Are linear feedback shift registers being generally discouraged by cryptologists? Katz and Lindell mention in their book that LFSR have been horrible as basis for pseudorandom generators, and advocate that they are not used anymore (well, they also recommend that people use block ciphers instead of stream ciphers).
But I see for example that one of the ciphers in the estream portfolio (Grain, targeted for hardware) uses an LFSR, so the opinion that LFSRs are not good is not a consensus.

I'd like to know if there many cryptologists sharing Katz and Lindell's opinion on LFSRs (and on stream ciphers)?
There are many types of cryptanalytic attacks: Linear approximations, Algebraic attacks, Time-memory-data-tradeoff attacks, fault attacks.

For example you can read the survey: "Algebraic Attacks On Stream Ciphers (Survey)"

Abstract: Most stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR)
are vulnerable to recent algebraic attacks. In this survey paper, we describe
generic attacks: existence of algebraic equations and fast algebraic attacks. ...

At the end you can find other relevant references.

Another good paper about fault attacks to stream ciphers is: "Fault Analysis of Stream Ciphers"

Abstract: ... Our goal in this paper is to develop general techniques which can be used to attack the standard constructions of stream ciphers based on LFSR’s, as well as more specialized techniques which can be used against specific stream ciphers such as RC4, LILI-128 and SOBERt32. While most of the schemes can be successfully attacked, we point out several interesting open problems such as an attack on FSM filtered constructions and the analysis of high Hamming weight faults in LFSR’s.

For time-memory-data tradeoffs attacks you can read: "Cryptanalytic Time/Memory/Data tradeoffs for stream ciphers".