working on reaction time data. I want to fit the data with an ex-wald model but I only found one paper which interpreted the fitting with S. But I don't know S. Are there any ways to fit the RT data with R, python or Matlab?

This seems promising. I haven't used it

Heathcote, A. (2004). Fitting Wald and ex-Wald distributions to response time data: An example using functions for the S-PLUS package. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36(4), 678-694.
http://www.tascl.org/uploads/4/9/3/3/49339445/26_.pdf

It does include s-plus code in a supplement to the journal article:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758%2FBF03206550

Often S-plus can be used in R, sometimes with some adjustments.


Where to find patient responses on Rorschach's Inkblot test? I am looking to find data that has patient's responses to Rorschach's inblots as well and their associated diagnosis ( Mainly looking into patients that have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, depression or a related mental illness).
I have been able to find researches that mention they have used a number of patients, and give out their Exner scoring system for their illness, but is there a place where I can find the actual responses?
I do not need confidential data, mainly just patient's responses. Looking into doing some experimentative AI related tasks.

Where would I find such data?
Any guidance is appreciated!

Unfortunately, Exner scoring seems to be the standard for Rorschach test studies. The scores are likely a way of protecting patients that may give very personal answers that can identify them. For example, if a research subject reports the Rorschach image as reminding them of their hometown in Brooklyn and their mother who is a famous person, a research study that report raw data and raw responses will not pass ethics due to confidentiality issues.

You are right, most studies use the Exner reporting system -

Japanese study looking at young people with schizophrenia

Adolescent females study

You will likely need to contact studies and join teams that do Rorschach studies to learn the specifics for yourself. Unfortunately, you would not be able to cite or use it as the basis for your research.


The role of high-performance in neuropsychology As far as I understand, neuropsychology gains most of its insights from the reconciliation of lesions of the brain and cognitive impairments. Normal functioning (both of the brain and the mind) plays a less important role in neuropsychology.

My question is:

  Which role does cognitive high-performance play in
  neuropsychology? Are there attempts to map cognitive high-performance processes to neurophysiological structures and processes? Some examples would be great.

Examples of cognitive high-performance:

eidetic memory (e.g. Stephen Wiltshire)
memorization of pi (e.g. Akira Haraguchi)
mental calculators (e.g. Gert Mittring)
speedcubing (e.g. Lucas Etter)
advanced mathematics
advanced chess playing

The mere fact that for such high-performers there are possibly enlarged (and internally more strongly and probably more specifically connected) areas of the brain (and connections between them) is not what I am looking for. Especially for the more mathematical and intricate cases there must be more than that.

The main difference between neuropsycholgy by impairment and neuropsychology by high-performance seems to be that in the former case you can more easily perform statistical studies (but also single-case studies), in the latter case you can only perform single-case studies.

The short answer to your question is that, yes, you are correct. "Cognitive high performance" is a much smaller part of classic neuropsychology than the study of brain damage. There are studies of the topics that you mention from a cognitive neuroscience perspective (e.g., a study by Krawczyk et al. (2011) which does neuroimaging of chess experts). Some cases such as eidetic memory are disputed, so most of the science has focused on that. "The exceptional brain" is a classic book on "special talents" and neuropsychology, but it is pretty old now.

I don't completely agree with your final point. Extremely good and extremely poor performance can both be studied with single cases OR group studies, but for the latter you obviously need to find multiple people with similar behaviour which is hard for both classic neuropsychology (e.g., selective agnosias) and for special talents.

Some definitions of neuropsychology specifically refer to brain damage and deficits, so in that sense your point is trivially true. Some, or perhaps most, people studying patients are partly motivated by helping people who have problems, and so studying high achievers might be less useful. We have quite a good understanding of some syndromes because of their reasonably high frequency and many decades of research (e.g., Neglect, Balints, Ataxias, Aphasias). I think you could make the argument that the behaviour demonstrated in these cases is not just "less than" normal but qualitatively different. Most people can play chess, improve their memory and memorize long numbers, particularly with training. So it is easier to see those with "special talents" as just the extreme end of a continuum which could be studied with typical people.

Lastly, you might be interested in looking at work with autism which I think is a good example of something where people have looked at both the negative aspects and the (potential) advantages.

Krawczyk, D. C., Boggan, A. L., McClelland, M. M., & Bartlett, J. C. (2011). The neural organization of perception in chess experts. Neuroscience letters, 499(2), 64-69. [PDF]
Obler, L. K., & Fein, D. E. (1988). The exceptional brain: Neuropsychology of talent and special abilities. Guilford Press.


Neural basis of primitive (newborn) reflexes The Wikipedia article on primitive reflexes, or newborn reflexes, states that they originate in the CNS. Here's the list of reflexes from the article:

Moro
Walking/stepping
Rooting
Sucking
Tonic neck
Palmar grasp
Plantar
Galant
Swimming
Babkin

Precisely where in the CNS do they originate?

It seems that there is not much research concerning the anatomical localization of primitive reflexes. For instance, Schott & Rossor (2003) state in the conclusion of their review

  The complexity of
  many of these responses makes it perhaps unsurprising that
  detailed anatomical localisation, despite the availability of
  structural and functional imaging, has in general not been
  possible.

However, at least for the grasp reflex, they discuss an involvement of frontal areas.

References
Schott, JM Rossor M (2003). The grasp and other primitive reflexes. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 74(5): 558–560. [DOI] [PDF]


Could physically simulating neural structure on a fundamental level yield superior results to machine learning algorithms? My curiosity is merely of whether (in a future where we have computers with the processing power of the human brain) it's possible that actually simulating a neural network's physical behavior on the most fundamental level might be more effective than using algorithms to reach the same result.

I'm hoping for an answer which argues this topic on a purely fundamental level.

Is it likely (or not) that we might achieve a superior (more efficient, more intelligent, more dynamic) result by simulating the advanced behavior of neural interaction (the neuro-activity patterns the brain experiences to form emotions, develop conclusions, processes sensory data, establish and/or revisit memories, etc) than we can reach by using shortcuts (advanced machine learning algorithms, etc)?

Very interesting question. Although I have not a single little bit of expertise in this area, I do have some references you may want to read. First is a paper by Merz and Fromherz (2005) where they grew snail neurons on a silicon chip. Pfister et al (2007) also tried to grow neurons to allow interfacing between neurons and machine (for neural prosthesis e.g.). There is thus definitely a field of research that believe neural interfacing may be better than mechanical and algorithmic networks.

There has been 10 years worth of research since these papers so I bet there are some advancements that may give you a more definitive answer than mine.