What is the influence of "effort put into pursuing wealth" on happiness? As presented in the TED talk by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (3:30) repeated research has been unable to show a correlation between happiness and level of material wealth (above a certain minimum threshold).

As a result, a line of reasoning that is often made is:

  "We should stop pursuing more wealth, since attaining it will not make
  us happier."

While i agree that we can conclude from this research that attaining more wealth will not make us happier, i don't think we can conclude that the amount of effort we put into pursuing more wealth has no influence on our happiness.

There is anecdotal material to show that putting less effort into the pursuit of wealth makes you happier, take Zen monks for example, but there are a lot of other factors that could be causing their increase in happiness.

What research has examined the merit/effect of detachment from material wealth?
To what extent is pursuing or not pursuing wealth related to happiness?

EDIT:
Happiness, as roughly defined by any of the known measurement methods.

In alignment with the question author's commentary refinement, "It would already be a nice and useful answer if there was -any- clue on -any- type of happiness.":I submit:

Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. "Subjective Well-Being and Income: Is There Any Evidence of Satiation?" American Economic Review 103.3 (2013): 598-604. Web.

Abstract

Many scholars have argued that once “basic needs” have been met, higher income is no longer associated with higher in subjective well-being. We assess the validity of this claim in comparisons of both rich and poor countries, and also of rich and poor people within a country. Analyzing multiple datasets, multiple definitions of “basic needs” and multiple questions about well-being, we find no support for this claim. The relationship between well-being and income is roughly linear-log and does not diminish as incomes rise. If there is a satiation point, we are yet to reach it.Summary of findings:To preview, we find no evidence of a satiation point. The income–well-being link that one finds when examining only the poor, is similar to that found when examining only the rich. We show that this finding is robust across a variety of datasets, for various measures of subjective well-being, at various thresholds, and that it holds in roughly equal measure when making cross-national comparisons between rich and poor countries as when making comparisons between rich and poor people within a country.

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In contrast...

Diener, Ed, and Biswas-Diener, Robert. "Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being?" Social Indicators Research 57.2 (2002): 119-169. Web.

Abstract (reformatted for ease of reading)

Four replicable findings have emerged regarding the relation between income and subjective well-being (SWB):There are large correlations between the wealth of nations and the mean reports of SWB in them,There are mostly small correlations between income and SWB within nations, although these correlations appear to be larger in poor nations, and the risk of unhappiness is much higher for poor people,Economic growth in the last decades in most economically developed societies has been accompanied by little rise in SWB, and increases in individual income lead to variable outcomes, andPeople who prize material goals more than other values tend to be substantially less happy, unless they are rich.Thus, more money may enhance SWB when it means avoiding poverty and living in a developed nation, but income appears to increase SWB little over the long-term when more of it is gained by well-off individuals whose material desires rise with their incomes. Several major theories are compatible with most existing findings:The idea that income enhances SWB only insofar as it helps people meet their basic needs, andThe idea that the relation between income and SWB depends on the amount of material desires that people's income allows them to fulfil[].We argue that the first explanation is a special case of the second one. A third explanation is relatively unresearched, the idea that societal norms for production and consumption are essential to understanding the SWB-income interface. In addition, it appears high SWB might increase people's chances for high income. We review the open issues relating income to SWB, and describe the research methods needed to provide improved data that will better illuminate the psychological processes relating money to SWB.

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In spite of the substance in my answer (above), I maintain that the premise and question are poorly framed. Not unlike Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), I firmly believe that a post-modernist philosophical approach is being employed by this line of research that flirts dangerously close to pseudo-science. While there is little doubting the potential for the sensational, I stand with those who venture that applying immature definitions, as well as, recursive and undeclared assumptions create an illusion of scientific maturity that simply does not exist. Further, the current approach (unintentionally?) advocates unsound scientific short-cuts that, at best, run the risk of gross misinterpretation by lay persons -- while at worst, subject the entire body of knowledge to endless premise challenges. There is very little in this thread of research that is meaningful or actionable outside a very narrow community -- and still, for them, most appropriately, only to conclude that more focus is needed. It can, after all, be considered an advance to get off the blank page and begin scratching away at the "we don't know what we don't know" knowledge boundary. I suppose through Dr. Steven Wright (Visiting scientist, Brain and Language Lab, Georgetown University), I can be more cogent (and diplomatic) on this point.

According to Dr. Steve Wright, it is important for researchers to level set their understanding of the meaning happiness before measuring happiness or interpreting statistics for actionable conclusions. He suggests that, currently, two high-level meanings of happiness have emerged. One is happiness as a transitory emotion, a feeling. He further suggests, there are researchers who seem to think this is all there is, and would define a happy life as nothing more than a tally of emotionally “up” or "down" snapshots. While the completely, separate and distinct alternative meaning has a stronger cognitive component (bias), involving memory and judgment (which introduces entirely different, if not equally subjective challenges to scientific measurement and replicability. Finally, Dr. Wright also suggests the integrity of subjects answers can (should?) be viewed through a lens of disbelief -- that is, 'is a respondent's answer true and accurate or skewed selectively and/or unintentionally?Researchers have not yet come to an agreement about this dichotomy. They’re still quite a ways from being able to shed much light on most of the big questions. What’s really known scientifically advances slowly.

Disclaimer:  With the exception of the final blockquote, I am not purporting to channel Dr. Wright. My representation of him is applied interpretation.


Does the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM contain a Global Assessment of Functioning measure? I suspect that only licensed psychiatrists get to see the contents of the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM (SCID). I am drafting a proposal currently and need to know if the data I am applying for access to use has the data structures I need for my experiment. I need to know that the SCID generates evaluation measures of symptom clusters from disorder types in the DSM AND a measure of Global Functioning. Is this the case? What does phenotypic SCID data look like?

I couldn't find the SCID anywhere on the web. So i did some digging I found one literature search that used the DSM SCID as an example of a semi-structured interview from which GF data could be found (H Monrad, 2014). I also found that DSM- 5 had removed the GF scale (Gold, 2014), but presumably the alternative measures the same properties.

  the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF), the previously
  endorsed numerical rating scale used for assessment of functioning and
  reported on Axis V, has been eliminated. In its place, DSM-5 offers
  psychiatrists a new tool for assessment of global functioning and
  impairment, the World Health Organization Disability Assessment
  Schedule 2 (WHODAS 2.0).

And finallly I found a study by Aas which looks at rating the GF assesment, in which they reference a study by Williams which looks at the test retest reliability of the SCID.

  Rating GAF may mean choosing the lowest score for other specified time periods, for example the lowest level in the past month or for the worst week during the month prior to interview (Williams et al, 1992).

Based on the above it is reasonable to conclude that the SCID contains a measure for GF, even if it now called WHODAS.

Aas, I. M. (2011). Guidelines for rating global assessment of functioning (GAF). Annals of general psychiatry, 10(1), 1.

Williams, J. B., Gibbon, M., First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Davies, M., Borus, J., ... & Wittchen, H. U. (1992). The structured clinical interview for DSM-III-R (SCID): II. Multisite test-retest reliability. Archives of general psychiatry, 49(8), 630-636.

Gold, L. H. (2014). DSM-5 and the assessment of functioning: the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule 2.0 (WHODAS 2.0). Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online, 42(2), 173-181.

H Monrad Aas, I. (2014). Collecting Information for Rating Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF): Sources of Information and Methods for Information Collection. Current psychiatry reviews, 10(4), 330-347.


Determining if participants learned the objects as a whole or feature by feature I want to know if in an experiment participants will learn the object as a whole or feature by feature.

Let's say, my objects are geometric shapes, and its features are color and orientation.

Would it be a good idea if I do something like:

  Assign each object a unique color and a unique shape
  Randomly assign participants to either color or orientation group
  Tell participants to pay attention to "the" feature of objects (color or orientation, according to the group they belong) (this "paying attention" can be done in several ways, for example by asking participants to do an $n-$back task only with "the" feature)
  Show objects to the participants on a screen in random order, possibly many times.
  Suprise recognition task. Sometimes they will see exactly the same object, sometimes the orientation will be the same, but color will be
  different. Sometimes both color and orientation will be different
  etc.

My questions are:

Does this experiment measure what I want to measure?

Can you suggest some keywords for the above situation? Binding problem is somehow related but it is not exactly what I am seeking for.

Your experiment is most similar to those in categorization research. For example, Wills et al (2013)* argued that single-dimension classification (one-feature analysis) is less effortful, than multidimensional with more than one dimension, and omni-dimensional, where you process and categorize the stimuli as a whole. They used the match-to-standard procedure, where each stimuli is classified by participants as members of categories. This task was first used by Regehr and Brooks (1995) and basically means that you map each the stimuli features and each stimuli feature that you categorize.

For example, you have Stimulus A (dark, square), Stimulus B (light, triangle) and Stimulus C (dark, triangle). The dimensions are shape and colour.

Dimensions    colour shape
Stimulus A      1      0
Stimulus B      0      1
Stimulus C      1      1

Of course you have to have to set up rules for stimuli structures in category learning or learning in general and fit the stimuli into those structures.

If you instruct them to pay attention to the first dimension only, you would pay attention only to the first dimension in the data analysis. But that would be supervised learning, and that would defeat the purpose of your experiment. If you are curious to whether they learn by single-dimensions or through omni-dimension, you must not supervise the learningand should not provide feedback, because feedback will likely become superior to simple observational learning (see Wills, Milton & Edmunds, 2015).

A very good example is Nosofsky et al. (1994) replicating Shepard et al. (1961). That one is the closest to what you described you want to do. You can find the data and look at the categorisational structure in catlearn (Wills et al., 2016), so you can see how they handled their stimuli dimensions and data.

Hope this helps. I might have not been too coherent, but I think the gist is there.

Nosofsky, R. M., Gluck, M. A., Palmeri, T. J., McKinley, S. C., & Glauthier, P. (1994). Comparing modes of rule-based classification learning: A replication and extension of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). Memory & Cognition, 22(3), 352–369.

Regehr, G., & Brooks, L. R. (1995). Category organization in free classification: The organizing effect of an array of stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(2), 347–363.

Shepard, R. N., Hovland, C. I., & Jenkins, H. M. (1961). Learning and memorization of classifications. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 75(13), 1.

Wills, A. J., Connell, G. O., Edmunds, C. E. R., & Inkster, A. B. (2016). Progress in modeling through distributed collaboration: Concepts, tools, and category-learning examples. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 1–23.

Wills, A. J., Milton, F., & Edmunds, C. E. R. (2015). Feedback can be superior to observational training for both rule-based and information-integration category structures. Retrieved from https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/handle/10026.1/3064

Wills, A.J., Milton, F., Longmore, C.A., Hester, S., & Robinson, J. (2013). Is overall similarity classification less effortful than single-dimension classification?. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 66, 299-318.

* You can visit the authors' website to get the data and how the analysed that data.


Do people with ADD or Asperger's Syndrome often show different learning curves than neurotypical individuals? There's some interesting discussion at this Wrong Planet thread

Specifically, I was wondering whether people with ADD or Asperger's Syndrome are more likely to show a logistic pattern in their learning curves?

Although I don't know any publications exactly on that matter it is possible to be true.
So please treat this as a speculation.

People with Asperger Syndrome (or High-Functioning Autism) have higher attention to detail and tend to build more rigid structures in their minds (while neurotypicals may have more error-tolerant but less efficient structures). So it is very possible that the learning curve for AS starts slowly and then have sharp leaps. In the initial stage they may see merely a collection of facts (while neurotypicals can manage to work with them as they are less demanding when it comes to the self-consistency and structure). However, when it 'clicks' and one understands pattern of the structure it may give a considerable advantage.

Moreover, it may be also about time spent learning. Once a person with AS feels safe in a topic, (s)he may like to learn it even, while for a neurotypical there is no so much fun in learning more details.

When it comes to the relation of skills and cognitive style and Asperger Syndorme, the following references may be useful:

Samuel J. Umland, Karl Wessel "Cassandra Among the Cyborgs" in Darren Tofts Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History
Hsu-Min Chiang, Yueh-Hsien Lin, Mathematical ability of students with Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism: A review of literature (2007)

The first one is an essay relating cognitive styles of: people with AS, nerds and science. The second shows that there is high variance in mathematical skills among people with AS (so most are below average, but some are way above).

From my experience, the effect is very well visible when it comes to presenting knowledge. Nerdy people typically are bad at presenting topics they don't understand well. Neurotypical do it much better (perhaps because they make 'didactic lies' much easier, or they are not concerned so much by 'chaos' or lack of self-consistency, or they are better at repeating catch-phrases). At the same time nerds understanding a topic well often understand it really well (knowing a lot of connection, analogies, what is exact and what approximate, etc).


Database of EEG signal phenomenon I'm working on a paper describing the current state of EEG headsets used as computer interfaces. One of the things that is key for building a system using an EEG headset as a controller is having some known EEG response to detect. Examples I've been learning about are the P300, the SSVEP, motor-image-related changes in mu & beta rhythm amplitudes, and slow cortical potentials.

Has anyone created a common database or textbook of known phenomenon like these? I'm not talking about implementations that detect and use the signal changes, but rather a comprehensive list of everything currently known about EEG data. Everything that can be reliably reproduced, regardless of whether the underlying brain function is understood.

If you have learned about the P300, Steven Luck's An introduction to the event-related potential technique (2014) will be of interest;
the SSVEP and motor-image-related changes are used in BCI, so this book "Brain-Computer Interfaces: Principles and Practice" by John and Elizabeth Wolpaw will be helpful.


Training adults on how to react to social cues. I was researching social cues and stumbled upon this article, which concludes that:

  results suggest that implicit learning is context-dependent and can be influenced by the cue type, e.g., social and object cues.

Now, that is not surprising at all, the findings that learning is context-dependent, meaning that relevant social cues improve it. However, what if the subject has to learn how to react to social cues? Say we are talking about individuals that for various reasons, (let's say, social isolation growing up or as one symptom of a disorder or other) do not know how to react to most social cues, or to more complex ones? How do you train them, given that, as adults, exposure in a cvasi-controlled environment (like school) is not possible?

I guess my question is: In adult learning, would it be possible to train people to understand or react to social cues, taking into account that you need to make the training context-dependent? *

Yes. The first step in teaching others to recognize and how to respond to social cues is to help them learn self-awareness. They need to become aware of how they feel and naturally respond to stimuli. People with ASD often struggle with having a detached look of themselves- ToM. That too someone can overcome through self-awareness. Google scholar self-awareness and social competence.


Removing ocular artifacts from EEG signals I have read the following paper , which is try to remove EOG artifacts from EEG signal , the authors give the following figure .

The authors claim that components 1 and 2  represent electro-oculographic (EOG) artifacts. This is because its scalp map refers to locations very near to eye. My first question is how we map an ICA component to a certain location on scalp map. Secondly, how do we know a component lies on the front of the head, and not on another location, for example the center?

In short: we know that eye-blinks are reflected frontally in the EEG data and we use that knowledge to identify which components reflect for example eye-blinks. It would not make sense to identify a component related to eye-blinks on the back of the head - there would be something wrong with your data.

What ICA does is (data driven) estimate a number of statistically independent components (if you have 64 channels you get 64 components) based on your data. The input data is usually in the form of channels X timepoints X trials.

Eventually the output of ICA gives you, for each component, a weight for each channel which you can use to create the component scalp map. Together, the component scalp maps, the time course of the components, and frequency information of the component provide supplementary information that you can use to identify artifacts such as (but not limited to) eye-blinks, horizontal eye movements and heart beat.

In the above figure component 14 and 15 do not seem to be eye artifacts. (1) they are very focal, which is probably related to noise specific to that channel. (2) They look to be completely uncorrelated with the eye blinks in the original signal.


Do we perceive contrast colour patterns easily because of adaptation? I can understand that colours are just manipulation of our brain to light rays of different wavelength and energy. We perceive patterns better at higher contrast. Do we perceive patterns better at high contrast because of adaptive processes in our brain, i.e., do we habituate to the colours?

For example, consider a black board; we find texts written by white chalk easier to see than if it was written by blue chalk. Is white chalk on black board a form of adaptation of our brain, or it is always preferred by the brain in comparison to blue? In terms of wave mechanics, the white chalk may cause greater disturbance in the light waves travelling from the black board to our eyes.
Please don't consider the case of any eye defects.

Short answer
Contrast is hardwired in the visual system and can be explained by retinal and brain connectivities without the need for adaptive processes. My answer pertains to adaptation at the neurophysiological level. In other words, short-term neural adaptation in the retina or the visual cortex are not necessary components for color-contrast coding in the visual system.

Background
According to the model of Hering, color contrast in trichromatic species (such as most humans) is basically established between three sets of opponent systems: yellow-blue, red-green and the achromatic channel (dark-bright), and depicted in Fig. 1. The opponent system is established in the brain by cells in the visual cortex responding to both colors of a pair, but one color (e.g. blue) excites and the other (yellow) inhibits the cell, or vice versa. These systems are basically established by funneling the color information of opponent colors from the primary sensory neurons (the photoreceptive rods and cones) to color sensitive cells in the visual cortex (Gouras, 2009). In effect, we cannot perceive a yellowish blue, or a reddish green, because these colors are opponent colors in a pair.

Fig. 1. Hering model of color opponency. source: Mark Green

Because of this, the primary color-pairs yellow-blue and red-green yield excellent contrast, because in the brain the opponent response of cells will cause the edge to be sharply defined. Likewise, the achromatic channel yields high-contrast acuity. Mixed colors will impinge on this system not in an ON/OFF way, but in a gradient. For example, in your example, the blue chalk will be visualized through the yellow-blue opponent channel. On a black background, color contrast will be established against the achromatic channel. The highest possible contrast would be delivered with the blue chalk on a yellow background such that the blue-yellow opponent system could be used (e.g. blue chalk on a yellow 'white' board :-). However, blue chalk on a blackboard had to be contrasted using the yellow-blue against the achromatic channel, which are phsyiologically not opponent systems and therefore yield less sharp contrast.

Another reason is foveal tritanopia: the fovea has the highest resolution for perceiving fine detail. There are no short wave cones (blue cones) in the very center, the area of maximum resolution (Williams et al., 1981), so presumably it is impossible to see blue with the area of the retina with the highest contrast acuity.

Note that while the aforementioned Hering model does not depend on adaptation, many illusions do depend on adaptive processes in the color system, most notably after-images.

References
- Gouras, Color Vision. In: Webvision. The Organization of the Retina and Visual System (2009)
- Williams et al., Vis Res (1981) 21(9): 1341–56


Learning a language by Immersion Immersion is the process by which children learn their native language, but it can also be used in educational settings. Apparently in some countries, where the official language is not the language that is actually spoken, immersion is used in schools to teach the official language. Some companies (like Rosetta Stone) also use the method of immersion in their language programs.
From reading the Wikipedia article it seems that learning (a second) language by immersion is mostly used for children and does take quite a long  time.

Are there studies that compare the learning of a language by immersion and the learning by other approaches?
Is immersion equally useful for adults and for children?

This is a part answer.  According to "Immersion Education for the Millennium:
What We Have Learned from 30 Years of
Research on Second Language Immersion", (Cummins, 1998), based on the Canadian example of French language immersion state:

  For immersion education to attain its maximum potential it must be integrated into an
  educational philosophy that goes beyond just the discipline of Applied Linguistics. Students
  must have opportunities to communicate powerfully in the target language if they are going
  to integrate their language and cognitive development with their growing personal identities.

I noticed this as well when I was a teacher in Japan (I am Australian), where (and this is an anecdotal observation) multilingual students seemed to pick up the language by immersion, rather than the classroom.  The same applied to me, in Japanese classes I did not do too well, but immersing myself into the surroundings, I was able to pick up the language (at least the functional parts) very quickly.

A great reference is "Integrating Language and Content in Immersion Classrooms:
Research Perspectives" (Swain, 1998), making an important point that the traditional way of teaching aspects of language, e.g. grammar in isolation, i.e. without a context is not a particularly effective means of language development.


Term for a disposition to ramble on special interests in conversation? Some people are notorious for "going off on extended tangents," meaning: in any conversation they are prone to expound at length on subjects of personal interest without regard for the interest of, or relevance to, other listeners or participants.  Is there a term for this behavior?

To refine the question: I am curious not about general rambling (which can manifest itself in many ways, and is probably a consequence of many different pathologies), but more specifically about such behavior manifest by people who are "high-functioning" and intelligent, and where the exposition (when it begins) is relevant to the conversation.

For example, I have seen this sort of behavior frequently among people with high-functioning ASD when a conversation touches on a special interest.  It is something of a trope: The geek who everyone knows is going not going to stop talking about, say, trains, and once he gets started will not be derailed from the subject by any hint or attempt by others to bring the conversation back on track.

I'm not asserting that the behavior as described is only manifest in individuals with ASD (although if it is, or is particular to a few recognized conditions, that would be noteworthy).  I'm more curious as to whether the behavior itself has a clinical name or association.

I think the term you're looking for describing the nature of the interests is "obsessive". Quoting from a presentation aimed the general public:

Why so obsessive? Exactly why special interests, obsessions and autism tend to go together is still not very well understood. However, if you look at the key characteristics of autism, it does make a certain sense.
To begin with, autism is associated with ‘rigid’ thinking. This sounds quite judgemental, but another way to say it would be to say that people with autism tend to be more all-or-nothing than most people: something is either absolutely not interesting or absolutely fascinating.
This can be an oversimplification, but people with autism do tend to think in fewer shades of grey. When applied to favourite subjects, this can turn an interest into a passion, or an obsession.

And from a more DSM-ish perspective (that is not presupposing a common cause) that is stated as

Research suggests that anxiety disorders and OCD are highly prevalent in individuals with ASD. However, the significant overlap of ASD features with anxiety and OCD symptomology makes differential diagnosis of these disorders particularly challenging.

In the autism literature, the term "obsession" is used

to indicate strong, repetitive interests, even if this is not accompanied by anxiety.

The latter paper also has a survey of the content of obsessions in children with autism spectrum conditions, in case you're interested. (Generally speaking, such obsession tend to be more object- rather than people-oriented in subjects with autism.)
Keep in mind that the distinction between a "passion" and an "obsession" can be a bit value-laden, and not just when talking about autism, but also in the wider context of perfectionism etc.
An alternative term with practically the same meaning as "obsessive" [interests] is "circumscribed interests". I don't read enough autism literature to tell you if this or "obsessive" is the more prevalent term used. It's probably wise to search for both. It doesn't seem like the terminology has settled. The DSM is not terribly helpful in this respect because it discusses/titles the notion together with behaviors, more precisely using the term(s) Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours and Interests (RRBIs).
Finally the "rambling" part of your question relates more to social deficits present in autism, so what you're asking for is a combination of terms/notions rather than just one. In fact these two dimensions (social deficits and RRBIs) are considered definitory for autism... so the umbrella term you're looking for (for someone rambling about their very narrow interests) is basically... "autistic".
It would be nice if there were a term for some subset of A (social deficits) + some subset of B (RRBis) features, but I doubt you'll find a term so specific given the state of the literature I've looked at. So if "autistic" comes off as too broad, the precise answer is that there isn't a specific term for what you're asking... unless you want to coin/combine existing terms.
It's rather hard to even find a technical term just for the autistic rambling (regardless of subject). I did find an informal term for this used by autistic persons themselves, which has been reproduced in a psychiatry monograph, namely "data dump":

Paradoxically, when patients do eventually begin to talk, they can soon switch into a speech-like monologue that is difficult to interrupt or halt, and may seem rambling. (Often they are also quite self-conscious about how much they are digressing and 'wasting [your] time'.)
Being autistic means being slow to notice non-verbal cues from another person [i.e. from you the doctor] that signal to them [the patient], 'it's my turn to say or ask something now'. It is as as if they have been silently building up their in their minds a long and very detailed account of their lives, which is suddenly released. Some on the autism spectrum refer to this using the computer analogy of 'data dump' (there is no humorous intent here). Attempts to interrupt this flow can produce irritated reactions. This is not anger (although expression of anger can occur suddenly). A common complaint of people on the autism spectrum is that interruptions are hugely problematic--in more extreme cases the only way to resume is to start over at the beginning. Equally, they are sometimes aware of this. 'I know I talk on too much, but I just don't know when to stop, the way other people seem to know with its time to give way'. [sic]

So... if we were to coin a combined term for precisely what you are asking for... "obsessive interest data dump" (more informally) or "circumscribed-interest speech-like monologue" (somewhat more formally) would be the term combo I'd use. And that's for the action itself; for the [pre]disposition to it; prepend that word.
Finally the notion of perseveration defined as

the continuation or recurrence of an experience or activity without the appropriate stimulus

does seem to apply to the [socially uncalled for] "data dump" as well, but perseveration is a slightly broader term, so "perseverative speech/discourse on fixated interest" seems more precise... although there are at least some DSM-5 guidelines on autism using the terms "perseveration on a specific topic" (under criterion B3) and "preservative speech" (criterion B1), and it seems they suggest the former (rather than the latter) for what you ask about. (criterion B3). Note however that "failure of normal back
and forth conversation through reduced sharing of interests" including "One‐sided conversations/monologues/tangential speech" is under criterion A1... and (all three) A's and two B's are required for a diagnosis under DSM-5; and they also suggest to "avoid using the exact same behavioral exemplar to satisfy two criteria." (In general, meeting the DSM-5 criteria for autism is more difficult than for DSM-IV-TR; furthermore, the tightened criteria also results in greater OCD comorbitidy.)


Are there any reliable type descriptions for Big Five personality traits? The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) model of personality provides a list of 16 personality types with accompanying descriptions, like this. Are there analogous types for the Big Five model of personality?

A few thoughts:

MBTI has four dimensions, whereas the Big Five has five dimensions. Thus, when you set a high-low split on MBTI you get $2^4=16$ types. If you were to apply the same idea to the Big 5, you could get $2^5=32$.
However, the Big 5 framework tends to take the underlying continuum of personality traits more seriously. At the very least this should yield a more precise description of standing on a dimension.
The dimensions of the Big 5 are generally understood independently. Thus, it might be sufficient and more parsimonious to have a verbal description to describe a person's standing on each of the five traits. I think this is how most Big 5 test manuals work. They will provide descriptions of what it means to be high or low on each trait and this can be used to provide an overall description to the test taker.


Do introverted people have more emotional stress? Social support has several times been linked to psychological well-being and even physical health.

Some studies have also shown that shyness correlates stronger with introversion than with neuroticism.

This implies that less social people should score lower on physical health and mental well-being.

Note that I am not asking if introversion causes emotional stress, but rather if extroverts are better at coping with emotional stress because their extraversion give better odds for social support.

Is there any research on correlations between extraversion, physical and mental health?

References:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_support
Where in the Big5 does shyness belong?

Neuroticism is more strongly associated with emotional stressors in the form of depression and anxiety than is extraversion. That being said, extraversion is negatively correlated with symptoms of depression, anxiety, and self-reported lifetime mental disorder, even after adjusting for gender, age, and education. It appears that depression is moderately linked to introversion in those who suffer from depression, whereas anxiety is not linked to introversion nor extroversion.

The results of this study indicate that:

  It is argued that (a) one set of traits influences
  positive affect or satisfaction, whereas a different set of traits influences
  negative affect or dissatisfaction; (b) the former set of traits can be viewed as
  components of extraversion, and the latter as components of neuroticism; and
  (c) personality differences antedate and predict differences in happiness over
  a period of 10 years, thus ruling out the rival hypothesis that temporary moods
  or states account for the observed relations.

The paper further argues that one's happiness is relative to one's ability to adapt to new situations in healthy ways, which may be augmented in unhealthy ways by one's level of neuroticism.

So, to answer your question, it does appear that extraversion is linked to positive mental affect. However, it is worth noting that this does not necessarily imply that introversion is correlated to negative affect. It appears that neuroticism is a greater predictor of negative affect, which (hypothetically) could have a harsher impact on someone whose social support system is weaker or consists of fewer people, regardless of internal / external orientation.


Why are empty spaces around hippocampus and striatum not filled with astrocytes? I understand that, generally, when a neuron dies, the vacated, empty space will form a scar in the form of an astrocyte. Basically, the astrocyte thus replaces that neuron.

Why then are there empty spaces around the hippocampus and striatum that aren't filled with astrocytes? I am talking about the same spaces where adult neurogenesis might occur.

Why are these spaces left empty? Are they "waiting" for possible adult neurogenesis and therefore don't get filled in with astrocytes?

A better question might be "How does the CNS distinguish between types of empty spaces inside it?"

Short answer
Glial scarring is due to brain damage. Brain damage results in molecular signals to be released that attract glial cells. Spaces in the brain present during development are not characterized by signalling molecules associated with trauma.

Background
The key here is that glial scar formation follows damage to the brain, and is associated with healing processes in the brain, including those occurring after ischemic stroke (Huang et al., 2014) and physical trauma (source: Society for Neuroscience, 2010). Brain damage results in the release of inflammatory proteins that signal glia to form scar tissue (e.g. Patel et al (2013)).

There are many vacant spaces in the brain (Fig. 1), most notably the four ventricles. These spaces are there from birth, and are actually formed within the first few weeks after conception. Because there are no signals involved from brain trauma, and these structures should be there, the glial system does not get signals to invade these areas and fill them up with glial scar tissue.

Also note that glial cells have little to do with neurogeneration; glia is not nervous tissue.

Fig. 1. Brain ventricles. source: Anatomy Note

References
- Huanget al., Int J Med Sci (2014); 11(4): 344–8
- Patel el al., Int J Physiol Pathophysiol Pharmacol (2013); 5(2): 73–90


Progressed smoothly in a game while not paying attention I was playing Flappy Bird trying to beat my highest score. While on one run (or fly, hehe) my friend got me engaged in a conversation. When the short conversation ended I found myself thinking about something for probably 10-15 seconds, where in this time my eyes were looking at the game on my iPad, and yet my actual attention was not on the game. I was deep in thought on the topic my friend had brought up. The moment I got back to reality, I tried to re-engage myself with the game, but within a few seconds I crashed the poor bird. I had broken my record, however. It was as if another side of me took over while i was busy thinking of something else on the side. I voluntarily tried to reproduce this situation but I failed at the multitasking (as I know some will call it). This has happened while doing other things too. How is this explained, and why can it not be reproduced voluntarily.

My interpretation of this question is that you are asking about divided attention. Some (normally easy) tasks can continue to be accomplished in conditions of divided attention, and with practice you should be able to control this.

I don't know of any research confirming your suggestion that you actually got better in such conditions. You could also look at recent studies on mind-wandering (which tend to show interruptions in the main task when you are thinking about something else) or the passive/active mode in visual tasks (in which, some argue, people actually get better when they don't concentrate as hard).


Are younger people less capable of driving? I've seen articles saying that teen drivers have the most accidents out of every age group. Those articles also claim that teen drivers are less capable of driving as their brains are less developed than someone 25 years of age or older.

Are these claims that younger people are less capable drivers true?

Research shows that teenagers are not any less capable at driving, per se, but that the adolescent brain undergoes a period of neural changes that often lends itself to risk-seeking behavior. From Somerville et. al (2010):

  In adolescence, there is a heightened propensity to engage in risky behaviors that can lead to negative outcomes, including substance abuse, unprotected sex, inflicting harm on others, injuries, and death. According to the 2007 Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS, Eaton, et al., 2008) the four leading causes of death that account for 72% of adolescent mortality – motor vehicle accidents, unintentional injuries, homicide, and suicide - are preventable. Such statistics suggest that these fatalities may be attributed, in part, to poor choices or risky actions (e.g., accidents, injuries) and/or heightened emotionality (e.g., suicide) underscoring the importance of understanding the biological basis of emotional and incentive-seeking behavior of adolescents, the focus of the present review.

The paper goes on to discuss how the intensity of young adults' emotional states relative to those of adults, as well as a heightened sensitivity toward reward (as well as an immature 'self-regulatory competence') are all underlying factors.

I think that this is what your article is referring to when it mentions that teenagers have 'less-developed brains'. On the other hand, one could argue the opposite. With puberty and adolescent development comes an influx of hormonal changes. With these changes come developments and mental states that are novel, new, and (at first) difficult to control. From this perspective, it is less a question of the brain being 'less-developed' -- on the contrary, there is 'too much' new development in puberty and adolescence, which can be overwhelming. As we learn to cope with these new developments with time and experience, they become easier to manage and control.


Is the Flynn effect in conflict with other studies of intelligence heritablity? Studies comparing identical and fraternal twins, or occasionally identical twins reared apart have mostly concluded that there is a pretty high heritability of IQ. These studies, in particular the identical twins reared apart studies, imply that someone with the same genes but different environment would have a highly similar IQ.

The Flynn effect, though, shows that people's average IQ is increasing, around 15 points every 50 years. All the explanations I have encountered (like this one, from James Flynn himself) focus on environmental reasons for this, for example culture, education, perhaps better health. They seem to imply that someone with the same genes in a different environment might have a very different IQ.

Are these two in direct contradiction with each other, or is there some way of reconciling them?
If they are mutually exclusive, with which does the scientific consensus lie?

There are several ways in which this apparent paradox can be resolved.

As a starting point, it is important to consider how heritability is defined and assessed (also see this earlier answer). As you point out, heritability estimates originate from comparisons between people who differ in their genetic similarity (e.g., monozygotic vs. dizygotic twins). The high heritability for IQ means that genetic similarities correspond to a high similarity in IQ. It's crucial to note, however, that heritability only describes the extent to which differences in the phenotype (in this case IQ) overlap with differences in the genotype in a given population. In other words, heritability describes how much of the variance in a trait statistically corresponds to genetic variance (see e.g., Griffith et al. 2000). Heritability does not describe the extent to which genes actually cause IQ differences, only the correspondence of genetic similarity and IQ similarity. In this vein, high heritability does not exclude the possibility of environmental influences on IQ:

For example, one reason for the rise in IQ may be better nutrition. If everybody in a society gains access to better nutrition to the same extent, this may increase IQ for all. Nevertheless, heritability does not necessarily change as the genetic differences between people still translate into IQ differences between people.
Environmental changes may actually increase heritability estimates. For example, consider a country in which people in one geographical region have access to good education (another potential reason for the Flynn effect), and people in another region don't. If missing opportunities for education depresses IQ points, the population's variation in IQ should be affected by this environmental difference. Once good education becomes available for everybody, genetic differences should matter more, leading to a higher heritability estimate.

A detailed model of how high heritability estimates and large environmental influences on IQ can coexist has been proposed by Dickens and Flynn (2001). In their analysis they focus on the possibility that environmental influences can be underestimated because genes and environment shape IQ interactively, in a way that is not captured by heritability estimates.

They assume that small genetic advantages can translate into strongly favorable environments. For example, if a child is somewhat smarter than others, she will have a higher chance to end up in a better school, where she can thrive, and then go to a better college and so on (an individiual multiplier). Nevertheless, this environmental influence would be ascribed to genes, because of the way heritability is defined.
There may also be a social multiplier effect caused by the social environment one lives in. If average IQ in the society is rising for some external reason, everybody should profit from this rise. For example, if more people go to college because this now offers lucrative jobs, this may set examples, encourage others to do the same, make college education itself more widely available, and thus create a social dynamic that leads to IQ gains for all.

Another possibility to resolve the paradox may be to investigate whether the Flynn-effect is actually due to genetic causes. Mingroni (2007) posits that higher social mobility has reduced inbreeding of people who live in high social isolation, which is detrimental to IQ. However, reviewing empirical evidence, Nisbett et al. (2012) conclude that this hypothesis seems implausible, for example, because the Flynn effect is also observed in societies which have been characterized by high social mobility for a long time.

In conclusion, even though there is no consensus on the exact reasons for the Flynn effect (Nisbett et al., 2012), there are several ways in which high heritability estimates for IQ and the large gains in IQ (due to environmental reasons) can be reconciled.

References

Dickens, W. T., & Flynn, J. R. (2001). Heritability estimates versus large environmental effects: the IQ paradox resolved. Psychological Review, 108, 346–369.

Griffiths, A. J., et al. (2000). An Introduction to Genetic Analysis (7th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21766/

Mingroni, M. A. (2007). Resolving the IQ paradox: Heterosis as a cause of the Flynn effect and other trends. Psychological Review, 114, 806–829. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.3.806

Nisbett, R. E., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D. F., & Turkheimer, E. (2012). Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments. American Psychologist, 67, 130–159. doi:10.1037/a0026699


Are the physical sensations of an emotion due to neural activity strictly in the brain or also in the body? Symptoms of anxiety and anger are often described as some sort of energetic sensation in my chest and sometimes face or arms.  Are these sensations an 'illusion' from neural activity strictly in the brain which projects sensations on their body or is there also neural activity in my chest, face or arms that they're 'actually' sensing?  If so what is the nature of that activity. If not and the sensations are just an 'illusion' how is the brain creating that illusion.  Also why does stretching seem to calm or make this sensation more pleasant?

Psychophysiology is totally outside of my wheelhouse, but here it goes…

Those feelings in your chest, face, arms, etc. aren't an illusion.  Indeed, it's long been argued that physiological arousal (in your body) is a core component of emotional experience (e.g., James, 1884; Russell, 1980)--alongside feelings of pleasure and displeasure.

Moreover, that you have interoceptive awareness (i.e., awareness of your internal physiological sensations; Craig, 2002) is absolutely critical for your experience of emotions (e.g., Craig, 2004).  For example, damage to the anterior insula (thought to underlie interoception) impairs the experience, recognition, and regulation of disgust (Calder et al., 2000; Woolley et al., 2014).

In fact, disgust experience is consistently associated with increased activation of the anterior insula (Lindquist et al., 2012). This highly consistent relationship reflects the nature of disgust:  It often involves some potent internal sensation, e.g., a pain in your stomach, a bad odor up your nose, a bad taste in your mouth, and so on.

We can go through the list of emotions and potentially find some consistent and specific psychophysiological profiles (e.g., fear/anxiety involving an increased heart rate, sadness involving a lower temperature), but this has never been successful (Quigley & Barrett, 2014). There seems to be a lot of variability in physiological activity across individuals, contexts, and time.

How activity in the body and the central nervous system interact is pretty complicated (intimidatingly so). But there are lots of psychophysiology guides out there (notably by Cacioppo), and Quigley and Barrett (2014) do a good job of summarizing some things.


Mulitiple partners: macho man vs. easy woman? I sometimes hear from my friends that a man who has many female sexual partners is regarded as macho. But on the other hand, a woman with a lot of one-night stands is thought to be easy and desperate (without even mentioning harsher words).

So what's the reason for this? What are the psychological roots? I would say two most important factors are biological and social but how do they affect our opinions on this matter?

There are two very broad domains of theory that commonly address the double standard regarding promiscuity. Haven't got the time to lay it all out at the moment (would be happy to edit later to elaborate if you like; just comment on what aspects you'd like expanded!), but as you suspected, both biological and social factors pertain in ways that are essential to consider. In some senses the theories that focus on each oppose each other, as is a common consequence of any myopic discussion of an issue this complex and multidetermined. One answer focuses on one aspect, another answer focuses on another aspect, conflicting explanations and predictions arise, and hopefully the debate incorporates this...but unfortunately often, the original theorists who focus on one (their) side of the issue become invested and entrenched in their perspective, and dismissive of others (another example with which I'm personally familiar arose as the person-situation debate). Keep this in mind if you choose to read further into the literature on these theories. The best answer is often the one that is informed by both, or more accurately, all sides.

evolutionary psychology is the side that argues for explanations in terms of biological factors. Evolutionary theories pertaining to polygny and monogamy are not hard to find; even from a male perspective, there are competing motives to address here. Meanwhile, social-psychology has a lot to say about the influence of culture on social norms regarding promiscuity, particularly in women's studies. Again, a quick Google search on "women's studies sexual double standard" will give you more than you have time to read about that perspective. Bear in mind, these two are not the only ways to address the issue; they're just the most popular and most inclined to address this issue as a focal topic.

Enjoy, stay open-minded, and "trust no one [completely]!" :)


May somebody use oddball paradigm solely for psychophysical studies? I'm an undergraduate linguistics student with a strong interest in cognitive psychology of visual attention. Nowadays, I'm studying on an undergraduate research project in which I'm planning to use reaction-time measurement and oddball presentation. However, when I dive into the oddball paradigm literature it seemed to me that it is only used with some other neuro-imaging techniques like EEG, fMRI etc. So I started to wonder if it is inappropriate to use oddball in order to elicit some behavioral data for some reason. Although I've searched for this on Google Scholar or Science Direct, I could not find anything directly related to this.

Is it uncommon / inappropriate / methodologically flawed to use the oddball paradigm only with reaction time? If so, why?

First off, I'm not an expert, but the oddball paradigm was initially developed for use in event-related potential (ERP) studies (basically EEG measures) (source: Wikipedia). Hence, because of historical reasons, you see this paradigm pop up especially in ERP studies. However, the task has been used in purely psychophysical experiments as well, without EEG or imaging (e.g., Stockdale et al. (2011)).

Reference
- Stockdale et al., Vis Res (2011); 51(11): 1232–8


How exactly does alcohol consumption damage dendrites? How exactly does alcohol consumption damage dendrites? I'm not talking about over a long period of usage, but just one instance.

see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wernicke%E2%80%93Korsakoff_syndrome#Alcohol-thiamine_interactions

  Strong evidence suggests that ethanol interferes directly with
  thiamine uptake in the gastrointestinal tract. Ethanol also disrupts
  thiamine storage in the liver and the transformation of thiamine into
  its active form.[20] The role of alcohol consumption in the
  development of WKS has been experimentally confirmed through studies
  in which rats were subjected to alcohol exposure and lower levels
  thiamine through a low-thiamine diet.[21] In particular, studies have
  demonstrated that clinical signs of the neurological problems that
  result from thiamine deficiency develop faster in rats that have
  received alcohol and were also deficient in thiamine than rats who did
  not receive alcohol.[21] In another study, it was found that rats that
  were chronically fed alcohol had significantly lower liver thiamine
  stores than control rats. This provides an explanation for why
  alcoholics with liver cirrhosis have a higher incidence of both
  thiamine deficiency and WKS.[20]

[20] Todd, K. G., Hazell, A. S., & Butterworth, R. F. (1999). Alcohol thiamine interactions: an update on the pathogenesis of wernicke encephalopathy. Addiction Biology, 4, 261-272.

[21] He, X., Sullivan, E. V., Stankovic, R. K., Harper, C. G., & Pfefferbaum, A. (2007). Interaction of thiamine deficiency and voluntary alcohol consumption disrupts rat corpus collosum ultrastructure. Neuropsychopharmacology, 32, 2207-2216.

but this is of course over a long period.

for just one instance, there's no scientifical evidence AFAIK


Difference between concentration and attention Is there any difference between concentration and attention ?

The dictionary definition and some websites on psychology mention they are same. whereas many people say they are different. I am unable to figure it out

Concentration is focusing on a task (e.g. reading a book). Attention is focusing on a person (e.g. listening during a conversation). The verb, focus, is the same in both instances. The noun, task and person, is the point of differentiation.


Is the length and intensity of feelings and emotions limited? So, I know hormones in the brain being released are more or less responsible for the emotions we feel. From a physical point of view, the amount of hormones available and the production rate of the hormones is limited. So, if the amount of hormones being released exceeds the production rate, from a purely physical point of view, at some point it will be depleted. I personally experience this in the form that after euphoria I feel more down than usual (at least I believe that this is an example).

(Also, there is physical pain. I have no idea if that can be limited in any way depending (or not) on time of duration and intensity.)

So, I can grasp the concept from a logical point of view. On the other hand, I have a strong sense that there are certain actions in the world that have no upper limit of inflicting physical and psychological pain.

Question: Is the length and intensity of feelings and emotions limited, especially these of physical and psychological pain?

The key terms to help understand the answers about the duration and intensity of experiences over time would likely include habituation, emotion, and pain. You might be surprised by how scientists use these terms differently than most people. Consider an intro psych textbook or wikipedia.

For example, emotions are generally defined as being brief, transitory affective states. If someone has a negative feeling that lasts for hours, psychologists might call that a mood. If a person has a negative feeling that lasts for years, psychologists generally use other labels such as personality. The experience in a moment might be the same between these cases.

There are some assumptions in your question that are not shared by most research or clinical psychologists or neuroscientists. For example, emotions aren't deterministically caused by hormones.


What brain skill does Nonogram (Picross) games develop? I've been playing Nonogram Picross a lot lately. I really  like it and you can always find a harder challenge but I would hate to waste my time for nothing.

What brain skill does Nonogram (Picross) develop?

Psychological video game research began in earnest in the early 1980s "as a reaction to Surgeon General C. Everett Koop’s provoking statements about the adverse effects of video games." (Mulligan, 2008) From then on, video game research tried to understand wether playing violent video games increased aggressive behavior. For 20 years, violence was the only focus for psychological science, and understanding this became even more urgent in the public mind, when it became known after the Columbine High School massacre, that the assailants had "trained" for their attack by playing Doom.

In 2003 a paper by Green and Bavelier published in Nature had a revolutionary impact on computer game research. Green an Bavelier found that playing action video games increases visual attention capacities. Since their article, a multitude of papers has been published, documenting research into the effect of computer game play on cognitive abilities.

A research paper title illustrating this new trend in computer game research is "Mom, let me play more computer games: they improve my mental rotation skills" (Cherney, 2008). It has been suggested, that playing action computer games would benefit women (Spence, Yu, Feng & Marshman, 2009) or older people (Kato, 2010)  to increase their performance in certain cognitive skills and, for women, counter the cultural gender bias in learning these skills (which favors men), or, for older people, to counter the effects of aging. Spence and Feng (2010) emphasize the positive effect computer games can have on those skills (see the list below) that are important for success in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics:

  From an educational perspective, spatial cognition is essential for successful problem solving in science, technology, engineer- ing, and mathematics (STEM) education and occupations (Terrell, 2007). Spatial abilities are necessary for a wide range of job- related skills, such as solving mathematical problems (especially those involving geometry); visualizing the consequences of actions in surgery; designing structures such as bridges, buildings, and aircraft; constructing flowcharts and other representations of com- puter programs; creating and interpreting charts, graphs, diagrams, maps, and engineering drawings; and so on. Excellence in STEM fields is strongly correlated with spatial ability (Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009), and spatial skills are associated with performance in mathematics and science courses (Delgado & Prieto, 2004) and standardized tests (Casey, Nuttall, Pezaris, & Benbow, 1995), as well as the choice of mathematics and science courses in college (Casey et al., 1995).

A summary of the research is given in this meta analysis by Spence and Feng (2010). They give a table that details which games train which skills. I'll not give the complete table here, but in summary:

Action Games train:

sensory detection
attention (capture, selection, switching, etc.)
visuomotor coordination
processing speed
working memory
spatial cognition

Maze and Puzzle Games train:

long term memory
spatial cognition
analytical thinking

I don't know Picross, but if it is a puzzle game (as your link suggests), it should increase mostly the three cognitive abilities mentioned above, and, to a lesser degree, sensory detection, attention (specifically capture and divided attention), and working memory. The article by Spence and Feng (2010) provides a good overview and is a great starting point for further research.

Literature:

Cherney, I. D. (2008). Mom, let me play more computer games: They improve my mental rotation skills. Sex Roles, 59, 776-786. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9498-z
Green, C. S., & Bavelier, D. (2003). Action video game modifies visual selective attention. Nature, 42(6939), 534-537. doi: 10.1038/nature01647
Kato, P. M. (2010). Video games in health care: Closing the gap. Review of General Psychology, 14, 113-121. doi:10.1037/a0019441
Mulligan, M. (2008). Exploring mood management via exposure to a massively multi-player online game (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from the Florida State University Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations database. (ETD No. etd-04112008-154329) [http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04112008-154329/]
Spence, I., & Feng, J. (2010). Video games and spatial cognition. Review of General Psychology, 14(2), 92-104. doi:10.1037/a0019491
Spence, I., Yu, J. J., Feng, J., & Marshman, J. (2009). Women match men when learning a spatial skill. Journal of Experimental Psychology,: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 1097-1103. doi:10.1037/a0015641

Edit re Jeromy's comments below (post doi to the interface at http://www.doi.org to find the articles):

There have been a few studies showing increased performance in a non-game task after training with a computer game designed specifically for this ability (so called "serious games"). Examples are games improving treatment adherence in medical patients, surgical skill in doctors etc. (overview in Kato, 2010, see above; or doi:10.1542/peds.2007-3134), training multitasking in a supermarket with stroke patients (doi:10.5014/ajot.63.5.535). But you have asked for transfer from a generic (action or puzzle) computer game to a non-related real-world task.

(doi:10.1080/001401300184378) have shown that the treatment group (trained with a computer game) was "less affected by concurrently performed interference tasks", which the authors attribute to an increased ability to perform under high cognitive load. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-8535.2006.00593.x) found that "gameplaying was more effective than drills in promoting maths performance, and cooperative [vs competitive] gameplaying was most effective for promoting positive maths attitudes".

As always, I have methodological objections agains both studies, and I believe you will have, too. (doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00226) gives an overview of transfer studies and their results -- and methodological shortcomings.


Are there any negative effects from hypnotherapy for bipolar disorder? My wife has been diagnosed with Bipolar disorder and as her husband and care giver I'm trying to delve into both understanding this disease and being an intelligent guide to freedom from as many of the negative symptoms as is possible. I've been reading up on hypnotism and would like to consider it as a future treatment but I'm wondering if the nature of Bipolar creates any unique environments where hypnotism might harm rather than heal.

Preamble

First of all, I would like to point out that hypnosis, and therefore hypnotherapy, is generally considered pseudo-scientific within the scientific community and therefore this question can be classed as off-topic here by some.  However, there are trained and licensed hypnotherapists who share the same question on whether or not to use hypnotherapy on patients diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder (Leach, 2013), so I will provide some background to my answer with some research available.

Is hypnotherapy suitable for Bipolar Disorder?

Switches into mania have been observed in unipolar and bipolar depressed patients following physical treatments as well as cognitive therapy. Such a phenomenon has not been observed with hypnotherapy (Suresh & Srinivasan, 1994 - Introduction)

Suresh & Srinivasan studied the possibility of hypnotherapy being used to help Bipolar Disorder with a patient suffering from Dysthymic Disorder (now called Persistent Depressive Disorder) which is less acute and severe than major depressive disorder.

  Three sessions of hypnotherapy were given over a period of one week. Ventilation of her negative self evaluations and use of positive suggestions to improve her self esteem and ego strength was done during each session under first stage of hypnosis. Neither deep level of hypnosis nor hypnoanalysis was attempted. After the initial sessions, the patient was instructed to practice self-hypnosis once a day using an audio cassette with a recording of the last session by the therapist.

A point to note with this study is that hypnotherapy was advised for the patient as she did not prefer drug therapy and there were major problems.

  At the end of one week she presented with a cheerful mood and improved self-esteem, confidence and energy with no depressive symptoms. Her child was concurrently treated and had by then returned to school. Self-hypnosis was continued and ten days later her spouse brought her with symptoms of sleeplessness, irritability with a tendency to be aggressive and disinhibited, excessive talk, ideomotor pressure and grandiose ideation. Clinical examination showed the presence of a Manic disorder.

  Following recovery from this episode in two weeks with antipsychotics, she was advised not to practice self-hypnosis. However, this was not heeded and a week later there was reemergence of manic symptoms requiring increase in the dose of antipsychotics. Subsequently, it was ensured that she did not practice self-hypnosis.

Suresh & Srinivasan noted that as deep hypnosis or hypnoanalysis was carefully avoided, the manic reaction could not be viewed as a manifestation of nonspecific psychotic disorganisation which is known to occur if hypnotherapy is too deep and uncontrolled (Auerbach, 1962); and the precipitation of mania by hypnotherapy supports the evidence that this therapy can be useful in depression.

Although Psychotherapy using hypnosis is known to be helpful in mild depression if light hypnosis and simple positive suggestions are applied (Ambrose & Newbold, 1980), I would contest this last statement by Suresh & Srinivasan, by pointing out that antipsychotics were prescribed at the time of mania being present, and therefore you cannot say that it was the hypnotherapy which precipitated mania.

The bottom line - Talk to your doctor

As a trained and accredited hypnotherapist myself, the bottom line is that hypnotherapists are told in accredited training that they must not provide hypnotherapy to those diagnosed with a psychosis or certain types of personality disorder, as it could make your condition worse. (See also, neurosis vs psychosis)  Another golden rule is that anyone who is looking to embark on hypnotherapy when they are diagnosed with any mental health condition should obtain doctor's permission first.

References

Ambrose, G. & Newbold, G.(1980). A Handbook of Medical Hypnosis, 4th edition. London: Bailliere Tindall.

Auerbach, A. (1962). Attitudes of Psychiatrist to the use of hypnosis. Journal of American Medical Association, 180(11), 917—921.DOI: 10.1001/jama.1962.03050240013003

Leach, H. (2013). My experience of mental health discrimination as a hypnotherapist [Online]Available at: https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/blog/hypnotherapist-mental-health-discrimination

Suresh, T. R., & Srinivasan, T. N. (1994). Mania following hypnotherapy. Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 36(1), 34—35.PMCID: PMC2972454 [Free PDF]


What is the correlation between objective indexes and aggregated self-report measures of life satisfaction? The Better Life Index and other indices seek to overcome the limitations of GDP in assessing social progress. They provide a composite score with which to rank nations on a range of indicators such as safety, environment, health, employment, economic activity, and so on.

Other researchers obtain self-report measures of happiness of life satisfaction (e.g., Diener's popluar Satisfaction with Life Scale). With care these scales can be aggregated over individuals to form a group-level measurement. For example, with careful sampling, a nation level estimate can be obtained.

I'm curious about these things:

What is the correlation between aggregated self-report measures and objective indexes of life satisfaction?
What explanation is provided for the size of the correlation in terms of how they are similar or different in what they measure?

The World Values Survey seems like a good starting point for examining nation level life satisfaction and then correlating it with other indicators.

Diener (2000) summarises this research on

  mean levels  of life satisfaction for selected nations from the  World
  Values  Survey  (World  Values  Study  Group,  1994),  conducted  with
  representative  samples  of  approximately  1,000 respondents  per
  nation  between  1990  and  1993.  The  purchasing  power  parity
  figure  is  the  percentage  of  purchasing power (based  on a
  standard  "basket"  of goods) that  the  average person  in  each
  country  can  buy  with  his  or her  yearly  income,  compared  with
  the  average  purchasing  power  of individuals  in  the  United
  States.  The  correlation  between  mean  purchasing  power  income
  and  mean  life  satisfaction  was  .62  across  all  nations  in  the
  survey.  The  finding that wealthier  nations have higher levels of
  reported  well-being  has  been replicated  several  times  (see
  Diener  &  Suh,  1999).  One  reason  that  wealthy  nations  may  be
  hap-  pier is that they are more likely to fulfill basic human needs
  for  food,  shelter,  and  health,  as  well  as  to have  better
  human-fights  records  (Diener  et  al.,  1995).

OECD Life Index

I performed a quick analysis of data from up to 36 countries from the OECD Better Life Index Site. You can download the datafile used directly from http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/. The R code, data file, and output of this draft set of analyses is available here, along with a list of the included countries.

I obtained the following correlations between other variables and self-reported life satisfaction (r is correlation; n is number of countries):

##                                               r  n
## Rooms.per.person                           0.70 30
## Personal.earnings                          0.67 34
## Employment.rate                            0.63 36
## Households.income                          0.59 32
## Water.quality                              0.59 36
## Long.term.unemployment.rate               -0.58 34
## Self.reported.health                       0.58 34
## Life.expectancy                            0.57 36
## Dwellings.with.basic.facilities            0.54 32
## Social.network                             0.50 36
## Time.devoted.to.leisure.and.personal.care  0.43 21
## Household.financial.wealth                 0.41 31
## Voter.turn.out                             0.36 36
## Educational.attainment                     0.22 35
## Students..skills                           0.21 36
## Air.pollution                             -0.18 36
## Housing.expenditure                        0.12 32
## Years.in.education                         0.12 35
## Consultation.on.rule.making                0.12 35
## Employees.working.very.long.hours         -0.09 33
## Job.security                               0.08 32
## Homicide.rate                             -0.07 36
## Assault.rate                              -0.02 36

References

Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: The science of happiness and a proposal for a national index. American psychologist, 55, 34.
Diener,  E.,  Diener,  M.,  &  Diener,  C.  (1995).  Factors  predicting  the
subjective  well-being  of  nations.  Journal  of Personality  and  Social
Psychology,  69,  851-864.
Diener,  E.,  &  Sub,  E.  (1999).  Societies we  live  in: International  compar-
isons. In  D.  Kahneman, E.  Diener,  &  N.  Schwarz  (Eds.),  Well-being:
The foundations  of  hedonic  psychology  (pp.  434-452).  New  York:
Russell Sage  Foundation.
World Values Study Group. (1994).  World Values Survey,  1981-1994  and
1990-1993  [Computer file,  ICPSR  version].  Ann Arbor,  MI:  Institute
for  Social  Research.


Is the SPAD-T textual analysis software still available? I am looking for an old program called SPAD-T that is still used for textual analysis (especially in psychology).

Can anybody tell me where I can download or purchase a legal copy?  Failing that, does anyone know how I could contact the original publisher/developer?

Note that I have cross-posted the question here.

After a little bit of googling, it seems that the original developer of SPAD-T, CISIA (dead link), is no longer in business, and the software appears to have become unavailable. I found the company off this list, so maybe it will be of some help in finding an alternative.

(I'm mostly answering this because I suspected that it otherwise never would be.)


What happened to self-administered aversion therapy (with a rubber band in particular)? In the 1970s a great new use for the rubber band was discovered: self-administered aversion therapy. It didn't go so well in some cases, like for "obsessoinal thinking", the outcome being the opposite of the one intended.

The first paper discusses two cases: one of hair-pulling (trichotillomania) and one of... homosexual ideation. Initial success but relapse and discontinued treatment are reported in the first case (hair pulling), but claimed "cure" in the second case. The second paper (with two negative results) discusses a case of paranoid schizophrenia and one of sexual fantasies including cheating on spouse and homosexual acts. I think most mental health professionals today would see these cases (except the hair pulling case perhaps) as inappropriate for aversion therapy, and some for any therapy (homosexual fantasies in particular).

Did self-administered aversion therapy (with rubber band or otherwise) prove ineffective in general? Or did it find some niche where it is considered successful nowadays?

Out of the basically four possible ways to change behaviors, your rubber band lies at one extreme, being an example of positive punishment, which works by presenting an aversive stimulus after an undesired behavior is exhibited, making the behavior less likely to happen in the future.

There is also the lesser negative punishment when a certain reinforcing stimulus is removed after a particular undesired behavior is exhibited.

Further, there is positive reinforcement, which works by presenting a motivating stimulus to a person after a desired behavior is exhibited, and negative reinforcement where usually an aversive stimulus is removed after a particular behavior is exhibited.

Now all three alternatives are less extreme than your example and, anecdotally, I do see a tendency toward a more positive approach in efforts to change behaviors, for example in parenting (i.e. reward rather than punishment). Less anecdotally, according to wikipedia, punishment indeed seems to be used reservedly in psychotherapy nowadays and is mostly reserved to the more extreme cases to reduce outright dangerous behaviors such as head banging or biting.