CBT (or something similar): can it be used without a therapist? Can one apply CBT without a therapist?Or is there something similar that can be used without anyone's help? Is there any danger in using it without anyone's help?

There is some research into the efficacy of self-help versus therapy. Usually these studies find that self-help is less effective or not effective at all (e.g. Ehlers et al., 2003, to give just one example), although the relative effectiveness depends on the type and severity of disorders. For example, fear of flying is probably easier to self-treat than a personality disorder like antisocial behavior. The problem with this research in the context of your question is, that the self-help in these studies does not consist in handing out CBT manuals to the patients, but "self-help booklets", and that of course these are limited in content when compared to the full knowledge of a therapist. So to answer your question, I will assume that the "patient" in question knows as much about CBT as any therapist would. Because that would be the prerequisite to applying CBT to him- or herself.

In my opinion there are several problems with self-therapy:

The first step in any therapy is a careful diagnosis. You want to know what your problem is, before you start working on something that you don't suffer from. E.g. you might think that you have a depression, when in truth you are suffering from something that also has depressive symptoms, e.g. social phobia or an eating disorder. Diagnostics is a science of its own and psychologists spend quite some time during their education to learn it. I don't think a layperson can reliably diagnose a psychological problem.
Even if you are an educated psychologist yourself, an honest self-diagnosis might be impossible. Most people – and psychologists are just normal people in this – don't perceive themselves clearly, but are influenced by shame or misconceptions. A typical example is an eating disorder: the whole problem with most eating disorders is that the patients are unable to understand that they have a completely faulty image of themselves. They believe they are overwheight, while they are in fact completely normal or even underwheight. Such a person would never diagnose herself with an eating disorder. Most other mental disorders are the same: the concerned persons don't perceive their problems as problems, or not accurately.
Let's assume you have an accurate diagnosis. Maybe a psychologists diagnosed you, or you are uncommonly objective in your self-assessment (although most likely you fool yourself here, but let's just assume you know what you have). There is the problem that even therapists don't usually know what a patient has at the beginning of a therapy, or not definitely or completely. Their diagnoses are given provisionally, and adapted to new insights they may gain during therapy.
Okay, but let's assume you really, really know what your problem is. Couldn't you help yourself? To answer that, we must understand what a psychological disorder is. There is this model that thinks of all human behavior, normal as well as deviant, as an adaptation to a certain surrounding. You are being abused by your parents, and you develop dissociation to deal with it. This strategy of survival persists even after the situation that caused it no longer exists, because it was a successful strategy and because either it still works (to some degree) or you find yourself unable to unlearn it. There is something inside yourself that keeps you applying the same solutions to the same problems over and over again, even though other solutions would be better. There might be an underlying fear, or simply a deeply ingrained learning, whatever it is, you will find yourself faced with a very strong inner resistance against changing your behavior. What the therapist does is he adapts the therapeutic strategy to your resistance. He observes how you react to the therapy and finds just the right amount of therapy to slip in under your resistance. He finds the kind of things you find yourself able to do. And he offers his emotional support. In a therapy you are not alone, there is someone you can fall back to, someone who understands, accepts and appreciates you as you are, and at the same time supports your attempts at change. It is more than just doing gymnastics exercises blindly each morning. If CBT was only a number of exercises, there would be no therapists, only researchers that published these books with exercises. But these exercises lack adaptability and the human interaction that breaks your resistance to change.
Okay, but what if I know my problem and I'm not self-delusional and I'm really able to deal with my inner resistance? Well, chances are that you don't have a psychological disorder anyway. If your fears and habits don't keep you from dealing with your problems, then you don't have problems. Or only because you don't suffer enough from them to take care of them.

All disorders show a certain percentage of what is called "spontaneous remissions": the problems disappear without therapy. I'm pretty sure that in some of these cases the persons dealt with their problems themselves in some way. They got over it. Not everyone remains hampered for life after child abuse. Some people look at that experience, limit it to the people who abused them, and have normal and healthy relationships with everyone else. Somehow some people get out of their disorders after some period of "darkness" and are able to lead a normal happy life without the help of a therapist. Probably reading a CBT manual and applying some of the insight to one's own life will help some people make a change on their own, and it very likely won't hurt any of the others, but most likely it was something in that person, a certain resilience, or something in their surroundings, like the support of friends or familiy members, or a fundamental outside change, like moving to a new city, that effected this self-healing, not a CBT manual.

Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Hackmann, A., McManus, F., Fennell, M., Herbert, C., & Mayou, R. (2003). A randomized controlled trial of cognitive therapy, a self-help booklet, and repeated assessments as early interventions for posttraumatic stress disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60(10), 1024-1032.


Can drugs support emotional developement in personality disorders? Some personality disorders are associated with a degree of emotional blindness or coldness with narcissistic PD being such an example. I wonder whether there are drugs that - in addition to psychotherapy - aid in the process of learning to feel, express and cope with emotions.

Particularly, I wonder if antidepressants might be effective in this task. Serotonin ADs help to handle anxiety and depression and taken long-term might even heal things like social anxiety and generalized anxiety. Depression is also linked to somewhat reduced brain activity. The same holds for norepinephrine. Dopamine antagonists are also said to support the feelings of pleasure and motivation. The question is if these effects are permanent or tend to disappear or worsen upon discontinuation.

Moreover, some ADs are believed to induce "emotional flatness" which would possibly hinder the process of healing through psychotherapy.

  It is known that SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor)
  antidepressants, after taken for a while or taken one after another
  (if the doctor is trying to see what works), can cause what is called
  "emotional blunting". In this instance, the individual in question is
  often unable to cry, even if he or she wants to. In other cases, the
  person may seem fully present but operate merely intellectually when
  emotional connection would be appropriate. This may present an extreme
  difficulty in giving or receiving empathy and can be related to the
  spectrum of narcissistic personality disorder.[1]

As far as I know the amygdala is the part of the brain responsible for handling emotions. My question is if there are drugs that directly stimulate neuronal growth in amygdala to improve emotional processing.

[1] Johnson, Stephen M (1987), Humanizing the Narcissistic Style, NY: Norton and Co., p. 125, ISBN 0-393-70037-2

This question is a bit broad. The main reason it can be easily answered is that the answer is mostly no. According to a 2016 recent review:

for cluster A personality disorders, which among other things feature low empathy and social aversion there's not a lot going on regarding pharmacotherapy:

  Patients with schizotypal personality disorder have been analyzed in few small open-label studies using typical and atypical antipsychotics. There are no randomized controlled trials for patients with schizoid or paranoid personality disorder, and there is not a robust evidence about the efficacy of psychoactive drugs in these patients.

for cluster B (which include narcissistic and borderline PD) there is more pharmacotherapy in practice, in particular for the latter:

  Antidepressants, anxiolytics, antipsychotics, and mood stabilizers are used by a significantly higher percentage of borderline patients than other people with personality disorders [...] Cochrane review found that second-generation antipsychotics, mood stabilizers, and dietary supplementation with omega-3 fatty acids have some beneficial effects in these patients, while antidepressants may be helpful when comorbid conditions are present.

They don't say anything about narcissistic PD, so my guess is pharmacotherapy is not much of much help there.

for cluster C (which includes avoidant and obsessive-compulsive) they also note briefly that

  There are no randomized controlled trials of drug treatment for cluster C personality disorders, although it can be argued that antidepressants might be of some help. Particularly, in patients with obsessive–compulsive personality disorder, use of SSRIs may be helpful, especially if anxiety is present


Short term memory and an effective learning strategy What is the most efficient method learning multiple academic topics in parallel with each other. I propose, for a small number of different things (say 4), the best method is to cycle the topics, over the course of 4 days, i.e. topic 1,2,3,4,1... on days 1,2,3,4,5... respectively and working full days on each topic.

I am just wondering in terms of cognitive effectiveness is this the best strategy? Would changing up the topic every half day be more effective? I would tend to think that switching every half day could improve brains ability to work (reduced 'boredom') but maybe as the 2 topics would be inherently different it could hinder information retention for the first subject.

Does anyone know of any studies done which could relate to this or have any ideas themselves?

By one of Tony Buzone's memory book, I would say the right way is to memorize a topic/data, then do a 10 minute break. After 10 minutes, repeat it again. Then, Repeat it the next day, the next month and then the next half a year. That should put the topic in your memory in the long term.

However, it also depends on what kind of data there is in each topic. If the data is too similar with each topic, it will be too hard to memorize all topics at once without being confused and without mixing up facts. Other factors that you didnt mention are the volume of material in each topic.

Lastly, order of topics is not important. You may reverse the order of the topics to devote your mental effort to the hardest topic as being hte first...


Desire to climb from evolutionary perspective? When I go near a hill or dune, I feel desire to climb there and have a wider look on the surroundings. I know a lot of people who love mountains and want to climb higher and higher, but never have thought about why... Many people climb high building, restaurants on TV towers are very expensive, but very popular anyway.

I've recently started to think about it. From evolutionary point of view taking higher ground have made a lot of sense. Predators could be seen from larger distance, and in the era of fighting communities, higher grounds such as hills were higher to conquer.

But is such theory scientifically proven? Are there actually any researches on why people want actually to climb higher?

It's an interesting question, I imagine the desire is multifaceted and that it may reflect multiple desires and multiple activities. In particular, I'd distinguish between (a) the desire for a viewing experience and (b) the desire to get to the top and achieve goals.

Desire to Climb

There are many examples of people taking joy in climbing.
This can be seen for example in rock climbing, mountain climbing, and hiking.

Obvious motivations include  motivation for exercise and a desire to experience nature. Some mountain climbers are seeking thrills (see sensation seeking). Some studies of mountain climbing mention the flow inducing nature of mountain climbing (see MacAloon et al 1983 for an analysis).

Climbing in such cases also has a rather natural goal of reaching the top. Attaining goals can be satisfying (see goal theory for further elaboration). And clear goals may be part of the enjoyment in various related activities such as in sports and games.

Part of these activities is that the process of reaching the top is often a big part of the pleasure independent of the pleasure of the final view.

Desire for a view

There is another broad class of behaviour related to people's desire for a "good view". Houses, apartments, offices, restaurants, and so on with better views are valued by people. Viewing platforms are popular tourist attractions.

Benson et al (1998) provide an empirical analysis of the price added to real estate that is attributable to various view types and quality of views. In their analysis they found that high quality ocean front views added some of the most to house prices.

I imagine a distinction could also be made between people's desire for a once off experience and a daily experience. There is a novelty associated with a viewing platform whereby for that moment you get to see the world from a different perspective. You get to see connections between streets and buildings or mountains and rivers that you otherwise miss when immersed at regular ground level. I wonder whether this desire for a novel experience is somewhat different to a desire for a pleasant view on a daily basis.

Reflections on evolutionary psychology

I'm always a little bit uncomfortable with evolutionary psychology arguments. They often have a "just so" feel about them where it is difficult to prove or disprove them.

For example, I could make up an evolutionary argument. Human ancestors presumably climbed trees and liked to survey the land. Places which provided a good overview of the surrounding land enabled greater identification of both potential benefits (e.g., food, drinking resources, mating opportunities) and threats (e.g., other tribes, predators, scarcity of food and water). Such places would also provide further information on impending weather. Thus, humans and ancestors may have been more likely to survive and reproduce if they experienced pleasure in such circumstances.

However, the above evolutionary argument could also be complete rubbish. The desire to experience a view may be connected to many other rational explanations. Or alternatively, you could look at the nature of aesthetics and how they map on to the beauty of a view.

For further discussion of evolutionary psychology and aesthetics see here

References

MacAloon, J., Csikszentmihalyi, M., Harris, J. C., & Park, R. J. (1983). Deep play and the flow experience in rock climbing. Play, games and sports in cultural contexts., 361-384.
Benson, E. D., Hansen, J. L., Schwartz, Jr, A. L., & Smersh, G. T. (1998). Pricing residential amenities: the value of a view. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 16(1), 55-73.


What are there neuroanatomical mappings of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task? I know that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is used to diagnose various mental disfunctions such as schizophrenia and drug addiction. However, has it been specified what brain regions or structures are being evaluated and how?

According to Wikipedia:

  As predicted by the acquired brain injury literature, early PET
  studies have shown the task involves significant activation of the
  dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, more recent fMRI studies have
  shown that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex together with the
  caudate nucleus may be the regions most important for the set-shifting
  process required in the WCST. These regions are also associated with
  working memory functions.

Furthermore, according to Andrew Amos preservative errors are due to frontal lobe dysfunction, while random errors are due to basal ganglia dysfunction.

At a glance, this does seem to make sense since the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been associated previously with working memory and the caudate nucleus (as part of the basal ganglia) is known to be associated with switching between rewarding tasks.

More recently a series of lesion studies have been conducted with an analogous task with monkeys providing further insights into brain areas, with a summary of the most important summaries here.


How does the frequency of a visual stimulus affect the steady-state visually evoked potential? I want to make a project for EEG signal processing, and in my research I found the concept of SSVEP, which means that if you have a stimulus with low frequency applied to the eye, the electrical activity (measured via EEG) of the brain will change.

My question is whether is it known how the electric activity of brain will change? And a second thing, does it mean that each frequency applied the eye has a fixed reaction for the brain?

The steady state response is a sustained oscillatory response to a stimulus that is varying in strength with some regularity. But it is not a true oscillation, it's closer to an ERP in nature: it is a stimulus-driven response to variations in the stimulation.

In auditory processing, which I am familiar with, people take a tone and then add an amplitude modulation to it. This means that the sound level increases and decreases regularly at a certain frequency. Increases and decreases in neural stimulation are clearly visible in the brain, so if you average the frequency decomposition of your signal over all trials, you get a response at the frequency of the amplitude modulation. If you then manage to change something about this frequency response (e.g. the power) over different experimental manipulations, then most likely you've found some true top-down effect.

In vision I assume it would be similar if you flicker a picture: the stimulation will increase and decrease regularly and you should get a response at the frequency of the flicker. I haven't got a clue what would happen if you would split the frequency rate for the two eyes though.

One thing that mystifies me is that in audition, the steady-state response is particularly well picked up if the amplitude modulation is around 20 or 40 Hz. I have no idea why this is. I also don't really understand what the advantages are over just recording brain activity and looking at the ERP. With the steady-state response, you're in danger of covering up genuinely interesting oscillatory activity with the frequency of the flicker. Also, I'd expect that you'd also pick up a flicker that matches the frequency of the refresh rate of your display. I don't know how that would influence the steady state response (we don't have that problem in audition).


in R : How to check RT's for ex-gaussian fit with the fitdistrplus package I have several response times from participants in a mental rotation task.
I'm really puzzled how to get the best distribution model to fit my data. I had checked several ones with the fitdistrplus::fitdist function and have two good candidates (log-normal & gamma).

I would like to check for an ex-gaussian distribution fit (GAMLSS package), but the fitdist function ask for "start" parameters and I have no idea how to get them: any help would be much appreciated.

To answer the question relating to start values for the parameters for use with fitdist:

  I would like to check for an ex-gaussian distribution fit (GAMLSS package), but the fitdist function ask for "start" parameters and I have no idea how to get them: any help would be much appreciated.

Where possible, knowledge of the behavior of similar reaction times can be used. This might be particularly helpful when the sample skewness (see below) is not suitable for obtaining starting values, since skewness in particular might be anticipated to reasonably similar across different but related circumstances.

As Jeromy says, start values generally just need to be rough ballpark estimates, so if you have some experience of fits you may be able to supply suitable guesses. But if you don't have any suitable idea, there's still something you can do.

The Wikipedia page on the ExGaussian distribution offers some possibilities.

Firstly, it gives method-of-moments-related estimators based on the sample mean, variance and skewness (labelled $m, s^2$, and $\gamma_1$ there):

$${\displaystyle {\hat {\mu }}=m-s\left({\frac {\gamma _{1}}{2}}\right)^{1/3},}$$

$${\displaystyle {\hat {\sigma }^{2}}=s^{2}\left[1-\left({\frac {\gamma _{1}}{2}}\right)^{2/3}\right],}$$

$${\displaystyle {\hat {\tau }}=s\left({\frac {\gamma _{1}}{2}}\right)^{1/3}.}$$

The main thing to note there is that the $\tau$ (scale) parameter there is the same as the $\nu$ parameter in the GAMLSS function exGAUS (and is the inverse of the $\lambda$ rate-parameter in the definition of the distribution at the top of the Wikipedia article). The easy way to do this is by starting with $\hat{\tau}$:

$${\displaystyle {\hat {\tau }}=s\left({\frac {\gamma _{1}}{2}}\right)^{1/3}.}$$

then

$$ \hat {\mu }=m-\hat{\tau}$$

$$\hat {\sigma}^{2}=s^{2}-\hat{\tau}^2\,.$$

However, you need to be careful that you don't end up with implausible values for the parameters which might happen if the sample skewness were negative (leading to an impossible value for $\tau$) or if the sample skewness were very large (perhaps leading to issues with the other two parameters, such as a negative variance) -- this must be checked.

On the other hand problems here should also be seen as a warning; if those things happen with the method of moments, there's strong potential for the likelihood function to not behave nicely as well.

The article also mentions the range of the nonparametric skew (a skewness measure based on the second Pearson skewness), which relates the mean, median and standard deviation. This might be used in place of the moment-skewness (with some suitable modification) to obtain an estimate of the scale parameter of the exponential component.

An alternative would be to look at quantile-matching  (such as a calculation based on a high, low and middling quantile) or at estimates from quantile-based measures of location, scale and skewness, but the quantiles are not in general simple functions of the parameters; the existence of quantile and cdf functions in GAMLSS make this potentially viable as a strategy, however. This would be more complex but more likely to lead to feasible values of the parameters, at least in the case where the skewness is very large.

The notion of finding a "best" distribution -- and in particular searching for one with a given set of data -- is not especially useful. No simple distribution will be a perfect fit (no simple model will be exactly correct). Models are useful representations rather than perfect descriptions. If one has a simple model which usually fits fairly well and has some theoretical basis by which its parameters and relationships between distributions based on different estimates can be understood, that's a good reason to use it. We should not be overly concerned about a "best" model for a particular data set so much as an adequate model across a variety of data of similar kinds.

In relation to the title -- fitdist (from package fitdistrplus, or fitdistr in MASS) will give parameter estimates for a fitted distribution but doesn't really tell you whether the fit is good enough for some particular purpose or other (i.e. it doesn't really check the quality of the fit in a practical sense).


Can a mother's untimely death lead to misogyny? Many years ago, in an undergraduate psychology class, we were discussing misogyny, and my professor told us that there was a significantly high number of misogynists who had lost their mothers (specifically that they had died) in their mid to late teens.  He said it was because the teen were angry at their mothers for leaving them, but were unable to process or express what they were feeling, so the anger was redirected into an anger towards all women.

I have tried to find some mention of this theory elsewhere, but cannot seem to formulate the right Google search phrase.  Is this a theory that still has merit, or has it been disproven?  If it is a valid belief, can someone direct me to a book or online documentation which discusses it?

The answer to this question lies within theories I covered in an answer to another question, developed by Sigmund Freud and Erik Erikson.

Looking at the theories of life-span human development — Sigmund Freud's Drive Theory and Stages of Development, and Erik Erikson’s 9 life stages of man (Erikson & Erikson, 1998) — the theory you hypothesised comes from 2 Freudian stages called the Latency stage and Genital statge, and Erikson's industry vs inferiority stage and identity vs role confusion stage (which later also included a 3rd Erikson stage called intimacy vs isolation stage through splitting the identity vs role confusion stage in 2 parts).

These stages need to be "resolved" in order to move forward in life, and with Freud's Latency Stage or Erikson's industry vs inferiority stage, the child moves from extremely rigid attachments with their parents, directing his or her energies towards socially acceptable activities such as schooling, friendships, hobbies, etc. aiming for partial independence from the parents; whilst Freud's Genital Stage or Erikson's identity vs role confusion stage and intimacy vs isolation stage, psychological detachment and full independence from the parents is the aim.

If these dependencies are not properly dealt with due to death or divorce and separations, is is not implausible to say that misogyny will develop in boys or girls in anger towards their mother or misandry will develop in boys or girls in anger towards their father.

References and Further Reading

Erikson, E. H. & Erikson, J. M., 1998. The Life Cycle Completed. New York: W.W. Norton.

Miller, P. H., 2010. Theories of developmental psychology. New York: Worth.

Roche, D., 2009. Mapping the Human Phenome. [Online]
Available at: http://thewayitis.info/thewayitis/inhumandev/epigenetics/mapphenome/p71.html
[Accessed 16 March 2017].

Sigelman, C. K. & Rider, E. A., 2012. Life-Span Human Development. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Freud Museum London, n.d. Are Freud's Theories All About Sex?. [Online]
Available at: https://www.freud.org.uk/education/topic/10567/subtopic/10571/
[Accessed 16 March 2017]

Further note on reading materials

I have been told that a book called Why Men Hate Women by Adam Jukes is a good book on the wider subject of misogyny, but I haven't read it so I cannot attest to it's value.  There is a review on the book within The Independent (1993)


Effects of treatment versus psychotherapy on mental health of transgender people Has any reliable study been done to compare mental health (e.g. depression or suicide rate) of transgender people before and after procedures (hormone or surgery) intended to change their bodies to have characteristics that match their gender identity compared with psychological therapy intended to try and make them more comfortable with their biological sex?

I have heard some people claim that John's Hopkins used to perform sex-change procedures but stopped after failing to find it benefiting the mental health of those who they were performed on. But I have also heard people claim that these treatments really do cause a practical improvement in the mental health of transgender people. I'm not sure who, if either side or both, to trust.

Please avoid political discussion or debate on whether a transgender person can actually switch sexes or if it's a delusional disorder, even if your opinion on that might inform what you think the proper way of treating transgender people is. I'm just curious about reliable data on the psychological effects of the alternatives.

Johns Hopkins did stop doing gender reassignment surgery and one of their psychiatrists apparently says that

  The suicide rate among transgendered people who had the surgery is 20 times higher

He also apparently says that

  transgenderism is a “mental disorder” that merits treatment, that sex change is “biologically impossible,” and that people who promote sexual reassignment surgery are collaborating with and promoting a mental disorder.

According to this website, the Johns Hopkins psychiatrist involved has a history of speaking out against transgendered people.

On the flip side, the DSM-5 (5th Edition of the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual) in 2013 added Gender Dysphoria as the new term for Gender Identity Disorder in order to try and prevent stigma; and current case reports offer no evidence that psychotherapy offers total and long-standing change of gender dysphoria.


Is "gaslighting" a mainstream concept in the cognitive sciences? The term "gaslighting" (referring to abusive manipulation of the facts to confuse victims) is common in pop-psychology sources, and I have friends who report that their psychologists or psychiatrists use the term as some form of shorthand.

However, I have looked in a couple of online psychology dictionaries, and they don't define the term.

I have looked on this site, and it only appears once.

I have looked on Google Scholar. While I can find some references to the term - especially a "seminal" 1981 paper, Some clinical consequences of introjection: gaslighting, there don't appear to be many papers referencing it, and I haven't the experience to evaluate whether they are fringe ideas or mainstream science.

Is gaslighting just pop psychology, or is the concept of gaslighting widely accepted in the cognitive sciences?

The wikipedia article you linked to regarding the term Gaslighting has references to clinical and research literature.

Dorpat, (1996) talks about the incidences of Gaslighting conducted by therapists.

  In treatment, the psychotherapist is in a position of power. Often, this power is unintentionally abused. While trying to embody a compassionate concern for patients, therapists use accepted techniques that can inadvertently lead to control, indoctrination, and therapeutic failure. Contrary to the stated tradition and values of psychotherapy, they subtly coerce patients rather than respect and genuinely help them. The more gross kinds of patient abuse, deliberate ones such as sexual and financial exploitation, are expressly forbidden by professional organizations. However, there are no regulations discouraging the more covert forms of manipulation, which are not even considered exploitative by many clinicians.

Jacobson & Gottman, (1998) talks about wife batterers.

  After their decade of research with more than 200 couples, the authors conclude that not all batterers are alike, nor is the progression of their violence always predictable. But they have found that batterers tend to fall into one of two categories, which they call "Pit Bulls" and "Cobras". Pit Bulls, men whose emotions quickly boil over, are driven by deep insecurity and an unhealthy dependence on the mates whom they abuse. Pit Bulls also tend to become stalkers, unable to let go of relationships that have ended.

  Cobras, on the other hand, are cool and methodical as they inflict pain and humiliation on their spouses or lovers (Source: Google Books synopsis)

In the book, it says

  A tactic of emotional abuse that is common among Pit Bulls, but not Cobras, is the phenomenon known as "gaslighting."  (The term comes from the film Gaslight, in which Charles Boyer convinces Ingrid Bergman that she is going insane.)  We gave an example of this phenomenon with Dave and Judy, in which he blatantly denied that he was a batterer.  Gaslighting is a systematic attach on the wife's perception of reality.

The term has been used in articles I have read within the last few months including one by Christine Louis de Canonville (2017) who has a B.A. (Hons.) degree in Psychology, and Sarkis (2017) within PsychologyToday.

If you search Google Scholar, the site will return thousands of results including articles in therapy journals, so the concept of gaslighting is widely accepted in the cognitive sciences.

References

Dorpat, T. L. (1996). Gaslighting, the Double Whammy, Interrogation, and Other Methods of Covert Control in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. New York:Jason AronsonISBN-10: 1-5682-1828-1ISBN-13: 978-1-5682-1828-1

Jacobson, N. S. & Gottman, J. M. (1998). When Men Batter Women: New Insights into Ending Abusive Relationships. New York:Simon and SchusterISBN-10: 1-4165-5133-6ISBN-13: 978-1-4165-5133-1

Louis de Canonville, C. (2017). The Effects of Gaslighting on Victims of Narcissistic Abuse [Online]Available at: http://narcissisticbehavior.net/the-effects-of-gaslighting-in-narcissistic-victim-syndrome/

Sarkis, S. (2017) Are Gaslighters Aware of What They Do? [Online]Available at:https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/here-there-and-everywhere/201701/are-gaslighters-aware-what-they-do


What is the psychology behind addictive video games? Is the psychology the same as in casino games? where the person is addicted because winning is so unpredictable?

Are RPG games addictive by Gestalt theory, where players mind likes to see things organized and being whole and completed as opposed to being fractioned and incomplete?

People play games for different reasons - check out the Bartle test which describes some motivations behind actions in games, particularly multiplayer RPGs.

I've written an ebook on video game addiction, and will attempt to illustrate factors that contribute to a game being "addictive".

There are a few types of most addictive video games

Massively Multiplayer Role Playing Games (MMORPG like World of Warcraft)
Competitive shooters. (like Call of Duty or World of Tanks)
"Build and steal" strategy games (like Clash of Clans)
Purely social/achievement driven games (like FarmVille)

For example World of Warcraft, has been described as a "theme park MMORPG" - playera can do a variety of activities and if they get bored, they can do something else. The social component is a big part of a person wanting to return to this kind of games.

Then there are shooter games that are played in short matches, for example World of Tanks, War Thunder. Games like these depend on persistent RPG character progression to artificially create inequality among players. For example in a 32 player tank you can be driving the weakest tank, pretty much being prey for everyone else. This creates a feeling of "this is unfair!"

Part of the addictive nature of these games is that player is forced to "grind" - play the game over and over again, frequently without any enjoyment. This is a way to get better tanks/planes/guns/etc.

The way "grinding" is done in competitive games is by playing short matches (3-7 minutes), typically very adrenaline driven engagements. Once an engagement is over, a player is left in a state of imbalance - the player wants to experience the rush of victory again or is dissatisfied with defeat and wants to win instead. It's difficult to get off this cycle, which is why such games are called addictive. A player can spend entire day doing these short matches while looking forward to a more powerful tank/plane/gun/etc.

In some ways, this random element with inequality and short matches can be compared to a casino slot machine on steroids. Instead of pulling the handle, a player presses the "Battle" button, which is results in the player placed in a random battle.

Finally there are a number of simple "build and steal" kind of games, like Clash of Clans (smart phone games). A player builds a settlement, but resources are very scarce. A player is encouraged to steal resources by raiding neighboring settlements.  These games also thrive on the feeling of inequality among players The inequality gap between players can be lessened by paying real money - "Pay to Win (P2W)" model.**

"Pay to Win" is very much like gambling, and companies like Apple and Clash of Clans developers are taking heat for allowing 12 year olds spend real money in games to cover the inequality. It has been calculated that to buy everything in a game like Clash of Clans, a person would have to spend 11000 $$USD or close to a year of real time waiting for the resources to build up (all the while being raided by stronger players). Top of the line planes or tanks can cost up to 200$.

Once real money are invested, different mechanics come to play - it's hard to abandon a game where you invested hundreds of hours or dollars.

Most of this post is based on my own observations and analysis, as there isn't much mainstream interest in understanding the addictive nature of video games.


Is this some sort of soft-coded Grapheme-Color synethesia? I just found this remarkable optical illusion:

To do:
Fixate your gaze on the center of one of the figures and stare at it for some time (20-30 seconds) while it cycles (without moving your eyes). After several iterations you’ll start noticing that the empty outlines fill in with ghostly redish or bluish colors! These illusory colors are called “afterimages”. Interestingly, the colors of the afterimages vary, which is puzzling because they come from the same original figure. Moreover, the shape of the outlines determines the filled-in color, which is complementary to the color of the same shape in the original figure.

My question:

Is this some sort of soft-coded Grapheme-Color synethesia?
Do people with Grapheme-Color synethesia have hard-coded afterimages in their brains?

Very cool image! As for your question, your link includes a link to the authors' poster, which allows you to "read more about the illusion and possible explanations."

From the poster:

  In conclusion, the observations so far suggest that the afterimage effect is not due to higher level effects of shape-specific coloured afterimages but rather to a rapid spreading of local patch-based afterimages within the outlines presented after the image.

From Wikipedia: "Like all forms of synesthesia, grapheme → color synesthesia is involuntary, consistent..." This illusion operates involuntarily as well, but is manipulable by the image designer, as the poster shows. Hence I think it's safe to say this has nothing to do with synesthesia as an abnormal condition, but it could probably be described in perceptual terms that apply to normative function. You might want to look for more of the authors' work or contact them if you're sufficiently curious! Please share with us here whatever info you receive if you do.


Problem solving capability as a "function" of room temperature I'm wondering, whether there is a correlation between environmental factors like temperature and the ability to solve problems (say math exercises). Although I am sure this has been studied, maybe someone could point me to a reference.

As @what mentions Pilcher et al (2002) provide a meta-analysis of the effect of hot and cold temperature on performance. They found that cold temperatures of 10 degrees celsius resulted in an average reduction in performance of 14.88% and that hot temperatures of 32 degrees celsius resulted in a decrement of 13.91% relative to more neutral temperature conditions.

The study does discuss how type of task and duration of task moderate the effect of temperature on performance. However, as is often the case with meta-analysis, I found the results to be somewhat confusing and not readily explainable by a coherent theoretical model.

References

Pilcher, J. J., Nadler, E., & Busch, C. (2002). Effects of hot and cold temperature exposure on performance: a meta-analytic review. Ergonomics, 45(10), 682-698.


What psychological methods exist for dealing with uncertainty? Curious in finding out if there have been any psychological studies done on uncertainty & what the results of those studies have been.

Have there been any frameworks or methodologies on combating uncertainty from a psychological perspective? Assuming uncertainty is a negative experience for most people.

When uncertain about a decision and you are aiming for an optimal outcome, Hastie and Dawes (2009), suggest that the choice be 1) based on your current assets (money, physiological state, psychological capacities, relationships, and feelings). 2) It is based on the possible consequences of the choice. 3) When the consequences are uncertain, their likelihood is evaluated using the basic rules of probability theory. 4) It is a choice that is adaptive to the constraints of those probabilities and the values or satisfactions associated with each of the possible consequences of the choice.

As for some of the mechanisms at play when making a decision the authors provide some advice, such as focusing on the future and not the past (sunk costs), avoiding cohesive conclusions based on random data or what you "know" (texas sharpshooter and conjunction fallacies, respectively). They also point out that fast somatic markers (emotion, feeling, mood, and evaluation) typically shrink large choice sets, which contain fewer options but allow a more thoughtful cost-benefit evaluation. They use overemphasized happiness as an example of this being a bad idea and suggest taking a more thorough look at other aspects of a decision. Along with that they also recommend spelling out many of the relevant events and really thinking through the "reasons for" and "reasons against" the occurrence of each event which can help increase the quality of judgments under ignorance.

They also list some common decision-making procedures that have no relation to rational choice. 1) Habit, or choosing what we had chosen before. 2) Conformity, or making the choice you think most other people would make. 3) religious principles or cultural mandates, choosing as we have been taught by our parents and authorities.

There is also Kahneman (2011), who found that our brain has two modes one really fast and the other slow and deliberate, we tend to rely on the fast mode more than we should in decision making and the many bias and heuristics that come with faster choices can make us more confident in our decision-making but may not give us the most optimal outcome.

The two references provided overlap and seem to work off of each other in one way or another. They both come to the conclusion that optimal decision making is made more deliberately than based on some of the fallacies and biases that we tend to rely on for quick choices in our day-to-day. None the less, they do provide excellent examples of understanding and knowledge of how to deal with uncertainty.

References:

Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2009). Rational choice in an uncertain world: The psychology of judgment and decision making. Sage Publications.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.


What is mindful focused self-awareness from a cognitive science perspective? Focused mindful self-awareness (Google talk Jon Kabat-Zinn) are common activities, used to help patients of a variety of mental illness of different degrees - with some evidence of healing (Dr. Jeffery Schwartz).

From a cognitive science perspective, what is this focused mindful self-awareness?

I think your asking a psychologically healthy spiritual question. Psychologist are told to promote spirituality and many concepts from religion have affected current day therapies.

Bishop, Lau, and colleagues (2004) offered a two-component model of mindfulness:
The first component of mindfulness involves the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment. The second component involves adopting a particular orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance.
In this two-component model, self-regulated attention (the first component) involves conscious awareness of one's current thoughts, feelings, and surroundings, which can result in metacognitive skills for controlling concentration. Orientation to experience (the second component) involves accepting one's mindstream, maintaining open and curious attitudes, and thinking in alternative categories (developing upon Ellen Langer's research on decision-making).

-wikipedia mindfulness
As a student of psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience I will give you my perspective of the cognitive science understanding of mindfulness. Then I'll give a less biased published view of a professor of psychology.
When I was 14 the church I belong to at the time was helped to be run by my Father. He built a pool for the church and right before the beginning of the High School semester we laid down concrete. For some reason the baseball coach decided to help us in exchange for some extra concrete for his field. I did not like laying concrete. The raking, bull float and constant worry that it would harden in an untenable way. To make matters worse the coach talked my dad into removing his partitions which would have made many small slabs around the pool into one giant slab. Anyone who knows about concrete in the south would immediately know that this means its going to crack and have to be sealed eventually. At the end of the day my muscles were give out and i lost my balance and my hand went into the crete a couple of times. In addition even though I count that day one of the times I worked extremely hard for no pay the coach had decided to call me various names and stuff. On the way home my father lost his temper with me. My grandparents put things into perspective.
Thier common way of doing it is consistent with Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) which uses mindfulness:

Cognitive defusion: Learning methods to reduce the tendency to reify (inforce negative and self defeating schema see this example from The Help) thoughts, images, emotions, and memories.

Acceptance: Allowing thoughts to come and go without struggling with them.

Contact with the present moment: Awareness of the here and now, experienced with openness, interest, and receptiveness.

Observing the self: Accessing a transcendent sense of self, a continuity of consciousness which is unchanging.

Values: Discovering what is most important to one's true self.

Committed action: Setting goals according to values and carrying them out responsibly.

-wikipedia ACT
They said, God loves you we love you don't worry (Observing the self,Contact with the present moment,Values), don't be upset at him (Committed action) he's tired and isn't thinking clearly (Acceptance), of course you worked extremely hard today but your father wasn't watching you I was (Cognitive defusion), everyone loses their balance at some point especially during the last few hours it was easily correctable (Cognitive defusion). This common sense, non-judgemental, encouraged me to consider the situation rationally, accept the fact that I was limited and my father was limited and not hold ill feelings toward him.
Evangelical Christianity is all about "Contact with the present moment", "Observing the self", and "Values". Services are chocked full of religious based phrases which lead people to experience a contact with the present moment through experiencing forgiveness, justification and cleansing of the past. God loves you it doesn't matter what you've done in the past your forgiven now, forget the past, your a new person in Christ now, there is hope for you, "Everything is working out for my good and for God's Glory". While we don't have all of ACT down if you go to such a church you will certainly learn to live in the present by allowing God to deal with you past. Such may be the case in other religions but I do not know.
The following is an exerpt from Dr. McFadden's Mindfulness, vulnerability, and love: Spiritual lessons from frail elders, earnest young pilgrims, and middle aged rockers:

Raised a nominal Roman Catholic, with no concrete plans for entering the ministry, John McFadden went on to serve as senior pastor of two large United Church of Christ (Congregational) faith communities for a total of 32 years. As a result, I became a “minister's wife” and received the blessings of friendship with many older men and women who were my first teachers about aging with grace. These lessons accrued through the years and inspired my academic exploration of the psychology of religion and aging. From the beginning, when we were 23 years old with no clue how to be a minister or a minister's wife, to the time my husband retired from ministry to a beloved congregation in 2006, it was the old people who reached out to us with a multitude of kind and generous acts. In our age-segregated society, if I had married an accountant, a dentist, or a professor, I probably never would have developed such treasured friendships with older adults.
My sense of time stops, and my identity as “Susan McFadden, Ph.D., Psychology Professor, wife, mother, blah blah blah” disappears as I crouch to grasp a hand, gaze at a face, and say “peace be with you.” Regardless of whether the person whose hands I hold can reply with a verbal blessing, the moment feels powerfully imbued with holiness. I face my own vulnerability, for one day I may be demented or immobilized by stroke. In that large, crowded room at the nursing home, I am uplifted by love given and love received.
Although we cherish our worship experiences at the nursing home, most of the time we worship in a bar with pierced and tattooed young adults. The service starts at “10:30-ish,” the pastor sits on a barstool like everyone else, and music consists of everything from alt-rock to bluegrass. This bar is a long way from the staid Presbyterian church of my youth and the Congregational churches John served in his ministry. We decided that his leaving the ministry afforded us the possibility of doing something completely different and exploring a new way of being in Christian community. Called the “emergent church” by some scholars, these groups attract people who have been described as “avant-garde youth and aging hippies” (Byassee, 2006: 20). Many have fled “big box” Evangelical churches with their “Jesus goes to Vegas” style of worship and their political allegiance to conservative causes. They are seeking an authentic way of holding one another accountable to love God and one another.
Like worship at the county nursing home, worship at the bar evokes feelings of mindfulness, vulnerability, and love. The mindfulness derives from the desire to be fully present to the mostly young adults worshipping in that odd place, with its pool tables and dart machines. John and I do not want to play the role of know-it-all baby boomers, but rather to join these persons as fellow pilgrims. On the other hand, he is often asked to schedule a time for coffee and theological conversation, while I am frequently asked for advice about academic matters. Thus, mindfulness involves intentional awareness of how best to be respectfully present to others and to humbly offer whatever we have gained from our experiences that might be helpful. Vulnerability is located in the conviction that we have much to learn from these young adults, and that our own faith can grow as a result of knowing them and hearing their tales of spiritual journeys that sometimes have moved through treacherous territories of drug abuse and lost-ness. This little community often speaks about love, and the challenge of following Jesus' commandment to “love one another” in a world full of enticements to love self first and foremost, as well as repeated messages that the self is not good enough, attractive enough, rich enough, or sane enough to be loved by another person.
All of these people—old and young—have taught me about relational mindfulness, vulnerability, and love. Their intensity, whether born of their conscious decisions to live by different values than those of the prevailing culture, or their un-chosen suffering, invites mindful engagement. All remind me about my various vulnerabilities, ranging from the existential reality of my finitude to my everyday struggles to live faithfully. Most importantly, they teach me new ways of giving and receiving love.

McFadden, S. H. (2008). Mindfulness, vulnerability, and love: Spiritual lessons from frail elders, earnest young pilgrims, and middle aged rockers. Journal of aging studies, 22(2), 132-139.


Water Jug Problem in AI You are given two jugs whose capacity are 5 litre and 3 litre. No jugs have any measuring marks on it. You have one source of water. How can you measure 4 litre of water in 5 litre jug ?

Empty the small jug.
Fill the large jug.
Use the large jug to fill the small jug. This leaves 2L in the large jug and 3L in the small jug.
Empty the small jug.
Use the large jug to fill the small jug. This leaves 0L in the large jug and 2L in the small jug.
Fill the large jug.
Use the large jug to fill the small jug. This leaves 4L in the large jug and 3L in the small jug.


How quick a flash of light is invisible I know this overlaps a lot of previously asked questions but:

I understand that 'A photon hits a photosensitive molecule in a photoreceptor in the retina, which causes a chemical change. [...] Vision is slow: the cascade in response to a single photon takes on the order of 100s of milliseconds.' (for a persistent perceptual experience, why is video able to have a lower frame rate than audio?)

1) What is the longest amount of time a bright light can shine without it being visible to the human eye? (assume it goes from dark to bright to dark)

2) Would it make a difference if, at other times before and after the bright light, the light was on but dim?

My guess:

It would depend on the brightness of the light, and that even then it's almost impossible, as it would be to do with the number of photons hitting receptors, rather than how brief a period it happened. (I tried flashing a screen for 1/60th of a second and I could still see it).

I would also guess that the opposite - how long would a period of darkness or dim light have to last in between bright light in order for the brain to not register the darkness - would be much less time, certainly no more than 1/60th of a second. (I tried a 120Hz '3d' screen with glasses producing a 60Hz image).

It depends on ambient light, but in darkness, humans can detect as few as several photons, perhaps even down to a single photon (though all detection at these low levels is probabilistic - see Tinsley et al, 2016).

Therefore, this depends on the ambient light (ideal detection in darkness), and the number of photons. At this level of detection, it doesn't really make much sense to think about the duration of the signal: the duration can be infinitesimally brief as long as the intensity is enough to hit the retina with a few photons in the visible range.

A flash of 'darkness' is much different. Introducing dark flashes to a signal that previously had no dark flashes will be perceived as a change in intensity; you can read about contrast sensitivity to find these detection limits. The other attribute that is studied is the flicker fusion threshold which is the frame rate at which a flicker (i.e., alternation of dark and light flashes) can be perceived. The exact frequency of the flicker fusion threshold varies with condition, so there is no single number I can give to answer that question (see Brindley et al, 1966 for some ranges), except to say that it is typically less than 60 Hz for still images and higher frequency for brighter light (that is, if the light is brighter, you detect flicker at higher frequencies) and higher frequencies for moving objects.

Brindley, G. S., Du Croz, J. J., & Rushton, W. A. H. (1966). The flicker fusion frequency of the blue‐sensitive mechanism of colour vision. The Journal of physiology, 183(2), 497-500.

Tinsley, J. N., Molodtsov, M. I., Prevedel, R., Wartmann, D., Espigulé-Pons, J., Lauwers, M., & Vaziri, A. (2016). Direct detection of a single photon by humans. Nature communications, 7, 12172.


Discovery of “Functions of Brain” As far as I know, Physical Experimentation of Human Brain is not possible. So how does people come up with the idea that different parts of brain is associated with different specific functions? and Who found it?

Example:

Cerebrum for memory, speech etc..
Cerebellum for motor, sensory etc..

Often, we learn about brain functions when parts of the brain become damaged. One famous example is that of Phineas Gage. He survived severe brain damage, and his character and abilities were noticeably different. From the article:-

Some months after the accident, probably in about the middle of 1849, Phineas felt strong enough to resume work.  But because his personality had changed so much, the contractors who had employed him would not give him his place again.  Before the accident he had been their most capable and efficient foreman, one with a well-balanced mind, and who was looked on as a shrewd smart business man.  He was now, Harlow said, fitful, irreverent, and grossly profane, showing little deference for his fellows.  He was also impatient and obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, unable to settle on any of the plans he devised for future action.  His friends said he was "No longer Gage."


Are woman more Judging than men in the MBTI? Since I lack of academic formation please be tolerant if I write something not correct.

As you know the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test is based on 4 personality dimensions (E/I, S/N, T/F, J/P) each of which can assume two possible values (I think the name is trait) for a total of 16 clusters. link

There are gender differences with regard to a number of psychological variables (see for example gender roles and wikipedia Sex differences in human psychology). These differences may be due to education, culture, hormonal difference and so on.

According to the stereotype, many women are more judging than men.

Does any empirical evidence show that the prevalence of Judging is higher in women compared to men?

The MBTI is widely used in applied contexts, such as for personnel selection. Nevertheless, it is hardly used in scientific research on personality because its theoretical basis questionable, because its validity is limited, and because its reliability is inferior to other established measures of personality (for a starting point to criticisms of the MBTI see McCrea & Costa, 1989 and this earlier post). For these reasons it is unlikely that you will find reliable data on gender differences in the MBTI.

However, it has been shown that the MBTI traits overlap with those of the Big Five (the most widely adopted model of personality) and gender differences with regard to the Big Five have been studied extensively.

The MBTI Judging dimension and its Perceiving counterpart overlap to a large extent with the Big Five trait conscientiousness (e.g., Furnham, 1996, McCrea & Costa, 1989). This is not surprising if you look at how Judging vs. Perceiving and conscientiousness are measured:

Judging vs. Perceiving is measured by having people choose between sentence pairs such as

"I like to have things decided." vs. "I like to stay open to respond to whatever happens."
"I like to make lists of things to do." vs. "I appear to be loose and casual. I like to keep plans to a minimum."
"I like to get my work done before playing." vs. "I like to approach work as play or mix work and play."
"I plan work to avoid rushing just before a deadline." vs. "I am stimulated by an approaching deadline."

Conscientiousness is measured by items such as

"I get chores done right away."
"I carry out my plans."
"I stick to my chosen path."

Thus, there appears to be a clear semantic overlap between the two constructs.

Are there gender differences with regard to conscientiousness? According to a large scale meta analysis (with data from more than 23.000 participants from 26 nations, Costa et al. 2001), 1. there are far more personality differences within the genders than between genders 2. for conscientiousness there doesn't seem to be a detectable gender difference.

References

Costa Jr., P., Terracciano, A., & McCrae, R. R. (2001). Gender differences in personality traits across cultures: Robust and surprising findings. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 322–331. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.2.322

Furnham, A. (1996). The big five versus the big four: the relationship between the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and NEO-PI five factor model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 21, 303–307. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(96)00033-5

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1989). Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator From the Perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality. Journal of Personality, 57, 17–40. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1989.tb00759.x


People who climb the social hierarchy We know that people on top of the social hierarchy have (at least in developed countries) 30 or more years average life expectancy , more stable marriages, happier life and so on. So my question is for people who managed to get from the bottom to the top, what is their expected divorce rate, life expectancy and so on. It is more like the bottom or more like the top. Any research would help.

I think you want the term Life Course Social Mobility. Try searching for it and the outcomes of interest, e.g., life expectancy:

Climbing the social mobility ladder: where does health fit in? on "The Health Foundation" blog by Hannah Jones.

  [The UK] Social Mobility Commission also touched upon the idea that health and wellbeing play a role in an individual’s social circumstances and, thus, their mobility. For example, the report concluded that those in social housing are less likely to find employment as they are more likely to have a mental health condition, disability or other health condition.

Heller, R. F., McElduff, P., & Edwards, R. (2002). Impact of upward social mobility on population mortality: analysis with routine data. Bmj, 325(7356), 134.

  16% of the reduction in deaths between 1970–2 and 1991–3 among men in England and Wales was attributable to increases in the proportion of men in higher social classes

It is difficult to summarize across many different outcomes, and it also depends on a) the starting and ending classes as well as b) the life stage when the transition occurs and c) the speed of the transition.

So I think the question as originally phrased, whether they appear more like the bottom or the top, cannot be answered in the general case. It is generally going to be in-between.


Public domain scientific intelligence test available for use in research The IPIP is an example of a public domain scientific personality inventory that can be used for research.

Are there any good public domain scientific measures of intelligence?

Requirements

Do not link to the kinds of hits you get when you type "free online intelligence tests" into Google (i.e., tests where you can only do the questions and get summary normative feedback at the end)
Full text of instrument should be available, ideally with some form of test manual
Information about test has been published in a refereed journal
Test is freely available for use for scientific purposes, and ideally can be modified, adapted,

PEBL is a free open source programming language to help construct psychological experiments. A wiki and developer community provide some documentation and support.

PEBL has a Psychological Test Battery of many common or simple psychological tests so you may be able to use it out of the box without constructing your own test. PEBL includes free versions of many accredited and popular psychometric tests.

  Many of them represent the only Free version of proprietory tests available anywhere. They include a free Iowa Gambling Task, a free version of the TOVA®, a free Wisconsin Card Sort Test®, a free version of Conners Continuous Performance task, and a number of other useful tasks, with more to come.

If one of the included tests does not suit your needs, you or a programmer can create your own tests with PEBL's programming language which is customized specifically to create psychometric tests.


What cognitive strategies diminish bias in decision-making beyond those outlined by Larrick? Larrick (2004; pdf) offers a small number of suggestions for strategies to diminish bias in decision making, which he breaks down into four categories.

"Consider the opposite". Tell decision-makers to ask themselves "What are some reasons my initial judgment might be wrong?"
Training in rules. Teach statistical and logical principles to decision-makers, e.g. give them lessons on the law of large numbers and regression toward the mean.
Training in representations. Teach decision-makers to represent problems in ways that are likely to ameliorate biases.  For instance, encourage decision-makers to represent problems in terms of frequencies rather than probabilities, since evidence suggests people reason more accurately when thinking about the former than about the latter.
Training in biases. Larrick suggests that this boils down to seeing if teaching decision-makers behavioral decision theory has positive effects. Larrick implies that so far there is little evidence to suggest this method would work.

Question:

What other plausible categories of cognitive strategies exist?
What other strategies exist within the categories Larrick has defined?

References

Larrick, R.P. (2004). Debiasing. Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making, , 316-338. PDF

One possible strategy is to phrase decision-making problems as questions in a foreign language. There's evidence that this attenuates at least certain kinds of cognitive bias (making you more rational and consistent) by distancing the cognitive and affective baggage that comes with the problem. See the following:

Keysar, B., Hayakawa, S.L., & Sun, G.A. (2012). The Foreign-Language Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases. Psychological Science, 23 (6), 661-668.


Research operationalizing so-called strategic thinking? Is there contemporary research in trait psychology, which attempts to operationalize the structures behind a strategic thinking style? I'm thinking of a style of problem solving as taught in officer training, and to a lesser extent, manifesting in strategically-oriented games like chess.

I realize that this sounds perhaps a little vague. However, in common usage it's not unusual to refer to a person's being a "strategic thinker" or a "problem solver". I wanted to know whether these traits have been studied or deconstructed in a more formal capacity, so as to define them in a manner consistent with trait psychology.

Are there scientific definitions of strategic thinking with empirical support?

There is a large body of research on complex problem solving that is highly relevant to your question.

The starting point of this research was a critique of classic reasoning and problem solving research which seemed to focus on very small problems (such as the Tower of Hanoi), which may not capture the complexity of many real world problems that people face. The initial goal of this research was to conceptualize the characteristics of such problems.

In an attempt to find the common denominators of various definitions, Frensch and Funke (1995) define complex problem solving in the following way:

  [Complex problem solving] occurs to overcome barriers between a given state and a desired goal state by means of behavioral and/or cognitive, multistep activities. The given state, goal state, and barriers between given state and goal state are complex, change dynamically during problem solving, and are intransparent. The exact properties of the given state, goal state, and barriers are unknown to the solver at the outset. CPS implies the efficient interaction between a solver and the situational requirements of the task, and involves a solver’s cognitive, emotional, personal, and social abilities and knowledge.

The method of choice to investigate complex problem solving has been to use computer-simulated microworlds to pose complex problems, such as trying to improve the success of a simulated city as its mayor, fighting a wildfire, or running a factory  (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993, Dörner, 1997). In line with the definition, the performance in these simulations is determined in a complex way in that it is based on many decision variables, who are highly interconnected, and affect each other in a dynamic way. Furthermore, at the outset of the simulation, these variables and their relationships are intransparent and the simulation may be characterized by conflicting goals that have to be achieved by setting priorities and reaching compromises.

From this description, it may be clear that this research has focused more strongly on the "problem side". However, it has also explicitly incorporated personality and characteristics of the decision maker, such as motivation, certain (strategic) knowledge, and emotion regulation (see for example, Wenke et al. 2005). For example, much research has been devoted to the question whether the ability to solve complex problems can be distinguished from general intelligence. Some studies (e.g. Wüstenberg et al. 2012) suggest that even though performance assessed with in complex computer-simulated problems is highly related to intelligence, it can indeed predict behavior above and beyond IQ (incremental validity).

References

Brehmer, B., & Dörner, D. (1993). Experiments with computer-simulated microworlds: Escaping both the narrow straits of the laboratory and the deep blue sea of the field study. Computers in Human Behavior, 9, 171–184.

Dörner, D. (1997). The logic of failure. Recognizing and avoiding error
in complex situations. New York: Basic Books.

Frensch, P. and Funke, J. (1995) Definitions, Traditions and a General
Framework for Understanding Complex Problem Solving. In P. A. Frensch and
J. Funke (Eds.), Complex Problem Solving: The European Perspective.(Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum). 3-25.

Wenke, D., Frensch, P. A., & Funke, J. (2005). Complex problem
solving and intelligence: Empirical relation and causal direction.
In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Pretz (Eds.),Cognition and intelligence:
Identifying the mechanisms of the mind (pp. 160–187). New York:
Cambridge University Press.

Wüstenberg, S., Greiff, S., & Funke, J. (2012). Complex problem solving — More than reasoning? Intelligence, 40, 1–14. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2011.11.003


How is psychohistory theory of deMause viewed in academia? I've recently came across the psychohistory theory of deMause. To best of my understanding,
it roughly tries to capture the common psychology of an era by analyzing the childbearing practices of that era. See the summary below.

I'd like to know how credible this theory is. Briefly, how is it viewed by academicians, what is the summary of some different opinions surrounding it etc.
The wiki is rather silent on such discussions.

On the subject of criticism and how psychohistory is viewed by academicians, you stated that

The wiki is rather silent on such discussions.

Yet, the Wikipedia article outlines the criticism with plenty of citations.  The criticism in the article is laid out below, although I was not able to find url links for some of the journal articles referenced.

Psychohistory remains a controversial field of study, facing criticism in the academic community (DeMause, 1988; Stannard, 1982; Pomper, 1973; Paul, 1982), with critics referring to it as a pseudoscience (Hunt, 2002). Psychohistory uses a plurality of methodologies, and it is difficult to determine which is appropriate to use in each circumstance.
In 1973, historian Hugh A. Trevor-Roper dismissed the field of psychohistory entirely in response to the publication of Walter Langer’s The Mind of Adolf Hitler. He contended that psychohistory’s methodology rested “on a defective philosophy” and was “vitiated by a defective method.” He also contended that

Instead of proceeding from demonstrable steps, from fact to interpretation, from evidence to conclusion, psycho-historians move in the opposite direction. They deduce their facts from their theories; and this means, in effect, that facts are at the mercy of theory, selected and valued according to their consistence with theory, even invented to support theory (Shepherd, 1978).

DeMause has received criticism on several levels. His formulations have been criticized for being insufficiently supported by credible research (Demos, 1986). He has also received criticism for being a strong proponent of the "black legend" view of childhood history (i.e. that the history of childhood was above all a history of progress, with children being far more often badly mistreated in the past) (Aries, 1975). Similarly, his work has been called a history of child abuse, not childhood (Heywood, 2001). The grim perspective of childhood history is known from other sources, e.g. Edward Shorter's The Making of the Modern Family and Lawrence Stone's The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800. However, deMause received criticism for his repeated, detailed descriptions on childhood atrocities:

The reader is doubtless already familiar with examples of these psychohistorical "abuses." There is a significant difference, however, between the well-meaning and serious, if perhaps simplistic and reductionistic, attempt to understand the psychological in history and the psychohistorical expose that can at times verge on historical pornography. For examples of the more frivolous and distasteful sort of psychohistory, see Journal of Psychohistory. For more serious and scholarly attempts to understand the psychological dimension of the past, see The Psychohistory Review (Kohut, 1986).

Recent psychohistory has also been criticized for being overly-entangled with DeMause, whose theories are not representative of the entire field (Comtois,  2005).
References
Aries, P. (1975). De l'enfant roi a l'enfant martyr. Revue Psychologie. 68, 6.
Comtois, M. (2005) Introduction to Historical Method https://web.archive.org/web/20071130222935/http://cliopolitical.blogspot.com/2005/08/introduction-to-historical_112482482753969170.html
Updated 2010 at http://cliopolitical.blogspot.com/2005/08/introduction-to-historical_112482482753969170.html?m=1
DeMause, L. (1988). On writing childhood history. The Journal of Psychohistory, 16(2), 135. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1305588616
Demos, J. P. (1986). Child Abuse in Context: An Historian's Perspective. In Past, Present and Personal: The Family and The Life Course in American History. NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 68–91.
Heywood, Colin (2001). A History of Childhood. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 41.
Hunt, L. (2002). Psychology, Pschoanalysis and Historical Thought -The Misfortunes of Psychohistory. In Kramer Lloyd S. and Maza, Sarah C. (ed.). A Companion to Western Historical Thought. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. pp. 337–357.
Kohut, Thomas A. (1986). "Psychohistory as History". The American Historical Review. 91 (2): 336–354. https://doi.org/10.2307/1858137
Paul, R. A. (1982). Review of Lloyd deMause's Foundations of Psychohistory. Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology, 5, 469.
Pomper, P. (1973). Problems of a Naturalistic Psychohistory. History and Theory. 12(4): 367–388. https://doi.org/10.2307/2504699
Shepherd, Michael (1978). Clio and Psyche: the lessons of psychohistory. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. 71(6): 406–412. https://doi.org/10.1177/014107687807100604
Stannard, D. E. (1982). Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory. Oxford University Press, USA.


Would Artificial Super-Intelligence From Science Fiction "Speed Up" The Brain and Wear it Out Faster Leading to Earlier Death? In stories such as Flowers for Algernon by Daniel Keyes, the main character, Charlie Gordon, receives an operation on his brain that triples his intelligence.

Could something like this be achieved if the brain is somehow sped up and forced to do more in less time? And wouldn't something like this cause the brain to deteriorate rapidly from being "worn out" by so much use?

I found in this article that as the brain ages, it will shrink and will have larger fissures in it. In the story, after what seems to have been a short life, the mouse dies and is dissected. The mouse's brain is found to have much larger fissures and have shrinked.

Is this wearing out or aging of the brain due to increased activity by surgical means accurate in any way?

Our brain runs on a series of chemical and electrical reactions running at a stable pace. Unlike computers, you cannot "overclock" the brain into running these reactions any faster than normal.
However, if we were to assume the psuedoscience to be true, it would be logical for the brain to undergo premature death. With the rates of these reactions increased you would see the rate of DNA mutations increase along with the amount of oxidative stress. All of which are causes of cancer and cell death.

How to actually improve cognitive function:
http://m.wikihow.com/Increase-Your-Brain's-Processing-Speed


Q: Is there any Sleep limit for a human body?
Can we sleep throughout our whole life if we are supplied the necessary things like food,water etc.

A: Yes, there is a sleep limit for human (and other animals that sleep). And, no, we can’t sleep throughout our whole life even if all our metabolic requirements are supported. This is because sleep does not occur freely without any control but is under control of a complex neural network. This network limits how long one can sleep or be awake. It also regulates the time when sleep is to begin and to end. (Ref 1 - 4)

Sleep occurs alternately with wake in cycles, called sleep-wake cycle. These cycles are under control of a complex network of neural circuits in the brainstem, hypothalamus, basal ganglia, basal forebrain, and thalamus (see figure below).

(The figure is from Figure 2, Ref 1.)

And the periodicity of the cycles are controlled by circadian rhythm pacemaker in suprachiasmatic nucleus, internal homeostasis, and ambient light. (see figure below)

(This figure is from Figure 3, Ref 1)

In human and animals that sleep, this cycle is about 24 hours, with the mean duration of sleep (in human) of about 7.5 hours (with a standard deviation of about 1.25 hours) (Ref 2.). So, normally we sleep about 7.5 hours and then are set to be awake by these neural mechanisms. Because sleep is under control of these neural circuits, we cannot just fall asleep whenever we want and cannot sleep as many hours as we would like.

References:

Larson-Prior, Linda & Ju, Yo-El & Galvin, James. (2014). Cortical–Subcortical Interactions in Hypersomnia Disorders: Mechanisms Underlying Cognitive and Behavioral Aspects of the Sleep–Wake Cycle. Frontiers in neurology. 5. 165. 10.3389/fneur.2014.00165.
Purves D.  Chapter 27 Sleep and Wakefulness. Purves D, Augustine GJ, David Fitzpatrick D, Hall WC, Lamantia AS, McNamara JO, Williams SM, editors. Neuroscience. 3rd ed. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates Inc; 2004. ISBN-13: 9780878937257 ISBN-10: 0878937250. p659-686.
Moore RY. Clinical Update - Circadian Rhythms, Hypothalamus, and Regulation of the Sleep-Wake Cycle. Medscape. 2019 Sep 1.
Wikipedia. Sleep


What are good introductory books on mathematical psychology? I have a background in physics and has enough knowledge in Fourier analysis, group & representation theory, projective geometry, complexity theory, and dynamical systems theory. What introductory textbooks on mathematical psychology should I read?

I also like https://bayesmodels.com/.

I posted the question on twitter, you could check out the responses.

Joachim Vandekerckhove suggested:

Lewandowsky, S., & Farrell, S. (2010). Computational modeling in cognition: Principles and practice. Sage Publications. https://www.amazon.com/Computational-Modeling-Cognition-Principles-Practice/dp/1412970768

Edgar Kausel suggested the following classic that is still good to read:

Coombs, C. H., Dawes, R. M., & Tversky, A. (1970). Mathematical psychology: An elementary introduction.

Daniel Litted mentioned his list that includes over 15 recommendations
https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/121661.Best_Mathematical_Psychology_Books

Here are the first few:


What is a background assumption? What is meant by background assumption?

A background assumption is something implied or assumed by what you say, but not explicitly stated.
For instance, if you say 'I feel happy'.  It is implied or assumed that you exist.  It is also implied or assumed that happiness exists.  It is implied and assumed that you have feelings.  It is implied that you have told the truth rather than a lie. A background assumption is that you and I both interpret happiness in a similar way.
Many things we say include background or implied assumptions.  Fortunately, most people make similar background assumptions which means that they don't need to be stated, which greatly aids in efficient communication.
Did you notice that I made the assumption that we all make similar background assumptions?
This question may be better directed to https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/


What can cognitive psychology tell us about the results of the Stanford Prison Experiment? One of the experiments that are always taught as prime examples of social psychology in action is the Stanford Prison Experiment

In 1971, Zimbardo accepted a tenured position as professor of psychology at Stanford University. With a government grant from the U.S. Office of Naval Research, he conducted the Stanford prison study in which 24 normal college students were randomly assigned to be "prisoners" or "guards" in a mock prison located in the basement of the psychology building at Stanford (three additional college students were selected as alternates, only one of which participated in the study). The two week planned study into the psychology of prison life ended only after 6 days due to emotional trauma being experienced by the participants. The students quickly began acting out their roles, with "guards" becoming sadistic and "prisoners" showing extreme passivity and depression.
*from the Philip Zimbardo article

I realize there have been scores of scholarly articles written about the subject in the intervening time, but most of the abstracts dealt with the aspects of social psychology that were pertinent even in the last decade with the atrocities at Abu Ghraib.
All of that is painful yet certainly necessary to ponder, but I'm curious about the cognitive aspects of the study.  What facets of, for example, motivation does this study (and others like it) bring out?  What can be said about our sense of logical reasoning under these circumstances?  What sorts of qualia could one use to model this behavior in an agent?

I've always thought of Stanford Prison Experiment (and Abu Ghraib) as a situation in which group think forms a sort of feedback loop. If you agree that people behave within context of a group, and the context is created by the group itself (Hogg, 1998), then you can see what is happening. The context may at first be in line with the larger group (the University, or Military, or American culture in general). Within the smaller group however, individuals may "push the limit" of acceptable behavior. But in doing so, they are changing to context of the group. For a person to "push the limit" again, would be to act in an even more extreme way. The situation feeds back upon itself.

The question remains, as you pointed out, what motivation starts this movement in the first place? There is no reason to think it couldn't feedback upon itself in the other direction, either. There is some underlying feeling that is amplified by this group think. In the Hogg article, the researches essentially seeded that motivation experimentally. But in a normal situation, it can be virtually anything. Intuitively, I would say in the prison experiment the initial seed was just a desire for the students to act out the roles they were given. Prisoners obey the guards. Each time the limit of acceptable behavior was pushed, the context that defined acceptable behavior was changed too.

Myers (1977) describes something similar, which he calls polarization. In his research, he showed a tendency for people to not only conform to the group standards, but also try to exceed them in, "the socially preferred direction". This phenomena, plus a tendency to act within the context of a group, can lead to runaway behavior.

References

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/gdn/2/1/48/

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022103178900495


Which statistical tests to use when analyzing NASA TLX? The NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) is a subjective, multidimensional assessment tool that rates perceived workload. A set of different scales (Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Performance, Effort, Frustration) are combined into one measure ranging from 0 to 100, the task load index.

Which statistical tests can be used to compare these test results? I am particularly concerned with whether or not the task load index could be considered an interval variable, and thus whether, for example, a simple student t-test could be used. In particular, is the NASA-TLX scalar invariant? Can a difference between two means (e.g., 50 and 60) be interpreted as equal to a difference between two other means (e.g., 10 and 20)?

If not, what are the consequences of using a wrong test? What is a suitable test?

In Stevens' levels of measurement framework, the NASA-TLX is an ordinal scale, not an interval scale, because there is no way to know a priori how much "workload" each point corresponds to. In other words, we can only know how much workload a point corresponds to after observing the data from our sample. Indeed, Hart's own review of the NASA-TLX suggests that workload is "ill-defined" (Hart, 2006).

While levels of measurement often seems to be taught in behavioral and social science as accepted fact, however, the levels of measurement framework is quite controversial among methodologists. It is a useful enough heuristic taxonomy for didactic purposes, but it is not known to be inferentially meaningful. Analytic relatives of the t-test (i.e., least-squares/maximum likelihood regression) exist for all four types, so the type of scale should not necessarily concern you too much here. I have not encountered it outside the behavioral sciences.

Statistical inference is essentially a mathematical pathfinder that formally relates a specific question to a specific answer by way of the evidence. It is therefore impossible to say what a suitable test would be without knowing the specific question(s)―different analyses test different questions. For the same data set, one analysis may be meaningful (i.e., discriminates between conceivable answers) for one question, but not another; for another analysis, this may be reversed. The consequence of using a wrong test is that you effectively answer a question you did not ask, while not answering the question you did ask.

References

Hart SG. NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX): 20 years later. Paper presented at the HFES; San Francisco, CA. 2006.


What brain areas are involved in memorizing sections of a song? Typically when I listen to a song, the song will have different sections (e.g. chorus, verses, etc). As a composer, I have found that many songs use this structure to create a sense of repetition and help make the song more familiar to the listener. It tends to give the song a cohesiveness that simply introducing new material over and over doesn't yield.

Therefore, when I listen to a song, what brain area helps me  remember parts of the song so when I hear them again, they sound familiar?

Example:

  We Wish You A Merry Christmas

I would read this paper, its mighty interesting.

Books

Snyder, B.(2000) Music and memory: An introduction. The MIT Press. Cambridge 291.

Hemispheric Coordination and Conflict

  "...while listening to the melody of the popular carol "Silent Night", the
  right hemisphere thinks, "Ah, yes, Silent Night", while the left
  hemisphere thinks, "two sequences: the first a literal repetition, the
  second a repetition at different pitch levels—ah, yes, Silent Night by
  Franz Gruber, typical pastorate folk style." The brain for the most
  part works well when each hemisphere performs its own function while
  solving a task or problem; the two hemispheres are quite
  complementary. However, situations arise when the two modes are in
  conflict, resulting in one hemisphere interfering with the operation
  of the other hemisphere." (Regalski 1977)

Melodic Memory

  "Performance was greatest for the musicians, particularly for the
  nontonal melody pairs. These differences were not primarily
  attributable to pitch discrimination or pitch working memory
  impairments. The findings point to differential contributions of the
  left and right mesial temporal lobes to melodic memory, with
  specificity of the right mesial temporal lobe emerging for melodic
  learning within a tonal musical context." (Wilson, Saling 2008)

Tonal Memory

  In general, tonal memory is supported by a wide network including
  primary and secondary auditory areas more right lateralized, the
  supramarginal gyrus particularly on the left, and dorsolateral
  inferior frontal areas, more clearly seen under heavy memory load
  conditions (Zatorre et al., 1994; Griffith et al., 1999; Gaab et al.,
  2003). Premotor areas, the cerebellum, basal ganglia and the thalamus
  are activated when subvocal tonal rehearsal is explicitly required
  (Hickok et al., 2003; Koelsch et al., 2009). Importantly a direct
  comparison of memory for verbal syllables and sung pitches under
  rehearsal and under suppression elicited largely overlapping brain
  areas consistent with this network (Schulze et al., 2011).

Quoted from this source.

Sources

Who Knows Where Music Lurks in the Mind of Man? New Brain Research Has The Answer.
Journal of Music Educators (May 1977, Vol.63, pages 31-38)

Contribution of the left and right Mesial Temporal Lobes to Musical Memory: Evidence from melodic learning difficulties
Sarah J. Wilson, Michael M. Saling
Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 25 No. 4, April 2008; (pp. 303-314)

￼Towards A Neural Basis Of Music Perception.
Stefan Koelsch and Walter A. Siebel
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.12 December 2005

Functional anatomy of pitch memory—an fMRI study with sparse temporal sampling.
Gaab, N., Gaser, C., Zaehle, T., Jancke, L., and Schlaug, G. (2003).
Neuroimage 19, 1417–1426.

Neural mechanisms underlying melodic perception and memory for pitch.
Zatorre, R. J., Evans, A. C., and Meyer, E. (1994).
J. Neurosci. 14, 1908–1919.

Auditory-motorinteraction revealed by fMRI: speech, music, and working memory in area
Hickok, G., Buchsbaum, B., Humphries, C., and Muftuler, T. (2003).
Spt. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 15, 673–682.

Functional architecture of verbal and tonal working memory: an FMRI study.
Koelsch, S., Schulze, K., Sammler, D., Fritz, T., Müller, K., and Gruber, O. (2009).
Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 859–873.

Neuroarchitecture of verbal and tonal working memory in nonmusicians and musicians.
Schulze, K., Zysset, S., Mueller, K., Friederici, A. D., and Koelsch, S. (2011). Hum. Brain Mapp. 32, 771–783.


Why do people tend to avoid desperate people? From my experience,often in social interactions, the person who seems more desperate is the least desirable person to be interacted with. And no one wants to engage them.

More often than not, people seems to avoid desperate people,even when that person needed help most. An example would be a beggar on the street, if group of pedestrian walk by a beggar sitting on the ground, most of us would ignore and continue our journey. (I myself did this before)
Even though the beggar might be in a dire situation (i.e Hunger, No Shelter)

Is there psychological theories on this that describe the avoidance or disgust from desperate people?

From a personal standpoint I would avoid these people because I expect people to be continually getting such needs met. I would wonder why a person doesn't already have a support network in place and be suspicious of them.

I the situation with the beggar I would think this would link more closely to the bystander effect whereby as an individual you feel less inclined and less responsible as there are many other people in the vicinity that could also make a difference.


Why might a person get widely varying scores on different online IQ tests? Online IQ tests often yield wildly varying results (say 60 - 150). These are actual values obtained by repeated measures. It is puzzling, because it's such a wide range. How can the same person be mentally retarded and a genius at the same time?

Firmin et al. (2008) tested the validity of a handful of online IQ tests by having college students complete IQ tests at three different websites and also complete a validated lab measure, the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales (RIAS). They found that there were moderate correlations ($r$ values were around 0.4 to 0.5) between some of the online tests and the RIAS, though other tests did not have a significant correlation with the RIAS. Thus, there was some evidence that online IQ tests are measuring the same kinds of things as lab-based IQ tests, but the correlations were weak and some tests were better than others.

In short: online IQ tests are widely variable in their validity, and even the good ones are probably not all that accurate.

Reference

Firmin, M., Hwang, C., Burger, A., Sammons, J., & Lowrie, R. (2008). Evaluating the concurrent validity of three web-based IQ tests
and the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales (RIAS). Eastern Education Journal, 37, 20-28.


Technical term for "hidden addictions" In The Forbidden Keys to Persuasion, Blair Warren discusses seven “hidden addictions”: the need to feel needed; the need for hope in difficult situations; the need for a scapegoat (to believe our problems are the fault of someone or something else); the need to be noticed and feel understood; the need to know things others don’t; the need to be right; and the need to feel a sense of power.

Another author commented,

  This is by no means a definitive list. It is just one author’s way of
  organizing and categorizing our most potent and insatiable desires.

I'm simply looking for a way to correlate this with psychology. What's the best technical term for "hidden addiction"? I'd ultimately like to compile a more complete list of these "hidden addictions," something I can do more easily if I know the correct terminology.

I know this is something that's probably covered in Psych 101 - which I took 150 years ago - but I can't think of the correct term.

Addiction is defined as not having control over doing, taking or using something to the point where it could be harmful to you.  Often it can start with a habit but then it becomes an addiction because there is a compulsion to continue the habit.

  Addiction is most commonly associated with gambling, drugs, alcohol and nicotine, but it's possible to be addicted to just about anything

Some of these addictions listed by Warren (the need to feel needed, the need for hope in difficult situations, the need to be noticed and feel understood, the need to know things others don’t, and the need to be right) can be classed as compulsions which can lead to a diagnosis of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and the others (the need for a scapegoat (to believe our problems are the fault of someone or something else) and the need to be right) are covered by cognitive biases such as confirmation bias as you thought. The need to feel a sense of power can be covered by both.

  Many people have focused thoughts or repeated behaviors. But these do not disrupt daily life and may add structure or make tasks easier. For people with OCD, thoughts are persistent and unwanted routines and behaviors are rigid and not doing them causes great distress.

In the case of needing to be right, you can have the need but it may not interfere with your life.  Where someone challenges you and the need is so strong that it stops you doing anything until you confirm that you are correct about something, then it is an addiction which can also be a part of OCD.

I would say that Warren has legitimately created a category of behaviour which fits the bill of addiction as these behaviours can indeed be habit formations leading to addiction. The thing to remember with these are that all of them are compulsive thoughts and behaviours but not all of them can lead to OCD diagnosis.


Models relating neuron firing to oscillatory dynamics Many papers published seem to focused on oscillations to characterize synchronisation and communication between different brain areas. For example, this paper from Voytek et. al where communication between brain areas increases with the abstractedness of the task.

Are there models that relate neuron firing to these types of oscillatory readings? In other words, given spiking data and location of a neuron ensemble, would it be possible to model the types of oscillations that might be read?

The oscillations measured by EEG, ECoG, and MEG are thought to originate in the apical dendrites' fluctuating potentials. Try looking into the forward problem of EEG. Like the inverse problem but in reverse. Given a known source potential (apparently it's very common to model cortical neurons' LFP as a distribution of current dipoles?) you solve the Poisson equation to get the potential at the recording electrode.
I'm reading through this review right now and it's very interesting: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2234413/.

Other avenues which seem interesting are neural mass/neural field models, especially Walter Freeman's work on neurodynamics. See: http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Freeman_K-set.

Abstracted away from the biology a bit there's Jack Cowan's field models and stochastic neural networks. But they're both absolutely prolific and the math is dense and I'm not quite sure where to even really begin.