text:
Comparing Chinese Agama the ? Bundles of Reeds Simile with Pali Nalakalapiyo Sutta
In commenting a post, I have just been introduced to the "two bundles of reeds leaning up against each other" Sutta. The comments have just been moved to chat and I hope it would be kept for awhile since I notice most chats are just rubbish bins to collect "hazardous" information in this forum and later deleted.
From Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama No. 288 it has this verse:

...譬如：三蘆立於空地，展轉相依而得豎立，若去其一，二亦不立；若去其二，一亦不立，展轉相依而得豎立。識 緣名色，亦復如是，展轉相依而得生長。
Translation
...For example, three reeds standing on the floor, they
  relying on each other so are able to stand up. If one is removed, the
  other two cannot stand; if removed two, one also cannot stand. [Only]
  by relying on each other they are able to stand up. Consciousness
  correlating to name-form, is also the same, [they] relying on each
  other then are able to develop. ~ Saṃyukta Āgama No. 288

Remark: Chinese 識 has multiple meanings, depends on the context of the text, it either just refers to consciousness - the faculty of cognizing, or the total of mind

However, Pali Sutta Nalakalapiyo Sutta: Sheaves of Reeds reads:

"Suppose there were two bundles of reeds leaning up against each other. In the same way, name and form are conditions for consciousness. Consciousness is a condition for name and form. If the first of those bundles of reeds were to be pulled away, the other would collapse. And if the other were to be pulled away, the first would collapse. In the same way, when name and form cease, consciousness ceases. When consciousness ceases, name and form cease.” ~ SN 12.67

The Chinese Agama said three reeds can lean againist each other, but the Pali  Nalakalapiyo said two reeds can lean against each other. My questions are:

Are these two Sutra/Sutta equivalent but different versions?1
If they are equivalent Sutra/Sutta, which is more reliable? Or, more accurate?
They obviously have marked disagreement - can three reeds leaning against each others to stand up, or two reeds?

I welcome non-dogmatic, non-sectarian answers, and thanks in advance. Reminder, this is a professional academic comparison, please appeal to logic, reasons and facts. That would be much appreciated.

Footnote:
1. From my knowledge, Chinese Samyutta Agama has two versions, one is from Ceylon (Sri Lanka). But also from my knowledge, there wasn't any script of Pali Canon being brought back from Ceylon to China by the ancient Chinese Buddhist pilgrims in the Chinese Tripitaka.
1.1 Just excuse me rumbling, the Chinese pilgrims took scripts from other sects in Ceylon, not the Mahavihara sect - called Theravada today, who kept the Pali Canon.

I don't think it's off-topic (it's about an aspect of Buddhism). Sometimes e.g. scholars compare two versions of a sutta, perhaps no-one has actually done that for this sutta, I don't know, but if they have that would be relevant.

Yes, I suppose. 2. Both suttas talked about reverse dependent origination and dependent origination. The analogy/simile has been taken to explain link between two (cause and effect) in [reverse] dependent origination. So considering the whole idea the "two" is more reliable. The word "three" may have been used separating nama-rupa further as two. 3. If two playing cards can be leaned up against each other why two reeds could not? (Correct me if I'm wrong because I'm not a physics expert.)

You're welcome to write an answer @Damith. From physics, in my understanding, the stable minimum support is 3, like a tripod used for camera, or a table (classically) has at least 3 legs

@Mishu 米殊 To answer such scholarly question one needs to refer many resource materials. I commented only because I felt it as a poor answer. Sure I'll write an answer whenever I get free time.

This post is the rare example to be able to procure solid answer from most answers' contributions, especially @ruben2020.
@ruben2020 referred to the Sanskrit sutra SF 155 "Naḍakalāpikasūtra", an archaeological discovery of Sanskrit texts from Turfan kept in Germany, has a verse with high potential in consistency with the Pali Nikaya but not the Chinese Agama. I side with @ruben2020's speculation.
Though neither one is any Sanskit expert, I've done some checking from online Sanskrit and Pali dictionaries, and list the findings here to compare:

Turfen SF155:
1 tadyathā (for example = suppose) | 2 dvau (two) | 3
  naḍa-kalā-pāv (reed-kilo?-stalk = bundles of reed) | 4 ākāśe (in the air = open ground) | 5 ucchṛtau (upright/stand? = stand) | 6
  syātām (take place = leaning?) | 7 anyonyaṃ (mutually = against each other) | 8 niśṛta (?up)
For example, two bundles of reed in the open ground stand up leaning
  against each other
Pali SN 12.67:
1 Seyyathāpi | āvuso | 2 dve | 3 naḷa-kalā-piyo
  (reed/stalk-bundle?-? = bundles of reed) | 7 aññamaññaṃ (mutually = against each other) | ?8 nissāya | ?6 tiṭṭheyyuṃ
Suppose there were two bundles of reeds leaning up against each other.

I speculate the Pali verse only missed the ākāśe (open ground) and ucchṛtau (stand up).
The meaning of the whole verse, especially the word two (SF155 dvau, SN 12.67 dve); and the word before it: for example/suppose (SF155 tadyathā, SN 12.67 Seyyathāpi); the word after it: bundles of reeds (SF155 naḍakalāpāv, SN12.67 naḷakalāpiyo) are agreeing with each other. Therefore it has extreme high potential that the Pali Samyukta Nikaya is much closer to the text of Turfan manuscripts. The Chinese Samyukta Agama is not, especially the corresponding verse rendered as "...three reeds standing on the floor...".
Therefore, from this evidence, it infers that the Pali Samyukta Nikaya is a later version, compared to the Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama.
From a research article written by Renate Nöller and Oliver Hahn (PhD.), on the Turfan manuscripts, it said:

These documents, written in different languages and scripts, reflect
  the cultural diversity of the people who travelled along trade roads
  between East and West. Philology has distinguished the manuscripts’
  origin from the 6th to the 13th century...

The Pali text is consistent with the Turfan manuscripts dated to 600CE -1300CE.
From Chinese Wikipedia on Samyukta Agama (雜阿含經), I've translated a paragraph that gives more details than the English Wikipedia on Agamas:

The Samyukta Agama was, in Southern Dynasty of Lau-song between the
  reign titled "Yuan-jia" (a year between 435-443CE), at the Monastery
  Qí-huán (another saying is at Monastry Wǎ-guān) in County of Yang,
  recited by Guṇabhadra, Bǎo-yún translated into Han scripts, Huì-guān
  recorded, in total 50 scrolls. Its origin is not confirmed. In The
  Chronicles of Triple-gems it recorded, this text was the Samyukta
  Agama version bought back by Fǎ-xiǎn from Ceylon. Also, other scholars
  believe poissble bought by Guṇabhadra, from Ceylon or Hindu to China.
  The modern Sanskrit fragments discovered in Qocho (Gaochang) and
  Khotan, is in consistency with the Samyukta Agama, therefore the text
  of Han translation is probably translated from Sanskrit version, and
  inferred to be transmitted from the Mūlasarvāstivāda school.1

The Chinese translation is dated as 435-443CE. On the corresponding Qocho and Khotan manuscripts, research paper published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press said:

Indic and Khotanese Manuscripts: Some New Finds and Findings from
  Xinjiang:
Discovered mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, these finds have opened
  up fresh and often quite unexpected perspectives on the historical
  development of this religious and philosophical tradition. Some
  fragments date from the end of the first millennium BCE, and are
  therefore older than any manuscripts previously known from the Indian
  cultural sphere. At the same time their content throws light on the
  surprising ways in which early strands of Buddhism unfolded. All this
  has led to intensive philological efforts to preserve this legacy,
  while simultaneously bringing long-neglected manuscript finds from the
  last century back into view, and setting off another phase of
  intensive work on them.

The Qocho and Khotan manuscripts are much older texts than the Turfan manuscripts, among them included the Sanskrit text in consistency with the Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama.
Therefore from record, the Chinese text was translated in 435-443CE, it is corresponding to the Qocho and Khotan manuscripts, some fragments among them dated as ancient as ~1000BCE dated as ancient as end of the 1st millennium BCE. The Pali text has no record to date it, since they claim the oral tradition, but the written text was dated to ~1000-1600CE. However, perhaps the Turfan manuscripts finding could give it a more reliable speculative date to 600CE-1300CE.
It has never come to my mind that enlightened Buddhist ancient masters would modify original version to fit their doctrinal purpose, if there is any difference, it's probably resulted from negligence. However, inspired by @ruben2020: "I would say that most likely the Chinese agama version was modified from the original version which was probably in Sanskrit, or otherwise, in Pali. So, the Pali version is likely to be more accurate and reliable than the Chinese version, in my personal opinion...", I can't help to speculate, if the Pali text was from a later modified version to fit some sects' doctrinal purpose? From my study, the Tambapaṇṇiya (Sanskrit: Tāmraśāṭīya, old Indic name for Sri Lanka) sect was split from the Vibhajyavāda school group [A]. The Vibhajyavādins (those who preached differently), they gained their name by teaching different doctrines from all the others. It wouldn't be a surprise if they needed to modify the texts to justify their doctrines. And Mahāvihāravā who held the Pali Canon transmitted to modern Theravada, was a sub-sect split from Tambapaṇṇiya.
The other point is, as @ruben2020 quoting from Theravada Bhikkhu-scholar, Prof. Analayo to "proves that there has been a precedent for the Chinese Agama to add to or modify the original version". In this case, it just proves that it is highly possible the Pali Nikaya had added to or modified the original version. Meanwhile, I wonder how many wrong assertions have been made by Bhikkhu-scholars like the mistake made by @ruben2020, taking the Turfan manuscripts which dated later than the Chinese Samyukta Agama, to say the Chinese is inconsistent with the archaeological evidence? Though this is ludicrous, like someone mistaken the daughter as the grandma, and then saying the mother has more winkles therefore impossible to be the daughter-made-grandma's daughter. Perhaps Prof. Analayo should study this case, and go back to refine his perspective and recheck if he could have made similar mistakes like @ruben2020.
As an aside, Taking a later manuscript to condemn the Chinese Buddhist text is not an unprecedented activity in the Buddhist academia. From my knowledge, Prof. Jan Netter has done it to the Heart Sutra, taking a Japanese museum Sanskrit text back-translated from Chinese text to condemn Xuanzang "created" the Heart Sutra. There are 6 versions of Heart Sutras some dated earlier than Xuanzang's translation. Would a forger be so stupid to choose it for forgery? Wouldn't there be much better choices out there? Aside from hiccup like this, there yet another sect of Bhikkhu-scholars while using the Chinese Buddhist texts to write their thesis, at the same time never forget to step on them with shoe marks like "the (Chinese) Mahayana text were later works, not from the Buddha". For example, Sariputra-pariprekshya (Śāriputraparipṛcchā Sūtra), while using it in his article, Bhikkhu Sujato never forgot to remark it a later work. It is like someone after feeding himself the food, then spit on it. Not to mentioned there are many mistakes in his article on the Early Buddhist Schools. If he knows Sariputra-pariprekshya belonged to the Mahasamgika Vinaya section? The Japanese scholar has an article to verify its authenticity, but in Chinese text.
We the laymen, our society, are supporting these scholars with more leisure time and freedom so that they can help us to understand the truth and facts, not supporting them to pursue fame by writing eye-catching but misleading articles.
That said, how Buddhism going forward is not my interest, nor my care to promote the Chinese Buddhist texts. From my opinion, Buddhism has already passed its glorious time, what we got are just the leftovers. I just share what I know for those who are interested in the truth and facts, not schools or sects, that's all.

Now we can answer the 3 questions proper.
1. Are these two Sutra/Sutta equivalent but different versions?
Yes. @ruben2020 has detailed answer.
2. If they are equivalent Sutra/Sutta, which is more reliable? Or, more accurate?
The Chinese Samyukta Agama No. 288 is more reliable and accurate. The Pali SN 12.67 is consistent with the Turfan manuscript SF 155 dated as 600-1300CE. But the Chinese No. 288 translated in 435-443CE is consistent with the Qocho and Khotan manuscripts dated as early as the end of 1st millennium BCE. The Chinese Samyukta Agama is an earlier version than the Pali Saṃyutta Nikāya.
3. They obviously have marked disagreement - can three reeds leaning against each others to stand up, or two reeds?
Only three reeds leaning against each others can stand up, two reeds is unlikely: a) from physics, three supporting points are the minimum requirement for stability. b) two reeds will need special method to tie the bundle, as @ruben2020 suggested, tie it as a plank. But then the two planks are not really having 2 supporting points, it is 4. Also, it will require extra works to make the plank, than simply roll up as a bundle.

Afterword
While it's pretty sure the 3 questions have been properly answered, what to be concerned is the implication of this study. It is a huge implication. Because it infers that the Pali text with two reeds, instead of three, is a departure of the Buddha's teaching on consciousness. The Pali doctrine on consciousness is the 6 senses corresponding to their 6 consciousnesses, different from the Chinese Mahayana (not all Mahayana(s) are Mahayana of Buddha Shakyamuni's teaching)2 doctrine. From my study, mostly reading information on this forum therefore my understanding is limited and speculative, with this model, it is highly possible that the Pali-nibbana cannot be realized, the arahantship cannot be attained, the 9th Jhana called Nirodha Samapatti cannot be reached, even the 8th and 7th Jhana are in question, from logical inferences. The brief answer is that simply 6 consciousness model cannot arrive at the state of extinction while it lies within The All. Or if it arrives at extinction, it can't lie within The All. The Pali Sabba Sutta has explaint The All, but again, compared it to the Chinese corresponding text, at least from my memory, it missed a phrase on the 12 Āyatanas. But, it's already a lengthy answer, let's skip it for now.
Regarding this issue, some meaningful discussions have been carried out in the chats links in the above question post.
After the afterword
Also a rare case, the OP not only has to answer her own post but choose it as the correct answer. If this answer not appeal to logic, reason and facts, do challenge it. Much appreciated.

Footnotes:
1. 《雜阿含經》為南朝劉宋求那跋陀羅在元嘉年間（435年-443年間的某年），於楊都祇洹寺（一說瓦官寺）口誦，寶雲傳譯漢文，慧觀筆錄，共五十卷[10]。其原本來源，未有定論。《歷代三寶紀》中記載，此本是法顯由錫蘭取回的雜阿含經本。也有学者認為可能是由求那跋陀羅，從天竺或錫蘭帶至中國[11][12]。現代在高昌及于闐發現的梵文片斷，與現存《雜阿含經》一致，因此漢譯本可能是由梵文本譯出，推定為根本说一切有部所傳[13]。
2. Chinese Mahayana does NOT register: a) Tantra practice; b) root-guru; c) precept or vow of Samaye; d) later texts "revealed" or procured in mystic locations called Terma; e) tale of Nagarjuna discovered "Mahayana" (Tantra) Sutras from the iron pagoda of the Southern Sky or from Naga's Palace or the sort; f) reincarnation of alleged "buddha" and re-reincarnates again and again across centuries, to serve as the godhead of the religious and political power; g) a bhiksu can enter marriage and take wife, or a upasaka/upasika-teacher (the white-clothes) engages in extramarital affairs or with multiple partners; h) a upasaka/upasika-teacher not abiding in bodhisattva vow therefore eating meat and drinking alchohol, except with health or special reason... etc.
That said, some self-designated "Mahayanist(s)" are also NOT registered because what they written are inconsistent with the Chinese Mahayana Sutras. They are only skillful with their plays of words, borrowing Mahayana terms which they don't understand, glazing with ambiguous sentences, or idiosyncratic but in fact illogical arguments.

Revision Changelogs/ Remarks:
On 16/03/2019
[A] About Vibhajyavāda, the forefather of modern Theravada:
Vibhajyavāda was NOT one of the Early 18/20 Buddhist Schools according to Sariputra-pariprekshya and all other related texts on schools therefore it should be termed as "group", instead of school. Vibhajyavāda was a band of Vibhajyavādins (partisans) split from few Early 18/20 Buddhist Schools, they preached doctrines different from the original Buddhist schools. The Sarvāstivādins, a branch from Sthaviravāda, called the Vibhajyavādins heretics also citing their teachings were toxic and harmful.
According to Samantapāsādikā, the Pali Vinaya, (translated into Chinese in 489CE and kept as an archive only. The existing Pali version has additional 2nd half not found in the Chinese translation, probably later texts added after 489CE), Moggaliputta-Tissa was the founder of Tambapaṇṇiya Sect himself a Vibhajyavādin. Tambapaṇṇiya (Sanskrit: Tāmraśāṭīya) was ancient name for Sri Lanka. Moggaliputta-Tissa was not the son of Buddha's disciple Maudgalyāyana (Pali: Moggallāna) but a Brahmin turned Buddhist and well versed in Vedas. He made the king answered that the Buddha was a "Vibhajyavādin", playing the double meanings of the Sanskrit word Vibhajyavādin - analyst vs separatist, while separatists or partisans were the Vibhajyavādins being condemned of.
It is my speculation that since the Vibhajyavādins were rejected by the main schools therefore they went to more remote areas to establish and spread their new doctrines. Ancient Ceylon could be ideal location to forge their base since it's an island isolated from the Indian subcontinent, information and news were more difficult to reach there thus they could easily cultivate the people to embrace their new doctrines and interpretations.
The Early 18/20 Buddhist Schools should be regarded as necessary branches as a result of the spreading of Buddhism after the Buddha entered nirvana. Like modern day, a successful brand will open branch offices worldwide.
On 22/02/2019

Have made minor editions to typos and formats only.
On accepting your own answer, the (former) Co-founder Jeff Atwood said, "Hey, look at that, I just accepted my own answer!" because "a picture is worth a thousand words".
The current score (-2) doesn't reflect the quality of this answer, it only reflects the quality of this forum: buddhism.stackexchange.
The major addition is on explaining the term "Mahayana" in this post, in footnote 2.
Taken @ChrisW comment, rephrase the date of Qocho and Khotan manuscripts to end of the 1st millennium BCE instead of ~1000BCE.

I marked this answer down because in the teaching of dependent origination there are 12 conditions. One condition is consciousness and another condition is nama-rupa. In other words, there are not 13 conditions, with consciousness one condition, nama another condition and rupa another condition.

Sorry, you can't answer your own question and then accept it, this is completely unacceptable behavior.

The "end" of the first millennium is around 100 BCE not around 1000 BCE.

Dating the Pali to 600 CE because it's similar to a manuscript dated 600 CE doesn't make sense to me -- because the Turfen manuscript is/was meant to be a "modern" reproduction of an older original.

Similarly saying "there are Qocho and Khotan manuscripts" is comparing the ages of the oldest discovered/preserved copies -- and it's not about this specific sutta.

I think ruben was wrong to say that it's likely that "the Chinese agama version was modified" -- I don't see evidence for that claim, and here was an example of a detailed analysis which concluded that the Pali was the one altered. But similarly I see no evidence for the opposite claim, i.e. that in this cause it was the Pali that was altered.

My assumption was that the Pali version and the Sanskrit version (Turfen) descended from a similar source (probably an older Prakrit version), and then the Chinese version either descended from the Sanskrit version or the ancestor of the Sanskrit version (i.e. the Prakrit version). The Pali and Sanskrit versions are "distant cousins" so to speak. So, if the Pali and Sanskrit versions are the same and they descended from the same source, then the Chinese version must be the altered one. But this is only my assumption, and I'm not an accredited scholar.

Here are my perspectives for examining your assumption: 1) Other sources said "Pali" suttas initially were translated to Sinhalese, or borrowed Sinhalese letters to write: 1a. Sinhalese is a branch of Indo-European languages using Brahmi script, when re-translated back to "Pali", resembles Sanskrit. 1b. None of discovery of any Pali artifact or manuscript before the Pali Canon written was made. 1c. Why are "Pali" commentaries written in Sinhalese, not Pali? If I comment an English text, I use English, instead of Chinese, see? 2) Other Buddhist sects existed on Ceylon, but Pali Canon was...

...from Mahavihara the sub-sub-sect of Vibhajyavāda, altered. Fact: Faxian took Mahisasakas Vinaya from Ceylon - but not in Pali Canon. 3) No motive to alter text, Chinese Buddhists simply collected all Sutras, Sastras and Vinayas from different countries and schools, e.g. 5 Vinayas once all followed in China. 4) Pali Text Society (?) discussed to remove Prakrit from Pali to make it more "pure", believed Pali the language of Buddha. If natural language, is it logical? 5) What if perhaps stop assuming Pali a real language? I respect your opinion @ruben2020; just provide different perspective.

The name "Pali" and the script of Pali may be new but the language is old and almost forgotten if not for the Pali Canon. The Pali Canon was memorized and transmitted mainly orally - that's why earlier written manuscripts were not found. From what I read, it was Buddhaghosa who translated Sinhalese commentaries into Pali and tried to revive Pali as a written and spoken lingua franca for the vibhajyavada-descended school in South and South East Asia. Comy were in Sinhalese because Pali around Buddhaghosa's time was no longer a commonly spoken language, just as Bodhi's comy in English today.

Pali was old and almost forgotten because it was replaced with modern Sanskrit, just as modern standard Chinese is replacing older regional Chinese dialects which are slowly fading away. In parts of China today, people are calling modern standard Chinese their mother tongue just as Mexicans and Argentinians call Spanish their mother tongue, because they have forgotten their own old dialects.

Just correct one assumption that I know not true @ruben2020. Although "standard Chinese" = Putonghua/ Mandarin is compulsory to learn in school (I didn't learn it there though), also very standardized, say, gov't channels even TV episodes used dubbing to ensure that are "official" & "classical" Putonghua, people are speaking their dialects too. E.g. myself I speak two dialects plus Putonghua.

OP: Are these two Sutra/Sutta equivalent but different versions?

Yes, I think so. According to SuttaCentral, SA 288 and SN 12.67 are equivalent. I could find "三蘆立於空地" from your quote inside SuttaCentral's SA 288, so I guess it is the same.

OP: If they are equivalent Sutra/Sutta, which is more reliable? Or, more accurate?

SuttaCentral links the Chinese agama SA 288 to the Pali sutta SN 12.67 and the Sanskrit sutra SF 155. Only the Pali sutta has English translations from Bhikkhu Sujato and Bhikkhu Bodhi.
The Sanskrit sutra comes from "TRIPĀṬHI, Chandrabhal 1962. Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasaṃyukta ( = Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden VIII). Berlin: Akademie-Verlag."
Let me quote the other versions below.
From Pali sutta SN 12.67 named "Naḷakalāpīsutta":

Suppose there were two bundles of reeds leaning up against each other.
Seyyathāpi, āvuso, dve naḷakalāpiyo aññamaññaṃ nissāya tiṭṭheyyuṃ.

From Sanskrit sutra SF 155 named "Naḍakalāpikasūtra":

tadyathā dvau naḍakalāpāv ākāśe ucchṛtau syātām anyonyaṃ niśṛta

I don't really know Sanskrit, but I guess that the two bolded terms above in Pali and Sanskrit mean TWO in reference to the bundles of reed.
So, the Pali and Sanskrit versions agree with each other, but not the Chinese version.
Based on the above evidence, I would say that most likely the Chinese agama version was modified from the original version which was probably in Sanskrit, or otherwise, in Pali. So, the Pali version is likely to be more accurate and reliable than the Chinese version, in my personal opinion.
But then again, I'm not a professional scholar of Buddhist Studies. So, I should quote the opinion of one. Prof. Dr. Bhikkhu Analayo is not just a monk, but also an academic scholar in the field of "comparative studies of Early Buddhist Texts as preserved by the various early Buddhist traditions" (according to Wikipedia).
Prof. Analayo wrote the following in the book "Three Chinese Dīrgha-āgama Discourses without Parallels". While this is not related to the Bundles of Reed Sutta/ Sutra, it definitely proves that there has been a precedent for the Chinese Agama to add to or modify the original version.

The  three  discourses  in  the  Chinese  Dīrgha-āgama that  are
  without  parallels in other early discourse collections appear to be
  later additions  to  the  collection.  They  share  in  common  an
  attempt  to  map  doctrinal  terminology.  While  the  Discourse
  Increasing  by  One  (DĀ11)  and  the  Discourse  On  the  Three
  Groups  (DĀ  12)  still  seem  to  belong to an early stage in the
  developing of such maps, the Discourse On a Record of the World (DĀ
  30) appears to reflect a later stage.  The circumstance that all three
  discourses in the Chinese Dīrgha-āgama that are without parallels
  appear to be later additions should not  be  taken  to  reflect  a
  general  rule,  however,  assuming  that  any  discourse without
  parallels must be a later addition. It is always possible that a
  discourse is now extant from only one textual lineage due to  the
  vicissitudes  of  transmission.  An  example  would  be  the
  Jīvaka-sūtra  of  the  Sarvāstivāda/Mūlasarvāstivāda Dīrgha-āgama.
  Until  the  recent discovery of fragments of the Jīvaka-sūtra, only
  the Majjhima-nikāya version  of  this  discourse  was  known.  This
  was  because  the  Sarvāstivāda/Mūlasarvāstivāda  reciters  had
  allocated  this  discourse  to  their  long  discourse  collection,
  whereas  the  Theravāda  reciters  placed  their  version  of  this
  discourse  in  their  middle  length  collection. So lack of a
  parallel may simply be the result of differences in the  distribution
  of  discourses  among  the  four  discourse  collections,  transmitted
  by various Buddhist schools.

Whether name-and-form should be together or separate I think is out of the scope of this question and could be asked in another question.

OP: They obviously have marked disagreement - can three reeds leaning against each others to stand up, or two reeds?

Maybe two reeds cannot lean on each other, but surely two bundles of reed can lean on each other just like these two cards below. It just depends on how the bundles of reed are tied together.

Here are two books leaning on each other:

EDIT:
I removed the statement that the Pali Suttas do not separate nama from rupa. There is actually such a separation in DN 15:

‘Name and form are conditions for contact’—that’s what I said. And
  this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were none of
  the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the category of
  mental phenomena is found. Would linguistic contact still be found in
  the category of physical phenomena?” “No, sir.” “Suppose there were
  none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the
  category of physical phenomena is found. Would impingement contact
  still be found in the category of mental phenomena?” “No, sir.”
  “Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and
  details by which the categories of mental or physical phenomena are
  found. Would either linguistic contact or impingement contact still be
  found?” “No, sir.” “Suppose there were none of the features,
  attributes, signs, and details by which name and form are found. Would
  contact still be found?” “No, sir.” “That’s why this is the cause,
  source, origin, and condition of contact, namely name and form.

Nama and rupa is also separated in AN 10.27:

“When it was said: ‘A question about two, a concise statement about
  two, an explanation of two,’ with reference to what was this said?
  When a bhikkhu is completely disenchanted with two things, completely
  dispassionate toward them, completely liberated from them, completely
  sees their delimitations, and completely breaks through their meaning,
  in this very life he makes an end of suffering. What two things? Name
  and form. When a bhikkhu is completely disenchanted with these two
  things … in this very life he makes an end of suffering.

Thank you for your in depth research and rich references +1, just that we have to conform to evidences and facts. Two reeds in the Pali 12.67 is likely a later modified version to fit doctrinal purpose. I the OP have to write an answer because too much information needed to be presented

In my understanding of Mahayana doctrine, the term namarupa does not refer to individual's mind-and-body. In my opinion, this traditional Theravadin interpretation is incorrect.
Instead, namarupa means "name-form" - meaning "a concept of form", "an idea of form" - referring to our subjective representations of external and internal phenomena, as well as the most important Name-Form, our idea of self.
This is confirmed by SN 12.19:

For the fool, bhiksus, covered by ignorance, associated with
  craving, this body has thus resulted. There is
  this pair: just this body [with consciousness] and the outer (bahiddha) namarupam. Conditioned by this pair there is contact.

The corresponding SA 294 states:

For the fool, the untaught common person, covered by ignorance,
  associated with craving, this consciousness-body has resulted. Internally there is this consciousness-body and externally there is name-and-form. Conditioned by this pair there arises contact.

Salistamba Sutra explains it as:

That which delineate individual objects is [called] vijnana [...] [It is called] vijnana in the sense of "causing to know".

then

The four grasping-collections (upadana-skandha) that emerge in conjunction with vijnana are [called] namarupa.

then

The four immaterial collections (skandhas) emerging together with vijnana, along with physical form, is what is meant by "vijnana causes namarupa." [...] [They are called] namarupa in the sense of mutual support...

finally

That which produces the sprouts of name-and-form like reeds in a sheaf — the combination of the five collections (skandhas), together with the defiled mental consciousness [reifying the skandhas as "self"] — is called "the consciousness element".

So in my understanding, every time we delineate [external!] objects, our ideas of objects keep getting more concrete. And then these ideas feed back into the delineation process, making delineation more precise but also more rigid and fixed. Thus these two - "the process of delineation" and "the collection of ideas" - support each other in their growth and development.
Then we learn to not only recognize objects, but to associate them with some useful knowledge about them, what they mean to us (samjna, vedana). We learn to build an entire inner representation of a world, a whole reality, large in scope and rich in detail. We also form a bunch of attitudes to all those external things we now recognize.
Then the "defiled mental consciousness" - the mano-vijnana, or the ability to distinguish between individual internal objects - develops representation of the inner phenomena and reifies them as an entity called "self".
At the end we have what seems like "I am the actor and the observer" and "The world of other people and things" while in fact it's just a collection of ideas that delineate Everything into objects and entities.
Based on this interpretation, I think we can reconstruct the Bundles of Reeds metaphor in one of two ways:

Either the two bundles are Namarupa and Vijnana - or the ideas about things on one hand and the faculty of delineation on the other, supporting each other...
Or, the three bundles are Nama, Rupa, and Vijnana - or the ideas about things, the things themselves, and the faculty of delineation.

Personally, I don't see how the three reeds metaphor can be right. It's not like Nama and Rupa are truly two separate peers of Vijnana. Remember, Rupa does not refer to an ontological external object, it refers to what Vijnana delineates (sees or cognizes) as an object based on the available information. In reality objects are not monolith things - they are parts of bigger systems and are themselves made of smaller parts. It is Vijnana that "decides" where and how to draw the lines.
Once we have an idea about an object, we start seeing that object as a separate thing, so as Nama gets more concrete the appearance of Rupa gets more concrete. And as that appearance of Rupa gets more concrete, as we see it again and again, the Nama gets more solid. But we can't say that Rupa is a separate bundle because Rupa does not really exist. It's just a momentary transient Vijnana that "seems" like Rupa.
This is also confirmed by the context of the text, which says "when name-and-form cease, consciousness ceases. When consciousness ceases, name-and-form cease." - it does not say "when name ceases, consciousness and form ceases" etc.
Anyway, what's most important is not the metaphor of two or three bundles, but to actually understand the process that the metaphor and the other sutras are trying to describe.
Indeed, as you stop thinking in terms of objects, you stop seeing the world as objects and start seeing it "yathabhuta", and as you stop seeing the world as objects, your old ideas about objects wither and fade away.

"namarupa means "name-form" - meaning "a concept of form", "an idea of form" - referring to our subjective representations of external and internal phenomena, as well as the most important Name-Form, our idea of self." - how do you reconcile this with the following from SN 12.2? "And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention: this is called name. The four great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form."

Nice analysis on name-form and consciousness +1, perhaps a bit confused with the Pali two reeds simile, and trying to fit in that model?

@ruben2020 I think SN 12.2 simply says that feeling etc. are examples of our subjective representations (ideas, concepts, opinions, tendencies, memories etc.) of objects, examples of informational baggage. As for the rupa part, SN 22.48 says "Every form in the past, future, or present, inward or outward, gross or subtle, small or big, far or near, is called the aggregate of form" - so I assume when SN 12.2 says that rupas are derived from the four great elements, it does not limit itself only to our body but speaks about all forms.

If pages 3 to 6 of this PDF are read, it shows how Bhikkhu Thanissaro disagrees with the Brahmanistic ideas of Andrei Volkov. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/shapeofsuffering.pdf

If the idea of "self" arose at nama-rupa as Andrei Volkov is claiming then the Buddha did not have to teach about arising of "self" at attachment (upadana). For example, from SN 22.81: "assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that."

@ruben2020 Furthermore, the Pali for "derived from the four great elements" reads "mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ" - which can be translated as "form with reference to the four great elements", in other words, form is an image or mental object that references the four great elements, not made of them.

@Dhammadhatu - The self does not completely arise at that step yet. Twelve Nidanas are a summary of the main phases of a process that takes millions of steps. The self emerges gradually, vague at first, and getting more and more concrete towards the end. It's not just me, it is official Mahayana (Karma-Kagyu) teaching, I'm just expounding it in greater details here.

Comments are not for debating, Andrei. Its unrelated to Dependent Origination because what you are describing happens at upadana, bhava & jati. What Thanissaro has described is how real meditators experience it. Your ideas are just intellectual. That is, they are superstitious. Kind regards

@AndreiVolkov Your definition of namarupa seems to be right. See DN 15: “It was said: < “‘With namarupa as condition there is contact.’ If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the nama were all absent, would designation-contact be discerned in the rupa?”“Certainly not” “If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of the rupa were all absent, would impingement-contact be discerned in the nama?” “Certainly not” >

Wow, perfect. I have missed that piece. So namarupa does come from qualities, traits, signs, features, and attributes. Also in that sutta, the two previous paragraphs say the same about rupakaya, namakaya, and namarupa, I wonder what that means.

@AndreiVolkov How do you reconcile your definition of namarupa with this from SN 22.82?: “The four great elements are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the volitional formations aggregate. Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.”

Right - that just means they support each other, vijnana and namarupa. The more you learn to recognize, differentiate, and represent reality - the stronger your ideas-of-forms become, and vice versa - the more your ideas-of-forms develop, so does your ability to recognize, differentiate, and represent reality.

The rest of the sutta talks about pairs of things e.g. ...

From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media. From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth.

... so I suppose that "vinnana" and "namarupa" are also seen as a pair, not as a triplet.
Anyway I don't think it's trying to explain the details of what namarupa is  -- and so, e.g. this comment, "does it infer that consciousness cannot interact (leaning up against) with nama only, nor with rupa only?", was beside the point of the sutta.
Actually I think that's true of several nidanas, i.e. the definitions of several are a bit fuzzy and people interpret them or analyse each one differently.
I'm not sure that (precise analysis and definition of each nidana) is the point, though -- I think the point was:

Explaining a "codependent origination" relationship (which I think is cleverer than or at least a welcome addition to the doctrine of "causal" relationships, e.g. that "A causes B" which isn't symmetric i.e. "B doesn't cause A")
Saying that all the various concerns or things exist because of such relationship[s]
Perhaps suggesting that if you break that chain anywhere then they all cease

I guess the difference (between the Chinese and Pali versions) is possibly-interesting but minor or unimportant? Does the difference help to make the Chinese clearer or more idiomatic, for example ...

Does the Chinese include the word for "reed" (or could it making a different simile, e.g. to a Ding)?
Is this phrase ...

若去其一，二亦不立；若去其二，一亦不立

... clearer when it's explained as "three" instead of "two", because if it were two then the phrase would be ...

若去其一，一亦不立；若去其一，一亦不立

... which would be pure repetition, not distinguishing one and then the other? The latter would seem to me to imply a reflexive relationship, not the symmetric relationship described in the Pali -- though the suttas also/elsewhere to some extent describes the relationships as directional, asymmetric, cyclic, causal -- maybe "one" and two" is a way to distinguish them (like "first" and "second" would be)?

I can't discuss the Chinese but I'm suggesting that theory: i.e. that it's a minor change to clarify the meaning of or in the translation.

namarupa is a compound noun. I suppose it has one or more orthodox definitions. If you do want to verify the translation and decide the exact meaning for yourself, e.g. from the etymology, perhaps that's difficult or ambiguous -- because There are six types of compounds found in Pali literature, so I think that the mere fact that two nouns are compounded doesn't unambiguously describe the relationship between them.

Thank you for your fresh perspective +1. But it has a marked difference with three reeds or two reeds, because that implies the model of consciousness completely different. In brief, the Chinese Mahayana is 8 consciousness, the Pali Theravada is 6. Studying the Pali text cannot understand the 8 consciousness, even there is exact word alaya appeared in Pali Sutta yet they don't understand it. But it's another topic. I was referred by @ruben2020 the SN 12.67, stuck by how can 2 reeds stand up but not at least 3 from common sense, I checked the Chinese Agamas. Voila! The whole mass evolves

I don't think "two bundles leaning against each other" is difficult to understand, and therefore I think it's a good simile. As for how it can happen in practice, perhaps some people used reeds for thatched roofs. That would usually have a ridge pole too but it's just an analogy.

I consider only the 3rd question as answerable.
'Nama-rupa' is a compound to refer to one thing comprised of two aspects that are mutually dependent. While there is actually nothing wrong with the analogy of 'three-reeds', consciousness is something different from nama-rupa where as nama & rupa are never different. Therefore, the analogy of two reeds is more accurate than the analogy of three reeds.
For example, consciousness may be aware of an object, which nama perceives as pleasant. As soon as nama perceives the object as pleasant, the body (rupa) also comes buoyant. Then if the same consciousness of the same object is perceived by nama as unpleasant, the body (rupa) simultaneously becomes stressed. So consciousness is something that can remain neutral while the nama & rupa can vary together in the same way. That is why nama-rupa are one thing and consciousness is another thing (even though nama-rupa and consciousness are mutuality dependent cognitively. Consciousness cannot arise & function without nama-rupa and nama-rupa cannot operate without consciousness).
The 'neutrality' of consciousness is described in many suttas, such as MN 38 and MN 148, where the same consciousness of an object can result in either suffering or, otherwise, the end of suffering. However, nama-rupa will differ and always have the same quality here, as shown below from MN 149. If nama is stressed, rupa will be stressed. If nama is unstressed, rupa will be unstressed. But the consciousness of the object remains the same.

For him — infatuated, attached, confused, not remaining focused on their drawbacks — the five clinging-aggregates head toward future
  accumulation. The craving that makes for further becoming —
  accompanied by passion & delight, relishing now this & now that —
  grows within him. His bodily disturbances & mental
  disturbances grow. His bodily torments & mental torments grow.
  His bodily distresses & mental distresses grow. He is
  sensitive both to bodily stress & mental stress.

versus

For him — uninfatuated, unattached, unconfused, remaining focused on
  their drawbacks — the five clinging-aggregates head toward future
  diminution. The craving that makes for further becoming — accompanied
  by passion & delight, relishing now this & now that — is abandoned by
  him. His bodily disturbances & mental disturbances are abandoned. His
  bodily torments & mental torments are abandoned. His bodily distresses
  & mental distresses are abandoned. He is sensitive both to ease of
  body & ease of mind.

Thank you for your time. So, from your interpretation, the Pali version of 2 reeds = consciousness (1) + nama-rupa (1)? In this case, does it infer that consciousness cannot interact (leaning up against) with nama only, nor with rupa only? My understanding of nama is it referred to concept (immaterial), like the cup typed here as word, or image in your mind, intangible; rupa referred to object (material), like the cup you can fill in coffee and drink from, tangible.

Your view of nama-rupa is Brahmanism & Hinduism. The Buddha taught nama is feeling, perception, intention, contact & attention and rupa is the physical body composed of four elements of earth, wind, fire & water. Please refer to SN 12.2 and MN 9.

@Dhammadhatu how do you explain this phrase in SN 12.9: "Iti ayañceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ"?

https://dhammadhatu.wordpress.com/2016/08/19/sn-12-19-the-wise-man-the-fool/

Had +1 for your work @Dhammadhatu. But your understanding of consciousness and name-form is not Buddhist. It's not even logically correct. Regards.

Please avoid slander Mishu. My post is Buddhist. Your ideas are Brahmanistic. Because of wrong views, the Dhamma will never be realised.


text:
Is the Buddhist path one of 'selfless offering' or 'inner kindness'?
Just expanding on this answer is the Buddhist path one of 'selfless offering of oneself and efforts' or of 'inner kindness' i.e. kindness to oneself. Or is it both or neither. I've come across both themes and both seem right but to me they contradict.
Of course Buddhist is about many other things including outer kindness (to all beings) but right now I'm interested in these two aspects.
Many thanks as always

The two contradict only to a "confused" (=normal) mind - in which "self" and "others" are two separate things. To the enlightened mind, what's good for one is good for the other, because they dependently-co-emerge.
Even in a regular worldly sense, if you think about it, it's impossible to 100% neglect one and only care about the other. If you attempted to completely stop taking care of yourself and only help others, you'd die - and how do you help then? If you attempted to only take care of yourself at the expense of the others you'd soon run into problems with society and the law, and with the nature at the bigger scale.
Sedaka Sutta SN 47.19:

Looking after oneself, one looks after others.
  Looking after others, one looks after oneself.
And how does one look after others by looking after oneself?
  By practicing, by developing, by doing a lot.
  And how does one look after oneself by looking after others?
  By patience, by non-harming, by loving kindness, by caring.
  (Thus) looking after oneself, one looks after others;
  and looking after others, one looks after oneself.

I'd like to complement this wonderful answer by hanging on the idea of the illusive nature of the bounderies between "selves" and beings. When helping yourself, in general*, you diminish the amount and intensity of suffering in the world; when you help others (without neglecting your progress on the Path), you also diminish the amount of net suffering in the world. When you help other with underlying wholesome intentions, you benefit others and contribute to your own growth in wisdom. *I say in general because you can't predict how will others react to your actions, even if done in good will.

Case 14 of the Mumonkan  Nansen Cuts the Cat in Two
Nansen saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over a
  cat. He seized the cat and told the monks: "If any of you say a good
  word, you can save the cat."
No one answered. So Nansen boldly cut the cat in two pieces.
That evening Joshu returned and Nansen told him about this. Joshu
  removed his sandals and, placing them on his head, walked out.
Nansen said: "If you had been there, you could have saved the cat."
Mumon's comment: Why did Joshu put his sandals on his head? If anyone
  answers this question, he will understand exactly how Nansen enforced
  the edict. If not, he should watch his own head.
Had Joshu been there, He would have enforced the edict oppositely.
  Joshu snatches the sword And Nansen begs for his life.

A friend of mine is a Catholic priest.  Every Easter, I send him this koan.  I don't think there's a better example of two religions expressing identical, deep and transcendental truth than when the story of Christ's crucifixion is juxtaposed with the theme of this koan.
This is a koan about sacrifice.  It's about making an offering of oneself.  The cat knows what's coming.  He's in on the hit and he happily throws himself on the sword.  Christ also knew that his time of reckoning had come.  Though racked with doubt, he courageously goes to the cross to die.
We don't always offer ourselves bodily.  While we must always be willing to die on the cushion, our mundane life offers us millions of way to perish everyday.  If kindness is hard, that is your sacrifice.  If sitting is hard, that is your sacrifice.  If calling your mother is hard, that is your sacrifice.  Everything hard is an offering.  Everything that requires effort is the threat of the sword.
Practice means that we can't stay remain dumbstruck with silence.  Practice means that we can't let thoughts of self preservation stand between us and the way.  Practice means that we act the fool, put our sandals on our head, and let ourselves be cut in two.  You are the cat.  Trust what comes next.
Spark Notes version: Sitting ain't gonna kill you, dude.  You're standing in your own way. Pitter patter let's get at 'er!

'selfless offering of oneself and efforts' or 'inner kindness'
Let's put it this way:
When one want to offer selflessly, one needs to have the right resources and capabilities as pre-requisites.
One can cultivate resources and capabilities through various means, to the context of your question, "inner kindness", is definitely one of the MANY pre-requisites.
Then, within your scope of developed capabilities, such as Wisdom, Time, and any other resources, you offer to others appropriately.
So the two aspects do not inherently contradict to each other, and can be approached with tact and careful considerations.

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text:
Is Enlightment ultimatelly up to you (Karma and Freewill)?
According to the traditional Buddhist dogma the fourth noble truth or eight-fold path is the way to attain Enlightenment then again some sects in Buddhism accept karma as a factor.
Not knowing (gnosis) what your karma was in your previous life and how it affects your current life to attain Enlightenment makes you wonder about the illusory nature of karma or Buddhism itself.
What's the view Buddhism has on your own chances to obtain Enlightenment?
Is it because Enlightenment is just like truth and there are different degrees of Enlightenment? Is it because Enlightenment is like a path or direction you take in existence like a boat that heads west but the wind (karma) sometimes prevents you from moving forwards? Is it because Enlightenment is just like a riddle the Buddha plays to tell you about that characteristic of perception that makes you realize something that was always there but you were unaware of, or perhaps Enlightenment is the ultimate version of that? Or perhaps there is no Enlightenment and it's just the pursuit of it that gives us purpose in life and therefore less suffering (as long as we take the middle way of course...)?

"There is no spoon" The Matrix

Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.

Enlightenment comes as a natural result of the meditation practise. When you practise meditation with proper effort you'll realize very quickly that this is path of freedom from suffering. So with experience a person realizes the benefits of meditation and that realization can lead the person to get involved with meditation more deeply.
It is "not" possible for a person to not become enlightened If s/he is able to get rid of his physical and mental addictions, learns to practise mindfulness correctly and practises mindfulness and meditation for long periods of time. But modern life's requirements, the person's attachment to wrong ideas/beliefs and the possible mental or physical problems limits a person's conditions to do what is necessary in the path of freedom from suffering. So the chances to have success in the path is not just about freewill or karma. It's about both of them.
You don't need to be a Buddhist or subscribe to any religion or tradition to have benefits from spirituality. Also Buddhism really leads people to become Non-Buddhists If one follows Buddhism correctly. Just like Thich Nhat Hanh said "Buddha is made of non-Buddha elements".
If you want to start to walk in the path, this map can be helpful to you: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErN4a5qvxok

I agree with your view but the idea of meditation being the only way or exclusive way to attain enlightenment it's controversial even in this network you can find that debate.

You're right but I think that doing meditation naturally leads people to stop doing things that is harmful for a person's state of mind and also leads people to do things that is helpful in the spiritual path. I started practising mindfulness after reading Eckhart Tolle's books and I did naturally what the Buddhist precepts and principles recommends us to do. I didn't  know so much about the Buddhism for more than a year but I was living like a Buddhist Lol

@PbxMan this site is not a forum and you keep using it as such. Comments are not meant for discussion, only for a brief clarification of some details in the answer.

Yes christian intellectuals cannot get out of their awful dichotomy  free will-determinism, so when they get curious about the dhamma, they completely fail to understand it.
First since you care about kamma, you can read this https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/kamma.html instead of wikipedia.
Second, the path is not about free will, choices, or lack of control, ''accepting reality'', suspension of ''agency'', of choices. The path is about bhavana, which is cultivation. Like the buddha says, there are two paths; the path of craving as explained here
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/pts/sn/04_salv/sn04.36.023.wood.pts.htm and the opposite, which is a more complicated path for puthujjanas addicted to sensuality, and he calls that the noble path.
He even says that the purpose of the holy life is to end dukkha by following the noble path... Then of course, puthujjana who are not bikkhu do not like that there is no explicit purpose of their lay life (there is not precisely because they are not bikkhu). Thus, the people who are not bikkhu can do what they want, there is no goal, no rules, for the lay followers and they really do not like that.
So the method to stop being a bad puthujjana, in order to become a good puthujjana, or even better to stop being a puthujjana is to stop the bhavana of craving and to start the bhavana of non-craving. You can say that developing the citta and the mano towards nibanna is a choice over developing the citta and the mano towards samsara, a choice which  comes from only you, or some other people influence you to go towards one direction over another, but at the end of the day, there is only effort directed either towards craving or the cessation of craving.
Since puthujjanas are in love with what is toxic, namely sensuality, what they experience, what they feel, the aggregates, whatever is dukkha, the bhavana is about developing repulsion towards what is indeed, really, totally dukkha, which is thus any vedana, sanna, vinnana, sankhara, citta whatever is foudn in the ''dependent origination'', like that

These five things, bhikkhus, if developed and practiced frequently, lead exclusively to disenchantment, to dispassion, to
  cessation, to calm, to direct knowledge, to awakening, to Nibbāna.
  Which five? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwells observing foulness in the
  body, perceiving unattractiveness in food, perceving non-delight in
  the entire world, observing impermanence in all Fabrications, and he
  has the perception of death well established internally. These five
  things, bhikkhus, if developed and practiced frequently, lead
  exclusively to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to calm,
  to direct knowledge, to awakening, to Nibbāna.

So the path is not about choices, it is about how much energy is dedicated to the bhavana of rigth samdadhi of the citta and how much energy is dedicated to craving.
Generally the bhavana of the citta begins with sila, morality as they say today, which means it is about sati sampjanna, or mindfulness as they say today. When a bad puthujjana cultivate minduflness, this bad puthujjana has "sense-restrains'' and keep '''the five precepts'' and thus becomes a good puthujjana.
Minduflness is this stuff

And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu possessed of strength? Here,
  bhikkhus, a bhikkhu remains with aroused energy, for abandoning
  unwholesome mental states, for acquiring wholesome mental states, he
  is steadfast, firm in his effort, without relaxingfrom his duty
  regarding wholesome mental states. This, bhikkhus, is how a bhikkhu is
  possessed of strength.
Bhikkhus, heedfulness should be practiced in four instances. Which four? Abandon bodily misconduct and develop bodily good conduct; do
  not be negligent towards it. Abandon verbal misconduct and develop
  verbal good conduct; do not be negligent towards it. Abandon mental
  misconduct and develop mental good conduct; do not be negligent
  towards it. Abandon wrong view and develop right view; do not be
  negligent towards it.
Bhikkhus, heedfulness, mindfulness and protection of the mind should be practiced by oneself in four instances. Which four?
  Heedfulness, mindfulness and protection of the mind should be
  practiced by oneself [thinking:] 'May my mind not become avid on
  account of things that induce avidity.' Heedfulness, mindfulness and
  protection of the mind should be practiced by oneself [thinking:] '
  May my mind not become averse to things that induce aversion.'
  Heedfulness, mindfulness and protection of the mind should be
  practiced by oneself [thinking:] 'May my mind not become deluded on
  account of things that induce delusion.' Heedfulness, mindfulness and
  protection of the mind should be practiced by oneself [thinking:] 'May
  my mind not become intoxicated by things that intoxicate.'

As usual, puthujjanas do not know what is good and bad in life, so first they have to memorize it, which is that:

And what, bhikkhus, is the unwholesome? Destroying life, taking what is not given, misconduct in sensual pleasures, lying, malicious
  speech, frivolous talks, covetousness, ill-will and wrong view: this
  is called, bhikkhus, the unwholesome.
And what, bhikkhus, is the wholesome? Abstaing from destroying life,
  abstaining from taking what is not given, abstaining from misconduct
  in sensual pleasures, abstaining from lying, abstaining from malicious
  speech, abstaining from frivolous talks, non-covetousness,
  non-ill-will and right view: this is called, bhikkhus, the wholesome.

So instead of going with the flow of craving, so far the path is about restrain the toxic craving by restraining the senses and destroying bad thoughts. Mindfulness is the purification of the mano, or intellect like they say today.
When this is done, when mano is purified and the  kaya, body is relaxed, the citta will be in samadhi, or concentration as intellectual puthujjanas say.
When the citta is in samadhi, the citta is under control. THis is what control means for the buddha. Of course, for bad puthujjanas, control means changing things so that they can do whatever pleases them.

Sariputta, beggars, following upon his attainment of seven, controls
  the bent of his heart, is not controlled by the bent of his heart.
What are the seven?
Here, beggars, Sariputta has skill in serenity;   skill in attaining
  serenity;   skill in maintaining serenity;   skill in rousing up
  serenity;   skill in managing serenity;   skill in the pastures of
  serenity;   skill in abandoning serenity.
These then beggars, are the seven, following upon the attainment of
  which, beggars, Sariputta, controls the bent of his heart, is not
  controlled by the bent of his heart.

A few puthujjanas always claim that controlling the mind is bad, and letting thoughts come and go, no matter how bad  they are, is the way to go, because Those people have no notion of right and wrong.
When the citta is in samadhi, there is no demerit at all, because demerit is this 5 things

Speaking of 'accumulations of demerit',{1} bhikkhus, one speaking
  rightly would speak of the five hindrances. These, bhikkhus, are truly
  accumulations of demerit, that is to say the five hindrances. Which
  five? The hindrance of sensual desire, the hindrance of ill-will, the
  hindrance of dullness and drowsiness, the hindrance of excitement and
  worry, and the hindrance of doubt. Speaking of 'accumulations of
  demerit', bhikkhus, one speaking rightly would speak of these five
  hindrances. These, bhikkhus, are truly accumulations of demerit, that
  is to say the five hindrances.
  http://www.buddha-vacana.org/sutta/anguttara/05/an05-052.html

On the contrary, the purification of mano and citta is a meritorious activity. This means that the karma associated to these action is meritorious and brings meritorious births.

And what are bright deeds with bright results? It’s when someone
  makes pleasing choices by way of body, speech, and mind. Having made
  these choices, they’re reborn in a pleasing world, where pleasing
  contacts touch them. Touched by pleasing contacts, they experience
  pleasing feelings that are exclusively happy—like the gods replete
  with glory. These are called bright deeds with bright results.

But the a pure citta and mano is not enough to stop karma and birth. The citta cannot be permanently in samadhi and therefore, another method must be found to keep a pure citta even when the citta is not in samadhi.
In order to stop being a puthujjana, extra effort is required: the puthujjana has to go beyond merit-demerit and to become blameless.
When it comes to the bhavana of samadhi, there are 4 bhavanas as listed here http://www.buddha-vacana.org/sutta/anguttara/04/an04-041.html
Sati sampajjana is the first bhavana that any puthujjana undertakes, then the bhavana of the citta is the jhanas. The other two bhavanas are about the transition from good puthujjana to non-puthujjana, which is done when the citta is in right samadhi, like this:

‘The first absorption is a basis for ending the defilements.’ That’s
  what I said, but why did I say it? Take a mendicant who, quite
  secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities,
  enters and remains in the first absorption. They contemplate the
  phenomena there—included in form, feeling, perception, choices, and
  consciousness—as impermanent, as suffering, as diseased, as an
  abscess, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as falling
  apart, as empty, as not-self. They turn their mind away from those
  things, and apply it to the deathless: ‘This is peaceful; this is
  sublime—that is, the stilling of all activities, the letting go of all
  attachments, the ending of craving, fading away, cessation,
  extinguishment.’ Abiding in that they attain the ending of
  defilements. If they don’t attain the ending of defilements, with the
  ending of the five lower fetters they’re reborn spontaneously, because
  of their passion and love for that meditation. They are extinguished
  there, and are not liable to return from that world.

https://suttacentral.net/an9.36/en/sujato
or if the puthujjana fails to get the  vipassanas, there only remains the option to go up to ''the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception'' in order to keep the citta pure even when the citta is not in samadhi.
In terms of karma, the bhavana of samadhi and sati sampajanna and yoniso manasikhara is the ''kamma that is neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright result''

§ 30. "And what is kamma that is neither dark nor bright with neither
  dark nor bright result, leading to the ending of kamma? Right view,
  right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right
  effort, right mindfulness, right concentration."

So you can say that the noble path is still akarma, and when you say that, you must never forget that meritorious karma is not ''kamma that is neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright result''. DO not confuse the path of merit and the path of nibanna.

Enlightenment is the ultimate achievable state, which is a Goal where many Buddhists practice towards, through the teachings of the Buddha.
The path, has already been outlined by Lord Buddha through his teachings. Some people walk in the right direction. Some people walk and rest, then walk again. Some people keep their heads down eyes closed wondering if this path exist, or even asking pseudo questions and writing pointless critiques.
Who you choose to be, as you said, Ultimately Up To You. Practice the Dhamma, or question the Dhamma.

Not knowing (gnosis) what your karma was in your previous life and how it affects your current life to attain Enlightenment makes you wonder about the illusory nature of karma or Buddhism itself.

Can you explain why "Knowing your past karma" has to be a pre-requisite to "practicing the teachings of the Buddha, i.e. Dhamma" ?

Because some people need logic and reason and ultimately truth because if you don't it's just religion just like any sect or dogma that tells you to kill and die for your god.

Our perception changes as wisdom cultivates. What seems illogical/unreasonable now may not seem so when you derive insight into many minor things in life. Of course, we should respect the fact that everyone has different starting point so don't expect everyone to perceive the Dhamma on the same level. As for the killing part, there are precepts in Buddhist teachings already. If you argue that killing is a wholesome thing to do then perhaps you are not so ready for this stuff yet.

I think the suttas say that:

There are or were beings "with little dust in their eyes" who benefit from hearing the Dhamma

Actions and, more specifically, intentions are karmic

"I am heir to my own karma" is a reason to be careful of what you do and what your intentions are; it may also be cause for equanimity (others inherit their own karma)

The results of karma might be good or bad, instead it's recommended that you work towards the end of karma (e.g. not "heaven" nor "hell" but rather "no further becoming")

There's a lot of past (the beginning of samsara isn't evident), presumably a lot of karma, nevertheless see above

Notions of "you" and so on, an emphasis on that, is part of what needs to be dropped on the path to enlightenment; according to some definition there are several stages of enlightenment and dropping self-view marks entry into the the first stage (also called "stream entry")

People are fortunate to have been born as people (rather than e.g. as animals) and born in a place and time when it's possible to hear the Dhamma. This is a lesson that you shouldn't waste the relatively rare opportunity of having been born human.
I also read Tibetan-origin doctrine that you might view this (opportunity) as evidence of having sufficiently good karma (or perhaps as just blind luck), and therefore approach the doctrine and practice cheerfully.

I think that predeterminism ("nothing I do or want makes any difference because the future is predetermined") is probably one wrong view, and free will ("anything I want is what will happen") is another wrong view, opposite extremes.

Past life kamma is not something mentioned in the Noble Eightfold Path (the original form is explained in SN 45.8). Also, please refer to MN 117, which make it absolutely clear the "Noble" Path does not include ideas of "my good & bad kamma". If all ideas of "self" cannot eradicated, the Noble Path cannot be attained. AN 6.63 makes it absolutely clear the Noble Path ends kamma. Kamma is not part of the Noble Path. Kamma-vipaka is a doctrine for puthujjana ('ordinary worldlings'), as explained in MN 117.

Hi DD! I thought Right View could be broken down into two categories: mundane RV and supramundane RV, whule both being part of that RV nonetheless. If that's the case, could one assume that kamma is part of the N8P? Kind regards!

Thanks Brian. If MN 117 is read carefully, the kamma-vipaka of mundane RV is actually excluded from the Noble Path. Mundane RV is said to side with asava and, unlike the supramundane RV, is not described as "noble". My impression is MN 117 is a later addition to the suttas and was composed by an arahant to clear up the confusions as kamma-vipaka started to dominate Buddhist doctrine in the world. Kind regards.

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text:
Silabatta Parāmāsa
What does this fetter really refer to? Is it clinging to rites & rituals and thinking that these practises by their own can lead to liberation OR does it refer to clinging to precepts?
If it is the former, then most "rational" inclined people should have little to none of this fetter, no?
If it's the latter, then it's NOT about blindly believing a precept, but questioning it and seeing for oneself that it's helpful.
However, it appears to me that many rules in the vinyana are there to avoid social faux pax and unnecessary conflicts. If we take the not-eating-after-noon precept, we will see that the Buddha has reason for devising such precept; but do those reasons still hold true nowadays? I doubt it.
So if most monks just follow rules and precepts because the Buddha said so (or they are deemed to be effective), then this is called Silabbata Parāmāsa?

The suttanipata is full of this stuff about how holy work is not right liberation..
Ex:

On his (attaining the) bliss of (the right) view three things (dhammas) are left behind (by him): conceit and doubt and whatever he
  has got of virtue and (holy) works. He is released also from the four
  hells, and he is incapable of committing the six [39] deadly sins.
  This excellent jewel (is found) in the Assembly, by this truth may
  there be salvation. (230)

[154] 8. They do not form (any view), they do not prefer (anything),
  the Dhammas are not chosen by them, a Brāhmaṇa is not dependent upon
  virtue and (holy) works; having gone to the other shore, such a one
  does not return. (803)

THe problem with virtue and holy work is that puthujjanas take them as an end and claim that they are pure because they are good at doing holy work, pure because they see something, pure because they think this or that thought, pure by philosophizing (what is called knowing in Snp), instead of understanding which kills clinging.
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/ati/kd/snp/snp.4-04.than.ati.htm
When puthujjanas make purity relies on philsophy, that gives disputes as explained here
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/sbe/kd/snp/kd.snp.faus.sbe.htm#IV.12
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/sbe/kd/snp/kd.snp.faus.sbe.htm#IV.13
But for the buddha, being pure means being an asekha, not some puthujjana who is good at sila from the perspective of right view, let alone a puthujjana who is good at sila form the perspective of some wrong view [because the meritorious actions, like dana, samadhi, can be sen either from right view or from wrong views]
Purity is not about what is seen, or thought, it is about  the usual lack of clinging, craving, desire, thirst

Magandiya:
Sage, you speak without grasping at any preconceived judgments. This
  'inner peace': what does it mean?
      How is it, by an enlightened person,
      proclaimed?
The Buddha:
He doesn't speak of purity in connection with     view,
                  learning,
                  knowledge,
                  precept or practice. Nor is it found by a person through lack of view,
          of learning,
          of knowledge,
          of precept or practice.[1] Letting these go, without grasping,
      at peace,
      independent, one wouldn't long for becoming.
Magandiya:
If he doesn't speak of purity in connection with     view,
                  learning,
                  knowledge,
                  precept or practice. and it isn't found by a person through lack of view,
          of learning,
          of knowledge,
          of precept or practice, it seems to me that this teaching's
      confused, for some assume a purity
      in terms of
      -- by means of --
          a view.
The Buddha:
Asking questions dependent on view, you're confused by what you have
  grasped. And so you don't glimpse
      even the slightest
      notion [of what I am saying]. That's why you think
      it's confused.
Whoever construes
      'equal,'
      'superior,' or
      'inferior,' by that he'd dispute; whereas to one unaffected by these three,
      'equal,'
      'superior,' do not occur.

or even

[200]3. 'All these Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas,' — so said the venerable
  Nanda, — 'say that purity comes from (philosophical) views, and from
  tradition, and from virtue and (holy) works, and in many (other) ways.
  Did they, in the way in which they lived in the world, cross over
  birth and old age, O venerable man? I ask thee, O Bhagavat, tell me
  this.' (1078)

'All these Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, O Nanda,' — so said Bhagavat, — 'say that purity comes from (philosophical) views, and from tradition,
  and from virtue and (holy) works, and in many (other) ways; still they
  did not, in the way in which they lived in the world, cross over birth
  and old age, so I say.' (1079)
'All these Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas,' — so said the venerable Nanda, — 'say that purity comes from (philosophical) views, and from tradition,
  and from virtue and (holy) works, and in many (other) ways; if thou, O
  Muni, sayest that such have not crossed the stream, who then in the
  world of gods and men crossed over birth and old age, O venerable man?
  I ask thee, O Bhagavat, tell me this.' (1080)
'I do not say that all Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, O Nanda,' — so said Bhagavat, — 'are shrouded by birth and old age; those who, after
  leaving in this world what has been seen or heard or thought, and all
  virtue and (holy) works, after leaving everything of various kinds,
  after penetrating desire, are free from passion, such indeed I call
  men that have crossed the stream.'[227] (1081)

But there are indeed duties for the bikkus

"I ask the kinsman of the Sun, the great seer, about seclusion and the
  state of peace. Seeing in what way is a monk unbound, clinging to
  nothing in the world?"
"He should put an entire stop to the root of
  complication-classifications:
      'I am the thinker.'[1] He should train, always mindful, to subdue any craving inside him. Whatever truth he may know,
      within or without, he shouldn't get entrenched in connection with it,
      for that isn't called
      Unbinding by the good. He shouldn't, because of it, think himself
      better,
              lower, or
          equal. Touched by contact in various ways, he shouldn't keep conjuring self. Stilled right within, a monk shouldn't seek peace from
  another
              from anything else. For one stilled right within, there's nothing embraced,
      so how rejected?
      Nothing that's self,
          so from whence would there be
          against-self?[2]
As in the middle of the sea
      it is still, with no waves upwelling, so the monk -- unperturbed, still -- should not swell himself
          anywhere."
"He whose eyes are open has described the Dhamma he's witnessed,
  subduing danger. Now tell us, sir, the practice: the code of
  discipline and concentration."
"One shouldn't be careless with his eyes, should close his ears to
  village-talk, shouldn't hunger for flavors, or view anything in the
  world
      as mine. When touched by contact he shouldn't lament, shouldn't covet anywhere any
      states of becoming, or tremble at terrors. When gaining food and drink,
          staples and cloth,
      he should not make a hoard. Nor should he be upset when receiving no gains. Absorbed, not     foot-loose, he should refrain    from
  restlessness, shouldn't be        heedless, should live         in a
  noise-less abode. Not making much of sleep, ardent, given to
  wakefulness, he should abandon sloth, deception,
      laughter, sports,
      fornication, and all that goes with it; should not practice charms,
      interpret physical marks, dreams,
      the stars, animal cries; should not be devoted to
      practicing medicine or inducing fertility.
A monk shouldn't tremble at blame or grow haughty with praise; should
  thrust aside selfishness, greed, divisive speech, anger; shouldn't buy
  or sell or revile anyone anywhere; shouldn't linger in villages, or
  flatter people in hopes of gains.
A monk shouldn't boast or speak with ulterior motive, shouldn't train
  in insolence or speak quarrelsome words; shouldn't engage in deception
  or knowingly cheat; shouldn't despise others for their
      life,
      discernment,
      precepts,
      or practices. Provoked with many words from contemplatives or ordinary people, he shouldn't respond harshly, for those who retaliate
      aren't calm.
Knowing this teaching, a monk inquiring should always train in it
  mindfully. Knowing Unbinding as peace, he shouldn't be heedless of
  Gotama's message -- for he, the Conqueror unconquered, witnessed the
  Dhamma,
      not by hearsay,
      but directly, himself. So, heedful, you should always train in line with that Blessed One's message,"
                the Blessed One said.

http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/ati/kd/snp/snp.4-14.than.ati.htm

Given that:

A little baby doesn’t even have a concept of ‘precepts’, so how could misapprehension of precepts and observances possibly arise in them?
  Yet the underlying tendency to misapprehension of precepts and observances still lies within them. --MN64

Your question might be about how misapprehension arises. MN64 explains how Identity View traps us in misapprehension:

That identity view is reinforced in them, not eliminated: it is a lower fetter.
  Their heart is overcome and mired in doubt,
  and they don’t truly understand the escape from doubt that has arisen.
  That doubt is reinforced in them, not eliminated: it is a lower fetter.
  Their heart is overcome and mired in misapprehension of precepts and observances,

Therefore, an example of a subtle misapprehension is if one says, "I am a person who does not kill."  Compare with "let there be no killing here." The difference is identity view or the lack of it.

Definitely the former.  I suppose most people today wouldn't find that fetter necessarily challenging but instead would have to face down all of those impediments that often arise because of hyper-rationality (e.g. intellectualism, scholasticism, etc.).  They cling to that instead!  And it puts them a serious disadvantage in that they are less trusting of their own experience and rely too heavily on reason.  Often what is remains subtle and can't really be appreciated or even so much as noticed by our discursive minds.  Frankly, I'd be inclined to recommend rites and rituals to people like this just to pull them out of their friggin' heads!  I mean, after all, the fetter is about clinging to rites and rituals.  That doesn't mean that those practices can't be used to uproot some obstacles!
It's interesting that you mention the Buddha's injunction to avoid eating afternoon.  I think that makes for a great example of where the lived experience of a practice is entirely different than accepted, rational reason for instating it.  I mean, we can say that periods of not eating might be less of a burden on the laity.  Hell, we might even say that they "build character" or are disciplines aimed at training the mind, blah blah blah.  But does that really demonstrate how they really work within the context of our practice?  Do those rational reasons really capture what it's like to sit at 9PM, having fasted for most of the day?  Do they really express the experience of how the will is thwarted and the Way embraced?  Do those rational reasons really teach us anything?
I think you can apply the same sort of thinking to the rote keeping of the precepts...something that your original post seems to do.  You really have to dive into these things.  Thinking about them is one thing.  It's really only when you live them that you figure out how deep they go and how incredibly difficult they are to keep.
IDK.  Like most of what the Buddha said, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.  We just end up ensnaring ourselves when we quibble about the recipe.

What comes with a set relates to the other members. Sīlabbata can't come alone, so it's meaning already came in its context.
Depentent origination means aggregates' relation.
Taṇhā means craving, addict.
Upādāna means caving again and again.
Diṭṭhi means the mental habit of the misunderstanding in the aggregates' relation.
DiṭṭhiUpādāna means caving again and again of the misunderstanding in the aggregates' relation. This is only unwholesome.
Sīlabbata means doing verbal and physical habit, depending on Diṭṭhi. This is able to arise with wholesome, unwholesome, and neither wholesome nor unwholesome, e.g. the thinking "I want to be a Deva in heaven" is arising with SakkāyaDiṭṭhi (unwholesome) but next moment the doing giving a gift, follow that SakkāyaDiṭṭhi for going to heaven, is arising with wholesome.
SīlabbataUpādāna means caving again and again of doing verbal and physical habit, depending on Diṭṭhi.
See DN MahāNidānaSutta:

So it is, Ānanda, that feeling is a cause of craving. Craving is a cause of seeking. Seeking is a cause of gaining material possessions. Gaining material possessions is a cause of assessing. Assessing is a cause of desire and lust. Desire and lust is a cause of attachment. Attachment is a cause of possessiveness. Possessiveness is a cause of stinginess. Stinginess is a cause of safeguarding.
Owing to safeguarding, many bad, unskillful things come to be: taking up the rod and the sword, quarrels, arguments, and fights, accusations, divisive speech, and lies.

The Answers

What does this fetter really refer to?

It refers to SīlabbataUpādāna.

Is it clinging to rites & rituals and thinking that these practises by their own can lead to liberation OR does it refer to clinging to precepts?

It addicts to do follow to DiṭṭhiUpādāna again and again. So if the rites, rituals, practises, and precepts depending on DiṭṭhiUpādāna, it is SīlabbataUpādāna.

So if most monks just follow rules and precepts because the Buddha said so (or they are deemed to be effective), then this is called Silabbata Parāmāsa?

The mong who keep on 91,805,036,000 vinaya rules follow to Buddha because they trust the Buddha, who rightly understanding in the aggregates' relation, is not SīlabbataUpādāna. It is similar to when you are following an expert guide and you are going to arrive the right destination surely, no one can't say "you are going the wrong way" although you do not understand the map by yourself at first.
91,805,036,000 vinaya rules are keeping Tipitaka go on through 5,000 years, but some lazy buddhist people try to cut them off, while there are many monks still can do follow to all those rules. It is superficial thinking and killing Buddhism age because Theravāda Tipitaka still available nowadays by the Tipitaka Memorizer who did follow all those vinaya rules. And it is going like this until 5,000 years. The similitude is the chemist who has recited, memorized, and learned about the periodic table and the formulas from the past chemist generation to generation.
There were many Nikāya tried to cut some part of Tipitaka off, and now their canons already disappeared, right?

If it is the former, then most "rational" inclined people should have little to none of this fetter, no?
If it's the latter, then it's NOT about blindly believing a precept, but questioning it and seeing for oneself that it's helpful.

All ordinary people have SīlabbataUpādāna because they have DiṭṭhiUpādāna. They still have the mental habit of the misunderstanding in the aggregates' relation, DiṭṭhiUpādāna, so they still act follow to that habit, SīlabbataUpādāna.

However, it appears to me that many rules in the vinyana are there to avoid social faux pax and unnecessary conflicts. If we take the not-eating-after-noon precept, we will see that the Buddha has reason for devising such precept; but do those reasons still hold true nowadays? I doubt it.

It may be not important for 21th century, but it may be important for 22th century. The Buddhist age is for 5,000 years, not only for 100 years. Tipitaka should lose after Buddha's death for 1-200 years without 91,805,036,000 Vinaya rules, but it still going on because of the Vinaya rules. Who can understand entire chemist canons without the chemist expert, right?
By my experience with Burmese monks (stickest on rules), Thai monks (sticker), and the westerner monks (not stick), the Burmese monks can understand the whole Pali Canon deeply, while the Thai and westerner monks often distort the Pali Canon by their own opinion then say "Pali Canon is conflicting with each other". For example, the fabrication of MN 44 is talking about Jhāna, and SN 12.2 is talking about Vipassanā by each Sutta's context. But the Thai and the westerner monks mix them together then say "they are conflicting with each other." It is like that because many, almost all, Thai and the westerner monks are lazy to recite and memorize Tipitaka follow to Vinaya rules  "the monk can't live without Tipitaka Memorizer Teacher if he has not enough Tipitaka memory, and it is counted as a defense each date, 10 dates 10 offenses."
I understand Tipitaka without cutting any part of Tipitaka off because I always support the monks who doing follow entire Vinaya rules.
How can one understand the action and its effects when one never do follow them all?

There were many Nikāya tried to cut some part of Tipitaka off, and now their canons already disappeared, right?


text:
How can I tell the difference between the Deva realm and the Buddha and bodhisattva realms?
How can I tell the difference between joy bourne of karma that will expire and joy bourne of karma which has turned the irreversible wheel of the dharma?

Denizens of the heavenly planets enjoy more and live longer. They have made lots of good karma in their human form of life and became qualified to enjoy heavenly life. The joy of of Buddhas is eternal and unlimited. Buddhas enjoy their natural life that's found in enlightenment.
The best way to know this is by gaining experience from meditating.

The Deva Realm is one of the six realms of Saṃsāra, implying Devas are still subject to Karma. Simply put: what goes up, must come down. Existence in the Deva realm is temporal, and therefore the joy it brings is temporal, sensorial, and driven by the ego.
The Buddha and Boshisattva realms are not on the Samsara map, implying they are either not subject to Samsara or that Samsara is Nirvana (opinions on this will vary from lineage to lineage). The joy of this state is considered non-temporal and non-individual as it stems from compassion, is not induced by the senses, and is in essence non-dualistic.

Cosmologists today attribute approximately 5% of the cosmos to matter i.e. the material world of the planets and stars, approximately 35% of the cosmos to dark matter and the balance 60% or so, to dark energy. Scientists say that in the realm of dark matter light is reflected whilst in dark energy no reflection takes place. According to Buddhist cosmology, it is conceivable that the deva world (only the higher senses are present i.e. sight, sound, mind) represents the realm of dark matter and the brahma world (only the mind/cognition is present) represents the realm of dark energy. These three realms may be defined as samsara. It is conceivable that Enlightened beings living in the realm of Nirvana may be either in the ''higher frequency band' of dark energy or in a realm unknown to science.


text:
Are eating raw oysters a violation of the first Precept?
The first Precept is to abstain from Killing a "living being".
Is there a consistent definition of Living Being that we should not kill to avoid violating the first Precept?
I have heard of a definition such as a Living Being means they have the Five Aggregates, so that Plants / Germs do not count as they do not have all Five and cannot be reincarnated into.... etc. But I don't know if this definition is widely accepted in either Theravada or Mahayana.
If this definition is accepted, how do we know what beings do not have all Five Aggregates? If not, is there any other definitions that we can use?
Would also want to know if Clams, Oysters, Corals...etc... are considered as having all of the Five Aggregates too.
Five Aggregates:
1. form (or matter or body) (rupa),
2. sensations (or feelings, received from form) (vedana),
3. perceptions (samjna),
4. mental activity or formations (sankhara), and
5. consciousness (vijnana)

The  word 'panatipata'  is  derived  from  two  words: 'pana'  which means  'living  being'  and 'atipata'  which  means  'striking  down', hence  killing  or  destroying.  According  to  the Atthasalini or Expositor, for killing to take place five conditions must be met.

The being must be alive.
There must be knowledge that it is a living being.
There must be intention to cause its death.
Action must be taken to cause its death.
Death must result from such action.

If  all  these  conditions  are  fulfilled,  then  the  precept  has  been broken.

~ Cited from: Five Precepts (Pncasila)
If all the above conditions are not met, the action doesn't become a kammapata (action which gives birth in another existence) but become only a kamma (action which gives its result during the lifetime of a living being in an existence).
Suppose you eat something. But you don't know it's a living being. First precept is not broken for such action.
Suppose you see something on your desk and think of it as a bug. You hit that with your hand with the intention of killing that bug. But later you get to know it's not a bug but something which was not alive. First precept is not broken for such action. But you accumulate bad kamma for such action.
Suppose you see a flying mosquito and you hit that mosquito with a mosquito racket with the intention of killing it. But mosquito is not killed (let's assume the battery in the racket was drained). First precept is not broken for such action. But you accumulate bad kamma for such action.
Suppose you gave medicine to a ill dog with the intention of saving that dog. But then that dog die of that medicine. For such action you don't accumulate bad kamma. Actually you accumulate good kamma for such action.
Note: This is what I understood. I may be wrong but not Dhamma.

Thanks. For no.1 would like to know how a "Being" is defined. Plants and Oysters are both organic beings, so is the Precept violated by consuming both?

@Krizalid_13190 There are living beings with one aggregate (Asañña-satta). They have form only and live in fine-material world. There are living beings with four aggregates. They have sensation, discrimination, mental formations, and consciousness and live in the immaterial world. (So you don't have to worry about both of them). We live in the sensuous world and here all the living beings should have all five aggregates. Plants have form only and don't count as a living being in sensuous world. Oysters have all five aggregates and count as a living being.