Assault and capture of Nanking
When did the Japanese demand surrender from the Chinese?
Nanking Massacre
Japanese prisoners of war in World War II Chinese Japanese Battle of Canton (May 1841) Battle of Zaoyang–Yichang Antonius Hambroek
Japanese_prisoners_of_war_in_World_War_II-Japanese_attitudes_to_surrender Chinese_Japanese-Abstract Battle_of_Canton_(May_1841)-Background Battle_of_Zaoyang–Yichang-Abstract Antonius_Hambroek-Abstract
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) adopted an ethos which required soldiers to fight to the death rather than surrender. This policy reflected the practices of Japanese warfare in the pre-modern era. During the Meiji period the Japanese government adopted western policies towards POWs, and few of the Japanese personnel who surrendered in the Russo-Japanese War were punished at the end of the war. Prisoners captured by Japanese forces during this and the First Sino-Japanese War and World War I were also treated in accordance with international standards. Attitudes towards surrender hardened after World War I. While Japan signed the 1929 Geneva Convention covering treatment of POWs, it did not ratify the agreement, claiming that surrender was contrary to the beliefs of Japanese soldiers. This attitude was reinforced by the indoctrination of young people. The Japanese military's attitude towards surrender was institutionalised in the 1941 "Code of Battlefield Conduct" ("Senjinkun"), which was issued to all Japanese soldiers. This document sought to establish standards of behavior for Japanese troops and improve discipline and morale within the Army, and included a prohibition against being taken prisoner. The Japanese Government accompanied the "Senjinkun"'s implementation with a propaganda campaign which celebrated people who had fought to the death rather than surrender during Japan's wars. While the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) did not issue a document equivalent to the "Senjinkun", naval personnel were expected to exhibit similar behavior and not surrender. Most Japanese military personnel were told that they would be killed or tortured by the Allies if they were taken prisoner. The Army's Field Service Regulations were also modified in 1940 to replace a provision which stated that seriously wounded personnel in field hospitals came under the protection of the Red Cross Convention of 1864 with a requirement that the wounded not fall into enemy hands. During the war this led to wounded personnel being either killed by medical officers or given grenades to commit suicide. While scholars disagree over whether the "Senjinkun" was legally binding on Japanese soldiers, the document reflected Japan's societal norms and had great force over both military personnel and civilians. In 1942 the Army amended its criminal code to specify that officers who surrendered soldiers under their command faced at least six months imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances in which the surrender took place. This change attracted little attention, however, as the "Senjinkun" imposed more severe consequences and had greater moral force. Japanese attitudes towards surrender contributed to the harsh treatment which was inflicted on the Allied personnel they captured. Not all Japanese military personnel chose to follow the precepts set out on the "Senjinkun". Those who chose to surrender did so for a range of reasons including not believing that suicide was appropriate or lacking the courage to commit the act, bitterness towards officers, and Allied propaganda promising good treatment. For instance, recent analysis of Japanese soldiers' diaries conducted by Richard Aldrich of Nottingham University has found that what is allegedly a common perception of the Japanese soldier as being fanatically devoted to the Emperor and codes such as bushido is not necessarily true in all cases. During the later years of the war Japanese troops' morale deteriorated as a result of Allied victories, leading to an increase in the number who were prepared to surrender. Japanese soldiers' reluctance to surrender was also influenced by a perception that Allied forces would kill them if they did surrender, and historian Niall Ferguson has argued that this had a more important influence in discouraging surrenders than the fear of disciplinary action or dishonor. In addition, the Japanese public was aware that US troops sometimes mutilated Japanese casualties and sent trophies made out of body-parts home from media reports of two high-profile incidents in 1944 in which a letter-opener carved from a bone of a Japanese soldier was presented to President Roosevelt and a photo of the skull of a Japanese soldier which had been sent home by a US soldier was published in the magazine "Life". In these reports Americans were portrayed as "deranged, primitive, racist and inhuman". Hoyt in "Japan’s war: the great Pacific conflict" argues that the Allied practice of taking bones from Japanese corpses home as souvenirs was exploited by Japanese propaganda very effectively, and "contributed to a preference to death over surrender and occupation, shown, for example, in the mass civilian suicides on Saipan and Okinawa after the Allied landings". The causes of the phenomenon that Japanese often continued to fight even in hopeless situations has been traced to a combination of Shinto, Messhi hoko (self-sacrifice for the sake of group), and Bushido. However, a factor equally strong or even stronger to those, was the fear of torture after capture. This fear grew out of years of battle experiences in China, where the Chinese guerillas were considered expert torturers, and this fear was projected onto the American soldiers who also were expected to torture and kill surrendered Japanese. In a June 1945 report an Office of War Information (OWI) officer noted that 84% of Japanese POWs expected torture or death at the hands of their American capturers, and that this was a greater factor than Bushido when it came to Japanese fighting to the death. 
Chinese Japanese or Japanese Chinese may refer to: Sino-Japanese vocabulary, Japanese vocabulary that originated in the Chinese language or in elements borrowed from Chinese Kanbun, classical Chinese language as written in Japan Sino-Japanese relations  
Canton was the only port in China open to foreign countries, mostly European, for trade under the Canton System. In the early stages of this commerce, the demand in foreign countries for commodities including tea, silk and porcelain greatly outweighed Chinese needs for foreign products and thus a significant trade imbalance developed. This unequal situation ended in the late 18th tcentury when opium was shipped into China from plantations in India owned by the British East India Company. The number of people using the drug in China grew rapidly, to the point that the trade imbalance shifted in the foreign countries' favour. In 1839 matters came to a head when Chinese official Lin Zexu tried to end the opium trade altogether by destroying a large amount of opium in Canton thereby triggering the First Opium War. In January 1841, the Royal Navy began a bombardment of Chinese positions near Canton, and successfully created many beachheads. Local Chinese officials were forced to surrender and sign local peace treaties with the British. When the local officials brought these peace treaties to Beijing they were punished for their failures. The Qing Dynasty government refused to acknowledge these peace treaties, neither did they acknowledge any Chinese territory had been lost. Instead, they sent in more troops to drive back the British. 
The Battle of Zaoyang–Yichang (), also known as the Battle of Zaoyi was one of the 22 major engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese were seeking a quicker solution to achieve a Chinese surrender. The Japanese contemplated moving directly down the Yangtze to the relocated Chinese capital, Chongqing. To do so, they would need to capture a critical town in western Hubei province, Yichang. The Japanese attack did not commit many troops or materiel, which enabled the main Chinese commander, Li Zongren, who had frustrated the Japanese before, to repel the Japanese.  
Antonius Hambroek (1607–1661) was a Dutch missionary to Formosa from 1648 to 1661 during the Dutch colonial era. He was martyred by Koxinga as the Chinese-Japanese warlord wrested Taiwan from the Dutch. Koxinga had captured Hambroek along with his wife and three of his children, and sent him as a messenger to Frederik Coyett, the Governor of Formosa, to demand the surrender of the Dutch garrison at Fort Zeelandia and the abandonment of their colony. Koxinga promised the missionary death should he return with a displeasing answer; Coyett refused to surrender and Hambroek was executed on his return to Koxinga's camp. After the Siege of Fort Zeelandia, Koxinga took Hambroek's teenage daughter as a concubine. Other Dutch women were sold to Chinese soldiers to become their wives. 