Is remembering a list of words an example of semantic or episodic memory? I'm having a hard time making a clear distinction between semantic and episodic memory. When presented with idealized examples, I find the breakdown clear; describing a trip to Paris is an example of episodic memory, describing the structure of a cell is an example of semantic memory.
However, when it comes to experimental settings, things suddenly start to look more murky. For example, say that one is presented 20 words in a sequential fashion and then is asked to repeat as many of these as possible. Are we dealing with episodic memory then? Does it make any difference if one is forced to recollect them in the same order as they appeared? Many researchers seem to consider this situation an example of episodic memory (just as an example, see van der Helm et al., 2011), and indeed, the man who invented the concept of episodic memory also did so at the time of its conception (Tulving, 1972; p.390).
However, later, Tulving has revised his original definition. In a more recent article (Tulving, 2002) he writes:

I had been wrong in 1972 when I had assumed that the traditional, Ebbinghaus-inspired, study/test laboratory experiments of verbal learning and memory had dealt with episodic memory. They had not. Two important features of episodic memory were missing.
One had to do with the contents of what the subjects in the experiments had to learn. Episodic memory is about happenings in particular places at particular times, or about “what,” “where,” and “when” [...] Traditional laboratory experiments, however, were almost invariably concerned with “what.” Subjects are asked, “What do you remember of the presented material?” They report their knowledge in tests such as free recall, cued recall, or recognition. Subjects’ memory for “where” and “when” was hardly ever examined.
The other missing feature was what I referred to in Elements as “recollective experience,” or conscious awareness of what had happened in the past. In traditional experiments the experimenter assumes that the overt behavioral response reflects the subject’s mental state; that is, that behavior is a faithful index of cognition. The reasoning goes something like this: Surely, if the subject recognizes an item in a recognition test, it means that he remembers it from the list, that is, that he has a conscious recollection of the item’s occurrence in the study list. How could it possibly be otherwise?
As subsequent history showed, it could be otherwise. Research on implicit memory [...], or so-called nonconscious memory [...], has overwhelmingly proved that one and the same behavioral response in a study/test experiment could represent conscious awareness of the retrieved item’s experimental history as readily as it could represent total lack of such awareness.

So which one is it? Are there any large disagreements within the community of what episodic memory actually is? Are word list tests seen as something that at least captures a small part of episodic memory? If remembering a list of words isn't an example of episodic memory, then what is it an example of?
References:

van der Helm, E.; Gujar, N.; Nishida, M; Walker, M.P. (2011).Sleep-Dependent Facilitation of Episodic Memory Details. PLoS ONE, 6(11).
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving and W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of Memory (pp. 381-402). New York: Academic Press.
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 1-25.

The definitive categorization of memory is an example of semantics (an irony I enjoy in answering this question).
Firstly, you have asked four questions in one.

So which one is it?

Definition of semantic:

adjective
relating to meaning in language or logic.

Semantic is the imposed meaning that human beings give things.
Remembering a list of words, would be semantic memory, as the person is required to recollect a list, that has been arbitrarily compiled, as opposed to recalling the experience of reading the words.

Are there any large disagreements within the community of what episodic memory actually is?

Not that I am aware of, but I am not an expert and have not investigated this thoroughly.

Are word list tests seen as something that at least captures a small part of episodic memory?

Word list test would be capturing semantic memory, though I doubt they would form long term memory, as they are only being held for a short period of time, have no emotional context, nor form the part of pattern or logic of any semantic learning. Taking and remembering the test itself would form episodic memory, in recalling the event, time and place, with, the long term semantic memory in knowing how to do such a test. I have addressed this in more detail under the next point.

If remembering a list of words isn't an example of episodic memory, then what is it an example of?

To answer this, I am going to present two alternative arguments.
As episodic memory.
To   regard  it as episodic memory, (but short term memory, which is muddying the waters, as the information only needs to be keep in the memory for a short term and would be used within the working memory) so in terms of it being episodic, it is unlikely to be recalled effectively at a later date (for most people). I would liken it to being shown images of animals, with no  purpose of pattern, except the person is asked to retain a memory of what they have seen. Like going to a museum and then being asked, what did you see there, as opposed to going to a museum and then being asked what was the history of the steam engine, which would be recalled from semantic memory of reading about the team engine at the museum.
In this context, a test of semantic memory would be to give the individual the rules of a new game and ask them to memorise them. If a person was being asked to remember the periodic table of elements, this would be semantic memory, as it would be something the person would later use as a useful pool of human defined information, like the rules of a card game.
As Semantic memory
So in terms of the concept of semantic memory being the recall of facts, as opposed to episodic memory being the recall of personal facts, it could be argued that recalling a list is using semantic memory. The list is a generic and semantic thing (human created rules, as opposed to the spontaneous and authenticity of life experience, that creates episodic memory). So regardless of the intention, it is a semantic list, that has no bearing on action or what is occurring, hence the episodic memory. The episodic memory, may be of perspiring whilst trying to recall 20 unrelated words. So the person is trying to jam 20 words into their short term memory, in a rote learning fashion. Rote memory would be regarded as semantic memory.

Rote Memory (item or semantic memory)  (1)

Episodic memory could be considered explicit memory, whereas semantic memory could be considered implicit memory, as it does not require the recall of a particular event, but it the memory of a generic mental exercise, as opposed to the test itself.
The ability to use a pen and write out the test form, is an example of implicit procedural memory, the memory of a teacher leaning over you and showing you how to write is an example of explicit, declarative, episodic memory. Knowing how the testing process works is an example of implicit, declarative, semantic memory.

Semantic and episodic memory are related, both being  types of declarative memory.

Types of Memory
Declarative vs. Procedural Memory
Declarative memory is recall of factual information such as dates, words, faces, events, and concepts. Remembering the capital of France, the rules for playing football, and what happened in the last game of the World Series involves declarative memory. Declarative memory is usually considered to be explicit because it involves conscious, intentional remembering.
Semantic vs. Episodic Memory
Declarative memory is of two types: semantic and episodic. Semantic memory is recall of general facts, while episodic memory is recall of personal facts. Remembering the capital of France and the rules for playing football uses semantic memory. Remembering what happened in the last game of the World Series uses episodic

Episodic memory is the memory of autobiographical events (times, places, associated emotions, and other contextual knowledge) that can be explicitly stated. It is the collection of past personal experiences that occurred at a particular time and place. For example, if you remember the party on your 6th birthday, this is an episodic memory. They allow you to figuratively travel back in time to remember the event that took place at that particular time and place.
Tulving has seminally defined three key properties of episodic memory recollection. These are: a subjective sense of time (or mental time travel), connection to the self, and autonoetic consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness refers to a special kind of consciousness that accompanies the act of remembering which enables an individual to be aware of the self in a subjective time. Aside from Tulving, others named the important aspects of recollection which includes visual imagery, narrative structure, retrieval of semantic information and the feelings of familiarity.

Semantic memory refers to the memory of meanings, understandings, and other concept-based knowledge, and underlies the conscious recollection of factual information and general knowledge about the world. Semantic and episodic memory together make up the category of declarative memory, which is one of the two major divisions in memory. With the use of our semantic memory we can give meaning to otherwise meaningless words and sentences. We can learn about new concepts by applying our knowledge learned from things in the past. The counterpart to declarative, or explicit memory, is procedural memory, or implicit memory.
Semantic memory includes generalized knowledge that does not involve memory of a specific event. For instance, semantic memory is knowing how to add and subtract, whereas episodic memory is the specific memory of being taught how to subtract.

Disclaimer: I could be completely wrong.

Reference:
(1) BRAIN Research Compatible Memory Strategies Judy Willis, M.D., M.Ed.


Is multitasking a myth? Often, the term 'multitasking' is applied to very busy and 'wired' people.  There is an adage that women multitask better than men.

My question is, do we actually multitask?  If so, what are the cognitive processes that allow this?

Or, is it a case that we momentarily put a task on hold to do another and it has more to do with a well organised short term memory of tasks?

Scientists studying the matter generally believe multitasking, and women's superiority at it, to be a myth.  Men come out slightly better multitaskers than women but there's not really any meaningful difference.  The way it's defined is critical though; it's being able to do two things that typically require focal attention at the exact same time.  For example, driving and carrying on an important conversation on the phone.  In general, people are quite bad at any such multi-tasking.

When you interview women they tend to believe the myth that women are better but it's based on a different definition of multitasking.  They often mean that they'll start one task that can sort of self run, like putting the laundry in, and while that's happening go and work on a letter they've been writing to a client or some other task.  They would tend to say they do that all of the time.  There's not much research into whether men or women are better at that because that's generally not the kind of multitasking researchers have cared about. I should think an investigation into planning potentially overlapping tasks would be how you'd test this.

In addition, as one of the articles below mentions, there seems to be a general belief that while neither sex is particularly good at it, women actually do it more frequently.  That too, hasn't really been studied as far as I know.

Here are some related newsy articles:

Why men (yes, men) are better multitaskers

Are Men or Women Better at Multitasking?


Where can I get data on lie detection and brain activity? Are there databases or data sets that contain metrics about lie detection?

The data would include variables such as:

Did the subject lie? (0 or 1 variable)
Brain activity measures (fMRI, EEG) when subject was given question.

For example, was the hippocampus hyperactive when the subject was probed about a question? (Could be a discrete or continuous variable)

Metrics of the rest of the body

For example: Average heart rate, blood pressure level, level of various hormones, facial expressions, body posture, etc.

Any other metrics to describe people (remains to be seen if some of these variables would be useful): socio-economic status, age, race, gender, political affiliation, relgious affiliation, etc.

Does data involving, at least, points 1, 2, 3, exist? Point 4 would be a luxury, I suppose.

You might have trouble finding raw data but there have been plenty of studies looking at the neurological and physiological activity associated with deception, which may contain answers to your question:

A few examples:
Ganis et al used fMRI and found that both types of lies (rehearsed & spontaneous) elicited more activation than telling the truth in anterior prefrontal cortices (bilaterally), the parahippocampal gyrus (bilaterally), the right precuneus, and the left cerebellum. At least in part, distinct neural networks support different types of deception.

Thackray & Orne published a pretty thorough comparison of lie detection methods.

Bradley & Janisse looked at threat and deception but discuss physiological response in depth.

Abe et al used PET scans to argue that we have distinct neural pathways for deception.

Additionally Sip et al discuss the efficacy of deception detection and studies summarising that

  The problems
  that bedevilled the old technology have not
  been eliminated by the new

References:

Ganis, G., Kosslyn, S. M., Stose, S., Thompson, W. L., & Yurgelun-Todd, D. A. (2003). Neural correlates of different types of deception: an fMRI investigation. Cerebral cortex, 13(8), 830-836.

Thackray, R. I., & Orne, M. T. (1968). A COMPARISON OF PHYSIOLOGICAL INDICES IN DETECTION OE DECEPTION. Psychophysiology, 4(3), 329-339.

Bradley, M. T., & Janisse, M. P. (1981). Accuracy demonstrations, threat, and the detection of deception: Cardiovascular, electrodermal, and pupillary measures. Psychophysiology, 18(3), 307-315.

Abe, N., Suzuki, M., Mori, E., Itoh, M., & Fujii, T. (2007). Deceiving others: distinct neural responses of the prefrontal cortex and amygdala in simple fabrication and deception with social interactions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(2), 287-295.

Sip, K. E., Roepstorff, A., McGregor, W., & Frith, C. D. (2008). Detecting deception: the scope and limits. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(2), 48-53.


How to explain individual ignorance towards people wanting to help? Please allow me to introduce the context of the situation first before asking my questions.

This week I was taking part in a non-violent occupation of a public place (in Paris) within the context of an international movement (you may have heard of it or not).

Part of this occupation was blocking a bridge for car traffic, still allowing bicycles and pedestrians to pass.

At one point in time, the authorities decided to completely close one side of the bridge by using thick and high metal fences, no one could pass through any longer - and they were patrolling on the other side of the fence.

The event organizers decided to deploy "peace-keepers" on the other side of the bridge (the open one) so that people would be informed that it is really blocked - it was not really visible before almost traversing the bridge completely - and they were given a deviation-possibility and other help - friendly and non-violent!

What did I observe with individuals and couples (very biased of course):

Tourists (non-french) were very open and happy to be there, asked what all this is about and so on - no problem for using the deviation, some even participated in the event for some time.

Young, "native" people were partially very open, partially they did not want to listen (up to ignoring) to the help and had to learn it the hard way (when facing the fence).

The ratio of those strongly ignoring any help seem to raise with age and status. From "Don't worry, I'm a lawyer, I will pass" up to getting a hysterical crisis of one individual when realizing that one cannot get through.

I wasn't observing a female/male variance.

It was quite disturbing to us to see so many people ignoring our advice as it was well meant and the situation was not caused by us.

Is there any study concerning this kind of behavior? Does it have a name?

Ideally I would like to know what makes people behave in this way. Why are some open, why are some so stubborn?

How much is it depending on the culture of the society?

Is there a method which could help to improve our impact?

Different personalities at play can partly explain this.

An old joke goes:

  "There are two kinds of people in this world. If there is an electrical fence, and you tell them about it, one will believe you. The other will insist on peeing on the fence to find out the truth."

Individuals prone to anxiety may indeed be less trusting.

Trusting someone's word, especially a stranger's, carries uncertainty and uncertainty to an anxious mind causes a lot of mental distress. So anxious people often try to cope with this by trying to regain the feeling of being in control by "doing their own research".

A narcissist personality type may have an unrealistic view of their status in society and thus expect to be treated differently than "normal" folks. Due to their exaggerated sense of importance of their own self, they may feel that regular rules don't apply to them.

A paranoid personality type would be less trusting of a stranger too, as they sometimes tend to be overly suspicious and distrustful of people.

(These are the few personality types that immediately came to my mind and their underlying way of thinking could explain why these kind of people may have opted to not listen to your group of "peace-keepers").


What is the effect of motherese on development? Most cultures (Falk, 2009) have a special type of language that is used to talk to children: infant-directed-speech (IDL; or informally, motherese, baby talk). For instance, Fernald (1992) argues that motherese is an evolved phenomena that was selected for. This suggests that it has a benefit to child development, hence my questions:

What benefit does IDL provide children?
How do the features of IDL benefit the cognitive development of children?
Are there benefits beyound effects on language-acquisition?

Notes

The only benefit I am familiar with (shameless self plug) is in helping avoid reversal-errors in pronoun acquisition but Kaznatcheev (2010) is only a theoretical prediction based on a particular computational model of questionable (1, 2) empirical validity.

I am interested in the developmental benefit of the very specific language used in IDL, not about the benefit of maternal care in general.

References
Fernald, A. (1992). "Human maternal vocalizations to infants as biologically relevant signals: An evolutionary perspective." In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.) The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 391-428).
Falk, D. (2009). Finding our tongues: Mothers, infants and the origins of language. New
York: Basic Books.
Kaznatcheev, A. (2010). "A Connectionist Study on the Interplay of Nouns and Pronouns in Personal Pronoun Acquisition." Cognitive Computation 2(4): 280-284.

Motherese may play a role in emotional development.

Soken and Pick write: "Concurrent with the exaggerated speech of motherese, there are probably exaggerated facial displays, allowing infants to explore the particular aspects of the face... Child-centered displays may serve as opportunities for learning about affective events."

Walker-Andrews (1997) also suggests that "the presence of the face acts as a setting for attending to the affective quality of the voice."

Yet, according to a recent, extensive review on motherese (Saint-Georges et al., 2013), its role in emotion and cognition  is still an open area of research.

References

N. H. Soken and A. D. Pick, “Intermodal Perception of Happy and Angry Expressive Behaviors by Seven‐Month‐Old Infants,” Child development, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 787–795, 1992.
A. S. Walker-Andrews, “Infants' perception of expressive behaviors: differentiation of multimodal information.,” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 121, no. 3, p. 437, 1997.
C. Saint-Georges, M. Chetouani, R. Cassel, F. Apicella, A. Mahdhaoui, F. Muratori, M. C. Laznik, and D. Cohen, “Motherese in Interaction: At the Cross-Road of Emotion and Cognition? (A Systematic Review),” PLoS ONE, vol. 8, no. 10, p. e78103, Oct. 2013.


Is "brain training" effective? We've had quite a few questions about "brain training" on this site (see questions tagged brain-training). And the effectiveness of "brain training" has been touched on in several questions (this question on the definition of brain training, this question about lumosity, and this question about n-back training).

That said, I agree with @Chuck's suggestion that it might be useful to have a canonical sceptics-style question about the effectiveness of brain training.

Questions

What is the effect of completing "brain training"?
Is there any evidence for domain general benefits to cognitive functioning that extend beyond the specific task practiced?
Is there anything particularly "neural" or "brain"-like about brain training?
Is there any evidence that brain training prevents any neurological diseases?

Naturally, it would be good if any answers are backed up by independent scientific empirical research. References to and summaries of recent scientific review articles would also be particularly useful.

I believe the hype about brain training got started with Susanne Jaeggi's paper  on n-back training and its alleged improvements to fluid intelligence (Gf) and working memory (WM):

The experimental design was called into question by papers that followed and tried to replicate similar results. Most of them could not detect a maintained improvement in WM and Gf. Further, most studies did not find it to generalize to other skill domains.

I'm not sure how to interpret the third question.

Numerous studies have shown that mental stimulation is effective in reducing the risk of Alzheimer's disease. The more interesting question is probably whether brain training can ameliorate attention deficit...


Does spanking a child teach them that it's ok for another person to touch them against their will? The debate over whether spanking is an appropriate punishment largely revolves around proponents saying that it creates a more "disciplined" person and opponents saying that it traumatizes the child or makes them grow up violent.

One thing that, as far as I know, has been overlooked is the issue of how it affects a person's sense of personal physical sovereignty. Can a child really compartmentalize spanking such that they can believe "It is acceptable for my parent to spank me as long as a child, but nobody else, and not when I am an adult."? It doesn't seem likely to me. It seems that, if a child is conditioned to believe that spanking is a normal and acceptable thing, it isn't a stretch to believe that other entities, such as the government, have potential suzerainty over the individual.

Given that any rational person should want their children to believe that nobody but nobody has the right to touch them against their will, for any reason, would it not make sense that spanking is detrimental to an individual's psyche?

Short answer

It depends on the definition you are referring to on "touch them against their will?"

If you are referring to violent touching in the form of physical punishment/restraining etc. then it is proven by the accounts given by may people who advocate physical punishment.

If you are talking about sexual touching, spanking does not necessarily teach them that it's ok for another person to touch them against their will, but it can lead to someone touching them against their will.

Long Answer

Preable before answering the question

To cover the point raised by @user13275 in the comments, physical punishment (also known as corporal punishment) has been defined as

  the use of physical force with the intention of causing a child to experience bodily pain or discomfort so as to correct or punish the child’s behavior” (Gershoff, 2008, p. 9)

This includes: spanking, hitting, pinching, squeezing, paddling, whipping, ”whupping,” swatting, smacking, slapping, washing a child’s mouth with soap, making a child kneel on painful objects, and forcing a child to stand or sit in painful positions for long periods of time. (Holinger, 2015)

In a 2012 editorial piece within the Canadian Medical Association Journal, John Fletcher, MB BChir MPH, Editor-in-Chief says

  Is spanking wrong? Clearly, hitting anyone in anger or when losing an argument is bad behaviour. To do this to children sets a bad example and may only teach them that violence is a means to getting their own way. But what about a slap as the ultimate sanction and a means of enforcing boundaries and discipline? It’s an obvious question and one in which parents will be interested. Are those who use physical punishment bad parents?

  If they are, then they are in the company of roughly 90% of my parents’ generation, including 70% of family doctors and 60% of pediatricians, who thought spanking acceptable in some circumstances. The proportion of parents who spank toddlers now is still high but closer to 50%.

He also states in the editorial

  So heated is this debate, and so long-running, that the question of whether spanking is morally “right or wrong” is probably intractable. A more promising line of enquiry, however, is whether the physical punishment of children is effective.

Whilst there are opponents to the idea that physical punishment is wrong, Birbalsingh (2012) for example provides an argument for how physical punishment provides an ultimate form of discipline, a key piece or research on the effects of physical punishment on the child, which the editorial points to, is Durrant and Ensom (2012) which was also published in the Canadian Medical Association Journal.  This article looks at lessons learnt from 20 years of research.

  Today, research showing the risks associated with physical punishment is robust, the convention has been integrated into the legal and policy frameworks of many nations, and 31 countries have enacted prohibitions against the physical punishment of children. These three forces — research, the convention and law reform — have altered the landscape of physical punishment.

  The growing weight of evidence and the recognition of children’s rights have brought us to a historical point. Physicians familiar with the research can now confidently encourage parents to adopt constructive approaches to discipline and can comfortably use their unique influence to guide other aspects of children’s healthy development.

One of the pieces of research that this article pointed to shows that spanking leads to escalated levels of Antisocial Behaviour from children 6-9 years of age (Straus, et al. 1997)

In a treatment study, Marion Forgatch showed that a reduction in harsh discipline used by parents of boys at risk for antisocial behaviour was followed by significant reductions in their children’s aggression. (Forgatch, 1991)

In answer to your question

  Does spanking a child teach them that it's ok for another person to touch them against their will?

If you are referring to sexual touch,

The way physical punishment is used will determine whether the child's autonomy is challenged or not.

  Controlling parents are motivated by the Authoritarian Personality Syndrome and therefore are compelled, by fear of loss of control, to restrict the child's self-directed, autonomomous efforts.  While parents motivated by the Authoritarian Personality Syndrome are controlling, it does not follow that the converse is true.  Some subgroups of controlling parents permit high autonomy in many areas of the child's life.  Hoffman, et al. (1960) described a subgroup of parents who were perceived by their children as both coercive and permissive of high autonomy. (Baumrind, 1966)

This indicates that a parent can use physical punishment but still provide the child some autonomy over their personal rights.  The other personal rights taken away contravene articles 19, 28(2) and 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) - which is legally binding in international law and signed by 140 signatories involving 196 UN States.

However, some may use physical punishment in order to take the child's autonomy away completely or deminish the child's feelings of self-worth, which can lead the child to look for love and affection elsewhere.

Spanking does not necessarily teach them that it's ok for another person to touch them against their will, but it can lead to someone touching them against their will.  Although with sexual touching, that there are other factors which can play a role including whether the concept of "good touch/bad touch" or the pants/swimsuit/underwear rule has been taught to them, but again, that does not necessarily completely prevent it when the child is really desperate for attention, love and affection.

Anthony (2008) on page 253, says that you can have the following initial belief (iB)

  "I absolutely must be loved by so-and-so, and if not it's awful and I am and inadequate person because he/she does not love me!"

  When you question and challenge this iB you often can come up with an Effective New Philosophy that is accurate but still in the infancy stages and therefore weak: "I guess that there is no reason why so-and-so must love me, because there are other people who will love me when so-and-so does not.  I can therefore be reasonably happy without his/her love."

From experience from talking to and supporting abused people, in the bid to find love elsewhere it can lead a child (or adult in later life) to get into an abusive relationship with someone in the belief that that person is doing the things they do (including inappropriate touching etc.) because that person loves them.

References

Anthony, R. 2008. Ending the Epidemic of Child Abuse. Raleigh, NC:Lulu.com
Paperback at Amazon.com
PDF eBook at Lulu.com at a much cheaper price

Baumrind, D. 1966. Effects of Authoritative Parental Control on Child Behavior Child Development 37(4): pp 887—907
DOI: 10.2307/1126611

Durrant, J. and Ensom, R. 2012. Physical punishment of children: lessons from 20 years of research. Canadian Medical Association Journal 184(12): pp 1373–1377
DOI: 10.1503/cmaj.101314 PCMCID: PMC3447048

Forgatch M.S. 1991. The clinical science vortex: a developing theory of antisocial behaviour. In: Pepler DJ, Rubin KH, editors. The development and treatment of childhood aggression. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum; p. 291–315

Hoffman, L., et al. 1960. Parental coerciveness, child autonomy and child's role at school. Sociometry 23(1): pp 15—22
DOI: 10.2307/2786134

Gershoff ET (2002). Corporal punishment by parents and associated child behaviors and experiences: A meta-analytic and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin 128(4): pp 539-579.
DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.4.539

Holinger, P.C. 2015. Physical Punishment—and Violence Psychology Today [Online]
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/great-kids-great-parents/201508/physical-punishment-and-violence

Straus M.A., et al. 1997. Spanking by parents and subsequent antisocial behavior of children. Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine Journal 151(8): pp 761—767
DOI: 10.1001/archpedi.1997.02170450011002  PMID: 9265876


Importing EGI eeg binary format data into R? Are there R packages/functions for importing EGI eeg data format into R?

While the available R packages for EEG do not seem to support the EGI eeg data format (see Robin Kramer's comment), you might want to try MNE-Python as a free and open alternative to any EEG toolbox implemented in Matlab.

MNE-Python does support the EGI eeg data format among many others. Furthermore, there are several comprehensive examples to get you started.


Are individuals who are generally jealous more likely to experience sexual jealousy? Some people are just jealous of many things they perceive others to possess. Materially or as part of that person.

Is a person who is prone to jealousy more likely to be jealous in romantic relationships?

or does sexual jealousy have different roots.

As Parrot and Smith have said (1993), "envy and jealousy are confounded by laypersons and scholars alike (Schoeck, 1969)", while in psychology, philosophy, and the social sciences in general, a distinction is drawn between jealousy and envy:

  [E]nvy occurs when a person lacks another's superior quality,
  achievment, or possession and either desires it or wishes that the
  other lacked it. It occurs when this shortcoming exists in a domain
  that is self-definitional (Salovey & Rodin, 1984), and it intensifies
  with self-dissatisfaction and when superioority in alternative
  comparison domains is lacking (R. H. Smith, Diener, & Garonzik, 1990).
  ...
  Jealousy, by contrast, necessarily occurs in the context of relationships. It occurs when a person fears losing an important
  relationship with another person to a rival—in particular, losing a
  relationship that is formative to one's sense of self (Hupka, 1991;
  Rorty, 1988, chap. 7). (Parrot & Smith, 1993)

As studies have shown, envy appears to be characterized by feelings of inferiority, longing, resentment, and disapproval of the emotion. Jealousy appears to be characterized by fear of loss, distrust, anxiety, and anger. (Parrot & Smith, 1993).

So, if you write: "Some people are just jealous of many things they perceive others to possess. Materially or as part of that person.", then you are actually not talking about jealousy, but about envy, and your question must read:

Are envious individuals more likely to experience sexual jealousy?

As experiments and surveys show, both envy and jealousy are caused by threatened self-esteem (DeSteno, Valdesolo & Bartlett, 2006; Parrot, 1991), so it might be concluded that the propensity for both emotions would be equally high or low in one individual. But that is not necessarily so. Findings suggest that

  a distinction might be made between different types of self-esteem, or
  between different routes to lowering self-esteem. ... In envy one's
  own appraisal leads to dissatisfaction with oneself. In jealousy, the
  reflected appraisal of another leads to a lack of security and
  confidence. (Parrott, 1991)

Feelings of jealousy appear to be equally high in different individuals (and both sexes) if they face the same situations (Salovey & Rodin, 1985). Nevertheless there might be

  certain personality characteristics that might make some people
  particulaly prone to jealousy. ... The people whose responses
  indicated a high degree of jealousy were those who also reported these
  three personality characteristics: having a low opinion of themselves,
  seeing a large discrepancy between how they really are and what they
  would ideally like to be and valuing highly such visible achievements
  as becoming wealthy, famous, well-liked and, especially, physically
  attractive. (Salovey & Rodin, 1985)

Variance in self-esteem is attributable to genetics, parenting style, perceived appearance, and past experiences of success and failure (Emler, 2001). Nevertheless, in intensity of jealousy was mostly moderated by how secure and committed the current relationship felt (Salovey & Rodin, 1985). Thus it seems that environment factors play at least an equally strong role in promoting jealousy as personality traits or states. Because, of course, "close and loving relationships with others later in life do contribute positively to self-esteem. But" – and here the circle closes – "the likelihood of forming and sustaining successful relationships of these kinds is itself higher when self-esteem is higher in the first place." (Emler, 2001)

Sources:

DeSteno, D., Valdesolo, P., & Bartlett, M. Y. (2006). Jealousy and the threatened self: Getting to the heart of the green-eyed monster. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 626-641. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.626
Emler, N. (2001). Self-esteem: The costs and causes of low self-worth. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Parrott, W. G. (1991). The emotional experiences of envy and jealousy. In P. Salovey (Ed.), The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy (pp. 3-30). New York: Guilford Press.
Parrott, W. G., & Smith, R. H. (1993). Distinguishing the experiences of envy and jealousy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 906-920. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.6.906
Salovey, P., & Rodin, J. (1985). The heart of jealousy. Psychology Today, 19, 22-29.


Can we draw conclusions about content of thoughts from neural firing patterns? Can the neural firing patterns of animals be associated with specific kinds of thoughts? (ie Thoughts related to food, mating, or neighborly aggression?)

I am curious about the speculations in yesterday's Neuroskpetic blog post, "What is My Cat Thinking" on Discover Magazine's site. The author ponders if measuring his cat's neural firing patterns upon confronting a neighbor's cat, and then observing if similar patterns appear at other times when the neighbor's cat is not present, can be used as evidence for his cat's "thinking" or memory of the other cat.

The author concludes, preemptively, that such an experiment would not demonstrate anything about the content of thought: "We have no idea how neural firing relates to consciousness in humans, let alone animals."

However, I am quite sure I have seen various papers published that use fMRI and neural patterns as evidence of particular states of mind. There are also social science experiments in which participants' brains are electrically stimulated, resulting in particular actions (grabbing of a pencil, for example), and then asked to explain the motivations for this action. These experiments would suggest that it is already assumed that specific brain patterns correlate to specific thoughts and actions.

I am wondering to what extent biologists have already studied neural firing in relation to consciousness and the content of thoughts. More specifically, can we infer the recall of specific memories from a neural firing pattern?

This is a complicated and loaded question. As Neuroskeptic noted, our understanding of consciousness is very poor (in fact, we don't know how to define it most of the time). To see some of the best current definitions, take a look at:
What are current neuronal explanations and models of 'consciousness'?
We definitely can't infer arbitrary properties of consciousness from something like fMRI. In general, we don't have a clear mapping from brain to mind, and thus all studies are inherently correlational in nature. Since all the work is correlational, it is thus not usually mentioned and the popular press tends to misconstrue this as a for-sure causal connection. But does that mean we can't infer any thoughts? No!
We can "read thoughts" well enough to produce an brain-computer interface. Adapted from my earlier answer:
Erik Ramsey is locked-in syndrome patient and is incapable of movement apart from his eyes. However, he has control of his brain enough to be distinguished by electrodes implanted into his cerebral cortex (Guenther, 2009). Although the sensors were implanted in the motor-area responsible for speech (which you would expect typical inviduals to have control over, since they can speak), the understanding of how to decode this is not full. Thus, the patient had to train in order to adapt to the system:

Accuracy of the volunteer's vowel productions with the synthesizer improved quickly with practice, with a 25% improvement in average hit rate (from 45% to 70%) and 46% decrease in average endpoint error from the first to the last block of a three-vowel task.

In a much more dramatic experiment, Adrian Owen has used brain imaging techniques as means of communicating with vegetative-state patients. It is known that visualizing playing-tennis and walking around the house produce very distinct (to an fMRI) activation in the brain. So Owen used that capability to allow a vegetative-state patient to answer yes-or-no questions. He asked the patient to imagine playing tennis for yes, navigating the house for no (Monti et al., 2010). Hence, neuroscientists think they can distinguish the thought of walking around the house versus playing tennis.
Of course, it is hard to say if this can be continued arbitrarily far, in practice or even in theory. For more info, see this question:
Is performance reducible to brain activity in an unambiguous way?
References
Guenther, F.H., Brumberg, J.S., Wright, E.J., Nieto-Castanon, A., Tourville, J.A., Panko, M., Law, R., Siebert, S.A., Bartels, J.L., Andreasen, D.S., Ehirim, P., Mao, H., & Kennedy, P.R. (2009). A wireless brain-machine interface for real-time speech synthesis. PLoS ONE, 4(12)
Monti MM, Vanhaudenhuyse A, Coleman MR, Boly M, Pickard JD, Tshibanda L, Owen AM, & Laureys S. (2010). Willful modulation of brain activity in disorders of consciousness. New England Journal of Medicine, 362(7):579-89.


What is the information storage capacity of the human brain? Related/bonus points: I seem to remember reading about some equation that states the amount of information that can be held by a neural network with n neurons in it arranged in l layers, or something vaguely like that (n and l probably weren't even the letters in it.) Can anyone help me remember what I'm thinking of?
(The brain is a very large neural network. So, if we have an equation for neural networks, we should be able to get an estimate of the information contained in the human brain's neural network.)

Disclaimer: Quantifying the capacity of the human brain is quiet complex as you might imagine. And although in cognitive neuroscience we often compare the brain to computers this is not an exact comparison, in many ways the brain is far more complicated and encodes information in a very different way than the comparison of CPU processors and hard-drives. The short answer is that we have understandings about capacity under specific situations regarding STM, but LTM capacity is mostly based on estimates.
TL;DR: Estimates vary from 10^13 to 10^18 bytes (10 terabytes - 1 exabyte), and even this range should probably be taken with a grain of salt.
The long version:
Memory in the brain is often split by cognitive psychologists into several different modules, such as the memory storage model suggested by atkinson and shiffrin; attention->short-term(STM)->long-term(LTM).
Fig 1.

This model is largely inaccurate as the brain encodes information relative the type of information received, for instance auditory inputs will be processed by neural areas associated with auditory processing first. In addition attentional processing, unlike in this model, relies heavy in precognitive processing e.g. if you are hungry you will attend more to food. That being said we still use STM and LTM to distinguish between memory that is in use and memory that is stored.
Short-term memory capacity
The rather brilliant researchers Baddley and Hitch developed what is perhaps the most compelling models for short-term memory processing. The working memory model (see Fig. 1) accounts for differences in information types and how it is held within the processing centres of the brain.
Fig 2.

A meta-analysis of 400 studies has displayed good support for the three main modules of cognitive memory. Generally speaking the central executive can be considered as the processor, while while the episodic buffer, phonological loop and visit-spatial sketchpad may be the modular RAM which holds information for processing.
According to Baddley the phonological loop can hold about 2 seconds of auditory information, this would be a list of unrelated words with a task designed to restrict rehearsal and encoding of information. However if the information was related, say "Our lecturer told us to read chapter 3 of working memory" we could hold more of the information as its related and may be chunked together. 'Chunking' is a feature of memory that complies similar information together. The capacity recorded generally depends on numerous factors, such as the task type, time between learning and recall, and the significance of the information. In addition we can also add age and context (internal and external) as factors influencing memory recall. Overall we can't identify the exact capacity of working memory due to the complexity of information processing, what we can say is that working memory deals with small amounts of information spit across different modules, and relates this to LTM. Although that small amount of information is probably a lot more than your average super computer can process as this post indicates.
Long-term capacity
As with STM, LTM is modular in anyways. However the total capacity is somewhat related too neurons, with 86-100 million neurons and 1000 glia cells thats means the human brain has a large capacity for storing information. However as previously mentioned these neurons relate to particular types of information. With regard to processing capacity the human brain is estimated to be [10 to the power of 17] 11 flops per sec, according to the blue brain project. Another recent estimate puts the processing capacity of the brain at 10^28 Flops.
Fig 3. A comparison of recent predictions of neural processing capacity and current fastest Super CPU

A different measure of calculating processing capacity has been devised by Grace and Christiano who stated the following...

We can use Traversed Edges Per Second (TEPS) to measure a computer’s ability to communicate information internally. We can also estimate the human brain’s communication performance in terms of TEPS, and use this to meaningfully compare brains to computers. We estimate that the human brain performs around  0.18 – 6.4 * 1014 TEPS. This is within an order of magnitude more than existing supercomputers. TEPS = synapse-spikes/second in the brain

= Number of synapses in the brain * Average spikes/second in synapses

= Number of synapses in the brain * Average spikes/second in neurons

= 1.8-3.2 x 10^14 * 0.1-2

= 0.18 – 6.4 * 10^14

So the brain operates at around 18-640 trillion TEPS, while closest supercomputer is 2.3 * 10^13 TEPS (23 trillion TEPS).
Memory has been calculated to be around 2.5 petabytes (2.5 * 10^15 bytes), as reported here (seems to be based upon speculation by Prof P Reber). Another estimate has the neural memory capacity at 8∙10^19 bits--that's over 8 quintillion (10^18) bytes. Some researchers at Berkeley have suggested a relatively small 10-100 terabytes (10^13 to 10^14 bytes). All these estimates are based on variations in calculations relative to neuron density and and synapse connections across the whole brain. The larger estimates take addition account of other factors involved in neural communication. But the overall criticism I have is that we can't simply say that one synapse is 1 byte or 200 calculations per second.
The term estimate is generous here; guesstimate would be far more accurate. Individual neurons are complicated enough; moving to distributed and interconnected networks in the brain is just another level. Neurons do not conduct calculations independently; they rely heaving on context and information types. So we can say the processing of the brain is modular, in fact we already know this to be true to initial sensory processing. There is also no clearly obvious separation of memory from processing, although we know in motivation for instance certain areas will activate (the so called 'reward system') when assessing motivational objects. We won't say this is memory but it relies on it previous associations in memory. So some areas of the brain are used to assess rather than recall but they will activate together. The point being that we can't bundle all neurons together to calculate memory or processing. We just don't know what the vast amount of neurons are doing right now.
I highly recommend this article, for more information and references regarding computational and memory estimates.


How can reaction times be measured, and what affects it? I was playing pinball the other day, and I wasn't doing very well - my reactions were far too slow it seemed.

My question is - Firstly - how can someone's reactivity measured/determined? I imagine there are some quite conclusive tests.

Secondly - what affects people's reaction times? I imagine alcohol impairment and sleep deprivation affects them - are there other common factors? Is there anything that increases reactivity?

Reaction times can be measured by a variety of techniques in the lab. The simplest test is to present a stimulus to a test subject and instruct the subject to press a button as fast as possible after the stimulus is perceived. Responses can be measured by using a response box. Often-used stimuli are either visual (e.g., a colored dot that pops up at random times on a computer screen), auditory (e.g., an acoustic beep), or tactile (e.g., a vibratory buzz or tap on the finger). These tests measure the reaction time from stimulus presentation up to the moment the subject presses the button. Hence, obtained response latencies include peripheral sensory processes, central sensorimotor processing in the brain, and motor output.

Age increases reaction time, mainly due to a slowed motor output (Woods et al., 2015). The stimulus modality also affects response latency. Visual stimuli result in long reaction times, tactile stimuli in shorter latencies, and auditory stimuli induce the shortest reaction time (Ng & Chan, 2012). These differences reflect the slow sensory processing in the visual system and the fast response of the auditory system. Neuro-supressants, such as alcohol, tranquilizers, antiepileptics- and anesthetics all increase reaction times (e.g., Mitchell et al.,, 1993).

References
- Mitchell et al., Pediatrics (1993);91(1):101-5
- Ng & Chan, Proc IMECS II (2012)
- Woods et al., Frontiers Human Neurosci (2015); 9:131-12p


Perception of time as a function of age For many people time seems to run faster as they get older. That is, for an old person an hour, a day or a year seems to be shorter than for a young person.

Is there any hard data for such phenomenon?
And if so, what is the cause?

To name a few possibilities it can be about the reaction time (so one have more or less 'turns' in a minute), the relative time comparing to one's age, ways in which memory changes with age or habits (younger may live more active life). Of course, there may be different causes for different time scales. However, I haven't found anything but anecdotal data and home-made theories.

Wikipedia on time perception

The Wikipedia article on "time perception". In particular, the section on long-term time perception cites a couple of articles.
    * The articles makes the common point that a unit of time as a proportion of one's life decreases with age. A few empirical studies are also cited.

Ukraintseva (2001)

Ukraintseva (2001) wrote an article devoted to the topic and makes several interesting points about time perception over aging. E.g.,

Ukraintseva argues the rate of aging decreases with age and that this may have relevance to experience of time.
Ukraintseva also suggests that living may be slower in some sense with age citing examples of slower "metabolic rate, rate of cell proliferation, physical, mental alertness, and the rate of living in general".

Graf and Grondin

Graf and Grondin have an article that reviews the literature on the psychology of time perception and discusses age related differences. However, the article seems to focus more on aspects of performance rather than the subjective experience of time slowing.

They cite a few studies that suggest that in relation to judging time intervals, older adults may be less accurate.

Personal musings

My own random musings (treat them as you wish) suggest that topics such as flow, goals, rhythm of life, and boredom might also be relevant.

A feature of being immersed in a state of flow is a sense of time distortion.
As we get older, perhaps we start to set more long term goals, and this might shape the experience of time and change.
Increased levels of routinisation and automaticity might also decrease awareness of time passing.
Perhaps knowing how to avoid boredom would be relevant to time passing.

References

Graf and Grondin "Time perception and time-based prospective memory" in TIMING THE FUTURE - The Case for a Time-Based Prospective Memory (FREE PDF)
Ukraintseva (2001) Aging and the subjective sense of time. (FREE PDF)

The above are just a few quick points (it's not my area):


Is there a report of a successfully EEG-Based Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) using image training? Currently I am involved in constructing an EEG-Based BCI.

The goal of the BCI is to control which light in a series of lightbulbs lights up. The plan is to use different images (i.e. a flower versus a tiger) to elicit different neuron response that will show up on the EEG. The light bulb will light up in any order these images are given (tiger -> flower -> mountain -> sky -> white noise -> bright red...etc.)

Does anyone know if there has ever been a successful realization of such system? Please provide me with a link to it.

This article by Bobrov et. al seems to be similar to what you are looking for. They were able to classify (at above chance performance) whether subjects were imagining houses or faces. The training protocol is particularly interesting: they started by showing subjects pictures, but then used a feedback process of showing the subjects the output of the classifier while they were imagining the images to try and improve the subjects' 'imagination' of the images.


Neuroanatomical mapping of production compilation ACT-R and Spaun map their production rule system onto the the basal ganglia and thalamus. However, I haven't been able to find how ACT-R maps production rule compilation onto the basal ganglia or thalamus. Does a mapping exist in ACT-R or in other cognitive architectures?

Given that all production rules reside in the Basal Ganglia and Thamalus, although it is not explicitly stated, the only place the rule compilation could feasibly take place is in the Basal Ganglia and Thalamus.


When does a human baby develop a consciousness? Not to offend anyone or anything, but I've been searching up about abortion lately, and all the debate about it, and it got me wondering, when does a baby develop a consciousness?

Consciousness - the ability to sense the world around you in an independent way. You can think for yourself, and make choices that defy your natural instincts. It is what some say separates us from wild animals. Animals have a survival instinct. They do what they can to survive. Eating colourful packets of soap is not an example of a survival instinct, and therefor proves that we have a consciousness.

Definitions of consciousness

So when does consciousness begin in a baby? And before that time, how does the brain work? Does it just feel the surroundings without any response? Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!

Q: When does a human baby develop a consciousness? … Consciousness - the ability to sense the world around you in an independent way. You can think for yourself, and make choices that defy your natural instincts. It is what some say separates us from wild animals...

A: Consciousness is the term that has various meanings. In the above meaning, it requires the function of certain groups of neural circuits that include the ARAS (ascending reticular activating system), several cortical areas, and the thalamo-cortical loop [1,2]. So, for a fetus to begin to have consciousness, it must have these neural circuits developed to the point that they start functioning, which occurs around gestational week (GW) 24 -26. [3,4]

  “Two of the most important pathways in the brain are the ones that transmit sensorimotor information, the thalamocortical (TC) and corticothalamic (CT) pathways. The TC relays sensory and motor information from the receptors in the retina, cochlea, muscle or skin to the sensorimotor regions of the neocortex via the major subcortical sensorimotor relay, the thalamus. The CT pathway completes the feedback loop by transmitting information from cortex back to the thalamus. These essential pathways begin to form in the later part of the second trimester in humans, and are complete by GW 26. [3]”

Studies about sleep-wake cycles in fetuses also find that a fetus has definite sleep-wake cycles with distinguishable REM and non-REM periods between GW 28 – 31 [5,6]. This means that a fetus does already have periods of wakefulness, which are necessary for conscious awareness to occur, instead of being in an unconscious state all the time, during this time. So, consciousness begins to exist in a fetus no later than this time period.

However, consciousness in a fetus is in a very rudimentary form; this can be evident from the fact that even an infant, which has a more mature brain than a fetus, exhibits consciousness only at a low level compared with an adult and that the default mode neural circuit, which is now found to have an important role in consciousness at rest [2], is still incomplete[4]. What’s more, the sense of self or self-recognition begins to appear in some infants only around 15 months of age and in a majority of infants by 24 months of age [7]. So, it’s very very unlikely that an infant has the sense of self and that it can think for/about itself.

In conclusion, it seems that an infant begins to have a rudimentary form of consciousness at around GW 24-26. This may help provide informed decision about legal abortion.

  “Assuming that consciousness is mainly localized in the cortex, consciousness cannot emerge before 24 gestational weeks when the thalamocortical connections from the sense organs are established. Thus the limit of legal abortion at 22-24 weeks in many countries makes sense...[4]”

However, these are only indirect evidence. Direct, definite evidence of when exactly a fetus begins to have consciousness is not available yet.

References.

Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tononi G. Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 2016;17: 307-321. The full pdf file can be downloaded from here.
Song X, Tang X. An extended theory of global workspace of consciousness. Progress in Natural Science. 2008 Jul;18(7):789–793.
Stiles J, Jernigan TL.The Basics of Brain DevelopmentNeuropsychol Rev. 2010 Dec; 20(4): 327–348.
Lagercrantz H.The emergence of consciousness: Science and ethics. Semin Fetal Neonatal Med. 2014 Oct;19(5):300-5. doi: 10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003.
Okai T, Kozuma S, Shinozuka N, Kuwabar Y, Mizuno M. A study on the development of sleep-wakefulness cycle in the human fetus. Early Human Development. 1992 Jun-Jul; 29(1-3): 391-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-3782(92)90198-P
Mirmiran M, Maas YGH, Ariagno RL. Development of fetal and neonatal sleep and circadian rhythms. Sleep Medicine Reviews. 2003; 7(4):321-334.
Anderson JR. The development of self-recognition: A review. Dev Psychobiol. 1984 Jan;17(1):35-49.


Is there a formal definition for the difficulty of learning something? Sometimes I hear that one subject is harder than another, but never scientifically investigated. For example, in high school, it's commonly thought that mathematics is the hardest subject. But I think that this definition is poorly built. I remember when I was in high school, and mathematics wasn't hard, but I really had no interest, and I ignored it and obtained poor grades. Today I've started to like mathematics, and it's really not that hard. I can solve problems and prove propositions, and the only thing I feel that changed in my mind is the addition of interest.

It seems that sometimes, the subject is not hard, and the student is under the effect of something that compels him to not do it, such as mathematical anxiety or the lack of interest as I pointed out before. I believe that the concept of difficulty per se is a poor measure of skill needed for doing something and that it interacts with other aspects. So, I got curious: are there studies on the definition of difficulty?

I have found this question after making my question, and it seems to address some of the questions I've made, but it doesn't mention the effects of willingness or lack of interest in obtaining knowledge.

First, let me start by saying your topic is extremely broad.  There are many reasons why something may be difficult to learn.  However, the exact "difficulty associated with learning something" is known by many different terms in the scientific literature, and in particular, I have found cognitive load theory to be a particularly useful description of this.  According to Sweller, Cognitive Load falls into three distinct domains:

Intrinsic cognitive load is that difficulty that is associated with the material itself, independent of the learner.
Extraneous cognitive load is associated with the instructional methods or materials (poor instructional techniques increase this load).
Germane cognitive load is load that the learner requires to create associations and connections among the concepts, and depends on the learner's knowledge base.

The basic premise is that subjects are difficult to learn if they require a great number of connections to be formed (a mental model or schema).  The greater the connections required, the greater the difficulty.  Complicating this, certain topics are inherently difficult, such as mathematical computation and critical thinking, and learners bring their own pre-conceived mental notions to the table.  Cognitive Load theory attempts to provide a framework for thinking about the interactions between these variables.

I have studied the difficulty with teaching/learning engineering subjects, such as statistics, variability, critical thinking, etc. using controlled experiments that attempt to hone in on the second and third aspects of CLT. Here is a link to a conference proceeding that I published on the subject; I have another paper in-work that I can't share until it is published- but so far, my results very much support CLT.

Interest can be a factor, because attention given to a learning subject will take away from the students' ability to process other cognitive loads. Likewise, anxiety can also be a factor.  Lots of research left to do in this field if you ask me, though - so expect these theories to develop substantially in the next 10-20 years.


Do hints improve memorization when using spaced repetition? For example, I'm learning geography using the spaced repetition method. I have some program which asks me questions like, "In which country Melbourne is located?", and I have to recall the country (assuming I've studied the material and at least once seen Melbourne on the map). This program also gives me two possible hints when I can't recall the answer:

If I choose "obvious hint" it says "kangaroo", which for me is a straight giveaway for "Australia".
If I choose "vague hint" it says "hell". After thinking a while, I may come up with this: "There's the Devil in Hell. There's an animal called Tasmanian Devil, which lives on the island Tasmania, which is near the Australia."

The idea in both cases is to not show the answer right away when I can't recall it, but rather force me (more or less) to try recalling it once again, but now with some additional information.

Questions:

Do obvious hints help memorization at all? As you saw, the hint "Australia" is as good as just showing me the answer, but maybe it helps building association in my memory which helps recalling the answer later.
Do vague hints help more? I assume yes, since they trigger some associations in my memory, but I have no proofs.

Of course, the "obviousness" of a hint is very subjective, but the idea behind it should be clear: "obvious" hints are just one or two associations away from answers, while "vague" ones form longer association chains.

EDIT: There is a related question with an answer which mentions elaborative rehearsal and depth of processing, but I'm not sure if those processes are involved here, since hints are mostly related to an answer ("Kangaroos live in Australia"), not a question ("kangaroos" and "Melbourne" are not associated in my memories, neither do "hell" and "Melbourne").

Short answer: Based on my assessment of the literature, I would say that a vague hint leaves room for retrieval practice, and will therefore likely elicit a testing effect. An obvious hint does not, and will therefore likely help recognition, but not recall.

Background

Spaced repetition refers to the practice of combining two well-known memory effects, namely the spacing effect and the testing effect, typically implemented in some form of flash cards.

Testing effect

The testing effect aspect of spaced repetition is highly relevant. It refers to the finding that retrieval practice leads to improved long-term recall (cf. recognition) ability for a practiced item compared to non-practiced items.

Modern theories on the testing effect tend to take the view that the testing effect represents a complex, active process in the brain rather than simple association formation or Hebbian learning. A critical meta-analysis of the recent testing effect literature unsurprisingly found support for the testing effect's existence, as well as some support for effortful processing as a contributing factor (Eisenkraemer, Jaeger and Stein, 2013). They did not find support for semantic elaboration theories (i.e., new/re-weighted brain associations).

Additional support for the testing effect as an active process comes from the fact that associated non-practiced items may be actively inhibited by retrieval practice, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork and Bjork, 1994). We currently do not know much more than that the testing effect happens when we engage in retrieval practice. I know researchers who are studying exactly this, but at this point, I'm unfortunately not comfortable with discussing their thoughts or unpublished work.

Spacing effect

I'm mostly including this for completeness' sake. The spacing effect was discovered by Herman Ebbinghaus in the 1880's and is one of the oldest phenomena studied in psychology. It refers to the tendency for animals to retain items presented over a longer period relatively better than when presentation of the same items is massed over a single brief period. It doesn't have any relation to the use of hints in spaced repetition learning, at least not one that I can think of.

References

Anderson, M. C., Bjork, R. A., & Bjork, E. L. (1994). Remembering can cause forgetting: retrieval dynamics in long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(5), 1063.
Eisenkraemer, R. E., Jaeger, A., & Stein, L. M. (2013). A Systematic Review of the Testing Effect in Learning. Paidéia (Ribeirão Preto), 23(56), 397-406.


Is there evidence for “because it’s boring, it’s very easy to make errors” There seems to be a common view in programming / software engineering:

  “because it’s boring, it’s very easy to make errors”

And then the solution to this is often to introduce some level(s) of abstraction to avoid what is classed as boring.

What's the evidence to justify this?

The quote is from lecturer of a Haskell course I am taking right now, https://afp-2017.github.io/index.html .

A quick Google reveals similar statements, such as

  Repetition easily induces mistakes

from "Secure Development for Mobile Apps: How to Design and Code Secure Mobile Applications with PHP and JavaScript" by J.D. Glaser

I think I have heard similar statements from professional software engineers, relating to justifying more levels of abstraction in code. However, I am unable to think of specific other instances.

Short answer
There is scientific evidence that boredom can increase error rates.

Background
My gut feeling would tell me that boredom decreases vigilance, which then  would increase the chance of errors. Vigilance being defined as sustained attention (Oken, 2006).

And indeed, vigilance has been directly linked to boredom, and more specifically, boredom decreases the amount of vigilance. In fact, an accepted measure of vigilance is the error rate in task performance (Pattyn et al., 2008), based on earlier observations that motor task performance decreases with lower vigilance levels (MacWorth, 1968).

Another way to measure alertness or vigilance is with EEG. Generally, low EEG frequencies are associated with sleepiness and reduces alertness (Delta band with 0 - 4 Hz oscillations), while high frequencies are associated with alert states (Gamma band at >30 Hz). Figure 1 shows that EEGs with low frequencies are associated with higher error rates (Oken, 2006).

Fig. 1. Error rates plotted against EEG spectral frequencies. As time went by, the subject lost attentiveness, EEG frequencies went down and error rates went up. source: (Oken, 2006)

References
- MacWorth, Can J Psychol (1964); 18: 209-23
- Oken et al., Clin Neurophysiol (2006); 117(9): 1885–901
- Pattyn et al., Physiology & Behavior (2008); 93(1–2): 69-378


Are the lobes of the brain anatomically distinct, or is the distinction between them not as well-defined? If I had a brain in front of me, would I be able to find some kind of crevasse or something separately each lobe from the next? I guess what I'm asking is, are lobes more arbitrarily-defined regions of the brain, or is there a definite distinction between them anatomically?

There are anatomical features that make lobe demarcations fairly non-arbitrary. From Wikipedia:

by Sebastian023

There are some borders here that may be more arbitrary than others:

The border between the occipital and parietal lobe between the preoccipital notch and parieto-occipital sulcus
The border between the parietal and temporal lobes between the preoccipital notch and the lateral fissure
The little space between the central sulcus and the lateral fissure that separates the parietal and frontal lobes

These lines seem to be anchored on non-arbitrary points, but their flatness (lack of curves/bumps) may be somewhat arbitrary. An analogy would be the southern border of my home state, Minnesota. It's a flat east-to-west line between two rivers that form the eastern and western borders. The rivers aren't arbitrary, but the southern border didn't have to be a straight line. (Why not a sine wave? That surely would've made things more interesting!) If there's more to these borders of the brain than just their anchor points at either end, it's not apparent to me from this image or any other sources I know offhand, but it would be nice to see another answer from anyone who might know better than I.


Explanation of "I never thought I'd get this far" There's a phenomenon where people get to a stage in life they never thought they'd see it and they don't know what to do. Why is that? Why is that when we're faced with a non-foreseeable dilemma we don't know what the right thing is to do? How common is this?

"I Never Thought I'd See the Day!" or "I never thought I'd get this far" from SpongeBob's Plankton T.V. Show are memes.

I'm adding to social psych tag because I've seen related questions in social psych class.

This is a good question which cannot really be provided with scientifically proven reasons, so we can only look at possibilities.

From personal experience as a therapist, anecdotally I can say that with some people, the meme would not be complete.  With these people the situation would be

  I didn't think I would get this far so quickly

and that could be a key point with many others.

When planning for the future, do you plan for things you know you will reach very soon or do you include those points where you cannot envisage getting to right now?

Forward planning can be different from person to person, and if you haven't planned for a particular eventuality, how do you know what you want to do, let alone how you should do things?

The comment at the bottom of your image:

  I have managed to change my name and gender on ALL of my legal documents! So what's next?

can be a comment of surprise, and maybe despair; or it could be:

  Good! I have that out of the way, now do I have to do anything else?

The processes involved with identity change can be daunting and therefore some choose to take things a step at a time rather than planning the whole process before carrying it out.

Is the person aware of all the things they need to do?
Can they cope?
Do they have the support of professional organizations to help along the way?
Do they have support from friends and family?

All these things and more will affect how the person will be dealing with the situation.


How do personality tests work that require you to choose one of two statement that applies most to you? There are different kinds of psychometric tests, I think the numerical and verbal ones are fair enough, I can see their usefulness. However, I cannot understand how the 'soft' psychometric tests work and how they apply to a particular career.

I just finished one which consisted of 90 'questions', except they were not questions, they were all "pick one of the two following sentences" 90 times. Some made sense, such as

  Do you like to lead a group.
  Do you like to fit in with a group.

But others I could not answer because I could not choose either option for example:

  You are slow at planning.
  You are slow at making decisions.

I have to answer one. In this case, I'd say that I am not slow in either.

How exactly (detail) do these types of psychometric tests work? A link to an open one would be what I am looking for. How do they create the answers? How do they pair them? Do they change based on your previous answers?

There is a large general literature evaluating the degree to which personality tests predict job performance. In particular see for example the review by Barrick et al (2001). In general such reviews find that personality measures provide a small but meaningful prediction of job performance.

Ipsative testing

So in general, you are asking about how personality tests work. But more specifically, you are asking about ipsative personality tests:

  Ipsative is a descriptor used in psychology to indicate a specific
  type of measure in which respondents compare two or more desirable
  options and pick the one that is most preferred (sometimes called a
  "forced choice" scale).

Regarding your statement that you could not answer one of the questions, presumably the instructions asked you to indicate which statement applied most. Thus, it would be hoped that even if there were two statements that both applied to you a lot, or both applied a little, you would be able to indicate which applied more.

For general scientific use where you can rely on people to answer honestly, researchers typically do not use ipsative testing. Ipsative testing generally distorts the correlations between subscales.However, ipsative tests is popular in applied settings such as in selection and recruitment. The argument is that ipsative testing reduces faking.

Relevant references include:

Heggestad et al (2006) interpreted their results to indicate that ipsative testing was not a viable method for controlling for faking:

  Recent research suggests multidimensional forced-choice (MFC) response
  formats may provide resistance to purposeful response distortion on
  personality assessments. It remains unclear, however, whether these
  formats provide normative trait information required for selection
  contexts. The current research evaluated score correspondences between
  an MFC format measure and 2 Likert-type measures in honest and
  instructed-faking conditions. In honest response conditions, scores
  from the MFC measure appeared valid indicators of normative trait
  standing. Under faking conditions, the MFC measure showed less score
  inflation than the Likert measure at the group level of analysis. In
  the individual-level analyses, however, the MFC measure was as
  affected by faking as was the Likert measure. Results suggest the MFC
  format is not a viable method to control faking.

However, Bowen et al reached a more positive conclusion about ipsative testing and the degree to which it is faking-resistant:

  The current study extends previous research by comparing empirical
  data on ipsative and normative versions of the 30-scale Occupational
  Personality Questionnaire (OPQ). Participants were randomly assigned
  to “honest” or “faking” groups. Results support the proposition that
  when the number of scales is large, the measurement dependency problem
  associated with the ipsative format is negligible. There was
  satisfactory convergent validity between ipsative and normative forms
  in both groups. On both forms, the distance between an ideal profile
  and participants' ratings were narrower in the faking group than in
  the honest group. The results suggest that though ipsative measures
  were not completely free from faking, they were relatively more
  effective in guarding against faking than more commonly used normative
  measures.

Meade (2004) discuss ipsative measurement more generally.

  Data are described as ipsative if a given set of responses always sum
  to the same total. However, there are many properties of data
  collection that can give rise to different types of ipsative data. In
  this study, the most common type of ipsative data used in employee
  selection (forced-choice ipsative data; FCID) is discussed as a
  special case of other types of ipsative data. Although all ipsative
  data contains constraints on covariance matrices (covariance-level
  interdependence), FCID contains additional item-level
  interdependencies as well. The psychological processes that give rise
  to FCID and the resultant psychometric properties are discussed. In
  addition, data from which both normative and ipsative responses were
  provided by job applicants illustrate very different patterns of
  correlations as well as very different selection decisions between
  normative, FCID and ipsatized measures.

References

Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Judge, T. A. (2001). Personality and performance at the beginning of the new millennium: what do we know and where do we go next?. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9(1‐2), 9-30. PDF
Bowen, C. C., Martin, B. A., & Hunt, S. T. (2002). A comparison of ipsative and normative approaches for ability to control faking in
personality questionnaires. International Journal of Organizational
Analysis, 10(3), 240-259.
Heggestad, E. D., Morrison, M., Reeve, C. L., & McCloy, R. A. (2006). Forced-choice assessments of personality for selection:
Evaluating issues of normative assessment and faking resistance.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(1), 9.
Meade, A. W. (2004). Psychometric problems and issues involved with creating and using ipsative measures for selection. Journal of
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 77(4), 531-551.


Why is the chicken crossing the road joke funny? According to modern psychology why is the answer to the joke "Why did the chicken cross the road?" "To get the the other side." Funny?

According to the relief theory, what are we relieved about?

Could it be that the question invokes a feeling of stress when we don't know the answer? Do we fear that we shall have to expend a lot of energy in trying to work out the solution? Is it stressful having a question put to us which we can't answer? (Just like starting a new job where we don't know what we're doing?)

Or does the stress come from the fear that we will look stupid for being unknowledgeable about the answer to the question?

Why are we then relieved by the answer? Is it because we are relieved that we don't have to expend new energy storing new information because we the information is already so obvious? (But this might not make sense as we do tend store jokes.) But we do not have to alter any of our existing information.

Or does the relief come from finding out that the questioner does not have superior knowledege to ourselves. And we laugh at how idiotic this person is. Like shadenfrauder.

Or... is the laugh a submissive behaviour that we acknowledge that we have been fooled by a greater wit and intelligence?

What is the modern take on this?

I think, as you surmised, the joke isn't all that funny. I would consider the dynamics of the social interaction in which the joke was told as more important than the joke itself.

Laughter is as much a social phenomenon as an involuntary reaction to something humorous. Duchenne laughter is even correlated with increased pain tolerance, in addition to feelings of well-being (https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.1373). People may laugh or otherwise respond positively if they are seeking social or personal approval.

But as an example of an infamous anti-joke, the chicken-road question "humor" is probably the relief of stress caused by the knowledge that the answer is trivial and thus we are obviated of the need to seek a more clever answer that would render this more of a riddle. The expectation is that the answer is something clever, interesting, or non-obvious, and so when the punchline is revealed, we are relieved and also fooled. The relief comes from the realization that it's not actually important what we said because the joke was a trick and our intellectual status was never on the line.

You may be interested in My Humorous Robot, a conference paper on human responses to an NAO robot telling jokes. The jokes range from actually funny to anti-jokes and human responses are statistically analyzed.

HRI '18 Companion of the 2018 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction
Pages 193-194
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3177015


Nature vs. nurture in irritability? For example, personally I'm quite irritable. It's not hard to irritate me and I swear either through an inner voice or whisper very often, but not out-loud. That does not happen very often. This is hardly likely due to some temporal cause.

But at the same time it seems there are people who are less irritable. How much of this is due to nature and how much is due to nurture? Are there any studies?

You will have to investigate quite a few factors:

There must be a genetic/epigenetic factors to this because we know that personality trait neuroticism has genetic and environmental factors.
You should also investigate into stress - biological and psychological stress.
Investigating theories of psychological development can also come in handy, especially, Freudian theories.

In my personal view, I think a combination of genetic and environmental factors should play role in shaping irritability tolerance, however, additionally environment plays a role of stressor.

In other words, you should have genetics, epigenetics and upbringing as a predictors of general irritability. Immediate state of being can also have influence, but stressor is like a trigger.


Looking for a name of a theory or reason behind a seeming cognitive mistake or error Setting:
Bathroom, you've just brushed your teeth, turned the water on to let the remainder drift into the drain. After a moment you know there is something that needs to happen(obviously turning off the sink) but instead you flick the light switch off, for no apparent reason.
I realize it's an odd situation but it can be compared to other events where there are multiple options for action and 'accidentally' choose the
 one you don't mean to.Question Would this be regarded as cognitive dissonance or is there a better name for this type of action? Thank you.

I think what you describe is a capture error.

  Capture errors refer to frequently performed tasks that take over the
  correct intended action. Wickens & Hollands clearly define capture
  errors as resulting from two primary reasons: (1) the intended action
  and the resulted action share somewhat characteristics that are
  closely related: and (2) the action sequence is resulted from
  automated behaviour and therefore, not closely monitored by attention.
  The example stated earlier about pouring orange juice instead of milk
  is a capture error by itself.

You had the intention to close the sink, but instead you closed the light. Both actions share the characteristic of closing, closing the light is the most frequent.


Why pale when we fear and red when we are angry I find it hard to explain why we turn pale when we fear but red when we are angry. In both emotions adrenaline is released which if I am not mistaken cause vasoconstriction in vessels going to the head. As such I would expect to be pale during anger instead of red. So what is causing causing the difference in color in the two emotions. It seens that in anger blood vessels dilate while in fear they constrict, I thing this contradicts that in both emotions adrenaline is released.

The 5F response (fright/flight/fight/freeze/fawn response) to threats is responsible for both situations.

Specifically, among other reactions, the 5F response causes the following: [emphasis mine]

  Catecholamine hormones, such as adrenaline (epinephrine) or noradrenaline (norepinephrine), facilitate immediate physical reactions associated with a preparation for violent muscular action and :[13]

  Acceleration of heart and lung action
  Paling or flushing, or alternating between both
  Inhibition of stomach and upper-intestinal action to the point where digestion slows down or stops
  General effect on the sphincters of the body
  Constriction of blood vessels in many parts of the body
  Liberation of metabolic energy sources (particularly fat and glycogen) for muscular action
  Dilation of blood vessels for muscles

  Citations
  [13] Henry Gleitman, Alan J. Fridlund and Daniel Reisberg (2004). Psychology (6 ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-97767-6.

Pale face when in fear

During periods of threat, the amygdala and hyppocampus within the brain can initiate "flight" within the 5F response.

  The physiological changes that occur during the fight or flight response are activated in order to give the body increased strength and speed in anticipation of fighting or running. Some of the specific physiological changes and their functions include:[14][15]

  Increased blood flow to the muscles activated by diverting blood flow from other parts of the body.
  Increased blood pressure, heart rate, blood sugars, and fats in order to supply the body with extra energy.
  The blood clotting function of the body speeds up in order to prevent excessive blood loss in the event of an injury sustained during the response.
  Increased muscle tension in order to provide the body with extra speed and strength.

  Citations
  [14] Stress Management for Health Course. "The Fight Flight Response". Retrieved 19 April 2013.

  [15] Olpin, Michael. "The Science of Stress". Weber State University.

Because the muscles in the arms and legs etc. need more blood to operate effectively, the increase in blood flow to the muscles is obtained through Vasodilation of blood vessels leading to those muscles, and Vasoconstriction of blood vessels leading to areas of the body which are in less need of blood.

Diversion of some of the blood from the facial area will remove the colour from the skin in that area.

Red face during anger

The 5F response, and resulting Vasoconstriction and Vasodilation is responsible for this too.  This time with a "fight" response.

  Within a few seconds, your pupils grow large, your heart beats faster, and blood vessels all over your body widen, to increase blood flow. This allows more blood to reach your muscles, providing them with more oxygen, and preparing them for action — whether that’s putting up a fight, or running away,” explains Aranda. “As a result of all this, the vessels in your face also widen, allowing more blood to flow in.

  “Scientists are still learning what, if any, evolutionary function this response — known as flushing — might have, especially because humans seem to be the only animal that has it.”

  “It’s likely that this redness has been useful in helping us communicate our emotions. When your face turns red, the people around you have a better idea of how you’re feeling — which helps you socially.”(Source)


Evolutionary motivation for the existence of pleasure? It seems like pleasure goes beyond needs. What is its purpose? Is it supposed to make you not do anything, because of how good you feel?
Are there animals that don't feel pleasure, but only have needs to satisfy, and how would their CNS differ from human/primate CNS?

My main question: What is the motivation for there being some sort of pleasure, as opposed to simply the absence of a certain need? In the case of an orgasm, why exactly does a person feel very good for a while - why doesn't he just go directly into a state of neutrality, with there no longer being a need for sex? If a person defecates, why is there a momentary pleasant feeling - why doesn't the person simply go into a 'no longer have the need to defecate' state?

It really seems that there is an unnecessarily large amount of pleasure, as opposed to a mere lack of need.

It seems like there are 2 mechanisms that motivate action - the need to satisfy an unfulfilled need, and the need to achieve a reward. Is this the case? If yes, what is useful about this? It seems like a the 'need to satisfy an unfulfilled need' by itself should be good enough.

EDIT:

For example, we have an instinctive need to not feel like starving, or to not feel extremely tired - we simply don't want to feel that way. However with some things, it seems like there's more than just a need - with sex, there is a 'need' to have sex - a male who hasn't had sex for long enough, will simply want to have sex, so that he gets rid of the feeling of wanting sex - but there is also the motivation of expected pleasure from the orgasm. Similarly, I'd say that there is some sort of pleasure from food.

I think this is true (that there are 2 motivating factors, not just one), and I think that it's quite weird in some sense. Why isn't there just a need - why doesn't a male after sex simply stop having the need to have sex? I think I've read something about the pleasure having something to do with encouraging certain types of behavior, but I really don't know.

First a couple of definitions:

Positive reinforcement occurs when an event or stimulus is presented as a consequence of a behavior and the behavior increases.
Negative reinforcement occurs when the rate of a behavior increases because an aversive event or stimulus is removed or prevented from happening.

Learning may occur as a result of negative or positive reinforcement; ie, through the elimination of a need, or through the pleasure of reward.  Traditionally, these have indeed been thought of as two complementary mechanisms as you suggest, but the modern view is that they are actually synonyms.  They are different ways of looking at the same thing, like describing a glass of water based on how full or how empty it is.

For example, eating can be described as the elimination of hunger (negative reinforcement) or as the pleasure of taste (positive reinforcement).  The choice depends on the context of the situation, but it is always possible to describe any reinforcement as both negative and positive.

As for why the feeling of pleasure exists at all, you can think of it this way: If an action only results in the elimination of a need, then there is no motivation for the subject to do any better than that.  We can fulfil our hunger with rice-cakes, but we are motivated to seek high-calorie foods because of the pleasure they give.  This was an essential survival mechanism for our ancestors.


What is meant by "serotonergic" in "serotonergic psychedelics" "Serotonergic psychedelics" is apparently a sub-class of psychedelics. Now, I believed that the pharmacological definition of psychedelics is that they all agonise 5HT receptors, especially the 2A subtype. However, the existence of this serotonergic sub-class implies that perhaps some psychedelics don't operate on serotonin receptors. Unless, something else is meant by "serotonergic".
Does serotonergic in this case refer to what receptors they agonise, or, what chemical the substances imitate. If the latter, that means that some psychedelic substances are able to agonise 5HT receptors without imitating serotonin, whereas the serotonergic psychedelics do this while imitating serotonin.
If the former, then that means that not all psychedelics agonise the 5HT receptors, meaning that "agonises the 5HT serotonin receptors, especially the 2A subtype", is not the definition of psychedelics.

Short answer
It's messy.
Background
The classical psychedelics (mescaline, DMT etc.) are derived from plants (peyote, ayahuasca) and have a long history of use by shamans and originally often mainly served religious purposes, before being exploited by the New World peoples for recreational (and occasionally scientific) purposes. LSD is also considered to be classic yet it is a synthetic derivative, but readily made from lysergic acid derivatives extracted from the mold Claviceps purpurea. These classic psychedelics are indeed all, primarily, 5HT2A agonists.
Having sad that, 'psychedelic' is a classical term meaning 'mind opening', and was first coined back in the 1950's. It's a broad, ill-defined term often associated with illicit drugs, hippies and alternative rock. The term serotinergic drug is more specific, while the term '5HT2A agonist' is yet even more specific. The former also includes MDMA, which is imo mind-opening, yet (generally) not hallucinogenic. The latter includes those drugs that produce profound hallucinations, i.e., the classic psychedelics.
This is the reason I tend to move away from 'psychedelic' as often soft drugs like THC are also termed 'psychedelic'. Hallucinogenics are a more specific class of drugs and is the one I think you are referring to, i.e., those compounds producing hallucinations, i.e., sensations that are not there (a hallucination being 'a perception in the absence of external stimulus that has qualities of real perceptions').
Now what about non-serotinergic hallucinogens? Well, there are particularly potent hallucinogens that are primarily not serotinergic, but glutaminergic, particularly the dissociative anesthetics. These include PCP and ketamine that are hallucinogenic as they

can produce visual and auditory distortions and a sense of floating and dissociation (feeling detached from reality)

However, here again it comes down to a matter of definition; a 'true' hallucination is a percept in the absence of a stimulus; a distortion is more akin to an illusion, namely

an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience

In addition, most and perhaps all hallucinogens are 'dirty' drugs, in that they affect multiple neurotransmitter systems and therefore have broad effects. MDMA for instance is psychedelic because of its 5HT effects but definitely has stimulant, dopaminergic properties too (having the methamphetamine backbone this isn't surprising of course).
In all, not only is the scientific terminology messy, also the science behind it is messy, as 5HT2A agonists may still have effects on other neurotransmitter systems too. This can explain why every 5HT2A drug has slightly, or even grossly different actions than structurally related ones.


What is the optimal exercise regime for improving cognitive functioning? It seems that researchers agree that physical exercise increases cognitive abilities. This seems to work universally for all ages: children, adults and old people.

It is suggested that everyone should exercise for half an hour at least 3 times a week. I'm wondering if there are any studies which try to find dependencies between the amount of training and the effect of it on cognitive abilities?

Yes, there are several  studies which found links between the amount of training and the effect of it on cognitive abilities. See the below for references and summaries of some of these:

Jaeggi, Susanne M., et al. "Improving fluid intelligence with training on working memory." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105.19 (2008): 6829-6833.

Jaeggi et al. found that dual n-back could improve fluid intelligence. This approach has been developed into a game, and this game which can be freely played online.

However, more recent research has failed to support its effectiveness for normal individuals, although I have read anecdotal evidence for effectiveness in increasing mental ability in older adults or individuals with ADHD.

Overall, it appears that the literature suggests that brain training does not work, that "the scientific literature does not support claims that the use of software-based “brain games” alters neural functioning in ways that improve general cognitive performance in everyday life, or prevent cognitive slowing and brain disease."

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-training-doesn-t-make-you-smarter/

However, working your brain hard through education has been linked to increases in IQ so maybe that is the best approach.

Winship, Christopher, and Sanders Korenman. "Does staying in school make you smarter? The effect of education on IQ in The Bell Curve." Intelligence, Genes, and Success. Springer New York, 1997. 215-234.