What is the basis of God's Goodness/Righteousness? I would like an Answer from a Reformed/Calvinist Perspective.

There are many instances in scripture that affirm GOD is good (Psalm 119:68, 1 Tim 4:4).

And that God is Righteous (Psalm 48:10, Jeremiah 12:1). 

I was considering God's Sovereignty - that all things move according to his will. Which means, earthquakes, disease, death etc... And he has the right to - for example, Kill a person, because all people are his possessions. 

So a person sins if he kills another person because he has no right to the lives of other people. But if a person were to kill a character in his/her books - is is not a sin, since the author has the right to do whatever he wants in his book.

Because God owns all the earth, he has all rights to do whatever he wants. And cannot be guilty of sin- since there are no bounds for him to overstep.

This is the only way I have thought of to reconcile 'God is Good' and 'God caused the earthquake'. 

However, If I was an author who killed a character in my book - you would not necessarily regard it as a 'good' action, just that the author cannot be condemned for it.

So is the Righteousness of God based on the nature of his position over the world? or is God just defined as Righteous. 

Thanks.
Christian theologians have been divided on the issue of balancing God's sovereignty and man's freedom. If we construct a strict sovereignty then we fall in the danger of determinism and fatalism, that inevitably raises the question on God's moral nature and his sincerity. If we overemphasis on man's freedom then we might diminish God's sovereignty. The Reformed and Calvinistic theology has often been accused as determinism which makes man into puppets in the hands of God. The other prominent branch is "Molinism" after the name of a Spanish Jesuit of the Counter-Reformation Luis Molina (1535-1600) which is  considered to be the root of "Arminianism" after the name of Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609). Here is an excerpt by Dr. Craig's article  from ReasonableFaith: 


  Everyone acknowledges that we have at least the illusion of free will.
  I take it that my sense of freely choosing is not mere appearance
  only, since if it were, nothing I think or do is of any significance
  whatsoever. Even the decision to believe in determinism would be
  meaningless, no more significant than having a toothache. Since
  freedom of the will is a necessary condition of the meaningfulness of
  my life, I may as well assume that I do have it. After all, if I do
  not have free will and my life is meaningless, who cares?
  
  So I think that determinism is incompatible with free will, but that
  determinism has not been demonstrated to be true. So what does it mean
  to have free will? Some thinkers have said that it is the ability in
  causally identical situations to choose either A or not-A. It seems to
  me, however, that this so-called Principle of Alternative
  Possibilities is not a necessary condition of willing freely. I’m
  persuaded by illustrations like that given by Harry Frankfurt to show
  that freedom does not require the ability to choose other than as one
  does. Imagine a man whose brain has been secretly implanted with
  electrodes by a mad scientist. The scientist, being an Obama
  supporter, decides that he will activate the electrodes to make the
  man vote for Obama if the man goes into the polling booth to vote for
  Romney. On the other hand, if the man chooses to vote for Obama, then
  the scientist will not activate the electrodes. Suppose, then, the man
  goes into the polling booth and presses the button to vote for Obama.
  In such a case it seems that the man freely votes for Obama. Yet it
  was not within his power to do anything different!
  
  Such thought experiments have been criticized on the grounds that no
  one could know what the man was going to do before he actually
  attempted to do so; hence, his free decision must be aborted by the
  activation of the electrodes. But while this objection seems cogent
  against human examples of prevention or intervention, it occurs to me
  that if God has middle knowledge and so knows what a person would
  freely do in any set of circumstances God might place him in, then the
  objection has no force. Suppose, for example, that had God known that
  Pontius Pilate would not send Jesus to the cross, He would not have
  placed Pilate in such circumstances. In that case, Pilate did not
  under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go. Yet he
  freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so.
  
  This suggests that what is critical to free will is not the ability to
  choose differently in identical circumstances but rather not being
  caused to do something by causes other than oneself. It is up to me
  how I choose, and nothing determines my choice. Sometimes philosophers
  call this agent causation. The agent himself is the cause of his
  actions. His decisions are differentiated from random events by being
  done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind.
  
  This understanding of free will has relevance to the case of God
  Himself. Jesus, being divine, was impeccable (could not sin).
  Therefore, there was no possibility of his yielding to Satan’s
  temptations in the wilderness. Yet he resisted sin freely because
  nothing external to him determined his choices. Like the man with the
  electrodes implanted in his brain, Jesus could not have chosen to sin,
  but he freely resisted sin. Again, God cannot choose to do evil, yet
  He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to
  do so.
  
  So, to return to the case of human agents, certainly a free choice
  influences physical events, most obviously in the case of basic
  actions in my own body, like freely lifting my arm. We are not
  causally determined to make all the choices we make; rather many
  choices are up to us and are therefore free choices. We are held
  accountable for such choices because they are not the result of random
  brain events but are undertaken for reasons which we weigh and act
  upon.
  
  I’m not sure what you mean by “some ethereal and unintelligible
  source,” but if you are referring to God, I agree that if God secretly
  determines my every thought and action, then I am but a puppet whose
  actions are meaningless. But a God endowed with middle knowledge of
  what persons would freely do in any set of circumstances God might
  place them in can be provident over human affairs without infringing
  on human freedom.


also read a concise comparison of Molinism and Calvinism.