Connection between sociosexual orientation and parental instincts? According to wikipedia:

  Sociosexual orientation, or sociosexuality, is the individual difference in the willingness to engage in sexual activity outside of a committed relationship. Individuals with a more restricted sociosexual orientation are less willing to engage in casual sex; they prefer greater love, commitment and emotional closeness before having sex with romantic partners. Individuals who have a more unrestricted sociosexual orientation are more willing to have casual sex and are more comfortable engaging in sex without love, commitment or closeness.

The same page suggests there are many connections with others traits. But there is no info on parenting traits.

Do individuals with less restricted sociosexual orientation on average have weaker parental instincts?

By parental instincts I mean the desire to have and grow children, the ability of being better parents, etc. This may mean that individuals who want to have more sexual partners are also more inclined to have children and are worse in doing it.

Is there any study confirming or rejecting it?

There's not much research on this, but one study I found Kruger (2017) found no significant relationship between parenting effort and the usual measure of sociosexuality (SOI):


What causes CSF to flow? Since matter at rest tends to stay at rest until acted upon, there must be some mechanism in the brain causing cerebrospinal fluid to move from the choroid plexus to other areas of the central nervous system.  Is there some kind of hydraulic pump that causes it to flow from one area to the next?

Also, the ventricular system seems to be more of a continuous cavity, rather than a unidirectional closed circuit. How does the fluid make it's way into the far corners of the lateral ventricles, and other nooks and crannies of the ventricular system without the risk of fluid in some areas staying stagnant?

The following is taken from the bio answer https://biology.stackexchange.com/questions/94/how-does-cerebrospinal-fluid-circulate-in-the-central-nervous-system

  Venous system has generally low pressure, thus sucking the CSF up to drainage points. Speaking about drainage we also should consider the fact that the venous system has a pressure lower than the atmospheric pressure and much lower than pressure in any middle-sized arterial vessels. This is reached by having elastic walls and by transmitting the negative pressure from the mediastinum during the inhale, when the diaphragm and the thorax expand. This negative pressure propagates mostly to the connected vessels, including sinus system. Due to the elastic wall other parts of venous system can accommodate this negative pressure constrict their lumen, but not the sinus system which has a hard external framework formed by dura mater and bones. That is here we can measure the lowest pressure and this is the pressure that sucks CSF in into the venous system

click here for bonus .gif of this process happening in an MRI


Baby Names and the Hive Mind A couple of months ago my wife and I found out we were having a little girl and needed to start thinking seriously about picking some names. After going through a dictionary of names we narrowed it down a (long) shortlist. Interestingly almost every single name on one of the various 'Top Baby Names UK 2017' lists happened to appear on our shortlist. 8 out of the top 10 names below appeared on our list.

I'm assuming that this isn't coincidence and it's probably very common, hence the popularity of the names. What I struggle to understand is where the influence comes from.

I don't read celebrity magazines. I don't have lots of friends with children. None of these names are family tradition. I've never even met people with some of these names and some I've only met who are 80+ years old. Ava being a good example of that, it turns out for the last ten years, completely unbeknownst to me, every woman and her dog have been named Ava.

What is influencing our preferences and why does this convergence happen?

There are probably a number of factors at play here.

One important contribution to the "snowballing" of trends like this is the mere exposure effect by which things we encounter repeatedly become more attractive to us just because of their familiarity (this is also the logic that underlies ad campaigns that just put the brand or logo all over the place without bothering to associate any particular messaging with it --- just hoping to increase the number of times people see it). Notice how similar the list of names you have are to each other. Repeated sounds (the "ia" ending, the use of nasals and liquids like "l" and "m" in place of harsher stop consonants like "t" or "p").

You (and everyone else) has been encountering names with these components, and these names in particular, increasingly over the last couple years, which make them seem more and more attractive to you.


What's the technical name for this cognitive bias? I'm pretty sure I've seen this cognitive bias described in the literature, but I can't find its official name, so I'll provisionally call it "the used-book finder's bias", based on the following vignette.

Say you are browsing through some used-book store, looking for nothing in particular, when you spot, tucked in some corner, almost hidden, a copy of some "classic" book.  The book is in good shape, and the price is very attractive.  What a find!  You've got to have it, never mind the little voice reminding you that your reading list is already overcrowded, as are your bookshelves, and that you won't have time to read this book in the foreseeable future...

The cognitive bias I'm referring to is the intense compulsion to acquire the serendipitous find, even though one does not need it, and almost certainly will not do anything with it.

As someone who used to frequent used-book shops, I'm all too familiar with this cognitive bias.  It led me to spend a lot of money, and acquire more books than I could even store, let alone read.  (Eventually, I wised up.)

Mind you, the vast majority of the books I found this way were not really hard-to-find; I could easily get through other means (e.g. the library) if I ever really needed to read them.  Moreover, if I had just paid full price for brand new copies of the very few among those books that I ultimately read, I would have still saved myself a lot of money.

The principal element of the bias, seems to me, is the strong feeling of good fortune one feels in such a situation.  Conversely, one feels strongly that one would be a complete fool not to take advantage of such a lucky event.

I am not entirely sure about the proper scientific names but I think your issue revolves around buying things because they are

cheap;
hard to find.

The first is a notorious reason to buy stuff; the impulsive purchase of goods, simply because they are advertised as 'buy two, pay for one!'. This bargain hunting can indeed become pathological and addictive (source: Psychology Today).

The buying simply because a product is hard to find is a bit harder to frame in behaviors, but it is indeed a common phenomenon that people tend to buy stuff because they are exclusive (#55 here). Also, perhaps you simply wish to buy it just because you can (#26 here).

Further, buying stuff in general makes you feel good as it activates the reward circutry in our brain. As a consequence buying stuff can become an addiction (shopaholics).

There is actually a disorder named compulsive buying disorder. It was included in DSM-III, but not in later DSMs. It's not strictly defined but it has been associated with addictive disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, or mood disorders (Black, 2007).

Reference
- Black, World Psychiatry (2007); 6(1): 14–18


What's the behaviour of downplaying the importance of something you wanted but didn't get called? I've seen this phenomenon in various pieces of media, but recently observed it in real life and I'm wondering what it's called.
Basically, when you want something but don't get it, you downplay the importance of that thing.
I've mostly seen it depicted as "moody teens" using responses like "I didn't want to go to that party anyway", or "you can keep your stupid X, I didn't want it anyway".

In  general, rationalization is:

... a defense mechanism in which controversial behaviors or feelings
are justified and explained in a seemingly rational or logical manner
to avoid the true explanation, and are made consciously tolerable—or
even admirable and superior—by plausible means.

The specific case mentioned in the question is one of Sour Grapes, from Aesop's fables:

The story concerns a fox that tries to eat grapes from a vine but
cannot reach them. Rather than admit defeat, he states they are
undesirable.

"Defense mechanism" however, is a psychoanalytic (Freudian) construct, which is generally considered pseudoscience or outdated.  The more modern theory of cognitive dissonance now subsumes what was previously thought of as rationalization:

In practice, people reduce the magnitude of their cognitive dissonance
... by changing the conflicting cognition [or] Ignore or deny
information that conflicts with existing beliefs.


What is a "psychological evaluation" for kids? What does a psychological evaluation consist of for pre-teens and adolescents?

I work with a child who has been abused (physically and emotionally) who is having suicidal ideations with one parent, but is also having problems with the "good" parent who is also supposedly making them feel like they don't like the other parent (which I don't think is actually true). The authorities have come in and determined that the child needs a "psychological evaluation" and I'm trying to understand what's going on here.

First, they must assess whether intervention is necessary in a episode of acute crisis.

http://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/practice_guidelines/guidelines/suicide.pdf

Subsequently, the evaluation that must be carried out by an expert aims to determine the psychological impact in the present, if it is advisable to follow up and that possible implications would take place in the future.

http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/assessment.aspx


Is there a conflict between Mindfulness-based and Acceptance-based Therapies and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT)? Mindfulness-based and Acceptance-based therapies are gaining vast momentum in the treatment of mental illnesses. These therapy modalities are seen to share some similarity with Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) (Ost, 2008), however, I am curious to know what conflicts exist in a therapist-client relationship when adopting some of the techniques/foundations from both therapy forms?

For example, in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) - defusion (the process of distancing ourselves from our throughts) seems to present some form of conflict to CBT which suggests that cognitive restructuring is fundamental to behavioural change, i.e. "trying to change our thoughts". There may be some conflict within a therapeutic setting.

Questions:

What conflicts can occur in the therapist-client relationship when using mindfulness and acceptance exercises with cognitive behaviour therapy exercises?
In what ways may the two groups complement each other in achieving therapeutic outcomes ^ for the client?

^ Therapeutic outcomes can be assumed as symptomatic alleviation of the mental illness or any other positive outcome towards the alleviation of a mental illness.

Some further examples would be great.

References:

Öst, L.G. (2008). Efficacy of the third wave of behavioral therapies: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(3), pp.296-321

No takers so I've decided to do some research and theorise if there are any conflicts between these two therapy modalities. Drawing on research by Hofmann & Asmundson (2008), three distinct differences are identified between Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT):

  The role of cognitions. "CBT helps patients to identify, challenge, and
  re-evaluate these rigid rules and adopt a more relaxed and satisfying
  system of values in order to enhance overall life satisfaction.
  Instead, ACT subsumes cognitions under the more general term behavior
  as it is used in behavior analysis, namely “as a term for all forms of
  psychological activity, both public and private, including cognition”
  (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 2). In essence, the word cognition has a
  different meaning in ACT than in CBT; it is a thought process in CBT
  and a private behavior in ACT."

  The role of emotions. "CBT and ACT target different stages in the emotion-generative process: CBT promotes adaptive antecedent-focused
  emotion regulation strategies, whereas ACT counter-acts maladaptive
  response-focused emotion regulation strategies. The cognitive
  restructuring techniques used in CBT are in line with the
  antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies, providing skills
  that are often effective in reducing emotional distress in the long
  term. Acceptance and mindfulness-based strategies counter suppression
  and, thereby, alleviate emotional distress."

  Philosophical foundation. ACT is based on functional contextualism,
  which has been proposed as the philosophical basis for behavior
  analysis to emphasize the functional relations between behavior and
  environmental events ... CBT is not directly linked to a particular
  philosophy. The philosophical foundation most closely associated with
  CBT is critical rationalism, an epistemological philosophy (Popper,
  1959) that shares its philosophical roots with the natural sciences."

Potential conflicts

These are theorised based on the above differences between CBT and ACT:

Unclear criteria for the suitability of exercises. Since CBT and ACT are clearly disparate  therapy modalities, there is no universal guide on when and how to adopt therapeutic exercises from either CBT or ACT in combination or separately. The decision to use certain exercises is influenced highly by the therapist's subjective judgment and past experiences.
Unknown effects of combining CBT and ACT. As far as I know, there are no studies on the effects of traditional exercises such as cognitive restructuring (CBT) and mindfulness practice (ACT) when combined together on specific mental illnesses. Prima facie, the former involves deliberate attempt to modify cognitions and the latter involves a systematic process of observing non-judgmentally cognitions. It is difficult to see no conflict without empirical counter-evidence.
Potential negating effects. In ACT, Cognitive Defusion involves the process of  distancing or separating oneselves metaphorically from their thoughts (Moffitt et al., 2012). If a client initially uses cognitive restructuring techniques to alleviate distress from their mental illness and this becomes conditioned - using cognitive defusion subsequently after that could negate the positive effects of the previous CBT-based technique.

References

Hofmann, S.G. & Asmundson, G.J.G. (2008). Acceptance and mindfulness-based therapy: New wave or old hat? Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 1-16
Moffitt, R., Brinkworth, G., Noakes, M. & Mohr, P. (2012). A
comparison of cognitive restructuring and cognitive defusion as
strategies for resisting a craved food. Psychology & Health, 27(2),
74-90


What is the difference between IQ and Executive Function? I was reading an article today that stated that people with high IQ's that have trouble with social skills, memory, being punctual (on time), emotional control, and "growing up" are likely to have issues with Executive Function.

My question is, what is the difference between Executive Function and IQ?

As I mentioned in my comment: IQ is a measurement that is believed to correlate with certain aspects of 'intelligence'. Executive function is "an umbrella term for cognitive processes such as planning, working memory, attention, problem solving, verbal reasoning, inhibition, mental flexibility, multi-tasking, initiation and monitoring of actions." The two are not directly comparable.
However there are measures of executive function through tests like Wisconsin card sorting, verbal fluency, and trial making, cognitive estimates test, verbal fluency for animals, simplified six element (Burgess et al., 1998; Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000). Burges et al. (1998) found that these load on 3 main factors: inhibition, intentionality, and executive memory. Ardila et al. (2000) found that these tests do not correlate well with IQ tests and concluded that traditional intelligence tests are not an appropriate metric for executive function.
However, Mahone et al. (2002) studied normal and ADHD children and found that some measures of executive function (Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure, Variables of Attention – Visual
Test, Letter Word Fluency) correlated moderately with IQ. In fact IQ scores accounted for a greater proportion of variance in the EF measures (~10% of the variance) than the diagnosis of ADHD (~0.4% of the variance). They also found that measures of executive function at average IQ differ between children with ADHD and those without. However, this effect disappears for children with above average IQ.
To me this discrepancy suggests that we don't know how to measure executive function very well. This is to be expected, since a huge umbrella term like executive function is a tell-tale sign that we are lumping a lot of things we don't understand well together under one umbrella until we learn more.
References

Ardila, A., Pineda, D., & Rosselli, M. [2000] "Correlation Between Intelligence Test Scores and ExecutiveFunction Measures." Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology 15(1): 31-36.

Burgess, P.W., Alderman, N., Evans, J., Emslie, H., & Wilson, B.A. [1998] "The ecological validity of tests of executive function." Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 4: 547-558.

Mahone, E.M., Hagelthorn, K.M., Cutting, L.E., Schuerholz, L.J., Pelletier, S.F., Rawlins, C., Singer, H.S., & Denckla, M.B. [200] "Effects of IQ on Executive Function Measures in Children with ADHD." Child Neuropsychology 8(1): 52-65.


Are chatbots based on deceased loved ones healthy? I recently read an article about a journalist who created a chatbot to ensure that a conversational entity with elements of his dying father's personality would exist even after his father--terminally ill with cancer--passed away.

I am a software engineer experienced with creating chatbots and it has crossed my mind to create one for the parents of my best childhood friend who was killed 10 years ago in a car accident.

I speak to the parents a few times a year and we have a great relationship. Having been their son's best friend when we were growing up, I know his mannerisms and expressions almost as well as they do so I am confident that I could do a good job of training the chatbot.

That said, the parents have found their peace with my friend's passing and I don't want to do anything to jeopardize that. In any case, I would obviously discuss with them before creating such a chatbot. This leads to my ultimate question:

Would creating a chatbot based on a deceased loved one help or harm those of us left behind?

I really don't know the right answer to this. In my most generous thoughts of how this turns out, it could give his parents, siblings, and future family members a way to remember/meet his fun, goofy personality, but I could also see this opening old wounds.

In my opinion, it depends on whether they would like the AI to synthesize novel thoughts/opinions or to merely contextually quote a history of that individual's textual recordings.

Making a value judgement here, I would say than an AI saying "I forgive you." (from beyond the grave) is not healthy.

But if the chatbot acted as a way of indexing into the individual's actual history, then all potential errors become ones of context (and not content).
(This level of reproduction may not be totally necessary depending on the users' sensitivity to cognitive dissonance, but I would personally feel slimy if I tried to pass off a markov chain of scripts and data as my friend.)

If you're open to alternatives to chatbots, I would suggest that you frame the project as a tribute to your friend's life; even a simple collection of stories from your time together could have a powerful (healthy) impact on the grieving parents.


Multiple "levels" of association in classical conditioning? Sorry if this appears a silly question - If I understand correctly, the objective of classical conditioning, is to pair a neutral stimulus with an unconditioned stimulus, so the neutral stimulus starts producing the same unconditioned response corresponding to unconditioned stimulus.
My question is - can there be multiple "levels" of stimuli that can end up producing the same unconditioned response ?
For example, referring to the famous dog salivating experiment, the dog learns to associate ringing bell stimulus with food because it was paired with food stimulus.
Now if we start pairing another stimulus say, "bang the door", with "ring door-bell", would the dog be able to eventually salivate on "bang the door" stimulus ? Would it learn that "bang the door" would then be followed with "ringing door bell" and eventually "food" stimuli and thus learn multiple "levels" of associations between the stimuli ? If yes, how many such "levels" can an animal like rat or dog form these associations for ?

Found answer to my own question. This is called "higher order conditioning":
https://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Higher+Order+Conditioning#:~:text=Higher%20Order%20Conditioning%20(also%20known,produce%20salivating)%20to%20produce%20the


Diagnosis and treatment for Concentration Deficit Disorder? Sluggish cognitive tempo, sometimes known as Concentration Deficit Disorder, is a syndrome related to (but distinct from) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
Question: What are the best methods to diagnose and treat Concentration Deficit Disorder?
Do any of the following have scientific support?

Electroencephalography (EEG)
DNA therapy

This answer covers the diagnosis of Sluggish cognitive tempo
While there is debate about its nature (Brooks, 2014, Silva, n.d.) there is a whole issue of the Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology (Vol. 42, Issue 1 - January 2014) devoted to the subject of sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) and the debate. That issue has renewed interest in the condition (Silva, n.d.).
American Psychological Association (APA) publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and is the "go-to" for diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. The latest edition is DSM-5 (APA, 2013). As it stands right now, there is no official definition (as defined by the DSM) of "sluggish cognitive tempo" (SCT) or "concentration deficit disorder" (CDD), but the DSM-5 does mention that concentration deficits frequently occur following mild traumatic brain injury but,

can occur in brain-injured and non-brain-injured populations, including individuals with PTSD (page 280)

and

in individuals with acute stress disorder (pages 284 and 286)

Concentration deficits can also occur in depression.
While the Wikipedia article for "sluggish cognitive tempo" states that

there is no overlap between the official ADHD inattention symptoms [ADHD-I] and the SCT symptoms

there is actually a definite overlap.
The DSM-5 states that for a diagnosis of ADHD-I (emphasis mine on symptom category letters),

Six (or more) of the following symptoms have persisted for at least
6 months to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level and that negatively impacts directly on social and academic/occupational activities:
Note: The symptoms are not solely a manifestation of oppositional behavior, defiance, hostility, or failure to understand tasks or instructions. For older adolescents and adults (age 17 and older), at least five symptoms are required.
a. Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in schoolwork, at work, or during other activities (e.g., overlooks or misses details, work is inaccurate).
b. Often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities (e.g., has difficulty remaining focused during lectures, conversations, or lengthy reading).
c. Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly (e.g., mind seems elsewhere, even in the absence of any obvious distraction).
d. Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork, chores, or duties in the workplace (e.g., starts tasks but quickly loses focus and is easily sidetracked).
e. Often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities (e.g., difficulty managing sequential tasks; difficulty keeping materials and belongings in order; messy, disorganized work; has poor time management; fails to meet deadlines).
f. Often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental effort (e.g., schoolwork or homework; for older adolescents and adults, preparing reports, completing forms, reviewing lengthy papers).
g. Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g., school materials, pencils, books, tools, wallets, keys, papenwork, eyeglasses, mobile telephones).
h. Is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli (for older adolescents and
adults, may include unrelated thoughts).
i. Is often forgetful in daily activities (e.g., doing chores, running errands; for older adolescents and adults, returning calls, paying bills, keeping appointments).

Citing Becker, et al (2016), Barkley (2018) and Becker & Barkley (2018), the Wikipedia article lists the following for the symptoms of SCT:

Prone to daydreaming DSM criteria b for ADHD-I
Easily confused or mentally foggy
Spacey or inattentive to surroundings DSM criteria b and c for ADHD-I
Mind seems to be elsewhere DSM criteria c for ADHD-I
Stares blankly into space DSM criteria c for ADHD-I
Underactive, slow moving or sluggish
Lethargic or less energetic
Trouble staying awake or alert
Has drowsy or sleepy appearance
Gets lost in own thoughts DSM criteria b, c and h for ADHD-I
Apathetic or withdrawn, less engaged in activities
Loses train of thought or cognitive set
Processes information not as quickly or accurately

While there is an overlap, in criteria, if consensus is achieved for the idea that SCT or CDD exists, there will be a need to officially define a set of criteria which would need to be met, due to the overlap with ADHD-I and the fact that the other symptoms listed can occur with depression.
In the meantime, the

13 SCT symptoms that loaded consistently on an SCT factor as opposed to an ADHD factor

put together by Becker et al. (2014) and copied into Wikipedia (listed above) are all we have at the current time for a diagnosis of SCT.

Although additional measurement work needs to be conducted now that these 13 items have been identified (15-17), it is important to note that parent, teacher, adult self-report, and child self-report ratings scales (18-23), as well as a semistructured clinical interview (24), have been developed that include at least most of these 13 items. Studies using these measures demonstrate that SCT can be reliability assessed, with excellent internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and moderate interrater reliability (14). (Becker & Barkley (2018))

On top of this, whilst research indicates SCT is associated with ADHD-I,

findings show that SCT is even more prevalent in autism. SCT is most common when autism and ADHD co-occur. Because autism without ADHD is rare (whereas ADHD without autism is not), it is important to assess both SCT and ADHD in children referred for autism evaluations and rule-out autism in children referred for ADHD. SCT may be another neurocognitive problem shared by children with autism and children with ADHD in need of assessment and intervention (Mayes, et al. 2020).

References
APA. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5®). American Psychiatric Pub. https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm
Barkley, R. A. (2018). Barkley Sluggish Cognitive Tempo Scale — Children and Adolescents (BSCTS-CA). Guilford Publications.
Becker, S. P., Leopold, D. R., Burns, G. L., Jarrett, M. A., Langberg, J. M., Marshall, S. A., ... & Willcutt, E. G. (2016). The internal, external, and diagnostic validity of sluggish cognitive tempo: A meta-analysis and critical review. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 55(3), 163-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2015.12.006
Becker, S. & Barkley, R. A. (2018). Sluggish cognitive tempo (Chapter 15) Banaschewski, T., Coghill, D., & Zuddas, A. (Eds.). Oxford Textbook of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (pp.147-153). Oxford University Press. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292148331_Sluggish_cognitive_tempo
Brooks, M. (2014). Sluggish Cognitive Tempo a Distinct Attention Disorder? Medscape Psychiatry News https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/819838
Mayes, S. D., Calhoun, S. L., & Waschbusch, D. A. (2020). Sluggish cognitive tempo in autism, ADHD, and neurotypical child samples. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 79, 101678. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2020.101678
Silva, M. (n.d.). A Fuzzy Debate About A Foggy Condition Cincinnati Children's Hospital https://www.cincinnatichildrens.org/professional/resources/research-horizons/archives/2015/summer/sluggish-cognitive-tempo


Is hypnotic susceptibility associated with responsiveness to rapid vs. standard hypnosis induction? I have been learning about hypnosis, inductions etc. and I have heard how there is a spectrum of how able people are to be hypnotised. There are those who will go into trance at the drop of a hat, and others who are near-impossible to induce a trance state on.

My question is, is there a correlation between where one is on this spectrum, and the success rates of rapid compared to standard hypnosis?

Any extra info would be nice. Thanks!

I am studying hypnotherapy myself and from what I am led to believe, there is no "spectrum of how able people are to be hypnotised".  Everyone who wants to be hypnotised can be.  How quickly they are hypnotised depends on the experience of the hypnotherapist and their methods used.

Take a look at Elman and Ericksonian Inductions in Google.  There are good videos on YouTube showing you the different methods.  Milton H. Erickson developed a permissive style of induction which is considered slower than Dave Elman's authoritarian style.  The thing you would need to consider is what style is suited to your client.  You would need to develop your own induction routine based on these 2 styles and you may then have to tailor the induction to their modality (Kinaesthetic, Visual, Auditory, Olfactory, or Gustatory).

Hope this helps


Activation of brain reasoning areas during dreaming I would say that dreaming is like any conscious experience, except that objective reasoning is turned off. Do fMRI imaging studies indicate that the reasoning centers of the brain are inactive during REM sleep? Are other sensory sections, like the visual cortex active?

By reasoning centers of the brain, I am referring to area(s) specifically associated with logic.

I cannot answer from fMRI's, but this theory conflicts with other anecdotal evidence from medicine.

In sensory deprivation, or under psychotomimetic substances, you can be awake and unimpaired logically, and still have reality make as little sense as it does in a dream.  (People on LSD are not less logical, in an abstract sense.  If you can get them to care about an IQ test long enough to take it, they can do just as well.)

To the extent those effects are comparable, I would doubt it is reason that is impaired.  It is more likely that reasoning is fine, but the ability to check predictions against perception is lacking.

Antonio Damasio's observations on brain lesions that limit emotion, explained in his popularizing book, seems to indicate that abstract reason needs physical grounding (from the environment or from internal sensations like emotional reactions) or it goes off the rails and does not result in what we ordinarily consider logic, even if the reasoning skills themselves are in order.

Much perceptual feedback and even internal feeback loops are disabled or attenuated by the physiological paralysis in sleep.


Are axon terminals always part of a synapse, or are there any that just release neurotransmitters into the ether during an action potential? By "ether" I mean to no post-synaptic cell in particular.

If this is the case, how common is it for an axon terminal to not be part of a synapse?

Related question: do axon terminals form only as part of a synapse? Or are they formed ahead of time, and then connect to form synapses as needed?

By "ether" I mean to no post-synaptic cell in particular.

Yes; this is an important mechanism, as it allows the volume conduction of neuroactive chemicals. For example, many brainstem nucleus, such as the locus coeruleus, are small in size, yet affect much or even most of the cortex by this mechanism. Neurotransmitters are released and diffuse in the fluid-filled extracellular space (what you call "ether"), affecting many cells at once without making specific synaptic contact with any of them.

This mode of conduction is slow and spatially nonspecific compared to synaptic transmission, but it underlies much of neuromodulation, such as the setting of cortical states via norepinephrine, dopamine, serotonin etc.

  If this is the case, how common is it for an axon terminal to not be part of a synapse?

This depends on what brain systems you're talking about. Intracortical connections and most direct afferent and efferent projections are mostly synaptic (since they require speed), but many other systems are greatly, or even mostly, volume conducting. Again, the brainstem nuclei are a good example, but gut neurons are another.

  Related question: do axon terminals form only as part of a synapse? Or are they formed ahead of time, and then connect to form synapses as needed?

Some synapse quickly, others never synapse.

References

Vizi, E. S. & B. Lendvai (2008): Synaptic and Nonsynaptic Release of Transmitters. Handbook of Neurochemistry and Molecular Neurobiology, pp 101-111

Taber, Katherine H. & Robin A. Hurley (2014): Volume Transmission in the Brain: Beyond the Synapse. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 4-4.


Thesaurus for types of psychological projections Thanks to Berne, there is an plethora of "games people play" between people based on pattern analysis of social interaction.

Now, is there a comparable approach to analysis of psychological projections in social interactions, to name, list and describe them?

Freudian Psychological Projection: "humans defend themselves against their own unconscious impulses or qualities (both positive and negative) by denying their existence in themselves while attributing them to others." (Wikipedia)

Preamble

Before I go into my answer, I should point out that where the theory of psychological projection originated from Sigmund Freud, his theories are considered by many as pseudoscientific. More can be read in my answer to this in meta

Definition of Projection

This is a psychological defence mechanism whereby beliefs, attitudes or other negative aspects from ourselves or the environment are attributed to others or other aspects of our environment (Reeves, 2013).  Totem and Taboo by Sigmund Freud (Freud, 1913) contained his major thinking on the role of projection (Hurry, Novick, & Novick, 1976).

To list all possible forms of projection would be too broad for this site as it would fill a fairly thick book to do so with ample description.  Below I will outline some examples which are on the WikiPedia pag linked in the question and alongside those examples will be references to books which you are free to read to gain more.

Examples of Projection

Victim blamingThe victim of someone else's actions or bad luck may be offered criticism, the theory being that the victim may be at fault for having attracted the other person's hostility (Bingham & Tamarkin, 1985).
Projection of marital guiltThoughts of infidelity to a partner may be unconsciously projected in self-defence on to the partner in question, so that the guilt attached to the thoughts can be repudiated or turned to blame instead, in a process linked to denial.
BullyingA bully may project his/her own feelings of vulnerability onto the target(s) of the bullying activity. Despite the fact that a bully's typically denigrating activities are aimed at the bully's targets, the true source of such negativity is ultimately almost always found in the bully's own sense of personal insecurity and/or vulnerability. Such aggressive projections of displaced negative emotions can occur anywhere from the micro-level of interpersonal relationships, all the way up through to the macro-level of international politics, or even international armed conflict (Jung & von Franz, 1964).
Projection of general guiltProjection of a severe conscience[26] is another form of defense, one which may be linked to the making of false accusations, personal or political (Jung & von Franz, 1964).
Projection of hopeAlso, in a more positive light, a patient may sometimes project his or her feelings of hope onto the therapist (Casement, 1990).

References

Bingham, J. & Tamarkin, N. (1985). The Pursuit of Health: Your Mind, Your Body, Your Relationships & Your Environment. New York: Walker Press

Casement, P. (1990). Further Learning from the Patient: The Analytic Space and Process. Hove, UK: Routledge.

Hurry, A., Novick, J. & Novick, K. K. (1976). Freud's concept of projection. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 4(2), 75-88. DOI: 10.1080/00754177608254963

Freud, S. (1913). Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics Translated by A. A. Brill, 1919 London: George Routledge & Sons Limited

Jung, C. G. & von Franz, M-L. (1964) Man and his symbols. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday

Reeves, A. (2013). An Introduction to Counselling and Psychotherapy: From Theory to Practice. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.


Do people feel impotent when arguing with someone able to do Emotional detachment? Some people who experienced negative emotions after being forced in their childhood often develop a passive-aggressive behaviour as a form of self defence against whoever is trying to manipulate / force them.

Instead of a simple assertive "no" in a dispute they tend to overreact sometimes in a passive-aggressive way, i.e. through emotional detachment.

They are usually aware this can hurt the person who is angry with them but use Techniques of neutralization to feel "OK".

But why do people tend to be hurt by this kind of passive aggressive behavior? Does this happen only to people with obsessive / narcissistic personality trait?

The answer to this question is in the link to passive-aggressive behaviour I provided in your question.

  In conflict theory, passive-aggressive behavior can resemble a behaviour better described as catty, as it consists of deliberate, active, but carefully veiled hostile acts which are distinctively different in character from the non-assertive style of passive resistance.

When faced with any hostility, most people would feel hurt

Examples given in the link to passive-aggressiveness in the workplace including

  [deliberately] 'forgetting' to do something, chronic lateness, and intentional inefficiency.

leads to others having to pick up the slack.  This not only hurts people - knowing that the passive-aggressor could have done it but didn't - but it also leads to resentment by those picking up the slack and can lead to low morale leading to more problems in the workplace.  And it can hurt anyone, not just those with obsessive/narcissistic traits.


Is our sense of smell heightened when we are asleep? My question is whether our sense of smell is stronger when we sleep? From an evolutionary perspective this could have been beneficial in terms of runaway camp fires, marauding saber tooth tigers or the testosterone of night-raiding cave men.

Does this effect back off when we wake, as our eyesight comes into play? And, if so, how do we account for the claims that many people die in  night time house fires before they wake up?

I'm aware that the brain is able to desensitise itself to certain smells and go about its olfactory business elsewhere. That second sniff of fresh-ground coffee beans is never as good as the first.  I'd say that most people assume they are 'a bit slow' first thing in the morning until they 'wake up properly', but is this true?

Short answer
The sense of smell may still be operational during sleep, but it is not enhanced. Olfactory stimuli typically will not wake you up during sleep, however.

Background
Olfaction and sleep are an interesting lot. Most sensory stimuli presented during sleep typically cause awakening, especially when when they are intense  and sudden (e.g. a loud noise). This is not the case with odors, and even holds for unpleasant ones (Carskadon & Herz, 2004).

In addition, while most sensory systems stop processing their input altogether, odors remain processed by the sleeping brain. This may, at least in part, be due to the direct olfactory projections from the periphery to the cortex, without a thalamic relay being used as with the other senses (Perl et al., 2017). However, they will typically not wake a person up.

The neural adaptation (reduction of sensitivity over time) of the olfactory system is related to repeated or sustained exposure to scents (Dalton, 2000), and it is not affected by sleep per se as far as I know. Hence, taken together these findings support the claim that odor alarms will not work.

Note, however, that fire comes with heat and irritant smoke that will work on the heat and pain receptors in the skin, respectively. These may wake you up, barred the dulled sensory systems pick the stimuli up. And even then it may already be too late to be of any help.

References
- Dalton, Chem Senses (2000); 25(4): 487-92
- Carskadon & Herz, Sleep (2004); 27(3): 402-5
- Perl et al, Springer Handbook of Odor: 111-2


Cognitive Models of learning Working Memory usage Recently in deep learning, there's been a surge in learning how to use memories as part of the optimisation process (i.e. LSTM's and Stacks). However, these aren't really analogous to how a cognitive systems learns how to use it's working memory.

Are there models of how working memory modules (where a saved value decays over time) can be learned to be optimally leveraged? Either via reinforcement learning or supervised learning?

ACT-R is a complete cognitive model that incorporates Working Memory,  Declarative Memory and Procedural Memory, but also incorporates input (visual and auditory) and output (manual) buffers. It is a really interesting model about the human in its entirety but, it is at a high level of abstraction.

The paper about memory you want is "REFLECTIONS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT IN MEMORY" by Schooler and Anderson. It describes how and why memory is like Reïnforcement learning. In this paper you can read how memory is used for studying. About learning to leverage the working memory, I don't exactly know what you mean, but I think these papers give you a nice headstart.

If you want to learn more about ACT-R, I would recommend this book, or just read the many papers they have published over the years. They have great examples that explain multitasking and time perception among others.


Images on personal computers - Which aspect of size to keep constant? For various reasons we're doing a reaction time study involving images that runs on unstandardized equipment: patients' personal computers (unless they don't meet certain requirements).
It's not about vision or individual differences, but group-level intraindividual change in reaction times (attention retraining), so it's not that important that participants all have the same experience as long as it's not confounded with the experimental condition.

Most reaction time studies run on standardised equipment, with a standardised distance from the monitor etc.

We can at most ask participants to keep a certain distance to the screen, but we can't ask them to buy new monitors of course.

So, three basic options arise (assuming our images are in a sufficiently high resolution):

Use constant number of pixels.
Positive: We can use the same images for everyone, if we use a medium number of pixels, we can accomodate most resolutions. Also, potentially everyone sees the same amount of information (i.e. no information lost due to down-scaling).
Negative: With high resolutions, images may look pretty small, and with large monitors, participants may usually position themselves further away from the monitor habitually, so some see "less information".
Use constant display size (i.e. 7 cm wide).
Positive: On large and small monitors with different resolutions, images are the same size.
Negative: Apparently the information used to compute actual display size can be unreliable, so we may end up with different display sizes. We'll probably need different images and people with larger monitors and higher resolutions will be able to see more details.
Use constant fraction of display (i.e. 70% percent wide).
Positive: Fraction of display may do the best job of letting people perceive considering that people probably sit further away from bigger monitors.
Negative: Need images in different sizes (dynamically computed with JS). They may see different levels of detail.

These options could be combined (i.e. constant pixels unless that is less than 50% of the monitor) and there's also the option of letting users zoom (will result in somewhat blurry images though).

Is there any research into this matter and if not, which option sounds best perception-wise?

I don't think that (2) works. The physical size of the screen is not available to you. You may be able to calculate the dimensions in pixels, but pixel density (dpi), pixel format and sampling pattern change from screen to screen. So you won't be able to calculate the centimeters from the pixels.

I would do what web designers have done for centuries: rely on the user to resize content to their needs.

I would provide images in high resolution, display them at an initial size* that works well on the most common screen resolutions (1366 x 768 and 1024 x 768), and provide a highly visible request to resize the image to make viewing comfortable. With Javascript you can offer fluid, continuous resizing options easily (e.g. TwinHelix or, what I prefer, YUI), allowing the users to resize web content in the same way they would resize the browser window. Or you can offer a number of preset sizes (+/- 10% etc.) and link these to different style sheets.

*A good measure for the initial size, in my opinion, is the em. You can rely on two factors with this: if the user uses the computer at its factory settings, then type size is adapted to the screen size; if the user changed the settings, then type size is adapted to his visual ability and preferences. If you give image size in em, i.e. in relation to type size, images will be scaled to the users needs.

This is, of course, no exact science, but that is what I do, when I design a website. It is the closest I manage to get to cross computer similarity in size. As soon as you read about cross browser web design, you'll lose all optimism that your goals at exactness can be achieved ;-)


Do antipsychotics have a delayed onset of action similar to (monoamine) antidepressants? I've been trying to understand the position of Steve Hyman (a former NIMH director), who has been amply quoted in an recent article in Quartz, saying among ohter things that

  There’s not “an iota of direct evidence” for the theory that a chemical imbalance causes depression.

I looked into Hyman's papers and I found a fairly cited (~500 in Google Scholar) paper of his some 20 years ago in AJP, co-authored with Eric J. Nestler, in which they propose that

  drug-induced neural plasticity [...] underlies the long-term actions of psychotropic drugs in the brain [...] Biological investigation in psychiatry has often focused too narrowly on synaptic pharmacology,
  especially on neurotransmitter turnover and neurotransmitter receptors. A paradigm is presented to help understand the long-term effects of psychotropic drugs, including
  the latency in onset of their therapeutic actions.

The paper further details that

  Acute dosing of the antidepressants
  produces little in the way of subjective or
  behavioral effects (other than side effects). Initial doses
  of the antipsychotic drugs produce subtle motor effects
  or some degree of sedation, and initial doses of the
  stimulants produce euphoria and locomotor activation.
  However, substantial improvement in depressive or
  psychotic symptoms, or the development of addiction
  to psychostimulant drugs, occurs only if the drugs are
  taken at adequate dosage and with adequate frequency
  and chronicity. For example, depressive symptoms
  would not be expected to improve if an antidepressant
  were taken at too low a dose, only occasionally, or for
  too short a period of time.

  We therefore conceptualize antidepressant-induced
  increases in synaptic serotonin or norepinephrine, antipsychotic-
  induced blockade of dopamine neurotransmission,
  and cocaine- and amphetamine-induced increases
  in synaptic dopamine as initiating events for longerterm
  changes in neural function. It is the adaptive response
  of the nervous system to adequate repeated perturbations
  mediated through these initial targets that
  produces the therapeutic responses to antidepressants
  or antipsychotic drugs or, in the case of the psychostimulants,
  addiction [...].

I'm somewhat familiar with the slow, cumulative effect of monoamine antidepressants and with the mechanism of addiction. Hyman and Nestler can be probably be forgiven for not anticipating the ketamine-as-fast-antidepressant fervor 20 years later. But what I want to ask here is:

What is the evidence that anti-psychotics also work in this delayed manner? Is it uncontroversially so?

There seem to be multiple studies generally pointing to a delay of clinical antipsychotic action of these drugs, typically between a week and two weeks (e.g.., Zedkova et al (2011) and Mousavi et al. (2013)). However, there is evidence that antipsychotics may start working after a day, or even within a few hours after starting the meds. See for an interesting review Agid et al. (2006).

From reading these papers my understanding is that a lot of it depends on where the researcher puts the threshold of clinical effectiveness and which outcome measure is used to define that effectiveness.

References
- Agid et al., J Psychiatry Neurosci (2006); 31(2): 93–100
- Mousavi et al., J Res Pharm Pract (2013); 2(4): 138–44
- Zedkova et al., Neuro Endocrinol Lett (2011); 32(5): 667-70


Research suggesting conscious control over brain region activation? Has there been any research proving, disproving, or exploring the concept of conscious activation of specific brain regions?

To elaborate on this:

I've read that performing processing tasks causes the brain to reinforce that type/kind of processing or thinking.  For example, visualizing performing a task fires the same neurons as actually performing the task.

Thus, has there been research into the idea that mental models and biofeedback mechanisms can result in conscious control over the activation of particular brain regions?

For example, with biofeedback and practice, can I consciously, measurably, and significantly increase activity (blood flow, electrical activity, etc) in the frontal lobe?

Yes! Recent work using fMRI has shown that subjects can indeed control localized brain regions through practice [1]. Some regions that have been tested include the rostal ACC [2] responsible for pain perception, PPA responsible for representing locations, and FFA responsible for representing faces. Repeated experiments seem to suggest the phenomenon is robust, and that the technique may not be particular to regulating any specific brain region but could work on many brain regions given the proper experimental design.
Typically, these experiments work by utilizing real-time fMRI, a technique that allows real-time biofeedback of brain activation to be presented to a subject in an fMRI scanner. In these experiments, a subject may specifically be instructed to "up-regulate" or "down-regulate" activation in a brain region by performing a specific task. For instance, a subject can "up-regulate" activation in the fusiform face area (FFA) by mentally picturing faces. Consequently, feedback is presented to the subject (e.g., as a 'thermometer') indicating level of activation of the FFA.
Interestingly, subjects become better at up-regulating or down-regulating activation in specific brain regions by attending to feedback-- even moreso than subjects who do not receive biofeedback. This is reflected both in the fMRI images and subjective reports from the subjects. This technique has potential implications for rehabilitation, e.g. giving chronic pain patients another tool to cope with their disorder.
The technique has even been used to up-regulate abstract, distributed patterns across the brain. For instance, Stephen LaConte and colleagues have used a machine learning technique called support-vector machines to classify abstract patterns such as 'craving' or 'not craving', represented as a distributed pattern of brain activity. Using real-time fMRI, smokers have been able to learn to control their cravings through instruction and biofeedback.
I believe similar findings have been shown using EEG as well, though I am not as familiar with the literature. However, there is evidence that subjects using an EEG brain-computer interface to control an on-screen keyboard become better with practice, which suggests that they are able to manipulate their brain patterns in order to perform the task.
References

de Charms et al. (2004). Learned regulation of spatially localized brain activation using
real-time fMRI. NeuroImage, 21, 436-443. Retrieved from http://www.christofflab.ca/pdfs/deCharms_2004_Neuroimage.pdf

de Charms et al. (2005). Control over brain activation and pain learned
by using real-time functional MRI. PNAS, 102,
18626–18631. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/~fumiko/publications.files/Hoeft(Maeda)_2005PNASdeCharms.pdf


How do people that can't perceive 3D view a stereoscopic 3D image or movie? According to Mendiburu (2009), 3-15% of the people can't view a stereoscopic 3D image or movie, mostly due to poor binocular vision.

Imagine one of those is in the movie theater, trying to watch a 3D movie. How would this movie appear to this person?

Mendiburu (2009) 3D Movie making: stereoscopic digital cinema from script to screen, Oxford, England: Focal Press) (Free PDF)

People who are unable to perceive stereoscopic depth typically only perceive information from the dominant eye.

Failure to perceive stereoscopic depth is usually caused by conditions where the eyes do not converge properly (e.g., strabismus). If left untreated, it is not possible to develop the necessary correspondance between the two signals from either eye, and one eye will dominate over the other. The result is that the majority of visual cortical neurons will respond to stimuli presented to the dominant eye, whereas there will be far fewer binocular neurons (i.e., neurons that respond to stimuli from either eye) and monocular neurons that respond to stimuli from the weaker eye.


Reading vs. watching a lecture: which activity results in higher knowledge retention? I teach calculus to freshmen and currently spend most of the classroom time lecturing. To make classes more interactive I'd like to shift this phase of "knowledge transfer" outside of classes. Either by giving students reading assignments, or by giving them videos to watch.

So I was wondering if reading as opposed to watching a video of someone explaining the same thing, results in different learning outcomes.

An attempt to make the question more narrow: is there a difference in brain activity or knowledge retention between reading a text vs. watching another person reciting the same text?

Consider this, communication is more than 50% nonverbal. Studies vary (from 93% nonverbal to 75%) and the actual percentage is difficult to interpret, but it is generally accepted that most of the communication is nonverbal.
That being said, a book is only written word and content, whereas a lecture is dynamic, versatile, and incorporates much of the nonverbal content.
Moreover, a lecture and video has much more stimulus going to the brain and this does have an impact on memory retention. Consider how PTSD cases arise; they are due to an individual experiencing hyper-stimulation (from the emotional brain) which in turn creates very strong memories. The same would hold true when comparing learning through reading and learning through a lecture.
However
This depends on many things:

For example if the lecturer is boring and monotone, it's the same or worse (boring lectures can put people to sleep) than giving a student something to read.

It also depends on the student's ability and motivation. If he or she is motivated and enjoys the subject, they will retain a lot of information from reading and working on their own due to their sense of joy in the subject--an emotional response will in turn encode memories more strongly.

Lastly it depends on how well the concept is explained. If a student does not understand a concept then for them to perform the calculations it will require a lot more memory work. If they understand something, then the actual memory work will be less, because they need not recall as much information in order to solve the problem.

In general though I would say that videos and lectures have more potential of creating memory retention due to providing more stimuli for the student.


What's the term in psychology for the way people think of concepts using examples? I learned about this but forget its name. The idea is that when people hear a word or think of a concept they tend to come up with certain examples that fit the idea more than others. For example, if people think of birds, they tend to think of sparrows or seagulls, not penguins, even though penguins fit the definition of bird perfectly. If people are told to imagine a chair, they tend to think of one with 4 legs, probably made of wood, not something like a movie theater chair. What's the name for this?

You are talking about Exemplar Theory, since the question is almost verbatim from Wikipedia:

  For example, the model proposes that people create the “bird” category
  by maintaining in their memory a collection of all the birds they have
  experienced: sparrows, robins, ostriches, penguins, etc. If a new
  stimulus is similar enough to some of these stored bird examples, the
  person categorizes the stimulus in the “bird” category.

This contrasts with Prototype Theory, which proposes that categories are based on a single example rather than multiple:

  ... prototype theory would consider a category like bird as consisting of
  different elements which have unequal status - e.g. a robin is more
  prototypical of a bird than, say a penguin.

Other theories on categorization (or how a Concept is structured in the mind) include Essentialism, and Theory-theory.


Can critical thinking be taught? Critical thinking is central to the scientific method and believed to be essential to a successful democracy. Recently, the 2012 Texas Republican platform voiced the party's opposition to the teaching of critical thinking skills in public schools. This stance raises many controversial questions on the GOPs motivation, but also a fundamental question: are public schools in the US successfully teaching critical thinking?

In the West, critical thinking descends from the Socratic method and is a central tenant of the tutor system at the earliest institutions of higher learning (Oxford and Cambridge, for example). This historic dedication of the top institutions to teaching critical thinking suggests that the method is effective. On the other hand, contemporary psychologists of education are suggesting that critical thinking cannot be effectively taught (Willingham, 2008).

Can critical thinking be taught? Are there studies (with proper controls) that show that a course on critical thinking teaching the skill beyond standard domain specific problem-solving/fact-knowing courses?

It seems like somebody's done a lot of literature pooling already:

Is Rationality Teachable?

Among influences mentioned are statistics, logic training, and debiasing.

There's also a book that summarized findings:

Teaching Critical Thinking: Some Lessons From Cognitive Science
Tim van Gelder
College Teaching
Vol. 53, Iss. 1, 2005

  ABSTRACT: This article draws six key lessons from cognitive science
  for teachers of critical thinking. The lessons are: acquiring
  expertise in critical thinking is hard; practice in critical-thinking
  skills themselves enhances skills; the transfer of skills must be
  practiced; some theoretical knowledge is required; diagramming
  arguments (“argument mapping”) promotes skill; and students are prone
  to belief preservation. The article provides some guidelines for
  teaching practice in light of these lessons.

Anecdotally, I recognize a tendency for science professors to let students use their intuition at first and then crush it in an attempt to make debiasing habitual.


Can drugs cause positive reinforcement for undesirable tasks? For this example, I will use alcohol as an example drug, since it's legal and increases dopamine.

Can drinking alcohol when performing unpleasant tasks, such as homework, cleaning, or laundry confuse the brain into associating those tasks with positive feelings, and thus increase the desire to perform those tasks, even in the absence of alcohol?

For example, I noticed some of the songs I first heard of while drinking sounded particularly good, but also sound great when not drinking.

Short answer
Aversive stimuli can drive drug seeking.

Background
Central to your question is the dopamine circuit of the limbic system (Fig. 1), being crucial to the reward circuitry in the brain. One notorious way of powerfully activating the reward system is through intake of highly addictive dopaminergic drugs like cocaine, heroin and amphetamines, but also alcohol, albeit less potently. They are so addictive because they evoke strong euphoric, hedonic feelings and the notorious 'crash' when their effects wear off. The euphoric state is a powerful positive reinforcer, the crash a potent negative reinforcer.

Stressors negatively impact emotional state and can drive drug seeking by modulating the activity of the mesolimbic dopamine system. In rats this was tested by stressing them with the administration of the bitter compound quinine. Rats stressed in this way had a decreased dopamine tone in their limbic system. This was accompanied by an increased tendency to seek and use cocaine. This increased cocaine-seeking behavior resulted in increased dopamine levels in the limbic system, at least partially counteracting the stressful quinine shots (Twining et al., 2016).

Admittedly these findings do not directly answer your question

  [When] performing unpleasant tasks [can drugs] confuse the brain into
  associating those tasks with positive feelings [?]

My answer shows that

  Unpleasant tasks can lower dopamine in the brain and drive drug seeking behavior [and cause addiction] when drug intake is associated with [more] positive feelings

Fig. 1. Dopamine pathways in the reward center of the brain. source:
 Lieff J.

Reference
- Twining et al., Addiction (2007); 102(12): 1863–70


How does appreciation for music change over time for the same person? I know that there's a concept of acquired taste, where a child may find certain tastes, like peppers and beer unappealing until certain age or frequency of exposure.

Is there something similar to acquired taste in music?
How does perception of the "beauty" of the same musical track vary for the same individual over a lifetime?

There has been an episode of the popular TV show "South Park" that deals with taste in music, although in a satirical way.

Following the comments you've received, I'll add my own subjective answer in the affirmative to your first question. I think we've already compiled enough votes and comments here that support @JoshGitlin's unscientific answer to say that there is some empirical basis for theorizing the existence of a "taste" acquisition process in music. Nonetheless, here's another somewhat unscientific (and inadvertent) contribution from Wikipedia:

Acquiring the Taste was the second album of English progressive rock band Gentle Giant...This was a departure from the blues and soul styles found on their self titled debut. It was more experimental, more discordant, and with more varied instrumentation. In the sleeve text, the band made this famous declaration:
"...It is our goal to expand the frontiers of contemporary popular music at the risk of being very unpopular. We have recorded each composition with the one thought - that it should be unique, adventurous and fascinating. It has taken every shred of our combined musical and technical knowledge to achieve this. From the outset we have abandoned all preconceived thoughts of blatant commercialism. Instead we hope to give you something far more substantial and fulfilling. All you need to do is sit back, and acquire the taste."

So there you have it: a fairly sophisticated band of musicians appealing to some common intuition about the very process in question, acquiring a taste for certain music. At the risk of being flagged for spamming, I'd even recommend that anyone curious enough to try out the process for oneself should give the album a listen; it's likely to be quite different from the music you're used to, but it's also likely to grow on you somewhat (it's certainly grown on me since I first heard it)!
As for your second question, generally speaking, aesthetic appreciation of a given, enjoyable stimulus (including, but not limited to discrete musical compositions) changes in at least two ways over repeated exposures.

Hedonic adaptation often occurs to some extent, such that as novelty wears off, so does enjoyment.
Nostalgia plays a somewhat opposite role under certain circumstances, such as those that associate the stimulus with a desirable memory.

There's probably plenty more to it than just these two influences though. How it all actually plays out would be very interesting to see, so here's an upvote for any references others might be able to offer in their own answers!


What is the sleep study that showed that a percentage of humans have a biological clock that is ~28 hours or greater? There was an article published some years ago about a sleep study (I think from Germany) that showed about 10-20% of people (European's I think) are genetically predisposed to function on a 30-hour* cycle. (As opposed to the 24 hour Circadian rhythm.)

*I think it was 30 hours, but don't know for sure. And I can't seem to find any reference to the study or what this "sleep disorder" is called. From Googling, I don't believe it is any of the following:

Delayed sleep phase disorder
Segmented Sleep Disorder
Non-24-hour sleep-wake disorder

The study was most likely related to cognitive function and may have been funded by a space agency.

Hope this is on topic here, I just saw this site in Area 51 but didn't read much about it.

Free-running circadian periods were estimated to vary from 13 to 65 hours in normal subjects according to a 1979 study by R.A. Wever. This paper was referenced in a more recent article regarding the circadian pacemaker (Czeisler et al., 1999). I could not access the Wever article directly to assess quality. However, the Czeisler article takes issue with the methods of earlier work that purported to show circadian rhythms longer than about 24 hours:

  ...the generality of these
  findings has been limited by reports that activity (16, 17), knowledge of time of day (18), and
  exposure to ordinary indoor room light (19, 20)
  can shift circadian phase or alter the observed
  free-running circadian period in humans and
  thus may have influenced those observations
  (21)."

Czeisler et al. sought to control these confounds and estimate a rhythm with very little variance centered at 24.18 hours.

  Czeisler, C. A., Duffy, J. F., Shanahan, T. L., Brown, E. N.,
  Mitchell, J. F., Rimmer, D. W., … Kronauer, R. E. (1999). Stability,
  Precision, and Near-24-Hour Period of the Human Circadian Pacemaker.
  Science, 284(5423), 2177–2181. doi:10.1126/science.284.5423.2177 PDF

  R. A. Wever, The Circadian System of Man: Results of Experiments Under
  Temporal Isolation (Springer-Verlag, New York, 1979); Experientia 40,
  1226 (1984).


Can general intelligence be understood as pattern analysis? I have been thinking for a while about general intelligence (i.e.,not specific abilities used for particular tasks such as chess).
I think that the essence of general intelligence is pattern analysis. I.e., the brain of any animal is a pattern analysis machine. The brain analyses patterns of sounds, lights, pressure, chemicals (in the nose and the tongue). More than that, it also analyse patterns of actions (body language, pattern in doing daily activities, etc etc).

To what extent can intelligence be understood as pattern analysis?
Do any existing researchers conceptualise intelligence as pattern analysis?
What evidence is there to support conceptualising intelligence as pattern analysis?

You are certainly not the first to conceive of intelligence as pattern analysis. In fact, there is a book by Jeff Hawkins called "On Intelligence" which investigates this idea in depth. His idea is that the best candidate mechanism for intelligent brain function is predictive coding.

In the predictive coding framework, the job of the brain is not to continuously process all incoming information, but instead to continuously predict upcoming information: the brain is an inference machine. Predictive coding is a hierarchical process whereby a any stage in cognitive processing sends its prediction to a previous stage in processing via feedback connections. For example, if area V2 'expects' to see a square, it will send this information to area V1, which codes for line orientation. If the received input matches the expectation, the information is suppressed. The information now doesn't need to go any further than V1, because it has already been fully predicted, i.e. the brain already contains a representation of it. If, however, the input doesn't match the prediction, the mismatch, called prediction error, is transmitted further through the processing hierarchy.

Prediction error is considered the reason why surprising (invalidly predicted) stimuli lead to more neural activity than unsurprising (validly predicted) ones, for example in mismatch negativity paradigms.

The notion of expectation here is automatic, it is a function of each brain area and does not need to be conscious in the sense of us being aware that it's happening.

It is however important to note that this notion of intelligence is nothing like the notion of intelligence in psychology. In psychology, intelligence is a measure of individual differences between people. The predictive coding framework is, in contrast, posited as a general feature of the neocortex.


Is there a way to make a DIY EEG? I have MATLAB. I would like to try out a small EEG project because my field of interest is in neuroscience, however I'm still doing my undergrad.

The OpenEEG project has some information for building your own EEG system. Instructables has a "simple" EEG circuit you can build. Note that this is going to be somewhat costly and time consuming because you are dealing with tiny voltages and high impedances.

OpenBCI has some hardware for sale (still expensive but not as bad as research-grade equipment) and their forum can be helpful for the DIY EEG enthusiast.

You also might want to look into utilizing some existing publicly available EEG datasets instead of collecting the data yourself:

BCNI
UCI
NIAL
UCSD
More links


How does excess of dopamine affect one's mental health? If a person takes dopamine increasing medication for some illness, what effect will it have on his/her mental health considering that medication doesn't target just one area of the brain ?

In Parkinson's disease, dopamine is lacking in the brain area responsible for motor functions i.e. muscle movement hence creating  spasms in muscles.
Dopamine medication corrects this but it doesn't target just that area of the brain.

I'm curious what happens with all the dopamine roaming in other parts of the brain, and how it affects mental health?

EDIT: I've made some changes, I hope it's more understandable now.

Not all medications administer dopamine in the same way.

For treating Parkinson's specifically, dopamine-boosting medications such as L-DOPA (which are notable for their ability to cross the blood-brain barrier, which dopamine itself cannot do) are often administered with a DOPA decarboxylase inhibitor (DDCI) or with a benserazide to prevent peripheral synthesis of dopamine from L-DOPA. This prevents the negative side effects that may result from excess dopamine in the peripheral nervous system.

Other medications (such as stimulant medications, used to treat disorders such as ADHD) convert tyrosine hydroxylase into L-Dopa, which in turn becomes dopamine. Long-term amphetamine use has shown to have positive effects on the brain when administered in therapeutic doses. By contrast, however, certain psychotoxic amphetamines such as methamphetamine have shown to cause long-term brain damage.

When taken in higher doses, these medications can negatively effect heart rate, sleep patterns, appetite, mood, anxiety, aggression levels, and (in cases of abuse and overuse) can lead to psychosis or paranoia. They can also lead to trouble with urination and muscle coordination.


Do the students that report "friendly" teachers perform better on standardized tests? I'll preface this by saying that I've been considering this question in light of the "Summer of Love" initiative and subsequent blog posts, which are looking at the extent to which comments are "friendly" on Stack Exchange.

Much of the impetus behind the movement is a commitment to treating new members better, and it's safe to assume that a majority of these new members are here for help in the process of learning something (e.g., programming, statistics, new software).  Comments can both set the tone while also being a means through which to deliver learning.

The actual Stack Exchange study is measuring the response of a third party to the comments made on the site, but, as more readily available system, I'd like to find out if a teacher who projects a "friendly" attitude positively affects the learning process.  Conversely, it's not ideal if a teacher uses "unorthodox" methods to motivate students (e.g., sarcasm), but controlling for all other factors, could these methods actually motivate some students to learn better?

While the analogy between educators, students, and Stack Exchange participants is far from perfect, is there support in the educational psychology literature for the notion that teachers reported by students as "friendlier" (on average) help those students achieve higher levels of performance on standardized tests and other evaluations?

I am answering this in parts, as an overview for issues relating to learning outcomes and perceived teacher friendliness.

To assist, I would categorise friendliness to mean encouragement and rapport (respect may or may not be correlated within this).

Firstly to address integrating theories of teaching and learning.

  Theories of learning and theories of teaching often originate and
  operate independently from one another. This article attempts to
  contribute to the integration of the two types of theories. First, the
  cognitive, affective and regulative activities students use to learn
  are analyzed. Next, different ways in which teachers can regulate the
  learning and thinking activities of students are discussed, as well as
  the teaching strategies they can use for that aim. The third part
  focuses on different ways in which student-regulation and
  teacher-regulation of learning act upon one another. Congruence and
  friction between these modes of control are discussed. From this
  interplay implications are derived for process-oriented teaching,
  aimed at promoting congruence and constructive friction, avoiding
  destructive friction and reducing the gap between learning and
  teaching. 1

Secondly a study that shows the  beneficial and cyclic effect of an encouraging teacher/student relationship. (note the reverse is true for students caught within a negative   cycle)

  On the basis of a new model of motivation, the authors examined the
  effects of 3 dimensions of teacher (n = 14) behavior (involvement,
  structure, and autonomy support) on 144 children's (Grades 3–5)
  behavioral and emotional engagement across a school year.
  Correlational and path analyses revealed that teacher involvement was
  central to children's experiences in the classroom and that teacher
  provision of both autonomy support and optimal structure predicted
  children's motivation across the school year. Reciprocal effects of
  student motivation on teacher behavior were also found. Students who
  showed higher initial behavioral engagement received subsequently more
  of all 3 teacher behaviors. These findings suggest that students who
  are behaviorally disengaged receive teacher responses that should
  further undermine their motivation. The importance of the
  student–teacher relationship, especially interpersonal involvement, in
  optimizing student motivation is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database
  Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved) 2

This study examines the effects of positive versus negative verbal reinforcement on different personality types. It would appear that not all people perform best within the cycle of "friendliness".

  However, there was a highly significant interaction between these
  variables; extraverts performed better under positive than negative
  reinforcement, whilst introverts performed better under negative than
  positive reinforcement. 3

Which brings me to my last point, which is that motivation appears to be improved by a balance between friendliness creating a tension within the classroom.  It also shows that both positive and negative reinforcement are necessary.

  Motivation
  • Set a feeling or tone for the lesson. Instructors should try to
  establish a friendly, open atmosphere  that shows the participants
  they will help them learn.
  • Set an appropriate level of concern. The
  level of tension must be adjusted to meet the level of  importance of
  the objective. If the material has a high level of importance, a
  higher level of  tension/stress should be established in the class.
  However, people learn best under low to moderate  stress; if the
  stress is too high, it becomes a barrier to learning.

  Reinforcement
  • Positive reinforcement is normally used by instructors who are
  teaching participants new skills. As  the name implies, positive
  reinforcement is "good" and reinforces "good" (or positive) behavior.
  • Negative reinforcement is the contingent removal of a noxious
  stimulus that tends to increase the  behavior. The contingent
  presentation of a noxious stimulus that tends to decrease a behavior
  is  called Punishment. Reinforcing a behavior will never lead to
  extinction of that behavior by  definition. Punishment and Time Out
  lead to extinction of a particular behavior, but positive or  negative
  reinforcement of that behavior never will 4

In conclusion
From the available studies, an underlying friendliness, which enables approachability b students, facilitates learning, but a certain level of discipline and the boundary creating an unequal relationship is also necessary. Suggesting that balance is the key and there are no hard and fast rules, as people have varying learning styles.

1 Congruence and friction between learning and teaching
Jan D Vermunt, Nico Verloop
Leiden University, ICLON — Graduate School of Education, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4752(98)00028-0, How to Cite or Link Using DOI
Permissions & Reprints

 2 Motivation in the classroom: Reciprocal effects of teacher behavior and student engagement across the school year.
Skinner, Ellen A.; Belmont, Michael J.
Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol 85(4), Dec 1993, 571-581. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.85.4.571

 3 Effects of positive and negative verbal reinforcement on performance as a function of extraversion-introversion: Some tests of Gray's theory
John Boddy, Annabel Carver, Kevin Rowley
Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, England
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(86)90111-X, How to Cite or Link Using DOI
Permissions & Reprints

 4 Carrie Ekey, Literacy Coaches Training, Feb. 2012  PRINCIPLES OF ADULT LEARNING By Stephen LiebSenior Technical Writer and Planner, Arizona Department of Health Servicesand part-time Instructor, South Mountain Community Collegefrom VISION, Fall 1991


How many samples are there when test subjects come through different recruitment strategies? Let's assume I want to conduct a survey. To find test subjects, I post an ad in a local newspaper, one on a locally relevant website, distribute flyers in front of the train station, and have managed to get one complete class from a local school to partake.

Due to the different recruitment methods, each will probably have drawn quite different samples from the population: the local newspaper is mostly read by older people with medium to high education; the institute website is mostly visited by students and researchers; the flyer is given to commuters; then there is that group of pupils, all of the same age and education level.

In my test, I ask my test subjects to specify how they knew of the test:

ad in newspaper
ad on website
flyer
they were tested in class

So I can group my data according to the recruitment method, if I want to.

Is this all one sample? Or have I drawn four samples?

And if this is one sample, how then do you draw two or more samples?

This depends on your research question, as well as the population you want to generalize your conclusions to.

If you care about whether complex sounds are easier to discriminate when they are longer, you can regard all the participants to be one sample because there is no theoretical reason to assume that people differ in this. In principle, the more universal the subject of your study is, the less you need to care about your sampling technique because any person should be as good as any other. In practice, the sample will likely be first year psychology students :)

But if you care about computer literacy or car ownership or attitudes towards standardized testing (i.e. if your question relates to individual differences or group differences), then clearly your samples are drawn from very different parts of the population. In that case you can say that you have drawn four samples. Or perhaps less - perhaps you drew two: people unlikely to have cars (school kids and train takers) and people likely to have cars (American newspaper readers and internet users). This is not the best example but you can see the logic.


How to look for correlations between heart rate and eda I am looking for some advice on how to take heart rate (HR) and electro-dermal activity (EDA) data files collected via an Empatica e4 and look for correlation between them.

My research project is looking at emotional responses to artworks in museums. I have individual participant data and what I am finding is that when visualised simply some emotional responses provoke EDA and other HR. What I would like to do is run an analysis to show whether there is a relationship between the two. I suspect not, and that this might be a pointless exercise, but it's something I want to have in my back pocket when questioned about these relationships and to use to defend my approach.

Has any one else done this, and if so, what was the best way?

HRV measures

Measures of heart-rate variability (HRV) are primarily calculated with the Inter-beat interval (IBI), also referred to as RR-intervals or NN-intervals (see this question). Some variables in the time domain are :

SDNN/SDANN
NN50 / pNN50
SDSD
rMSSD

And many more (see also the rHRV tutorial, which also describes frequency-domain measures).

EDA measures

Electrodermal activity can be quantified by calculating the galvanic skin level (GSL) or the galvanic skin responses (GSR; see also this question; Bouscein (2012)).
GSL is a slow drifting tonic level of conductivity, whereas GSR are spikes in activity after some events. You can quantify these values by determining the average amplitude of the GSL/GSR’s within a specific time period, or calculating the amount of GSR’s.

Correlations

When you have acquired the variables you can start calculating correlations. You do have to ensure that the time intervals of these variables are the same. E.g. the average values of each variable are calculated over five-second windows. In turn, each five-second period can be considered as a data point.

Here are some results I found in a pilot-study I performed with two participants. Because of the little amount of data, not every correlation may be what you expect. pNN50, SDNN, LFHF, LF and HF are the HRV data. numGSR (amount of spikes), eda_p_filt (mean amplitude of GSR spikes) and eda_t (tonic skin activity) are the electrodermal-activity measures. The IWS is a subjective measure of workload (Kramer, Johnson and Zeilstra, 2016),

References

Bouscein, W., Roth, W. T., Dawson, M. E., & Filion, D. L. (2012). Publication recommendations for electrodermal measurements. Psychophysiology, 49, 1017-1034.

Garcıa, C. A., Otero, A., Vila, X., Méndez, A., Rodrıguez-Linares, L., & Lado, M. J. (2013). Getting started with RHRV.

Kramer, R., Johnson, A., & Zeilstra, M. P. (2016). The Integrated Workload Scale–Translation and validation of a subjective workload scale. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit.

What is the difference between RR-intervals and NN-intervals in HRV-data?

Open-source software for analyzing Electrodermal activity


Why do people bite their nails even when they do not want to? Why do people bite their nails? People seem to be doing it primarily while contemplating something, or during problem-solving tasks. They seem to understand it is a bad habit, and sometimes they seem to try to active avoid it, but keep on doing it nonetheless so it seems. Why does this happen?

Nail-biting is considered a parafunctional habit. A parafunctional habit is the habitual exercise of a body part in a way that isn't the way that that part was intended to be used. Other common parafunctional habits include bruxism (grinding of teeth), hair-pulling, and picking at skin.

Nobody knows what causes these habits. Possible physical or psychological causes may include emotions (aggression, anxiety, stress, tension), hyperactivity, complications from other disorders (such as obsessive-compulsive disorder), or as a coping or focus mechanism, similar to how babies and young children find it soothing to suck on their thumbs.


How much overlap should I expect between Medline and PsycINFO? I'm currently conducting a set of broad searches in both Medline and PsycINFO. However, when importing the results into my reference manager, I'm surprised of how little overlap there is between these two databases. That is, when importing a couple of thousand references from each database, both set of results retrieved using the exact same search terms, there's only a handful of duplicates (I'm using a fairly unrestrictive duplicate finding algorithm in EndNote, only looking at year and title of the article and ignoring punctation and spaces). This is, for example, the case if I search for (memory AND sex) and restrict the results to studies with human subjects.

Unfortunately, I'm not sure there's a quick answer to the exact amount of overlap, but you may be able to get an estimate by comparing the list of journals included in Medline (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/archive/20130415/tsd/serials/lji.html.notice.html) to the list of journals covered by PsycINFO (http://www.apa.org/pubs/databases/psycinfo/coverage.aspx). Also, keep in mind that each database has it's own thesaurus and preferred search terms, and the terms you're using might pull up different results in different databases. You may be able to optimize your results by using search terms specific to each database.


Can rationalization be objectively recognized? In psychology and logic, rationalization or rationalisation (also known as making excuses[1]) is a defense mechanism in which controversial behaviors or feelings are justified and explained in a seemingly rational or logical manner to avoid the true explanation, and are made consciously tolerable – or even admirable and superior – by plausible means.[2] It is also an informal fallacy of reasoning.[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalization_%28psychology%29

Is it possible to objectively recognize that someone is rationalizing?

Is it possible to make an individual realize that s\he is rationalizing when it happens?

Is it possible to assess an individual's tendency to rationalize?

Research:
Rationalization is a defence mechanism - a Freudian (read: outdated) construct that is still in common use in clinical psychology, but no longer used much in research, so current studies about such mechanisms are hard to come by.
To some degree, rationalization has been superseded by cognitive dissonance, and related self-perception theory.  This is a more general theory about rationalizing that includes normal, healthy ways of dealing with internal conflict, as well as pathological forms.  However, this line of research has focused mostly on theorized unconscious rationalizing, rather than verbal explanations provided by subjects.  There are many other lines of research into verbalized non-pathological rationalizing, which is very common.
Therapy:
In modern cognitive therapies, the concept of cognitive distortions generally supersedes rationalization.  Clinicians are specially trained to detect many varieties of cognitive distortion in patients, including minimisation, intellectualization, and sour grapes.  In general, the idea is to look for inconsistencies or contradictions in the patient's descriptions of their thinking.  For example, a patient might say: "Cheating on my spouse was a desperate call for attention."  That might sound logical at first blush, but then why hide it?  Or why not choose a healthier way to get attention?
Confronting patients with inconsistencies in their thinking is a common part of several traditions of therapy.  One of the hallmarks of many personality disorders is patients' inability to recognize or failure to admit to the inconsistencies in their thinking.  For most patients without symptoms of a personality disorder however, it is expected that they should confront, recognize, accept, and ultimately find healthier alternatives to their maladaptive distortions.


Are emotions needed to make decisions? Oprah.com says:

  It turns out, though, that for most people there is no such thing as a purely rational self. Decision making is intrinsically linked to our emotions, so much so that when a person suffers damage to her orbitofrontal cortex—a part of the brain just behind the eyes that's strongly involved in processing emotions—she can lose her decision-making ability entirely. (We're talking any decision, like which day to schedule a doctor's appointment or whether to use a blue or black pen.) "If it weren't for our emotions," says science writer Jonah Lehrer, author of How We Decide, "reason wouldn't exist at all."

Is this really so? Lab experiments on humans on this would certainly be unethical, so I suspect Lehrer might be talking about some nature-did-the-experiment-for-us case (Phineas Gage style). Is anyone familiar with the details, e.g. from Lehrer's book or elsewhere?

Phineas Gage style indeed (is that a precursor to Gangnam style?) - ironically (referring to one large iron rod), Phineas Gage's accident is believed to have entirely removed his OFC, as well as parts of his PFC.  Though Gage likely suffered some mental changes, his recovery was a far cry from any sweeping "lose his decision-making ability entirely" diagnosis, even with injuries more extensive than just the OFC, so I think we can safely rule out the statement above without resorting to unethical experimentation.

This misconception may have originated with Antonio Damasio:

  Antonio Damasio, in support of his somatic marker hypothesis (relating
  decision-making to emotions and their biological underpinnings), draws
  parallels between behaviors he ascribes to Gage and those of modern
  patients with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. But
  Damasio's depiction of Gage has been severely criticized ...

In neuroscience, this type of error is called a "reverse inference".  For example, if we find that a particular region of the brain is active when subjects experience an "emotion", we can't then conclude that it always means subjects are experiencing that "emotion" when it is active.  That brain region may have other functions besides that emotion, many other brain regions may be involved in experiencing that emotion, and different regions may be involved in different contexts.

Furthermore, in modern emotion traditions, the distinction between emotion and cognition in general tends to be blurry, to the extent that some popular emotion models argue that the two cannot feasibly be separated.  In other words, depending on your preferred model, "emotion" may refer to all cognition (the entire brain), so the answer to your question would be ... yes?

Note: I don't know anything about Jonah Lehrer's book, but Wikipedia says:

  On March 1, 2013, following revelations that Lehrer has been caught in
  numerous falsifications in his œuvre of writings, Houghton Mifflin
  Harcourt announced the book was taken "off sale" after an internal
  review.


Are there animals with only excitatory neurons? Are there animals with only excitatory neurons?

I am not sure it is possible.

Also, maybe excitation/inhibition can become relative?

I however will be happy to read your opinion..

For example, are there animals with only glutamatergic neurons?

Thanks

Not in any well-studied animal; for example, C. elegans certainly has both excitatory and inhibitory neurons. Even in animals with very simple and poorly understood nervous systems (for example, jellyfish) there are certainly inhibitory and excitatory neurotransmitters used, even though one could argue whether their nervous tissue cells are all that similar to neurons of more organized animals.

More broadly speaking, I think it is non-controversial to state that "excitatory" versus "inhibitory" communication between cells predates the development of nervous systems themselves.

Note that neurotransmitters used vary across species, so although glutamate is a common excitatory neurotransmitter in vertebrates, that does not mean glutamate is a common excitatory neurotransmitter in other animals.

Bargmann, C. I. (1998). Neurobiology of the Caenorhabditis elegans genome. Science, 282(5396), 2028-2033.

Martin, S. M., & Spencer, A. N. (1983). Neurotransmitters in coelenterates. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part C: Comparative Pharmacology, 74(1), 1-14.

Kass-Simon, G., & Pierobon, P. (2007). Cnidarian chemical neurotransmission, an updated overview. Comparative Biochemistry and Physiology Part A: Molecular & Integrative Physiology, 146(1), 9-25.


What's the relation between BCM and Oja's learning rule? A software I'm using has implemented two unsupervised learning algorithms, Oja's and Bienenstock, Cooper, Munro's (BCM) learning rule. I understand that they are two very different algorithms for adjusting a neuron's connection weight, but I was wondering what is the relation between them. Do they both have the same plausibility? Can they be used together or are they mutually exclusive?

Although the effects of BCM and Oja's learning rule have been explored superficially in a computational manner in the context of the NEF, judging from the results (which I've reproduced below) it isn't clear to me if they can/should be combined in any meaningful way.

The best hypothesis that I can come up with is BCM forces the ensemble to be either "ON" or "OFF" by minimising transitory states, while Oja provides limits to how much the connection weights can change. So in a way, Oja provides bounds to BCM? Further investigation is needed.