text:
Words of the Buddha
This question is motivated by a comment from another user. Highlights in the quote are made by me. It's written:

"You have no reason to believe that any words of the Buddha are preserved except uncritical acceptance of traditional narratives. There are some Buddhist words, but to attribute them to the Buddha is simple, blind religious faith. If your criteria is practical application, then your question is meaningless in any case. You can verify the truth of the quotations by putting them into practice. Why have you not done so?".

My questions are:

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?
What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?
Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

Perhaps to avoid asking a 'leading question', I suggest rewording this to ask three questions: 1) What reasons are there, for believing (that some words of the historical Buddha are preserved)? 2) What reasons are there for not believing ...? 3) Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

Thanks Chris. I have reworded the question using your examples.

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

I can think of three reasons:

blind faith - believing it to be true without any rational reason to believe.
argument from authority - believing it to be true because of the authority of the tradition that has preserved the teachings
argument from the nature of the teachings - believing it to be true because the teachings accord with expectations of the calibre to be expected from a Buddha

I think only the third argument holds much weight in this instance. It can be divided into two categories as well:

that the teachings are so ostensibly profound as to convince one who reads/listens to them that only an enlightened being could have being their author;
that the teachings, when practiced, lead one to enlightenment, thereby providing evidence to the practitioner of the enlightenment of their author.

Either of these seems a reasonable argument for claiming that Buddhist teachings come from the Buddha himself.

What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

It's easy to find reasons for doubting if you're looking for them... even if they are not actually there.
Of course, all of this ignores that fact that historical authenticity isn't really of any intrinsic value. What is important is the quality of the teachings; that is what should really be up for debate. As the Buddha said, "Come! See!"

Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

I don't think the jataka commentaries claim to be the words of the Buddha; they are retellings of the stories that the verses (which are claimed to be the words of the Buddha) are supposed to be based upon. Same goes for the dhammapada stories.

It seems to me that this answer is unbalanced. You say "It's easy to find reasons for doubting if you're looking for them" but you don't engage with any of them. Thus your answer gives the appearance of suggesting there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the Buddhist texts, when in fact there are many quite valid reasons. If the historical authenticity of the texts had no "intrinsic value" the question would come up repeatedly, but of course it does. People ehipassiko, but apparently none become arahants. Hence the questions.

The goal of the Buddhist councils is to preserve the word of the Buddha and to remove alien elements. They are headed by enlightened monks. So the faith in the scriptures isn't blind.

I summarised the problems with Buddhist history in an essay entitled The Very Idea of Buddhist History.

There is only one reason to believe that Buddhist text are the words of the Buddha. It is because the Buddhist tradition says they are. There is no other reason.

Reasons for not believing are more numerous.

When we talk about the historical Buddha for example there is no corroborating evidence from another tradition that he existed. Buddhist texts mention the Jain leader, Mahāvīra, or at least we think they do. They never use the name Mahāvīra but do refer to a person called Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta whose views are very similar to the early Jains. See The Dictionary of Pali Names sv Nigantha. However Jain texts don't return the favour. Nor do the late Vedic texts record anyone called "Buddha". They do record many Gautamas, since the original Gotama was one of the ṛṣis who wrote the Ṛgveda, but not our Gautama. This is particularly surprising since Brahmins were frequently mentioned in Buddhist texts and they were actively composing new texts at the time. The first solid evidence for Buddhism is a brief mention in one of the inscriptions left by Asoka, ca. 250 BCE.
As far as the name Siddhartha Gautama is concerned, the Pāḷi version of the first name Siddhattha is never used of the Buddha in the Pāḷi Suttas. The name is a later invention. Indeed it had competition in the early Sanskrit Buddhist texts like the Mahāvāstu and Lalitavistara which tended to call him Sarvarthasiddha instead. What's more, as mentioned, Gautama is a high status Brahmin gotra (roughly "clan") name. Gotra names were used to mediate exogamous marriages. There is no obvious way that a non-Brahmin of that time, and of that culture which was not even part of the Vedic milieu, could have had a name like Gautama. If the name was adopted by the family, then it is strange that neither the Buddha's father nor any of his male relatives are ever called Gautama. It is even more strange that the Buddha's mother and maternal aunt were called Gautamī. Māyā wouldn't have changed her name at marriage. So it's possible that she as Prajāpatī were called Gautama and married into the Śākya family. Both Māyā and Prajāpatī are also distinctively Brahmanical names. The suttas have nothing to say on these matters. But the upshot is that we do not know with any certainty what the name of the historical Buddha was. I discuss this at length in an as yet unpublished article: Siddhārtha Gautama: What's in a Name?
What's more there are at least two biographical traditions about the early life of the Buddha. The standard narrative says that he is a prince, married with a child, his mother is dead, and leaves home in the middle of the night. And the alternative in the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta tells us he is a youth, does not mention any wife of child, and his parents are both still alive and present when he leaves. Since it is less familiar here is the Paḷi, with my translation.

So kho ahaṃ, bhikkhave, aparena samayena daharova samāno susukāḷakeso, bhadrena yobbanena samannāgato paṭhamena vayasā akāmakānaṃ mātāpitūnaṃ assumukhānaṃ rudantānaṃ kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajiṃ. [M i.163]
At a later time, though still only a boy, with much black hair, in the first stage of life, and endowed with youth and good fortune; with my mother and father unwilling, tearful and wailing, I cut off my hair and beard, donned brown robes, and went forth from home, into homelessness.

The contraction cannot be easily revolved. I've discussed the contradiction and it's implications in an essay called: The Buddha's Biography.
A minor point is that the Pāḷi Canon is almost certainly a translation. No one spoke Pāli as a mother tongue, it was a lingua franca created for the purpose of recording the Buddhist texts. Of course it was probably very like the Prakrit or vernacular languages spoken in the region at the time. The Canon has quite clearly been edited and added to at different periods. Another problem is that by their own admission the texts were preserved orally for something like three centuries before being written down in Sri Lanka, ca. 100 BC. In other words the texts were preserved as stories told and retold. The dynamics of this kind of transmission are explored by Bhikkhu Anālayo in a paper called: Oral Dimensions of Pāli Discourses: Pericopes, other Mnemonic Techniques and the Oral Performance Context. It's clear when one reads the suttas that they are made up of modules - a bit like lego bricks. One meets the same bricks again and again in different contexts. This is typical of a story telling tradition. But it does not guarantee verbal fidelity. The best we could hope with three centuries of oral tradition, is that the suttas contain the gist of the what the Buddha, if he existed, might have said.
Another problem is that the Pāḷi Canon is inconsistent in some respects that make it unlikely to have been composed by one philosophical genius. For example dependent arising says

imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti... imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.
when this exists, that exist... when this ceases, that ceases.

This means that when the condition ceases the effect must cease at the same time or immediately afterwards (this is implied by the grammatical form of the statement - a locative absolute using present participles). However for karma to work the effect (vipāka) must manifest long after the action (kamma)
has ceased. This problem was noticed by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd Century (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.6). Another (topical) inconsistency is that between metaphysics and morality. The metaphysical insistence on the impossibility of personal continuity because there is no substantial entity to persist (anattā) contracts with the explicit personal continuity in the Jātakas and some suttas. These inconsistencies undermine the idea of the historical Buddha was we read about him in the texts.
Most of the innovations in Buddhist theory and practice have been because Buddhists have found the earlier accounts intellectually flawed and practically unworkable. The question of authenticity comes up constantly. Modern day Buddhists still compose apologetics for the authenticity of the suttas.
Over all what we see when we look with an open mind is a series of not entirely consistent stories about a traditional, legendary figure. His name is unknown, nor the language he spoke. Details of his biography are sketchy and contradictory. The literature which we take to be authoritative are characteristic of an oral, story telling body of traditional stories. The doctrines that we take to be the unifying factor of Buddhism on closer inspection turn out to be internally inconsistent (according to Nāgāruna anyway). We note that the Buddha was protagonist in our stories performed magic and miracles at times and that such stories are not distinguished from historical facts. And there is no external corroborations for any of the facts (which ever version of events we think are the authentic version).
If we are intellectually honest we have to admit that we know nothing at all about the Buddha for certain. There is doubt about every detail, about every word.
There are those who claim that we can trust the word of the Buddha because when put into practice the techniques work, for example Bhikkhu Yuttadhammo makes this claim in his answer to this question. In fact this is also rather doubtful. After 2500 years of practising what purport to be the very techniques employed by the Buddha, places like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand ought to be overflowing with arahants and every other person ought to be a stream entrant. But in fact there are at present no confirmed arahants in the world (I'm reliably informed that Daniel Ingram has recanted his claim). In which case the techniques in the suttas clearly do not work. Or at best they work rather partially to make people more relaxed about being unenlightened. If the suttas "worked" then many people would be arahants presently. So this argument from experience fails.
In the final analysis those people - both lay and scholars - who argue for the authenticity of the Buddhist texts either have to redefine "authenticity" to mean something less than 100% authentic; or admit that they are not willing to accept the facts and simply believe it to be so. In which case they are the same as religious people everywhere who just happen to believe that their teachings are the God's Honest Truth.
Which is not to say that the methods of Buddhism are not valuable. They are valuable. Extremely so. Just not in the way that the tradition or Traditionalists claim they are.

There are several references to the Buddha in Hinduism. In the Ariyapariyesana sutta, the Buddha was referring to his step mother Mahapajapati Gotami who breastfed and raised prince Siddhartha as her own child.
It is said that during the Anuradhapura era, there were many Arahants in Sri Lanka. But as time went by, those who can understand the Dhamma quickly and easily have already attained enlightenment.
Also, there's no scientific way to prove enlightenment. So even if you meet an Arahant face to face, you wouldn't know

Hinduism is the invention of the British in the 19th century. The word Hindu before that simply meant "Indian". And these references are all in late texts. They are mostly talking about Viṣṇu, as the Vaiṣṇava cult has assimilated Buddhism, and this happened very late. In the Ariyapariyesana the Buddha is clearly not refering to his "aunt", but to mātāpitā 'mother & father' - there's a word for stepmother and he doesn't use it. Indeed Pajapati is not mentioned. Explaining away the apparent absence of Arahants just proves my point.

Pali was the mother tongue of people of Magadha kingdom and nearby kingdoms around Magadha at the time of Buddha. It was not created later. The point is historically incorrect and misleading. The comment that we know nothing at all is also extremely misleading. There is undeniable archeological and historical evidence about Buddha and his teachings. In fact, there is more evidence about Buddha and his teachings than almost any other tradition (philosophical and religious) of that time period.

Lies don't help, @HomagetoManjushri, please stop spreading them.

The question placed an unrealistic burden on the answerer. It is couched in the context of modern society where it is possible to have high fidelity/authenticity with regards to what’s been said and done. To insist that one can only trust a body of knowledge when it is captured verbatim or written down by the original founder/discoverer/inventor do a great deal of injustice to all the knowledge accumulated throughout history.
Similarly, our concepts of authenticity and fidelity by modern standards would be strange and bewildering to the people who lived during the Buddha’s time. If I go back in time to confront a villager who claimed to have heard the Buddha’s sermons and insisted that he guaranteed what he heard is word for word from the Buddha, he’ll probably think I’m mad.
Much of Greek philosophy survived in part due to Arabic translations. Even algebra would not be acceptable if one insists on believing this knowledge if, and only if, we can verify the original sources. As we know that the Arabs got much of their inspirations on algebra from different civilizations like Greek, Egyptian and Indian.
Nonetheless, why are ancient Greek philosophy and algebra important and why can they be trusted? They are important because of their contributions to modern civilisation (science, philosophy, arts and politics). They can be trusted because they can be validated.
To establish authenticity in a dogmatic manner requires either a time machine or technology that captured audio-video recordings of the Buddha and is passed on till modern days (you can replace the Buddha in this statement with Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras and so on). Above all, authenticity is not the most important concern, a knowledge should also be evaluated on its contribution to humanity. We should borrow the examples of philosophy and algebra above by asking a) what is the Dharma’s contributions to modern civilization and b) can it be validated?
I leave the above questions to those who think they are the final authority on the matter. Lastly, I believe to know if a student understand algebra, you should be able to solve algebraic questions yourself in order to test the student. Would a skeptic to a particular body of knowledge fall under this category? I have my doubts.

Beautifully highlighting a problem with a question like this via precise counter/mirror questioning.

OP asked:

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some
suttas more than others?

The first good news is that a whole book has been written to answer these questions.
It's The Authenticity of the Early Buddhist Texts by Venerables Ajahn Sujato and Ajahn Brahmali.
The second good news is that the whole book is available for download, for free, in the PDF format.
The Abstract states:

This work articulates and defends a single thesis: that the Early
Buddhist Texts originated in the lifetime of the Buddha or a little
later, because they were, in the main, spoken by the Buddha and his
contemporary disciples. This is the most simple, natural, and
reasonable explanation for the evidence.
Our argument covers two main areas:

The grounds for distinguishing the Early Buddhist Texts (EBTs) from later Buddhist literature;

The evidence that the EBTs stem from close to the Buddha’s lifetime, and that they were generally spoken by the historical
Buddha.

Most academic scholars of Early Buddhism cautiously affirm that it is
possible that the EBTs contain some authentic sayings of the Buddha.
We contend that this drastically understates the evidence. A
sympathetic assessment of relevant evidence shows that it is very
likely that the bulk of the sayings in the EBTs that are attributed to
the Buddha were actually spoken by him. It is very unlikely that most
of these sayings are inauthentic.

A book written by a couple of Buddhist monks which, miraculously, "proves" that their faith is True, is not worth the paper it is written on. What else were they going to say?
They, for example, assume that "the historical Buddha" is a meaningful phrase. In what sense is the Buddha "historical" when we cannot link him to any historical event or fact. Rather, the Buddha is the protagonist in a series of religious stories, written by generations of religious fanatics who give up sex, family, work, eating after midday, and wearing trousers.

Its always interesting to observe how few internet Buddhists have taken formal refuge in the Dhamma. If a person has taken refuge in the Dhamma, they understand the following Refuge verse is all that matters.

‘svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opaneyyiko paccattaṁ veditabbo viññūhī’ti;
‘The teaching is well explained by the Buddha — visible in the here & now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, leading onwards, to be  experienced individually by the wise for themselves.’
AN 10.92

Pali morning chanting here
Again, from MN 38

Inappropriate Questions Avoided
"Knowing thus and seeing thus, would you say, 'The Teacher is our
respected mentor. We speak thus out of respect for the Teacher'?"
"No, lord."
"Knowing thus and seeing thus, would you say, 'The Contemplative says
this. We speak thus in line with the Contemplative's words'?"
"No, lord."
"Is it the case that you speak simply in line with what you have
known, seen & understood for yourselves?"
"Yes, lord."
"Good, monks. You have been guided by me in this Dhamma which is to be
seen here & now, timeless, inviting verification, pertinent, to be
realized by the observant for themselves. For it has been said, 'This
Dhamma is to be seen here & now, timeless, inviting verification,
pertinent, to be by the observant for themselves,' and it was in
reference to this that it was said.


text:
Is Nirvana redundant?
I'm confused over Buddhism's lack of afterlife, yet belief in rebirth.

If there is no soul, how can there be rebirth?
What happens to the five aggregates after death?
Consciousness in Nibbana

From reading answers given on this site, there is no rebirth of the self or consciousness. Logically then any concern of either suffering from bad karma in a next life, or being reborn as an animal is unwarranted.
Although apparently death leads to rebirth, Nirvana appears futile as life will continue to reproduce unhindered. Life is far more effective at producing more life than death is.
What does Nirvana offer that death does not? It would seem they both lead to oblivion.

It's not that Buddhists believe in rebirth, it's that Buddhists don't believe in death.

The question of what happens to a tathāgata after death is said to be avyākata or "unexplained". We know, negatively, that they do not undergo rebirth, since that is explicit, but we have no positive knowledge.
The question of how rebirth can work with no medium of continuity is not a trivial one. It has consumed Buddhist philosophers for centuries and we still debate the finer points.
For example, an orthodox Theravādin would say that each moment of mental activity is short lived and acts as a condition for the next moment. The last moment of mental activity (cuticitta) gives rise to a moment of consciousness somewhere else (paṭisandhicitta). But the Sarvāstivādins pointed out that the transition could not be instantaneous. The Theravādins had to insist it was instantaneous because any break in the stream would prevent the connection of causes to effects. The Sarvāstivādins had to invent a kind of interim realm (anatarābhava) which was not a rebirth, but which could account for the time it took for the citta to get from one to the next body). Unfortunately neither theory really explains rebirth. In the end there is no Buddhist description of conditionality that is entirely compatible with rebirth.
So you have hit upon a real weakness in Buddhist doctrine. And what we see is that in Buddhists texts where the message is about morality, a quite explicit personal continuity is implied that is quite at odds with the metaphysics of dependent arising. In fact Buddhists seem to switch back and forth between denying continuity and stressing the consequences of actions without noticing the howling contradiction.
The question of the five aggregates is also non-trivial. These have typically been seen as summing up all the physical and mental phenomena of existence (Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary). An important contribution to understanding the khandhas was made by Dr Sue Hamilton in two Books, the most accessible of which is Early Buddhism: A New Approach. In these books Dr Hamilton shared the results of studying every reference to khandhas in the Pāḷi suttas. Firstly they seemed to have nothing to do with existence. Dr Hamilton argued that the khandhas were more like the factors of experience. Indeed she influentially argued that Buddhist texts in general were commenting on experience rather than existence (or reality).
It can be useful to ask what the Buddhist texts refer to when they say that "things arise independence on causes". What is meant by things. A careful reading of Buddhist texts shows that was is mainly meant is dhammas - the objects of the mind sense (manas). Sometimes this is metaphorically linked to the world (loka), meaning "the world of experience" and sometimes to dukkha, which in this case is equivalent to unenlightened experience.
Now the Kaccānagotta Sutta (SN 12.15) says of this world of experience that talking about it in terms of existence (atthi) or non-existence (n'atthi). when experiences arise, it's not that experience exists or doesn't. It arises and it passes away. We have an experience and then it's gone. What was it that could have existed? Since the khandhas are just the factors, or even processes that make up experience, they have the same characteristics. The don't exist while you have an experience, or cease to exist when the experience stops. Experience is presence without substance. This is why experience is likened to a soap bubble, a dream, etc.
Nirvāṇa only really makes sense in an intellectual milieu in which rebirth is a given and seen as something to be avoided. But as prof. Richard Hayes once said:

“And if there is no rebirth, then the very goal of attaining nirvāṇa, understood as the cessation of rebirth, becomes almost perfectly meaningless. Or rather, nirvāṇa comes automatically to every living being that dies, regardless of how that being has lived.” (Hayes 1993: 13)*

For many of us who are engaged with both tradition and modernity this poses a major problem. It is apparent that there can be no rebirth under the known natural laws of universe. And yet this statement appears to disembowel traditional Buddhism and make it meaningless. And yet in the face of this theoretical argument, many people find Buddhist practices very helpful in many different kinds of ways. Whether or not there is rebirth, the practice of meditation, puja, mantra chanting, etc remains. As yet there is no very good way of explaining why we would still call this Buddhism. Maybe in the future we won't. Some people who think like this call themselves Secular Buddhists. Other labels are being tried.

Hayes, Richard (1993). ‘Dharmakīrti on punarbhava’ In Egaku Maeda (ed), Studies in Original Buddhism and Mahayāna Buddhism. Kyōto: Nagata Bunshodo. Volume One, p. 111–30.

"No afterlife" means, from a Buddhist perspective, that there is no ego-centered identity to experience that afterlife. After life, the ego entity created by the human mind is no more but the consciousness in which that individual was operating in never dies.
As Andrei_Volkov answered, the Buddhist perspective likens consciousness to a vast ocean. The Five Aggregates are what happens as consciousness becomes embroiled and enmeshed in straits and currents, like tidepools on the coastline where water can be "trapped". If it mixes with pollutants here, it will still contain them if swallowed by a stork or channeled elsewhere. This is karma and it is a causative process stretching infinitely.
The human brain reasons and automates judgement which can blind one and veil true causation and the true nature of things. For instance, the human brain contains two dedicated regions in the parietal lobe: one to keep track of the body's boundaries ("elbow: check! nose: check! right arm: check!..." and another to keep track of the body in space. These regions greatly contribute to the human sense of ego or I-ness or self. There is no afterlife for this sense of self that is delimited by skin and bound in space. However, consciousness channeled through the eddies of the individual will forever return to the ocean (rebirth) carrying the traces of its course (the five aggregates).
Nirvana, the great blowing or washing out, is only possible when the water returns to its pure and primordial state. Death will always accompany life, and to the Buddhist death is only a turning point on a great wheel of eternity. Nirvana refers to the complete freedom, beyond conception. Nirvana is not a possibility only after death. Despite the rendering of the phrase "to enter Nirvana", it is not an "arrival" like you die and you go there instead of somewhere else. It is freedom from the perspective that otherwise glues consciousness to life, but in an ultimate sense - not a temporary conceptualization within an individual mind's understanding.
To explicitly answer your question, Nirvana offers nothing -- and death doesn't exist -- it begets more life. Like night and day, they are just vantages from a stationary point on the rotating earth. The sun just shines and gravity just propels and it makes a whole horse-and-pony show out of next to nothing. Again, Nirvana offers nothing.

Hi and welcome to Buddhism SE. We have put together a Guide and a Resource section for new users that you might find useful.

From Buddhist perspective, consciousness is not an entity. Instead, life is like the sea, with currents mixing and separating all the time. In that sea of life, there is rebirth of hangups (pathological preconceptions) - and with them comes the rebirth of suffering patterns. That's the perspective.
Nirvana is better than death because

A. you can be free from suffering while still alive, and
B. the lives downstream will not inherit your share of ignorance-suffering and will hopefully inherit some wisdom-freedom.

When it looks as though someone has died, the someone is  really just experiencing  another change and then is changed(rebirth). Death and rebirth is just change. When we are alive, we die and are reborn ever moment in the form of changes in the mind-body. Nirvana means you have let go of everything, even your desire to exist or not to exist. So the difference between Nibbana and death is that one has to desire to understand the reality of the body and mind's experience to achieve Nibbana because otherwise we will desire to go on existing and dying. The only requirement for death is birth.

The Buddha never ever taught the concept of " emptiness" (all phenomena is empty of inherent existence). This concept was added by later Buddhist schools hundreds of years after the Buddha died. The Buddha taught that all phenomenon is empty of self because the self transcends all phenomenon. If this were not so, then the self woul be temporal and we would all be up s creek without a paddle.This realization is Nirvana, and because Nirvana exists, you have hope of escape from eternal suffering of samsara and this life is not a tale told by an idiot.

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Is it only a matter of time before expected feelings of "remorse or shame or guilt" surface during meditation?
Approaching yr68, I have committed my share of unwholesome conduct over the years, the typical errors of middle-class youth and adulthood in this USofA. I've been practicing sitting meditation for close to two years, and am most comfortable with Theravada vipassana  concepts and practices, though I have not taken lay Buddhist vows. I generally sit "with the breath" for one hour most every day, some days see two sessions. I have not yet realized "access concentration". I am perplexed that I never have feelings of remorse or shame or guilt over past deeds arise during sitting, and only rarely have I experienced strong feelings of gratitude or happiness. Might I assume that it is only a matter of time before "the stuff hits the fan" and I find myself overwhelmed with "remorse or shame or guilt" during sitting meditation?

I'd suggest that no-one can predict what comes next for someone in meditation. Perhaps there is 'stuff' that has yet to arise into consciousness, but if there is, there's no point trying to 'predict' what it is. That would just be unhelpful speculation.
I'd say, if you stick with sensing what is in your physical experience in a kindly way, if there's something there, it'll make itself known. In the meantime, just enjoy the practice :-)

Something might surface at some point in time. Maybe in this life, maybe in the next or maybe in future lives.
Maybe something from earlier in this life will surface, maybe something from last life or maybe something from previous lives.
It's not really that important to speculate what comes up at what time since that will only serve to take us out of the present momement.
Until one is enlightened then every moment is either a kamma-receiving-moment or a kamma-making-moment. When receiving kamma it's like being dealt a fistful of cards. Now it's up to oneself to play that hand of cards in the most skillful and beneficial way. Here we have the noble eightfold path to guide us.
Don't worry too much about what comes up or if anything comes up. Just keep practicing so that you are fit for fight when/if something comes up.
One important thing in Vipassana meditation is to treat all phenomena equally. No matter what arises, you treat it the same. Nothing is more or less important than something else. Everything is of equal importance.

Now is the time to take lay Buddhist wows. Try to keep them.
If you can, your "concentration" will develop gradually.
If you success to keep them, then try to take advance steps.
The order is as follows,
FAITH (Saddhā)  GIVING (Dāna)   VIRTUE (Sīla)   MIND (Bhāvanā)  WISDOM (Paññā)
refer House Holder Buddhism.

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text:
How does craving (taṇhā) relate to neutral feelings?
How does craving (taṇhā) manifest with respect to neutral feelings?
In Dependent Origination (or dependent co-arising, however you'd like to call it), it is said that Craving (taṇhā) follows on the heels of Feeling (vedanā). Feeling, in general, is of 3 main types: pleasant, unpleasant, neutral.
I do see how craving/aversion manifests with respect to both pleasant and unpleasant feeling. But how does it relate to neutral feeling? How is it that I either lust after or try to avoid something that is truly neutral?

There is more subtlety to the mind's relationship to feelings than only craving or aversion. The Vedanās and the underlying tendencies that arise are described in the Pahana Sutta (SN 36.3) like this:

In the case of pleasant feelings, O monks, the underlying tendency to lust should be given up; in the case of painful feelings, the underlying tendency to resistance (aversion) should be given up; in the case of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings, the underlying tendency to ignorance should be given up. Pahana Sutta: Giving Up

Neutral feeling can give rise to boredom, restlessness and confusion which are clearly obstacles to insight and equanimity.

Taṇhā doesn't automatically have to relate to neutral feelings. Remember, the twelve links of dependent origination are talking about nessisary causation, not sufficient causation, so when the Buddha says

[W]ith feeling as condition, craving [comes to be]

the meaning is that feeling is necessary for craving to arise, and without feeling, craving can never arise. But it does not mean that if there is feeling, craving will always arise.

That's a very good point. The source texts continually surprise me with how explicitly logical and complete they are.

Neutral feeling can be course in two ways. for normally it course to ignorance (creates Ego). for Buddhas(pure minds) it is not course to ignorance .
For eg. Normal person feels Neutral feeling as i feel.(something).  but for Buddhas its only feeling.

Craving can arise in respect to any type of feeling.
There there three types of craving (tanha), namely, craving for sensual pleasures (kama-tanha), craving to be (bhava-tanha) and craving not to be (vibhava-tanha) - SN 56.11.
The word 'craving' is not the opposite of the word 'aversion'. To the contrary, 'aversion' is a type of craving, namely, craving not to be.
Thus, MN 148 says there can be 'gratification' or 'lust' towards neutral feeling.

When one is touched by a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, if one
does not understand as it actually is the origination, the
disappearance, the gratification (assāda), the danger and the escape in regard
to that feeling, then the underlying tendency to ignorance lies within
one.
MN 148


text:
Right livelihood - how many cutouts is enough?
Slaughtering an animal for meat or a  person for wealth is not right livelihood, nor is it right to pay someone else to do so. So far, so good.
Modern corporations allow individuals to amass more wealth and power than Genghis Khan while not having to lead the charge from up front.
It's easy and direct enough to link Genghis Khan to the invasion of Eurasia, but it's nearly impossible to link a billionaire to a war in Iraq or Congo, though it is common knowledge that the modern economic system since colonial times promotes wars in natural resource rich parts of the world  all the time for economic gain.
The billionaire beneficiary is often on a yacht thousands of miles away, while ordering the war through middle men, board room decisions, corporate interests, political lobbyists and hedge funds.
Such specifically designed to be tenuous connections to the scene of the violence allow the shot caller to even forget there's violence.
Kind of like how when people pick up shrink wrapped meat in a supermarket it's a very different sterile experience from going out into the backyard with a cleaver and a cackling hen and returning with bloody hands.
Even in his time the Buddha did not criticize wars or say being a king isn't right livelihood. So where's the line in the sand, how many intermediaries does it take to make the wrong right?

As I understand the Buddhist approach to ethics we are all responsible for our own actions, and the Buddha defined significant actions as "intention" (AN 6.63 cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi). It is the impact of our intention that is under our influence (control would be too strong a word).
How well we understand something like the food chain will be dependent on how much effort we put in. Clearly meat always comes from dead animals. More subtly we know that animals are often mistreated in the production of food. So free range eggs most likely involve less cruelty than battery eggs. Diary products always involve killing off most of the male calves very early, and rennet for cheese often comes from the stomachs of those same calves. A little research can reveal much about such things.  But ignorance is also a karmically significant intention, especially if it is based on laziness or deliberate shying away from the truth. Intending to remain ignorant so as to continue to enjoy a sensory pleasure is an unskilful action.
On the whole we have little influence beyond our own actions. We may have some influence on our intimates, but even that is limited. The point of application of Buddhist ethics is our own mind. We certainly have little influence over billionaires. But then the theory of karma supposedly takes care of this. We take care of our karma and karma takes care of the problem of the actions of others. Everyone gets the fate they have worked towards. The multi-life perspective allows for localised unfairness to persist because the afterlife sorts out the discrepancy between action and reward/punishment.
Of course these ideas of morality were conceived in an environment with very short food chains - most people probably knew the source of their food. The rich directly exploited their serfs for wealth, but this was pretty much out in the open.
And of course bhikkhus (literally "beggars") made a decision to accept whatever food they were given, excepting only when they knew that an animal had been killed specifically for the. So the bhikkhu purposefully distances themselves from knowledge of the food chain and accepts whatever comes. The morality of this seems moot from a modern point of view. Accepting alms from someone who is am arms dealer for example, would seem to be unethical.
I'm not sure it's true that the Buddha did not criticise war. He did tend to stay out of politics. But for example in the opening pages of the Mahānibbāna Sutta he subtlety dissuades Ajātasattu from attacking the Vajjis. And keep in mind that the tradition says that Ajātasattu had already tried to assassinate the Buddha. in any case the Buddhist texts are unequivocal in denouncing violence. And war is only violence on a larger scale.

I can appreciate why the Buddha didn't believe in using his position for social reform, like perhaps encouraging the many kings who worshipped him to give up war.
The problem with social reform is it doesn't address the root of the problem. It can result in a superficial change - but the underlying mental conditions that caused the problem remain intact.
For example, take the racial integration movement in America - after a long and hard fought struggle there's a modicum of equality and respect for the African American community, but the engine of hate in American society remains intact and has found new targets - like gays or Muslims or fat people - essentially anyone noticeably different and vulnerable.
This isn't isolated, I am unable to find a single example where social reform changed the underlying psychological condition that caused it. The dirt merely got swept under the carpet to emerge sooner or later in a different place.
Perhaps the Buddha struggled with this too, because he didn't totally stay away from attempting social reform. "Don't butcher your own meat or cause it to be butchered" seems like one of the well meaning attempts, but in the light of over two millennia of evidence it is safe to say, it has largely failed even though there were a few isolated periods where it worked.
There is no room for reform if people don't fundamentally change. Change has to be at the individual level, not at the social level. They have to become deeply aware of their intentions leading to actions, and optimise their existence for freedom from suffering.
Where the Buddha or Buddhists did attempt social reform it has become farcically tragi-comic. Some Asian Buddhists release birds to gain merit, except it produces a thriving trade in trapping birds to sell to Buddhists. Likewise, since slaughter is against Buddhist ethics butchers in Thailand are generally from the Muslim minority. Neither attempt at social reform actually works as intended.
This isn't a purely Buddhist finding. It is a very Indian sentiment. In the Bhagavad Gita, Lord Krishna doesn't ask Arjuna to stop being a warrior or give up fighting, for he knows that his destiny in this life is to be a warrior. However, he teaches him to stop reacting to pain and pleasure with aversion and desire. As far as I know, nothing is ever said of what happened to Arjuna in later life times, but if he did follow the teachings of Krishna, I imagine he became a non-violent person in a few lifetimes.
I was hoping to trigger a reexamination of platforms like right livelihood with this question - because too often I see examples of arms trade or butchery as proscribed activities, but both continue to happen in Buddhist lands.
My personal view is intentions matter. Right livelihood isn't so automatic as not being a butcher or arms dealer. Many people are looking for a table of modern professions with a checkbox of wrongness or rightness next to it. That's never going to happen because it is a doomed exercise. After all, these days a company like Monsanto can even turn selling farm supplies into an unethical profession.

FYI I have more than one non-Buddhist neighbour who kills their own farm animals, and won't buy animal products from the supermarket: they say that their own animals have a good life and a stress-free death, unlike animals which/who are farmed, transported, and slaughtered commercially.

I know those who can't stand the sight of blood and like to share videos of cute animals, but neither stops them from digging into meat. Likewise, I have seen people speak at length about the environment and then speak about looking forward to their holiday at the other end of the world. :-)

Consider this: the billionaire is not an entirely independent decision-maker. He too is a subject to the corporation's interests, not an absolute sovereign. The life of a billionaire is only as pleasant as it aligns with the needs of his god, the corporation.
As long as billionaire's life revolves around his corporation, it may resemble paradise as far as physical comfort. But that is no freedom. It's not what you imagine it is. You could say the billionaire is possessed by the corporation, not the other way around. Naturally, since corporation involves extracting profit - money being its blood -- some of it is used to keep the human puppet (the billionaire) on the hook.
As far as karma is concerned, a corporation itself is a sum total of karma created by a huge number of people: consumers, vendors, partners, investors, politicians, etc -- it is a living embodiment of their karma. Your question is, with corporations doing much harm, to what extent should their human agents expect retribution. The answer is, it does come, though not always immediately but over the course of many lives. Some of today's harm being done by corporations is fruition of karma performed 2-3 hundred years ago or more!
Karma is like a heavy wheel rolling, there is a lot of inertia passed on from generation to generation. The king may temporarily enjoy being the head of the dragon but if his karma is of such nature that fruits as negative experience, it will fruit as negative experience in this life or in future lives, you can count on that.

Corporations, software, technology and bots throw up so many twists on old problems. For example right speech would be refraining from breaking bad news to someone who's engaged in a dangerous operation like driving on a highway - yet with cell phones and other tech lots of people experience unintended consequences like that all the time. I'm reminded of Marshall McLuhan's "The Medium is the massage".

My thinking on this is along the lines of, a king isn't only functioning as a general for his people; he (should) be maintaining social order, providing aid to those in need, providing security to his people. And if he is acting morally, should be defending his people from invasion if the situation arises and is unavoidable.
In this way, as not to disturb the social order, I would imagine the Buddha did not speak against the "agency" of kingship, but rather probably tried to impress upon the royalty the need for morality and skillful means.
It is clear to see, I believe, with this in mind, the distinction between a king, and a billionaire on a yacht orchestrating foreign conflicts to drive up profit margins.

Billionaires would say the same - they offer jobs to thousands, and products people love. They are acting on behalf of people too. Charity contributions and art are often funded by such people.

Here is a quote on "Right Livelihood" from the book "The Noble Eightfold Path" by Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, p. 55-56:

Right Livelihood (samma ajiva)
Right livelihood is concerned with ensuring that one earns one’s living in a righteous way. For a lay disciple the Buddha teaches that wealth should be gained in accordance with certain standards. One should acquire it only by legal means, not illegally; one should acquire it peacefully, without coercion or violence; one should acquire it honestly, not by trickery or deceit; and one should acquire it in ways which do not entail harm and suffering for others.
The Buddha mentions five specific kinds of livelihood which bring harm to others and are therefore to be avoided: dealing in weapons, in living beings (including raising animals for slaughter as well as slave trade and prostitution), in meat production and butchery, in poisons, and in intoxicants (AN 5:177). He further names several dishonest means of gaining wealth which fall under wrong livelihood: practicing deceit, treachery, soothsaying, trickery, and usury (MN 117). Obviously any occupation that requires violation of right speech and right action is a wrong form of livelihood, but other occupations, such as selling weapons or intoxicants, may not violate those factors and yet be wrong because of their consequences for others.
The Thai treatise discusses the positive aspects of right livelihood under the three convenient headings of rightness regard- ing actions, rightness regarding persons, and rightness regarding objects. “Rightness regarding actions” means that workers should fulfill their duties diligently and conscientiously, not idling away time, claiming to have worked longer hours than they did, or pocketing the company’s goods. “Rightness regarding persons” means that due respect and consideration should be shown to employers, employees, colleagues, and customers.
An employer, for example, should assign his workers chores according to their ability, pay them adequately, promote them when they deserve a promotion and give them occasional vacations and bonuses. Colleagues should try to cooperate rather than compete, while merchants should be equitable in their dealings with customers. “Rightness regarding objects” means that in business transactions and sales the articles to be sold should be presented truthfully. There should be no deceptive advertising, misrepresentations of quality or quantity, or dishonest manoeuvers.

There are 3 important points here:

One should acquire it only by legal means, not illegally; one should acquire it peacefully, without coercion or violence; one should acquire it honestly, not by trickery or deceit; and one should acquire it in ways which do not entail harm and suffering for others.

He further names several dishonest means of gaining wealth which fall under wrong livelihood: practicing deceit, treachery, soothsaying, trickery, and usury (MN 117). Obviously any occupation that requires violation of right speech and right action is a wrong form of livelihood, but other occupations, such as selling weapons or intoxicants, may not violate those factors and yet be wrong because of their consequences for others.

“Rightness regarding objects” means that in business transactions and sales the articles to be sold should be presented truthfully. There should be no deceptive advertising, misrepresentations of quality or quantity, or dishonest manoeuvers.

One more thing to add to all this is the intention / volition behind the actions.
If a billionaire acts in a way that violates the above mentioned points then it would, according to the text, make it wrong livelihood.

I don't think illegality is a good test. In fact, winning in business is socially sanctioned violence. Whenever we humans depend on external things for happiness we will use violence to protect it. Self defence, defence of the family, of the realm etc. is essentially this, defending what gives us identity and makes us happy. Rich people, at least those willing to persist at something until they make billions derive happiness more from money and status than most humans.

Most normal humans would stop and take it easy or give wealth away after a few millions, a billion is a lot of money. Unfortunately there are more people out there to steal money or take away business success than there are people who want to destroy families and so on. So a billionaire defending his profit is as justified as a man defending his farm.

If we try to sum it up isn't it then wrong livelihood is the actions are based on the 3 unwholesome roots, i.e. greed, hatred and delusion?

Is slaughtering a chicken for hunger greed, hatred or delusion?

I would say that it was rooted in hatred because one has to give rise to unwholesome mind states in order to take another beings life.

Is it still hatred if I buy it in the supermarket?

It's a good question my friend. I would say no because if one goes to buy it in the supermarket then one does not have any intentions of hatred or killing. One does not give rise to unwholesome mind states in order to buy the meat. If one has to kill the animal to get the meat then it's a very different mind state one has to act one.

So killing using robots and factories with a lot of waste is wholesome, but  growing a chicken on a farm and slaughtering it is hatred?

It's difficult to answer. I would say that when it comes to the individual being who goes to the supermarket to buy meat then there is no ill-will, hatred, anger or other unwholesome mind states present. If one has to kill the animal to get the meat then there are definitely unwholesome mind states present. Regarding the robots and factories i would say that it's unwholesome because the people doing it also has to give rise to unwholesome mind states. I might be wrong about this.

Most people have hatred and aversion to smelling or even looking at raw faeces, but when it's been made into manure, and then used to grow vegetables they have no problem eating it. Like that, people dislike wars and killing but have no problem living a lifestyle enabled by cheap gas and sweatshop labor. If robotic drones do all the killing tomorrow will everything be fine? In old times an invading army was tens of thousands of men, today it can be a single missile or drone operator, does this mean the latter is preferable since there's only one hateful mind?

In firing squads they load blanks into several guns so that nobody knows who fired the deadly shot. In the end the victim dies all the same but the executioners have no guilt because they can all believe they fired the blank. I think supermarket chicken is merely sweeping the dirt under the rug. With enough mindfulness can one not see the violence in the supermarket chicken too?

About the drone operator there are also his superiors who have participated in the killing by giving the green light to launch the drone missile. I think there are many involved in the killing when it comes to war. I mean generals and other personel must also give rise to hatred. But i still think the buying-supermarket-meat is different because one does not have those strong unwholesome mind states it requires to kill a being to take it's meat.

I would think that it still requires unwholesome mindstates to pull the trigger. It's a volitional action rooted in hatred.

Exactly. Supermarket chicken too :-) People elect politicians who they know want to wage war, they demand cheap fuel knowing it will lead to war, and that demand conveniently shrink wrapped meat that has been cleaned of the smell of death. They get what they want. Isn't it delusion or ignorance then on the part of the supermarket shopper to believe there's no hatred?

I would argue that the supermarket chicken doesn't have the same karma loaded to it as actually committing the act, but in and of itself isn't entirely wholesome either. In accordance with right intention: It means the renunciation of the worldly things and an accordant greater commitment to the spiritual path; good will; and a commitment to non-violence, or harmlessness, towards other living beings. Being mindful of ones desire, one can see that by creating the demand for the chicken, this is not harmlessness to other living beings. Beings will lose their life as a result of this demand

I think Ryan said it pretty well about the supermarket-chicken. What i would like to mention is where is the line then? Can one then not drive a car because of the killing of animals that car owners are responsible for. Or what about all the tiny lifeforms we kill everytime we vacuum clean or just take a step. I mean it has to be the intention that guides us or else one is responsible for everything that goes on.

Friends, i would love to continue this interesting and important discussion but it's almost 5.00 in the morning here. I need some sleep:) I will be back later to answer questions. Good night.

I am also going to sleep, goodnight everyone :)

Orthodox Jews have elaborate workarounds and technology that enables them to not work on Sabbath, not even turn on a light switch. If Supermarkets are preferable to but chicken from than killing it myself, it sounds a bit like a convenient workaround.

If anyone feels he is guilty of doing bad behave yer, they should correct it immediately, otherwise they get the natural reaction. (Low of karma).
Money or wealth is not the happiness.
Are the all great personals are rich?.


text:
How to determine Chithasikas in Naama?
We know that there are combinations of Cetasikas that are used to identify different Cittas. I want to know how to determine Cetasikas in a naama who is having the udaya waya gana (or steps ahead like bhanga khana). If we consider one naama, there are multiple cetasikas in different amounts.If a person can see naama with their meditation power, how they ditermine what are the Cetasikas in one naama and what are the amounts were there.
As a example, lets suppose that the meditator had a "somanassa sahagatha Khana(Gana) sampayuthha asankarika" citta (This is having 17 naama). How to determine what are the cetasikas were at each of 17 naama, out of 52 cetasikas? We know there must be Aloba, Adosa and Amoha cetasikas in naamas at previously mentioned citta, but how to determine the amount or the power of these cetasikas?
I think it must be a really tough exercise and very tricky one to the meditator.
I would like to know the strategy in step by step. I need abidhamma expert's answer.

The recognized spelling for the word I think you are looking for is "cetasika". I don't recognize either "kshana" or "bangurathwa", though I imagine them to be Sinhalese corruptions of Pali/Sanskrit terms.  Please try to find the correct Pali/Sanksrit spellings if possible, otherwise most of us cannot help you.

@Gurusinghe I changed your question quite a bit. See if it is the same thing you wanted to ask.

@Sankha Thank you! In visuddi magga, Bhanga khana is step ahead to the Udaya waya khana(Gana). I thought Udaya waya khana is enough to determine Cetasikas....

@Ven. Yuttadhammo, I'm very sorry for putting those words and my poor English venerable sir. But I didn't know any other way to express them.

I am an Abhidhamma teacher. I am going to try and help you.
You are asking how to identify the list of cetasika within a nāma and the intensity of the various cetasika.
An Abhidhamma text such as the Abhidhammattha Sangaha will provide the list of cetasika. You mentioned "somanassasahagata ñāṇasampayutta asaṅkhārika" (accompanied by joy, associated with knowledge, unprompted) as an example. Chapter 2, paragraph 23 of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha indicates that there are 38 cetasika in this nāma.
You are asking about how to identify cetasika as part of a meditative practice. Here is a relevant quote from the Milindapañha, "If a man were to take a handful of water from the ocean and tasting it could say, ‘This water is from the Ganges, this from the Jumna, this from the Gandak, this from the Sarabhu, and this from the Mahi.’ More difficult than this is the distinguishing of those mental states that accompany any one of the senses."
In the Anupada Sutta (MN 111), the Buddha praised Sāriputta for being able to recognize the cetasika accompanying jhāna states.
In brief, I do not think that it is practical to expect to be able to identify the cetasika in a nāma as part of your meditative practice.
You also asked about identifying the intensity of the various cetasika within a nāma. You are correct that varying the intensity of the cetasika provides a very  different experience of the nāma, however the Abhidhamma does not differentiate  levels of intensity, except in the most broad of terms (because of kamma-result condition "vipākapaccaya", consciousness and the mental factors of the resultant nāma are passive and weak).

Great, Thank you! But I don't understand how Milindapañha is related with cetasika in a nāma.

In the Milindapañha quote, "distinguishing of those mental states that accompany any one of the senses" is the same as saying "identifying the cetasika in a nāma" (in other words, almost impossible).
In the Sutta, the Buddha had great praise for Sāriputta ("wise, of great discernment, deep discernment, wide... joyous... rapid... quick... penetrating discernment") because after two weeks of being in jhāna, Sāriputta was able to identify the cetasika. If it took two weeks of jhāna concentration for Sāriputtta to identify the cetasika, what hope do you and I have? Easier to look in the book :-)

:) Excellent answer.  I thought sometimes it could be a Buddha's khana to determine cetasikas and their intensity in a naama.

Although i am not an expert, but i like to mention some facts.
Chathasikas collectively determine as Chitta(Naama).
"Banga " is current situation of "Chitta -(Naama-roopa)".
The persion who can feel(see/live) now have experiance "Banga Gana" and-"UdayaWaya". rising and decaying of "NaamaRoopa".
If "life" is a flow then the Attributes of current moment as follows;
perception - "sangna". feeling - "Veedana".  Action - "Sankara". are some chethasikas belongs to Naama. There are also "roopa" and consiouness - "Vingnana" - in background.
There can be other Sankaras or chathsikas according the situation. (Depend on the roopa and Kamma-Vingnana). feeling and perception are also chathsikas belong to 52 chathasika (Model).

The strategy to understand above is:
Follow "Mahasathipattana Suttha"- (Ekayano Maggo).

For the help of clear understanding we take smiler example.
As a example, lets suppose that the meditator had a "kaya(physical BODY)". How to determine what are the elements were at each of 32 parts, out of 4 "Mahabootha"? We know there must be patavi apoo thego and vayo boothas in  roopa at previously mentioned kaya, but how to determine the amount or the power of these boothas?
Here BODY(kaya) is one.  (physio-physical level)
32 parts are small bodies.  (Bio-chemical level)
4 MahaBoothas are Lover level energy. (physical)
As Like this
Mana is collective chttha.
Chitta is collective chathasika.
How does the process work? The mind – consciousness – gives rise to our experience of reality. We experience the physical and mental reality around us according to our state of mind. So this conscious mind is said to give rise to the mental-physical reality we experience from one moment to the next. For instance, when we practice meditation, we experience the stomach, rising and falling. When we breathe, when the stomach rises, when the stomach falls, there is the physical and the mental aspects of the experience. The rising is physical and the knowing of the rising is mental. When we walk, there’s the foot moving, which is physical, and the mind knowing it, which is mental. When we feel pain, there’s the physical experience and there’s the mind that knows it and doesn’t like it and decides that it is unpleasant. And so on.
http://www.sirimangalo.org/text/lessons-in-practical-buddhism/practical-dependent-origination/

"kshana bangurathawa" is  not  current situation of "Naama-roopa". But it is the nature of ultra high speed creation and distruction of the mind.

If creation and destruction is "Udaya Waya" then "Banga Gana" is the undestanding of impermenancy (Anichch) of mind(objects)/ "NaamaRoopa).

Q1). how to determine the amount or the power of these cetasikas?
A1). We have to follow meditation practice to feel these. this will be a really tough exercise for beginner. But for experience practitioner it is very tricky one. Because he/she use it every moment.
Q2). I would like to know the strategy in step by step.
A2). The Seven steps of purification are as folows:
    Purification of Conduct (sīla-visuddhi)
    Purification of Mind (citta-visuddhi)
    Purification of View (ditthi-visuddhi)
    Purification by Overcoming Doubt (kankha-vitarana-visuddhi)
    Purification by Knowledge and Vision of What Is Path and Not Path (maggamagga-ñanadassana-visuddhi)
    Purification by Knowledge and Vision of the Course of Practice (patipada-ñanadassana-visuddhi)
        Knowledge of contemplation of rise and fall (udayabbayanupassana-nana)
        Knowledge of contemplation of dissolution (bhanganupassana-nana)
        Knowledge of appearance as terror (bhayatupatthana-nana)
        Knowledge of contemplation of danger (adinavanupassana-nana)
        Knowledge of contemplation of dispassion (nibbidanupassana-nana)
        Knowledge of desire for deliverance (muncitukamyata-nana)
        Knowledge of contemplation of reflection (patisankhanupassana-nana)
        Knowledge of equanimity about formations (sankharupekka-nana)
        Conformity knowledge (anuloma-nana)
    Purification by Knowledge and Vision (ñanadassana-visuddhi)

Q3). Who is Abidhamma Expert?
A3). First we have to clarify whit is Abidhamma?
The core of Buddhism is four Noble Truth. To Understand it we need some path. it consists samatha and Vipassana. In samatha concentrate on (mental) object as Kama, Roopa and Aroopa. for Nibbana the object is "Niroda".(Chetho Vimuktha).
In Vipassana (As in Sathipattana Sutta) start from Body then Feelings then Thoughts finally mental Objects. For Niroda "The Object" must be "Sunnya"(No-Self).(Pangna Vimuktha).
How the Self creates and How it Not creates (Niroda) is explains using patithchasamuthpada. There are 12 Links in this Model. How these 12 links are Inter Depend (AnnaManna Prathya) is ex-planes using 24 "Prathyas"(course and effects) in -"PattanaPakarana" the 7th book of Abidamma. This is in Theravada view point. In Mahayana view point (Hua yen) it explane as "Indras'Net".


text:
What does Buddhism say about practicing Spiritism?
What Buddism teaches about Spiritism, especially the Kardecist Spiritualism Doctrine (link above)?
Is it wrong to try to communicate with the ghosts and to learn from spirits?

Hi and welcome to Buddhism SE. We have a Guide and a Resource section for new users that you might like.

Despite the idealised and Romanticised versions of Buddhism popular in the West, which suggests that Buddhists are only interested in Enlightenment, historically and presently Buddhists have always maintained social practices which are unrelated to the such lofty goals. Amongst these are belief in and practices related to unseen entities which can loosely be called "spirits".
Spirits play an important role in daily life in almost all traditional Buddhist countries. In Burma for example, spirits are called "nat" and in Thailand "phi" (Encylcopedia Britannica). Phi are spirits of towns, homes, caves, and so on. Such spirits are the object of rituals and superstitions. Nats are imagined to look like humans. Thai people make little houses for spirits to live in.
In addition the traditional texts of Buddhism are full of references to spirits (devatā) of various kinds. Prominent types include yakkha, nāga, and kinnara. Tree spirits were, and still are in modern India, a focus of religious activity. The commentarial back story to the famous Karaṇīya Metta Sutta tells of how the sutta was spoken after some monks disturbed a family of 'tree spirits' or rukkhadevatā, who responded with fearful apparitions and terrible smells. (See How the Karaṇīya Mettā Sutta Came About). Tree spirit worship is also common in Thailand. Across India and Asia large old trees become shrines.
It seems that Buddhists assimilated animistic beliefs very early on, along with ideas and practices from Brahmin culture, and possible Zoroastrianism (via migrating Iranian tribes). Buddhism has always been syncretistic (i.e. it assimilates elements from other traditions). It's very likely that when speakers of Indic languages, who eventually became the dominant culture, first ventured into the Ganges Valley, they encountered people who spoke Austroasiatic and Tibeto-Burman languages for whom animism was a principle form of religion. They are the likely source of yakkhas for example, who share many characteristics with Burmese nats.
Many modern day Buddhists of my acquaintance are firm believers in ghosts, spirits and minor deities. I have been present at and even participated in more than one ritual to propitiate local spirits for example (in New Zealand, Britain and Spain). An account of some of these modern practices can be found in a book by Sally McAra, Land of Beautiful Vision, which is an anthropological account of a stupa building project by a Triratna Buddhist group in New Zealand. This includes discussion of the idea of local spirits, influenced by Māori beliefs.
So while the specific form of spiritualism you ask about is unfamiliar, Buddhists through the ages have believed in and engaged with spirits of many different kinds.

I don't know if buddhist schools explicitly forbid communicating with ghosts and spirtis, but I'm quite sure that in the theravadian vipassana-movement it is stressed that one should be aware of directing one's mental and physical ressources towards liberation (whatever that means) and the so-called psychic powers like being able to communicate with demons and angels don't have much to do with that.
On the contrary, in books it is often warned that one should not get attached to funny powers or incredible mind-stated.
So, in the end, it probably depends on your attitude towards these phenomena. If you're conversing wiht some ghosts and are at the same time aware that these ghosts are annica, annata and ducca, it should be no problem ;-)


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What is the difference between Yogacara Buddhism and Idealism?
I've often heard the Yogacara school of Buddhism being described as 'Mind Only'. To my untutored mind this seems reminiscent of the western philosophy of Idealism.
So there is a description of Yogacara which goes

the reality we think we perceive does not exist except as as a process
  of knowing. Phenomena, anything that can be experienced, have no
  reality in themselves.

And a description from Idealism which goes

[..] reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally
  constructed, or otherwise immaterial.

To me they seem similar but actually my feeling is in reality the two philosophies are very different. Can someone help me understand how they are different?
Note: I know the two quotes are from sources that have been identified as potentially unreliable (Barbara O'Brien and Wikipedia) but really I'm just want to use them as an illustration of how similar the two philosophies appear to me. I'm not claiming accuracy - in fact they could well lack it.

Some scholars, notably Dan Lusthaus, have argued that Yogācāra is not a form of Idealism. Lusthaus is one of the leading living authorities on Yogācāra and author of the authoritative analysis, Buddhist Phenomenology. The charge of Idealism is simply a mistaken reading of Yogācāra. For example in the introduction to his paper, What is and isn't Yogācāra he argues

Yogācāra focused on the processes involved in cognition in order to overcome the ignorance that prevents one from attaining liberation from the karmic rounds of birth and death. Yogācārins' sustained attention to issues such as cognition, consciousness, perception, and epistemology, coupled with claims such as "external objects do not exist," has led some to misinterpret Yogācāra as a form of metaphysical idealism. They did not focus on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogācāra claims consciousness is only conventionally real since it arises from moment to moment due to fluctuating causes and conditions), but rather because it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to eliminate.

However, some scholars, for example Sean Butler, in his essay Idealism in Yogācāra Buddhism *, remain unconvinced by Lusthaus's argument. Butler cites Vasubandhu's Trimsika for example (and here he cite's Lusthaus's own translations):

The transformation of consciousness is imagination. What is imagined by
  it does not exist. Therefore everything is representation-only.
For consciousness is the seed of everything. Transformation in such and such ways Proceeds through mutual influence, so that such and such imagination is born.

A note of caution is that Butler seems to be confused by Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which is not really a form of Idealism, in that it does not argue that the mind is all there is, but does argued that experience is all that can be known (Transcendental Idealism is not an ontological theory in the way that Idealism is). But he does go on to discuss more relevant definitions of Idealism. Butler weighs the arguments for and against labelling Yogācāra as Idealist and considers that he has decisively shown that it is.
Although Yogācāra is not my area of speciality, I am an advocate for Dr Sue Hamilton's hermeneutic strategy of treating all Buddhist doctrines as though they are addressing the topic of what we experience rather than what exists, which she outlines in Early Buddhism a New Approach. This outlook is in fact evident in Early Buddhist texts. As Bhikkhu Bodhi says:

“The world with which the Buddha’s teaching is principally concerned is ‘the world of experience,’ and even the objective world is of interest only to the extent that it serves as that necessary external condition for experience.” (Bodhi 2000, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: 394, n.182)

If we read the early Buddhist texts as being concerned with experience, or in Buddhist terms with the arising and passing away of mental states, then a number of confusions are resolved. We can for example dispense with the confusing Two Truths doctrine that phenomena are both existent and non-existent. Early Buddhist texts take the view that when it comes to experience, ontological commitments like "existent" (atthitā) and non-existence (n'atthitā) simply do not and cannot apply. This need not imply a commitment to the proposition that only mental states exist (which is what Bishop Berkeley claims). But like Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, we might have to conclude that there is an epistemological limit on what we can know, since all of our knowledge comes via experience.
There is accumulating evidence that this early Buddhist outlook continues into the Prajñāpāramitā literature (See my long essay Form is (Not) Emptiness). So that it might persist into the Yogācāra ought not to surprise us. And for this reason I am predisposed to give Lusthaus the benefit of the doubt and accept his assertion that Yogācāra is not Idealist because it sees vijñāna as only conventionally real, in line with the Yogacāra interpretation of the Two Truths, which is distinctive to the Yogācāra. (Incidentally Lusthaus has written a good article on this subject: The Two Truths (Saṃvṛti-satya and Paramārtha-satya) in Early Yogācāra. Despite the philosophical problems entailed by the Two Truths, the fact that Yogācārins accept the consequences of their version of the doctrine makes it unlikely that they fell into the Idealist trap.
However one has to weigh the criticism of Butler and others. I think the jury is still out.

Here's one additional point. The other very astute answers have dealt with possible philosophical distinctions between these two. The only point lacking as a difference between these two in the other excellent answers I see is that Yogacara Buddhism is not simply a philosophical take on reality or experience. So, in elaborating the difference between them, it must also be pointed out that Yogacara Buddhism includes so much more than just philosophical view or distinctions.
The name itself "Yogacara" means (or indicates) something like "one who masters the practice of yoga." So Yogacara Buddhism includes a system of training on which the whole thing is predicated. Honestly, I'm not a trained western philosopher, so I don't know if the exponents of Idealism et al included progressive systems of mind training designed to transform one's experience of perception, interpretation, etc, but I think it could be successfully argued that this is the sole and only point of Yogacara (and any Buddhist system).
So while trying to fit a Buddhist system into a frame like idealistic or not, ontological or not, phenomenological or not, may be an interesting intellectual exercise from the perspective of scholars trying to understand the tradition from the outside or even practitioners on the inside, don't miss the main point which is that Yogacara Buddhism (and any Buddhism) is soteriological or aimed at liberation from suffering and ignorance first and foremost. Therefore, the positions, statements, etc, are not made to color within the lines of a particular perspective (commitment to idealism or not, in this example) but instead are made for their efficacy in producing liberation for a practitioner.
I suggest this is why you cannot group the whole of every significant writer on the topic of Yogacara into a single uniform lot and easily conclude, "They all believed the same thing." Also why scholars studying the subject (as outlined in prior answers) can't come to consensus about the matter. This just isn't something Yogacara masters were really concerned with. Some writers lean more idealistic than others, and they differ in what aspects of the system they emphasize at different times. Even the same author can sometimes be found to write one text that seems more idealistic and another that seems less idealistic.
Just two more cents.

It's important also to note that the mind spoken of in Western idealism is only restricted to what Yogacara calls the sixth consciousness. Using this definition, Yogaracara is definitely not idealism, as it does not suggest that the sixth consciousness produces external reality and ultimately exist. The sixth consciousness is itself dependent on conditions stored in seeds based on your previous actions and mental habits (as well as on others). Yogacara also defines "real" differently from western philosophy. In the west what is real is usually associated with what fundamentally exist. Yet in Yogacara nothing substantially exist because everything is dependent and empty, but they are still real because you experience it. Contrast to Kant, only what you experience is real (because its a priori). An external metaphysical thing in itself is not (metaphysical, objective existence is denied as real altogether because of the idea of emptiness). External reality is real in Yogacara, but does not objectively exist and early writers even mention things like rupa dharma as conventionally real and only exist because of your actions (karma), but its not substantially objective, as other people cannot experience what you experience.

Welcome to the site! If you'd like to add an afterthought to your previous answer you can edit the answer (to add to it) -- see the "edit" link underneath the answer-- that's more conventional than adding a second answer. Also you mention that Yogacara defines "real" -- what is the (non-English) word for "real" there?

Yogacara is a form of idealism. Classical subjective idealism developed by George Berkeley says that everything that we think to be external objects are really just purely internal representations, and Yogacara says the same thing.
However, Yogacara is a lot more than just saying that. Yogacara also has detailed descriptions for how this process of mental projection occurs within the mind, how it is dictated by karma, and how to meditate to gain insight into how all things are mind created.

While idealism (1) gives some substantial existence to ideas and (2) separates neatly inner and outer worlds, in Buddhism (mahayana) (1) ideas and emotions (inner world) are as much unsubstantial as "matter" (outer world) is and (2) the concepts of inner and outer reality still belong to a dualistic, relative view, hence are not elucidating what the true nature of reality is (true nature is non-dual). Mahayana Buddhism practices sometime "prioritize" mind over matter for the only pragmatical reason that mind can usually be controlled directly, broadly and more efficiently, but at one point of training, mind (thinking mind) should be overcome too in order to experience the true nature (enlightment). Mahayana don't idealizes mind or ideas thus, IMO, it is not a form of idealism...

I would like to say that it depends on the Yogacara school (and how broadly are you willing to define idealism). The original school does NOT say that everything is consciousness, it only say that everything cannot be INDEPENDENT FROM consciousness. It's important to understand this fundamental difference as Yogacara defines mind differently from Western philosophy. In western idealism, the mind, self, and concepts are not fundamentally separate. However, this is duly separated in Yogacara philosophy. According to the Faxiang school, the physical reality conventionally EXIST, they are NOT pure conceptual constructs; however they are only real for you and not others. The conceptually constructed realm (遍计所执 parikalpita-svabhāva) is only the first of the 3 self natures and is the only one that is completely not real. The realm of causal dependency (依他起性 paratantra-svabhāva) is conventionally REAL, it is basically reality as perceived from a tainted lense. So to use an analogy, you see a cup for example, the concept of the cup is the first parikalpita-svabhāva, however, there is still a real cup there, if it was purely conceptual, it would be like a dream, but its not. This real cup is however tainted, but the experience of the cup is real and is the second paratantra-svabhāva. However, this cup is only real to the observer. Outisde of the observer there is no cup. Once a person gets rid of his defilements and see the cup's true nature as empty, he then sees the tathata which is the only thing thats ultimately real and not as a cup. Idealism assumes that the concept of the cup is produced by the mind and is hence just conceptual. Yogacara accepts that there is a concept of a cup and a real cup divorced from concepts, hence it is NOT idealism. However this real cup is not really a cup.

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What does deathless mean?
The word "deathless" is used sometimes.
What does it mean? Are there non-obvious or non-English meanings to the words translated as 'death' and/or 'deathless'?
Similarly what does "attaining the deathless" mean, in this Upatissa-pasine,  for example ...

Whoever attains the Deathless first will inform the other

... how are they supposed to recognize when they "attain the deathless"?
Is "deathless" predicated on the idea that practitioners are trying to escape some dukkha associated with death, or escape death itself? Does that sutta conflate "deathless" with "sorrowless", or are the two distinct?
I notice there's also a word Timeless. Deathless is a different word (amata instead of akalika), does the word 'deathless' have a different meaning and/or different usage?

The expression is used in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta:

So I said to them, 'Don't address the Tathagata  by name and as "friend." The Tathagata, friends, is a worthy one, rightly self-awakened. Lend ear, friends: the Deathless has been attained.

That suggests to me (I may be wrong) that deathless might be associated with an ultimate stage of enlightenment (or perhaps that it's specifically intended/designed for the five in that audience, e.g. perhaps the Buddha knew that they were seeking "the deathless").

A more literal translation would be "undead", interestingly enough; the sense should be "undying", i.e. that which, because it is not involved with arising, is also not involved with ceasing.

Here's some further description (adjectives and nouns which refer to Nibanna): Nibbana is an existing reality

The Deathless = Unbinding (nibbana / nirvana),
which gives release from the cycle of death and rebirth.       Mindfulness is the way to the Deathless
(Nibbana), unmindfulness the way to Death.
Those who are mindful do not die, and those who
are not are as if already dead.

What does deathless mean?

The Deathless is a synonym for Nibbana. The Deathless state is the state where one is freed from birth and thereby death. Conditioned phenomena constantly arise and fall. In other words: They must die. Nibbana is unconditioned, unborn, it does not arise and fall and therefore must not die.
Here are some quotes from the Majjhima Nikaya and Samyutta Nikaya where the Buddha talks about The Deathless state in relation to Nibbana. There are also some notes from the author (Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi):

"He turns his mind away from those states and directs it towards the deathless element thus: "This is the peaceful, this is the sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attachments, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbana"
-- MN 64: Mahamalunkyaputta Sutta, p. 540, Bodhi translation

Another quote:

"Then at that point the Blessed One uttered this exclamation:
The greatest of all gains is health,
Nibbana is the greatest bliss,
The eightfold path is the best of paths
For it leads safely to the Deathless."
-- MN 75: Magandiya Sutta, p. 613, Bodhi translation

Sutta notes:

"The eleven "doors to the Deathless" are the four jhanas, the four brahmaviharas, and the first three immaterial attainments used as bases for the development of insight and attainment of arahantship."
-- Notes to sutta 52, p. 1252

Sutta notes:

MA: He "turns his mind away" from the five aggregates included within the jhana, which he has seen to be stamped with the three characteristics. The "deathless element" (amata-dhatu) is Nibbana.
-- Notes to sutta 64, p. 1266

Sutta notes:

"MA says that the arahantship of the dry-insight meditator is intended. MT adds that arahantship is called "the Deathless" because it has the flavour of the Deathless, being attained on the basis of Nibbana the Deathless."
-- Notes to sutta 106, p. 1312

Here is a quote from the Samyutta Nikaya:

"This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
"One who desires merit, established in the wholesome, Develops the path to attain the Deathless;
  He who has reached the Dhamma's core,
  Delighting in destruction,
  Does not tremble thinking,
  'The King of Death will come."
-- SN 55: Sotapattisamyutta, p. 1829, Bodhi translation

Another quote:

"Bhikkhus, I will teach you the taintless and the path leading to the taintless. Listen to that ...
"Bhikkhus, I will teach you the truth and the path leading to the truth ... I will teach you the far shore ... the subtle ... the very difficult to see ... the unaging ... the stable ... the undis integrating ... the unmanifest ... the unproliferated ... the peaceful ... the deathless ... the sublime ... the auspicious ... the secure ... the destruction of craving ... the wonderful ... the amazing ... the unailing ... the unailing state ... Nibbana ... the unafflicted ... dispassion ... purity ... freedom ... the unadhesive ... the island .., the shelter ... the asylum ... the
  refuge ...
-- SN 43: Asankhatasamyutta, p. 1378, Bodhi translation

Sutta notes:

"The removal of lust, etc., is a designation for the unconditioned, deathless Nibbana element. The destruction of the taints is arahantship. The removal of lust, etc., is a name for arahantship too."
-- Notes to sutta 45, p. 1893

The Dhamma Wiki has a list of "33 Synonyms for Nibbana".

Yes it seems like merely a synonym i.e. another word for the same thing, i.e. a new word with no new meaning. I was hoping it might be more, e.g. a separate attribute or a new description.

Does its being in the Sotapatti-samyutta imply it's associated with stream-entry, and not only "an ultimate stage of enlightenment"?

Answer updated. Good question. Sotapanna is one of the 4 stages of enlightenment so if you mean as a "part" of nibbana then maybe you can say that. But i'm not sure about it.

A good, fairly comprehensive answer.

@ChrisW Although they all refer to Nibbana, all of them describe distinct qualities of Nibbana. So it is not just a new word with no different meaning. ex: taintless and deathless describe 2 different qualities.

Since there is at least one last death for the attainor of deathlessness, seems that rebirthless might be more accurate ... though the term deathless prompts a more favorable connotation;)

@PaPa Here 'deathless' refers to the Nibbana dhamma(phenomenon). Not the being.

According to @SankhaKulathantille's two comments and yuttadhammo's comment, perhaps the first two sentences of the answer should be, "The Deathless is an attribute or description of Nibbana" (i.e. attribute not synonym) and something like "The state of Nibbana is described as "deathless" because it is not involved with birth and death, or arising and ceasing." (i.e. it's a description of Nibanna not a description of the 'attainer').

@Chris. I updated the answer putting in a reference from SN 43 wherein the Buddha gives different names for Nibbana. Could you explain why it's not a synonym? I just want to be sure before i change anything.

Not just a synonym (instead, a description of a distinct quality) is what I think this comment of Sankha's is saying.

It sounds like it's all 3 things, i.e. an attribute, a description and a synonym for Nibbana. Can that be written instead?

"Deathless" typically translates amrita (lit. "no-death"), also translated as "the nectar", using the useful parallel with Greek mythology. Another translation of "to attain deathless" is "to partake of the nectar" - just another metaphorical way to refer to The Fruit. I suppose we could compare this with the modern American idiom "drank the Kool-Aid" - although the latter has rather satirical connotations.
More specifically "the deathless aspect" (amrita-dhatu) is (seems to be?) a synonym with what Mahayana calls "the absolute truth" -- the perspective of Three Marks Of Existence, Emptiness, and Pratityasamutpada -- as opposed to "the conventional truth" -- the perspective of Rebirth, Karma, and Samsara vs. Nirvana dichotomy.

imo the American "drinking the kool-aid" is a reference to the Jonestown massacre (i.e. not a happy parallel). Thank you for connecting Amata to Amrita for me: I didn't expect that connection! I read the Rig Veda once (in translation) but scarcely understood it. I suppose the term is therefore aimed at ... contemporaries for whom the term was significant. Maybe I should understand it more as a metaphor, name, or title rather than as a description.

Sanskrit amṛta or Pāli amata.

I thought it was an LSD/Pranksters reference, no?

Well as a modern idiom I think it means an unthinking or enthusiastic cooperation with a (e.g. corporate or political) culture or party-line; but imo (and google confirms) that "(don't) drink the kool-aid" is a reference to Jonestown; so yes satirical I guess, but a strain to compare it with "deathless".

The way it is used in USA where I live, I think it means a sudden and surprising change of perspective as a result of someone adopting someone else's point of view.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drinking_the_Kool-Aid

"To become a firm believer in something; to accept an argument or philosophy whole-heartedly." "It can also be used ... humorously to refer to accepting an idea or changing a preference due to ... persuasion." - sorry I only ever heard it used in this sense. Also, I'm still not persuaded it has connection with Jonestown massacre, seems contrived after the phrase got popular.

I guessed that you meant, "(irrevocably) altered by their own experience (of the kool-aid)" ... I didn't guess you meant, especially, "adopting someone else's point of view". My initial guess before posting the OP was that it might be related to identity-view (if without-identity implies without-death). But other comments are saying it's a description of the state (not of the person), e.g. not conditioned, not created or destroyed, not impermanent -- so maybe it's a synonym for "not impermanent" (a reversal of a western view which readily associates 'death' with 'permanent').

I'm with your first guess.

wrt to "koop-aid", there was also "The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test", written by author Ken Kesey, having to do with some of the early hippie LSD scene.

Lanka's answer strikes me as comprehensive. Except for the etymology of the word. Pali amata and Sanskrit amṛta derive from the root √mṛ 'die'. The form here is a past participle used as adjective - mṛta means 'died, dead'; compounded with the 'a', amṛta means 'undying, deathless'.
Ultimately it probably comes from Vedic, as the Upaniṣads more frequently speak of the cyclic afterlife as punarmṛta 're-death' or punarmṛtyu 'repeated dying'. It's this repeated death that makes the fact of cyclic existence ultimately unbearable and motivates the search for the deathless. And the opposite of repeated death is no death, the deathless. It can mean "immortality" in Vedic, in the sense that one's ātman exists permanently and once one transcends repeated death, then ātman rejoins and attains union with the universal principle of being, Brahman. Notably in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta it is Brahmā, the personification of Brahman, who urges the Buddha to teach after he opens the doors to the deathless.
But as Lanka says, in Buddhism it is one of many synonyms for nibbāna.

Thank you for the clarification about the etymology of the word.

In Buddhism, to be deathless means you have realized Nirvana and are liberated from samsara and will have no more rebirths and thus no more deaths. This does not mean you cease to exist for that would be nihilism and the Budha was clear that to say his teachings were nihilist was heresy.

I addressed this in my blog recently. Quotation follows:

The Buddha teaches the path of the arhant, the Noble Eightfold Path,
  consisting of four levels of attainment of degrees of progressive
  realization or accomplishment: stream entrant, whereby one achieves
  emancipation within seven rebirths without ever experiencing a lower
  non-human rebirth; a once-returner, whereby one is reborn as a human
  being once more only; a non-returner, whereby one is never again
  reborn as a human being, but will be born as a deva being in the Five
  Pure Abodes; or an arhant, in which on death one achieves parinibbana
  (lit. ‘complete snuffing out,’ as of a fire) and subsequent
  ‘immortality’ (amata). This Pali word, amata, pervades the Pali Canon,
  and is generally translated as ‘deathlessness,’ but the PED makes it
  clear that the primary meaning is amrita, translated by Rhys Davids as
  ‘ambrosia’ or ‘water of immorality,’ from the Sanskrit root MR,
  ‘death.’ Amrita, which is also described in the PED as a “medicine,”
  is the Buddhist word for soma, the Vedic mind-altering beverage that
  is identical with the plant-based psychedelic that was worshipped by
  the early Aryans and inspired the rishis, including the Seven Sages,
  to write the ecstatic hymns of the Rig Veda. Mata means both ‘thought’
  and ‘dead,’ so the state of amata is a state beyond both death and
  thinking. Paradoxically, a state of apparent ‘impercipience’ is
  identical with the realization of essential sentience itself. Hence,
  ‘deathlessness.’

http://palisuttas.com/2015/06/07/epitome-of-the-pali-canon/

According to http://pali.hum.ku.dk/cpd/search.html the word for "not apprehended by mind" is amuta not amata. According to the PTS dictionary the two mata words are from two different roots.

You are absolutely correct etymologically (PED, p. 517). However, the two 'matas' have identical spelling and pronunciation, raising the possibility of a homonym. I find this hermeneutic very useful in application to the Pali Canon. There are other examples.

My interpretation of the Buddha's teachings (with input from many teachers) is that he was not especially concerned with what came before or after this existence. He said that he taught "the end of suffering" and little else.
As someone said earlier, nibbana is the cessation of the need for rebirth, thus any death. The way I understand it is that the conditions for some following existence cease, like blowing out a candle, and there is just nothing. The aspect of some sort of permanent "bliss" is counter to the teachings, in which nothing is permanent. I believe that permanence aspect was added on later because followers could not let go of that need to continue on in some respect.

What needs (or better wants) to continue and in what respect, TonyCr, in the "earlier" idea?

To break through to even so much as Metta (Lovingkindness), is a taste of the deathless (for as long as it's sustained).
So all these definitions above are helpful, but you can't truly know what the deathless is until you practice the 8-fold path enough that a Brahmavihara (or higher) occurs as a resultant.  Experiential knowledge is "Knowledge" in Buddhism, not mere book-reading, intellectual-level "knowledge".
I feel it's important for this distinction to be mentioned.  It's a feeling (which is "not of the flesh", as opposed to a "worldly feeling"), and not a concept.
Note: I'm a Buddhist monk, however I wish to remain anonymous.  I am bound by Vinaya to not discuss any attainment's I might have, so please don't ask (if "I've ever experienced the deathless").

Hi Bhante and welcome to Buddhism SE. We have put together a Guide and a Resource section for new users that you might like.

The deathless element refers to the aspect of your existence which is persistent through all mental states and conditions. It is not death in the sense of physical life or death, but in the sense of being eternally persistent within all conscious existence.
In this interpretation, it shows that Nibbana is not a state to be attained, but is instead an element of being, which is to be recognized as ever-present and then aligned with. Through recognizing yourself only as the deathless element, and only as a witness to the conditioned phenomenon, you reach the state of Nibbana.

The Eternal Witness is related to Eternal Consciousness or even a Universal Consciousness, which is an idea of Hinduism (Brahman / Atman / Paramatman), that is rejected by the Buddha. According to the Buddha's description of eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness etc. it is dependent on other things and not standalone, therefore, it is impermanent (not eternal).

" within all conscious existence", How the ('all') suite here? considering "Kilesa"

There's an explanation on page 36 (page 10 of the PDF file) of Pita Tan's introduction to SN 56.11.
The context is explaining the various types of dukkha ("birth is dukkha, death is dukkha, ..." and so on).

When we understand this, we have a good idea why nirvana—the final state of the Buddha and the
  arhats—are also “described” (for the convenience of the understanding of the unawakened) as being the
  opposites of birth, decay, disease and death—nirvana is thus non-birth, non-decay, non-disease and nondeath,
  that is to say:

ajāta or abhūta “birth-free” being unborn, being free of rebirth, hence, no redeath;
avyādhi or ajarā “decay-free” not subject to change, bodily or mental, or disease and dis-ease;
asoka or abhaya “fear-free” without craving, there is no fear, nor danger from the world;
amara or amata “death-free” without rebirth, there is no redeath, the cycle is finally broken.