What are the conditions of deliberate practice? TL;DR: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for deliberate practice?

Longer version:
I've read a number of books/articles on deliberate practice and its role in acquiring expertise.  The texts make a compelling case for the argument that a minimum of 10,000 hours of deliberate practice is required to develop expertise in a particular field.  The implication of the research is undoubtedly optimistic (as it largely dispels the notion of being born talented - with certain semi-exceptions, notably, athletes).  However, I struggle when it comes to translating the research into practical takeaways for myself.

As someone who'd like to apply the concept of deliberate practice to his profession/hobbies, it would be useful to have a rigorous/comprehensive definition of deliberate practice that I could effectively use as a check-list.  But in the material I've read, it seems that "deliberate practice" is effectively defined as (and I'm paraphrasing): "the type of practice of which 10,000 hours are needed in order to develop expertise".

So, to put it differently (from the TL;DR above):
How do I know if I'm practicing effectively?  (Aside from practicing a certain way for 10,000 hours and seeing if I become an expert)

Disclaimers:

It's probably evident from my post that I'm not a professional
researcher / academic.  My exposure to the topic is largely from pop
science books that cater to the mass-market (i.e., I'm trusting the
authors re: the quality of underlying research).
Also, the answer to my question may well be addressed in formal research papers found
on PUBMED/etc., but I unfortunately don't have access to that.

My causal impression is that the literature on deliberate practice is a little vague about how deliberate practice differs from other forms of practice.

I think it was Ericcson who distinguished between work, play, and deliberate practice. Work is to get something done, play is for enjoyment, and deliberate practice is activity completed with the goal of improving skill.

A few general features of deliberate practice include:

It should be effortful and is likely to involve a degree of focus
The intensity and focus of deliberate practice may limit the amount of time that can be dedicated to it per day, and it is important to get appropriate rest either side.

Deliberate practice is generally designed to be at the optimal level of challenge given your current ability. It should also include feedback.

In general it is going to help a lot to have a tutor. Tutors go by many names: coaches, supervisors, mentors, trainers, teachers, and so on. The tutor can assist in providing you with appropriate exercises and giving you the right feedback. So for example, music instructor may push you to master specific exercises or get you to master a particular musical piece because they can see that it will challenge you. Similarly, a tennis coach may get you repeating particular strokes with feedback.

That said, if you don't have a tutor, you can still attempt to apply the principles of deliberate practice to your own learning. It's harder and probably less efficient, but it is possible to teach yourself a lot of things. A few general suggestions:

Be clear on the skill you're actually trying to master. What is the goal state? What would be evidence of you achieving that state? For example, in academia, evidence of achievement might be seen in getting some top-tier publications. In golf, it might be achieving a certain handicap.
Try to create learning environments where you get feedback on your performance. For example, when doing mathematics exercises you get feedback. When you submit journal articles you get feedback through peer review.
Reflect on whether the activities you are doing are actually improving your skill. Be mindful of when you are getting stuck in a rut. Explore learning materials that might be useful.

I'd also make a final point about the importance of actual work in acquiring a skill. The deliberate practice literature does have a tendency to emphasise the importance of drills and background study (e.g., practicing your serve; studying famous chess masters, etc.). However, in many cases, actually doing the activity (i.e., that which is called work) can be an incredibly valuable learning experience. I vaguely recall a study that looked at soccer referees that showed that number of matches refereed was an independent predictor of referee performance over and above deliberate practice.


Does individual understanding or perception, determine dream lucidity? Does dream lucidity come with understanding the mechanisms of the world, age, or something else?

I am unsure if you mean, if the ability to lucid dream comes with age? or if the type or degree of lucidity within the dream is different depending on the individual? So I will aim for a ballpark answer.

Lucid dreaming defined by a dream in which the dreamer is – while dreaming – aware that she/he is dreaming (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004).

A variety of different factors have been found to influence lucid dreaming. Though most people report having had a lucid dream at least once in their lives, only about 20% of the population reports having lucid dreams once amonth or more (Snyder & Gackenbach, 1988; in LaBerge, 1990).

Contrary to your suggestion, lucid dreaming has not been found to come with age, but rather is more common before the age of 16 (Voss & Frenzel, 2012). Additionally, much research has shown evidence supporting the idea that one can train oneself to lucid dream, hence suggesting that lucid dreaming does is not necessarily influenced by ones understanding of the world but rather is an acquired skill (see: Price & Cohen, 1988; LaBerge, 1980). However, it can perhaps be influenced by an individuals experience for example one study found a positive correlation between lucid dream instances and time spent playing video games (Gackenbach, 2006).

References:

Gackenbach, J. (2006). Video game play and lucid dreams: Implications for the development of consciousness. Dreaming, 16(2), 96.

LaBerge, S. P. (1980). Lucid dreaming as a learnable skill: A case study. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 51(3f), 1039-1042.

LaBerge, S., & Verified, L. D. P. (1990). Lucid dreaming: Psychophysiological studies of consciousness during REM sleep.

Price, R. F., & Cohen, D. B. (1988). Lucid dream induction. In Conscious mind, sleeping brain (pp. 105-134). Springer New York

Schredl, M. & Erlacher, D. (2004). Lucid dreaming frequency and personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 37(7), 1463-1473.

Voss, U., Frenzel, C., KOPPEHELE‐GOSSEL, J. U. D. I. T. H., & Hobson, A. (2012). Lucid dreaming: an age‐dependent brain dissociation. Journal of sleep research, 21(6), 634-642.


Is the inability for people to accept they may be wrong on a topic (and the rationales for that) something that psychology ever discusses in depth? Pride, shame, hubris and ego being factors in whether a person is able to consider they may be wrong on a statement, claim or stance on a topic.  Not only consider wrongness, but accept or note their change of mind.

This was discussed by Erich Fromm, a German social psychologist. In his popular book "To Have or to Be?" he explains this mode of attached to one's own conviction as the modes of existence related to "Having" as if this was one's property that it is about to defend. On the other hand, people living in the mode of "Being" do not "posess" their ideas but are open to learn new things, the best what can happen in a conversation.


Is there any fMRI evidence for different "states of mind"? If you've seen a snickers commercial, it goes something like "you are a different person when you are hungry". I'm interested if the person's brain actually looks different when observed through fMRI if the person is tired/hungry, and the person's outlook on the world changes. For example things become more irritating.

Is there fMRI evidence to support that a person is capable of switching to a different "state of mind" based on the condition of the person's body or neuromodulator levels?

If there's a better term than "States of mind", could you suggest what it is? I'm thinking of an entrained state which changes the person's outlook on the past, present and the future, as well as influencing the choice of actions and behavior. Is there a good term I can google to find research on this topic?

Thank you for your input!

Dario Ringach wrote in a letter titled Neuroscience: States of Mind:

(inline references removed, see link for references)

  If the ability to perceive oriented stimuli is found to depend on the
  cortical state, we can then ask a number of important questions
  about cortical function. Is the time the cortex spends visiting
  particular states a function of attention? In other words, if an
  animal is trained to perceive horizontal stimuli, will there be a
  corresponding increase in the time the cortex spends sampling the
  horizontal orientation map relative to the other maps? Perhaps
  perceptual learning has more to do with 'top-down' mechanisms (brain
  processes learning how to 'control' the ongoing state of the early
  visual cortex) rather than 'bottom-up' mechanisms (external stimuli
  producing dramatic and long-lasting changes in the way the visual
  cortex processes incoming information). In more general terms,
  one might ask if such intrinsic cortical states represent the brain's
  'current hypothesis' about the state of the external world. In
  this case, the purpose of the cortical machinery would be to
  continuously update the current hypothesis by considering new visual
  information.

Rabinovich is well-known in dynamical systems neuroscience for highlighting the importance of transient states (as opposed to attractor states).  That is, it is the active dynamics that correlate with perceptive state, moreso than the steady-state dynamics.  This view has experimental evidence from several different organisms (See the Rabinovich link) but the most notable example is Locust olfactory states.

The Rabinovich paper above is really the goldmine for this question, including fMRI evidence, but another source of fMRI theory in relation to brain states is Karl Friston's Free Energy Principle for the Brain


How much power, in watts, does the brain use? When  IBM's Watson won on Jeopardy a few years ago, it did so using a room full of servers with a cooling system and a fat power feed, competing against a couple of humans powered by the equivalent of a tuna fish sandwich every several hours.  How much power does the human brain actually use?

Notes: If other assumptions are necessary, just state what you're answering for (e.g. healthy adults). If you know of differences between groups (e.g. people who are awake vs. asleep), please mention both.

References to scientific papers, especially reviews, are helpful.

This paper, which might be the one discussed here, discusses power usage of individual neurons but not the whole brain.

20 Watts.

Watson mentioned this in 2011: "The human brain only requires 20
watts of power to operate ... Watson? About 20,000 watts."  An interview with John Kelly (an IBM senior vice president and director of IBM Research) also puts the brain at "about 20 watts" (but puts the machine at 85 kW; the inconsistency doesn't matter for this question).
Popular Science also says 20 watts in an article explaining how simulating it in 2009 technology would take tens of megawatts.
Glenn Elert's high school students cite a collection of resources concluding 20W, as 20% of a 100W full-body power consumption.  That's the source cited on Wikipedia.
The 20W figure is cited like common knowledge from "several different sources" here, but those sources aren't named.


What are some examples of emergent abilities? By emergent ability I mean this: suppose that competently performing ability Z is contingent on, and only on, having skill X and skill Y developed to a certain level (that is, ability Z is a non-linear combination of ability X and Y that is distinct in type from those abilities).

You would see a person developing, slowly, their abilities X and Y, and then, when they have developed them sufficiently, one would suddenly observe ability Z.

I am interested in this question because it might seem like ability Z is a neurally innate ability that is suddenly triggered by some experience, when in fact this ability is just a combination of other abilities.

My question is perhaps two-fold: Do these sorts of abilities exist, and if so, what are some examples?

Many tasks can be decomposed into subtasks. And in a similar way the skills required to perform a task can be decomposed into component skills. For more detailed discussion, check out discussion of task analysis.

A few examples:

Driving a manual car requires an additional component skill (using the clutch and gearshift) over and above all the skills required to drive an automatic car (knowledge and application of road rules, speed control, vehicle control, etc.).
Writing an email requires a wide range of skills including basic skills in using computers, skills in communication and writing, and so on.

Much of education is based on the idea of layering new skills on top of those already established. For example, reading, writing, numeracy, and computing skills are fundamental to a lot of what is taught at university.

Another perspective on your question is to think about transfer and training.

Transfer: Skills in many tasks involve transferring what we already know and then developing some task specific adaptations. For example, if you were to write a report in industry after starting a new job, you would build on all your previous training in report writing, but there would also be some domain specific learning related to the new job. In this sense, the previous acquired skills assist performance, but domain-specific learning is required.
Training: Training, practice, and experience also tend to have a certain structure. Development of skill in an overall task tends to lead to development of component skills. For example, when learning to drive a car, an individual will tend to get practice in all the component skills. The nature of experience itself will encourage development of steering, road navigation, and gear changes. Training can also be designed to deliberately compartmentalise skill development (e.g., see the part-whole training discussions [Naylor et al (1963)]).

Relating all this to your specific question, defining component skills and emergent abilities as discrete entities is difficult. Transfer is often relative, and each task in a new context or with different details can alter the dynamics of transfer and performance.

References

Naylor, J. C., & Briggs, G. E. (1963). Effects of task complexity and task organization on the relative efficiency of part and whole training methods. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(3), 217.


How can experimental compliance (willingness of participants to participate) be measured? I would like to have a measure for how willing and eager participants were during an experiment. I have the intuition that their eagerness to comply will profoundly alter results of psychological and even psychophysiological experiments, but I lack a good way of experimentally quantifying this.

As a seed, one way would simply be to ask them following the experiment, another may be to include trick questions with an obvious but incorrect response - this would however tend to conflate willingness with attention.

Any suggestions very welcome.

You might look for examples in the Witt, Donnellan & Orlando (2011). They tested subject motivation in a psychology subject pool to see how it varied among groups. There may be follow up studies. Looking through similar studies will give you an idea of the kinds of things people use to assess. This is not a standardized line of research (yet).

Witt, E. A., Donnellan, M. B., & Orlando, M. J. (2011). Timing and selection effects within a psychology subject pool: Personality and sex matter. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 355-359. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.10.019


What are examples of stimuli that we know cause a grief or sadness reaction in humans? I am looking for examples of stimuli that has been shown to cause sadness in humans in a controlled environment as opposed to the neurological basis or evolutionary reason for sadness

I m not sure how much of sadness images are covered under it but perhaps you could have a look at IAPS ( International Affective Picture Series) . They seek to make media for specifically inducing desired affective states in research work including images , audios and videos.

http://csea.phhp.ufl.edu/media.html

Perhaps you could have a look into Mood Inducing Procedures ( MIP) used to induce both positive and negative affects in a laboratory setting .


Can binaural beats be generated with carrier tones outside the audible frequency range? I know that binaural beats are a controversial subject, as they might not work for everyone. In my own tests on myself I shuffled multiple recordings of binaural beats, with stereo headphones on, not looking at the frequency and resulting brain state advertised by each. I did, in fact, experience notably different mind states in these tests.

Binaural beats can be generated using carriers at any frequency within the audible range of human hearing. The frequency of binaural beats dictates the mind state that is being induced.

I'm wondering if binaural beats can be generated using carrier tones outside the range of human hearing?
And suppose that that works, do these binaural beats still have an effect on the state of mind? In other words, can you entrain your brain without being able to acoustically perceive the carrier tones producing the beats?

Short answer
No, infrasonic or ultrasonic sound cannot generate binaural beats.

Background
Binaural beats are generated in the brain and are associated with the frequency bands of the EEG. Binaural beats in the delta (1 to 4 Hz) and theta (4 to 8 Hz) ranges have reportedly been associated with reports of relaxed, meditative, and creative states, and used as an aid to falling asleep. Binaural beats in the alpha frequencies (8 to 12 Hz) are said to enhance alpha brain waves and those in the beta frequencies (16 to 24 Hz) have been associated with reports of increased concentration or alertness (source: Web US).

The binaural beat is not heard in the ordinary sense of the word - the human range of hearing is from 20-20,000 Hz and hence pretty much all the aforementioned frequencies cannot be registered directly by the auditory system. Instead, binaural beats are auditory brainstem responses which originate in the superior olivary nucleus of each hemisphere. They result from the interaction of two different auditory stimuli from opposite ears. The carrier frequencies have to be approximately below 1000 Hz and have to differ in frequency between one and 30 Hz. For example, if a pure tone of 400 Hz is presented to the right ear and a pure tone of 410 Hz is presented simultaneously to the left ear, an amplitude modulated standing wave of 10 Hz, i.e., the difference between the two, is experienced as the two wave forms mesh in and out of phase within the superior olivary nuclei (source: Web US).

Because auditory information needs to be sent to the brainstem, the auditory system is needed from the far periphery up to the brainstem. Thus, the hair cells in the inner ear are necessary to convey the information to the brain via the auditory nerve. Because infrasonic and ultrasonic sounds do not activate the hair cells and do not lead to auditory nerve activity, these sounds can hence not activate the brainstem and do not generate binaural beats.

Sources
- American Speech, Language & hearing Association
- Gray, Auditory System: Structure and Function. In: Neuroscience Online
- Web US


What is the meaning of the peak polarity in EEG data? I wish to define neuronal activities by analyzing the peaks of each channel in EEG signals. Some papers use the negative peaks as a measure of neuronal activity and others deploy the positive peaks. Which peak polarity should I use?

Short answer
The peak polarity of an EEG is arbitrary.

Background
Positive and negative in an EEG measure is arbitrary. If you measure the EEG between two electrodes and you flip the wires, the polarity of the signal will reverse too.

Only when standard EEG montages are used, in which the active and reference electrodes are strictly defined, then signal polarity makes sense, but only because a certain convention is followed.

If you are interested in peak amplitudes - they are independent of polarity, as long as the peak latencies are defined and absolute values are reported.

If you are interested in peak latencies and wish to compare those with others, then you do need to be aware what polarity your signal has. If you find out the polarity is reversed due to whatever reason - multiply every sample simply with -1. Problem solved.


Term for Plotting (as in behavior) I watched a video (First Man) on the evolution of humans that suggested the birth of language was probably the key to "plotting" and politics.

I'd like to learn more about plotting, but it's a hard thing to search for online, because the word plot is so frequently used in the context of plotting a thing's position (on a graph, for example).

Conspire and conspiracy are also inconvenient search terms because there's so much propaganda to wade through.

Is there a technical term for plotting or conspiring?

Merriam-Webster's gives the following synonyms:

  conspiracy, design, intrigue, machination, scheme

Intrigue yields a number of hits on books in Google Scholar, e.g.:

Carlton, Apple: The inside story of intrigue, egomania, and business blunders (1997)
Price, Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue
(2014)

Also, Machination AND intrigue yields a number of hits, such as

Pula, Polish Americans Protest Immigration Restriction: A Document,
Polish American Studies (2011); 68(1): 59-76

'Machination' alone yields a lot of unrelated (industrial) stuff, so I think it's important to use additional identifiers when searching for literature, such as synonyms, antonyms or couple them with the topic of interest, e.g. 'brain mechanisms', or 'gender differences'.


Any research backing alpha waves and impact on subconscious mind I've been researching the subject of affirmations and the relation with alpha waves over the course of the last few days.

I've found a significant amount of general information on the importance of performing learning/creative tasks during the alpha state, many of these sources indicating such a state as being ideal for self-suggestion.

On one of the articles I stumbled upon, the following statement was made:

  The subconscious mind is most open to helpful and beneficial suggestions while we are in the “alpha” brainwave state—our most relaxed state of mind. The alpha wave frequency is often achieved in a meditative state or just before falling sleep, creating an optimal time to receive positive affirmations.

Source: https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/embodied-wellness/201704/affirm-or-not-affirm

Such statements seem to run abound when running online searches, however, I have been unable to find any study to support statements like these; that could indicate the "openness" of the subconscious to "beneficial"/"helpful" effects to suggestive events when the brain is operating in the alpha band.

I am looking to find published research that could support to some extent statements like those.

Thank you.

For anyone interested, I believe to have found one such published article: Hypnotic Susceptibility increased by EEG Alpha Training by DAVID R. ENGSTROM, PERRY LONDON & JOSEPH T. HART.

In the article, they describe the correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and alpha waves. Here is one of the relevant lines:

  Results were analysed by correlation techniques and by analysis of variance and covariance. They indicate that hypnotic susceptibility and operant alpha rhythm are positively related both before and after the subjects received alpha training.


What does "Convolutional" signify in "Convolutional Neural Network"? The "Types of Neural Networks" wiki page doesn't even have the word "convolution" in it, and yet there's an entire Javascript library based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN).

So, what makes CNNs "convolutional"? When I hear "convolution", I think of either smearing/blurring together (as in the "convolve" tool in programs like Photoshop), or complexity/tangling (e.g., "a long and unnecessarily convoluted explanation").

When I think of neural networks, I think of networks with distinct layers, where neurons from one layer only connect to neurons of the next layer. To me, "convolutional" suggests that the neurons are more intricately connected somehow—or "tangled up". But I see nothing in the javascript library's documentation to suggest that this is the case.

The background section in the "On Complex Valued Convolutional Neural
Networks" master thesis suggests that CNNs are what has made neural networks actually useful for tasks like computer vision and face recognition. Why remains unclear, however, the term "convolution operation" was mentioned.

Guberman, N. (2016). On Complex Valued Convolutional Neural Networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.09046.

Convolution is a technical term, and comes from the signal processing field. Unfortunately, it is easily confused with "convoluting". Effectively, "to convolve" means to pick a small "window", slide it across your signal, and compute the same function for each step.

In CNNs, when applied to classifying, for example images, it means taking a small window, of say 3x3 pixels, sliding it across the whole image, and feeding the small sections of the larger image under the window into a neural network. The outputs of the network are then combined into a new layer and can then be fed into another NN layer for classification.

In the example above, the window is 3x3 pixels wide, and the step size is 1. Depending on the application, it's possible to have larger/smaller windows and step sizes.

The resulting layer can be said to be the result of convolving the original image with a neural network.

When using convolution filters in, say Photoshop, it's using a similar method where it takes sliding windows of pixels and computes a function (for example to achieve blur, the average RGB values of the window pixels) and creates a new image out of those. You can then say that convolving an image with a pixel average function results in a blurred image.


Why is it that only humans commit suicide? Many animals do 'brave' things to protect their children or family, and some male spiders sacrifice themselves so that they can impregnate the females.

However, humans commit suicide without necessarily any intention to help their kin. Why?

Such behavior does exist in the wider animal world, not just in humans.

See the Wikipedia page on Animal Suicide, particularly the section titled "Suicidal behavior".
(if you have done any preliminary research on this, be aware that your question doesn't reflect it).

There are a number of linked studies in that section, some of which may give you good or relevant information.

What it comes down to is twofold:

We can't reasonably say that animals are pursuing suicidal behavior for similar reasons that humans do, as we don't have a good enough view into the cognitions of other animals, and
We still don't fully understand the etiology of suicide (much less depression!) in humans, either, which confounds the entire issue.


Will Our Brain Speed Reduce As Our Memory "Mail Boxes" Fill Up? I recently stumbled accross the article "When the Brain's Mailbox Is Full", which can be found here:  http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/27/health/when-the-brain-s-mailbox-is-full.html.

The article claims that:

  ''As we get older, we run out of places to store new information,''
  said Dr. H. Lee Swanson, a psychologist at the University of
  California at Riverside and the author of the study. ''We have a
  limited amount of space in our memory system.''

Do we really have a such a limited capacity for knowledge that we risk slowing down our brain functions if we study too much?

  Swanson, H. L. (1999). What develops in working memory? A life span perspective. Developmental psychology, 35(4), 986. LINK

As Chuck pointed out in the comments, it's important not to take a metaphor too literally. Comparing our memory to a mailbox may have some validity, it is not true that our memory can "fill up"-- i.e., that we have a limited capacity for knowledge in general. No matter how old or how many facts you have learned, you will always be capable of learning new ones.
In the NYT article, prominent aging research Timothy Salthouse points out this research is controversial:

"It seems unlikely that any single study, regardless of its quality, will be able to resolve the issue. We don't know how to measure storage capacity."

Additionally, your question asks whether we risk "slowing down our brain functions" if we study too much. This study is about age-related deficits, and there is no evidence that simply learning more information will reduce our memory capacity.
The study also is referring only to working memory, and not long-term memory. While some researchers believe working memory is simply a subset of attended items in long-term memory (e.g. Cowan, 1999; Anderson J.R. et al., 2004), others believe they are unique constructs (e.g. Baddeley, 2000). It is important not to conflate the two.
While learning new facts cannot reduce our overall memory capacity, it may affect our ability to retrieve specific items. This is known as memory inhibition. For instance, recalling semantically related words can inhibit retrieval of a target word (Anderson, M.C. et al., 1994).
In sum, learning new information may prevent us from retrieving older information through inhibition, but it is not related to overall memory capacity, or to the age-related deficits mentioned in the NYT article. We don't risk "slowing down our brain functions" by studying too much.

Anderson, M. C., Bjork, R. A., & Bjork, E. L. (1994). Remembering can cause forgetting: retrieval dynamics in long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(5), 1063. PDF
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An integrated theory of the mind. Psychological review, 111(4), 1036. PDF
Cowan, N. (1999). An embedded-processes model of working memory.Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control, 62-101. PDF


Meditation for patients with neuroleptic induced tension Patients taking antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs often suffer from some kind of discomfort or tension. This can manifest as a neuroleptic induced dysphoria, akathisia, or some kind of anxiety.

Is there a way these patients can overcome this unpleasant feeling with some kind of mind work, i.e. meditation concentrating on breathing, visualization, watching coming thoughts or something else?

Is there some research on this topic telling what kind of meditation could be helpful in relieving the discomfort?
Is it even good to work with mind under these chemicals?

Akathisia is very difficult to handle. Sometimes akathisia responds to anxiolytic drugs such as benzodiazepines, propranolol, and even red wine. Amantadine, benztropine (for Parkinsonism) might also help. Mostly these are off-label prescriptions.

Meditation, exercise, and de-stressing measures are certainly helpful on general principle, though the best way to eliminate akathisia (if it is drug-induced) is to taper down the dosage or take a different medication. Finding a medication that treats the symptoms and provides a quality of life improvement despite side-effects is the job of the physician. You can think of it as quality of life improvement from reduction of symptoms plus quality of life improvement from minimization of side-effects, of which akathisia is one of the most common and unpleasant.

https://www.mdedge.com/psychiatry/article/89620/somatic-disorders/akathisia-restlessness-primary-condition-or-adverse-drug

King DJ, Burke M, Lucas RA. Antipsychotic drug-induced dysphoria. Br J Psychiatry 1995; 167:480–482.

Healy D, Farquhar G. Immediate effects of droperidol. Hum Psychopharm 1998; 13:113–120.

Jones-Edwards G. An eye-opener. OpenMind 1998; September:12,13,19.

Jones-Edwards G. On the receiving end. New Therapist 2000; 7:40–43.

Belmaker RH, Wald D. Haloperidol in normals. Br J Psychiatry 1977; 131:222–223.

Kendler KS. A medical student’s experience with akathisia. Am J Psychiatry 1976; 133:454.

Healy D, Savage M (1998) Reserpine exhumed. Brit J Psychiatry 172: 376–378.


Is there any formal understanding of how humans perceive humanity/vitality in other entities? When humans watch animations which contain human-like characters in them, we seem to imagine that the animated individuals, whether they be photorealistic or mere stick figures, are human, or at least living, in some way. If I see a stick figure get his or her heart broken, I feel for them as if I were watching a character in a movie get their heart broken.

There is obvious nuance in that my emotions will likely be different in response to watching two situations which ceteris parabus only differ in that one has stick figure characters while the other has high-qualtiy photorealistic ones. However, there still seems to be something going on where the mind imbues entities with a perception of humanity, or at the very least of vitality.

So, my question is first and foremost whether or not there has been any research done our perception of other things as human/alive (this seems like something that would at least happen in child developmental fields), and if so, is there a particular region of the brain and/or pathway/mechanism that we know is involved with this behavior?

Yes, there's a lot of work on this! Still a ton of open questions though, and plenty of smart people working in quite disconnected paradigms.

A classic study in this space is Heider F. & Simmel M. (1944). An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior, The American Journal of Psychology, 57 (2) 243. DOI: 10.2307/1416950

But note the date! 1944! I think what you're really looking for is the community that is still citing this today.

One recent example might be people interested in Bayesian Theory of mind, eg:
Baker CL, Jara-Ettinger J, Saxe R, & Tenenbaum JB (2017). Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing. Nature Human Behaviour

Also, 'agency' is one of the areas identified/investigated as part of core developmental knowledge by Spelke and collaborators, see for example
Spelke, E. S., & Kinzler, K. D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental science, 10(1), 89-96.

This answer doesn't really do justice to the breadth of this literature, there's a lot of it! But hopefully the citations and cited-by links from these will throw up the kind of thing you're looking for.


Research on properties of effective feedback I've been searching everywhere I know of for research concerning the topics listed below, but have been unable to find anything. The best I can come up with is general literature on feedback. Specifically I am looking for research on the following subjects:

The effects of feedback on an artifact given in-context of artifact versus out-of-context. A concrete example is feedback on a report; is it preferable to provide written feedback in the report margins (in-context) or in a separate document (out-of-context), and why/why not?
Context switches in workflows and why they are bad/good in general.
Related to 2: theory supporting integration of related workflows into a single computer, supported workflow. A concrete example is Microsoft Word which has a feature to edit images inside the application itself even though it is a word processor. Why is this preferable compared to e.g. editing the image in an external application and inserting it afterward?  And is it (always)?  Are there special cases where it may be counter-productive?
Properties of effective feedback. Preferably supporting the theses that:

4.1 feedback on a produced artifact is more effective if given early than late. This could be supported by arguments about memory and learning in general, e.g. that it's easier to remember what you did just now than a few hours ago, and thus also easier to comprehend feedback about what you did and the artifacts you produced in that time.

4.2 feedback on an artifact is more effective when the receiver is in the same "environment" he was in when the artifact was produced. A counterexample would be to give feedback on a report written in Microsoft Word by copying the report onto a web page and writing the feedback there. In that case the environment where the feedback is read by the receiver (the webpage) is completely different from the one where the artifact was produced (Microsoft Word). This has negative effects on effectiveness (which and why?).

I imagine the literature would be within cognitive load theory, learning theory, user interface design, usability design etc, but any suggestions are very much appreciated.

Here are a few theories and sources I happen to know that relate to your questions:

Contextual cues aid recall of context-dependent memories. Plenty of research exists on these topics. An easily digestible example may be found through PsychCentral (Nauert, 2009).
We have another great question about context-switching here already that you might want to check out: https://cogsci.stackexchange.com/q/4993/4086
Haven't got much to offer in response to this question beyond the suggestion that you see what they have to say about it over at the User Experience Stack Exchange.
Theories to support your theses 4.1 and 4.2:

This idea seems to relate to the primacy and recency effects in memory, which promote recall of first and last items in a list, respectively. Here's a graph from Wikipedia that combines these ideas into the serial position effect:

(source: wikimedia.org)
Haven't got more to add here beyond the link to the other question I mentioned in response 2. I hope you get some other, helpful responses here!

Reference

Nauert, R. (2009, December 14). How cues and context help memory. PsychCentral: Psychotherapy News. Retrieved from http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/12/14/how-cues-and-context-help-memory/10159.html.


How do deaf people get feedback on their speech? When we speak, our ears give us feedback on the same. This, presumably, helps in learning a language and adjusting the volume of our speech. How do deaf people get this feedback to learn a new language or adjust the volume of their speech?

Many "deaf" individuals still have some functional hearing. Even in the case of a total loss of hearing, there are proprioceptive cues that provide useful feedback for speech production. The typical way of teaching pre-lingually deaf children how to speak involves hours of one-on-one time with a speech-language pathologist. The child learns to speak by placing their hand on the throat/mouth of the instructor and feeling the vibrations and movements of the articulators. There is also software that process speech in near real-time and helps the talker adjust their speech to match a target pattern. These same techniques could be used for the post-lingually deaf. That said, I think it is pretty rare for post-lingually deaf individuals to learn a second spoken language.


Why do people have the tendency to pick their nose while driving? It seems that whenever I am driving I've always got to pick my nose. I've also noted that other people do this on a daily basis as well. Why do people have the tendency to pick their nose while driving?

I suppose one explanation of this observation is that being a driver in a car is a semi-private space. It is semi-private in that it often feels like people can't see you. In addition, even if someone sees you, you will be driving away from them shortly. And it is unlikely that they know who you are and that your nose picking will ever affect your reputation.

Thus, presumably there are many activities that people tend to do more in private, that occur often in a car. E.g., random singing, farting, etc.


Is there a reasonably valid and reliable self-measure of computer literacy? Measuring computer literacy or skill is important when grouping respondents for usability studies and other Human Computer Interaction studies. But for the life of me I can't find a good, simple but reliable measure of it.

The most frequent suggestion I see is a terribly complicated and non-standard approach like comparing multiple Likert scales for things like "I feel comfortable with computers". I'm fine with multiple Likert scales if it's a proven measure, but hundreds of people making up their own multi-question Likert scales does not create reproducible research.

I'm a proponent of just asking the darn question as I find it less ridiculous than made up scales, but I'm sure HCI work has been done on this.

Is there an agreed upon or otherwise well tested, reliable and valid self-measure of computer literacy? Ideally one which could be used to easily group participants into relative groups of proficiency, such as a Likert scale. By "self-measure" I mean some test item that can be asked on a survey rather than any form of observation.

I don't know of any well-validated general short scales. Here are a few thoughts:

A major distinction is between self-report versus ability based measures. Self-report measures will ask the participant to rate their knowledge, skills, and experience. Ability based measures will require demonstration of competence. If you are limited to "self-measures", ability based measures are still possible (e.g., set of multiple choice, or possibly short answer questions). An issue with self-report measures is that people may be inaccurate in their own self-evaluation. Ability-based measures do not have this issue.
Having more items generally increases the reliability of the test. It also permits you to assess statistically the item properties of the scale.
Computer literacy is a broad construct. The meaning and standards of computer literacy are probably also changing over time, as computing practices change and as the computers get further integrated into society. I assume this is part of the reason why a lot of people use customised instruments. For example, I once did a study of keyboard-based text-editing. To assess prior experience, I asked a number of general questions about computing experience, but I also assessed various specific measures related to knowledge of shortcut keys.

A quick search revealed a couple of scales (e.g., Wilkinson et al, 2010, Fogarty et al, 2001). None look like entirely what you are after, but I thought I'd mention them. Both followed a formal scale development process.

Wilkinson et al

For example, here's a subset of the items from Wilkinson et al

ICT skills
I know how to create a folder
I feel confident closing down a software program
I do not feel confident attaching a file to an email
I can use a word processing application
I know how to save a document to a folder
I would not recognise a PDF (Portable Document File)
I would have difficulty finding a web site∗
I feel confident making selections from popup menus∗
I would find it difficult to search a database of references to journal papers
I need help with using computers for learninga
I feel confident using a computer to write a letter or essay
I do not know how to find an article in an e-journal

Experience with computers
I have used computers at work/school∗
I feel disadvantaged by my lack of experience with computers
I communicate with people using email
I have used computers to look for information for example: Library catalogue/books
I have used computers to support my learning
I have used computers to find out about careers
I have used computers for leisure

Fogarty et al

Here's a subset of the items from Fogarty et al

The following statements refer to your confidence when using computers.
1. I have less trouble learning how to use a computer than I do learning other things.
2. When I have difficulties using a computer I know I can handle them.
3. I am not what I would call a computer person.
4. It takes me much longer to understand how to use computers than the average person.
5. I have never felt myself able to learn how to use computers.
6. I enjoy trying  new things on a computer.
7. I find having to use computers frightening.
8. I find many aspects of using computers interesting and challenging.
9. I don’t understand how some people can seem to enjoy spending so much time using
computers.
10. I have never been very excited about using computers.
11. I find using computers confusing.
12. I’m nervous that I’m not good enough with computers to be able to use them to learn
mathematics.

References

Wilkinson, A., Roberts, J. & While, A.E. (2010). Construction of an instrument to measure student information and communication technology skills, experience and attitudes to e-learning. Computers in Human Behavior, 26, 1369-1376.
Fogarty, G., Cretchley, P., Harman, C., Ellerton, N. & Konki, N. (2001). Validation of a questionnaire to measure mathematics confidence, computer confidence, and attitudes towards the use of technology for learning mathematics. Mathematics Education Research Journal, 13, 154-160. PDF


Explanations of responses to real graphic harm I want to know answers to the following questions :

Why do I feel curious sometimes to check out sites of "real accidents" such as "Documenting Reality" or "Live Leak" ?
Why do I feel nauseous when I have seen a few of these events, such as videos / images of real motorcycle accidents ?

I am confused that I feel both occasionally (every 3 months say) curious to see what really happens to people in these accidents as well as feel physically ill once I have seen that.

I suppose this is somewhat similar to the reason people slow down to "take a look" at a motor vehicle accident while driving past on the highway.

I guess what I am also interested in is -- how is it possible for people to feel turned on by this same content -- such as "self harmers" or psychopaths? Is there a "causal emotional chain" that could be explained the reactions of such people as compared with the feeling of aversion ... or is such arousal just random and unexplainable?

I'm not an expert in social cognition and this may be considered somewhat speculative, but I wouldn't be surprised if the literature found a link between shocking images and their high informational value (along the lines of a delta in reinforcement-learning models).

Intuitively, one would expect that visual representations of potentially dangerous situations would be extremely informative and therefore extremely salient.  Indeed, emotion-induced blindness studies suggest that gory stimuli benefit from the deployment of massive attentional resources, to the point that they may exclude other salient stimuli.

Where this gets speculative is why this is experienced as something pleasurable.  I'd suggest that highly-informative stimuli might be pleasurable in general.  On the pure social psychology end of things, a search for "morbid curiosity" is bound to turn up some relevant results (as suggested by @medica).

I'll leave it up to you to explore these three bibliographic trails. =)


Consciousness without language It seems that consciousness can only be investigated through self-report, i.e. language/communication of some kind. Is it believed that consciousness could nonetheless exist without language?
Yes, it is assumed that non-human animals have varying degrees of consciousness - but this seems somewhat unverifiable without our capacity to ask them.
Conversely, has there ever been a human being to grow up without language for years and then learn a language sufficiently well to be questioned regarding their subjective experience prior to learning the language?

Language is a means of expression and communication. It serves as a medium of expression. Consciousness is independent of language. One (human or any animal) can be conscious however to report and verify, as you said, we need a language or any medium of communication.
Consciousness could safely considered an axiom in psychology.
For the second question, you have bumped on to one of the canonical pairs. How do we explain nothing? Ideally we cannot. The same is with consciousness. It is a fundamental thing. A formal verification might require a revisit to the fundamentals of philosophy and psychology.
Reference:
Thought without language: Thought without awareness? - L.Weiskrantz


Split Brain Experiments on Animals I was wondering what would happen if you took a split brain person and stimulated the pleasure center of one hemisphere and the pain center of the other hemisphere in conjunction with an external stimulus... basically Pavlov's Dog but applied differently to the two halves of the brain of the same person.  Of course, such an experiment is highly cruel and unethical, so it's safe to assume it was never done on a human.

So, that got me wondering... we often experiment on animals when a procedure is too cruel to perform on humans (for better or worse, I'm not here to debate the ethics of animal experimentation).  Are there any split brain experiments that we've done on animals that we haven't tried on humans?  What have we learned from these experiments?

Split-brain syndrome is caused when the corpus callosum is cut to prevent epileptic seizures from spreading from one side of the brain to the other. After some time passes from the procedure most patients are indistinguishable from a "normal" person because they adapt.

In a typical split-brain experiment, two stimuli are presented to the patient in such a way that one will be processed by the left hemisphere and the other by the right hemisphere. For example, the word ‘key-ring’ might be projected such that ‘key’ is restricted to the patient’s left visual field (LVF) and ‘ring’ is restricted to the patient’s right visual field (RVF). The contralateral structure of the visual system ensures that stimuli projected to the LVF are processed in the right hemisphere and vice-versa. Other perceptual systems can be studied in a similar manner. For example, tactile perception is examined by asking the patient to compare, either by verbal report or by pointing, objects presented to each hand.
Such studies have revealed two kinds of disunities in the split-brain: behavioral disunities and representational disunities. Behavioral disunities are most striking. When asked to report what she sees the patient in the key-ring experiment will typically say that she sees only the word ‘ring’; yet, with her left hand, the patient may select a picture of a key and ignore pictures of both a ring and a key-ring. Generally speaking, visual information projected to the RVF cannot be verbally reported, and visual information projected to the LVF is unavailable for behavior involving the right hand. In the tactile modality, the patient cannot describe, or use her right hand to respond to, objects palpitated by her left hand, and objects palpitated by the right hand cannot be reported via left-handed actions.
Representational disunities involve a lack of integration between the contents of the
patient’s conscious states. These states do not enjoy the inferential promiscuity that
conscious states typically enjoy. The patient in the key-ring experiment appears to have
representations of the words ‘key’ and ‘ring’ without having a representation of the word ‘key-ring’. Similarly, a patient might appear to be conscious of the identity of the objects palpitated by each hand but have no conjoint awareness of both objects. As we shall see, the precise nature of behavioral and representational disunities differs from patient to patient, but the foregoing description captures the core features of the split-brain syndrome.

-The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome
Your question specifically asks about what happens when there is conflict between the hemispheres. One side being pleasured and another side being tortured. In general the response mode will determine which action is taken. The right typically responding to visuo-structural similarities between two stimuli and the left functional-conceptual similarities according to Levy J (1976). However the left side of the brain tends to remain dominate in determining what the end result is during conflicting stimuli.

In general, not only partially but also fully split-brain patients behave in a coordinated, purposeful and consistent manner, belying the independent, parallel, usually different and occasionally conflicting processing of the same information from the environment by the two disconnected hemispheres. Free field performance often resembles that of the superior hemisphere (horse race), especially when the task is linguistic and performed better in the disconnected LH. Occasionally the LH dominates free field responses even when it is inferior to the RH. On rare occasions the RH dominates in spite of being inferior, particularly when the task has prominent visuospatial components. Thus, hemispheric dominance in responding is not al ways the same as the superior unilateral competence (Levy and Trevarthen, 1976).
When the two hemispheres receive competing stimuli at the same time, the response mode tends to determine which hemisphere controls behavior: Lh responses reflect RH decisions and Rh responses reflect LH decisions, even when these decisions are in mutual conflict. A variant of this technique presents brief chimeras consisting of competing half stimuli around fixation, divided along the vertical meridian (Levy and Trevarthen 2). In this case, both the nature of the task and the response mode interact to select a behaviorally dominant hemisphere.
Bimanual responses facilitate interhemispheric cooperation for compatible stimuli in the two VFs even in the split brain. It seems that motor responses tend to be unified so that in the chronic condition the two hands do not respond in conflict with each other even when the two hemispheres make conflicting decisions.
The disconnected LH can be said to be generally dominant for several reasons. First, it is more likely than the RH to assume control over behavior in unlateralized situations. Second, it has better ipsilateral visual and tactile-kinesthetic sensory motor control than the RH. Third, LH performance is more stable and less sensitive to small task differences. Fourth, although each disconnected hemisphere is hemianopic with respect to ipsilateral half space and does not deny ipsilateral perceptual experience, the disconnected LH does routinely express disbelief of correct RH responses to left sensory field stimuli.

-The Split brain


Do we only hear what we want to hear? When I Google this, the results are about misinterpreting what we hear to suit what we want or expect. However, I'm interested to know if we ignore specific things we hear and focus on things we are interested in.

For example, if you are in a public hall, and there are 4 or 5 conversations within your hearing range, will you focus onto the ones you are interested in while completely ignoring the ones you are not?

The answer ought to be a qualified "Yes." We don't only hear what we want, in as much as motivation has zero direct control over the transduction of auditory signals in a sensory sense. Motivation affects which way we turn our ears and whether we keep them in a room with sounds we want to hear vs. a room with sounds we don't want to hear, but if those sounds hit our ears, whether we want to hear them shouldn't affect whether the stereocilia in our cochleae wiggle and tell our brains all about it. That's the only qualification of the otherwise plainly affirmative answer that occurs to me.

In a perceptory sense, motivation matters a lot more, because transfer from echoic memory to working memory is a matter of attention, and motivation certainly affects attention. E.g., if you're listening for a particular sound, you'll notice it better (hence the cocktail party effect), and you'll even experience more false alarms in the signal detection sense. A personal example within the general example: all the sounds that had the same pitch and tone as the first note of my cell phone ringtone used to drive me nuts when I would take a shower while anticipating a call from a girl I really wanted to talk to, who would often call me unexpectedly and complain when I didn't answer.

Transfer from working memory to long-term memory is arguably even more sensitive to motivation, because it depends greatly on elaborative rehearsal. Hence the more obsessed (or just interested) you are with a particular topic is the more often and deeply you'll think about it, and the more likely you'll remember it after your working memory's fairly short duration is up. If you don't remember something, you can't say whether you heard it, so the better you remember is also the more evidence you can offer that you have heard it. This is important in an empirical epistemic sense for our purposes, partly because it exacerbates the effect as perceived retrospectively, and thus reinforces the folk theory in your title.


Can split-brain patients sleep like whales? Regular split-brain patients still have some remaining connection between the hemispheres, but would it be possible for their hemispheres to fall asleep independent of each other?

What about when not just the corpus callosum, but also the anterior and posterior commissures are not functioning for interhemispheric communication?

Short answer
An animal study did not reveal any effects on the synchronization of the cerebral hemispheres after callosotomy, as based on EEG recordings. When one hemisphere showed sleep patterns on the EEG, the other half would show similar activity.

Background
If intact commissures are needed between the two hemispheres to synchronize the two halves of the brain, a callosotomy would be expected to result in different EEG patterns during sleep. The most extreme case being laid out in the question, namely one hemisphere being in a different arousal state than the other.

In a study in split-brain cats (Susic & Kovaevic, 1974) the authors performed a callosotomy or related surgeries, including the sectioning of the anterior and posterior commissures*, and recorded the EEG during various behavioral states, including wake and sleep states and their transitions. After separation of the hemispheres the authors did not find any differences in EEG patterns across the two hemispheres in cats. Specifically, during transition from the alert to the drowsy state, the onset of EEG slowing appeared simultaneously in both hemispheres in all cats regardless of the type of section made. The shift from the synchronized to desynchronized pattern occurring during arousal or at the beginning of the paradoxal sleep (REM sleep) was always simultaneous in both cerebral hemispheres. The transition from REM to short arousal or to slow-wave sleep patterns was also bilaterally symmetrical. These results demonstrate that shifts in behavioral states from vigilance to sleep and vice versa are characterized by a simultaneous bilateral symmetry of the EEG events.

* List of surgical groups (n= 14 per group)

Cats with sections of commissural systems between hemispheres and diencephalon (corpus callosum, fornix, commissura hippocampi,
septum, commissura anterior, massa intermedia of thalami, commissura posterior, commissura habenularum, commissura intercollicularis).
Cats with interrupted left optic tract and sections of the commissural system between hemispheres and diencephalon.
Cats with an interrupted left optic tract and section of the left half of the midbrain tegmentum (the lesion passed intercollicularly in the
dorsal part, and ventrally into the premesencephalic area).
Cats with an interrupted left optic tract section of the left half of the midbrain tegmentum and section of commissural systems, combined with the section of crossed fibers of the commissura supraoptica.

Reference
- Susic & Kovaevic, Brain Res (1974); 65: 427-41


What is the evolutionary purpose of envy? I am seeking for a general explanation within the context of evolutionary psychology.

1) What is the purpose of envy?

2) Is it safe to assume that experiences with envy should reach a maximum during  peak reproductive years? Is it a causal relationship, or just correlation?

(To add to the above: At least in modern societies, where basic survival has been for the most part dealt with, how often can envy be ultimately traced back and attributed to primordial instincts?)

I also have a more specific question, which is the following:

3) In the context of a romantic relationship, assuming there are no other potential mates as external threats, and the two partners are not competing for resources in the same domain, are there any reasons for which romantic partners could be envious of each other?

I am not a psychologist, so please feel free to edit the question if you think it lacks specificity.

A lot of sources might be of use here, but one thing in your question is not clear to me - when you write "envy", do you mean a kind of resentment towards someone with material possessions that you don't have, or a jealousy in a romantic context? Everything that I would write is about the first meaning, and I have no idea about anything connected with the second. I don't really understand it, or questions number 2 and 3. Whence the data about it?

Basically, a negative feeling towards someone with a larger lot of things (like food) is quite easily understandable in an evolutionary context - someone with more goods has a larger chance to survive and produce an offspring, thus feeling bad about it motivates us to reduce the difference. As fitness is not absolute, but relative, reducing someone's fitness enlarges ours. More nuanced view would be that it rather motivates us and enhances cognitive abilities, and it is indeed what some have found - a link.

Somewhat different story comes from modern behavioral economics. It claims that humans have something that they call social preferences, or "other-regarding preferences" (Gintis 2009). An few examples - Fehr and Schmidt show that agents have a concern for the welfare of others and income distribution, with equality being preferred. Further studies has shown  that in experimental games, such as Ultimatum Game, Dictator’s Game or Prisoners’ Dilemma,  participants observing the interactions of others were punishing those who did not cooperate or share, although their interest was not involved and punishing itself was costly for them – they punished altruistically (Fehr and Gachter 2002). This also allowed for cooperation to flourish, while if such third-party punishment was not allowed, cooperation broke down.

Fehr and Gachter’s data were then explained by postulating an evolutionary mechanism that brought about these patterns of behaviour - specifically group selection, which was deemed possible precisely because of altruistic punishment, in which individuals were acting in the interest of their groups at some cost for themselves. A bit different conclusions were reached by Charness and Rabin (2002), who claimed that participants were more concerned with increasing social welfare, especially that of the worst-off, rather than with equity, as was in previous models. Later, the Fehr and Gachter model of inequity aversion was challenged and the same data were said to better explained by egalitarian motives, which tend to lead to punishment of the highest earner (Fowler et.al. 2005).

Thus, envy could be interpreted as really an urge to restore fairness. This urge might of course be a mistake, since some inequality could be fair, but for our hunter-gatherer minds it is still a bad thing.

Some involve envy in their more general theories. For example, Binmore has a whole, somewhat complicated, game-theoretical explanation of fairness as an equilibrium-selection device. If you were to buy his theory, it would answer your first question - the purpose of envy in this theory is to maintain stable social system in hunter-gatherer bands, as large inequalities would lead to hierarchy and a possible dissolution of their social contract. Envy construed in such a way is also a criterion of fairness, not just for Binmore, but for quite many modern welfare economists: assignment of goods is deemed fair only if nobody envies the bundle of commodities assigned to someone else (while envying here means not only to compare just material goods, but also what comes with them - few would envy in this way a millionaire with a terminal cancer).


Do people have a tendency to stick to one opinion after they formed it? Scytale's assessment, from the science fiction novel "Dune Messiah" (1969)

  When a creature has developed into one thing, he will choose death
  rather than change into his opposite.

While reading some discussions on Meta Stack Overflow, it dawned on me that it might not be the best format to start constructive discussions. Once people pick sides in a discussion, they have a very high tendency to stop approaching the discussion from the other angle. People will dislike certain parts of a proposal, and then become vehemently against the entire thing, instead of trying to participate in resolving the issues they raise.

Is this an established psychological phenomenon?

Yes.  But why should it be so?  One can approach the question from a number of directions. For instance, Cass Sunstein talks about how information cascades can create the path-dependent effects you describe: person A says something, which steers person B toward the same opinion, with the result that group decision-making heavily overvalues inputs of early responders.  (James Surowiecki also did an excellent popular science treatment of this topic.)

So much for the hobgoblin of little minds for groups.  Within the individual, the topic has been addressed through the dissonance literature, in which cogitation contrary to an established position carries unpleasant consequences, both hedonic and adaptive.  Particularly, maintaining a consistent set of mental beliefs seems to be important for efficient action selection, possibly as a consequence of the way semantic information (including motor control programs) is represented in the brain.

The result of all this is that, as you suggest, people establish a position, and then are motivated to keep it, which is not news.  What is surprising is that this annoying behavior is probably highly adaptive and a consequence of our neural architecture for knowledge representation and decision-making.  In other words, a feature and not a bug.


Improving Speed of Thinking What are some ways one can improve his/her speed of thinking and reasoning ? I am looking for some easy to follow strategies that can be systematically applied. (I am presuming it can be learnt/ taught ).

I think you need to think about what you mean by "speed of thinking".
Your language implies that you are looking for a generalised way to be more intelligent. I have not seen any simple interventions for increasing general intelligence.

You may find it more productive to focus on particular domains of your life that you want to improve. Practice and instruction improve performance in a given domain. There are a wide variety of mechanisms by which this occurs, some of which could be characterised as speed of thinking.

In particular, practice often leads to automaticity. Take for example, learning your times tables. When you first encounter a given question (e.g., 8 * 8 = 64), you may have to use a longer algorithm to solve the problem, but with practice, the equation itself may directly trigger recall. Alternatively, take many computer based tasks. The first time you try to perform a task (e.g., sorting your email by date), you may have to think more about how this task can be performed. With practice, you just recall how to do it.
A similar process of automaticity also applies to the perceptual and motor domains as you learn to assign visual attention effectively or learn to smooth out motor responses (for a review see Rosenbaum et al 2001).

This process of acquiring automaticity in a given domain is not exactly speed of thinking, but it has the same consequences. Automated actions reduce the demands on limited attentional resources, and can be executed quickly and efficiently.

For specific suggestions on what makes a great practice schedule you may want to read up on the literature on deliberate practice (e.g., Ericsson, et al 1993).

References

Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological review, 100(3), 363. PDF
Rosenbaum, D. A., Carlson, R. A., & Gilmore, R. O. (2001). Acquisition of intellectual and perceptual-motor skills. Annual Review of Psychology, 52(1), 453-470. PDF


Will hearing but not listening to a video mentor help me learn? I have a A+ video mentor that I got through school. I was wondering if playing the videos as if they were music and just going about the rest of my tasks on the computer would help me to learn the information. Thank you.

From experience and some knowledge gathered from all over the place, yes and no. For example, if you want to do two things that are both mind-engaging, you'll probably end up doing both sloppily, or one much better than the other. But if one task is mundane and other mind engaging, like listening to music and doing math problem, or listening to a lecture and cleaning a room, you can probably do them both with no problem.

Also, "multitasking" does not actually exist. You can find many articles on this subject. What we think of as multitasking is actually task-switching. Your brain does not do two things at once, but switches from one thing to another. Task-switching is demanding a lot of energy, so some people may feel tired from it.

Some people are better than the other at task-switching, and can do it for some time without getting that much tired. I don't know how good you are at it, but you can try. If you haven't trained your mind to work efficiently like that, you might get better after some time, or just keep doing one thing at a time. (I know person who wasn't much of a "multitasker" but got better after some years of practically forcing it.) Hope this helps.


Can an extravert suffer from social anxiety disorder? Extraversion is a personality trait that, as the Wikipedia article describes, causes people "to enjoy human interactions", to be sociable, outgoing and love crowds.

Social anxiety disorder (SAD), on the other hand, causes people to fear being judged and often makes them avoid social situations, either in general or at least those aspects that would lead to the person to "stand in the spotlight".

From their definitions, extraversion and SAD seem to exclude each other. It seems impossible that they can co-occur in the same person.

Is it possible that an extraverted person suffers from social anxiety disorder?

It's pretty difficult to imagine a person with Social Anxiety Disorder being an extrovert.  The symptoms of SAD include [1]:

  Intense fear of interacting with strangers and of being judged
  Worrying about embarrassing or humiliating yourself or that others think that you look anxious
  Anxiety that disrupts your daily routine, work, school or other activities
  Avoiding doing things or speaking to people out of fear of embarrassment
  Avoiding situations where you might be the center of attention
  Difficulty making eye contact or talking

Signs and symptoms include blushing, sweating, trembling or shaking, fast heartbeat, upset stomach, nausea, shaky voice, muscle tension, confusion, diarrhea, and cold, clammy hands.

Extroverts, on the other hand, usually don't have any problems with the above situations.

Introversion and extroversion are not either/or, but exist on a continuum. One can have attributes of both, and empathy with both. SAD is not on this continuum.

[1] Mayo Clinic


In a class room setting, why do people look at you when you are asking a question? Picture this scenario:

You are a student enrolled in a large class
You arrived slightly late to the class, so you are sitting at the back of the class
You raise your hands to ask the teacher a question.
As you speak, you observe that the entire class turn their body sideways to look at you, even the students who are sitting in the front row. You feel self-conscious

Three thoughts are now going through your mind:

What are "ears" for, again?
It must be really uncomfortable and awkward to twist your body like that.
What is the incurred "loss" if the other students did not look at you and simply listened?

Can some expert chime in the reasoning as to why students have to look at you when they are listening?

Could this be some sort of form of peer pressure?

Could the act of looking help to localize the sound (or synthesize the information) in some way?

Do we look so we can prejudge? For example, if we see that the asker/speaker is another professor, we pay more attention to the question as it might be more sophisticated than asked by a student.

Well, your ears are shaped in a way that is optimized for sound sources in front of you, so it could be that. But my non-expert bet is that probably they're using gaze to signal that they're paying attention. The signal is not just to you "I'm following what you're saying" but to everyone else as well, "hey, check out what's going on over there" creating joint attention that coordinates the group in thinking about your question. This might be uncomfortable for you (although it's probably a compliment that you're worth paying attention to), but the general mechanism of having super-obvious cues to attention and a predisposition to follow them to create joint attention is a very effective way of coordinating social behavior. This is so fundamentally human that most people take it for granted, but that doesn't stop academics from studying it. You could maybe try something like

Pfeiffer, U. J., Vogeley, K., & Schilbach, L. (2013). From gaze cueing to dual eye-tracking: novel approaches to investigate the neural correlates of gaze in social interaction. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(10), 2516-2528.

or

Brooks, A. M. M. R. (2017). Eyes wide shut: The importance of eyes in infant gaze-following and understanding other minds. In Gaze-Following (pp. 229-254). Psychology Press.

...if you really want a deep-dive into this.


Insensitivity of MEG to inhomogeneous conductivity Why MEG is not sensitive to inhomogeneous conductivity profile of different brain compartments (scalp,skull and brain) but EEG is sensitive to that?

MEG measures magnetic fields and EEG measures electrical potentials.

One property of magnetic fields is that organic matter (scalp, skull, and brain) does not block them in any significant way.

Electrical potentials measured on the scalp, on the other hand, are definitely affected by the matter between the source of the signal and the location they are measured. This is because the scalp, skull, and brain provide significant resistance to the flow of electrons.


How to help people who may suffer from Paranoia? I am a very active member of the Information Security Stack Exchange site. Every now and then, I come across people who I believe may suffer from paranoia. They believe that "someone" is out to get them, and use techno-babble to make themselves sound legitimate. Here is an example post:

How to prevent attacker from viewing what's on my Android phone screen? Can someone give me advice or suggest apps to prevent this?
For example, if I write in notepad, and it's offline, they can read it. They know the time of my alarm. if I just set new random one they know. If I play some music, they know.

Another post by the same user:

they can read my screen, listen to my mic and even control my notification. both my rooted and unrooted phone. This happens when i just moved to new place im renting, it was bad neighborhood.

I'm not a psychiatrist, but I am very well-versed in security and I am 99.999999% certain that the things this person described are not real. I asked that person a few times who "they" were, and how he could know that someone was reading his messages. He claimed he didn't know who "they" were, but he was certain someone was watching him. As an example for "proof" he claimed that someone in his neighborhood was listening to the same song he was listening to a while ago.
The sad thing is, such users come to our site regularly and I am unsure how to best help them. What should I do when I come across a person who I suspect may suffer from paranoia?
What I've tried so far
So far, I have tried to tell those looking for help with their supposed hacker problems that they are likely not being attacked, and that it seems to me that they may be affected by paranoia. I tried to help them by adding links to credible organizations (like the Australian Better Health Channel), which was always countered by them claiming that they are not paranoid and that their problems are real.
I'm not sure if bluntly saying "I think you may have a mental health problem" is beneficial though, and if it may do more harm than good. For this reason, I am asking this question, how exactly I should act and how to best help people.

I'm not active on this board, so please forgive me if my answer is not up to community standards.

I am not a psychologist, but I have some experience with mental illness (maybe too much.)

True paranoia (or Paranoid Personality Disorder/PPD) is much more pronounced than thinking that people can spy on you through your mobile. Whether it's true or not isn't relevant, really. In this case, there is a kernel of truth to their fears, which becomes exacerbated.*

  According to the DSM-5, persons with Paranoid Personality Disorder will have trouble operating with others in the workplace, educational or social settings (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It is noted that people with PPD are more frequently unemployed or working more menial jobs than the general population (Mueser, Mischel, Adams, Harvey, McClure, Look, Leung, & Siever, 2013).They tend to be solitary, self sufficient, and secretive, and will have difficulty making or maintaining intimate relationships or close friendships. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Persons with PPD may experience a conflict, in that they want intimate relationships and friendships, but do not have a level of trust which is an essential element of such relationships.

If many of the other criteria aren't met, it's probably not paranoia. On the other hand, if your interactions are limited, you may not know about other criteria, so this might be paranoia.

  How to help people who may suffer from Paranoia?

It's very difficult, even for therapists, because challenging their belief systems makes the person very defensive. They do not tend to have much self insight, which makes therapy challenging. Clearly you are not in a therapeutic relationship with the user; I would try to steer them in the right direction security-wise, and then (gently and respectfully) disengage.

  So far, I have tried to tell those looking for help with their supposed hacker problems that they are likely not being attacked, and that it seems to me that they may be affected by paranoia.

I would definitely avoid this, as this is giving a diagnosis, which you should not do (I believe it's unethical) over a brief interaction on the internet. I'm not surprised they counter by claiming that they are not paranoid and that their problems are real. To someone who's paranoid, their problems are real.

In case my answer isn't well explained,

  I'm not sure if bluntly saying "I think you may have a mental health problem" is beneficial though, and if it may do more harm than good. For this reason, I am asking this question, how exactly I should act and how to best help people.

Unless you are in a close personal relationship with someone, I think it's not in their best interests to tell them they may suffer from a mental illness, whether they do or not. First, you do not know. Second, they will most likely be defensive if not offended as well.

My reaction would be to be kind and gentle with the person, avoid overt confrontation ("That's not possible...") and let people close to them tell them they need professional help.

*Laptop cameras have been hacked, and worse.

**I know people who believe Pizzagate was real. Te truth doesn't matter if you like conspiracy theories.

References

American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostics and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) Washington. DC: American Psychiatric Publishing.


reading an EEG dataset using EEGLAB When I'm reading the documentation of importing events in EEGLAB from a file here I have noticed that when we used a stimulus , we must know which time  we will apply it , since in the dataset file , you have to identify  of what times stimulus happen .  I don't know if my understanding is right or not , since i didn't  deal with EEG data practically (but in 2 weeks I will), but I was  reading a theoretical topics and papers on that.
 thanks in advance.

If I understand your question correctly, yes, since ERP involves averaging over similar events, very accurate time-locking to stimulus onset is critical.  The idea of an ERP is that activity relevant to the stimulus will happen at a similar timepoint after similar stimuli--if you don't have an accurate time stamp (usually to the level of single milliseconds if not better), then the activity will be "smeared" across the time course.  For a good overview of ERPs, see the article Event-related Potentials: An Overview


How to quantitatively measure strength of friendship using observable factors? Is there any quantitative measure associated with the strength of a friendship or relationship? Ideally it should be able to be calculated based on observable factors, but should not require interaction with the subjects, just observation.

Note: Specifically I am analyzing fictionalized novels.

It's not my area, but a quick Google revealed this one.

The McGill Friendship Questionnaire - Respondent's affection (MFQ-RA). Item and validation information is available on the site.

It also mentions that it takes inspiration from  "the Friendship Questionnaire" and the "Friendship Qualities scale". So they might also be worth checking out.


Difference between reverse inference and decoding (e.g. MVPA) in fMRI Reverse inference, i.e. the use of brain activation (fMRI) data to infer the engagement of a certain mental function, is heavily criticised (e.g., Poldrack 2011, Neuron).

At the same time, decoding, the process of applying machine learning algorithms to such brain activation patterns in order to infer something about the mental function that elicited this response (e.g. to distinguish between two different conditions in an fMRI experiment), is extensively used and actively developed - multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) being just the most widespread of these techniques.

The two concepts appear, however, to be one and the same; or rather, that the second (decoding) is a special case of the first (reverse inference). Is there an additional nuance to their difference? Also, why is decoding not criticised in the same way as reverse inference?

Note. I initially scan read the question, I have rewritten my answer as a consequence, and due to the comments given.

As highlighted by others here Multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) is an application of machine learning, used for decoding vast quantities of complex information (neural activation patterns to particular asks). This is a form of decoding may be used to infer a cognition, otherwise known as reverse inference.

The problem of reverse inference is largely summed up by the following comment from Poldrak's (2011)...

  The use of reasoning from activation to mental functions, known as “reverse inference”, has been previously criticized on the basis that it does not take into account how selectively the area is activated by the mental process in question.

Poldrack (2011) goes on to explain that informal reverse inference, which is based on a researchers knowledge, is flawed because an individuals knowledge is limited by what the remember and have read. Additionally poor interpretations are compounded from one researcher to another.

The problem with reverse inference comes not from understanding general cognitive processes, such as sight, movement, language, decision-making etc. General patterns for general processes have been established, the problem as Poldrack (2011) points out is when we interpret patterns to more well defined cognitions, for example instead of looking at merely reward processing, we might want to compare patterns of pleasure derived from seeing highly palatable e.g. cake, and less palatable food e.g. fruit. At this level, comparing the data requires far more specific analytical approach. If we were a researcher making an inference based on our knowledge, we would have a strong chance of error.

MVPA deals with a far higher resolution of data than an individual could deal with, and compares data to prior trials or previous experiments, see Fig 1. However it is critical to remember that we are comparing participants within similar contexts.

Fig 1. MVPA diagram of testing and inference Norman et al (2006)

Poldrack (2011) gives an excellent example of how to use MVPA, which was conducted by Kay et al (2008). Simply Kay et al (2008) scanned participants viewing natural images n= 1750. In the following trial 120 images were added, MVPA of the neural data was able to accurately predict which images were being viewed. This method has seen substantial development to the point that using a similar method researchers have accurately analysed neural patterns observed in a participants waking brain into decoding what participants are dreaming. Basically the quantity and quality of when taking account of context may be used to conduct reverse inference, but this does require previous data, within context, for the MPVA and other machine learning methods to compare too.

This does not mean that machine learning can not be wrong if incorrectly applied. It is a statistical method in which humans set the parameters, the post below by Arnon Weinberg accurately defines the issues and pot holes that must be avoided to make this method viable for reverse inference.

Norman, K. A., Polyn, S. M., Detre, G. J., & Haxby, J. V. (2006). Beyond mind-reading: multi-voxel pattern analysis of fMRI data. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9), 424–430. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.005


Does high IQ correlate with good social skills? Are people with a high IQ more likely to have good social abilities? Are they more likely to be popular?

Wikipedia lists that IQ helps with school performance, job performance and income. It's possible to be good at those things without interacting much with other people.

Social skills being the ability to achieve goals such as winning friends, doing well in negotiations, being successful at romance and being good at networking.

The question is more complicated than it seems.

Even though it is easy to agree to that some people are more competent in their social behavior than others, it has proven to be very difficult to define what we mean when we talk about social skills (or "social intelligence", "social competence"). Is it the ability to manage social relationships, does it contain empathy, is it the knowledge about how social relationships work, the number of friends, or being good in negotiations, as you define it? Over the years, researchers have used partly overlapping and partly distinct definitions. For the difficulties associated with conceptualizing social intelligence refer to this review by Kihlstrom and Cantor (2000).

Consequently, this difficulty is also reflected in the difficulty of  measuring social skills. A wide variety of measures have been developed. Based on the multitude of conceptual approaches it is clear that the results of these measures will often diverge. For example, Riggio et al. (1989) conducted a study in which participants completed a large number of standardized measures of social intelligence. The measures included tests that measured the ability to perceive the feelings and intentions of others, the ability to assess interpersonal relationships, various measures aimed at testing the ability to predict social behavior of others and the ability to perceive feelings of others. The correlations of these measures "ranged from  -0.20 to 0.44, with a mean r of 0.20". Thus, they had some overlap among each other, but this overlap was pretty low. Riggio et al. also measured academic intelligence (with a variety of measures) and found that "the measures of academic and social intelligence ranged from -0.10 to 0.52, with a mean r of 0.15". Some have used results like these to question the usefulness of social intelligence as a construct. Others have questioned whether it is possible to distinguish social from other forms of intelligence at all. The methodological problem becomes even clearer if you keep in mind that most social intelligence tests are based on paper-and-pencil (self-report) questionnaires that do not necessarily overlap with peer reports or actual tests of social skills (in an assessment center, for example). In light of these difficulties, it may not be surprising that a prominent review of the literature regards the search for "social skills" as a concept as "long, frustrating, and fruitless" (Landy, 2005).

Even though the field does not seem to have found consensus in the mean time, more recent research shares the idea that it is necessary to take the multidimensionality of social intelligence into account when conceptualizing and measuring them. From this perspective, there will be elements of social intelligence that have a stronger overlap with "pure reasoning" measures of IQ than others. For example, Jones and Day (1997) found in research with sample of high school students that indicators of "crystallized social knowledge" (declarative and  procedural knowledge about social events) were highly correlated (r=.79) with academic problem solving (which is closely to related to what is measured with classic IQ tests). However they were not so strongly related (r=.29) to "social-cognitive flexibility" (the ability to apply social knowledge flexibly to solve novel problems). A strong point of this research is that the researchers combined self-ratings and tests with teacher ratings to assess all of these constructs. These findings suggest that some parts of social intelligence (social knowledge) are virtually indistinguishable from general intelligence. However, other elements of social intelligence (applying social knowledge) are somewhat positively related to intelligence (more intelligent = somewhat better in social problem solving on average).

References

Jones, K., & Day, J. D. (1997). Discrimination of two aspects of cognitive-social intelligence from academic intelligence. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 486–497. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.89.3.486

Kihlstrom, J.F, & Cantor, N. (2000). in R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of intelligence, 2nd ed. (pp. 359-379). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Landy, F. J. (2005) The Long, Frustrating, and Fruitless Search for Social Intelligence. In K. R. Murphy (Ed.) The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon: The Struggle Between Science and Marketing for the Soul of EI. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2005

Riggio, R. E., Messamer, J., & Throckmorton, B. (1991). Social and academic intelligence: Conceptually distinct but overlapping constructs. Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 695–702. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(91)90225-Z


Human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games Background
A one-shot game is one where two participants have some set of actions $\{1, ... , n\}$, they make their decision on which option to take (without knowing the decision of their partner, or in sequence depending on game). Based on the action $i$ of the first player and $j$ of the second player, they receive some reward (or punishment) $G(i,j)$. The participants never play again, and are made aware of this before the interaction happens. There is no communication allowed between the participants except making their action choice.
The game is perfect information if the participants are made aware of all possible outcomes of the game ahead of time (they are shown and explained the payoff matrix $G$ at least implicitly). The final result depends solely on the mutual decision of the players. From the perspective of the participant, there is no hidden state or chance apart in the action of the opponent.
Question
Game theory makes predictions on how rational players will behave in such settings. The fun part of psychology is that humans often don't follow these predictions. They cooperate more than they should in Prisoner's dillema (PD), violate the sure-thing principle in turn-based PD (Shafir & Tversky, 1992), reject unfair offers in ultimatum game (Guth et al., 1982), vary across cultures in their propensity to punish in public goods games (Herrmann, et al. 2008), and many other things that game theory doesn't predict.
The experimental literature is vast and divided between anthropology, economics, psychology, and law (just sampling from my own library). Is there a reliable current or canonical survey/summary/meta-analysis of well-controlled laboratory based experiments of human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games?
Notes

I prefer artificial well-controlled experiments with a large number of participants over natural or in-the-field experiments.

The previous point means that I am alright with data just from WEIRD participants, even for games where cultural variation is known to be significant. However, discussions of known cross-cultural effects is welcome.

Bonus if the summary looks at many different games in very similar experimental setting, and shows games where there is both agreement and disagreement from game-theoretic predictions.

I am not interested in papers about a single experiments, unless you want to provide a detailed survey of many such papers, their results, and methodology in your answer.

References
Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3(4): 367-388.
Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., & Gachter, S. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319(5868): 1362-1367.
Shafir, E., & Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice. Cognitive Psychology 24:449-474.

The question seems to ask for reviews; well, a Google Scholar search on...

  one-shot + game + review

...yields:

Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters (Alessina, 1988)
Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions (Nagarajan & Sošić, 2008)
Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006)
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment (Archettia & Scheuring, 2012)

...among a host of other hits (65k+), so enough out there!

The Hagen & Hammerstein (2006) provides a critical review that seems to be matching your 'bonus' question (you're going to upvote my answer twice? :-)

References
- Alessina, American Econom Rev (1988); 78(4): 796-805
- Archettia & Scheuring, J Theor Biol (2012); 299 (2012); 9-20
- Hagen & Hammerstein, Theor Pop Biol (2006); 69(3): 339-48
- Nagarajan & Sošić, Eur J Operat Res (2008); 187(3): 719-45


Why do we have so much neurological research on and treatment designed for dyslexia, yet less so for dyscalculia? I know next to nothing about intervention methods designed for dyscalculia, or 'dyslexia with numbers', as I have heard it colloquially referred to (considering how obscure the term seems to be compared to its language-related twin). I have also read that dyslexia and dyscalculia often occur in conjunction, and both seem to affect the population at equal rates. Yet I can find far more literature and neurological research on dyslexia than on dyscalculia.

Is there a reason for this? And what do we know about dyscalculia from a neurological standpoint, as well as a treatment standpoint? (By 'neurological standpoint', I mean what do we know about neurological causes and/or areas of the brain that appear to be affected in those with dyscalculia)

This website http://www.aboutdyscalculia.org/causes.html provides answers to some of the questions you posed, although I am not sure it is the most up to date information. I would always advise one to do research on more scientific grounds.
From my perspective, dyslexia has also been more studied than dyscalculia as its impact in academics seem more easily perceived thus easier to diagnose. Furthermore, I think that there is a social component to the issue as people often accept with ease someone struggling with mathematics but respond with more preoccupation towards difficulties with reading and spelling.
I leave you one article that may be helpful to you. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3514770/