text:
Can an answer, while sakayaditthi is present, be intentional free of bias?
Aside of the trap of self-overestimating, theoretical (abhidhamma in action):
When one is asked a question and brings his person, his estimate, into play, is it possible to give an answer which is not biased, does not protect ones stand or ones disabilities at first place (i.e. minimum holding something back)?
Is a person able to give a "objective" answer if the mind is caught by identification-views intentionally?
Wouldn't such a person, in such a state not either give a non-biased answer certain unaware of certain "self-damaging" or be shameless? In cases of being aware and fearing "self-damaging" simply not answering?
(May one not fear or be ashamed of skillful actions while trying to give an answer.)

"To his ruin, indeed, the fool gains knowledge and fame; they destroy his bright lot and cleave his head" ~ Bala Vagga, Dhammapada. It's very hard for someone to answer free of bias while sakkhayaditthi is present. One should always think about this Dhamma as "This Dhamma is not found by me. Shakyamuni Tathagata Lord Buddha face so much difficulties to understand this Dhamma and preached for the sake of all suffering beings. There's no owner for this Dhamma. I'm no one but just a speaker of that Dhamma"

Possibly the question should be: "Can an answer, while sakayaditthi is not present, be intentionally not free of bias?"

There are two kinds of bias, in relation to this question.
The first is deliberately answering a question in a way that serves the self-interest of the one who answers, but not necessarily the questioner's self-interest.
An example of this is that a salesperson, when asked some questions about the product he's trying to sell, would try to hide the disadvantages of the product and instead, highlight the advantages.
Indeed, there are people in the world, with identity view, who are not stream winners, who can act selflessly, and answer in an objective way without the above kind of bias. After all, an unenlightened person can selflessly act with altruism and compassion (karuna), to help another person.
The second type of bias is a deep-seated collection of biases, prejudices and stereotypes that lies deep within a person's mind. These are related to more than one of the ten fetters.
An example of this is that a person who identifies with a religion that's against homosexuality and abortion, might answer general questions about these topics in a way that is aligned to his bias, even if any kind of answer to these questions do not bring him any profit or loss.
This kind of bias is very deeply ingrained and it would be very hard for a person with identity view to avoid this kind of bias.

Is a person able to give a "objective" answer if the mind is caught by identification-views intentionally?

That is the reason why we should answer by quoting the arahants' speaking.
I am not a Stream-Enterer. I can enlighten this life, but it is not going to happen because my Buddhist mission drives me to pause my meditation.
It makes me answering here without enlightenment.
Buddha already allowed my case by rules in VN Mahhākhandhaka and Mahāpadesa, so I can answer the question if I still quote the original text from Tipitaka and Atthakatha without making them conflict with each other.
It's like when I answer by only my opinion, it is my responsibility, but it is Tipitaka, Atthakatha, and the readers' responsibility when I answer the question by the quote, only when it is the right quote. My opinion can come from Sakkāyadiṭṭhi but Tipitaka and Atthakatha can't, so if the reader proves my quote with the origin they will see the truth that I never try to make Tipitaka conflict with each other, never make Atthakathā conflict with each other, and never cut any part of Tipitaka and Atthakathā off. It protects the reader from my opinion. The only Pāli canons without conflict with each other appear in my answer.
The Tipitaka and Ancient Atthakatha were arranged by the first council members and the Siṅhala Atthakatha was already arranged by Buddhagosa, so it is impossible that they let their work conflict with each other, right?

Wouldn't such a person, in such a state not either give a non-biased answer certain unaware of certain "self-damaging" or be shameless? In cases of being aware and fearing "self-damaging" simply not answering?

When I answer the question which I understand of it I feel like I am making "The Shorter Discourse on the Lion’s Roar", but when I answer the question which I don't understand of it I feel like "I am going to distort Tipitaka and Atthakatha and I am going to make people misunderstand in Tipitaka and Atthakatha", so I often avoid the question which is never quoted Tipitaka and Atthakatha because I don't understand the question objective exactly.
Below is an example
I can't understand Johann's question because he not often quote the original text. I often tell Johann about my terrible English skill through many years we met each other, but he never improves himself to understand my problem. This is very different from the Pa-Auk monks because they try to improve themselves to teach me and Thai people by learning Thai culture, i.e. language and pāli, another from ChrisW who often offer me help on the mistake of my english skill. I never find this help from Johann. Johann looks like a weird monk who often act out of Tipitaka and Atthakathā for me. Johann never tries to understand my terrible in English, not often quote Pali, and never understand my Buddhist mission. This is making realize that I should avoid him, the outsider monk for me.
I can be friends with people that disagree with me, I never keep to hate anyone, but someone can be my close friend if we try to adapt ourselves to keep our relationship. This is what Johann never did.
Johann often thinks "my opinion is the best truth", so he still keeps to make Tipitaka conflict each other although I can prove that they are not the real conflict, it is just the readers' fails. This is what I think he doesn't be honest with the pieces of evidence.

Why I should care for the person who tries to make conflict of the no
conflict?
Why I should care for the person who tries to distort the pieces of
evidence?
Why I should care for the person who never cares about the truth from the evidence?
If their understanding is right, why they still making Tipitaka
conflict with each other and trying to cut some part of Tipitaka off?
Why I should care a person who called himself "I am a monk" who acting weird from the Tipitaka monk?
Why I should care of who never try to improve himself to understand me?

I still keep saying everyone is my friends however only someone can be my close friends.

I prove that I answer every question which I understand it by the above example, but for Johann case, I can't see the way I can answer him. He often uses difficult English grammar and he does not often quote the original text, while the other anti abihdhammist people quote, so I can understand the other question, except Johann's.
Johann: good to have a clear sample of the question's matter.

If Agati is ceased by Arahanta then DN 31 must be a teaching for Arahant Householders. This does not make sense to me.


text:
Buddhism to change the world
According to Buddhism, should one change oneself or change the world and why.

Please clarify, are you trying to plot "fight for truth, freedom, justice" against "reduce Dukkha" ? Please clarify what you are trying to ask. Ask directly also helps... no need to play with words. And no need to evolve your question based on my answer.

@PbxMan Once again, this is not a web forum. Please keep your questions to the point. "According to Buddhism, should one change oneself or change the world and why" - that woud be enough. Thanks.

@AndreiVolkov don't worry all take it another forum. I cannot delete from here. Would you please do that for me?

Changing oneself and changing the world aren't mutually exclusive. Unless one is a hermit living completely isolated from the world, a layman who "changes himself" by observing precepts, practicing meditation, etc. would make a correlated positive impact on the world due to the positive effect on other people from his 3 gateways: mind, body, and speech.

The Buddha did not intend monks to participate in politics, as seen in DN 2:

"Whereas some brahmans and contemplatives, living off food given in
  faith, are addicted to talking about lowly topics such as these —
  talking about kings, robbers, ministers of state; armies, alarms, and
  battles; food and drink; clothing, furniture, garlands, and scents;
  relatives; vehicles; villages, towns, cities, the countryside; women
  and heroes; the gossip of the street and the well; tales of the dead;
  tales of diversity [philosophical discussions of the past and future],
  the creation of the world and of the sea, and talk of whether things
  exist or not — he abstains from talking about lowly topics such as
  these. This, too, is part of his virtue.

However, the Buddha did intend for lay people to participate in constructive nation building, in accordance with the Dhamma in DN 16:

At that time the Venerable Ananda was standing behind the Blessed One, fanning him, and the Blessed One addressed the Venerable
  Ananda thus: "What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis have frequent
  gatherings, and are their meetings well attended?"
"I have heard, Lord, that this is so."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis assemble and disperse
  peacefully and attend to their affairs in concord?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they do."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis neither enact new decrees
  nor abolish existing ones, but proceed in accordance with their
  ancient constitutions?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they do."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis show respect, honor,
  esteem, and veneration towards their elders and think it worthwhile to
  listen to them?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they do."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis refrain from abducting
  women and maidens of good families and from detaining them?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they refrain from doing so."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis show respect, honor,
  esteem, and veneration towards their shrines, both those within the
  city and those outside it, and do not deprive them of the due
  offerings as given and made to them formerly?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they do venerate their shrines, and that
  they do not deprive them of their offerings."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline.
"What have you heard, Ananda: do the Vajjis duly protect and guard the
  arahats, so that those who have not come to the realm yet might do so,
  and those who have already come might live there in peace?"
"I have heard, Lord, that they do."
"So long, Ananda, as this is the case, the growth of the Vajjis is to
  be expected, not their decline."

AN4.95 clearly lists the priorities of practicing to help oneself vs. others:
Not so good:

One who practices to benefit neither themselves nor others;

Better:

one who practices to benefit others, but not themselves;

Even better:

one who practices to benefit themselves, but not others; and

Best:

one who practices to benefit both themselves and others.

Notice that practicing to become a better person is seen as having more benefit that telling others how to practice. It sounds odd until you think about it, but when you think about it, would you follow the example of one who does not practice what they preach?
Hence it is best to practice and help others practice, but it's also ok to just worry about your own practice until you can help others.

Buddhism is not a religion that tries to change the world I think. Just like Buddhism don't give direct explanations of the nature of the universe. Buddhism's purpose is to lead people to experience the nature of reality themselves and give proper guidence to the people who have the intention to free themselves from suffering.
I remember a dhammaphada verse(thousands) that is not directly connected to this topic but I think it can give us some insight about Buddhism's approach to this subject

Greater in battle than the man who would conquer a thousand-thousand men, is he who would conquer just one — himself.
Better to conquer yourself than others. When you've trained yourself, living in constant self-control, neither a deva nor gandhabba, nor a Mara banded with Brahmas, could turn that triumph back into defeat.

If a person is interested to the core of Buddhism(meditation) most likely s/he  becomes less interested to changing the world, because meditation leads people to realize that trying to change or help others can be an ego demand and most of the things in the world are out of our influence. Also trying to change the world without changing oneself can cause harm to others because a person's state of mind directly influences the quality of his/her actions. But that doesn't mean that everyone who are deeply involved with meditation are less interested to changing the world. Trying to change the world can continue in the meditators as a habit even If the meditators greatly purify themselves. Meditation leads people to become more aware of the suffering of other living beings, so it is possible for a Buddhist meditator to become interested to change the world but eventually that desire would be diminished because of the realization of the uncontrollability of the forms and the degree of craziness of the humans.
Buddhism is not a political movement, don't have "Sharia Laws", don't try to conquer the world, forcibly trying to change an individual's desires or have rules that restricts people's freewill so it is up to the individual to decide to interfere the world politics or try to change the world or not. But "doing good deeds" to other people and living beings is certainly what Buddhism directly recommends to it's followers but that is not the same thing as trying to change the world I think.

that's a clear example of somebody who needs to work with their inside.

Anyone who acknowledges Dukkha (Suffering) and wants to eliminate as such, need to work with their inside.

According to Buddhism is it bad for her to try to change her external conditions or perhaps she is encouraged to do so because after all she is taking action for the everybody's well-being?

Another xxx VS xxx....
It is for her to decide. Is she experiencing Dukkha? Does improving her external conditions directly lead to less Dukkha? If yes, Go for it. How about improving the inner conditions first?
Whether her external conditions prevents her from improving her inner conditions, is a different matter of fact and cannot be determined unless you articulate the exact situation.

This answer doesn't make sense now after the question was edited.

Yes. Pbxman kept changing the question after I posted the answer. He even deleted his account now. Probably just trolling and realized its much harder than he/she thought...

If the world has many problems, it is up to the people of the world to sort out those problems rather than Buddhism.
I may be a Buddhist in this world and thus choose to not purchase sweatshop goods or choose to not support certain politicians, which may include not supporting the government of the nation I live in.
However, every other person, be they Buddhists or non-Buddhists, must also contribute to this. If others do not join in the path of goodness then I alone cannot change the world (even though my own Buddhist actions are moral & harmless).
For example, if I have a problematic neighbour, I sort out the problem. I talk to the neighbour or go to the police or go to a court of law. I do not wait for a Buddhist in a Superman outfit to save me from my bad neighbour.
Similarly, while illegal immigrants should not enter into the USA or any other sovereign nation, if this is really a major issue, it is up to the American people to sort out this issue. It does not require SuperBuddha to save the day, like in a Hollwywood movie.
The girl working in the sweatshop can try to educate herself and move out of the sweatshop. Regardless, it is American companies operating most of these sweatshops and the American people buying most of the sweatshop goods. America is a democracy. People can boycott sweatshops and lobby to have clothing made again in the USA. If people do not think importing all of their goods is a problem then that is the will of the people; just as it is the will of the American people to destroy nation after nation in imperialist wars. SuperBuddha cannot stop this.
In short, these political matters are for the people of the world to sort out. The people of the world may include Buddhists. But Buddha is not a SuperBuddha from a Hollywood movie.

yes people who want to change the world and babble about revolutions and are obsessed with rights completely fail to understand that nobody can be forced to be mindful nor being secluded from sensuality and that there is no punishment to forbid non-mindulfness and so on.
The people who love the idea of helping people do not even manage themselves to be mindful for more than a few hours, yet they have no problem fantasizing themselves has been good people able to make other people better.
 It is part of their insolence of claiming to know the dhamma, when all they do is being infatuated to the toxic pile of garbage that is the aggregates, always trying to salvage sensuality by claiming that  sensuality is skillful, always daydreaming and building stories that deep down in their heart, they are not bad people already, so that they leave room for a little improvement in order to have  a purpose in life, because daydreaming about not changing their ways is all they have in their life.
When they see that they have no skills to better themselves, they long for some external source of improvement which would make everybody better.
In fact, most of the people addicted to sensuality do not want to stop clinging to sensual pleasures. Some of those people  even claim that nibanna would be the most horrible event to happen to anybody.

If Buddhism has taught me anything, it's that you can't engineer happiness.  Real joy in this life comes only by a wholehearted engagement with emptiness.  Any attempts to engender joy, no matter how valiant, are ultimately impermanent.  Institutions wither, people die, and the enthusiasm that burns so brightly at the heart of many social programs ultimately burns out.  Worse, no intentional act, no matter how pure in intention, is wholly wholesome in its impact.
I remember when I was a kid and working at a coffee shop.  This well dressed, well spoken man used to come in all the time.  Apparently he used to be a doctor in the country he grew up in.  His medical license didn't transfer, so now he was studying up to take his exams in America.  The man was a saint.  He was kind, generous in spirit, and just a pleasure to be around.  He once was named Mr. Barbados back in his home country and was very interested in bodybuilding and weightlifting - an interest I shared with him.  Everyday he'd come in and ask me how my workouts were going.  He even came to see me lift a few times at some powerlifting meets.
I saw this guy pretty much everyday for a year.  One day he comes up to me and says that he needs me to proctor a test for him.  I agree.  He tells me, "don't worry about me cheating, I'm a Jehovah's Witness.  We don't cheat!"  I was flabbergasted by his admission.  If you know anything about this sect of Christianity, you'll know that bearing witness - essentially proselytizing - is at the heart of their practice.  I never heard him mention a peep about it.  I asked him about it.  "Good sir," he says to me, "do you think I would cheat?"  I tell him no.  "Do you think I am a good man?"  I said of course.  "Are you happy to see me when I come in?"  Absolutely, I said.  "That is my witness.  That is my light of Christ."
Atta dipa.  Be your own light.  We can only illuminate our own way and let that brightness shine on the paths of others.  What will be your witness?  How will your light shine in the world?

One cannot change the world.
One can only change oneself and that is done by practicing the Dhamma.

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sort: votes


text:
No owner of the Dhamma?
Surely a convention-philosophy conflicting question:
One sad "There's no owner for this Dhamma." Can this be related to the Buddhas words as they are known from the Sublime Canon, or is it told different, or both, or neither?
If there is an owner of the Dhamma, what makes them rightly recognized as such?
[Note: This question is not given for trade, exchange or whatever wordily gain and bondage]

No owner of the Dhamma?
  If there are owner of the Dhamma, what makes them rightly recognized as such?

There are no owners of the Dhamma. The Dhamma is timeless, impersonal and cannot be owned by anyone. There are practitioners and teachers of the Dhamma.
Furthermore, the Dhamma is discovered. A fully enlightened Buddha discovers the Dhamma and teaches it.
In the Nagara Sutta, the Buddha teaches how he discovered an ancient Path, the Noble Eightfold Path, and by following it he came to experience the cessation of aging and death (conditioned reality).

"... So too, bhikkhus, I saw the ancient path, the ancient road travelled
  by the Perfectly Enlightened Ones of the past. And what
  is that ancient path, that ancient road? It is just this Noble
  Eightfold Path; that is, right view, right intention, right speech,
  right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right
  concentration. I followed that path and by doing so I have directly
  known aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation,and the way leading to its cessation ..."
-- SN 12.65: The City, p. 603, Bodhi transl.

Sir, this is truly an excellent answer!

"Monks, I will teach you the Dhamma compared to a raft, for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of holding onto. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak." ~ cited from Alagaddupama Sutta. I suppose this also supports the idea expressed in the answer.

Bhagava: (the only) one able to give (his own). Only an Araht is real owner of the Dhamma.
Who are the owner of the Dhamma? The Buddha and his Noble disciples, are the owner of the Dhamma, having seen it by themselves, made it their own. The first seven persons are particulary owner.
Faith and Dhamma-followers are those helping the owner to carry.
Those outside the Noble Domain are debters or even thieves, making use of it and it's lable.
On the conventional level the Savaka Sangha of the Buddhas monastic disciples is the owner and carrier. Althought there are many this days who actually steal their heritage for their lifelihood, and monks selling of the heritage, transgressing strongly and heavy in doing so, even when monks give away heavy possession, as the Buddha said, it still belongs to the Sangha.
That is why the wise old never keeped such in there houses but brought it quickly back to a good monastery so that it could benefit many for a long time.
Don't get involved in fencing! Be quick if realizing t9 be in the middle of a plunderer-crowd!
Don't forget "Namo..." if having borrowed for possible deliverance.

"It is in dependence on me as an admirable friend that beings subject to birth have gained release from birth, that beings subject to aging have gained release from aging, that beings subject to death have gained release from death, that beings subject to sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair have gained release from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. It is through this line of reasoning that one may know how admirable friendship, admirable companionship, admirable camaraderie is actually the whole of the holy life." the threefold refuge

People are shameless in times of plunderer, but the easy way to act common wrong does not prevent from the effects, and tears will not help once seeing that having act as the greatest thief of ones parents.

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text:
Western scholars: Did the Buddha not speak the Digha Nikaya?
Recently, Bhikkhu Sujato wrote:

It is no coincidence that these elaborate texts are often addressed to
the brahmins, who were the self-proclaimed spiritual leaders of the
time. The brahmins were the custodians of the most sophisticated texts
in ancient India up to this time, the Vedic literature. It seems that
one aim of the Dīgha was to impress such learned men.
The Long Discourses: Dhamma as literature and compilation

There also this introduction on Access to Insight (which cites Bhikkhu Bodhi and Joy Manné):

The "Long" Discourses (Pali digha = "long") consists of 34 suttas,
including the longest ones in the Canon. The subject matter of these
suttas ranges widely, from colorful folkloric accounts of the beings
inhabiting the deva worlds (DN 20) to down-to-earth practical
meditation instructions (DN 22), and everything in between. Recent
scholarship suggests that a distinguishing trait of the Digha Nikaya
may be that it was "intended for the purpose of propaganda, to attract
converts to the new religion."1

Bhikkhu Bodhi, Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Somerville, Mass.: Wisdom Publications, 2000), p.31, referring to Joy Manné's
"Categories of Sutta in the Pali Nikayas and Their Implications for
Our Appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature," Journal of
the Pali Text Society 15 (1990): 29-87.

Sutta Pitaka
The Basket of Suttas

Is there evidence (such as contradictions with other suttas) suggesting the Buddha did not speak the Digha Nikaya?
In there any evidence in the suttas where the Buddha said he would teach a different modified Dhamma ("propaganda") merely for the purpose of converting Brahmins & other outsiders?
Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible" in his teaching of Dhamma? Or do the suttas show the Buddha wished his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of what he taught?

There is plenty of textological evidence showing that DN and MN were composed long after AN and SN, and most likely DN & MN were made by compiling pieces of AN & SN.

Why don't you post some of this evidence in an answer. Thanks

My desire to be right is not strong enough for that amount of tedious mechanical work copy/pasting quotes for you.

DD It is even questionable whether every Sutta besides the Digha Nikayas are as authentic as portrayed. I don't believe that the Buddha repeated himself a thousand of times per meeting, nor is it believable that Buddha had psychic powers to hear other's conversations. That's just too god-alike. Same could be said about the passing away of the Buddha that he entered the Jhanas and left them. This is probably more likely, but again shows a god alike character portrayed by monks. It was also said that a lot of students reached certain levels of enlightenment just by mere listening. Unlikely imo.

But then again, whether the aforementioned things really occured or not is actually not that important. It's rather important whether there are inconsistencies in the teaching, to see the context in which Buddha was living (a Brahmin influenced society), and finally, if the teaching works. In the end it's personal interpretation anyways, and if one apriori believes in unverifiable teachings it is hard to challenge those people adhering to such beliefs to begin with.

Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible" in his teaching of Dhamma?

He was not a little flexible when one spoke A-dhamma but did not limit the Tataghata to his speech at the same time, as the only that should be taken as that of the Tataghata.
Once the Budddha rebuked some who told that another does teach something the Buddha did not say by "What ever Dhamma a Noble one speaks, it is the Dhamma of the Tatagatha". One may google it ... or ask a monk for details if able to leave house. It was, btw, on the teaching one gave, that one should seriously reflect one's own attainments and that of others, periodical!
[off (ordinary) cause: this is not given for trade, stacks, exchange or Buddh-ism and other binding purposes for the world but dedicated for refuge toward liberation]

Is there evidence (such as contradictions with other suttas)
suggesting the Buddha did not speak the Digha Nikaya?

The four primary Theravadin Nikayas, namely Digha Nikaya, Majjhima Nikaya, Samyutta Nikaya, and Anguttara Nikaya contained no contradiction with each other.
You may also wish to scrutinize the Buddhist Councils "convention" and their outcomes to ascertain the level of "authenticity"/preservation of the Buddha's teachings.
In there any evidence in the suttas where the Buddha said he would
teach a different modified Dhamma ("propaganda") merely for the
purpose of converting Brahmins & other outsiders?

In the suttas, the Buddha pretty much taught the same thing to everyone. There was no "special" teachings for select groups of disciples or audiences.
Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible"
in his teaching of Dhamma? Or do the suttas show the Buddha wished
his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of what
he taught?

The Buddha had over 40 years to teach. So, he did teach the same thing in many ways depending on the intellectual level of his listeners. And he had 40 years to admonish/correct disciples who developed wrong views of his teachings.

It was the Buddha who spoke the words of the DN, but it was compiled, collated, arranged and rearranged by the Sangha centuries after his passing. The DN was not fabricated. Also the Buddha certainly never said, "Today I'm going to speak Digha Nikaya 1".
The Sangha may have rearranged the suttas into the sequence of the DN today with intention to define the difference between the Buddha's teachings and other religions (in DN 1), the role of the monks (in DN 2), the role of the lay followers (in DN 31), the continuation of Buddhism after the Buddha passes away (in DN 16) etc. There might have been some specific intention behind this arrangement, perhaps to create a constitution of sorts.

OP: Is there evidence (such as contradictions with other suttas) suggesting the Buddha did not speak the Digha Nikaya?

There is no evidence of contradiction between the nikayas.

OP: In there any evidence in the suttas where the Buddha said he would teach a different modified Dhamma ("propaganda") merely for the
  purpose of converting Brahmins & other outsiders?

No. The Buddha taught the same thing to monks, lay followers and outsiders, according to SN 42.7:

“To me, the monks and nuns are like the good field. I teach them the
  Dhamma that’s good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in
  the end, meaningful and well-phrased. And I reveal a spiritual
  practice that’s entirely full and pure. Why is that? Because they live
  with me as their island, protection, shelter, and refuge.
To me, the
  laymen and laywomen are like the average field. I also teach them the
  Dhamma that’s good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in
  the end, meaningful and well-phrased. And I reveal a spiritual
  practice that’s entirely full and pure. Why is that? Because they live
  with me as their island, protection, shelter, and refuge.
To me, the
  ascetics, brahmins, and wanderers who follow other paths are like the
  poor field, the bad ground of sand and salt. I also teach them the
  Dhamma that’s good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in
  the end, meaningful and well-phrased. And I reveal a spiritual
  practice that’s entirely full and pure. Why is that? Hopefully they
  might understand even a single sentence, which would be for their
  lasting welfare and happiness.

So, he did not teach followers and non-followers differently..

OP: Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible" in his teaching of Dhamma? Or do the suttas show the Buddha
  wished his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of
  what he taught?

WHAT he taught was the same, but HOW he taught it, could be different according to the Kesi Sutta (AN 4.111):

"Kesi, I train a tamable person [sometimes] with gentleness,
  [sometimes] with harshness, [sometimes] with both gentleness &
  harshness.
"In using gentleness, [I teach:] 'Such is good bodily conduct. Such is
  the result of good bodily conduct. Such is good verbal conduct. Such
  is the result of good verbal conduct. Such is good mental conduct.
  Such is the result of good mental conduct. Such are the devas. Such
  are human beings.'
"In using harshness, [I teach:] 'Such is bodily misconduct. Such is
  the result of bodily misconduct. Such is verbal misconduct. Such is
  the result of verbal misconduct. Such is mental misconduct. Such is
  the result of mental misconduct. Such is hell. Such is the animal
  womb. Such the realm of the hungry shades.'
"In using gentleness & harshness, [I teach:] 'Such is good bodily
  conduct. Such is the result of good bodily conduct. Such is bodily
  misconduct. Such is the result of bodily misconduct. Such is good
  verbal conduct. Such is the result of good verbal conduct. Such is
  verbal misconduct. Such is the result of verbal misconduct. Such is
  good mental conduct. Such is the result of good mental conduct. Such
  is mental misconduct. Such is the result of mental misconduct. Such
  are the devas. Such are human beings. Such is hell. Such is the animal
  womb. Such the realm of the hungry shades.'"
"And if a tamable person doesn't submit either to a mild training or
  to a harsh training or to a mild & harsh training, what do you do?"
"If a tamable person doesn't submit either to a mild training or to a
  harsh training or to a mild & harsh training, then I kill him, Kesi."
"But it's not proper for our Blessed One to take life! And yet the
  Blessed One just said, 'I kill him, Kesi.'"
"It is true, Kesi, that it's not proper for a Tathagata to take life.
  But if a tamable person doesn't submit either to a mild training or to
  a harsh training or to a mild & harsh training, then the Tathagata
  doesn't regard him as being worth speaking to or admonishing. His
  knowledgeable fellows in the holy life don't regard him as being worth
  speaking to or admonishing. This is what it means to be totally
  destroyed in the Doctrine & Discipline, when the Tathagata doesn't
  regard one as being worth speaking to or admonishing, and one's
  knowledgeable fellows in the holy life don't regard one as being worth
  speaking to or admonishing."

Is there any evidence in the suttas showing the Buddha was "flexible" in his teaching of Dhamma? Or do the suttas show the Buddha wished his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of what he taught?
I think the Buddha explained Dhamma, and that the explanation was adapted according to who he was addressing.
This footnote to the Sigalovada sutta, for example, suggests that "worshipping the six directions" was a Vedic ritual, and the Buddha takes advantage of the occasion to teach a different doctrine.
But that's not to say that the doctrine is incompatible with the doctrine taught in other suttas (but it is rather different to the Rhinoceros sutta for example).
Or according to Piya Tan the Aggañña Sutta (DN 27) is addressed to Brahmins (i.e. probationary monks who were Brahmins) and is perhaps a parody of Brahminical creation myths. The subject matter is "fantastic" but the doctrine (i.e. that the fall is due to craving "nourishment") is again not incompatible with other suttas.
I don't mean to generalise about the whole Digha Nikaya. But you ask whether he was "flexible, or, wished to remain consistent" -- perhaps he was flexible 'and' remained consistent.
I think that's famously part of his ability as Buddha, i.e. to know how to teach different people.
One of the suttas which shows that "the Buddha wished his teachings to remain consistent & clearly representative of what he taught" is (perhaps ironically, given the question) the Maha-parinibbana Sutta i.e. DN 16 -- which includes the "four great references" and so on.

Incidentally in this answer Bonn says ...

I can answer the question if I still quote the original text from Tipitaka and Atthakatha without making them conflict with each other.
I never try to make Tipitaka conflict with each other, never make Atthakathā conflict with each other, and never cut any part of Tipitaka and Atthakathā off.

... and in this answer ...

People who can understand the noble truth from tipitaka must can deconflict every uncleared word of tipitaka

... so I presume it's possible that, I think it's the opinion of e.g. Thai/Buddhist scholars that, the teachings are consistent.
In my opinion though (I don't know about Bonn's) to say "they're consistent" might need some flexibility (and good-will, and if not 'faith' exactly then at least a willingness to listen) in how you interpret them -- words have a range of meanings, they're often used metaphorically, part of the doctrine is not being over-attached to specific views, I think they are adapted/suited to the specific audience (often a reply to a specific question), etc.
Perhaps my opinion (above) is overly rosy though, and there are bits (of suttas) -- not all in the Digha Nikaya -- which I overlook or ignore. I don't think I'd want to argue the doctrinal details you identify in your answer -- some of your comments (e.g. about namarupa) I just don't understand or have no opinion about; and some (e.g. about DN 27) isn't how I read that sutta (and I'm content with my reading of it but I'm not sure it would benefit anyone to try to argue about it with you).

The Digha Nikaya has so many contradictions. I might take days so to finish this post.

DN 11 (which similar to MN 49 is anti-Brahmanistic propaganda addressed to Brahmans) refers to a 'consciousness without feature that occurs when nama-rupa is destroyed'. However, the core suttas (MN 9; SN 12.65; SN 12.67; etc) say consciousness cannot exist without nama-rupa. This is a contradiction, which supports the claim of the Western scholars that the DN was composed as propaganda for converting Brahmans. It also supports the intelligent view that 'nama-rupa' in the DN has the old Brahmanistic meaning rather than the Buddhist meaning. There can be a consciousness without 'naming-forms' but there cannot be a consciousness without mind-body.
DN 15 defines 'nama-rupa' in the old Brahmanistic way; and not the new Buddhist way found in SN 12.2; MN 9, etc. This is a contradiction.
In AN 3.61, the Buddhist lists the sense bases as one of his four teachings. But DN 15 does not even include the sense bases. To have nine conditions for Dependent Origination but exclude the sense bases is a contradiction.
DN 15 does not define 'aging & death' and gives a biological rather than mental description of 'jati'. SN 12.2 defines 'jati' as the production of 'beings' ('satta'). SN 5.10 and SN 23.2 define 'a being' as a view or idea. Therefore, DN 15 does not provide for a proper interpretation of 'jati'.
DN 15 does not define the six-fold consciousness but refers to a consciousness entering in a womb; which is not taught anywhere else in the suttas. This is a contradiction.
DN 27 gives a biological origin of the world account; where SN 12.44 and AN 4.45 say the world originates from sense contact. This is a contradiction.

You quote the Sigalovada sutta though, don't you? And it is introduced as an antithesis to a Brahmanistic ritual.

The topic is about the DN not about "me". The above comment appears to be "identitarian Cultural Marxism" that focuses upon "personalities" rather than about Buddhism.

The way the question is phrased seems to be writing off the whole DN, I guess I'm wondering whether you intended that. I'm not sure where the title comes from (i.e. that the DN isn't buddha vacana) given the quotes (which maybe don't imply that). Also you said this answer is incomplete -- I was curious to know your view (if you have one to share) of DN 31 (and also DN 16). But I can delete my comment, if you find it offensive or something.

In the interest of Buddha dhamma:-
DN 11 (which similar to MN 49 is anti-Brahmanistic propaganda
addressed to Brahmans) refers to a 'consciousness without feature
that occurs when nama-rupa is destroyed'.

In DN 11 (Kevatta Sutta), quoting from Maurice Walshe's translation, substituting the ambiguous "consciousness" with vinanna:-
And the answer is:
Where vinanna is signless, boundless, all-luminuous,
That's where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul,
There namarupa are wholly destroyed,_
With the cessation of vinanna, this is all destroyed.

You missed the last line - the vinanna's cessation.
Many experienced human meditators, while they are still alive and kicking, have "seen" this vinanna that is signless, boundless, luminous. It can never be seen via thinking and reading. And it is "there", eventually, and finally, at the expiration of that individual's present karmic "life forces", that the final liberation is won, i.e., the next namarupa cannot come into being.
I do not wish to cause ill-will and unease by writing point-by-point counter-reply to the other statements you had made in your answer to your own question.
However, should your intention be skillful, i.e., to know others' opinion so that you have some answers to your many questions, you may wish to ask your questions separately. On the contrary, if you had come to your own conclusions, this forum may not be the correct place as it is a question-answer platform.
My apology for offering an unsolicited advice/opinion. Upon reading your reply to your own question, I know that many of your doubts can be cleared with meditation practise. Thereafter, you will be too "occupied" trying to match your experience/insight with the Abhidhamma. Ehipassiko.

May you quickly find unconditioned inner peace.


text:
How to reconcile Mahayana ideas of "nama-rupa" with the Pali definition?
I read the following ideas on the internet by Mahayana faithful:

Namarupa means "name-form" - meaning "a concept of form", "an idea of
  form" - referring to our subjective representations of external and
  internal phenomena, as well as the most important Name-Form, our idea
  of self. So in my understanding, every time we delineate [external!] objects, our ideas of objects keep getting more concrete. And then these ideas feed back into the delineation process, making delineation more precise but also more rigid and fixed. Thus these two - "the process of delineation" and "the collection of ideas" - support each other in their growth and development.

And, in affirming the above idea and negating an alternate explanation, another Mahayana said:

But your understanding of consciousness and name-form is not Buddhist.
  It's not even logically correct.

Now, in the Pali suttas of SN 12.2 and MN 9, "nama-rupa" is described as follows:

And what are nama and rupa?
Katamañca, bhikkhave, nāmarūpaṃ?
Feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention.
Vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro—
This is called nama.
idaṃ vuccati nāmaṃ.
The four primary elements and form derived from the four primary
  elements.
Cattāro ca mahābhūtā, catunnañca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ.
This is called rupa.
Idaṃ vuccati rūpaṃ.

In his translation of the Majjhima Nikaya in 1995, Bhikkhu Bodhi translated 'nama-rupa' as 'mentality-materiality' as follows:

When, friends, a noble disciple understands mentality-materiality, the
  origin of mentality-materiality, the cessation of
  mentality-materiality, and the way leading to the cessation of
  mentality-materiality, in that way he is one of right view…and has
  arrived at this true Dhamma.
Feeling, perception, volition, contact, and attention—these are called
  mentality. The four great elements and the material form derived from
  the four great elements—these are called materiality.
MN 9

Also, in the Pali, the word "nimitta" is often found, to mean "theme" or "sign". For example, ideas such as "beautiful" are said to be a "nimitta". The Pali (MN 43) says such nimitta are produced by greed, hatred & delusion. Therefore, the impression is these nimitta are much more than mere "perception" ("sanna"). At least in the Pali, "nimitta" appear to be "mental formations" ("sankhara").
My questions are:

How does the Pali definition above about "feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention" describe the Mahayana idea of "a concept of form" and "an idea of form"? Particularly how do the Pali terms "contact", "intention" and "attention" operate as part of this Mahayana "a concept of form" and "an idea of form"?
How is the Mahayana "a concept of form" and "an idea of form" different to the Pali "nimitta"?

Unlike Theravada tradition, which passes down the words, Mahayana tradition passes down the meaning - using whatever words and images that are most fitting for the occasion and the recipient.
So in Mahayana tradition there is a large number of texts that explain the major points of Buddhism in a variety of ways. Some are written as poems, some are as formal treatises, some are as stories and anecdotes, and some are expansive comments elaborating on topics arranged in methodical sequence. Also, in Tibetan Mahayana tradition, it is customary for a tutor to go over an ancient (Mahayana) text, explaining the overall meaning and commenting on the points made, so that the next generation does not get stuck with a text they no more understand.
Many of these texts and lectures cover development and arising of the samsaric mind. Because Mahayana is more focused on the overall meaning than on the exact form, many of these teachings do not literally go point by point over the Twelve Nidanas, but they do describe the overall process, some in more broad terms and some in more details. One such example is Lamp of Mahamudra by Tsele Natsok Rangdrol which I quote in this answer. Another example is Thrangu Rinpoche's lecture on Madhyantavibhanga. Yet another example is Chogyam Trungpa's lecture that I quote in this answer.
Not a single of these explanations is 100% perfectly clear, but combined together they absolutely paint the coherent picture.
I have read and was exposed to enough of these learning materials on the topic of development and arising of the samsaric mind that I now have a very strong confidence that I do understand the overall meaning.
The gist of Dependent Origination (a better translation would be "Gradual Auto-Arising"), as explained in these texts and by these teachers, is progressive/incremental/gradual development of differentiation, or development of the mind of delineation and designation of entities. This process starts from complete non-differentiation, goes through a phase of vagueness or semi-ambiguity, then matures to the point when individual objects are designated, and all this time in parallel with development of object-thinking there is a growing separation of this vs that, or self vs world. As this idea of self matures it starts getting involved in progressively more active interactions with the world of objects, until through the act of formulating an intention, carrying it out, appropriating the result, and connecting these three steps together, it gets enough cohesion as to become self-aware. Most explanations understandably paint this process in dark colors by showing how the increased separation leads to fear, aggression, indulging in pleasures, and eventual imprisonment in a web of results, relationships, obligations and other karmic constraints.
It is rather clear to me from these explanations that Namarupa-Nidana corresponds to an early phase of this process, when the mind has just accumulated enough impressions and tendencies as to start differentiating something, but before this something gets integrated across all sensory modalities as to become an "object" we can "come in contact" with. So Namarupa is a phase when the mind builds its notions of objects as cohesive entities. Chogyam Trungpa, for example, describes this phase so:

Things slowly escalate that way. ... When an object has a conceptualized name, it becomes significant. ... Names and forms serve as ... philosophical reinforcement. For instance ... you think that the title should fit the person.

From many such explanations, plus the very etymology of nama-rupa itself, plus my own years of meditation experience, it is rather clear to me that namarupa stands for some sort of information about an object's identity.
Or, perhaps, Namarupa stands for the entire collection of such information, comprising a single individual, what today we would call the "psyche". That is a possibility. It could even stand for both. (Remember the situation with the word Dharma which means phenomena, things, thoughts, a way of life, or the Buddha's Teaching - depending on the context.) In any case, Namarupa is definitely of the nature of information about entities and identities, names and forms.
Now, to answer your concrete questions:

How does the Pali definition above about "feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention" describe the Mahayana idea of "a concept of form" and "an idea of form"? Particularly how do the Pali terms "contact", "intention" and "attention" operate as part of this Mahayana "a concept of form" and "an idea of form"?

The point here is that the Skandhas (MN 9 is about the only sutta that erroneously brings in the "contact") are a collection of information, they are nothing else but Namarupa. As was explained many times, e.g. in Questions of King Milinda, the distinct Skandhas are a product of logical analysis, not actually separate things. In actuality the "stuff" that is skandhas is not divided into the four or five neat "piles of brushwood", it is all mixed together into what's traditionally described either as burning fire or the ocean where all rivers' waters mix. So the skandhas are "made" from the same "material" as the previous nidana, just a bit more specialized by now. What used to be formations(tendencies,latencies) solidifies into ability to delineate stuff, which eventually matures into a collection of information about the world of objects and the corresponding "psyche" or the inner world. This is Namarupa.

How is the Mahayana "a concept of form" and "an idea of form" different to the Pali "nimitta"?

Nimitta is what's known in cognitive sciences as identifying feature.
(Nimitta is not a "theme", that's a mistaken translation. The example of "a nimitta of beauty" speaks about a sign of beauty, such as for example long hair or big eyes or nice proportions or whatever.)
Instead, Nimitta is some basic clue that the mind uses to recognize stuff in the stream of raw sensory input. Namarupa is a more general concept, it is a notion of object, which may have one or more identifying features that (either individually or together) help us recognize the object.
Remember, according to Mahayana, objects do not exist, they are empty. Objects are constructs of mind; they are projections. Mahayana speaks about it all the time.
So, nimitta is just one part of this story, it is the sign by which an object is identified. When the sign is latched on, there come the chain of associative perception, the associated feelings, the associated impulses to do something in regards with the object etc. and all this information-about-the-object-and-the-mental-activity-it-enables is called Namarupa. I hope it's clear now.

Short answer? Mahāyāna follows śrāvaka non-Theravādin abhidharma in its definitions of these terms, not śrāvaka sūtrānta.

This? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namarupa-vyakarana I trust we will find nama-rupa has extensive pre-Buddhist Brahmanistic origins and the Mahayana views posted here also are the same as those old Brahmanistic definitions of "father naming his son", etc.

I think the two are similar in that, from a contemporary sūtrānta view, they can both be construed as abstractions and cerebralisation.  The above (OP) seems to be someone's personal interpretation, using personal idiosyncratic language.  That they feel the need to line up name-and-form with the contemplation of the internal, the external, the internal-external is very interesting.  A lot of the schools of Mahāyāna that stress non-duality inherit this line of thinking from things like the mindfulness bases.

As to the article on the Hindu view(s), I know so little about Hinduism I can't really comment, and the article doesn't seem to be written using any technical philosophical vocabulary from either Buddhism or Hindusim, which would help clarify it's contents.

All-in-all, I think the best place to go is Abhidharmakośakārikā.  This is a technical text that will give you your answer in the clearest and most precise terms, which you can then compare to Hindusim, Jainism, etc.  Keep in mind that it could be well that the Buddhist view once matched the Hindu view, but then either one or both innovated and the views came diverged.  This is also quite possible. In relation to the above text, there is a translation by Louis de La Vallé Poussin that one can find on the internet for free.  I'll post a link in a bit but I have some errands around to do first.

Since the Abhidharma is a rather imposing text, there is also a wonderfully concise, if someone biased, series of study notes by Āryopāsaka Korin which is on the Abhidharmakośakārikābhāṣya and approaches the material from the less influential Sautrāntika view, the other Abhidharma text above being Sarvāstivāda in outlook (as well as making some comparisons between newer Mahāyāna and older Mahāyāna).
As śrāvakāḥ converted to bodhisattvayāna, they essentially took their abhidharma texts with them.

One last thought, naming of the son by the father as an act of name-and-form, it just occurred to me that this is very similar to Christianity, when God creates by naming things, charges Adam, who is (made in) his image, to name things, and his "word"/name itself can be called a form or sorts (i.e. Jesus).

There is no difference to trace and may possible lir only in the preoccupations of the observer, taking words (form) as ideas (nama) and viciversa, thinking sanna is real, not able to trace nama or rupa within a kaya.
Worthy to think about coming in contact with the answer here.


text:
Where is careless attention (ayonisomanasikāro) in Dependent Origination?
AN 10.61 says:

Thus not associating with good persons, becoming full, fills up not
hearing the good Dhamma. Not hearing the good Dhamma, becoming full,
fills up lack of faith. Lack of faith, becoming full, fills up
careless attention (ayonisomanasikāro). Careless attention, becoming full, fills up lack
of mindfulness and clear comprehension. Lack of mindfulness and clear
comprehension, becoming full, fills up non-restraint of the sense
faculties. Non-restraint of the sense faculties, becoming full, fills
up the three kinds of misconduct.
AN 10.61

Since careless or improper attention (ayonisomanasikāro) results in non-restraint of the sense faculties, it appears this ayonisomanasikāro arises before sense contact in Dependent Origination. Is this true?
If the above is true, where do we think careless or improper attention (ayonisomanasikāro) should be placed within the standard teaching of the twelve conditions of Dependent Origination?

manasikāra or attention is part of the definition of nāma in nāmarupa. Or is this too easy?

MN 148 (my emphasis added) ...

Mind consciousness arises dependent on the mind and thoughts. The meeting of the three is contact. Contact is a condition for what is felt as pleasant, painful, or neutral. When you experience a pleasant feeling, if you don’t approve, welcome, and keep clinging to it, the underlying tendency to greed does not underlie that. When you experience a painful feeling, if you don’t sorrow or wail or lament, beating your breast and falling into confusion, the underlying tendency to repulsion does not underlie that. When you experience a neutral feeling, if you truly understand that feeling’s origin, ending, gratification, drawback, and escape, the underlying tendency to ignorance does not underlie that. Mendicants, after giving up the underlying tendency to greed for pleasant feeling, after dispelling the underlying tendency to repulsion towards painful feeling, after eradicating ignorance in the case of neutral feeling, after giving up ignorance and giving rise to knowledge, it’s totally possible to make an end of suffering in the present life.

... so maybe unwise attention happens at the "feeling" stage (and the converse is "guarding the senses").
You could probably say it's associated with other nidanas too, e.g. ignorance (which is arguably the "root"); and/or namarupa (per the definition you referenced here, i.e. that nama includes "Feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention").
Also MN 2 says that the "thicket of views" associated with self-views arises when attending inappropriately -- and MN 148 (quoted above) also says it's possible (but wrong) to identify with eye, eye-object, eye-consciousness, contact, feeling, craving, etc. -- so maybe that would be some inappropriate attention associated with all of these nidanas.
But because AN 10.6 says it results in "restraint of the sense faculties" I think that's talking about "guarding the senses" and therefore e.g. not delighting in feeling.
Maybe not "before" sense contact though -- before and after. I think the DO relationship is more complicated than strictly chronological e.g. "once around the clock, clockwise".

At the first point, avijja, see lokutara-Dependening co-arising/disapearing, Upanisa Sutta, for easier understanding in relation of the cited sutta and the doubts.
Not hearing, reminding the good Dhamma, no Saddha/Sila: Samsara.
This, how ever, is a matter of Upanissaya, strong conditions and thete given causes: lack of proper birth and missing of Dukkha.
[Note: not given for trade, exchange, stacks, Buddh-ism, bounds to the world, but to be used for liberation]

Based in MN 19, I say inappropriate attention occurs at nama-rupa.
The 1st thing inappropriate attention attends to inappropriately are the internal sankhara.
MN 19 describes how the Buddha-To-Be attended appropriately to the internal sankhara.

And as I remained thus heedful, ardent & resolute, thinking imbued
  with sensuality arose in me. I discerned that 'Thinking imbued with
  sensuality has arisen in me; and that leads to my own affliction or to
  the affliction of others or to the affliction of both. It obstructs
  discernment, promotes vexation & does not lead to Unbinding.'
As I noticed that it leads to my own affliction, it subsided. As I
  noticed that it leads to the affliction of others... to the affliction
  of both... it obstructs discernment, promotes vexation, & does not
  lead to Unbinding, it subsided. Whenever thinking imbued with
  sensuality had arisen, I simply abandoned it, dispelled it, wiped it
  out of existence.
Whatever a monk keeps pursuing with his thinking & pondering, that
  becomes the inclination of his awareness. If a monk keeps pursuing
  thinking imbued with sensuality, abandoning thinking imbued with
  renunciation, his mind is bent (namati) by that thinking
  imbued with sensuality. If a monk keeps pursuing thinking imbued with
  ill will, abandoning thinking imbued with non-ill will, his mind is
  bent by that thinking imbued with ill will. If a monk keeps pursuing
  thinking imbued with harmfulness, abandoning thinking imbued with
  harmlessness, his mind is bent by that thinking imbued with
  harmfulness.
MN 19

Note: the word "bent" above is "namati"; which, according to Buddhaghosa, is the verbal form or action of "nama". Buddhaghosa said: "why is it called nama; because it bends (namati); thus it is called nama". "Inclination" above is also related to "nama".
When the mind is bent inappropriately with inappropriate inclinations, this is ayoniso manasikāro (careless attention).
When the mind is not bent inappropriately, this is yoniso manasikāro (careful attention).
This is why knowing exactly what nama-rupa is is important. Nama-rupa is the 1st line of defense against ignorant sankharas.

I think the first link ignorance and the eight link Thanha (craving) is the result of Ayoniso Manasikara.


text:
DN 15: Whose or which consciousness enters the mother's womb?
In the pre-Buddhism Brahmanism philosophy, namarupa meant 'name-form' or 'naming-forms', as follows:

Nāmarūpa-vyākaraṇa (Sanskrit: नामरुपव्याकरण ), in Hindu philosophy,
  refers to the process of evolution of differentiation into names and
  forms i.e. to the unfolding of the primal state into the manifest
  world prior to which unfolding there was nothing that existed; it
  refers to the conditioned reality.
The sage of the Chandogya Upanishad regarded the creation of the
  universe as a huge chest/egg from a Primeval Being existing as the
  undifferentiated whole, who alone existed without a second prior to
  the commencement of the process of creation which was the beginning of
  the differentiation of the undifferentiated.
Namarupa-vyakarana - Wikipedia

It appears most of the self-appointed famous Western scholars agree the Digha Nikaya was composed for propagation to & conversion of Brahmins. See this topic: Western scholars: Did the Buddha did not speak the Digha Nikaya?.
It appears obviously DN 15 contains a description of 'namarupa' that conforms with the pre-existent Brahmanism, as follows:

This is the way to understand how from name-&-form as a requisite
  condition comes contact... If the permutations, signs, themes and
  indicators by which there is a description of name-group and
  form-group were all absent, would designation-contact or
  resistance-contact be discerned?

DN 15 continues with the following verse, for which the Pali must be included so my question can be considered & answered:

Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho
  nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathā”ti?
If consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would
  name-and-form take shape in the womb?"
Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu
  kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā”ti?
"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart,
  would name-and-form be produced for this world?"

DN 15 continues with the following words:

This is the extent to which there are means of designation, expression
  and delineation.... To what extent, Ananda, does one delineate when
  delineating a self?

My questions (which probably requires Pali knowledge that I personally do not have) are:

Which consciousness is entering into the mother's womb?
Is it the consciousness of a disembodied being or relinking consciousness floating in outer space seeking to be reincarnated?
Or is it the consciousness of the mother, so the dependent arising of the permutations, signs, themes and indicators that lead to her designating her embryo in her womb as "my baby" can occur?

No consciousness is entering into the mother's womb. 2. It is relinking consciousness NOT floating in outer space. 3. No, consciousness of the mother has no such power.

I would rather say consciousness is NOT entering into the mother's womb.

Which consciousness is entering into the mother's womb?

In English, the word consciousness already implies the (mental) self. In the context of this question, the term used in the Buddhist suttas is viññāṇa. It is the viññāṇa that "descends" (figuratively) into the womb.
Here is a (grossly) oversimplified way to understand viññāṇa via the reading (of this answer):-
Story #1
One day, a man decided to venture into a hutama. Not far into the hutama, he heard bunyee and caught a whiff of bauya. He felt jamaya in his being. He looked up and saw hamaza.
Story #2
One day, against the warnings of the villagers, a man insisted to venture into a forest reportedly inhabited by a flesh-eating demon. Not far into the forest, the man heard an unfamiliar sound and caught a whiff of an unfamiliar scent. Fear grew in him. He looked up and saw an unfamiliar figure. He soiled himself where he stood, and on regaining his composure, he ran.
Story #3
One day, upon hearing the presence of a grant-fulfilling tree in a forest, a man decided to seek for it. Not far into the forest, he heard an unfamiliar sound and caught a whiff of an unfamiliar scent. Excitement grew in him. He looked up an saw an unfamiliar figure. He was so happy that he cried.

Story #1 attempted to illustrate the viññāṇa as it arises through the ear, nose, "heart" and eye but stopped at the memory-look-up/comprehension step by using some made-up words. Story #2 and Story #3 attempted to illustrate unpleasantly and pleasantly preconditioned "heart" viññāṇa.

Is it the consciousness of a disembodied being or relinking
consciousness floating in outer space seeking to be reincarnated?

"Rebirth-linking consciousness" is a misnomer. In the kama-loka, when a being is dying, as the functioning of the physical sense organs deteriorate, so will the functioning of viññāṇa and mana. And when the viññāṇa ceases to function, the bhavanga kicks-in. The Theravadin Abhidhamma texts describe the bhavanga as the absence of mental awareness and comprehension. According to Visuddhimagga, it is this bhavanga that links up the next birth.
Or is it the consciousness of the mother, ...

A free woman can decide whether or not to bear a child. This much as I can say.

The term "rebirth linking consciousness" is "cuti citta" So, it's a bhavanga type of "citta" but not a viññāṇa.

Hehehe. Even citta needs "holiday".

The stories filled my mind with suspense but the end of your post (about bhavanga) was pretty boring but I scored your post up for the effort. Ultimately, you did not answer the question.

@Dhammadhatu Hehehe. Thank you for your brownie points. I need more, although I don't know what I could do with them. Hehehe.

Firstly, is there rebirth according to the suttas? (And is it also taught to monks?)
Yes. According to SN 12.19:

Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving,
  this body has originated. For the fool that ignorance has not been
  abandoned and that craving has not been utterly destroyed. For what
  reason? Because the fool has not lived the holy life for the complete
  destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the
  fool fares on to another body. Faring on to another body, he is not
  freed from birth, aging, and death; not freed from sorrow,
  lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; not freed from suffering,
  I say.

So, the fool gets reborn. But is it the same fool, or a different fool, or it's neither the same fool nor different fool? Which fool is it?
According to MN 38, it's not the same consciousness that gets reborn:

“Exactly so, venerable sir. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the
  Blessed One, it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders
  through the round of rebirths, not another.”
“What is that consciousness, Sāti?”
“Venerable sir, it is that which speaks and feels and experiences here
  and there the result of good and bad actions.”
“Misguided man, to whom have you ever known me to teach the Dhamma in
  that way? Misguided man, have I not stated in many ways consciousness
  to be dependently arisen, since without a condition there is no
  origination of consciousness? But you, misguided man, have
  misrepresented us by your wrong grasp and injured yourself and stored
  up much demerit; for this will lead to your harm and suffering for a
  long time.”

OK. So, if it's not the same consciousness or same individual that gets reborn, then is it a completely different unrelated individual?
Not really - it's not the same individual, yet not completely unrelated individual according to SN 12.17 (but paraphrased here):

Again, when the Buddha was asked by the naked ascetic Kassapa whether
  suffering was of one's own making or of another's or both or neither,
  the Buddha replied "Do not put it like that." When asked whether there
  was no suffering or whether the Buddha neither knew nor saw it, the
  Buddha replied that there was, and that he both knew and saw it. He
  then said "Kassapa, if one asserts that 'He who makes (it) feels (it):
  being one existent from the beginning, his suffering is of his own
  making,' then one arrives at eternalism. But if one asserts that one
  makes (it), another feels (it); being one existent crushed out by
  feeling, his suffering is of another's making,' then one arrives at
  annihilationism. Instead of resorting to either extreme a Tathaagata
  teaches the Dhamma by the middle way (by dependent origination)"

I see it as a chain of the succession of related changing processes that are dependently originated based on conditions, which can continue beyond the death of the physical body.

OP: Which consciousness is entering into the mother's womb?

It does not belong to someone. The "descent" of consciousness is not a literal physical movement of something but simply refers to the manifestation of consciousness, just as if I were to say "Buddhism descended into the minds of people".

OP: Is it the consciousness of a disembodied being or relinking consciousness floating in outer space seeking to be reincarnated?

If I were say, "Buddhism descended into the minds of people", you might ask "from where?".
Well, it certainly did not fly in some medium like a particle and enter into people's brains. But it transferred somehow didn't it? When people read Buddhism.SE questions and answers, or someone told them something, it caused them to think about it, and that's how Buddhism descended into their minds.
Similarly, I don't see it as a direct physical transfer of some thing but rather, it's an indirect information transfer of some kind. But I don't know how it works.
This is analogous to quantum entanglement in particle physics. Physicists cannot explain why or how it happens (because there is no physical transfer of information), but they know that it happens.

OP: Or is it the consciousness of the mother, so the dependent arising of the permutations, signs, themes and indicators that lead to
  her designating her embryo in her womb as "my baby" can occur?

I'll quote the excerpt of DN 15 here:

‘Name and form are conditions for contact’—that’s what I said. And
  this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were none of
  the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the category of
  mental phenomena is found. Would linguistic contact still be found in
  the category of physical phenomena?” “No, sir.” “Suppose there were
  none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the
  category of physical phenomena is found. Would impingement contact
  still be found in the category of mental phenomena?” “No, sir.”
  “Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and
  details by which the categories of mental or physical phenomena are
  found. Would either linguistic contact or impingement contact still be
  found?” “No, sir.” “Suppose there were none of the features,
  attributes, signs, and details by which name and form are found. Would
  contact still be found?” “No, sir.” “That’s why this is the cause,
  source, origin, and condition of contact, namely name and form.

Guess what? This seems to fit into Andrei Volkov's description of namarupa in this answer.

It might fit into Andrei Volkov's description of namarupa in this answer but, as i already pointed out in the question, the Western scholars say this was written for the Brahmans. Regardless, you did not appear to answer question 3. As for the rest of your answer, it is just idiosyncratic ideas about suttas.  SN 12.17 in particular is unrelated to this question. For example, "kaya" does not necessarily mean "physical body". Please refer to MN 44 which discusses "sakkaya"; where "kaya" refers to the five aggregates.


text:
What is the duality of body and external name-and-form?
What is the duality of body and external name-and-form?
What is the difference between the two? What is the relationship between the two?
From the Balapandita Sutta (SN 12.19) (translated by Bhikkhu Sujato):

“Mendicants, for a fool hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving,
  this body has been produced.
“Avijjānīvaraṇassa, bhikkhave, bālassa taṇhāya sampayuttassa evamayaṃ
  kāyo samudāgato.
So there is the duality of this body and external name and form.
  Contact depends on this duality. When contacted through one or other
  of the six sense fields, the fool experiences pleasure and pain.
Iti ayañceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ, itthetaṃ dvayaṃ, dvayaṃ
  paṭicca phasso saḷevāyatanāni, yehi phuṭṭho bālo sukhadukkhaṃ
  paṭisaṃvedayati etesaṃ vā aññatarena.

The same excerpt translated here by Bhikkhu Bodhi:

“Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by
  craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and
  external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is
  contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or
  through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and
  pain.

Also, as reference, from SN 12.2 (trans. Bodhi):

“And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition,
  contact, attention: this is called name. The four great elements and
  the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form.
  Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form.

Also, please note that the term "kāya" has been used in the sense of physical body for example in SN 22.56 (although I know that it can be used to mean group or collection, when combined with other things):

eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousness.
cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, sotaviññāṇaṃ,ghānaviññāṇaṃ, jivhāviññāṇaṃ,
  kāyaviññāṇaṃ, manoviññāṇaṃ.

The word duality is probably not a great translation in this context, as it has specific connotations of opposition or contrast which I don't think are meant by the simple "dvayam"

This is just an elaboration of D.O. Everything is clear and makes sense.
Delineation of feeling depends on the notion of contact.
Delineation of contact depends on separating totality into "internal" and "external".
Six sense doors are the subjective boundary across which the contact is made.
On this side of the boundary are upadana-skandhas - stuff we appropriate as I/mine.
On the other side of the boundary are the namarupas, the mind-made delineated entities that we designate as "external".
In each pair of DO, it's always a notion and its counterpart serving as foundation.

If the meaning is closer to the first translation; 'there is the twoness of this body and the external namarupam'
If so then the twoness is the name and the form (which are external or internal).
However i think the Tathagata is unlikely to use two words with same meaning in a sentence like that, it is my personal opinion and i just find it strange and out of character as i can't recall similar precedent.
Therefore i think the twoness could be a twofold statement about the body and the external namarupa being 'hindered by ignorance' and 'bound by craving'. So in this way it becomes a statement about the origination of the internal & the external existence in general.
Also kaya is probably the body, because later there is the somewhat common; 'with the breakup of the body..' and the breakup of the aggregates is not spoken of in that way afaik.

"Sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedayati" means "experience happiness & suffering" rather than "pleasant & painful feelings" (similar to how these words are used in MN 149), as follows:

And they experience physical and mental suffering. So kāyadukkhampi cetodukkhampi paṭisaṃvedeti
And they experience physical and mental pleasure. So kāyasukhampi cetosukhampi paṭisaṃvedeti.

"Kaya" means "collection" or "group" of five aggregates rather than "(physical) body".
There is no such thing as "external name-and-form" that together with a "kaya" creates contact. For example, "naming" is an internal process therefore external names (within the minds of others) cannot produce sense contact.
"Nama-rupa" here means "external minds & bodies". Thus with this internal collection ("kaya") of five aggregates plus external minds & bodies  ("bahiddhā namarupa") there arises sense contacts that lead to producing (samudāgato) happiness & suffering.
For example, this internal collection ("kaya") of five aggregates has sense contact with an angry mind & body (nama-rupa) externally. Hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this internal collection of five aggregates ("kaya") creates the idea from the external mind & body of "my enemy"; thus generating suffering.
In summary, the beginning of SN 12.19 should be regarded the same as the following verse from SN 12.81:

At Sāvatthī. Then Venerable Rāhula went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat
  down to one side, and said to him: “Sir, how does one know and see so
  that there’s no ego, possessiveness, or underlying tendency to conceit
  for this conscious body and all external stimuli?” “Rāhula, one truly
  sees any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or
  external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all
  form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this
  is not my self.’ One truly sees any kind of feeling … perception …
  choices … consciousness at all—past, future, or present; internal or
  external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all
  consciousness—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not
  this, this is not my self.’ That’s how to know and see so that there’s
  no ego, possessiveness, or underlying tendency to conceit for this
  conscious body and all external stimuli.”

External nama-rupa is external stimuli. However, there is no such thing as an "external name" that can be a stimuli. This is why the Pali term "nama" means "mind". External minds can be perceived and produced into suffering but external "names" cannot be perceived (unless they are spoken as words).
"Nama-rupa" comes from Brahmanism. The Buddha took this term and redefined it so it accords with suffering & the cessation of suffering (rather than according with the creationist philosophy of Brahmanism of 'naming-forms').
When ignorance & sankhara arise, they subject the mind-body to tension; just like an addiction causes the mind & body to seek out external sense contacts of sense gratification. Every translator that translates "nama-rupa" as "name-form" is wrong. Believe it or not!

Do you have any references to prove this? ""Kaya" means "collection" or "group" of five aggregates rather than "(physical) body""

Nikaya. Sakkaya.

The term "kaya" is also used for the physical body in the suttas. See SN 22.56: "eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousness. / cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, sotaviññāṇaṃ, ghānaviññāṇaṃ, jivhāviññāṇaṃ, kāyaviññāṇaṃ, manoviññāṇaṃ."

@Dhammadhatu Hi! This might not be completely related to the topic in question, but you cannot make assumptions just by looking the roots of the words.' 'Atoms', for instance, are definitely not undividable particles (A=without; temnein=to cut), despite his etimological root; and 'sarcophagi' is not the same as 'carnivorous' (sark=carn=flesh; phagos=vorus=eating). Some words keep their historical root, even when in the future that word could change its original meaning and mean something not directly related. Not all magnets are made from magnetite. Kind regards!

The introduction of Balapandita Sutta (SN 12.19) is about person, the foolish and the astute, but the dependent origination is about five aggregates cycle, so the Buddha has to transform the person to be five aggregates for driving the cycle of aggregates in the depedent origination because there is no person in the dependent origination.

So there is the duality of this foolish body (person which referring to internal sense-field aggregates) and external name and form (aggregates which referring to external sense-field aggregates). Contact depends on this duality (those both internal and external sense-fields). When contacted through one or other of the six sense fields, the fool experiences pleasure and pain.
Iti ayañceva (bālo) kāyo (puggalo, paññatti) bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ (khandho, paramattha), itthetaṃ dvayaṃ (ajjhatta&bahidhā-āyatanāni), dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso saḷevāyatanāni, yehi phuṭṭho bālo sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedayati etesaṃ vā aññatarena.

You can use above explanation in various sutta depend on its context such as in DN22 MahasatipaṭṭhānaSutta:

ajjhatta-bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati
he dwells observing kāya in kāya internally and externally

The first kāya refers to a collection of 28 forms (the second kāya). Internal kaya is the practitioner's kāya and external kāya is the other's kāya.
See their Atthakathā for more information.

When there is a stand, a body (in sense of compound, not physical, see DD's answer in this regard), not-knowing, there is a surface, hence "duality".
By absence, having uprooted not-knowing, not dwelling on another stand, there is what goes beyond able to trace and discriminate. Others then the Nihilists idea, there "is" something beyond the six senses.
dvaya is just another word for avijja, not-knowing. Althought many try to trace something special, the Buddha used different words to serve different inclinatiins of different people.
[This answer is not given as means of trade, exchange, for Buddh-ism or other low wordily bonds but for liberations purpose]


text:
Ex-monk reliable Teacher?
While even most teacher today are ex-monks (someone who rejected the refuge and went back to the lower life), isn't it clear that such a person has own problems with his faith? How could one nevertheless rely on such people often "patiseit" the Gems?
My person wonders if there is any reliable story of an ex-monk having become a , by the Buddha, by the Sanga and good people, praised Dhamma teacher.
Can any reference in the history, beside of the modern degenerated, be found that one leaves the Buddhas religion (bond) by dis-jointing/robing, the Savaka Sangha, takes on "a wordily mission" and made even some merits while doing so?
(Not that there are also those going back to lower life but still wearing the clothers of the Arahats. And there are those never weared the robe but lived the holly life a while who went back to lower life for "missions of gains in the world".)
[This question is not for trade, exchange, stackes or what ever bonds to the world given, but for cleansing and liberation, receiving and serving it]

Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.

The answer to your question is YES, an ex-monk can be a reliable teacher.
Piya Tan is a very good example. Here is another profile of him.
He was a Theravada monk from 1970 - 1990 by the name of Bhikkhu Piyasilo, but since 1990 he is back to being the lay person Piya Tan.
He is a well-known translator and scholar of the Pali Canon. The other well-known translators are either monks (like Bhikkhus Thanissaro, Bodhi, Sujato) or academics (like T W Rhys Davids or I B Horner).
You can take a look at his excellent Sutta Discovery series.

It simply is not correct that because someone gives back their robes/vows they have "problems with their faith." There can be many reasons why a person gives back their vows that have nothing to do with doubt. Especially for Western monastics.
You would do well to put away your preconceptions.

I will listen to the ex monks very cautiously. For instance, Pia Tan says it is not possible to attain Nibbana in this life. In my opinion, it is the wrong advice. Otherwise, you can learn a lot from their experience. It is no different from learning from a layperson. You can learn the theory of Buddha's teaching from anyone including non-Buddhist. However, you should exercise caution when it comes to relying on certain practices.


text:
Meditation Experiences as a beginner
So I notice that I have what I consider to be intense meditation experiences as a beginner. I still consider myself as a beginner because I am not following any guidelines or books or yoga practices. Plus I get scared and stop meditating for long periods of times because of Fear of the unknown.
 But in my meditations it's just me and music or me and crystals (mostly Amethyst).
Today I was listening to a Theta Vibration YouTube video and began to notice I was going to deeper into meditation I started to have Rapid Eye Movement.  I told myself that I should not fear this and as I did I got passed the eye movement. I then started to feel my hands in a specific position and my index fingers being bent upwards toward the ceiling (not uncomfortable) I then became more blissful and serene. But my main question is,
"IS it normal to feel your hands and arms raise mere inches off the bed? (I lay down during my meditations, I notice laying down works best for me.) What is my body healing in order to be feeling what I experience as this type of levitation in my arms? I have felt this in my legs too another time. What is my body doing in this process?
Thanks in advance for any answer. I'm not sure who to talk to about my experiences.
Thanks,
Alicia

Likely there is a subtle energy blockage around your elbows & shoulders so the lifting of the arms is to allow the energy to flow out of your arms and through your shoulders.
In Buddhism, we practise meditation on the natural ordinary breathing. This also leads to purification or healing of the body; where certain energies must flow so they can be released. Limbs can move to accommodate this.

I am going to give you a neuroscientist answer, not a traditional Buddhist one.
Our mind relies on models of the world, and that includes our body, we basically live in a delusion or mirage. Normally this delusion coincides with reality, so we are not the wiser. Our brain constantly incorporates information from reality to keep our “delusion” (I.e., mental model) consistent. When it comes to our body most of this information comes from proprioception and skin nerve endings, but also vision.
This mechanism is made evident in phantom limb syndrome, alien hand syndrome, and in extreme cases body dysphoria. It can be easily explored with some basic experiments in normal individuals like the rubber hand illusion.
When we meditate we can directly interfere with these mechanisms, and our mental model of parts of the body can get disconnected from the information that those body parts are providing. To the extreme that our mental model can feel completely detached from the body.


text:
This consciousness turns back; it doesn't go further than name-and-form
In SN 12.65, we read about the cyclic relationship between consciousness and name-and-form, which has been asked in this question.
However, this sutta also has the curious phrase in bold below.
What does this phrase mean? "This consciousness turns back; it does not go further than name-and-form."
How does it fit with the rest of sutta?
As translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi:

“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does birth come
  to be?… existence?… clinging?… craving?… feeling?… contact?… the six
  sense bases?… name-and-form? By what is name-and-form conditioned?’
  Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a
  breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form
  comes to be; name-and-form has consciousness as its condition.’
“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does
  consciousness come to be? By what is consciousness conditioned? ’
  Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a
  breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is name-and-form, consciousness
  comes to be; consciousness has name-and-form as its condition.’
“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘This consciousness turns back; it
  does not go further than name-and-form. It is to this extent that one
  may be born and age and die, pass away and be reborn, that is, when
  there is consciousness with name-and-form as its condition, and
  name-and-form with consciousness as its condition. With name-and-form
  as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as
  condition, contact…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of
  suffering.’

As translated by Bhikkhu Sujato with Pali version included (from here):

This consciousness turns back from name-and-form, and doesn’t go
  beyond that.
paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññāṇaṃ nāmarūpamhā na paraṃ gacchati.

I don't know why the Venerable translates it "turns back from" instead of "turns back to" -- one of the literal translations (out of context) might be "return again to".

In his analysis, Buddha sought to identify the semiotic precursor/counterpart for the experience of death. Going backwards from death, he identified the notion of "life" (jati, the notion of separate organism that gets born and dies) as the precursor/counterpart of death.
Going further backwards, he identified a chain of precursors/counterparts supporting each other in the process of semiotic development. These were appropriating experience aka becoming, object grasping aka goal-setting, obsession aka craving, associating a feeling with object, contact with object, six doors of contact, and namarupa or the labeled objects themselves.
He then tried to identify a precursor or counterpart for namarupa, information about objects and identities. He realized that vijnana or ability to differentiate objects from their background and from each other (the function that gives rise to our basic awareness of the world), is the precursor/counterpart of namarupa.
Naturally, the next step was to try and identify the precursor/counterpart for vijnana (recognition/differentiation). Upon much thinking, Buddha came to conclusion that namarupa itself was the counterpart of vijnana. Indeed, there may be no differentiation of objects without capacity for recognition, and there is no capacity for recognition without notions of objects.
At that moment Buddha realized that the entire chain of phenomena he has been analyzing, including death, is completely included in the realm of objective thinking. In other words, the entire experience of living and dying is a story our object-obsessed mind is telling itself. This realization was a huge breakthrough and a major step in the direction of Enlightenment.
At a later date, Buddha reconsidered this idea that vijnana and namarupa are each other's precursors and instead came up with an alternative chain which had "accumulated tendencies" (samskaras) and "ignorance" as two more links of the chain. This is the version of DO that ended up becoming the classic we know today.
Anyway, the importance of this realization still stands, that all our experienced phenomena are mind-made ("form is emptiness"), and this mind itself is a reflection of interaction of phenomena since beginningless times. In Mahayana we say, phenomena are empty, and mind is empty as well, these two emptinesses are a reflection of each other and yet they manifest as seeming reality ("emptiness is form"). This relationship is an important topic of analytical meditation in Tibetan Mahayana.

SN 12.65 says:

Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisatta....

Therefore, the teaching in SN 12.65 is Gotama's preliminary incomplete exploration of Dependent Origination. It is not yet complete Dhamma.
The words 'contact', 'six sense bases', 'mind-&-body' and 'consciousness' here do not have the same meaning as in the complete twelve condition formula because SN 12.65 only traces the real causes of suffering back to craving.
When the above words are used in the twelve condition formula, they have the following meaning, as shown in the case of 'contact':

contact with ignorance: avijjāsamphassajena
SN 22.81

But in SN 12.65, the words 'contact', 'six sense bases', 'mind-&-body' and 'consciousness' do not have the above meaning, namely, as 'tainted by ignorance'. The words are used meta-physically rather than in terms of suffering.
Gotama gets to feeling and asks: "From what does feeling arise?" He answers: "Sense contact" (rather than sense contact with ignorance). Then asks: "From what does contact arise?" and answers "sense bases". Then asks "From what does sense bases arise?" and answers "mind-body". Then asks: "From what does mind-body arise?" and answers "consciousness". For the mind-body to be known there must be consciousness. Then asks: "From what does consciousness arise?" and answers: "mind-body". Because for consciousness to exist, it comes from the mind-body (per SN 22.82; SN 22.56, etc).

Mind and body are the reason why the aggregate of consciousness is
  found.
Nāmarūpaṃ hetu, nāmarūpaṃ paccayo viññāṇakkhandhassa paññāpanāyā
SN 22.82

In other words, since a "visual form" cannot be known without sense organs, obviously the term "nama-rupa" does not mean the old Brahmanistic "naming-forms" because the sense organs must arise before a form can be experienced & named; as follows:

Dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the
  three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there is
  feeling. What one feels, one perceives (labels/names in the mind). What one
  perceives, one thinks about.
MN 18

Note: In MN 18 above, the terms 'eye', 'forms' & 'eye-consciousness' are also used meta-physically rather than in terms of suffering. The terms are "neutral". MN 18 is similar to suttas such as MN 38 and MN 148, where sense contact is "neutral" (neither wholesome or unwholesome) and two paths can occur from sense contact, namely, the path to suffering or the path to nibbana.
The people who don't yet understand dhamma; who don't understand the difference between the different Dependent Origination formulas; won't be able to understand this answer.

"For the mind-body to be known there must be consciousness." -  is this your explanation for consciousness (as nidana) in dependent origination?


text:
Growth, increase, landing, establishing of consciousness
The following quotes talk about consciousness. Through relishing, intending or having underlying tendencies, consciousness would grow, increase, mature, land, establish.
What does growth, increase, maturing, landing and establishing of consciousness mean in this case?
Are these simply different ways of talking about craving and clinging?
Or is there another interpretation?
When it comes to relishing, it sounds like the craving and clinging of sensual pleasures (kama) based on sensations that are cognized (based on SN 22.79's statement that consciousness is that which cognizes).
When it comes to intending, it sounds like the craving and clinging of becoming (bhava) based on mental ideas that are cognized (based on SN 22.79's statement that consciousness is that which cognizes).
From SN 22.53:

As long as consciousness remains, it would remain involved with form,
  supported by form, founded on form. And with a sprinkle of relishing,
  it would grow, increase, and mature.
Rūpupayaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ
  tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasecanaṃ
  vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyya.

And the same applies to other aggregates apart from form.
From SN 12.38:

“Mendicants, what you intend or plan, and what you have underlying
  tendencies for become a support for the continuation of consciousness.
“Yañca, bhikkhave, ceteti yañca pakappeti yañca anuseti, ārammaṇametaṃ
  hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā.
When this support exists, consciousness becomes established.
Ārammaṇe
  sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti.
When consciousness is established and grows, there is rebirth into a
  new state of existence in the future.
Tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe
  virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti.

As an additional reference from SN 22.79:

“And why, bhikkhus, do you call it consciousness? ‘It cognizes, ’
  bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness. And what does it
  cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it
  cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes
  salty, it cognizes bland. ‘It cognizes,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is
  called consciousness.

I think that what you quoted is the converse of SN 12.64 -- which describes how consciousness doesn't grow or become established, i.e. as a result of not "landing".
I guess an analogy is if you have a seed or seedling which lands somewhere then its roots become involved and it grows -- or, it is doesn't land, then it doesn't.

Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?” “On the western wall, sir.” “If there was no western wall, where would it land?” “On the ground, sir.” “If there was no ground, where would it land?” “In water, sir.” “If there was no water, where would it land?” “It wouldn’t land, sir.” “In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …

I think I agree with what you said, i.e. that you attach to what's cognized, make plans based on whats's cognized.
But perhaps it's saying the converse too, i.e. that when attaching (or on attaching) to something then the consciousness lands there and evolves -- e.g. glimpse something, feel attracted, then gaze at it, further resolve details of it and fit those into the idea of what's attractive, etc.
I think that's called "grasping signs" -- I don't know the best example of that, but one is e.g. SN 35.235

You’d be better off mutilating your eye faculty with a red-hot iron nail, burning, blazing and glowing, than getting caught up in the features by way of the details in sights known by the eye.
Varaṃ, bhikkhave, tattāya ayosalākāya ādittāya sampajjalitāya sajotibhūtāya cakkhundriyaṃ sampalimaṭṭhaṃ, na tveva cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu anubyañjanaso nimittaggāho.
For if you die at a time when your consciousness is still tied to gratification in the features or details, it’s possible you’ll go to one of two destinations:
Nimittassādagathitaṃ vā, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya, anubyañjanassādagathitaṃ vā tasmiñce samaye kālaṃ kareyya, ṭhānametaṃ vijjati, yaṃ dvinnaṃ gatīnaṃ aññataraṃ gatiṃ gaccheyya