text:
How is the romanized Pali Tipitaka on tipitaka.org formatted?
Looking at tipitaka.org/romn, I have a few questions about the XML markup used for it, so I can better understand the significance of each thing.
The ’’ symbol?
Take this paragraph as one reference:

Atha kho sudinno kalandaputto aciravuṭṭhitāya parisāya yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno kho sudinno kalandaputto bhagavantaṃ etadavoca – ‘‘yathā yathāhaṃ, bhante, bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānāmi , nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparisuddhaṃ saṅkhalikhitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ; icchāmahaṃ, bhante, kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajituṃ. Pabbājetu maṃ bhagavā’’ti. ‘‘Anuññātosi pana tvaṃ, suddinna, mātāpitūhi agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti? ‘‘Na kho ahaṃ, bhante, anuññāto mātāpitūhi agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti. ‘‘Na kho, sudinna, tathāgatā ananuññātaṃ mātāpitūhi puttaṃ pabbājentī’’ti. ‘‘Sohaṃ, bhante, tathā karissāmi yathā maṃ mātāpitaro anujānissanti agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti.

What do the double special single quote characters ’’ mean? They appear to come at the beginning of a sentence, or two characters before the end of the sentence, but maybe that is just in this context. Yeah they also appear in other places too:

Dutiyampi kho sudinnassa kalandaputtassa mātāpitaro sudinnaṃ kalandaputtaṃ etadavocuṃ – ‘‘tvaṃ khosi, tāta sudinna, amhākaṃ ekaputtako piyo manāpo sukhedhito sukhaparihato. Na tvaṃ, tāta sudinna, kiñci dukkhassa jānāsi. Maraṇenapi mayaṃ te akāmakā vinā bhavissāma, kiṃ pana mayaṃ taṃ jīvantaṃ anujānissāma agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti! Tatiyampi kho sudinno kalandaputto mātāpitaro etadavoca – ‘‘ammatātā , yathā yathāhaṃ bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānāmi, nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparisuddhaṃ saṅkhalikhitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ; icchāmahaṃ kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajituṃ . Anujānātha maṃ agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti.

The ...
You see that a lot, does it mean something was missing or was that part of the original somehow? What does it mean?

Bhikkhupaccatthikā tiracchānagatubhatobyañjanakaṃ jāgarantaṃ… suttaṃ… mattaṃ… ummattaṃ… pamattaṃ… mataṃ akkhāyitaṃ… mataṃ yebhuyyena akkhāyitaṃ…pe… āpatti pārājikassa. Mataṃ yebhuyyena khāyitaṃ bhikkhussa santike ānetvā vaccamaggena… passāvamaggena… mukhena aṅgajātaṃ abhinisīdenti, santhatassa asanthatassa, asanthatassa santhatassa, santhatassa santhatassa, asanthatassa asanthatassa. So ce pavesanaṃ sādiyati, paviṭṭhaṃ sādiyati, ṭhitaṃ sādiyati , uddharaṇaṃ sādiyati, āpatti thullaccayassa…pe… na sādiyati, anāpatti.

The multiple titles
In one of the pages, the start of the XML looks like this:

Dhammapaccanīye dukapaṭṭhānaṃ

1. Hetudukaṃ

1-7. Paṭiccavārādi

Paccayacatukkaṃ

Hetupaccayo

What does it mean that there are 2 title and also 2 subhead? That is 4 titles? Sometimes you see 3 title and no subhead, or 2-4 subhead and no title. Does it have significance or no?
The paragraph numbers
Sometimes a page starts with 1, other times it starts with a later number, such as this:

1. Pārājikakaṇḍaṃ

1. Paṭhamapārājikaṃ

Sudinnabhāṇavāravaṇṇanā

<hi rend="paranum">24</hi><hi rend="dot">.</hi> Ito <pb ed="M" n="1.0168" /><pb ed="V" n="1.0155" /> paraṃ <hi rend="bold">tena kho pana samayena vesāliyā avidūre</hi>tiādi yebhuyyena uttānatthaṃ. Tasmā anupadavaṇṇanaṃ pahāya yattha yattha vattabbaṃ atthi, taṃ tadeva vaṇṇayissāma. <hi rend="bold">Kalandagāmo</hi>ti kalandakā vuccanti kāḷakā, tesaṃ vasena laddhanāmo gāmo. <hi rend="bold">Kalandaputto</hi>ti gāmavasena laddhanāmassa rājasammatassa cattālīsakoṭivibhavassa kalandaseṭṭhino putto. Yasmā pana tasmiṃ gāme aññepi kalandanāmakā manussā atthi, tasmā kalandaputtoti vatvā puna seṭṭhiputtoti vuttaṃ. <hi rend="bold">Sambahulehī</hi>ti bahukehi. <hi rend="bold">Sahāyakehī</hi>ti sukhadukkhāni saha āyanti upagacchantīti sahāyā, sahāyā eva sahāyakā, tehi sahāyakehi. <hi rend="bold">Saddhi</hi>nti ekato. <hi rend="bold">Kenacideva karaṇīyenā</hi>ti kenacideva bhaṇḍappayojanauddhārasāraṇādinā kiccena; kattikanakkhattakīḷākiccenātipi vadanti. Bhagavā hi kattikajuṇhapakkhe vesāliṃ sampāpuṇi. Kattikanakkhattakīḷā cettha uḷārā hoti. Tadatthaṃ gatoti veditabbo.

<hi rend="bold">Addasa kho</hi>ti kathaṃ addasa? So kira nagarato bhuttapātarāsaṃ suddhuttarāsaṅgaṃ mālāgandhavilepanahatthaṃ buddhadassanatthaṃ dhammasavanatthañca nikkhamantaṃ mahājanaṃ disvā ‘‘kva gacchathā’’ti pucchi. ‘‘Buddhadassanatthaṃ dhammasavanatthañcā’’ti. Tena hi ‘‘ahampi gacchāmī’’ti gantvā catubbidhāya parisāya parivutaṃ brahmassarena dhammaṃ desentaṃ bhagavantaṃ addasa. Tena vuttaṃ – <hi rend="bold">‘‘addasa kho…pe… desenta’’</hi>nti. <hi rend="bold">Disvānassā</hi>ti disvāna assa. <hi rend="bold">Etadahosī</hi>ti pubbe katapuññatāya codiyamānassa bhabbakulaputtassa etaṃ ahosi. Kiṃ ahosi? Yaṃnūnāhampi dhammaṃ <hi rend="bold">suṇeyya</hi>nti <pb ed="V" n="1.0156" />. Tattha <hi rend="bold">yannūnā</hi>ti parivitakkadassanametaṃ. Evaṃ kirassa parivitakko uppanno ‘‘yamayaṃ parisā ekaggacittā dhammaṃ suṇāti, aho vatāhampi taṃ suṇeyya’’nti.

What does that paragraph number mean, is it used elsewhere, why is it important?
The hidden <pb ed="P" n="1.0203" /> tags?
In the XML, you see <pb ed="P" n="1.0203" /> and other <pb tags with different n values, what is that used for?
The bold, centered, indented, and unindented texts
Sometimes things are made bold, other times they are centered or marked as indented/non-indented, what does that mean? Is it copying some formatting from original books, or is it for some other reason?
The gatha?
You see stuff like this:

Paṭhamapārājikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Tatridaṃ samantapāsādikāya samantapāsādikattasmiṃ –

Ācariyaparamparato, nidānavatthuppabhedadīpanato;

Parasamayavivajjanato, sakasamayavisuddhito ceva.

Byañjanaparisodhanato, padatthato pāḷiyojanakkamato;

Sikkhāpadanicchayato, vibhaṅganayabhedadassanato.

Sampassataṃ <pb ed="V" n="1.0228" /><pb ed="M" n="1.0247" /> na dissati, kiñci apāsādikaṃ yato ettha;

Viññūnamayaṃ tasmā, samantapāsādikātveva.

Saṃvaṇṇanā pavattā, vinayassa vineyyadamanakusalena;

Vuttassa lokanāthena, lokamanukampamānenāti.

Paṭhamapārājikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Sometimes the gatha tags are listed in order, with gathalast at the end, other times they are gatha1-gatha4-gatha3-gatha2-gathalast or 4-3-2-1-last or other sequences. What does that mean? They appear to be verses at the UI level, but why are the encoded this way (and sometimes out of order)?

P.S. if anyone finds this post in the future, it took me hours to realize the XML files were UTF-16 big-endian encoded! Need the right parser for that! Most normal files are utf-8 little endian haha.

You asking technical questions. How the knowledge was rendered?And you are asking questions without understanding the meaning of prose. I think it is not the right forum to ask software related questions. You must understand Pali language before asking about the syntax of the language.

This is the main source of the digitalized Pali canon, I think it is appropriate. It is like asking about the writing style of an ancient grammarian. No different.

Ancient grammarians gave verbal teachings not digital. You have a long road ahead. You should be smart.

It might be easier to help research some of the details -- or an answer might become obvious to you -- if for each question you'd provide a hyperlink to the XML you're asking about, and a hyperlink to an HTML page which it renders.

See also this answer for an explanation of how ellipsis is used when texts are rendered.

If you are making the Pali Canon application for iOS, please contact me. My monks request me to write the  Pali Canon application for iOS. I have knowledge about Tipitaka and Desktop programming but I don't know about iOS application.
I still recommend for reciting Pali with Tipitaka Memorizer who attained Jhana that is the best and easiest way to study Tipitaka.

The ’’  is for a conversation like ... the Buddha said "there are two
extremes..."
The ... is the brief sign for what have been recited before the ..., which maybe recited 50 pages before, like

“Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent. The cause and condition for the arising of the eye is also impermanent. As the eye has originated from what is impermanent, how could it be permanent?
“The ear is impermanent…. The mind is impermanent. The cause and condition for the arising of the mind is also impermanent. As the mind has originated from what is impermanent, how could it be permanent?

The multiple title is because of many part of the first title like first title is "World had 195 countries". "Thailand" is a subtitle in 195 subtitles. "Bangkok" is a subtitle in 77 states of Thailand. "Bangkhen" is a subtitle in 50 city of Bangkok, etc.
The paragraph numbers is for reference because each Buddhist country printed Tipitaka by difference page number range in the past.
< pb ed="P" n="1.0203" />

pb = Page break

ed = Edition

n = Number

1.0203 = < Book number >.< Page number >

The format is the sign for easier understood and memorizing kind of main idea, etc.

There are so many type of Gatha, some is 3 lines some is 4 lines, some is 5 lines, etc, so the XML is like that because for the right format rendering.

Can you elaborate on the ..., I don't quite understand still, does that mean the text was repeated many times and they leave it out? Or what? Also, can you clarify the multiple titles description, I don't follow that either. Thank you! Got a lot of perspective from your answer so far. I am writing an app for not just the Pali Canon, but every ancient text from around the world. Here is me. Would love to collaborate on this.

In theory we could talk about an iOS application in Chat but nobody on this site ever uses the chat. You say they want an application for iOS -- what are their requirements? Can you (and if not why not) simply write it as a Progressive Web Application? Wikipedia says here that there is "Partial" support by Safari on iOS, which I guess might mean "support for the basic features". But I guess monks might use old devices.

The ellipses most likely show repetition -- see this answer for an example, that refers to the ellipsis in SN 15.4, which repeats a phrase or formula from SN 15.2.
Many suttas are similar from one sutta to the next.
So when it's printed, instead of repeating the repeated phrase in every sutta, they replace it with an ellipsis and only print the part that's different/new.
You need to refer back to the earlier sutta in the sequence to see what's being elided.
I think it isn't or wasn't elided when spoken/recited (and that some repetition may be a feature of many texts that were originally memorised and passed by word-of-mouth instead of written, e.g. Homeric).

What do the double special single quote characters ’’ mean?

They are simply ordinary quotation marks, as follows:

He then approached that gathering and sat down.
Atha kho sudinno kalandaputto yena sā parisā tenupasaṅkami;
upasaṅkamitvā ekamantaṁ nisīdi.
As he was sitting there, he thought,
Ekamantaṁ nisinnassa kho sudinnassa kalandaputtassa etadahosi—
“The way I understand the Buddha’s Teaching, it’s not easy for one who
lives at home to lead the spiritual life perfectly complete and pure
as a polished conch shell.
“yathā yathā kho ahaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, nayidaṁ
sukaraṁ agāraṁ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṁ ekantaparisuddhaṁ
saṅkhalikhitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ carituṁ;
Why don’t I cut off my hair and beard, put on the ocher robes, and go
forth into homelessness?”
yannūnāhaṁ kesamassuṁ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṁ pabbajeyyan”ti.
Translation

I advised you previously, you need to learn the simple basics of researching. All I did above was copy a portion of the Pali into google & immediately found the Sutta Central translation. By reading the translation, it is plainly obviously the quotation marks in the Romanized Pali text is simply the ordinary quotation marks used in the English language.

The ...
Same as in English.

Why do the quotes end 2 letters before the word is done, I don't understand that part. ‘‘Sohaṃ, bhante, tathā karissāmi yathā maṃ mātāpitaro anujānissanti agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajjāyā’’ti. And why didn't they just use regular double quotes?

That is how it is. Its up to you to know the word that has been abbreviated due to the "ti" (rather than due to the quotation marks). In general, your methodology is wrong. First of all, simply learn how to read English-Pali translations of Sujato on Sutta Central. The Tripitaka.org is very old. This is rarely used by anyone. Your questions here a placing the cart before the horse. Learn the basics of how to read English-Pali translations of Sujato on Sutta Central rather than waste others time here. Once you can use Sutta Central then you can advance from there & ask questions. Thanks

@Lance See "hearsay" at the end of this definition. I suppose an English phrase might be like, "The sky is blue" or so I heard, i.e. the ti is referring to what's quoted.


text:
Did the Buddha ever turn away certain people from his teachings?
I'm specifically remembering a sutra where the Buddha turned away some youngsters because he said they weren't ready, or didn't have the proper attitude. I may be remembering completely incorrectly and getting this confused with something else, but it's in my memory nonetheless and wonder if it's at all accurate. Thanks!

Yes. The Buddha often didn't answer questions or attempt to teach others. SN 44.10 is a well-known example of this.

Not exactly what you remember, but similar:
Uposatha Sutta - One uposatha night, during the first watch, Ananda approaches the Buddha and asks him to recite the Patimokkha. Three times he asks, but the Buddha remains silent, and at last says that the assembly is impure. Mahamoggallana, who is present, looks round, and seeing there a monk given up to wicked ways, asks him to leave. On his refusing to do so, Moggallana takes him by the hand and leads him away. Thereupon the Buddha proceeds to explain how, just as the sea is full of eight kinds of marvels, so is the Dhamma. A.iv.204ff.
https://www.wisdomlib.org/definition/uposatha-sutta

In SN 42.2 and SN 42.3, an actor and a warrior ask the Buddha whether their professions would lead them to heaven based on their assumption of the positive contribution of their professions.
The Buddha tried to turn them away three times. When they were insistent, he proceeded to answer the question in the way that disappointed them.

Buddha never turned away anyone who had the intention of understanding the Dhamma. Whether rich or poor , wise or layperson , king or a fisherman, saint or thief etc . No one was turned away. Some foolish people failed to understand what he said and Buddha can’t be blamed for that. Some people were against Buddha and there was no need to teach as such. Angoolimal was a dacoit and he converted to Buddha Dhamma by the blessings of Buddha.
In my opinion Buddha Dhamma is a great gift to give to anyone who is serious about understanding reality.

source: Stack Exchange

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sort: votes


text:
Is there a tendency or an effort to keep sanskharas as it is?
Sabbe sanskharas Anicca. But is there any tendency or effort to keep sanskharas as it is for as long as possible?
I personally suspect yes because there is a craving to keep the narrative alive.

good question. Craving fuels the sankhara.

@enRaiser Thanks. Why don’t you answer it ?

Sankhara or Samskara is a technical term for anything that emerges from coming together of multiple constituent causes and conditions.
As the famous Buddhist sayings explain, all compound phenomena are impermanent because whatever comes together eventually falls apart.
But most of the time, it does not fall appart immediately, it exists for some duration of time. Why?
Two reasons. One, because the constituent causes and conditions change gradually, not all at once. As they change, they may still be in the zone where the sankhara continues to exist, even if it doesn't stay exactly the same.
Two, and more directly regarding your question. Many sankharas are in fact cyclic in nature, meaning, they have some kind of homeostasis going on, that maintains existence of the sankhara through regenerating one or more of the constituent causes. It doesn't necessarily make the sankhara alive in the biological sense of the word but it does make it a self-sustaining tendency.

This depends on the particular sankhara, the particular person, the particular time, the particular place, etc. Of course, for any particular situation (i.e. combination of person, place, time, sankhara, etc.) there may be an effort to keep a particular sankhara “as it is” for as long as possible.
The reverse may also be true though: there may be an effort to destroy a sankhara as quickly as possible, or there may be the wish that a particular sankhara lasts only a certain amount of time, etc.

The word sankhara in "Sabbe Sankhara Anicca" does not mean "mental formations". Instead, "sankhara" here refers to anything that is compounded/conditioned/formed (put together by various parts), which would include a rock, a cloud, a drop of rain, a planetary universe.
You may consider referring to this old blog post: The word ‘sankhara’ in context.

Form, friend Channa, is impermanent. Feeling is impermanent.
Perception is impermanent. Mental formations (saṅkhārā) are
impermanent. Consciousness is impermanent. Form is not-self. Feeling
is not-self. Perception is not-self. Mental formations are not-self.
Consciousness is not-self. All (sabbe) conditioned things (saṅkhārā)
are impermanent (aniccā). All (sabbe) phenomena (dhammā) are not-self
(anattā).
SN 22.90

Great blog but the two sanskharas can’t be different. A sanskhara can be made up of other sanskharas.

Obviously what you wrote has no basis in Pali or the Suttas or in reality.

@DhammaDhatu Sabbe Sankhara Anicca meants All sankharas are impermanent. Sankharas are translated (best in my opinion) as complex mental formations. Since they are impermanent, they are also compounded, conditioned and formed. To be impermanent means to have such aspects.

Your opinion is wrong.

Yes, the continuity of conditioned existence is sustained by craving. The fires of passion, aversion and delusion are fueled by craving.

“The past, reverends, is one end. The future is the second end. The
present is the middle. And craving is the seamstress, for craving
weaves one to being reborn in one state of existence or another.
That’s how a mendicant directly knows what should be directly known
and completely understands what should be completely understood.
Knowing and understanding thus they make an end of suffering in this
very life.”
AN 6.61

For a living arahant, as described in Iti 44, cravings have ended, and the fire has been put out, so the embers continue to glow till the end of his physical life.

avijja paccaya sankhara

As long as avijja is there. the sankhara will be remain.
And as long as sankhara remain, it get stronger and stronger. Thus sankhara itself rebuilds it. or sustain it for long.
Lets take the case of addiction. You smoke cigar due to avijja. Not knowing danger in it. not knowing the source of pleasure etc.

Initially you feel pleasure of smoking. that pleasure reduces day by
day. but by that time you are trapped in craving. Now you smoke even
if there is no pleasure. just to get rid of the unpleasant sensation
of not smoking.i.e pressure of craving.
The sankhara of smoking get stronger and stronger, to the point that
even if you get cancer. You still feel the pressure of craving. and if
you dont smoke you get physical problem, like headache, perspiration,
vomiting,  and what not.
Then you are put in rehabilitation centre, where you are forced to
quit. in that situation first time , you endure the pressure of
craving. the urge to smoke. the restlessness of it with proper
assistance. Slowly  your body adapt to not smoking. and you
permanently quit. but still there remains desire to  smoke, hidden
within you. you still remember the pleasure of smoking etc. let few
more year pass by. and point will come you realise that you lost that
taste of cigaret too.  Now you can even be in company with people who
smoke in front of you and be comfortable.

So you can see here that even to uproot  a sankhara you need another sankhara or  practice/tricks. but at the end it is impermanent too.
before rehabilitation its was impossible to remove the sankhara of cigaret, but after rehabilitation you realise that it also goes away if you stop feeding it.
Note: dont take buddhas teaching as general phylosophy. dont apply it to outside world.like all things(star,moon, earth,tree, house) etc are anicca. by saying sabbe sankhara anicca. That way  you loos the opportunity to work on yourself. As buddha clearly says Loka means 6 Sense base. There is no world outside you.

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text:
Is there a possibility of a *real* temporary self?
It can be understood that the self is not some real permanent thing, but I wish to know whether we can find a real temporary self?
We can define a temporary self, which lasts for some small duration, and at a certain location. For example, we can identify this temporary self with the mind which is controlling the ideas I am presenting here as a question.
Is this definition of a temporary self in some sense real?

The self is just an idea of the mind, and as such, it is temporary.

@ruben2020 I would argue it is real. I am the mind controlling my thoughts, at least for some duration of time.

Sure you can define a temporary self, but does your definition match with reality? That's the question! If your definition matches reality and this definition purports to define something real, then we should be able to find it in reality.
The Buddha encourages us to ask this question and to try and find that real self. The analysis I post below is one of the oldest and most venerated ways of conducting such an analysis, but it isn't the only one. See if you can poke holes with the analysis I post below.

If the self is real - even for a temporary duration - then you can find it. You can pin point it using analysis to locate this real thing in space and time for some definite duration. Just like a chariot. A chariot is a temporary thing, yes? Let's consider:
1) Is a chariot inherently the same as its parts?
If a chariot is the same as its parts, then those parts are themselves made up of other parts, yes? A huge multitude of parts. If the chariot is inherently the same as its parts there should be many chariots reflecting this multitude and not the experience of one, right? Even for a temporary time, do we think of a chariot as one or many?
Can the chariot be thought of as somehow the same as each part individually even for a temporary time? But again, this would imply numerous chariots not the experience of just one chariot. If it was equal to each part individually, then the destruction of one part would destroy the chariot, no? If it were all the parts individually then, the destruction or removal of even a single tiny part would destroy the chariot, right? But that is not what we experience of a chariot. So it can't be that the chariot is each part individually nor can it be that it is inherently the same as its parts even for a temporary time.
Further, when we own a chariot we don't mistake it for its parts. Even temporarily. Say we lose a wheel we don't immediately think, "My chariot is destroyed and I have no more chariot!" We don't mourn the loss of the chariot if it loses a single fleck of paint from its exterior as we drive down the road. We own a chariot not individual flecks of paint, right?
2) Is the chariot inherently other than its parts?
If it is other than its parts, then you wouldn't need the parts at all! The chariot would exist inherently without any parts, right? Even for a brief "temporary" time, if the chariot were real and somehow other than its parts in this temporary time, then it would not depend on the parts at all. You could have a chariot without any wheels, without any seat, without any paint, without any axels, you could own a real chariot for a temporary amount of time without any parts whatsoever, right? Name the person who owns such a chariot.
No, a chariot depends upon its parts. It can't be real - even for a temporary time - without depending on its parts. Just for the sake of argument, say a real chariot could exist without any parts. How would you know it existed? How would you experience such a real chariot that had no parts?
Think about it in deep mediation and try and imagine a really existing chariot without any parts even for a short temporary amount of time.
3) Is a chariot inherently in or dependent on its parts?
If the chariot is somehow in the parts, like a person is inside a house, then you could remove the person from the house and you'd have still have a person and a house, right? Can you remove the chariot from being inside the parts - even temporarily? No, because then you'd have a chariot with no parts, right? We've discussed that above. Worse, you could have a perfectly collected specimen of parts of a chariot with no chariot! Imagine coming across a collection of parts, perfectly arranged like a chariot, but not experiencing a chariot. Can you imagine such a thing even temporarily? No, the chariot can't be thought of as somehow inside the parts like a person can be inside a house.
Can the chariot then be thought of as somehow inherently dependent upon the parts for a short temporary time? If the chariot is dependent upon the parts, this implies the chariot is other than the parts. And we wind up in the same situation as #2 trying to imagine a chariot with no parts somehow existing and real - even temporarily. It just makes no sense to talk about "partless" chariots existing even for a temporary amount of time.
4) Are chariot parts in an inherently existing chariot?
Does an inherently existing chariot contain the parts like a bowl might contain cherries? If so, then we can empty that bowl and we are still left with an empty bowl and some cherries on the table, right? Can we think of an inherently existing real chariot empty of its parts even for a temporary amount of time? It is absurd right? Can we think of somehow removing all the parts of a chariot, one by one, and somehow experiencing a real chariot at the end? Even for a temporary time? No, right?
5) Does an inherently existing chariot possess or own its parts?
If an inherently existing chariot possesses its parts we should be able to find it without its parts like we can find the owner of a house absent the house, right? But again we're faced with a "partless" chariot. It simply makes no sense to talk of experiencing or finding a chariot absent its parts like we can experience and find the owner of a house absent the house. If a real chariot existed - even for a temporary time - as the owner of its parts we should be able to experience or find this owner absent its possessions, but we don't find any such thing. Even for a temporary time. How can any real chariot exist in such a way?
6) Is an inherently existing chariot just the collection of its parts?
If an inherently existing chariot is real - even for a temporary time - as just the collection of its parts, then it wouldn't matter the order or location of these parts. They could exist anywhere in any configuration and we'd say "chariot" and experience or find a chariot, right? But that isn't how we experience chariots. The order and placement of the parts is very important to us experiencing a chariot, right? So it can't be that the chariot is just the mere collection of its parts as this mere collection couldn't function as a chariot even for a temporary time.
7) Is a chariot inherently the specific order and placement of its parts in a given time and location?
If a chariot were inherently the specific order and placement of its parts in a given time and location, then at another time, location and specific order we'd have a different inherently existing chariot, right? The instant that any of those parts moved in time or space, the inherently existing chariot would be destroyed, right? We could have no inherently existing chariot existing for any duration. We'd be left with chariots that can not move! How can we think of a chariot as real that can not move? Isn't the function of a chariot to move?? What use would we have for a "real" chariot utterly incapable of moving? Utterly incapable of existing for any duration.

So, like that. Really consider a chariot and see if you can find one that really exists - even for a temporary amount of time - in one of the seven ways above. I challenge you to try.
If you can't - which I suspect you'll find - then try and think of some other way that a chariot could exist and be thought of as "real" - even for a temporary time. Can you think of another way it might exist that isn't included above ^^^?
Really analyze the chariot case. Try and poke holes in the arguments above. Try and find a real chariot existing for even a small temporary duration. If you can find one let me know.
If you can't find one - even after an exhaustive search - then consider the self in the same way. Good luck!

NOTE: I'm using a definition of "real" here as synonymous with inherently existing. In my tradition, the word "real" is actually less stringent than "inherently existing", but the analysis above would still be correct. If you use the word "real" to just mean that something exists exactly as it appears, then it is still clear that a temporary self is not real in that it appears solid, existing, stable through some power of its own and not as a merely a label designated in dependence upon a myriad of things.

I’ll bite. I think I can find one, although I am not sure if the comment section is an appropriate place for this type of discussion.

There is no temporary self in Buddhism because self is described in the suttas as:

a delusion (moha)
a disease (roga)
only arising of suffering (dukkhameva uppajjamānaṁ uppajjati)
a conceiving (maññita)
a formation (sankhara)
a view (ditthi)
a theory (vada)

There is only a temporary delusion or temporary insanity.

Is there a possibility of a temporary self?

No there is not.
The "view of a temporary self" is actually 1 of the 62 kinds of wrong view taught by the Buddha in the Brahmajala Sutta (Digha Nikaya Sutta 1).

Partial-Eternalism (Ekaccasassatavāda): Views 5–8

"... There are, bhikkhus, some recluses and brahmins who are eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things, and who on four grounds proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal ..."

"... He is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and he will remain the same just like eternity itself. But we, who have been created by him and have come to this world, are impermanent, unstable, short-lived, doomed to perish. This, bhikkhus, is the first case ..."

What is your definition of a self?
You could conceivably define “self” in such a way that a temporary self is possible or impossible.
One of the points the Buddha made was that such activity is not conducive to liberation. It might be a fun philosophical activity, but it leads to a “thicket of views.”
Also note that semantic discussions of what the term “self” means are distinct from the felt sense or psychological activity of “I-making and my-making.
That is, I can convince myself of a consistent definition of self in which my body is not a self - but then look in the mirror and within a fraction of a second have the “gut sense” that I am that body.
The teachings of not self are designed to get you to set aside the philosophical speculations about whether you have a self or not, or how to define the self, and simply focus on attempting to cease the more basic activity of I-making and my-making.
My views expressed in this post are influenced by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. He explains these more in length if you wish to learn more. However, other authors disagree with him.

Yes . Sometimes advice is the answer. But I am not asking a Buddha. :-))

@YesheTenley To proceed with this analysis we need a definition of self. I am curious, what definition do you propose?

Yes, I would be willing to sidestep that question and focus on the chariot. I am still not sure if this forum is the appropriate place to do so, however. I would hope to have an interesting discussion!

The question you have proposed presupposes that your analysis is "correct," so I would not phrase it like that. At present though, I am not inclined to pursue the issue further with you. Your response to a disagreement in textual interpretation seems to be to downvote those you disagree with, so I doubt we would have a fruitful discussion.

I would change my vote to and upvote if I was allowed to, but it doesn't let me change it now since it was recorded more than 7 hrs ago. What I suggested wasn't to presuppose that my answer was correct rather it was just suggesting we do things the way the site asks us to rather than have extended discussions in comments.

@YesheTenley No worries, friend. For what it is worth, I find the arguments made by Thanissaro persuasive in some respects but lacking in others - and he is also in the minority view it seems. I would love to discuss and “debate” it in depth at some point in time, but maybe here is not the right time or place :)

Today I found some enlightening understanding of Self which led me to answer my own question. The example of chariot was a good one to understand that in a chariot, the definition of chariot i.e. self can not be found. I had said in my question that I am defining Self as someone controlling my reasoning and thoughts to write these sentences or questions or answers. I am the controller. Here the analogy of chariot doesn’t seem to apply because I am not claiming to be the chariot but I am the one who is controlling the chariot.
I will claim that even then no temporary self can be found. I will claim that in order to form sentences different parts of the brain, body and the mind are utilized. Mental Control shifts from place to place in the body and in the consciousness.
Therefore no temporary self is possible. Metta.

This is what the fifth prong in the seven-fold reasoning was trying to make clear. The chariot is not the owner or controller of the parts. If that were so, then the "chariot" itself would not itself be made of parts it would just be the owner or controller. In that case, we're back to discussing partless chariots which makes no sense.
Very good that you arrived at this through your own reasoning and analysis.


text:
How does the self-doer of AN 6.38 not conflict with anatta?
The third mark of existence states sabbe dhamma anatta - all phenomena is not self.
Despite that, the following sutta states that there is a self-doer (attakārī). Also, this implies free will.
How is it that the existence of the self-doer (and free will) does not conflict with the third mark of existence?

“So, brahmin, when there is the element of endeavoring, endeavoring
beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer,
this, the other-doer. I have not, brahmin, seen or heard such a
doctrine, such a view as yours. How, indeed, could one — moving
forward by himself, moving back by himself — say ‘There is no
self-doer, there is no other-doer’?”
AN 6.38 (translated by K. Nizamis)

“Brahmin, if there is this element of approaching, brahmin, then it is
evident then that beings are approaching: this is what beings do
themselves [self-agency], this is what is done by others
[other-agency].” “Yes, sir.”
“Brahmin, I do not hold such a doctrine,
such a view [that there is no action of one’s own, that there is no
action by others]. For, I have neither seen nor heard of a situation
where one could oneself step forward or one could oneself step back,
and yet say, ‘There is no action of one’s own, there is no action by
others.’”
AN 6.38 (translated by Piya Tan)

“Since there is an element of energy, and sentient beings who have
energy are found, sentient beings act of their own volition or that of
another.
Brahmin, may I never see or hear of anyone holding such a doctrine or
view! How on earth can someone who comes and goes on his own say that
one does not act of one’s own volition, nor does one act of another’s
volition?”
AN 6.38 (translated by Ven. Sujato)

MN 61 says:

‘yannu kho ahaṁ idaṁ kāyena kammaṁ kattukāmo idaṁ me kāyakammaṁ
attabyābādhāyapi saṁvatteyya, parabyābādhāyapi saṁvatteyya, ubhayabyābādhāyapi saṁvatteyya—
‘Does this act with the body that I want to do lead to hurting
myself, hurting others, or hurting both?

SN 47.19 says:

Attānaṁ, bhikkhave, rakkhanto paraṁ rakkhati, paraṁ rakkhanto attānaṁ rakkhatī”ti.
Looking after yourself, you look after others; and looking
after others, you look after yourself.”

AN 6.38 says:

‘natthi attakāro, natthi parakāro’”ti.
One does not act of one’s own volition, nor does one act of another’s
volition.”

These suttas use conventional language. AN 3.68 is not supramundane. It is merely about intention. No one got enlightened. Anatta is not relevant.

I believe this talk was given to a brahmin who held the belief that actions are merely actions with no consequences somewhat similar to the doctrine of non-doing. In the case of this brahmin, there was an additional element in that he incorrectly thinks that since there is no one (or self), the actions and their effects are of no consequences. I suspect this was an excuse to ignore or justify that there are no consequences to actions.
The Buddha corrected the brahmin by pointing out that skillful or unskillful actions were initiated by a being and both the actions initiated and the initiator can be identified and recognized. In such a case, there will be karma and its consequences.
A few additional points. First, it is clear the brahmin is not enlightened. Second, actions have consequences due to being tainted by greed, aversion and ignorance. Third, we incline by default towards unskillful actions (arising from our habitual tendencies of selfishness, greed, aversion and ignorance). Wrong beliefs do not help to counteract or reduce this inherent dangers we faced. Only the proper understanding and belief in karma can restraint, correct and reduce our habitual tendencies towards unskillful actions.
Clearly, this sutra has nothing to do with anatta or just vaguely, in the sense that the brahmin was using anatta as an excuse or basis to justify that there are no consequences to actions. With Metta.

From the dictionary it looks like "kari" is a very generic word for action or performance. That would make "attakari" mean "self-action" or "self-doing" — not "self-doer". Also, from the context it seems pretty clear that Buddha and a brahmin were discussing the notion of free will.
From other suttas we know that the Buddha was a huge opponent of fatalism. He taught his students to implement skillful behavior and avoid unskilful behavior, and to apply a strong continuous effort in meditation, and how can we control our behavior and apply effort if everything is predetermined? So Buddha was clearly against the fatalism.
Based on this, it kind of makes sense that the Buddha supports the idea of self-agency or free-will. But how can free-will coexist with anatta?
Back when I was still seeing a buddhist mentor, I asked him whether there was free-will or not and he said, the official Mahayana position is that it is both yes and no at the same time, that freewill both exists and does not exist. I asked how this was possible and he explained, that's because it's a matter of perspective. If we imagine subjective world of a sentient being, there's making choices and acting. If we look from the perspective of the totality of everything, every activity happens due to some causes, nothing happens by itself.
The concept of agency or acting is a twin sister of the concept of entity. Both are abstractions. The concepts of totality and determinism are also abstractions. In the provisional teaching, the Buddha taught effort and anatta, but in the ultimate teaching he taught freedom from all descriptions.
This is why, in the Aggi Vaccagotta Sutta, and a number of similar suttas the Buddha says "no" to pairs of opposite questions, whether tathagata exists or does not exist after death and so on. The Buddha even explains that "a position" is something he has abandoned. Why? Because freedom from position is the liberation he taught. Why? Because position is a one-sided simplification of reality. When we are stuck on a position we only see what fits into position and become blind to everything else. This leads to conflict and suffering. The Buddha taught seeing reality as it is, not through the glasses of a position.
So in the final analysis we can say, indeed attakari and anatta are a bit of a contradiction but thanks to this contradiction we can understand what Buddha meant when he said he had abandoned all positions.

Looking from an individual's perspective, do you think free will is an illusion arising from not seeing things clearly. Like playing a perfect game of chess or Go. To an amateur, there are many choices (free will?) but to an accomplished player, there is only one right move. Thanks!

That's what I used to think, but now I see that analyzing the situation and making that best choice still happens, and the will power perseveres despite circumstances. Accordingly, when you teach others, you teach them to make the right moves and to apply the will power to persevere, not going with the flow.

Indeed, one should stay grounded and do the practice with honesty and sincerity. Thanks.

@AndriyVolkov I think a good follow-up question would be: why some conceptualizations tend to be better than other ones (I'm assuming some are better than others because the Buddha chose some, while at the same time opposing to others)? What makes them better? And what is the standard for deciding which is better, if they are all mere human creations, saying nothing "truer" about reality?

@BrianDíazFlores That question is of secondary importance imo. Some concepts are better than others in certain context because they more accurately model a certain aspect of reality, making it a more effective tool for certain problems, that is all. But this is common sense. The novel part the Buddhism brings in is to explicitly acknowledge that reality behind the models can be seen but can never be exhaustively conceptualized, and our arguments whose model is better are only ever gonna lead to conflict and suffering.

How does the self-doer of AN 6.38 not conflict with anatta?

In the Suttas (Sutta Pitaka), which were directed at the laity, the Buddha used conventional language.
In Ultimate Reality, as seen in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, there's no beings, self, persons, entities etc.
So there's no confliction.

It is an interesting question. Ignorance exists and real events of pain and pleasure and disgust follow from it.
If out of ignorance I say I am moving forward and backwards then out of ignorance it is considered true. I am acting out my own volition is true in the world full of ignorance. The idea of self needs to be stamped out to enter the world of knowledge. Saying that there is no self and passively or actively believing that I did that, I am doing this and I will do that doesn’t prove that there is no self, instead it proves that there is a self in the ignorant world. Moving forward and moving backwards is just moving forward and moving backwards and this similar to the understanding heard is just heard, felt is just felt, thought is just thought. Understanding this leads to Nibbana.

The self-doer or self-doing or volition of AN 6.38 appears to be simply related to intention and volition.
These are not conflicting with the third mark of existence, because they are also part of dependent origination.

Feeling, perception, intention, contact, and application of mind.
Vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro—
This is called name.
idaṁ vuccati nāmaṁ.  .....
Choices by way of body, speech, and mind.
kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro.
SN 12.2

“Suppose that the person who does the deed experiences the result.
Then for one who has existed since the beginning, suffering is made by
oneself. This statement leans toward eternalism. Suppose that one
person does the deed and another experiences the result. Then for one
stricken by feeling, suffering is made by another. This statement
leans toward annihilationism. Avoiding these two extremes, the
Realized One teaches by the middle way: ‘Ignorance is a condition for
choices.
Choices are a condition for consciousness. … That is how this entire
mass of suffering originates. When ignorance fades away and ceases
with nothing left over, choices cease. When choices cease,
consciousness ceases. … That is how this entire mass of suffering
ceases.’”
SN 12.17


text:
If we are taught not to expect or desire anything in return for good deeds, does this means there are no karmic consequences?
I have often heard teachings that it is better that one should not expect or desire anything in return for good deeds or dana performed. I presume it is because this leads to attachment. If one is not attached, does this mean that there are no good karmic consequences? I recalled that it was also mentioned the good karmic fruits are magnified as a result (of lack of attachments). How is this achieved? How should this be understood in line with the teachings on karma?
Thank you.

Appendix A:
To clarify, the lack of attachment does not mean there is no intention. Undeniably, there will be some good intentions behind a charitable act like a wish for the well-being of or some relief for the recipient(s). What is meant by lack of attachment refers to the lack of desire or want for something in return e.g. praise, recognition or even good future karmic effects.

Kamma that is neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright result leads to the ending of kamma. Giving without attachment beautifies non-attachment. In other words, since the mind is non-attached, it can readily give.
AN 8.31 says the highest purpose of giving is it beautifies/is an adornment for the mind. Notice only the last gift here is not related to 'self' but only occurs for the sake of the mind's development.

Mendicants, there are these eight gifts. What eight? A person might
give a gift after insulting the recipient. Or they give out of fear.
Or they give thinking, ‘They gave to me.’ Or they give thinking,
‘They’ll give to me.’ Or they give thinking, ‘It’s good to give.’ Or
they give thinking, ‘I cook, they don’t. It wouldn’t be right for me
to not give to them.’ Or they give thinking, ‘By giving this gift I’ll get a good reputation.’ Or they give thinking, ‘This is an adornment and requisite for the mind.’ These are the eight gifts.”
AN
8.31

True, giving with attachments feels like cutting of a piece of flesh. It will be wonderful if there is a reference to the mentioned sutta, thank you.

@Desmon AN 7.49 according to this topic; or AN 7.52, different collections have slightly different numbering.

@ChrisW the related post you linked to is very illuminating, thank you so much!

Karma is a concept that predates the Buddha and directly translated is something like 'action' or 'deed' done with some intent. It is related to the law of cause and effect in that our actions and deeds have consequences. So called good/bright karma are those actions which result in consequences down the road that we find good and similarly with so called bad/dark or even neutral or mixed consequences.
With that background I think the crux for your question is that karma is defined as intentional or volitional actions. Karma is those actions we take with specific intents. Actions taken without any intent whatsoever simply don't apply. Intent or volition is a product of the mind so it is imperative to look at what the mind intends with every action we take.
If one takes actions with zero expectation or desire this sounds  a lot like zero intention or zero volition, but somehow I don't think this is what you mean? Usually, when we give something away we usually intend some result or consequence of this giving action, yes? A good intention might merely be to bring relief from suffering in the case of giving food to someone who is hungry. A bad intention might be to cause others to praise us for how generous we are.
To clarify, are you asking about the case where we give with zero intent whatsoever - not even to bring relief from suffering in the case of giving food to someone who is hungry - or are are you asking about the case of only good intentions like the above? If the former, I think it is not a karmic action as it has zero volitional action. If the latter, then I think it is a karmic action that will bring so-called good karmic results, but the question is to whom?
One way to understand the sutta you referenced is that its talking about karmic actions taken with zero intentional volition on the part of "I-making" or "mine-making." That is, intentional actions we take that simply do not have any relation or intention bundled up with our ignorant sense of self. If we give food to a hungry person merely to relieve them of starvation with absolutely no reference to "I" or "mine", then this intentional action will have neither good nor bad karmic results for "I" or "mine". In this sense, I think it would be a karmic action taken that results in neither dark nor bright consequences for the "I" and would lead to the ending of "I-making" and "mine-making." At least that is how I understand the teaching.

Thanks for asking, I have added an appendix A to clarify.

Good deeds bring good results. The statement before if true means it is a Dhamma, a teaching, a reality then according to three marks of existence, Sabbe Dhamma Anatta, meaning, the statement above is lacking Self. It is lacking Self because that Truth of mind is impermanent, meaning, the statement arises as true, changes in its meaning and vanishes from existence.
Therefore it is always not true that good deeds bring good results.


text:
Is Emptiness empty of meaning?
I believe Emptiness is a Dhamma.
But here is an observation which arose: Emptiness is empty of meaning.
My question is: Is Emptiness empty of meaning?

No, it isn't empty of meaning because understanding emptiness is necessary for the understanding of reality which is crucial to achieving the soterilogical purpose of Buddhism. If we don't understand reality and continue taking actions in ignorance how can we ever put an end to ignorance? You have to be careful when studying sunyata that you don't fall to the extreme of nihilism and negate conventional reality.
Sunyata does not mean that nothing exists. Things exist. It is how they exist that is the question and our problem is that we are mistaken in our conception of how things exist. If you ever find yourself thinking that sunyata somehow negates existence altogether, then you've misunderstood.
In order to really understand the object of negation - inherent existence - you need to be crystal clear about how it is possible things exist without inherently existing.
The President of the United States is a thing that exists without inherently existing. We designate the label on the basis of an individual person using human rules and customs. In order to use this label correctly it is necessary to have a valid basis of designation that everyone agrees upon. A seven year old child is not a valid basis, etc.
Sunyata does not mean that The President of the United States does not exist. If you believed the The President of the United States does not exist at all you would be gravely mistaken and might take actions leading to bad consequences. The President of the United States has a lot of power in our world so it is important to understand that they exist.
Sunyata also does not mean that we can just go around giving labels to anything. If I went around declaring myself to be President of the United States and then tried to assume some power of the President it would not work and I'd be laughed at. So it is clear that just because something exists by convention does not mean that it does not exist at all nor does it mean that we can just magically label anything whatever we want: sunyata does not give us magical abilities.
What Sunyata is saying is that the President of the United States does not exist inherently. It doesn't exist as a thing arising under its own power. Moreover, Sunyata is saying that all things exist in a way similar to the President of the United States in that nothing arises under its own power. It is relatively easy for lowly sentient beings to see that the President of the United States does not exist inherently, but it is hard for lowly sentient beings to see that all things - most importantly the self - do not exist inherently.
Things appear to us as inherently existing. Sunyata is teaching us to see this is not the case. Sunyata is emphatically not teaching that things don't exist whatsoever. This is the Middle Way.

I agreed, the Buddha compared the consequences of understanding the Dharma incorrectly with grasping a poisonous snake in the wrong manner (see the water-snake simile).

From what I understand nagarjuna has said “even emptiness is empty”. So your understanding of emptiness is one thing and your experience of it is another

Yes, but I don't think that is the question. Also, what does it mean that emptiness is empty? It means emptiness is empty ... of inherent existence.

@YesheTenley Sure that too


text:
Which word is more suitable for describing reality?
There can be different kinds of reality. Reality as experienced by dogs, cats, elephants, lions, pigs, snakes, humans, gods, maras or reality as experienced in hell or reality as experienced in heaven or reality as experienced by water born animals or by birds etc., differ widely in their nature.
The word I am comfortable using for reality is dhamma. However, sankhara is another word which might be used as all realities are impermanent therefore they must be a sankhara.
My question is : Which word - dhamma or sankhara - should be used to translate the meaning of reality from english to pali?

Please see the question "What is world (loka) in SN 12.44? Why is it called "world"?"

Please also see the question "SN 35.116 - Is "the world" ("loka") an objective reality perceived via the senses?"

Nibbana is a reality that is not impermanent & not sankhara

There are over 80 different connotations of the word dhamma/dharma. Likewise, there are many different connotations of the word reality. Your question asks for a 1 word "description" of reality which is more like asking for a translation. Context-less translations (or even transliterations) can be quite inaccurate. It may help you to have specific contexts to be precise.

@HomagetoManjushri I have given the context.

@DhammaDhatu Suppose you are translating the word "reality" as I have given in the context above, which word "Dhamma" or "Sankhara", will be appropriate to use?

Dhamma does not mean "reality", unless it refers to "Dhamma Niyama". Sankhara certainly does not mean "reality".

@DheerajVerma part of the problem here is you're not specifying the definition of 'reality' or 'real' that interests you. When answering this question the first thing I did was look up the most common definition on Google and use that. But other people are using different definitions. You should specify next time what definitions you are using to make things as clear as possible otherwise it will lead to confusion.

Reality is the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them. (common definition)
For something to be real means that it actually exists exactly as it appears to exist. An example of an unreal thing is an illusion or mirage in the desert. It isn't real because it actually exists in a way that is deceptive and different from how it appears to exist.
Neither dhamma nor sankhara are good translations of this concept. There are suttas where the Buddha uses the adjective real or not real. I'd look for those suttas and the translations from the pali experts on sutta central to find suitable words in pali of a similar meaning.

Reality is a word that has two opposite meanings:
Sentient being's subjective reality, known in the modern semiotic science as "Umwelt", is the world a sentient being finds itself in: a world of a frog, a world of a bat, a hell, and so on. This is what Pali Canon refers to as a "loka".
The objective or ontological reality, is the supposed basis or ground underlying the subjective experience, common to all the different perspectives and interpretations and giving rise to them.
Historically, Buddhism had difficult relationship with this second type of reality. The Buddha famously described The All in terms of subjective experience (the seen, the  heard, and so on) and refused speculations about the metaphysics, leading some students of Dharma to think that Buddhism denies any objective reality. Indeed, the dhammas in their narrow technical meaning — Abhidhamma's fundamental building blocks of reality — are expressed in terms of their phenomenology, they are things like solidity, wetness, hotness and so on. At the same time, early buddhist texts speak about "external forms" and describe consciousness as something dependent on the body, so it seems clear that Buddhism is not a form of subjective idealism.
That said, I don't remember a historical text, whether EBT or Mahayana, that would explicitly define or use a concept equivalent to what we would call ontological reality. When we hear that all dhammas are empty, or impermanent and deceptive, or that their existence does not match their appearance, we kind of understand that we are talking about subjective reality vs ontological reality, but no Pali or Sanskrit text ever uses such terms. Perhaps bhava (existance) comes close but it refers to existence of each individual thing, not all of them as in "reality". Another word I can think of is "dharmata" but it refers to the way things work not the way things are.
Back to your question whether it's dhamma or sankhara that refers to subjective reality, it is neither. Just like bhava, dhamma refers to each individual phenomenon, not the overall Umwelt of a sentient being. Sankhara is even less fitting, since it refers to the objective composition of phenomena in the ontological reality of causes and conditions, not to appearance.
So I guess the best Pali word for what you are asking about would be "loka", a world sentient being find itself in.

Can I say “Sabbe Loka Anatta” ? If yes then loka is a Dhamma which means subjective reality is a Dhamma. So what is the problem in calling reality a Dhamma ?

If a sentient being lives in hell for 100 years, would you call those 100 years as one dhamma, or do you consider every moment of experience of hell a separate dhamma? In English when we say subjective reality we assume that it lasts for some period of time, even if it is not identical from one moment to next. But what about dhamma, is it like that?

why is the subjective reality not identical from one moment to the next? if you say it lasts for some period of time, then it must be identical for that lasting time

why? you last for some time, but you are not identical. Subjective reality is you, just inside out.

Reality is called "the world".

Whatever in the world through which you perceive the world and
conceive the world is called the world in the training of the Noble
One. And through what in the world do you perceive the world and
conceive the world?
Through the eye in the world you perceive the world and conceive the
world. Through the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind in the world you
perceive the world and conceive the world.
Whatever in the world through which you perceive the world and
conceive the world is called the world in the training of the Noble
One.
SN 35.116

In Piya Tan's commentary on SN 12.44, he drew a connection from the arising of feeling to the arising of mental proliferation (papanca).

And what, bhikshus, is the arising of the world10?
Bhikshus, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises.
The meeting of the three is contact.
With contact as condition,
there is feeling.12
10 On the 3 types of “world,” see Rohitassa
S
12 From hereon, Madhu,pindika
S (M 18.16) continues: “What one feels, one perceives. What one
perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one mentally
proliferates. What a person mentally proliferates is the source
through which perceptions and notions due to mental proliferation
impacts one regarding past, future and present forms cognizable
through the eye.”

In Piya Tan's commentary on the Rohitassa Sutta (SN 2.26), he explains the three types of worlds:

In the Rohitassa Sutta, the word “world” (loka) is used in two
senses: in the sense of the physical world and the world of
formations. Rohitassa asks the Buddha a question on the physical world
(cakka-vāla loka, “universe world”), but the Buddha answers him
referring to the world of formations. Through-out the Buddhist texts,
the word “world” has three senses:

Sankhāra loka - the world of formations,
Satta loka - the world of beings,
Okāsa loka - the world of space (ie the space-time reality).
(Vism 7.37/204 f; DA 1:173; MA 1:397, 2:200)

The world of formations is defined in the Patisambhidā,magga thus:
“One world: all beings are sustained by food.” (Pm 1:122).

So, the "world" of SN 12.44 corresponds to the world of mental formations (sankhara loka) arising from mental proliferations (papanca), that is derived from the feelings (vedana) coming from the contact of consciousness with the six sense media and their sense objects (The All).

Good answer. Is it true that “ Sabbe sankhara loka Anatta” ? If yes then can we call sanskar Loka a Dhamma ? If yes then why can’t we call reality , as mentioned above, a Dhamma?

The English word "reality" is ambiguous or has a broad set of meanings.
To me its primary or basic use is to refer is to refer to the universe of tangible or thing-like objects -- and as such, perhaps it corresponds to the Pali word for "form" i.e. rupa.
The antonym of "real" is "imaginary" -- including unicorns and so on -- objects which exist or can be "seen" in the mind but not touched (they're not solid, not liquid, not gaseous, and not fire, i.e. none of the four elements).
You also mentioned "reality as experienced in heaven" and so on. I'm not sure but the word for this, i.e. for what's "experienced", might be "feeling" (vedana) or "perception" (sanna).
Dhamma is another word with several meanings. According to this glossary's entries for dhamma and ayatana it can be used to mean (generically) "thing" but perhaps more precisely "mental phenomenon".

The arising and vanishing trillion times per second of five aggregates are called dogs, cats, elephants, lions, pigs, snakes, humans, gods, maras, hell, heaven, etc.
Anybody could say "Alexander is good man" which could be truth or not because of wrong or right view, but Alexander is right to be called "good man" while his awesome mind arising and vanishing period.
One could imagine whatever but the arising or not will prove the reality.
And how to see trillion times per second arising and vanishing?
Meditate (Eight)Vijja(Fifteen)Carana in VijjaCaranaSampanno of "Itipiso..." with Svakkhato Bhagavata Dhamma. Then you will be purify enough see the real complicated & advance dependent origination.
I type it in pali because it is important to understand what you daily reciting in deep.

yathābhūtaṁ jānāti passati = know and see according to reality/what really exists (AN 11.2)
yathābhūtaṁ
that is reality = etaṁ yāthāvanti (Iti 49)
yāthāva

Can I say “Sabbe Bhutam Anatta” ? If yes then Bhutam is a Dhamma which means reality is Dhamma. So what is the problem in calling reality a Dhamma ?

There is nothing called reality in buddha-dharma. Or at max you can say sunnata is reality.
Everything is perceived. and perception is dependent on past experience or sankhara.A perception of one person need not to match perception of other.
However we have perception based on generality and that we call Reality.
Can you say what is reality in case when few people says earth is flat. and majority says earth is round. And remember, just 200 year back the reality was opposite.

Science has pointed out that our senses are really limited when it comes to comprehending our surroundings and its reality. We see only a fraction of a percent of the electromagnetic spectrum. We unable to hear infrasound or ultrasound. Dogs’ senses of smell are far superior than ours. Our sense of taste and touch are equally inferior. In truth, the reality we are aware of is only a very tiny subset of the actual reality based on the information gathered by our limited senses. This tiny subset is our internal representation of reality and this tiny subset is all that we ever know about the actual reality.
Unfortunately, on top of this tiny subset of reality, we add false narratives, subjective interpretations and fictitious details. We also filter out objective information that goes against our likes or matches our dislikes. These actions further skewed what we know about reality. We may think everyone have their own interpretations of reality and as long as the interpretations are similar there is no problem. Yes, often they are very similar but at times different interpretations can arise w.r.t. the same event and the reality surrounding it. Sadly, these different interpretations lead to breakdowns in relationships, conflicts amongst various groups and even war between countries. It is also difficult to admit that our internal representation of reality is inaccurate. Frequently, we will only do so when reality shove it down our throats by crushing our expectations, hopes and dreams i.e. by making us suffer.
I think this is the message the Buddha is trying to bring across. That there is something wrong with our internal representation of reality and it is making us suffer. At first, we will try our best to be objective and impartial in the process of representing reality once we understood that sufferings come from getting it wrong. But it will always fall short. This is because there is an invisible perpetrator that just keep colouring and tainting the whole process. The moment the mind comes into contact with sight, sound, smell, taste and touch, they are already coloured. When feelings, perception and thoughts arise, they are already tainted. In time, the realization hits us that this invisible perpetrator is none other than ourselves.
It doesn't matter if we use dhamma or sankhara or whatever word to describe reality. We can even use a symbol @ to express it. But it is all pointless if we don’t realize that there is a problem even before we start describing and interpreting reality. With Metta.

if you think that reality is about experience, dhamma (phenomena), sankhara (dukha) might work.

"So you should view this fleeting world -- A star at dawn, a
bubble in a stream, A flash of lightening in a summer cloud, A
flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream."

Anubhāva might translate to experience in pali


text:
How should we understand the phrase "saccato thetato"?
Inspired from another question, I went looking for translations from the pali on suttacentral where pali experts have used the english word 'real.'
SN 22.85 as translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi

“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death’?”

However, Bikkhu Sujato translates SN 22.85

“In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t actually find the Realized One in the present life, is it appropriate to declare: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”

While the original pali of SN 22.85 has:

“Ettha ca te, āvuso yamaka, diṭṭheva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne, kallaṁ nu te taṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ: Variant: thetato → tathato (sya-all, km) | tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne → tathāgato anupalabbhiyamāno (sya-all, pts1ed); tathāgate anupalabbhamāne (?)‘tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṁ maraṇā’”ti?
I think I've isolated the pali phrase in question as saccato thetato which I think breaks down like this:
Saccato (सत्यतः in sanskrit): This term conveys the idea of "truth" or "reality." In a philosophical context, it's used to describe something as genuine, actual, or true. In the passage provided, "saccato" is used to suggest that one does not apprehend or perceive the Tathagata (Buddha) as "true" or "real" in the present life as Yamaka perceived.
Thetato (स्थितिः in sanskrit): This term refers to "establishment" or "existence." It is used to indicate that something is established or exists in a certain way. In the passage, "thetato" is used to convey that the Tathagata (Buddha) is not established or perceived as existing in the present life in the way that Yamaka perceived.
Since I'm neither a pali or sanskrit expert and I know there are some accomplished language folks on this forum:

Is saccato thetato the correct term under question in these two different english translations?
Which is the better translation or is there another translation that should be preferred over what Bikkhu Bodhi/Sujato suggest?
Are there other suttas that reference this term that could help with the translation and the meaning that is conveyed here?

Here is the search of the term on suttacentral.
Thanks!

It appears the Sujato translation omits a word.

tathāgate = Tathāgata as a

diṭṭheva = visible

dhamme = thing/reality/phenomena

saccato = true

thetato = reliable

an = not

upalabbhiyamāne = is found

Sujato + saccato thetato = actually
Bodhi + saccato thetato = real and actual


text:
Is there a true contradiction between SN 5.10 and SN 22.85?
It is said by the bhikkhuni Vajira:
“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’
SN 5.10
However, in the Yamaka Sutta:
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
...
“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life ...”
SN 22.85
Yamaka denies the aggregates taken together as the Tathagata is real and actual. On the other hand, Vajira seems to be affirming that the aggregates taken together is a convention.
The words in pali for this phrase of real and actual are saccato thetato and for convention the word is sammuti.
When he performed an analysis - as the Buddha advised Yamaka to do - he tried to find the saccato thetato self, but came up empty. Does that mean that Vajira erred in naming 'a being' as a convention?
Is this a true contradiction? Why did the Buddha advise Yamaka to try and find a self through analysis? Wasn't this leading Yamaka into a thicket of views?
UPDATE:
This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question (at least I do now and I'm not totally convinced I didn't have that idea already when I first opened it) so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

So, why can't Tathagata be real and actual temporary bundle of aggregates?

Are you asking for the reasoning behind Yamaka answering negatively or are you asking why a "temporary bundle of aggregates" is not a real and actual thing?

The first one, of course. The text does not qualify for the real and actual, it just asks whether the skandhas taken together are what we "regard as" Tathagata, and Yamaka's negative answer is approved by Shariputra. But isn't Tathagata a conventional designation made on the basis of aggregates, as in the chariot metaphor? Wouldn't that make "no" an invalid answer, because the aggregates taken together is what we "regard as" Tathagata?

Shariputra's questions are directing Yamaka through an ultimate analysis to see if the Tathagata is ultimately findable as real and actual. The questions are not qualified as such, but this formula of analysis is found throughout the suttas and I suppose that Yamaka is well aware that the qualification 'real and actual' is the crux when Shariputra walks him through the formulaic analysis. IOW, I suppose that Yamaka and Shariputra are in agreement that the object of negation - as well as the difference between it and conventional designation - is the subject of the questions.

As for the actual reasoning employed in ultimate analysis you can see my account here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/49536/13375 but @AndriyVolkov you know all this so I surmise I'm missing something that you're trying to point out...

I'm not trying to point out anything, I'm just thinking that language used in Yamaka Sutta is way too sloppy for such an important subject :)

I prefer to see it as glass half full in that this apparent contradiction forces us to think and resolve it in a consistent manner and when we do so successfully we've established the middle way :)

Where's the contradiction?
When you sit down, you have a lap by convention. When you stand up, you don't have a lap by convention.
The lap is not a specific real and actual thing by itself. You cannot isolate a thing by itself that you can call a lap.
When you clench your fingers, you have a fist by convention. When you unclench your fingers, you don't have a fist by convention.
The fist is not a specific real and actual thing by itself.You cannot isolate a thing by itself that you can call a fist.
The being (satta), the person (puggala) and the self (atta) are such conventions, similar to the lap and the fist.

Lap i& fist are not convention in Pali. This post is solipsism

SN 5.10 says, for the unenlightened, the belief in "a being" or "sentient beings" is a wrong view. The unenlightened believe "beings" or "sentiment beings" are true & real and require salvation by bodhisattvas postponing enlightenment over countless lifetimes.
SN 5.10 also says, for the enlightened, the notion of "a being" is merely a convention. SN 5.10 does not say the five aggregates are a convention.
Similarly, SN 22.85 says, for the enlightened, (the convention of) The Tathagata is not true & real. SN 22.85 does not say the five aggregates are not true & real.
SN 22.85 begins with the following wrong view of Yamaka:

As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
the body and does not exist after death.

In the Pali, terms such as "annihilated" ("ucchijjati"; verb of "uccheda"; refer to DN 1) and "death" ("maraṇā"; refer to SN 12.2) refer to self-views of an "existent being". This is why Yamaka had wrong view. Yamaka believed an Arahant was a type of "being" or "self".
If in doubt, again, MN 72 says:

“But Master Gotama, when a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, where
are they reborn?”
“Evaṁ vimuttacitto pana, bho gotama, bhikkhu kuhiṁ upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.
“Well then, are they not reborn?”
“Tena hi, bho gotama, na upapajjatī”ti?
“‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”
“Na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

These common Pali words, such as "uccheda", "maraṇā" & "upapajjatī" are related to "self-views" of "a being". Most Buddhists are caught up in materialism, believing "marana" &  "upapajjatī" refer to biological death & a biological rebirth.


text:
What is the proper translation of the pali "Kāyassa bhedā paraṁ maraṇā" to english?
The pali phrase "Kāyassa bhedā paraṁ maraṇā" is found in many suttas.
Bhikkhu Sujato translates this as "when their body broke up, after death"
Bhikkhu Bodhi translates this as "with the breakup of the body, after death"
Bhikkhu Suddhāso translates this as "When there is separation from the body after death, following the completion of this life"
In another translation of Bhikkhu Sujato we see "Kāyassa bhedā" specifically translated again as "body breaks up"
We also see this phrase "Kāyassa bhedā" alongside "jīvitapariyādānā" which I believe means termination of life.
Are these correct translations referencing the breakup of the body? Does the body refer to the aggregates? Is this referring to the biological death of the body? If not, what is the proper translation?

1/2 The only way  to prove "Unawesome Karma give only unpleasant resultant [duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ Nirayaṃ upapajjanti]" is the practicing Vijjācaraṇasampanno, 3 Vijjās, follow the Buddha in DN2 Sāmaññaphalasutta. The practitioner will always automatically see, no effort no imagination, the appearance of Unawesome Karma at the almost death moment [Kāyassa bhedā] in each past life.  The practitioner will always automatically see, no effort no imagination, whether That-Past-Life-Appeared-Unawesome-Karma always  give  unpleasant resultant for entire each next life [Paraṃ maraṇā].

2/2 That's the easiest way to prove Karma Process in Sutta, Meditating forth Jhana for Pactice 3 Vijjas, because Karma and Resultant in between birth and death is very complicated to prove. Yes, it could prove but it's very in detail,  Abhidhamma. Abhidhamma is very in detail which is harder to understand it all right as it really is, arising and vanishing trillion times per second by uncountable causes and uncountable effects. However, it's possible to prove after meditate the forth Mastering Jhana.

Let's use the translations from the dictionary by Ven. Nyanatiloka Mahathera.
For "jāti":

jāti：'birth'，comprises the entire embryonic process beginning with
conception and ending with parturition．
＂The birth of beings belonging to this or that order of beings，their
being born，their conception （okkanti） and springing into existence，the
manifestation of the groups （corporeality，feeling，perception，mental
formations，consciousness； s．khandha），the acquiring of their
sensitive organs：this is called birth＂

For "maraṇa":

maraṇa：'death'，in ordinary usage，means the disappearance of the vital
faculty confined to a single life-time，and therewith of the
psycho-physical life-process conventionally called
'man，animal，personality，ego'，etc．Strictly speaking，however，death is
the continually repeated dissolution and vanishing of each momentary
physical-mental combination，and thus it takes place every moment.

For "kāya":

kāya，（lit：accumulation）：'group'，'body'，may either refer to the
physical body （rūpa-kāya） or to the mental body （nāma-kāya）．In the
latter case it is either a collective name for the mental groups
（feeling，perception，mental formations，consciousness； s．khandha），or
merely for feeling，perception and a few of the mental formations
（s．nāma），e．g．in kāya-lahutā，etc．（cf．Tab．II）

For "sakkāya":

sakkāya：'existing group'．'this word is usually translated by
'personality'，but according to the commentaries it corresponds to
sat-kāya，'existing group'，hence not to Sanskrit sva-kāya，'own group'
or 'own body'．In the Suttas （e．g．M．44） it is said to be a name for the
5 groups of existence （khandha）：Sakkāya，o Brother Visākha，is said by
the Blessed One to be a name for the 5 'groups as objects of clinging'
（upādāna-kkhandha），to wit：corporeality，feeling，perception，mental
formations，and consciousness．＂

For "bheda":  "bheda：[m．] breach; disunion; dissension"
For "paraṃ": "paraṃ：[adv．] after； beyond； further； on the other side of"
From the Concise Pali-English Dictionary by Ven. A.P. Buddhadatta Mahathera:

kāya，（m．），a heap； a collection； the body.
sakkāya：[m．] the existing body．

So, it can be translated in both ways:

The break-up of the physical body after physical death
The dissolution of the aggregates after the momentary death of individuality

#1 or #2 can both be derived from:

“But when someone who is attached has laid down this body (kāyaṁ)
and has not been reborn in one of the realms, what does Master Gotama
say is their fuel then?” “When someone who is attached has laid down
this body, Vaccha, and has not been reborn in one of the realms, I say
they’re fueled by craving. For craving is their fuel then.”
SN 44.9 (translated by Ven. Sujato)

However, #2 can easily be seen from:

“Contact, reverends, is one end. The origin of contact is the second
end. The cessation of contact is the middle. And craving is the
seamstress, for craving weaves one to being reborn in one state of
existence or another. That’s how a mendicant directly knows what
should be directly known and completely understands what should be
completely understood. Knowing and understanding thus they make an end
of suffering in this very life.”
“The past, reverends, is one end. The future is the second end. The
present is the middle. And craving is the seamstress … That’s how a
mendicant directly knows … an  end of suffering in this very life.”
“Identity (sakkāya), reverends, is one end. The origin of identity
is the second end. The cessation of identity is the middle. And
craving is the seamstress, for craving weaves one to being reborn in
one state of existence or another. That’s how a mendicant directly
knows what should be directly known and completely understands what
should be completely understood. Knowing and understanding thus they
make an end of suffering in this very life.”
AN 6.61 (translated by Ven. Sujato)

The last quoted paragraph from AN 6.61 can also have "identity" replaced with "existing body" or "existing group (of aggregates)".

i marked this post down. The dictionary entries lack authoritativeness. Even worse, Sujato's translation of SN 44.9 using the term "realm" for "kaya" is completely wrong.

when kāya is not qualified as nāma-kāya (mental body), by default kāya on it's own refers to a rūpa-kāya, the physical biological body made up of 4 elements.
Snp 5 is a great example in usage that proves kāya in meditation context is rūpa-kāya by default. https://notesonthedhamma.blogspot.com/2021/10/kn-snp-5-buddha-knew-about-ambiguities.html
That expression of OP is talking about physical death. For the arhant, after that break up of the physical body, they no longer are reborn.
For the ordinary person, the momentum of ignorance and craving at physical death leads to viññāa (consciousness) re-arise with another set of nāma (mental factors) and rūpa (physical form) in a new life form.
That's the context you find that expression from the OP. Arahant attains final nibbāna right there, and some beings who are not arahant at time of physical death attain nibbāna shortly after, most are reborn.

Majjhima Nikaya means "rupa kaya"?

"kaya" always means "group" or "collection", such as in SN 12.19. For example, in SN 12.19, the "rupa' does not originate from ignorance & craving. SN 22.56 & SN 22.82 literally say the rupa is caused by the 4 elements.

MN 72 “‘They’re not reborn’ doesn’t apply, Vaccha.”  “Na upapajjatīti kho, vaccha, na upeti”.

Arahant: MN 140 And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should he yearn?

Snp 5 is a great example in usage that proves kāya in meditation context is rūpa-kāya by default. https://notesonthedhamma.blogspot.com/2021/10/kn-snp-5-buddha-knew-about-ambiguities.html

what is Snp 5? regardless, there is no such thing as rupa meditation in Buddhism. Its called kaya because meditation here is about understand how the  mind effects  the breathing & body.

The pali phrase "Kāyassa bhedā paraṁ maraṇā" is found in many suttas.

My impression is we will find the above phrase is only used in reference to "beings" ("satta") in mundane suttas about kamma for puthujjana. The only exception is MN 140 but this is regarded as a corruption, particularly given it is not found is all versions of MN 140 (i.e., Burmese vs Sri Lankan, etc).

We also see this phrase "Kāyassa bhedā" alongside "jīvitapariyādānā"
which I believe means termination of life.

Apart from corruptions of MN 140, my impression is the term "marana" is not found with "jīvitapariyādānā" above. The word "marana" is defined in SN 12.2 as occurring to "beings" ("satta"). SN 5.10 says "beings" is the wrong view of Mara or Satan.
The term "kaya" does not mean "physical body". "Kaya" means "group" or "collection". For example, DN 15 refers to "nama-kaya" and "rupa-kaya". Or MN 44 uses the term "sakkaya" is relation to the five aggregates.

From what I can tell you are correct that only MN 140 has 'marana' and 'jīvitapariyādānā' mentioned in the same verse. However, Kāyassa bhedā and jīvitapariyādānā are mentioned in several and they don't all refer to kamma for puthujjana. How then do you translate Kāyassa bhedā?

You are focusing on the wrong words. "Satta" is related to "marana". "Marana" only occurs to "satta". When The Enlightened refer to the ending of life, the word "kālaṅkata" rather than "marana". "Marana" means "Mara". "Mara" means "attachment". Refer to SN 23.1, SN 23.11 & 12.

Understood. But focus on the suttas here that do not mention 'marana' at all: https://suttacentral.net/search?query=k%C4%81yassa%20bhed%C4%81%20uddha%E1%B9%81%20j%C4%ABvitapariy%C4%81d%C4%81n%C4%81 how do you translate Kāyassa bhedā ?

The 1st sentence of your question includes 'marana'.

I can easily open a new question or modify this one to omit any mention of 'marana' and focus on suttas which are not about kamma for puthujjana and the question would remain: how do you translate Kāyassa bhedā ?

Personally, I always translate it as the aggregates.

The breakup or dissolution of the aggregates then?

Kaya means 'group'. It can be group of 4 elements of rupa. Or group of aggregates. For the end of MN 144, I prefer aggregates. If kaya is translated as physical body in MN 114 it is about reincarnation, which i do not agree with.

In another
translation of Bhikkhu Sujato we see "Kāyassa bhedā" specifically
translated again as "body breaks up"

I have never read this before. It is a strange sutta (but the AN has lots of strange stuff in it). This sutta includes the following, which does not contain paraṁ maraṇā:

Because of the weakness of the five faculties, they become fully
extinguished when the body breaks up without making extra effort.
So imesaṁ pañcannaṁ indriyānaṁ muduttā kāyassa bhedā
asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.
That’s how a person becomes fully extinguished when the body breaks up
without making extra effort.
Evaṁ kho, bhikkhave, puggalo kāyassa bhedā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

My comments:

The translation of "extra effort" refers to when a mendicant meditates observing the ugliness of the body, perceives the repulsiveness of food, perceives dissatisfaction with the whole world, observes the impermanence of all conditions, and has well established the perception of their own death.

The translation of "without making extra effort" refers to relying on the four jhanas.

It is strange if the five faculties are weak that a person would be fully extinguished.

kāyassa (the body's) bhedā (dissolution) paraṁ (after) maraṇā (death) uddhaṁ (????) jīvitapariyādānā (life span's termination) idheva (right here) sabbavedayitāni (all felt/all experienced) anabhinanditāni (not delighted in) sītībhavissantī (cold becomes) (Dhamma Dhatu)

Yeshe Tenley posted:

Bhikkhu Suddhāso translates
this as "One knows, ‘When there is separation from the body after death, following the completion of this life, all that is felt here will become cool, as there is no delight in it.’"

Above, it appears Suddhāso has translated "uddhaṁ" as "separation". Suddhaso has also used a translation of "separated" for "nānābhāvā" in the following part of the same sutta (MN 140):

Monk, just as when two sticks are rubbed together warmth comes into
being and heat is produced, and when those two sticks are separated (nānābhāvā) the warmth from that friction ceases and comes to an end;

The word "nānābhāvā" is commonly used for "separated", such as in:

‘I must be parted and separated from all I hold dear and beloved.’ …
‘Sabbehi me piyehi manāpehi nānābhāvo vinābhāvo’ti abhiṇhaṁ
paccavekkhitabbaṁ itthiyā vā purisena vā gahaṭṭhena vā pabbajitena vā.
AN 5.57

It is notable this passage from MN 140 appears unique in the suttas. For example, this link shows the term "paraṁ maraṇā" in MN 140 is only found once (in MN 140) among eight uses of "uddhaṁ jīvitapariyādānā".
My impression is Suddhāso has also been influenced in his translation of "uddhaṁ" as "separation" by the often questionable translation & interpretation of "uddhagāmi" in SN 55.21. The word "uddha" means "upwards; in height; upstream; above; further; beyond".
Let us examine the other translations of MN 140 for the meaning of "uddhaṁ". Note: each of the translations below has excluded translating "paraṁ maraṇā":

Dhamma Dhatu: kāyassa (the body's) bhedā (dissolution) paraṁ (after) maraṇā (death) uddhaṁ (????) jīvitapariyādānā (life span's termination) idheva (right here) sabbavedayitāni (all felt/all experienced) anabhinanditāni (not delighted in) sītībhavissantī (cold becomes)
Sujato: They understand: ‘When my body breaks up and my life has come to an
end, everything that’s felt, since I no longer take pleasure in it,
will become cool right here.’
Bodhi: He understands: ‘On the dissolution (bhedā) of the body (kāyassa), with the ending (pariyantika) of life (jīvita), all that is felt (sabbavedayitāni), not being delighted in (anabhinanditāni), will become cool (sītībhavissantī) right here (idheva).’
Thanissaro: One discerns that 'With the break-up of the body, after the termination of life, all that is sensed, not being relished, will grow cold right here.' (Thanissaro)

The above can be compared to Iti 44, which says:

For them, everything that’s felt, being no longer relished, will
become cool right here.
Tassa idheva, bhikkhave, sabbavedayitāni anabhinanditāni sīti
bhavissanti.

In conclusion, for MN 140, my impression is Bhikkhu Bodhi did not translate "uddhaṁ" but possibly Sujato translated "uddhaṁ" as "comes to" and Thanissaro translated "uddhaṁ" as "after the". It may be prudent to ask one of the translators, such as Sujato at Sutta Central, what the word "uddhaṁ" means here.
For me, it seems the translation should be:

kāyassa (the body's) bhedā (dissolution) uddhaṁ (beyond)
jīvitapariyādānā (life span's termination)

Now, Thag 10.3, while again sounding very late & fake (because 'jati' & 'marana' are used for physical birth & death), says death occurs immediately after life. Therefore, the break-up of the body occurs after the termination of life rather than the termination of life occurs after the break up of the body.

For anyone who is born,
Anantaraṁ [immediately after] hi jātassa [one's birth],
death always follows after life.
jīvitā [life span] maraṇaṁ [death] dhuvaṁ [is certain];
Everyone who is born here dies here;
Jātā jātā marantīdha,
such is the nature of living creatures.
evaṁdhammā hi pāṇino.
Thag 10.3

In summary, whether 'kaya' refers 'aggregates' or 'physical body' remains indeterminate. For example, MN 43 says:

“When someone dies, their physical, verbal and mental conditions have ceased and stilled; their vitality is spent; their warmth is
dissipated; and their [five sense] faculties have disintegrated.
“Yvāyaṁ, āvuso, mato kālaṅkato tassa kāyasaṅkhārā niruddhā
paṭippassaddhā, vacīsaṅkhārā niruddhā paṭippassaddhā, cittasaṅkhārā
niruddhā paṭippassaddhā, āyu parikkhīṇo, usmā vūpasantā, indriyāni
paribhinnāni

Yeshe Tenley posted:

We also see this phrase "Kāyassa bhedā" alongside "jīvitapariyādānā"
which I believe means termination of life.

SN 12.51, which contains the above, says:

They understand: ‘When my body breaks up and my life has come to an
end, everything that’s felt, since I no longer take pleasure in it,
will become cool right here. Only bodily remains will be left.’
Kāyassa bhedā uddhaṁ jīvitapariyādānā idheva sabbavedayitāni
anabhinanditāni sītībhavissanti, sarīrāni avasissantīti pajānāti.

While SN 12.51 is a late & fake sutta, due to its illogical Abhidhammic discussion of 'sankhara', SN 12.51 clearly shows the word 'kaya' does not mean 'physical body' because SN 12.51 uses the tradition term for 'physical body', namely, 'sarīra'.