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Relation to Jainism
I've read that Jainism is one of the oldest Indian traditions, that Buddhism somewhat derived from it and that at some time they rivaled (I'm not sure if this was a political thing). Can you explain what are the connections between this two in terms of philosophy and practice?

The Jains were already established and flourishing when the Buddha came on to the scene. There are many places in the suttas where the Buddha debates with Jains and discusses their teachings. There are definite similarities, most likely due to being from the same general area with similar culture, but there are also major differences. In the Suttas they are called the Niganthas, as Ven Thanissaro will speak of below:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.101.than.html

As he
interrogates the Niganthas, he makes the point that if all pleasure
and pain experienced in the present were determined by past action,
why is it that they now feel the pain of harsh treatment when they
practice asceticism, and no pain of harsh treatment when they don't?
If past action were the sole determining factor, then present action
should have no effect on their present experience of pleasure or pain.
In this way, the Buddha points to one of the most distinctive features of his own teaching on kamma: that the present experience of
pleasure and pain is a combined result of both past and present
actions. This seemingly small addition to the notion of kamma plays
an enormous role in allowing for the exercise of free will and the
possibility of putting an end to suffering before the effects of all
past actions have ripened. In other words, this addition is what makes
Buddhist practice possible, and makes it possible for a person who has
completed the practice to survive and teach it with full authority to
others.
The second important point touched on in this sutta — how to put an end to pain and suffering — relates to the first. If the cause of
present suffering were located exclusively in the past, no one could
do anything in the present moment to stop that suffering; the most
that could be done would be to endure the suffering while not creating
any new kamma leading to future suffering. Although this was the Jain
approach to practice, many people at present believe that it is the
Buddhist approach as well. Meditation, according to this
understanding, is the process of purifying the mind of old kamma by
training it to look on with non-reactive equanimity as pain arises.
The pain is the result of old kamma, the equanimity adds no new kamma,
and thus over time all old kamma can be burned away.
In this sutta, however, the Buddha heaps ridicule on this idea. First he notes that none of the Niganthas have ever come to the end of
pain by trying to burn it away in this way; then he notes that they
have based their belief in this practice entirely on their faith in
their teacher and their approval of his ideas, but neither faith nor
approval can act as guarantees of the truth. As he illustrates with
his simile of the man shot with an arrow, only a person who has
succeeded in going beyond pain would be in a position to speak with
authority of the method that actually puts an end to pain. (What is
not mentioned in this sutta is the Nigantha idea that the practice of
austerities, to succeed completely in burning away old kamma, must
culminate in a suicide by starvation. Thus there could be no living
person who would be able to vouch for the efficacy of their method.)

The dhamma wiki also has a page that may be informative with a nice graph showing similarities: http://www.dhammawiki.com/index.php?title=Buddhism_and_Jainism

Which came first?
Jainism is clearly older than Buddhism if we just go by the
archeological and historical records. Both religions claim that their
founders, Mahavira and Buddha rediscovered the teachings after they
had died out from a previous era. The Buddhist scriptures clearly
refer to Jainism as if it is an already entrenched religion. And there
is reference made to a previous Jain teacher born at least a couple of
centuries before Buddha. Both religions maintained an oral tradition
and did not have their teachings put to writing for hundreds of years.
The Buddhist Tipitaka was put to writing around 100 BCE. However, the
Jain sutras did not get put to writing until the 6th century CE
(Mahesh Jain, 2004) which is about 600 years after the Buddhist
scriptures. The scriptures also have numerous parallels, including
some of the same stories and same formats. There is even a numerical
section of the Jain sutras similar to the numerical lists found in the
Buddhist Anguttara Nikaya. Considering this, it can be argued that the
Jain writers copied some material or at least the format off the
Buddhist scriptures.

There are marked differences in the definitions of kamma and nibbana
(karma and nirvana) and the Buddha was practicing asceticism prior to
enlightenment. In light of these facts it is possible that both
Mahavira and Buddha were practicing some form of
Jainism/Shramana/asceticism and the Buddha got it right (and was the
actual new enlightened one to teach the masses, not Mahavira) in
regard to nibbana and kamma but both were insistent on ahimsa and many
other teachings.

We would like to try any encourage original answers, rather than simple copy & paste on this site. Please see our discussion here

Notions of Karma
I believe one of the central differences between Jainism and Buddhism is in their respective interpretations of Karma.
For Jains Karma is a primarily a matter of external behavior or action. It is physical conduct that leads to Karma and the objective is to free the sould from its karmic accretions. This leads to a practice of inaction and extreme measures such as sweeping the floor before walking to avoid harming life.
For Buddhist karma is more of a matter of underlying intention. So unconsciously inhaling insects would be less of a problem for Buddhists than it would be for Jains as the intention to harm isn't present. The mind has primacy rather than the bodily actions.
In the Upali Sutta the Buddha debates these points with the Jain Upali. Uplai maintains that bodily actions carry most karmic weight whereas the Buddha states that it is mental ... to quote

I declare three actions for doing demerit and its perpetration. They
  are bodily, verbal and mental actions.’ [...] ‘Friend, Gotama, of
  these three actions that are different and dissected, which one does
  good Gotama declare as most blameworthy? Is it bodily, verbal or
  mental actions?’ ‘Friend Tapassi, of these three actions, I declare
  mental action as the most blameworthy, not so much bodily or verbal
  action.’

Notions of soul
Another notable difference between the faiths is which being have a persistent soul. If I could just bring in Hinduism to illustrate the point

Hindus believe that humans and animals have a persistent soul
Jains believe that humans, animals, plants, rocks, fire and a whole wealth of 'non-living' (to us) objects have soul. If you light a match then the flame has a soul.
Buddhists believe that nothing has a permanent soul or more accurately fixed self.


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Is it easiest to pursue/attain Nirvana as a human?
Is earth the ideal condition to achieve Nirvana; advanced enough for a being to discover and teach the universal truth of reality but not so advanced that beings won't care enough to strive for it?

According to the Buddhist cosmology, a human being has the best advantages to become enlighten.

It is not intrinsically marked by extremes of happiness or suffering, but all the states of consciousness in the universe, from hellish suffering to divine joy to serene tranquility can be experienced within the human world.

For being in the lower realms:

Among the lower realms, Pretas (aka hungry ghosts), and dwellers in the Narakas (Buddhist hell(s)) are gripped by pain and fear, and can only endure their lot but cannot better themselves. Animals are intellectually unable to understand the Dharma in full.

For being in the upper realms:

Most of the Brahmas and Devas simply enjoy reaping the fruits of their past actions and think that they are immortal and forever to be happy and so they don't try to practice the Dharma.

However in addition, when the Dhamma teaching is no longer available in the human world, some of the upper realms may still abundant with being knows Dhamma and still possibly attend nirvana.
Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_beings_in_Buddhism

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Practice taxonomy
I know there are a lot of practices in many different traditions. Can you redirect me to some source where different types of practice are somewhat classified? I'm not clear how this could be done, but maybe something in the lines of this book?

This really depends on what tradition your discussing. And I'd really suggest against Amazon.com links... I've changed it to the link from his site.

You could also try Wisdom Books. They are specialized in Buddhism. Maybe they have an answer for you.

I know it is a huge topic as even "mind" is a term not clear between traditions, but maybe someone had gone in the adventure of comparing practices before...

I think this sort of question is off-topic, in the sense that it doesn't ask a clearly answerable question about Buddhism, asking instead for resources. If you were to change the question to ask specifically for a practice taxonomy, it would then be considered too broad. Either way, I'm thinking it's a bad fit for our site.

As has been pointed out, this is a vast question, and I doubt it's answerable in anything other than a pile of doctoral theses and then some, but I'll make a small attempt at a piece of it.
I'll point you to one comparative study that could maybe act as a lead in your search. It is "Self-transformation According to Buddhist Stages of the Path Literature" by Jared Lindahl. In it Lindahl compares in some detail the path described by Buddhaghosa in "The Path of Purification" (the Visuddhimagga), with an ostensibly different path described by Dakpo Tashi Namgyal in "Mahāmudrā: The Moonlight".
Obviously this is very far from a complete taxonomy as you were asking, but it at least shows that a comparison/contrast can be done. All you have to do now is repeat what Lindahl has done, for every known practice area, and voila! Let us all know when you're done ;-)
P.S. Dan Ingram talks about connections between the different practice "maps" (as he calls them), in his "Mastering the Core Teachings of the Buddha". Ingram himself says his primary influence is Therevadan practices, especially those taught by Mahasi Sayadaw, but he seems to know enough to be able to make linkages between various attainments outlined on that path and similar attainments on other paths. So that book is (with my usual "don't get too caught up in the Dark Night panic" caveat) is worth a look.

The book that I  have read that comes closest to a comparative study of meditation practices is the Meditative Mind by Daniel Goleman. It compares meditation techniques from a variety of different religions and non-religious traditions. Obviously there is a lot of information about Buddhist techniques (Zen. Tibetean etc..) but it goes into Hindu techniques, Sufism, Christian and secular such as Transcendental Meditation. It covers the dhyanas and the differences between concentration and insight practices.
It was out of print when I bought it but it's easy to pick up a used copy - a quick google picks up loads. It's been a while since I read it but I remember liking it. Flicking through it again now is tempting me to read it again.
EDIT
Sorry - I've noticed that you have asked for practices in general not meditation practices. But I'll leave this answer standing as perhaps part of the answer. It is still a good comparative study

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What are the three marks of existence?
What are the three marks of existence and where are they found in the canon? Is there any fundamental differences in interpretation among the different traditions?

This is an odd sort of question; I wonder what is your reason for asking, since you ask where they are found in "the canon", then ask whether they are different in different traditions (with different canons, presumably). Can you elaborate on and maybe focus in on what you are really trying to learn?

@yuttadhammo I did not want to bother with the tradition question but my question was not long enough to be accepted by the system; so I just made up another question.

Such short questions like this might not be a good fit for an expert exchange site... you risk getting a LMGTFY reply.

@yuttadhammo Good point. I understand that it could be considered too novice or simple for this exchange. I had the community wiki in mind when I asked the question.

Although it is a novice question, it still deserves an answer that can be referred to (it probably won't be the first time this comes up). Such questions can also be asked of 'experts' - even a novice to one can be an expert to another. Suggesting for the community wiki, would be glad to see elaborate 'expert' responses to questions like this. :-)

The Three characteristics of existence are part of the core teaching of the Buddha and found throughout his teachings. In essence every single compound (i.e. made of the 5 aggregates and/or the four elements) thing has these characteristics inherent in their very existence.
When one realizes with their own experiential knowledge that all things we have attachments and aversions to have at their core these three characteristics, then there is nothing to cling to, nothing to run from, there is just peace.
We understand that everything, from the universe itself down to ourselves and our loved ones are subject to change and decay(impermanence). We understand that every compound thing is subject to and can be part of the cause of Dukkha(unsatisfactoriness/suffering). Because of our attachments and aversions, nothing created can bring lasting happiness. And Thirdly we understand that there can be found nothing that we can truly identify as "self". What we take to be self is not-self. There is no inherent permanent self/identity in anything created, the "self" we take to be us is merely a coming together of the 5 aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness), processes that come into being, and eventually decay.
As far as I know( and I'd love to be proven wrong on this if anyone can link it) there is no one grand sutta solely on this specific topic, but it is inherently at the core of all of the teachings and therefore pervades the whole cannon. I agree with what Catpnosis said about there being no fundamental differences, but differences in interpretation and usage as part of the various paths.
Here are a few Suttas regarding the three characteristics:

Dhamma-niyama Sutta: The Discourse on the Orderliness of the Dhamma
"Monks, whether or not there is the arising of Tathagatas, this property stands — this steadfastness of the Dhamma, this orderliness of the Dhamma: All processes are inconstant.
"Whether or not there is the arising of Tathagatas, this property stands — this steadfastness of the Dhamma, this orderliness of the Dhamma: All processes are stressful.
"Whether or not there is the arising of Tathagatas, this property stands — this steadfastness of the Dhamma, this orderliness of the Dhamma: All phenomena are not-self.

And from the Dhammapada:

Maggavagga: The Path

"All conditioned things are impermanent" — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification.
"All conditioned things are unsatisfactory" — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification.
"All things are not-self" — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification.

I think this passage from the Maha-parinibbana Sutta speaks volumes about understanding impermanence:

Then, when the Blessed One had passed away, some bhikkhus, not yet freed from passion, lifted up their arms and wept; and some, flinging themselves on the ground, rolled from side to side and wept, lamenting: "Too soon has the Blessed One come to his Parinibbana! Too soon has the Happy One come to his Parinibbana! Too soon has the Eye of the World vanished from sight!"

But the bhikkhus who were freed from passion, mindful and clearly comprehending, reflected in this way: "Impermanent are all compounded things. How could this be otherwise?"

Of course Dukkha is all over the teachings.. heck it's the first noble truth:

"Now this, monks, is the Noble Truth of dukkha: Birth is dukkha, aging is dukkha, death is dukkha; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair are dukkha; association with the unbeloved is dukkha; separation from the loved is dukkha; not getting what is wanted is dukkha. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are dukkha."

And about not-self:

Anatta-lakkhana Sutta: The Discourse on the Not-self Characteristic
"Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.'
"Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self...
"Bhikkhus, perception is not-self...
"Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self...
"Bhikkhus, consciousness is not self. Were consciousness self, then this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.' And since consciousness is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.'

According to one hypothesis, the Three Marks of Existence are Buddha's sarcastic response to Hinduism's Sat-Cit-Ananda, the three characteristics of Brahman experienced by an awakened yogi:

Sat -- true and timeless, not subject to change.
Chit -- self-aware.
Ananda -- blissful or happy.

Supposedly, when yogi becomes one with Brahman, he perceives Himself as infinite and timeless self-aware Universe. From this moment on, all of yogi's experiences are marked with perpetual bliss.
When Buddha awakened to the way things are, he realized that the above description was rather misleading, because it made the practitioner seek permanent bliss, something impossible in principle. Out of compassion for future seekers, he offered a more realistic description of the same Universal vision:

Whatever is compound (consists of multiple pieces coming together), will fall apart. Same way, whatever is conditional (depends on multiple factors coinciding together), is impermanent.
Nothing is solid, everything is made of pieces or depends on conditions. This includes "I" which cannot possibly be a solid/independent entity. Since "I" is really just a compound phenomena, it is not independent and too is subject to conditions. What we call "consciousness" is too an interplay of conditions and not a substance or entity.
Because of the above, there is no (and there can't be!) such thing as permanent Sukha ("ease", "comfort"). Dukkha ("wrongness", "trouble") is an inevitable part of existence at large. ("At large" is the key word here. As to personal liberation from suffering, Buddha addressed this question in his Four Truths of The Nobles.)

Buddha criticized simple naive non-dualism of Brahmins, as returning to the same limiting concept of "I" they supposedly wanted to escape. He compared "I" to a stick their mind was tied to, going around but never completely departing. This said, Buddha still held "the state of Brahma" (experience of non-dual unity with the world) as a useful intermediate realization (AN 4.190).
In an interesting twist, my present teacher, who comes from a Taoism-influenced non-sectarian tradition, speaks of Three Gates To Enlightenment, the experiential realizations one must go through on one's way to Completion:

Pain or Suffering. One must realize that life is painful and accept pain as necessary condition for one's growth. This involves dropping resistance that comes from seeing pain as important factor of one's decisions.
Impermanence or Transience. One must fully accept that nothing is permanent in one's life, and admit the inevitability of death. This involves dropping attachments to what one holds as dear.
Nothingness or Voidness. One must go through the realization that life is pointless and has no meaning in the absolute sense. This involves dropping fundamental preconceptions or imperatives about the purpose of one's life.

being loyal again?

They are the general characteristics of (or elaborations on) the Truth of Suffering (dukkha-sacca), and consists of: impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and non-self (anatta). They are found in many places in the canon as this is one of central concepts of the Dhamma. For example, see AN 3.134 for them together, or SN 22.59 for just one of them.
Probably, there is no fundamental differences between traditions, but there is differences: elaborations, different scholastic interpretations, and other details.

I would add the following
Anicca =
Impermanence.
Everything changes. Nothing can be maintained in a stable position.
Dukkha =
Unsatisfactoriness.
Nothing is truly satisfying and will bring you everlasting happiness.
Anatta =
Not-Self.
Body and mind are processes. There is no "I" or "Self" to be found in these processes. The processes have their own lives so to speak and run based on different conditions.

The Three marks of existence (Pali: tilakkhaṇa; Sanskrit: trilakṣaṇa), are these three characteristics

Impermanence (Anicca)
Suffering or unsatisfactoriness (Dukkha)
Non-self or not-self (Anatta)

This is a central teaching in Buddhism - completely understanding these three leads to the liberation of Nirvana/Nibbana. All sentient beings experience these marks of existence.
Anicca refers to the impermanence, uncertainty or inconstancy of existence in this conditioned realm. Conditioned meaning dependent on conditions - all conditions are in a state of change, not constant, unsteady. All parts of experience - all things and experiences - are dependent on causes and conditions, coming into being, ceasing to be. Nothing is everlasting. More on Anicca
Dukkha is often translated as suffering or unsatisfactoryness (dissatisfaction), or stress. Here meaning that nothing (physical nor mental phenomena) can ever bring lasting happiness (or a deeper satisfaction). Holding on to (or craving for, clinging to) impermanent conditions as if they were permanent is a frequent cause for dukkha. See dukkha
Anatta refers to the 'self', often translated at not-self or non-self. Often misunderstood as "non-existence" or "no-soul", this teaching refers to that no phenomena are 'self', in a 'self' nor owned by a 'self'. See The Discourse on Non-Self and Anatta
There is a lot of material on these topics, much too much to cover here.

Old thread. I would first answer that the phrase: "the 3 marks of existence" is inaccurate. The term "existence" implies "being" or "bhava", which requires mind. This "existence" is phenomenological or experiential.
Whereas the Buddha used the phrase: "the 3 characteristics of conditioned things". As explained in the Dhamma-niyama Sutta (quoted above), the 3 characteristics are the nature of compounded things, regardless of whether any human being realises or experiences this reality.
A rock or cloud does not possess mind. A rock or cloud does not experience life. A rock or cloud has no sense of 'existence'. Yet a rock or cloud possess the 3 characteristics, in that a rock or cloud are impermanent, cannot bring lasting happiness; are unsatisfactory (due to their impermanence); and are not-self, neither being a 'self' or able to be possessed by a 'self'.

This paper on the Dhamma-niyama Sutta tries to explain in detail, "Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā", "Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā", but "Sabbe dhammā anattā".

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

They are:

Anicca - Everything ends in one day or in a moment.
Dukkha - When things end (property, loved ones, life, etc.) all beings sense it as sad.
Anatta - The ending of things cannot be controlled by ourselves or others.

Dumindu, where did the text in the yellow boxes come from? Are you quoting something?

I am doing meditation. It is up to my sense.

OK, so they're your own words then? They're just unfamiliar explanations to me, and I wanted to check maybe you were quoting them from some sutta or other.

This doesn't really answer the question in its entirety...


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Is there some scripture reference to dream yoga?
By dream yoga I mean the practices intended to attain lucid dreaming, and then using that ability to realize that the world as we know does not exists as perceived (as in a dream) so one can reach the fully awake condition.

This depends somewhat on how you define "scripture." It's important to emphasize that "scripture" to a Buddhist doesn't necessarily mean the same thing as "scripture" to a Protestant Christian, despite the similar language.
As Rabbit references there is a document titled the Six Yogas of Nāropa (ན་རོ་ཆོས་དྲུག་, Narö chö druk).  Naropa himself was no small figure, at least for certain traditions, and a lot of the teachings in the Six Yogas are widely practiced among certain sects.
That, by itself, might count as a "scriptural reference" if that's what you are going for. This has been taught as stemming from the Gautama Buddha's statements about the illusory or dream-like nature of reality. It is an established document that is well known.
On the other hand, as far as I can tell it isn't listed–at least commonly–as part of the Tibetan Buddhist canon or any of the other major canons. That having been said, there are a great many Buddhist texts that cover a wide variety of different practices that are not found in in those specific texts that doesn't lessen their value.
So the question comes down to what, exactly, you consider "scripture" and why you are looking to know.

Six yogas of Naropa is not a document per se, it is a set of practises that were transmitted by Naropa down to his disciples and the transmission continues till today. There are various books with commentaries but the very practice should be transmitted in person.

Within the Kevatta (Kevaddha) Sutta: To Kevatta it is said:

Whereas some brahmans and contemplatives, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such lowly arts as:

...
interpreting dreams;
...

Given that, I do not think it is an endorsed approach within Buddhism.

The question was about lucid dreaming, not dream interpretation. I've definitely read of dream yoga as a valid part of some Tibetan traditions. No reference though, sorry. I got it via B. Alan Wallace's writings.

@Tommy I see your point. I was thinking that using dreams as a way of understanding samsara is an interpretation that dreams transitory nature is similar to the transitory nature of samsara. Maybe I am misunderstanding the way the sutta means 'interpreting'.

@Tommy Dream Yoga is a part of 6 Yogas of Naropa, try searching that


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Masturbation: Does it break the 3rd precept?
According to this  answer, it seems like masturbation is not considered sexual misconduct or breaking the third precept.
However, the whole point (in general) of keeping the precept is to make good kamma both in mind and body. Masturbation alters the mind state and creates bad mind-made kamma. So ideally, shouldn't it also be considered as sexual misconduct and breaking the third precept?

from my understanding it does not break the 3rd precept for lay people unless they are, for example, on a meditation retreat where they often temporarily take on more precepts. That said, while we should at minimum follow the five precepts, if we are serious about following the dhamma, then we will want to minimize mental and physical actions that fan the flame of lust.  Rather than checking off the minimal fulfilment of a precept off a list,  it's up to each individual to make right effort from moment to moment.

I would like an answer to this based on dhamma dacts rather than guesswork of what precepts are about. For example for first precept there are 5 clear conditions to satisfy. Are there any conditions to satisfy specified by Lord Buddha so the third precept is broken?

@ShamalKarunarathne I think this answer says what's specified in the sutta and its commentary.

@ChrisW thanks for pointing it out, but in the answer Conclusion is misleading. Only a person reads the last paragraph get's the real answer.

Argumentation is a tricky thing; it's easy to skip a step and before you realize it, you've got an argument whose premises don't actually necessitate their conclusion.
Premise: The whole point (in general) of keeping the [third] precept is to make good kamma both in mind and body.
Premise: Masturbation alters the mind state and creates bad mind-made kamma.
Conclusion: [Masturbation should] also be considered as sexual misconduct and breaking the third precept.
I'm not sure if you actually meant that the point of keeping the precepts in general is to make good kamma, or just the third, but either way, whether this premise is true or not, it doesn't necessitate the conclusion. We can see this by substituting the word "masturbation" with "consensual sex", "gambling" or even "dancing" - just because an act is unwholesome doesn't mean it violates any of the precepts, let alone the third.
You might have a better argument if your second premise pointed out that masturbation created bad karma relating to sexuality; we can maybe assume this was implied as obvious. Still, if masturbation is breaking the third precept, why is not consensual sex, or even romantic kissing or fondling?
The third precept does not cover all unwholesome activity relating to sexuality, just as the first precept does not cover all acts of violence. They are specific rules designed to keep people from breaking a basic moral code that would otherwise lead them to be reborn in the lower realms.
ANSWER: So, while masturbation may be unwholesome (and a cause of addiction), it does not by any means break any of the five precepts. It does violate the eight and ten precepts, and is a major offence against the vinaya for a bhikkhu.

Masturbation is unwholesome just like getting angry is unwholesome.  Getting angry is not recommended, but it is not against a precept.
I think there is confusion with abrahmacariya precept taken with 8 and 10 precepts. This precept replaces the third sexual misconduct precept of regular followers and requires complete celibacy. Abstinence from sensual pleasures are covered in this rule and also in the other higher precepts included in the eight/ten group.  These precepts are taken by serious lay followers and novice monks.
Bhikkhus must do manata/parivasa (probation) if they do such an act.  It is very serious for a monk to do such a thing and very serious legal act to rehabilitate. Often, separate "prison monasteries" are set up for this purpose in Asia because of the difficulties in the logistics to carry out such a task.
Novice monks ask to do chores (danda kamma) if they break this.  It should be noted that the only difference in precepts of a layperson and a novice monk is the tenth precept of not using the money. As far as the third precept (sexual misconduct) is concerned for the five precept yogi; "It takes two to tango."

From what I've heard, masturbation or fantasizing about people other than your partner won't break the 3rd precept. But it weakens it. Just like harming animals doesn't break the 1st precept until you actually kill. But it will weaken any merits you get by keeping to the 1st precept apart from creating lot of bad Karma for yourself.

There are multiple answers in the link you posted that explain what sexual misconduct is and masturbation cannot be considered among the ranks of actions named sexual misconduct.
Now you MAY have a case if you use the word sensual misconduct as the translation, then actions like over eating and excessive masturbation could be considered abuse of the senses.
Masturbation does not alter the mind state. If you look deep enough, masturbation is done BECAUSE of a mind state. Masturbation is only an issue for monastics, and is not something the laity need to go fret too much about, at least until such time as the practice starts to show them the futility of sexual actions, then it naturally falls away.

"Masturbation does not alter the mind state." Maybe not, but the intention to masturbate is mind-altering, as is the affirmation of the pleasure gained through the act. While the physical act is purely functional, it is practically-speaking an unwholesome act and therefore mind-altering.

Masturbation does not transgress the 3rd precept.
Yet, pursuing thoughts of sexuality is considered unskillful as they contribute to further becoming (bhava), which in turn leads to further dukkha.
However, long term forced sexual repression only for the sake of keeping a precept is also counterproductive. I have met a few people who have decided to be brahmachari while living a household life and developed very negative and hostile views towards women.
Sexual desire should be uprooted from the root with wisdom and compassion, not suppressed because of a rule.
Monastics have to abstain from all sexual activity. This is extremely difficult for the average man. This requires a proper environment, internal (mind) and external, proper preparation, developing proper views and thoughts, and proper support.
For lay people, the Buddha recommended abstaining from all sexual activity including masturbation, any sort of entertainment, at least once a week by under taking the Uposatha precepts.

"For all their lives the arahants dwell having abandoned unchaste
  conduct, they are of chaste conduct, living aloof, refrain from sex
  which is the way of common society; so today I dwell, for this night
  and day, having abandoned unchaste conduct, I am of chaste conduct,
  living aloof, refraining from sex which is the common way of society.
  By this practice, following after the arahants, the Uposatha will be
  entered on by me"

Visakhuposatha Sutta: The Discourse to Visakha on the Uposatha with the Eight Practices

"It's no gain for you, it's ill-gotten, that in this life so
  endangered by grief, in this life so endangered by death, you
  sometimes observe the eight-factored uposatha and sometimes don't."

The Sakka Sutta where the Buddha strongly urges the keeping of the Uposatha

This is an issue you really have to investigate for yourself whilst being mindful of what has been said elsewhere. Masturbation should be meditated upon and an attempt made to analyse what you are doing. Partly that is also about the rights and wrongs of it.
Imagine a man sees a woman who is a complete stranger to him during the day and is aroused, or sees an online picture, and later masturbates by bringing the image of her into his mind. Having never had the opportunity to have met the woman and found out if she resonated with him on other levels of being such as the emotional, is this then really just pure lust for her physical form?
After all suppose they actually met face to face. Perhaps they would have nothing in common, didn't actually like each other etc etc.
It helps to consider the reality that the form is just one aspect of the woman, and that relationship with her in reality would not just involve the form that is known about, but those other aspects of her being which are not known about.
That is the woman is considered in her totality.
Furthermore relationship in reality is a two - way thing. In reality she just might not be interested in the least.
It helps to try and draw reality into the created fantasy.
Anyway I think I've given a flavour of the kind of considerations that might be helpful.

Look, from what I experienced during vipassana, is this: and after a masturbation session after the retreat was done:

Step 1: You look at some romantic porn
Step 2: Your sense lightens up or some emotion, and the mind creates, "oh wow I want that kind of romantic sex, I need a girl friend".
Step 3: In reality you are not searching for an authentic relationship because the mind was clouded by judgment because you were not observing what was happening when you felt horny and needed to expulse some toxic waste. In truth, that sensation is the you want to just have sex for personal gain, and to numb that pain if you feel lonely for example (my case) ANICCA. For this reason, I CANNOT masturbate, and need to continue cleaning myself until I find an authentic girlfriend or wife for the right reasons. Sex and masturbation in marriage and with a GF is OK if the person and you have pure love and both judgments are not clouded, but usually in Traditional Chinese medicine there has to be exchange of yin and yang, so, if you do expulse makes sure you are observing what is happening on the surface and inside of the body...

I now understood why I could not just find a girlfriend: because it would have caused her a lot emotional pain and it was not right, and pornography and masturbation caused a lot of suffering which I was ignorant from, just like a drug addict or a carrot addict.
Don't be surprised you fall in love with women all the time, but make sure to do vipassana and read the Ananda sutta to see more insight. Sex and love are terms that are very well clouded because of our unawarness... which leads to SUFFERING.. I mean look, I am typing something, and boom! the urge to just launch off some nuclear sperm comes to my mind with a tons of PORNO, and wanting a wife. what to do if your a vipatator ( vipassana meditator)?
-1 I accept that face that I am horny and cannot do anything about besides be EQUANIMOUS...
-2 My sensation of hornyness is on my stomach and chest,
-3 Heart Beats 130 Round per minute lol, breathing becomes faster
-4 I decide if I want to or not, but I observe and I am aware, and no shame...
-5 it disappears after a while, 10 minutes later comes back again! ANNICCA, same process... observe. Nothing ever lasts, everything changes.....
Sleeping with random women too, creates suffering for them and you.

I cleaned up the spelling -- I'd guess most people find slang and abbreviations hard to understand, please try to use a more standard english if you can. There are three of your words that I wasn't sure of: 1) I replaced one **** with horny, but perhaps you meant to write like shit instead. 2) I guessed that M was marriage? 3) I couldn't figure out what TCM is an abbreviation for.

oh yes sorry, I will, it was for traditional chinese medicine, and it was horny, the M was for masterbation, I am just like still a bit confused after my retreat on what kind of words to use in order to not offend, and I will use more longer english then slang! Gotcha thanks you very much! :D

The Third Precept
The third precept entails that individual should refrain from engaging in sexual relationships with those who are married, engaged, imprisoned, protected, or practicing celibacy. In Buddhism, this precept underscores the importance of respecting others and avoiding any form of violence.
Masturbation
Masturbation is a normal activity that humans typically engage in during their teenage years (even adult). It involves self-stimulation without the physical involvement of another partner, relying solely on mental imagination.
The violation of the third precept occurs when an individual engages in sexual acts (oral, anal, or vaginal) with any of the aforementioned partners. To fully transgress this precept, three stages must be met:

Choosing the wrong partner
Intending to have sexual relations with that partner
Engaging in sexual activity with that partner and deriving pleasure from it

We can observe instances where monks violate the ‘vinaya’ by engaging in sexual activities, as detailed in the ‘Pārājika’ section of the Vinaya Pitaka. (Monks are required to abstain from sex). A monk commits a Pārājika offense when he engages in sexual penetration involving the mouth, anus (his own, another human’s, an animal’s, a corpse’s, or even a ghost’s), or vagina. Other types of sexual activities do not result in ‘Pārājika’. They may instead be classified as ‘Saṅghādisesa’ or ‘Dukūla’.
However, it’s important to note that masturbation itself does not break the precept. Nevertheless, it can stimulate desires and potentially accumulate negative karma (because one might think about inappropriate partners). For instance, if someone masturbates while thinking of a celibate woman who is following a religious path, they may accrue some negative karma as a result of these thoughts. However, this does not constitute a breach of the precept.
Aside from these considerations, addiction to masturbation and pornography is not good at all.

ALL THE POINTS ARE CLEAR, BUT COULD YOU PLEASE ELABORATE ON THE MEANING OF "PROTECTED"? ADDITIONALLY, DOES THE PRECEPT GET VIOLATED IF SOMEONE ENGAGES IN ORAL OR ANAL SEX WITH A PARTNER, EVEN IF IT'S WITH THEIR OWN SPOUSE?

In brief, the term "protected" can be interpreted in various ways, such as referring to "all single women", "all dependent women", or "only underage/young teen girls", among others. However, I personally hold the view that "adult women not in that category."   Engaging in (oral/anal) sex does not, in itself, break the precept.

If you hold the 5 precepts, it will not break the precept.
Otherwise it breaks the 3rd of 8,10 precepts.
But if others give you, that will break all the 3rd of 5,8 and 10 precept.

Depending on your goals with Buddhism, frequent masturbation is generally violating that precept because it harms the body.
Frequent masturbation is all sorts of sexual misconduct and harms the body-mind:

Taoist bioenergetics standpoint: "losing jing"
Usually accompanied by porn, this trains the mind is various erroneous ways

...
That being said, masturbation performed with the intention to cultivate one's biophysical energies rather than lose them, e.g. kegel practice, multiple orgasm self-training, is good for oneself in the long-run.

Masturbation in and of itself is neither harmful, not not harmful. It becomes misconduct and breaks the precept when it involves thoughts of harm to others. If you look at pornography carefully, you realize the purpose of this form of sexually charged communication is mostly about degradation, disrespect for others, a desire to revel in filth, or to rape, harm others, to act against their wishes, the violation of another person, of a child, or of a mother for example, these are inherently harmful in and of themselves. To make that a part of the self-gratification experience is a violation. Supporting sexual slavey in the pornographic industry, sex workers, etc.

all_licenses: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Which early canonical references help one find a skillful teacher?
There is a similar question from the Vajrayāna stand-point in which I gave an answer that was partially off-topic since it wasn't from that tradition's texts. So I thought it could be useful for newcomers to know what the early texts say on this matter.
Note: Since one is explicitly encouraged to answer his own questions for the sake of sharing his knowledge, I've also answered the question below.

(Disclaimer: Bear in mind that this answer is structured for the purpose of providing references. This structure is entirely my own way of putting the answer together. I'd emphasize taking the references on their -own terms- without giving too much importance to this structure.)
To find a skillful teacher, one could approach the matter prudently by investigating the teacher for the following points:

Doesn't accept money, especially for teaching.1
Doesn't show traces of greed, hatred or delusion in their behavior.2
Meditates frequently and for lengthy periods.3
Eats once a day before noon.4
Is content with very little.5
Is bent on solitude & seclusion.6

Note that these points are just good guidelines and should be taken as a supplement to one's own discernment. A skillful teacher doesn't need to fulfill all of the points, but if he does, great, stick with him.
For further references, the following discourses might be of great aid:

DN 12: Teachers that are worthy & unworthy of criticism.
MN 8: The whole discourse is worth reading but I linked to the specific section about instruction called "Quenching".
MN 47: This discourse addresses the issue head-on. (Recommended)
AN 4.73: Qualities of a person of integrity. (Recommended)
AN 4.192: Shows how one finds a person's virtue, purity, endurance & wisdom. (Recommended)
AN 5.100: Teachers being covered up by their pupils.
AN 5.159: Five qualities a teacher should set up. (Recommended)
Dhp 158-159: Two verses about teachers.

1. AN 5.159 has five qualities a teacher should set up. The fourth one is that he will not teach for the purpose of material reward.
2. MN 150 mentions that recluses without greed, hatred & delusion are those that should be respected, venerated & honored.
3. DN 29 mentions that buddhist recluses live addicted to the pleasure of meditation.
4. MN 65 is a good reference about the Buddha's thoughts concerning this issue.
5. AN 4.27 is a good reminder about contentment with the bare minimum but I wouldn't advocate it as a necessary guideline.
6. AN 8.53 has the qualities that make-up the Buddha's teaching and one of them is solitude\seclusion.


text:
What basic knowledge and skills are required to become a Vipassana teacher?
What would you say are the basic requirements to become a Vipassana teacher?
I don't necessarily refer to attainments. More to basic knowledge and skills.
What I can think of would be for instance:
 - knowledge of the 5 precepts;
 - knowledge of the 4 noble truths;
 - knowledge of the 8-fold path;
 - be able to listen.
(Just to name a few.)

What is the qualification to become a vipashyana assistant teacher.?

I imagine this varies from tradition to tradition. In my tradition, the Thai version of Mahasi Sayadaw's teaching, anyone can pass on the teachings, so in a sense anyone can be a teacher. What this means is that there is no governing body going to reprimand you if you go out and teach others as you have been taught. This seems in line with the Buddha's way himself; the only requirements as far as being a teacher is concerned relate to fulfilling a role as a monastic teacher (i.e. regarding monastic discipline).
That being said, to become recognized as a teacher in my tradition, one generally has to undergo training both theoretically and practically - and of course, it goes without saying that one must have previously completed basic training in insight meditation (at least one month of intensive practice, preferably more).
Theoretically, one must have studied and/or been taught about the sixteen stages of insight knowledge as found in the commentaries and Visuddhimagga, along with the sort of "symptoms" to look for in someone going through each of the stages. A basic knowledge of Theravada Buddhism (usually through the Thai Dhamma exams) is also understood as a given.
Practically, one would be required to first listen in on another teacher's interviews with meditators (I spent a year doing this, every day for about five hours including ceremonies) and then eventually teach yourself under the guidance of a qualified teacher.
There is generally no certificate given, though there is a standard course in Thailand now for monks that lasts 40 days and gets one a certificate of sorts. Since there is very little practical experience in teaching involved, it doesn't seem quite complete as a teacher training, more of a basic requirement that one should then use to undertake further practical study of the art of teaching.

Bhante, perhaps the answer would benefit from sources on the 16 stages of knowledge - http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/mahasi/progress.html and the Dhamma exams? /\

To know how to become a vipassana teacher go through this link http://www.globalpagoda.org/Seva-questions


text:
What are the salient differences between the Pāḷi Nikāyas & Chinese Āgamas?
What are the salient differences between the Pāḷi Nikāyas & Chinese Āgamas?
I'm looking specifically for a comprehensive list of discourses that are unique in the Āgama collection and differences between parallel discourses.

I found this catalog but, if available, something more intelligible would be appreciated. Maybe the only thing available that comes close to the answer is obtained by skimming through this huge bibliography. A list of the main doctrinal differences would be really handy but I guess I have to wait.

I guess you know, that the Chinese Agamas are translations of mostly (or only?) Sanskrit canons of schools or sects, that perished at some point. So the content is very much dependent on the specific canon, that was translated. So doctrinal differences can possibly be inferred by the doctrines of the schools in question (Dharmaguptaka, Sarvastivada etc.). On point of importance here is quite surely, that they are rather late texts (as translations).

Indeed, but I've found some differences from the available translations that make some pāḷi texts more coherent. That's why I'm curious to know what further differences exist.

You your self is the best person I met here who can answer this!!!

@SumindaSirinathSalpitikorala That's kind of you. I also thank you for the questions! Without them, it's harder to consolidate knowledge.

"Agamas seem to better convey the overall meaning of each discourse" I too find this to be true. Pali suttas often contain too much repetition. I find this somewhat exhausting.
Does anyone know why SA 80 "Discourse on the Seal of Dhamma" was left out of the Pali canon?
Has anyone ever raised a red flag on a discrepancy found in the Pali version of "Son's Flesh" and Chinese version of the same sutta i.e. SN 12.63?
Just curious.
Thank you.

@Pulsar Please create one or more new questions. This is a Q&A site and not a discussion forum with threads.

Venerable Analayo through the University of Hamburg has given online courses in 2012 and 2013 comparing MN suttas and MA sutras. So far not the whole collection has been covered but in the material covered in those courses, as I can recall, there are some minor differences here and there but nothing that would put in question the central teachings as we know better from the Pali Canon. In 2014 there was a course about bhikkhunis, and maybe next year there will be another course about MN/MA.
You may also want to check http://suttacentral.net/.

I'm already aware of those sources, including Anālayo's articles which also shed some light on some differences. I'm looking for the essence of those kind of studies. I hope in the following years, a list like this may appear. Thank you for reply.

@Dhammarakkhita I would like to see more participation from you ven sir.

FYI - Ven Anālayo's two volume (1000+ pages) "A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikāya" can be downloaded from https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/analayo/compstudyvol1.pdf https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/analayo/compstudyvol2.pdf

I'm not sure if this helps, but since you asked for a list of discourses:
There is an appendix at the end of "Buddhist Religions" (5th Ed.) by Robinson, Johnson, and Thanissaro, entitled "An Overview of the Three Major Canons", which lists the Pail Tipitaka, the Chinese canon, and the (or a) Tibetan canon. It's just lists though -- no commentary or comparison.

From my somewhat limited exposure to Agamas, mostly Samyukta Agama (equivalent of Samyutta Nikaya):

Because Chinese is a much more ambiguous language than Pali, Agama translations to English are necessarily more "lossy" than translations from Pali, which preserves many subtleties inherent in Pali grammar. This makes Pali sutras more expressive at micro level.
Agama sutras (at least those in Samyukta Agama) that have direct Pali counterparts, seem to be less stereotyped than their Pali versions. Meaning, a section that in Pali would often look like a stereotyped rendition of a matrika that repeats verbatim in many suttas, in Agama sutras seems to be in its pithy form. This makes Agamas more expressive at macro level.

For example, consider the following passage of Kaccayanagotta Sutta / Katyayana Gotra Sutra:
Pali

But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'non-existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, 'existence' with reference to the world does not occur to one.
'Everything exists': That is one extreme. 'Everything doesn't exist': That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle:

From ignorance as a requisite condition come fabrications. From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. From name-&-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering. Now from the remainderless fading & cessation of that very ignorance comes the cessation of fabrications. From the cessation of fabrications comes the cessation of consciousness. From the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form. From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media. From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering.
Agama

One who sees arising in the world, is not one who holds to its non-existence. One who sees extinction in the world, is not one who holds to its existence.
This is spoken of as ‘freedom from the Two Extremes,’ which is called the Middle Way:
That is, that "this existence" is the cause of "that existence", and "this arising" is the cause of "that arising". These are caused by ignorance, including even the entire arising of the pure mass of suffering. When ignorance ends, then from this comes the end of such actions, including even the end of the pure mass of suffering.”

To me it looks like (Samyukta) Agama sutras are closer to what the original sutras must have been (minus the lossy nature of Chinese language) - while Pali Nikaya suttas have evidently underwent editing and elaboration/formalization which often caused a loss of context-specific subtleties.
The bottom line is, if one wants to get a deep understanding of a topic, it would be a good idea to study the both sources. But if I can boil down the salient differences to a single point, Agamas seem to better convey the overall meaning of each discourse, while Nikayas are better at details.
According to scientists (can't find the reference now), the Sarvastivada Canon that later got translated to Chinese as Agamas, has been put in writing several centuries before the Pali Canon, which would make it that much closer to what was said in that First Buddhist Council. I wish we had Samyukta Agama survived in Gandhari - it would have been the best of both worlds.

I will talk about  Pāḷi Nikāyas only because I never memorize Agama of the others.
For me, this is one biggest difference which causes many other difference between Nikaya and Agama.
Pāḷi Nikāyas have the rules of the keeper which we still follow on the rules through 2500+ years. In tipitaka and commentary tradition, since mahākhandhaka of vinaya mahāvagga is completed authored by upāli in 1st saṇgāyanā, all layman's teachers must have all of these qualities, which concluded by upāli in bhikkhunovādakasikkhāpada's commentary (which I translate below as follows):

Qualities of nissayamuccaka-bhikkhu (teaching lay people)

Proficient to recite pāṭimokkha-pāli and to understand it's commentary.
Proficient to recite and to understand 4 bhāṇavāra (~1,000 syllable) of sutta and their commentary, to teach laymen on uposatha
day.
Proficient to recite and to understand sutta for bhikkhu's life such as andhakavindasutta, mahālahulovādasutta, ambaṭṭhasutta, etc.
Proficient to recite and to understand sutta for teaching in 3 chances: banquet for saṅgha by layman (nidhikaṇdasutta), funeral
ceremony (tirokuṭṭasutta), and auspicious ceremony (maṅgalasutta).
Enough understand to judge/to decide about saṇgha's ceremony such as uposatha, pavāraṇā, etc.
Proficient to recite and to understand his kammaṭṭhānā throughout the nibbāna-course.
5 years experience in monk hood as a monk.

Qualities of bhikkuparisūpaṭṭhāpaka-bhikkhu (teaching bikkhus)
If above layman's teachers want to teach bhikkhus (ūpajjhā-ācāriya, nissaya-ācāriya), they must increase their skill level to all of the following qualities.
These are for abhivinaya teaching:

Proficient to recite mahāvibhagha and bhikkhunivibhaṅga (first 3 books of thai 45 books pali-tipitaka) of vinaya-pitaka-pali. At least, he
can relay with the other 3 bhikkhu. Proficient to understand it's
commentary, too.
Proficient to recite all saṇgha's ceremony in vinaya-pitaka mahāvagga and julavagga.
Proficient to recite 14 vatta in vattakhandhaka.

These are for abhidhamma (kammaṭṭhāna) teaching:

Proficient to recite one of this suttanta-pali: mūlapaṇṇassa (1st/3 parts of M.N.) for student in M.N. faculty, mahāvagga (2nd/3 parts of
D.N.) for student in D.N. faculty,
sagāthavagga+nidānavagga+khandhavāravagga of S.N. or  mahāvagga of
S.N. for student in S.N. faculty, before half of A.N.  or after half
of A.N.  or ekakanipāta+dukanipāta of A.N. for student in A.N.
faculty, jātaka+commentary  (because kammaṭṭhāna was described in
commentary) for student in jātaka faculty.

Qualities of bhikkunovdaka-bhikkhu (teaching bhikkunīs)
If above layman's teachers want to teach bhikkhunī, they must increase their skill level to all of these qualities:

Proficient to recite whole tipitaka-pali and commentary-pali. Or at least, he still must recite whole tipitaka, but he can recite just one
commentary of suttanta, first 4 parts of commentary of 7 parts of
abhidhamma. However, vinaya-commentary is what he must recite it all.

Reference: tipitaka and commentary of vinaya pācittiyakaṇḍa bhikkhunovādakasikkhāpada and vinaya mahāvagga mahākhandhaka.

TL;DR
The summary from the following book is that:

Oral transmission of the Early Buddhist Texts (EBTs) were very reliable in different schools.
Even if there is difference in content between the Nikaya and Agama versions, they are all doctrinally identical.
There is a very high degree of correspondence between the Nikaya and Agama versions of Majjhima Nikaya, Samyutta Nikaya and Digha Nikaya.
All texts which are almost word-for-word identical between the different versions, although in different languages, were authored before the Sthaviravada-Mahasanghika split.
Anguttara Nikaya and Ekottara Agama are structurally identical but have significant content differences. The Ekottara Agama is said to be unfinished and contains proto-Mahayanist additions.
Other EBTs which are part of Khuddaka Nikaya have a common core, but the contents can be quite different, between different schools.
The Abhidharmas are even more divergent between the different schools.

Details
From The Authenticity of the Early Buddhist Texts by Bhikkhu Sujato and Bhikkhu Brahmali:

We possess EBTs from a substantial variety of ancient Indian Buddhist
schools, including the Mahāvihāra (modern-day Theravāda) of Sri Lanka,
the Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Mūlasarvāstivāda,
Sarvāstivāda, and others of uncertain affiliation. A century of
detailed study has consistently shown that they are essentially
identical in doctrine irrespective of transmission lineage.
With corresponding footnote:

The only complete set of EBTs is
the Pali version of the Mahāvihāra. Of the other schools we possess
EBTs in a variety of degrees of completion, from a majority of the
texts of the Sarvāstivāda, to only a few scattered Suttas and the
Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghika. In the case of the Mahāsāṅghika, this
would change significantly if it can be established that the
Ekottara-āgama in Chinese translation (T 125) belongs to this school.

The great Belgian scholar Étienne Lamotte says (in Lamotte, Étienne.
History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era.
Publications de l’Institut orientaliste de Louvain. Université
catholique de Louvain, Institut orientaliste, 1988): “However, with the
exceptions of the Mahāyānist interpolations in the Ekottara, which are
easily discernible, the variations in question [across the lines of
transmission] affect hardly anything except the method of expression
or the arrangement of the subjects. The doctrinal basis common to the
Āgamas and Nikāyas is remarkably uniform.” This is in stark contrast
to non-EBT texts.
...  In 1882 Beal described detailed correspondences between Suttas in
Chinese and Pali (in Beal, Samuel. Abstract of Four Lectures On
Buddhist Literature in China. Biblio-Life, 2010.). He accurately
predicted that “when the Vinaya and Āgama collections are thoroughly
examined, I can have little doubt we shall find most if not all the
Pali Suttas in Chinese form.”
.... Recently, in his detailed and thorough Comparative Study of the
Majjhima Nikāya, Anālayo shows that all significant aspects of early
Buddhist doctrine are the same across all extant textual transmissions
of the Suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya (in Analayo. A Comparative Study
of the Majjhima-nikāya. Dharma Drum Academic Publisher, 2011). Among
the parallels to the Suttas of the Pali Majjhima Nikāya, the most
important textual source, due to its completeness, is the
Sarvāstivādin Madhyama Āgama preserved in Chinese. The Sarvāstivāda
and Theravāda lineages must have separated approximately at the time
of the Asokan missionary activities. This means that these texts have
been transmitted separately for almost 2,300 years, including a period
of separate oral transmission that lasted several centuries. And yet
the doctrinal content is for all intents and purposes identical. This
shows how conservative and careful the individual schools were in
preserving the EBTs.
Moreover, this conservatism must have been inherited from the more
unified—both geographically and doctrinally—form of Buddhism that
existed prior to Asoka. There is no reason to imagine that the
separate schools would all be conservative in preserving their
canonical texts unless they had been conservative prior to their
separation. Since comparative studies show that the core doctrinal
material of the EBTs has been reliably transmitted for almost 2,300
years, the reasonable inference is that it was reliably transmitted
also in the first 150–200 years of Buddhist history.
In addition to the full scale study of the Majjhima Nikāya, there have
been multiple smaller studies of various parts of the EBTs. These have
confirmed that all the EBTs share a similar level of agreement to what
we find between the Suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya and its parallels.
Such studies have been carried out for substantial portions of the
Saṁyutta Nikāya/Saṁyukta Āgamas (in Bingenheimer, Marcus, trans.
A Digital Comparative Edition and Partial Translation of the Shorter
Chinese Saṁyukta Āgama (T.100). 2011 and in Choong, Mun-keat.
The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based
on the Sūtrāṅga Portion of the Pali Saṁyutta-Nikāya and the
Chinese Saṁyuktāgama. Harrassowitz, 2000), and to a lesser extent for the
Dīgha Nikāya.
Caution needs to be exercised, however, regarding the Ekottara Āgama,
which is nominally the collection corresponding to the Pali Aṅguttara
Nikāya. Although it shares some significant structural features with
the Aṅguttara, the content is often very different. The text is highly
erratic and internally inconsistent, possibly being an unfinished
draft. Scholars agree that it includes proto-Mahāyānist additions
(in Lamotte above and also in Warder below),
thereby establishing its late date of completion compared to the rest
of the EBTs.
This high degree of correspondence among the EBTs across different
lines of transmission does not exist for any other texts of the vast
Buddhist corpus. Even in the stylistically oldest part of the Khuddaka
Nikāya, such as the Sutta Nipāta, the Udāna, and the Dhammapada, there
is substantial divergence between the schools. This is despite the
fact that these texts do have a common core, which is found across the
different traditions. With texts such as the Abhidhamma, despite a
small common core, the divergence is even greater. But the vast
majority of Buddhist texts are exclusive to the individual schools and
do not have any parallels at all.

And also:

..... The first doctrinal split in the Buddhist monastic community was that
between the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṅghikas. Because this was the
first split, some scholars, such as Edward Conze and A. K. Warder,
have suggested that material that is common to both these groups of
schools be regarded as the most authentic.
With corresponding footnote:

See Conze’s Thirty Years of Buddhist
Studies, p. 9: “Where we find passages in which these two texts, the
one in Pali and other in Sanskrit, agree almost word by word, we can
assume that they belong to a time antedating the separation of the two
schools [Sthaviravādas and Mahāsāṅghikas] , which took place during
Asoka’s rule. ... This approach cannot, however, get us beyond 340 BCE
with the Sūtra texts, because their Mahāsāṅghika version is lost.”
And Warder says “... the agreement of these two schools [Sthaviravādas
and Mahāsāṅghikas] should establish the oldest available textual
tradition ...” (in Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism. Buddhism Series.
Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).


text:
What is the difference between non-self and emptiness?
Non-self (anātman) and emptiness (śūnya or śūnyatā) are very similar aspects of the Truth of Suffering. So similar that they are hard to distinguish apart. What is the difference between them? (Or what is purpose to have them as separate characteristics?)
Update: I did not specified that answers should be from Mahayana perspective, assuming that Theravada have the same list of 16 Aspects of Noble Truths, but it seems that Theravada list is quite different (see Visiddhimagga). And for some reason most answers was from Theravada perspective. I don't want to disregard Theravada explanations, and welcome them. But in Theravada, it seems, that suññata and anatta are never enumerated in the same list. Thus they don't imply distinction, and it's is quite possible that they are just synonyms (as pointed out by Unrul3r).
I will quote Abhidharmasamuccaya for more context:

What are the general characteristics of suffering? They are the
characteristics of (1) impermanence (anitya), (2) suffering (duḥkha),
(3) emptiness (śūnya) and (4) non-self (anātma).

Thus it's established that these are different characteristics.
Further Asanga provides some elaborations:

(3) What is the characteristic of emptiness (śūnyatā)? It is the
non-existence (abhāva) of a certain thing, there. To see
(samanupaśyanā) in this way is emptiness. Again, it is the existence
(bhāva) of another thing, there. In this way there is true knowledge
(yathābhūtajñāna). This is called emptiness perceived by penetration
(avatāra). True knowledge denotes the informed meaning. What is the
meaning of the non-existence of a certain thing, there? It is the
non-existence in the aggregates, elements and spheres of a self or
anything whatsoever belonging to a self of permanent, durable,
eternal, immutable nature. In this way is their emptiness. What is the
meaning of the existence of another thing, there? It is the fact that
there is non-self in the aggregates, elements and spheres. It is the
nonexistence of the self, and the existence of the non-self. It is in
this sense that the Blessed One has said: ‘Existence is the true
knowledge of an existent thing; non-existence is the true knowledge of
a non-existent thing.’
(4) What is the characteristic of non-self (anātma)? It is the
non-existence in the aggregates, elements and spheres of the
characteristics postulated in the theory of the self (ātmavāda) as a
result of the nonexistence of the characteristics of a self in the
aggregates, elements and spheres. This is called the characteristic of
non-self. For this reason the Blessed One said: ‘All things (dharmas)
are without self.’122 Furthermore, the Blessed One has said: “(i) All
of that is not mine, (ii) nor ‘I am’ nor my self”.123

So in light of this, what is the difference?

They are enumerated in a list but -not- the list you pointed to below. That is why I responded: "..the term emptiness was already an aspect of the truth of suffering". For example, "..should be envisioned as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a disintegration, an emptiness (suññato), selfless (anattato)." -MN 74. As you can see, all of these terms are synonyms of anicca, dukkha & anatta. This is another reason why there is no distinction in relation to non-self.

Bear in mind, that this is in the early texts, not in the later ones. But from the text you mention above, they also seem synonyms.

Where (which source/reference) did you find the quote of Asanga?

@ChrisW THE COMPENDIUM OF THE SUPER-DOCTRINE (PHILOSOPHY) ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA by ASAṄGA. Translated and annotated by Walpola Rahula, second edition, 1980, translated from the French by Gelongma Karma Migme Chodron, 2000.

As I understand, Mahayana's shunyata (noun, because shunya is adjective) includes all Three Characteristics of Existence, as well as Nirvana (sometimes counted as the fourth!)
In this sense, Shunyata is the all-encompassing view, and as close as it gets to Ultimate Truth, while Anatta is but one aspect of this truth.

So, Anatta refers only to oneself, and shunyata refers to, well, everything. Yes?

Anatta refers to corelessness of sentient beings, and Shunyata to corelessness of all phenomena without exception.

I would add to this, that in the reception of these two terms, there is a difference. While the two terms are possibly used synonymously in the second sermon of the Buddha (compare the answers already given for this), the terminus technicus in early buddhism is anattā/anātman, being as one of the three marks of existence a claim of the Buddha which marks the uncoupling of Buddhism from the philosophical mainstream of that time.
The word(s) suñña/śūnya have acquired a more refined philosophical sense, since they were to a great extent 'popularized' by Nagarjuna and the Śūnyatāvāda school of early Mahayana. In his main work Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Nagarjuna does in a (philosophically) much more thorough way than was done by the Buddha dissect certain supposed elements of existence, proving, that they are empty. By and large this is in response to the rival buddhist ontologies (Sarvastivada and Sautrantika) and in the end more or less re-states what the Buddha had already stated: anattā/anātman, but on a much more sound philosophical and argumentative basis. (By the way: it reiterates also the Buddha's contempt for metaphysics)
In short: In discourse, anattā/anātman makes one think of Buddhism and the Buddha, while suñña/śūnya incites more special associations to Nagarjuna and his school.
Please note, that the adjectives used in comparison of the words of the Buddha and Nagarjuna in no way constitute value-judgements. They just indicate, that Nagarjuna responded to different needs and not, that what he said is worth more.

Thanks, but sunyata teaching is not peculiar to Nagarjuna schools, it's common to any Buddhist school—Theravada (it's everywhere from the suttas up to commentaries), Sarvastivada, and Yogacara have it too (even though it's not Sunyavada/Madhyamaka branch of Mahayana). Common teachings, for example, is 16 aspects of Noble Truths and emptiness gateway to liberation.

I don't claim it's peculiar. As I stated it occurs in the Pali scriptures as well, but it is not as prominent there as in Śūnyatāvāda, the name speaks for itself. Pizza is also not peculiar to Italy, since you get Pizza in half of the world or more. Still, the concepts do have some immediate connection, don't they? I don't know your list, but if you are asking for something more specific, then consider specifiying your question.

I was wrong to say that 16 aspects are common teaching, it seems, while such named list is present in Theravada (in Visuddhimagga), its content are quite different, and lacks 'sunnata'.

1. What is the difference between them?
As far as I know, there is no difference. The world is said to be empty of self and what belongs to self.

Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One … and said to
  him: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘Empty is the world, empty is the
  world.’ In what way, venerable sir, is it said, ‘Empty is the world’?”
“It is, Ānanda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to
  self that it is said, ‘Empty is the world.’ And what is empty of self
  and of what belongs to self? The eye, Ānanda, is empty of self and of
  what belongs to self. Forms are empty of self and of what belongs to
  self. Eye-consciousness is empty of self and of what belongs to self.
  Eye-contact is empty of self and of what belongs to self…. Whatever
  feeling arises with mind-contact as condition—whether pleasant or
  painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—that too is empty of self and
  of what belongs to self.
“It is, Ānanda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to
  self that it is said, ‘Empty is the world.’”
  -SN 35.85, World Emptiness (Suññataloka-sutta)

Mogharaja: Twice now, O Sakyan, I've asked you, but you, O One with
  Eyes, haven't answered me. "When asked the third time, the divine seer
  answers": so I have heard. This world, the next world, the Brahma
  world with its devas: I don't know how they're viewed by the glorious
  Gotama. So to the one who has seen to the far extreme, I've come with
  a question: One who regards the world in what way isn't seen by
  Death's King?
The Buddha: Always mindful, Mogharaja, regard the world as empty,
  having removed any view in terms of self. This way one is above and
  beyond death. One who regards the world in this way isn't seen by
  Death's King.
  -Sn 5.15, Mogharaja's Question (Mogharāja-māṇava-pucchā)

This is not the only meaning of emptiness in the early texts though.

Unrul3r, could you add some more of your own commentary to this. It's pretty much a copy-paste and answers are usually better if there's more of the answerer in them than quotes (see this discussion). For example, is there significance in the distinction being made between "empty of self" and "what belongs to self" in your first quote. Also, notice the "but you ... haven't answered me" in your second quote. Even back then it was obvious a subtle question. Can you elucidate?

@Tommy Why add my own to what is already perfect? This seemed a simple question with a straightforward answer which didn't need commentary. There are too many commentaries already which only obscure the teachings. So, whenever I can, I let the texts speak for themselves without speculating. And this "copy-paste" took work, it's not just copy-paste from google. These past few years I've been indexing suttas by themes to make their understanding easier & answering questions more accurately. I give answers with consideration. If you insist, I can speculate about those two points you mention. :)

But your answers don't strike me as being straightforward. You make the assertion that the two concepts mentioned by the OP are the same ("no difference"), but then offer some text that doesn't, to my eyes, back up your assertion. If I was marking your text as an answer to a college question, I'd fail you :-)

Indeed, "to your eyes". I'd have no problem failing in your class then. If you have an alternative answer, feel free to post it, maybe I can learn something from you. May you be well.

Thanks, but if there is 'no difference' why they are enumerated as separate aspects of Four Noble Truths? (From the list of 16 aspects.)

Which list are you referring to?

16 aspects of Noble Truths, but maybe it isn't authoritative for you, as you are quoted only Theravada sources. Then I withdraw my follow up question.

Indeed, that list is not part of the early Pāḷi or Chinese texts, but the term emptiness was already an aspect of the truth of suffering. I'd recommend you to read The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism from p.28 to p.31. Summarized, it says that the only differences are in the emphasis given by early schools and not in it's meaning.

They are not the same. But Suñña is one aspect of Anatta.
Suñña can mean devoid of any inherent value, goodness or a soul.
Anatta means not under one's control.
Something that is Anatta isn't always Suñña. ex: Nibbana.
Nibbana is peaceful, devoid of suffering and permanent. So there's goodness to it. But it's still not a self or a soul since it's not under your control.
There are 40 meditative objects described in Patisambidhamagga under Vipassana meditation.
Ten kinds from the view-point of anicca;
twenty-five kinds from the view-point of dukkha;
five kinds from the view-point of anatta.
Suñña is one of those 40.
The detailed explanations are in Visuddhimagga.

Thanks, but nibbāna is also suñña (see Patisambhidamagga ch. XX, on aggasuññaṃ and sampajānassa pavattapariyādānaṃ sabbasuññatānaṃ paramatthasuññaṃ)—this fails main point of your answer, IMHO.

Yes, suñña as in no-soul. But not as in devoid of goodness.

If 'nibbana is sunna' and 'sunna is devoid of goodness' then if follows that nibbana is devoid of goodness. Did you mean that?

No! Suñña can mean devoid of a self or a soul. So from that perspective Nibbana is suñña. But suñña can also mean devoid of any goodness. It is not suñña in that sense.

Thx, so you take sunna from the context of dukkha-sacca and then it couldn't be applied to nibbana because nibbana is good, you do this as example of difference in the meaning with anatta, but then you still able to apply anatta to nibbana. Contradiction: if you take sunna as characteristic of dukkha then you should take anatta as characteristic of dukkha too and not be able to apply it to nibbana, but if you able to apply anatta out of dukha context to nibbana then you should be able to apply sunna in the same way too. As result instead of difference pointed out, there is mix of contexts.

Anatta means having none of the four kinds of self

controlling self
continuous self
active agent self
experiencing self.
So you are able to apply Anatta to Nibbana even when there's no Dukkha. But you can't do the same with Sunna because it implies no goodness as well.

But suñña is applicable to nibbana (see aggasuñña, etc), you seems agreed to that before. You saying that suñña is applicable and that it isn't applicable to nibbana, which is obvious contradiction. How would you resolve this contradiction? Contradictory statements is not explanation of difference.

suñña in terms of no-soul is applicable. But not in terms of it's other meanings.

"I don't know." "Third base!" (from Abbot and Costello)

I'm new here, thus have not acquired enough points to add my comments above, so I'll do so here. But I agree with the thrust.
I'll sharpen my answer by saying right off the top there is no difference between non-self and emptiness. They are one and the same thing. To comprehend emptiness you will already comprehend non-self, just different ways of looking at reality. Different vantage points.
Emptiness is the key concept in Buddhism. It lies behind everything in Buddhism. If a thing is empty it has no permanent substance. Why? Because it is always in transition, is in the midst of change, is not immutable. If it is in constant change it cannot satisfy, is therefore dukkha, suffering. We the observer are also in the midst of constant change, and therefore share the same characteristic this discussion began with — we are also empty. (Despite all appearances to the contrary.)
These three are the three characteristics of all phenomena. Everything is not only subject to change, but that change is constant. Anicca. Everything ultimately cannot satisfy. Dukkha. There is no permanent reference point, no self. Anatta.
The questioner makes an almost inevitable error. He/she assumes the puzzle of emptiness can be understood analytically, rationally. That by breaking it down into its parts and coming to understand each in turn, assemble a comprehensive understanding. It can't be done.
The only way is to confront it all at once, as a whole. Proceed by looking at what changes. I say that includes anything and everything. Am I right or am I wrong? Can you identify anything that is lasting? Perhaps a rock or a mountain. But these change as well, although not rapidly. Even a mountain is rising and/or falling.
Everywhere you turn there is impermanence. Everything is in process. Everything IS process.
I'll respond in your comments to the above.

I didn't talked about analytical splitting of śūnyatā, so you are projecting about my assumptions.

When we look for "impermanence" we find only a single instant - hence "impermanence" (the process of change from  moment to moment in the form of a "continuity" comprised of past, present, and future) is not there. (There is no continuity as there is only a single instant).
When, within that single instant, we look for a thing, we find only non-thing parts - hence, that so-called "thing" is not there.
And when we look at those parts referred to as "self" in the theory of self, we find that each of them is not self - hence, that so-called "self" is not there.
And since none of those parts is "self", neither can any part be owned by a self - because there is no self there which could own any part.

How it's related to my question?

Anatta:

Is the reality that we cannot control the nature of Anicca and the
  result of it(Dkkha).

Sunya:

That mean nothing could gain from it. That hasnt any advantage towards
  the way of Nibbana.

What is the source of quotes?

Btw, nibbāna is also suñña (see Patisambhidamagga ch. XX, on aggasuññaṃ and sampajānassa pavattapariyādānaṃ sabbasuññatānaṃ paramatthasuññaṃ).