text:
Accuracy of suttas
The suttas were as far as I heard transmitted orally, and it was only several hundred years later that the teachings were put on to paper. Now my questions:
i) Do you believe in every sutta? For example: That a person suddenly attained sottapanna or arahantship? Notice: It doesn't matter whether it happened or not because it has not real implications on me, but it's as always this easy and unrealistic kind of thinking that people often employ
ii) Couldn't it be the case that there are also many 'later alterations' to fit the dhamma to one's own/to culture's liking?
iii) Connected to question i): How do you interpret devas? And how do you verify 'post-morten' rebirth? Isn't it in contradiction of anatta? Didn't the Buddha teach that the Dhamma can be experienced in the here and now? Why do the 4NT (and N8P) not mention rebirth?
iv) Most people do not translate suttas by their own. They take the words from scholars and monks, which often copy from each other. Is this the critical thinking that Buddhists often speak of?

I think this question of this form, "Do you believe...", is theoretically off-topic -- it's a "polling question", i.e. the same kind of form as "How many users of this site belong to which schools of Buddhism?" And answers may provoke discussions and arguments. But perhaps this is a practical question as well, i.e. "How do you handle this problem/uncertainty?" I don't see how to reword it and I'm not sure I should vote to close it.

A way to reword it might be to ask "What's the doctrine of a[ny specific] school of Buddhism on the subject of...", instead of, "Do you believe...?" -- but maybe that's not what you want to ask.

I didn't understand, "It doesn't matter whether it happened or not because it has not real implications on me, but it's as always this easy and unrealistic kind of thinking that people often employ." Are you saying, "It doesn't matter to me because my mind is already made up, but I'm positing this to criticise, or to invite you to criticise, other people who have "easy and unrealistic" beliefs?" Because that would be off-topic, and ought to be closed.

I count several questions -- 1) Do you believe every sutta and how do you justify that belief given the history? 2) What are devas? 3) How do you verify post-mortem rebirth (i.e. whether that doctrine is true), and/or how does that fit with the anatta doctrine? 4) Why do the 4NT and N8P not mention rebirth? 5) Why do you trust translators and should you? -- I think these are quite separate questions, maybe this is "too broad". OTOH the policy says you may ask questions which are too broad, but can then expect "shallow" answers in reply.

Theoretically one might (and perhaps we should) put this question on hold (i.e. close it temporarily), and invite people to a new [meta-tag:specific-question] topic on Meta to discuss whether it ought to be permitted, or closed, or edited before reopening it...

When people attained arahantship or stream entry just after listening to a discourse then that mean they must have comtemplated what the Buddha said and they was able to attained stream entry or arahantship because of their paramis. I don’t think there are any latter additions but they could have been written down at a later period but that doesn’t mean that people just made up the sutta on their own. It is possible that the sutta was so long so they didn’t finish writing it. Devas are real beings just like humans and animals. Being able to see devas is one of the fruit of contemplative live. Rebirth was never a contradictions to anatta. I am not an arahant so I will just say why rebirth is not a contradictions to anatta in my opinion. Believing that the same person is reborn is an eternalist view. Believing that the person who is reborn is different from the person who dies is an annihilationist view. Dependent origin is the Buddhist’s view. Going to other realms like heaven or hell can be experienced here and now if you develop powers from the fourth jhana. It’s one of the fruit of contemplative live. Monks can’t show their powers so it’s not surprising that laymen have no ideas that they exist. Rebirth is in the noble eight fold path. It is right view. Rebirth is also in the four noble truth. The four noble truth is basically there is suffering, dependent origin, cessation of dependent origin and the noble eight fold path. Rebirth is the dependent origin. It shows that as long as Nibbana is not attained you will also be reborn. Physical death is not the end.

I marked this answer down because the sutta teachings on kamma & "rebirth" are very clear in that it is the same person that is "reborn". They are moral teachings; unrelated to anatta.  Also, "rebirth" is not mentioned in the noble truths. Words such as "jati" and "bhava" do not mean "rebirth".

DD, so you think that Buddha employed skillful means with lay people and (certain) monks to teach them kamma, which results to frighten them of literal hell (which a lot of people believed back them due to superstition), and to give them insight that their actions do have consequences and that is in their efforts to cultivate body, speech and mind.

Dhammadhatu I think some or most of Buddhist laymen and women in Buddha’s time was ignorant of the four noble truth because the Buddha didn’t taught it until a layman ask Sariputta to teach it to lay people too. So most Buddhist laymen and women might have assumed that self is reborn or something like that. They wouldn’t even know the dependent origin because Buddha never taught it to them until a later time. I think an arahant would believe in rebirth without self.

Val different people have different opinions. I am not attacking any person’s belief but this is what I think. The Buddha never lies or deceive even for the good of people. Rebirth is real. There’s a way to see it without self just like believing that “you” and “I” exist. My advice is don’t think that rebirth is fake or metaphorical. Ignore rebirth whenever it comes into your mind. Seeing heavens, hells are one of the fruits of contemplative life. You can’t deny if you have never seen it. The Buddha Dhamma invites us to come and see for ourself. So don’t deny it until you experience it

How can’t you deny rebirth if wise people like Buddha and those arahants from the sangha said that it’s one of the fruit of contemplative? You can’t deny if you have never seen it. Just keep an open mind. The Buddha Dhamma invites us to come and see for ourself. So don’t deny it until you experience it. Keep an open mind. I have to post another comment because it was too long so this site didn’t let me comment it together

i) Do you believe in every sutta?

Definitely not.

ii) Couldn't it be the case that there are also many 'later alterations' to fit the dhamma to one's own/to culture's liking?

Yes. And also to create a religion that appeals to more people.

iii) Connected to question i): How do you interpret devas?

Devas are the rich, powerful or angels (people with physic powers).

And how do you verify 'post-morten' rebirth?

It cannot be verified. Most teachings about 'rebirth' are not "post-mortem" but the later teachings about 'rebirth' are. The basic teachings about rebirth are about results of actions.

Isn't it in contradiction of anatta?

No. The teaching of anatta does not mean 'self-view' does not arise in the minds of ignorant people. Thus 'rebirth' is the re-arising of self-view due to results of kamma.

Didn't the Buddha teach that the Dhamma can be experienced in the here and now?

The Buddha not only taught this but also defined his Dhamma as this. Therefore, anything outside of here & now realisation is not really the Buddha's true teaching.

Why do the 4NT (and N8P) not mention rebirth?

Because the Buddha's true teaching is not about "rebirth". MN 117 explains there are two sorts of teachings: (i) the true teaching for liberation and (ii) impure teachings for morality. This is pretty basic stuff for those with faith in the Buddha (rather than for those who get lost in social media Buddhism).

iv) Most people do not translate suttas by their own. They take the words from scholars and monks, which often copy from each other. Is
  this the critical thinking that Buddhists often speak of?

In many suttas, particularly to Brahmins, the Buddha condemned blind faith. But later Buddhism became exactly what the Buddha condemned; probably because the later Buddhist clergy attempted to covert as many people as possible.
The above said, these issues should not concern a noble practitioner. These issues are the way of the world. Every religion gets twisted. For example, as soon as Mohamed (PBUH) passed away, this companions were squabbling and making up teachings. In Islam, there are literally millions of 'hadiths' claiming to be utterances of Mohamed. Then in Christianity, there is a multitude of varying scriptures. And the Hindus keep adding new stuff but claiming it is 1000s of years old. Why would Buddhism be any different; with writings like the Jataka Takes, claiming the Buddha was different kinds of animals in past lives that performed miraculous feats?


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In the Dependent Origination formula, shouldn't perception precede craving instead of feeling?
In the paticcasamuppada's formulation of the twelve nidanas, vedana precedes tanha.
As far as I currently understand, vedana is just the physiological and psychological -and involuntary- response
(felt as a pleasent, unpleasent or neutral sensation) to an specific stimulus. Vedana by itself shouldn't be an enough condition to give rise to tanha, because there's no necessarily an evaluation (sañña) of that feeling that could lead to the rise of a preference (like, dislike or neither-like-nor-dislike), and consequently, to the rise of tanha.
If read in this fashion, shouldn't be sañña placed between vedana and tanha?
Thanks in beforehand.

In paticcasamuppada, shouldn't sañña precede tanha, instead of vedana?
It should and it does: vedana => sañña => vitakka => papanca.
From Madhupindika Sutta (MN 18):

With contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling (vedana). What one feels, one perceives (sañña). What one perceives, one thinks (vitakka) about. What one thinks about, one objectifies (papanca).

To clarify terms, vedana is the qualitative component of the experience of subjective contact with a subjectively delineated (mental representation of) object: "this object feels right" / "this object feels wrong" / "this object feels neither right nor wrong".
Sañña is recognition/classification/delineation of a (subjective notion of) object by the raw features (signs) available to direct observation. While described as a single step, in actuality it is a chain of inferences that evaluates the signs, puts forward hypotheses about the perceived entity and feeds back to seeking more signs to confirm the hypothesis. At the advanced phases of the inference chain, sañña reaches a level of abstraction when it can be described as "conceptualization".
Vitakka (in this context) is pondering or mulling over. It is bringing the attention again and again to a given idea.
Papanca is entering a relationship of "pursuer & pursued" (or acquirer and acquired) with regard to an object. It is objectifying something and making it one's goal (-- and implicitly, making oneself an agent of pursuit. This is out of scope for this question but this is exactly how bhava or "becoming a personal form of existence" comes to fruition).
So, first we delineate an object, then we attribute pleasant experience to a contact with the object, then we conceptualize this experience of contact and the resulting feeling and make it into a target we'd like to acquire.

I marked this down. It is just personal ideas and unrelated to Buddhism. This poster needs to provide references for their answers and ideas; such as "sañña reaches a level of abstraction when it can be described as "conceptualization" or sanna is "hypotheses".  Also it is "vicara" that is commonly referred to as "pondering over" rather than "vitakka". Also. i have never read a sutta saying vedana is the feeling of "right" & 'wrong". The last paragraph sounds very mixed up and the whole answer seems to keep referring to "self agency" doing things.

At least as I understood it, I think Andrei said "right" and "wrong" in the sense of sensorial quality, not in a value-oriented or ethicalwise manner.

I meant  dukkha vedana, sukha vedana, and adukkhamasukha vedana. I prefer "feels painfully wrong" as a more idiomatic rendering of dukkha these days and "feels nice and right" as translation for sukha.

Saṃjñā translated as "conceptualization" is standard in Mahayana Yogacara texts. As is explanation of saṃjñā as recognition/inference based on nimitta (sign,mark).

Yes, standard in Mahayana Yogacara (lol).... I covered the things you wrote in my answer, such as "nimitta". "Nimitta" (such as the idea of "beautiful") is not "sanna". It is a different level of abstraction. The idea of :beautiful" is related to lust rather than to sanna. This said, I won't claim to be an expert. It very subtle.

@Dhammadhatu I suggest you spend some time studying the concept of "nimitta". Sounds like you are very off track on that one.

Also DN 22, which says vitakka and vicara occur after craving. "Eye-contact..."Feeling born of eye-contact..."Perception of forms... "Intention for forms... "Craving for forms... "Thought directed at forms... "Evaluation of forms... . That is where this craving, when arising, arises. That is where, when dwelling, it dwells."... https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.22.0.than.html

The following quotes will show how it is not DD that is off-track. ""Passion is a making of themes (nimitta). Aversion is a making of themes. Delusion is a making of themes." MN 43. (Thanissaro) Attachment, your reverence, is productive of signs, hatred is productive of signs, confusion is productive of signs. (Horner) ... Greed, hate, and delusion are makers of signs. (Sujato) MN 43 Rāgo kho, āvuso, nimittakaraṇo, doso nimittakaraṇo, moho nimittakaraṇo

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

Vedana and Sanna are conjoined not disjoint.
When it says Vedan it implies there is Sanna as well.
=============
"Feeling, perception, & consciousness, friend: Are these qualities conjoined or disjoined? Is it possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them?"
"Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not disjoined. It is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them. For what one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one cognizes. Therefore these qualities are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them."
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.043.than.html

I didn't know that sutta. Thanks for the info. But going beyond the suttas: how do we explained the state of mind when conceptualization stops, but sensations are still present? Do the suttas speak of such a state?

conceptualization is not sanna. Contact is a condition for feeling. What you feel (vedeti), you perceive (sañjānāti). What you perceive, you think about (vitakketi). What you think about, you proliferate (papañceti).  phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato

Or MN 1 - Having perceived (sañjānāti) earth as earth, he conceives himself (maññati) as earth, he conceives himself in earth, he conceives himself apart from earth, he conceives earth to be ‘mine,’ he delights in earth. Why is that? Because he has not fully understood it, I say. https://suttacentral.net/mn1/en/bodhi

To Dhammadhatu: My knowledge of the sutta is almost non-existent, so my only sources are from anywhere else but the suttas. In the wiki entry about sañña, it is explained that the function of sañña is to noting, characterize and distinguish objects from other objects. That's what I understand as conceptualization: to distinguish things between each othe by assigning and describing their corresponding features (either verbally or by non-verbal recognition). https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saṃjñā

I found another source that defines sañña as "label, recognition or interpretation". https://www.accesstoinsight.org/glossary.html#s

shouldn't be sañña placed between vedana and tanha?

Vedana & sanna are co-joined (MN 43). They are the mind conditioner (citta sankhara - MN 44).

As far as I currently understand, vedana is just the physiological and
  psychological -and involuntary- response (felt as a pleasent,
  unpleasent or neutral sensation) to an specific stimulus. Vedana by
  itself shouldn't be an enough condition to give rise to tanha,

Vedana alone is enough to give rise to craving. Surely the immediate taste of certain foods is sufficient to give rise to craving. Or surely the sight of certain forms is sufficient to give rise to attraction (which is craving). For example, surely there are all sorts of chemical, hormones & neurological design that gives rise to sexual attraction on a non-verbal or non-thinking level.

there's no necessarily an evaluation (sañña) of that feeling that
  could lead to the rise of a preference (like, dislike or
  neither-like-nor-dislike), and consequently, to the rise of tanha.

Sanna is not evaluation. Nor is sanna "like & dislike". "Like" & "dislike" are craving; even attachment (abhinandi; found in the definition of the 2nd noble truth). Evaluation of "good" & "bad" are views & opinions attachment (diṭṭhupādānaṃ). Ideas such as "beautiful" are called "themes" ("nimitta"). MN 38 says "delight (nandi) in feelings is attachment".

Engaged as he is in favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—he
  delights in that feeling, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As
  he does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feelings is
  clinging. With his clinging as condition, being comes to be; with
  being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death,
  sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair come to be. Such is the
  origin of this whole mass of suffering.
Having thus abandoned favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, he
  does not delight in that feeling, welcome it, or remain holding to it.
  As he does not do so, delight in feelings ceases in him. With the
  cessation of his delight comes cessation of clinging; with the
  cessation of clinging, cessation of being; with the cessation of
  being, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, ageing and
  death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair cease. Such is
  the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.
MN 38

In terms of sankharas, Sanna and vedanna are citta sankharas and as usual, sankharas stems from ignorance (like asavas) and the rest of what is conditioned stems from contact and dukkha form craving.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.011.than.html
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/pts/sn/04_salv/sn04.36.015.wood.pts.htm
Since sanna and vedana are citta sankharas, qualifying them of physiological is not a good idea. Same thing with trying to separate them. TYpically, the higher realm have vedana and sanna, without having the 4 elements, meaning without rupa.
Ignorance and contact are the two main conditions that must be stopped. Craving conditions dukkha.
Most of the stuff in the dependent origination depends on contact, more than ignorance and craving.
You say that vedana cannot lead to tanha, by using some proof by contradiction and the concept of necessity. On the contrary. Vedana like you know is typically pleasant, non-pleasant and nor pleasant nor dis-pleasant [typically in 4th jhana]. SO that's the ideal basis for craving to pop up. Once there is a pleasant vedana, there is typically delight,and  anybody wants more pleasant vedana.

"Brethren, if there were not this satisfaction which comes from
scents, beings would not lust after scents.
But inasmuch as there is satisfaction in scents, therefore beings lust
after scents.
If misery, Brethren, pertained not to scents, beings would not be
repelled by scents.
But inasmuch as there is misery in scents, beings are repelled by
scents.
If there were no way of escape from scents, beings could not escape
from scents.
But inasmuch as there is a way of escape from scents, beings do escape
from scents.
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/pts/sn/04_salv/sn04.35.018.wood.pts.htm#p1

the buddha even says how to see the 3 vedanas, in order to progress on the path

One who has seen the pleasant as painful And the painful as a dart,
Seen as impermanent the peaceful feeling Neither painful nor pleasant:
He is a bhikkhu who sees rightly, One who fully understands feelings.

But vedana is conditioned by contact, not by craving,
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.023.than.html
and once there is vedena, there is craving, and craving is the ''patipada[=path] to vedana''.
Just like the noble path is the cessation of dukkha, the opposite of noble path that is tanha is the path to contact, which is the condition for the arising of vedana [you do not need to do anything than craving more to get  more vedana through contact]. craving as a path is really a super simple path: the path is just craving.
On the contrary, the opposite of craving-as-path has plenty of branches, from right discernment to the stilling of the Sankharas to their destruction.
Puthujjanas who love the idea that there can be perception without vedana are the rationalists. They love to call such a fantasy ''the objective perception'' and they always say that vedana pollutes the knowledge, the perception and the reality [puthujjanas who are rationalist say that the reality is the objects living in a world devoid of humans]. Those people say that the pinnacle of being a human is to be a free thinker, meaning a thinker who is not influenced by other humans, nor swayed by emotions, devoid of biases.
Of course, the dhamma has nothing to do, nor by goals nor methods, with the moronic fantasy of the rationalists.
If you want to know more, there is a whole vagga on khandas, on nidana, on Salayatana and there is a whole Samyutta  on vedana
http://obo.genaud.net/backmatter/indexes/sutta/sn/idx_samyutta_nikaya.htm
Typically this stuff is what the sutta in  Saɱyutta Nikāya are about. Sadly, not many monks talk about them in a systematic manner. Bikkhu bodhi has done MN and is in the middle of AN right now, so it will be at least one year before he finishes AN, and perhaps he will do DN or Kn before SN.
Another famous bikkhu did an exposition on SN, but also MN, KN and DN,  Bhante Dhammavuddho
https://www.youtube.com/user/vbgnet98/playlists?disable_polymer=1
you can get the records of his readings here
http://www.vbgnet.org/resource-audio.asp?page=7&cbbAuthor=&cbbLanguage=2143&cbbSortBy=Title&btnSubmit=Go

Thanks for your time! I'm kind of confused. In the Sallatha Sutta, Buddha explained that both worldlings and noble ones experience vedana in its trifold modality (pleasent, unpleasent and neutral), the difference being the way "their" minds reacted to such feelings. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.006.nypo.html

Vedana & sanna are not citta and they are not sankhara khandha. The term "citta sankhara" means vedana & sanna condition the citta. For example, pleasant feeling causes lust to arise; unpleasant feeling causes anger to arise. Therefore a physical feeling, such as pain from a broken leg, is a citta sankhara because it can make the citta become angry.

Yes,  "their" minds reacted to such feelings. The mind is "citta". The reaction is "sankhara". This is the meaning of "citta sankhara", namely, feeling & perception can cause the mind to react to them. Feeling & perception are "provokers" of the "mind", which is "citta sankhara".

Thanks for your time! This is exactly the root of my confusion. In the ariyas' minds there's the unpleasent feeling (in the case of a painful stimulus), but the subsequent anger does not arise. Where's the perception in this specific scenario? Why in this case the citta sankharas do not produce a citta?

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Why is the Pali word 'saṅkhārā' in Dependent Origination plural?
In researching Dependent Origination as described in SN 12.2 and using a basic Pali language guide (page 18), I found the following about each main Pali word:

jarāmaraṇaṃ singular from maraṇa neuter
jati singular from jāti feminine
bhavo singular from bhava masculine
upādānaṃ singular from upādāna neuter
taṇhā singular from taṇhā feminine
vedanā singular from vedanā feminine
phasso singular from phassa masculine
saḷāyatanaṃ singular from saḷāyatana neuter
nāmarūpaṃ singular from nāmarūpa neuter
viññāṇaṃ singular from viññāṇa neuter
saṅkhārā plural from saṅkhāra masculine
avijjā singular from avijjā feminine

The above seems to correlate with every translation I have read. Note: saḷāyatanaṃ may appear to be translated as plural but it appears singular because it includes 'six'.
For example, all translations say: "What is feeling [singular]?" rather than "What are feelings [plural]?"

And what is feeling? Katamā ca, bhikkhave, vedanā? There are these six
  classes of feeling. Chayime, bhikkhave, vedanākāyā— Feeling born of
  contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.
  cakkhusamphassajā vedanā, sotasamphassajā vedanā, ghānasamphassajā
  vedanā, jivhāsamphassajā vedanā, kāyasamphassajā vedanā,
  manosamphassajā vedanā. This is called feeling. Ayaṃ vuccati,
  bhikkhave, vedanā.

The saṅkhārā condition is described as follows:

And what are saṅkhārā [plural]? Katame ca, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā?
There are three kinds of saṅkhārā. Tayome, bhikkhave,
  saṅkhārā— body saṅkhāro [singular], speech saṅkhāro [singular] and mind saṅkhāro
  [singular] kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro.

Why is the Pali word 'saṅkhārā' in Dependent Origination plural where all other words are singular?

Dependent origination is the cycle of the happening event. Each event has only one decision. There are 2 saṅkhāra for each decision: wholesome and unwholesome. Wholesome saṅkhāra gives good resultants. Unwholesome saṅkhāra gives bad resultants. So, viññāna to vedanā which are the resultants of saṅkhāra must be singular, because it's just the resultants of one decision. Jāti and jarāmaraṇaṃ are same. Wholesome karmma-bhavo gives good resultants. Unwholesome karmma-bhavo gives bad resultants. So, jāti and jarāmaraṇaṃ must be singular because of the same reason.
Above explanation explained clearly in abhidhamma vibhaṅga paccayākāravibhaṅga and it's atthakathā. It separates each event to singular as "saṅkhāro". That's why no direct explaination in any atthakathā, included path of purification. However, it's used widely in difference context such as in VN.A. Introduction.
And this is the example of what I wrote "it's used widely":

Kusalattika: kusalā dhammā, akusalā dhammā, abyākatā dhammā.
The "wholesome" triad: wholesome phenomena, unwholesome phenomena, not
  both phenomena

The Path of Purification detailedly exposited the dependent origination follow to 'the "wholesome" triad':

jarāmaraṇaṃ = not both phenomena
jati =  not both phenomena
bhavo =  not both phenomena
upādānaṃ = unwholesome phenomena
taṇhā =  unwholesome phenomena
vedanā =  not both phenomena
phasso = not both phenomena
saḷāyatanaṃ =  not both phenomena
nāmarūpaṃ = not both phenomena
viññāṇaṃ = not both phenomena
saṅkhārā = 1. wholesome phenomena, 2. unwholesome phenomena
avijjā = unwholesome phenomena

You can see whether saṅkhārā are separated into 2 events.
Above quote is my own conclusion. To read it, the reader needs to understand in advance of chapter XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, and some part of chapter I, III. Also, it requires Abhidhamma knowledge in advance, as well.
Path of Purification, CH. XVII, THE SOIL OF UNDERSTANDING—CONCLUSION, DEPENDENT ORIGINATION, III. Detailed Exposition page 547-608.

I marked this answer down because it is difficult to comprehend. Also, all conditions are unwholesome. Bhavo is unwholesome. Jati is unwholesome. 1st words of Buddha = jati is suffering.

If Upatti-Bhavo and Jati are unwholesome, there are no any arahanta, because arahanta must crease all unwholesome phenomena to be arahanta. Arahanta has no  unwholesome phenomena, but his current life's suffering still going on until he dies.
Another I modified it. I concluded it from the path of purification, as I modified above, so if you don't understand the path of purification, you can ask about it in a new topic.

To provide a better answer, i think you need to explain your key point more clearly, in the answer. Please do not add more comments. Thanks

@Dhammadhatu How can I explain hundreds page in this topic? -- even harder in English. I think Bonn is saying that an answer can be found in pages 547-608 of the linked Path -- that's a chapter which explains DO in detail, Chapter XVII -- and that to understand that you need to have understood chapters 14-16 and some part of 1 and 3.

@Dhammadhatu The bit most relevant to your question might start at near the top of page 548, i.e. "Formations" (which, is plural) -- which analyses or lists them (plural) in considerable detail.

@Dhammadhatu I too find that text daunting to summarise. And it already includes its own summary at the end of that section i.e. on starting page 577 (i.e. paragraph 182) which summarises the three kinds -- i.e. of merit, demerit, and imperturbable -- see also e.g. paragraphs 177 of page 576 "formation of merit" and other kinds of formation.

@Dhammadhatu If that doesn't answer your question I don't know what you were askng. Was it that you have another theory, a different answer to your own question already (does this answer miss some point that you were trying to make when you asked this question)?

I think its is not good enough for this site that people merely post links. If there is a salient point in the link then merely copy & paste it. Thanks

@Dhammadhatu you are the only one who never understands how it hard for Thai like me to explain something in English. You never know whether my friend, who is medico IELTS band 7.5 fluent english german chinese native thai, can't translate what I described to you neither English to Thai nor Thai to English. Many your question is very easy for me, but your restriction in language, such as no pali or no abhidhamma, let me use over long time to write the answer.

I graduated only in high school, but I read tipitaka from 16 years old. I understand pali tipiṭaka, atthakathā, and ṭikā in advance. I have many pieces of evidence on hand for you all.
Do you know if you give me the chance to write the answer mix together with pali, many question will have a very strong answer in pieces of evidence and in logic? Have you ever work as a team? Do you know the others who can't make the original answer, maybe can translate my answer into the real english? I give them the evidences and logics, they rewrte it into their own.  All my answer is free. It's teamwork.

@ChrisW Dependent origination is the cycle of the happening event. Each event has only one decision. There are 2 saṅkhāra for each decision: wholesome and unwholesome. Wholesome saṅkhāra gives good resultants. Unwholesome saṅkhāra gives bad resultants. So, viññāna to vedanā which are the resultants of saṅkhāra must be singular, because it's just the resultants of one decision. Jāti and jarāmaraṇaṃ are same. Wholesome karmma-bhavo gives good resultants. Unwholesome karmma-bhavo gives bad resultants. So, jāti and jarāmaraṇaṃ must be singular because of the same reason.

@ChrisW Above explaination explained clearly in abhidhamma vibhaṅga paccayākāravibhaṅga and it's atthakathā. It separates each event to singular as "saṅkhāro". That's why no direct explaination in any atthakathā, included path of purification. However, it's used widely in difference context such as http://www.84000.org/tipitaka/atthapali/read_th.php?B=1&A=2430&w=&pagebreak=1#p116.

OK. I scored your answer up (even though I do not necessarily agree with it). You explained why sankhara is plural and why the others are singular in terms of "each decision" or "each event". I understood what you were attempting to explain. Thank you. Khop Kun Krap Khun Bonn.

Disappointing there has only been one attempt to answer this question. Often questions are asked about if only one sense organ can operate at the same time therefore I expected some interest in this question.
The impression is each link (except sankhara) allows for the common arising of one type of phenomena in a moment. For example, eye contact being the predominant experience or sensual attachment being the predominant experience or sensual becoming being the predominant experience.
However, with sankhara, the impression is all three sankhara (namely, kaya, vaci & citta sankhara) can arise together, at the same time.

all_licenses: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
What are the Five Pungent (Vegetables/Roots/Spices) and when were they first proscribed?
According to Salguero (2017):

The Five Pungent Roots generally refer to garlic, leeks, scallions, onions, and asafoetida, as well as their subvarieties. In some sources, the list includes ginger and chives.

I am looking for a more definitive reference for this. In particular, I am looking for any early Buddhist texts that proscribe the "Five Pungents" and, better still, explicitly names the five.

Hello and welcome to Buddhism SE. We also have a Help Center with useful resources that you might like. Enjoy your time here.

Unless you know for a fact that this proscription does not appear in any non-Chinese or non-Mahayana Buddhist text, I would not assume so. (My question is about any Buddhist text, not just Chinese or Mahayana ones.)

@user1180576. Sorry, I was of the impression answers were sought from that tradition. I edited the tags again.

At the risk of posting something that's more of a comment rather than an answer ...
I thought of "Jains" (from the same kind of era as Buddhists) -- apparently they too don't eat garlic, leeks, scallions, onions (apparently their rationale is that these are root vegetables) -- but (I may be wrong) I read that they (and Brahmins) can eat asafoetida. I don't know the history of it though, nor the Buddhism.
I suppose you might look in the Vinaya (where else?), for what you're looking for.
Can monks and nuns eat garlic? (for example) gives a reference to this, which includes ...

Monks, garlic should not be eaten. Whoever should eat it, there is an offence of wrong-doing.

... and ...

I allow you, monks, to eat garlic in the case of illness.

And the last post in that thread says ...

Should the same approach of moderation be taken for all five "pungent spices," i.e., leeks, scallions, garlic, onion, and ginger (if I have them correctly)?

... which might make sense? Ginger is "pungent" and is another plant-root (avoiding plant-roots is, I think, part of being as harmless as possible -- in the Jain doctrine at least -- I think that forest-dwelling Buddhist monks, too, aren't supposed to dig i.e. disturb the soil).


text:
Which is a certified/authentic guide to entering Jhnanas?
By far I have came across only Ajahn Brahms book which gives detailed instructions on entering Jhnanas.
If I google for any other instruction manual I get this link.
I don't doubt Ajahn Brahm at all but I havent read any reviews or blogs or internet postings of anyone who has entered Jhnanas through the instruction set of AB.
The link seems to be talking on similar lines but different language.
Is there a certified, peer reviewed instruction manual to entering Jnanas?
Can you provide any other instruction manual link preferably if you have experienced it.

First, without being explicitly jhana,  to get the citta into samadhi, like here
https://suttacentral.net/an10.2/en/sujato
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/ati/sn/05_mv/sn05.55.040.than.ati.htm#p1
  there is, before, 'sukhaṃ vediyati'', meaning pleasant vedana or ''sukkha''.
Before the pleasant vedana, there is ''kāyo passambhati'', which is a tranquil body. Before, the  tranquil body, there is ''pītimanassa'' which is mano having piti. Before mano has piti, there is ''Pamuditassa'', which is the experience of joy (of being moral and rejecting thought of delight on kama and ill will, which makes you keep the 5 precepts and all those rules about morality). Before the joy, there is a lack of regrets.
This stuff about  eagerness for renunciation, seeing drawbacks, and nirodha is the discriminating factor between a success and a failure to reach sotapanna or arhanthood through the jhanas,
http://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/ati/an/04_fours/an04.178.than.ati.htm#p1
Like the buddha said about him, https://suttacentral.net/an9.41/en/sujato, he claimed that renunciation of sensuality was good, but his citta was not '' confident'' in it. And as usual, the citta is not inclined towards renunciation due to a lack of seeing a danger in sensuality. Once he saw this danger, he managed to get the jhanas.
Now explicitly for the jhanas. First there is a whole vagga about jhanas
http://obo.genaud.net/backmatter/indexes/sutta/sn/03_kv/idx_34_jhanasamyutta.htm
second, the usual way to enter the first jhana is to be ''aloof from sense-desires, aloof from unprofitable states,'' from the typical formulation http://www.buddha-vacana.org/formulae/4jhana.html#1-cl
 and the buddha says that samasamadhi is precisely those jhanas
http://www.buddha-vacana.org/sutta/samyutta/maha/sn45-008.html#sammasamadhi
so the situation where somebody is ''aloof from sense-desires, aloof from unprofitable states,''  should stem form the joy and lack of regrets from being moral and seeing drawbacks of cravings for and delight in sensuality.

Ajahn Brahm's instruction is most centrally based in SN 48.9 (or SN 48.10).

I havent read any reviews or blogs or internet postings of anyone who has entered Jhnanas through the instruction set of AB.

Real jhana is a supernormal state. At least for monks, it is a transgression to reveal a supernormal state to the general public. Also, since jhana silences speech, it is doubtful a layman that has reached real jhana would announce it to people because it is simply contrary to jhana.
When a person, by having no interest whatsoever in sex & have no fear of aloneness (solitude), reaches jhana, the mind has the clarity to discern the common worldly person, attached to sex & ego, cannot reach jhana. Therefore, they would not declare to worldly people they have reached jhana. To do otherwise would be similar to trying to teach calculus to a monkey.

The link seems to be talking on similar lines but different language.

I doubt Gunaratana would teach the same as AB. I imagine Gunaratana would teach (Hindu) yogic (manipulative) practises from commentaries, such as the Visuddhimagga.

Is there a certified, peer reviewed instruction manual to entering Jnanas?

Only a relatively tiny proportion of Buddhists have attained real jhana. There is no such thing as "certified" by peer review. The only way to "certify" instructions is to compare them to the Pali suttas.
In brief, Ajahn Brahm, as written in his book, says his instructions based on "letting go" ("vossagga") are how the Buddha taught in SN 48.9 (SN 48.10 and MN 118).

Can you provide any other instruction manual link preferably if you have experienced it.

It is not proper to ask people to declare if they have experienced jhana. The path is based on the aspirations of the student rather than the attainments of the teacher. If a student has a worldly attitude, its unlikely they can reach jhana (because ego is too strong in the psyche).
This said, if you want to follow instructions other than Ajahn Brahm, I recommend to read the relevant posts on Buddhism Stack Exchange by the poster named Dhammadhatu.
In summary, AB's book is based on the following words of the Buddha found in SN 48.9, SN 48.10 and MN 118. Therefore, the AB method has been certified by the Lord Buddha.

And what is the faculty of concentration? There is the case where a monk, a disciple of the noble ones, making it his object to let go (vossagga),
  attains concentration, attains singleness of mind. Quite withdrawn
  from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful mental qualities, he enters
  & remains in the first jhana...
SN 48.9 Indriya-vibhanga Sutta

There is the case where a monk develops concentration as a factor for awakening dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent
  on cessation, resulting in relinquishment (vossagga).
MN 118 Anapanasati Sutta

Simply put, Jhana states are stages of letting go. One cannot be attached to letting go. Just as one cannot be imprisoned by freedom.
  The joy and happiness that arises with the beautiful breath is fueled
  by the letting go of burdens such as past and future, internal
  commentary and diversity of consciousness. Because it is a delight
  born of letting go, it cannot produce attachment.
Ajahn Brahmavamso

As for samadhi, an empty mind is the supreme samadhi, the supremely focused firmness of mind. The straining and striving sort of samadhi
  isn't the real thing and the samadhi which aims at anything other than
  non-clinging to the five khandas is micchasamadhi (wrong or perverted
  samadhi). You should be aware that there is both micchasamadhi and
  sammasamadhi (right or correct samadhi). Only the mind that is empty
  of grasping at and clinging to 'I' and 'mine' can have the true and
  perfect stability of sammasamadhi. One who has an empty mind has
  correct samadhi.
Ajahn Buddhadasa

Is there a certified, peer reviewed instruction manual to entering Jnanas?

The answer is yes and no.
There are some universalities but when one comes to applying a particular approach devised by another person there will always be an element of experimentation, or at least there should be if one isn't getting results. Once you've realized the hindrances and let go the rest is mostly self-directed intuitive feeling-around-in-the-dark.
You could start with learning about your five mental hindrances. Once you see how they hinder your progression it becomes natural to let them go. A lot of people want to skip this part, then discover that they cannot reach jhana because they don't have the knowledge of the hindrances. It save a huge amount of time to go through these meticulously. There are times where hindrances don't occur and this can be capitalized on but I would always suggest you develop knowledge of how your hindrances arise in your sessions. Through this knowledge one can traverse those difficulties and navigate across the undulating contours of the meditative terrain.
Even with this, it isn't a one-size-fits all approach. We all have different things happening with the mind. You will only learn by examining yourself carefully.
Avarana Sutta
Mahasatipatthana Sutta (Section on Hindrances)


text:
Nagarjuna and the Schools
I am confused by the variety of views within Buddhism. It appears to me that Nagarjuna provides a complete philosophical justification and explanation for the Buddha's teachings and that this is accepted by many Buddhists. But not all. I'd like to ask:

Which sects or schools reject Nagarjuna's metaphysics?
On what grounds do they do so?
How do they deal with the difficulty that Nagarjuna proves all theories of Reality except his own are logically indefensible?

There are three issues here: there is N's proof of the absurdity of all positive metaphysical positions (in Fundamental Wisdom); his 'theory of Emptiness'; the doctrine of 'Two Truths'.
I wonder whether some Buddhists cherry-pick from these -- or do those who reject or accept one of them tend to reject or accept all three?

@ChrisW is this question safe from getting too argumentative?

@AndreiVolkov I think It's a sincere question, that Peter has been surprised that not everyone shares or understands his view[s] (which he derives from N). If I were to try to answer this I think I might just say that different schools have different "canons", which may or may include N (and that e.g. the Pali canon is already large and arguably sufficient) ... see also e.g. Nichiren I guess -- is their canon only the Lotus?

It is a sincere question and I did not mean to start any arguments. Clearly there is a major argument within Buddhism as to the meaning of the teachings and I'm exploring how deep it runs.

We usually want to avoid topics of the form, "why does school A think that school B's doctrine-of-X is wrong?"

@ChrisW - I wonder why. It seems an excellent kind of question.

See "Broad comparisons" here and "Minimising controversy" here.

So is philosophical discussion discouraged here, in case people disagree?  .

I think "discussions" of all sorts are discouraged -- i.e. this site is principally for Q+A ... i.e. for questions which can be answered. Also "hostility" is discouraged ("Your school sucks!" "No, your school sucks!" "No, you suck, and so does your teacher!"). Entertaining for some, maybe, off-putting for others. Stuff that generates more heat than light, and extended discussions which only their mother could love, can make the place unwelcoming or uninviting to others (see e.g. here). Apparently there are other places on the 'net ...

@ChrisW - Okay. I get that. This would be definitely inappropriate language.

... where you can go or be, for discussion, if you want. This place is trying to be a bit different, i.e. "This site is all about getting answers. It's not a discussion forum. There's no chit-chat." That's the idea. And (as referenced in that "Mimizing controversy" FAQ summary), the community had lots of previous experience with people's bickering elsewhere, hoped and asked that this site might be different. So we minimise inter-school debates, so that different members may co-exist on one site peacefully, which allows you to ask about any school.

Anyway, therefore, it's kind of policy that if you want to know more about "school B's doctrine-X" then you should typically ask school B about that -- school B are the better informed about that -- and, any answers about doctrine X should be from, based on, a school B perspective. And if you want to address your question to members of school A, you should ask them about school A's doctrines.

Okay. But I'm happy with the answer I'm receiving here.

I can tell you why the Theravada school does not pay attention to Nagarjuna's works:

Parable of the Poisoned Arrow
Parable of the Simsapa Leaves
The Discourse on the Unconjecturables
The statement by the Buddha that he did not hide anything in a closed fist.
Discourse on The All

Basically, this means that from the perspective of the Theravada school, everything that the Buddha had taught in the Pali Canon is sufficient. Nothing more is needed. Anything else is simply icing on the cake.
Personally, I have tried to understand Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka emptiness and tried to link it back to Theravada emptiness in this question. I appreciate the concept of Madhyamaka emptiness.
I don't think Nagarjuna is in conflict with the Buddha's original teachings (in the Pali suttas and Mahayana Agamas). But at the same, I don't think he introduced something new to improve the Buddha's original teachings.
One important contribution of Nagarjuna is the use of methodical philosophical analysis to defend Buddhism against attacks by Hindu and other non-Buddhist Indian philosophers. See this answer.

Thanks. I'm beginning to appreciate the depth of the divisions within the sangha. Often it is said that Nagarjuna places the Buddha;s teachings on a sound philosophical foundation but clearly this is a matter of debate. Perhaps there is an alternative sound foundation. Very much agree about the value of his philosophical explanation as a defense against sceptics but it can only work for the Middle way view. This is, indeed, why I'm confused about why he is widely rejected.

PS. I checked your first couple of link and found nothing there to explain why anyone would reject Nagarjuna.

I didn't say Theravada rejects Nagarjuna. I meant that Theravada doesn't need Nagarjuna and so ignores him.

Ah. Fair enough. I presume metaphysics is not a concern for Theravadans and in this case he may be safely ignored.

Yes. Metaphysics is one of the unconjecturables.

For Thervadans maybe. Metaphysics is a doddle if we grasp what Nagarjuna is saying and it would require analysis, not conjecture, but now I'm starting to argue and I didn't mean to do this. I'd agree that metaphysics is not necessary.if we are a serious practitioner.   .

can you summarize what Theravada is about?

I don't have the scholarship to give you a survey of several schools -- perhaps someone else will.
The way I see it is that schools will have a "canon". I think that's a bit a analogous to the "curriculum" of a school -- and different schools have different curricula ... almost by definition -- and therefore (i.e. to that extent) your question and/or my answer to it might be just trivial, or unsatisfying.
Or it may "beg the question" i.e. whether there even are different schools of sects of Buddhism, e.g.,

@Lanka Theravada Buddhists don't really recognize other schools. Mostly historians do that. So it's just Buddhism for us. – Sankha Kulathantille Aug 13 '15 at 13:33
And we do recognize other schools, it's all Buddhism for us :) – Andrei Volkov♦ Aug 13 '15 at 15:56

Now just consider the Pali canon, for example -- I thinks that's "the canon" for many Buddhists.
Trivially if something is in the canon then it's canonical, and if it's not it's not.
If you ask, "what makes something canonical?", then you might get an answer like, Buddhist councils.
If you ask, "is that (is a, is any) canon necessary and sufficient?" --

I won't try to answer whether and how much of it is "necessary" -- even with[in] the Tripitaka my understanding is that the suttas are accessible, and that there's (also) an "abhidharmic tradition" -- and maybe e.g. Zen schools are not a fan at all
But, maybe, whether "it's sufficient":

It's big enough ("approximately eleven times the size of the Christian bible") -- so, honestly, what more could you want?
It's good enough
It's Buddhavacana (which is another word which begs the question, i.e. different schools and even different individuals may have different definitions of what they consider buddhavacana)
It's partly an article of "faith" (e.g. in the triple gem, i.e. the doctrine and the teachers)
The Buddha himself said, famously, in several suttas, that he'd taught everything necessary -- that there's a lot of other doctrine (in theory), which he didn't teach because it isn't necessary (see e.g. "handful of leaves")

Which sects or schools reject Nagarjuna's metaphysics? On what grounds do they do so?
I don't know that they even know or care?
I don't know if this is a good analogy, but ... "How can there be people who haven't thoroughly studied Einstein's theories of relativity? How do they even explain the gravitational lensing of light, without it?" -- someone asking these questions might think that Einstein's theories are utterly fundamental to understanding the nature of the universe we live in -- for other people ("normal people", if you'll excuse my putting it that way) that's completely missing the point, quite irrelevant, nothing to even think about.
How do they deal with the difficulty that Nagarjuna proves all theories of Reality except his own are logically indefensible?
Quite. Well I suppose that Buddhism isn't necessarily "metaphysics". I think I inferred from this comment of yours that you see Taoism too as metaphysics (or what you call a "(perennial) philosophy") -- I don't know, maybe it's something else: practical, a science ... a history, a narrative (see also e.g. "is medicine a 'science', or an 'art'?") ... whereas "metaphysics" are even less relevant, more of a niche interest, than "physics" (if you'll forgive my saying so, that's me having studied physics but not formal philosophy).

Practically, I think that the suttas' summary is something like, "all sankharas (n.b. nibbana is a dhamma not a sankhara) are dukkha" -- and "both (i.e. all dhammas, including nibbana and sankharas) are anatta").
In contrast, I think that (correct me if I'm wrong) N's summary is that "everything (including nibanna) is sunyata".

Maybe the suttas aren't trying to be "logically defensible" -- they're trying to be "helpful descriptions" ... for people who have "ears to hear", and "little dust in their eyes".
I wonder whether some Buddhists cherry-pick from these -- or do those who reject or accept one of them tend to reject or accept all three?
I get from the suttas that the Buddha (and, following his example, some Buddhists) might treat that or any other kind of question as false dichotomy -- e.g., "Q: Is it this or that, or both, or neither? A: none of the above, or no answer."
Questions like, I don't know, "Are things empty or not? Are two truths, or only one, or none?" are just -- might be (at the risk of sounding rude) be called -- examples of papanca.
I mean, after you have studied -- and if you study -- Nagarjuna, then you may understand what he's saying ... and why he's saying it i.e. why it's helpful or beneficial, useful, practical, worthwhile.
Maybe you should know, though, that lots of people simply haven't (studied N that well) and don't (understand what good about it and exactly what he's saying).
If you try to make comments (brief remarks or answers), which presume that people have read N and that they understand it in the same way that you do, then your comments may be misunderstood, or baffling -- see e.g. here,

Buddhist discussions online have a tendency to attract "there is no spoon"* answers

I guess another example might be the Zen story, titled Nothing exists ... an example of the doctrine being -- variously, I guess, depending on I interpret that story -- hard to fathom, shallowly repeated, easy to misunderstand, or missing the point entirely.

Thanks Chris. - You go some way to answering my question by noting that many people do not study Nagarjuna. The 'Nothing Exists' link represents N;s position in that he does not say nothing exists. It seems that one answer to my question may be that not all Buddhist pay any attention to Nagarjuna or to metaphysics. I don't intend to argue with answers but I do wonder how Buddhists can feel comfortable while disagreeing so strongly on such important issues, particularly on the importance of metaphysics. But I'm just assessing the situation, not pushing a view.  .

And even scholars with an at-least-a-superficial understanding of other schools might not properly "get it" (or get them), see e.g. this topic.

Fascinating. It seems that non-duality and its many misunderstandings may be the source of much of the disagreement. I have been taking it for granted that Buddhism teaches non-duality but it seems some schools do and some don't. My suspicion is that the disagreements arise from a failure to distinguish between the Buddha;s 'Three Turnings of the Wheel' but that's a discussion for another time. For now I'm just nosing around.

Nagarjuna's ideas differ from the Pali suttas. Nagarjuna taught the following differences:

Using the term Dependent Origination to describe all "cause & effect" rather than merely restricting the term to the 12 conditions leading to suffering.
Equating Dependent Origination with Sunnata, which is wrong, because Nibbana is also Sunnata but Nibbana is not Dependently Originated. Also, for example, in SN 12.3, the Buddha taught Dependent Origination is "the wrong path".
Saying things that are contrary to meditative experience and contrary to the Buddha, such as there are really no causes and no effects because a cause is only cause dependent upon an effect to be a cause therefore an effect is the cause of a cause (or something like that). In reality, meditators see certain things giving rise to other things. That is why the Buddha taught there are causes. When in meditation things are seen directly, the THINKING does not occur that a cause is really an effect and an effect is really a cause and the other philosophical Taoist-like intellectual gymnastics of non-duality Nagarjuna engaged in.
My impression of his "Two Truths" is his so-called higher truth is "non-thinking" or "non-conceptualisation", which is unrelated to what the Buddha taught. The Buddha did not teach "non-thinking" or "non-conceptualisation" is Nibbana (the supreme state).
From what I have read by Mahayana Buddhists, Nagarjuna claimed the Four Noble Truths were a "conventional" or "lower" truth; which a Pali Buddhist cannot accept as true (because MN 117 says the Four Noble Truths are supramundane Right View).
Did Nagarjuna teach Nibbana & Samsara are the same? If so, a Pali Buddhist would generally find such an idea to be utterly ridiculous. The Pali suttas clearly say Samsara & Nibbana are totally opposite things.
Contrary to Satipatthana, Nagarjuna taught there is emptiness of self and emptiness of things and the "emptiness of the aggregates as things" must occur before liberation can occur. This is contrary to Satipatthana, where seeing the body as merely 'body'', etc, is sufficient for liberation.

Addition to post: I just read the comment below in answer, which is the opposite of Pali Buddhism:

I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught that whatever is dependently arisen is unceasing, unborn,
  unannihilated, not permanent, not coming, not going, without
  distinction, without identity, and free from conceptual construction.
Nagarjuna

Was he a mahayanist or Theravadin?

@ChrisW should we allow answers like this, in light of our "defend yours, don't disparage other's" rule? I would imagine we want to allow the proponents of Nagarjuna to provide common reasons he is doubted/dismissed but not to his opponents?

@AndreiVolkov I don't know whether D's view is that of any particular school or is only his own (which makes it difficult to soften, objectify, 3rd-personify the text, e.g. "such-and-such a school teaches that etc."). The introductory sentences, at least, are peculiar or something ... pretty questionable, I guess.(if you wanted his opinion). If you find it kind of offensive, you are allowed to edit it, if you can salvage it.

@AndreiVolkov It may be that because the question is asking about schools, therefore D's is "not an answer" at the moment (since it represents his own opinion). OTOH I think it's nice to be mild, if or when you post an answer which claims to represent the view of an entire school.

@AndreiVolkov I would imagine we want to allow the proponents of Nagarjuna to provide common reasons he is doubted/dismissed but not to his opponents? Or let the proponent of a school explain why their school is sufficient (even without N.); and (per the question) their theory of reality/logic (instead of N.'s, if they can contrast theirs with N.'s).

My answer is based on doctrine.

@Dhammadhatu The question was about "which sects or schools?", though (that's the first question and in the title). Are you telling the OP about the doctrine of a school? Which one? Does your view reflect that of a school? Or did you interpret it as being a personal question, i.e. "what does DD say about N"? And Andrei's concern was that answers must usually never be of the form, "what does DD think N's doctrine is and why does DD think that's wrong" e.g. because (unless you're a proponent of N -- of N's school) it may be better to assume you don't properly understand what N's doctrine is.

So generally e.g if a question is about Mahayana then we (i.e. the defined policy of this site) is to only solicit answers from a Mahayana viewpoint (and, so, a Mahayana practitioner or student) -- a) because they're better able to explain what Mahayana doctrine is, and b) to spare us from answers of the form "your school's doctrine is wrong".

I find this answer just fine and not at all argumentative. I feel it is very wrong but that's another matter. It does the job and explains to me some of the objections that are made to Nagarjuna. I have no intention of arguing here, just listening. .

Mind you, I would like some evidence that Nagarjuna says anything contrary to meditative experience or to the Buddha. This is a very bold claim. .

Nagarjuna did not promote "non-thinking", this is a translational misconception of Śūnyavāda. What Nagarjuna meant is "neither thinking or non-thinking", the base concept of Madhyamaka. As for cause & effect, Nagarjuna explains this clearly in MMK IV:6: "The assertion that the effect and cause are similar is not acceptable. The assertion that they are not similar is also not acceptable."  Otherwise said, it cannot be described because of the duality of language. Nagarjuna's core teaching is essentially experiential, not doctrinal.

@ChrisW - On reflection I share your view of this answer.and also now see your point about the danger in my question. I'll be more careful in future. ;

@Codosaur - I'm with you on this and do not feel this answer is well informed. I remain convinced that Nagarjuna is rejected only by those who don't understand him since after many years of study i have not discovered a single telling objection or found any evidence that he departs from the Buddha's teachings. I feel he is just poorly studied. .

I think it is quite evident from MMK IV:6 that his is not what the Buddha taught. There is nothing "experiential" about the idea of "duality of language". The Buddha taught language was conventions and never ever taught about "non-duality" as his Teaching.

The comments section is really for the purpose of the crying & complaining. People can simply write their own answer.


text:
Evidence of determinism in DN 2 Samaññaphala Sutta? Was the King already a faith follower?
Near the end of the Samaññaphala Sutta it says this:

"The king is incapacitated. Had he not killed his father — that righteous man, that righteous king — the dustless, stainless Dhamma eye would have arisen to him as he sat in this very seat." DN 2 https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html

Now in the English language to my knowledge when one uses the word "would" it means something definite. By my understanding it seems that the Buddha according to this sutta is saying that if King Ajatasattu had fulfilled certain conditions such as having not committed such an offense + coming to the Buddha and inquiring etc. as he did in this sutta then the "dustless, stainless Dhamma eye" would have definitely arisen.
So this particular statement seems entirely deterministic unless I am misunderstanding or translation is wrong.
Was the King already a faith follower or wisdom follower?

I think the Buddha does (supernaturally) know the condition[s] in which someone might become enlightened.
Like (I don't know if this is a good example) this isn't "deterministic" but I know that "if I hit something with a hammer then it will break".
A more explicit story like that is, for example, The Weaver's Daughter from the Dhammapada commentary:

Now one day, as the Teacher surveyed the world at early dawn, he perceived that this maiden had entered the net of his knowledge. When he saw her, he considered within himself, "What will happen?" And he became aware of the following, "From the day when this maiden heard my discourse on the Dhamma, she has practiced meditation on death for three years. I will now go to Alavi and ask this maiden four questions. On each of the four points she will answer me correctly, and I will congratulate her. I will then pronounce the stanza, This world is indeed blind. At the conclusion of the stanza she will be established in the fruit of stream-entry. By reason of her, my discourse will be profitable to the multitude besides." So the Teacher, with his retinue of five hundred monks, departed from Jetavana, and in due course arrived at the Aggalava monastery.

I'm pretty sure there are other examples of stories like that in the suttas.
I think that's part of what makes the Buddha "a Buddha" -- i.e. insight into other people so as to know how best to teach them.

Is that ... a question? "If he had studied he would have passed the exam", "If he didn't have a criminal record he would have got the job", it's a pretty ordinary remark IMO. You can say things, about stuff you know ("if that paper hadn't been wet it would have caught fire"), is there something remarkable about "determinism" in your opinion?

I think the king would have attained stream entry just like how the first five followers of the Buddha attained arahantship after listening to 1 or 2 discourses.

@Angus The Buddha's being able to do it doesn't everyone ("people") can, so... I'm not even sure about "know the future" -- maybe the stories suggest that the Buddha knows the present really well.

@TheDBSGuy Yes. Also though there's a paragraph towards the end of The Noble Search ("And so I was able to convince them. I would teach two monks while three went for alms, and we six lived off what the three brought back from their alms round. Then (etc.)", which suggests that their arahantship took a bit longer than that? But I think there are (several) examples in the suttas of "stream entry" after listening to a discourse.

@Angus Yes, in the suttas I think there there are stories of when, after someone died/dies, the Buddha is able to see (and to tell people) in what state that person is currently reborn (or, whether they were totally Unbound). I think that's perhaps the so-called "divine eye".

Determinism is soemtimes possible. For example, a stream enterer is destined to attained arahantship within 7 lives and a once returner will attain it in the next life and a non returner will attain it in the pure abodes.

ChrisW I think maybe he was just giving a talk on the gradual teaching to make their mind be free of the five hindrances

I also heard that the king will become a private or silent Buddha because he sponsored the first Buddhist council

@TheDBSGuy Determinism is soemtimes possible. For example... I think so. But "Determinism" is a Western philosophical school which implies that everything is predetermined, that the future is fixed, that there's no choice, etc. -- perhaps an extreme view and a view which people like to say is wrong. I think that's why the OP was puzzled -- something like, "if the Buddha can predict the future, is that saying that the future (especially e.g. the king's future) is predetermined, and does that mean that we (e.g., the king) have no choice, no effect?"

Stream enterer, once returner, non returner are all destined for enlightenment and who killed his parents, injure a Buddha are destined for hell in the next life

My reading is the Buddha said the King had the capacity for awakening but the King's mind was still emotionally hindered by the action of killing his father.

Even "determinism" is based on conditions. If a student's about to take a very tough rigorous final exam, if s/he doesn't spend enough time and effort to study up, on the day of the exam, it's "deterministic" that s/he will fail the exam. Similarly, the Five Heinous Offenses are a class of offenses so grave that once committed, it's deterministic that one's next life will be in woeful states, even after one tried to make up for it with wholesome deeds later on. That doesn't mean those good deeds are for nothing, but it does mean that their fruition will have to wait for the fruition of the heinous offenses to manifest first. That pretty much was the case of prince Ajatasattu in the DN sutta.

I think it mean he would have definitely attain stream entry after listening to the Buddha’s teachings if he didn’t kill his father.

I don’t know if it is his first time meeting the Buddha or not. I think he didn’t even know about the Buddha’s teachings before that. He might not have kill his father if he was a faith follower


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How is one supposed to be compassionate and 100% free of suffering while others are suffering?
How is this possible besides if one simply doesn't mind if others are suffering?
But if one truly doesn't mind whether others are suffering or not isn't that a lack of compassion? Is one supposed to let go of compassion regarding others?
Even if there is nothing that one can do to help the other being, even if one is doing one's best, wouldn't the desire to end all suffering for all sentient beings still be present and therefore suffering still existing in one before that goal has been achieved?
I don't see how it is possible for a being to be compassionate and free of suffering while still knowing that others are suffering.
Is it supernatural? Does it transcend reason?

How is this possible besides if one simply doesn't mind if others are suffering?

Its not a matter of not caring. It is a matter of each person must end their own suffering.

Even if there is nothing that one can do to help the other being

Correct. Well-spoken!!!

I don't see how it is possible for a being to be compassionate and free of suffering while still knowing that others are suffering.

The above is a contradiction. When it is realised there is nothing one can do to help the other being; the mind let's go; and ends its suffering. However, the mind, free from suffering, is always willing to compassionately help another person help themself.

Is it supernatural? Does it transcend reason?

Sorry. Please don't feel criticized but, in my opinion, your post does not accord with reason. When it is realised there is nothing one can do to help the other being, this giving up of desire or absence of hope is Nibbana.

The phrase 'absence of hope' may be used in regard to the attainment of arahantship, but it's not the resignation of the foolish and lazy,
  it's a different matter altogether. It is the absence of hope of one
  who with true wisdom sees that there is nothing in this or any world
  that one should wish to have or be. Truly nothing is worth having or
  being at any time or at any place.
Heartwood from the Bo Tree

No matter what the christian puthujjanas and their secular humanists children claim, compassion is not metta nor karuna, and love is not metta. Compassion has nothing to do with a puthujjana trying to stop being a puthujjana.
THe pali word for compassion is and always will be Anukampa.
TO do something out of anukampām means, with the vocabulary of toxic philosophers, to do something while having pity, having mercy, compassion, and in terms of other words, to know that puthujjanas have a miserable life and to tell the few puthujjanas who want to hear about the cessation of dukkha. There is zero emotions involved, zero pathos involved, zero suffering involved on the side of the buddha who do something out of Anukampa and teach for the sake of puthujjanas.
But of course, puthujjanas are stuck in their toxic craving for kama and they try to define ''being a good person'' has having certain emotions and ''being a bad person'' has having certain other emotions. Toxic puthujjanas are stuck on the level of pathos and the toxic people like the humanists claim that having the pathos of feeling sad when they see puthujjanas not enjoying themselves is a good thing. THose people have been around for many generations now and they still have not alleviate the suffering of anybody. But they  still claim that their view is correct.
The puthujjanas before the toxic humanists where here typically said that a ''good person'' can sleep peacefully, precisely because of a lack of regrets, because such a person  has done nothing which is shameful [typically there a virtuous actions, and morality is disconnected from intentions].
But for the humanist puthujjana addicted to sensuality, that is not possible, precisely because, according to their toxic view, ''a good person'' sees how miserable other puthujjanas are, to the point that a  good person cannot sleep at night.
The view stems as usual in taking the opposite side of the view create before: with those puthujjanas is is all about intentions and actions do not matter much. As long as the humanists delude themselves into thinking that they have good intentions, no matter what they do, they will think that they are good people.
But it gets worse for those toxic people:  they claim that what is left when they are humanist is their moronic fantasy of unconditional love, of accepting everybody and as usual, their favorite words ''being compassionate''. This stems from their awful dichotomy of opposing hate and love and their idiotic fantasy of ''enduring the suffering of other people'' like their jesus and bodhisattvas.
But it gets even worse: once they hear that the dhamma is about destroying hate, anger and so on, since those toxic puthujjanas addicted to emotions cannot stop thinking they are already good people for feeling sad when other puthujjanas cannot get the objects of their sensual lust, they pass the lack of hate and ignorance as their compassion which leads them to  never ever manage to have right intentions.
Those people completely fail to distinguish between ''kamma that is bright with bright result'' and the ''kamma that is neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright result'', by clinging to their moronic dichotomy of hedonism-selflessness and their toxic view that delight in the 5 strings of sensuality is not harmless as long as they feel compassionate.
If you want to train for metta, you calm the body, the mano typically by following the breath for 1h, then you focus on a living being you like, like a pet, and how much you want them to stop ''suffering'', which for a puthujjana means ''enjoying the things they like and avoiding the things they dont like''.
Quickly a pleasant emotion will arise, like the sukha and piti but more calm, and perhaps even the famous cessation of subject-object, the cessation of ''a doer'' will happen.
THis state is the famous state that puthujjanas who have zero wisdom, like the hedonists who invented the Mahayana and vajrayana, pass as nibanna.
When you have this good emotion for any human who focus on, you can claim to have metta.
Once you have metta, or at least have this good emotion for the people you love, you can focus on doing karuna and having mudita.
Since puthujjanas know nothing about the dhamma, they cannot teach it and non-puthujjanas who are not arhant have better things to do than teaching the doctrine.
The day you manage to become an arhant, you can start focusing on Anukampa as the teaching of the dhamma. In the meantime, if you want to do karuna, you can support the contemplative and the other people.

In Buddhism, we practice Brahama Viharas.
There are four Brahama Vihara and the last one is the Upekkha or equanimity.
Once you understand the nature of Anocca, Dukkha and Anataa you can extend equanimity towards other beings. This is a complex topic. The following link provides you with a detailed explanation of four Brahama Viharas.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanaponika/wheel006.html

you might have just mentioned a very high level dhamma.   Even compassion is a conditioned phenomenal.  It is also subject to dukkha, annicca, annatta.  It is unreliable.  It changes.   I dont remember which sutta, but those who practice compassion mediation and take note of its condition, it is possible to reach enlightenment in this life time, if not, they would appear in Bhramakayika world and become none-returner after that.  If it works for you (practicing compassion meditation and take not of its unreliability), I'd say run with it.


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Did the Buddha according to the suttas mean anything else by the word "self" beyond simply the aspect of control/power?
It looks like according to [the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta][1] one aspect that is considered "self" by the Buddha is power or control. Why did he use the word "self" instead of just "complete control/power"? Was/is there more to it than just power/control?
Was there anything more meant by the Buddha according to the suttas by the usage of the word "self"?

This is a very famous line of argumentation in Buddhism, especially in Theravada, about no-self. The basic idea is that according to common sense, we can control ourselves by the power of will - move our limbs etc. - but we can't control external objects. From this it follows that this notion of control can be used to help clarify the boundary between "me" and "not me". Buddha then uses reductio ad absurdum to show that, in fact, according to this definition, nothing is truly in our control, therefore nothing is me (or "self").
Mahayana builds up on this basic point to show a deeper meaning the Buddha implied. Since nothing is fully in our control and things are always in flux (including our mind), said the Buddha, let's stop expecting that things can ever be perfect in some imaginary state of (conditional) Nirvana. This very expectation of perfection itself, says Buddha, is what creates the mental mismatch that we experience as psychological suffering.
In fact, our definition of perfection that we have internalized, our idea of how things should be, is exactly the core of our sense of self. This mental point of reference is what we measure the world against, and as long as we measure it, we will find things to be imperfect, causing the painful feeling of wrongness, dukkha. Only by doing away with any sense of territory, any idea of how things should be, which is the core of Self, can we open to seeing things as they are.
Therefore Buddha says, do not identify with anything, physical or mental. Identification leads to dukkha. First, because it (=whatever we identify with, e.g. body) will eventually break up and it's not in our power to stop that. Second, because it (=all external things, but also even the mind) is in flux and never fully in our control, therefore fundamentaly unreliable; impossible to guarantee. Third, because it (a hard position or view) leads to conflicts, arguments, and even violence.  And fourth, because it (i.e. an idea of how things should be) serves as a basis of comparison and setting of expectations, which is inherently conducive to dissatisfaction.
Therefore, a wise man, a rational man, a practical man seeking to stop dukkha, would be right to conclude that identifying with anything, any entity or concept, is simply a bad move, because it would inevitably lead to suffering.
Cessation of identification leads to cessation of dukkha. Realizing this, letting go of identification, and achieving the unconditional suchness (perfection without comparison) is the solution that Buddha offers.
This is the meaning of this passage, in my understanding.

Option 3) There is something you have not thought of.
Your claim 'if one sees an illusion of a lake it requires the knowledge of an actual lake which requires an actual lake to exist.' is not true. It's easy to see it as true when you are choosing, as an example, something that is concrete and obviously conventionally true.
Very often, when people visualize things, either awake or dreaming, it is with the idea that they have a perfect vivid image in their mind of what it is they are thinking of. However, you can test this by asking a group of people to close their eyes and visualize something, then ask them to draw it. You will find that people often draw things very badly even if they thought, a second ago, that they had a picture realistic view in their head. You might be inclined to say that this is due to lack of artistic talent, but I can tell you from experience-- you can get a classroom of artists to draw something sitting on a table in front of them and get a pretty good sketch from each of them, but you'll find MUCH more varying results from asking them to draw from their imagination, even if they all insist that their internal image is photorealistic.
In reality, people very rarely (if ever) actually have a very detailed image in their mind. What occurs is that they have PART of an image, and the rest of the details are vague. They may know exactly how 3 parts of it look up close, and how the colors should vaguely be, but not how anything is actually supposed to fit together. However, the way the mental image works, it's hard for the mind to actually focus on the parts they don't know and especially hard for the mind to notice that those parts are incorrect. Once you must act based on the information in those parts (via drawing) suddenly it is hard for the mind to guide based on this bad image. Without that act, drawing, it is very difficult to realize what parts of the mental image are disproportioned or incorrect, or even that any of it is.
That may have seemed like a long digression, because, like the lake, you still are basing the image on something that physically exists.
But the same thing occurs when you ask people to draw abstract images that they visualize beforehand. When the only goal is to draw an image you have imagined, you still find that you have failed to imagine it to the detail you thought you had. It's less noticeable and, from an art perspective, it's much easier to still produce an art piece that looks very good, despite not being what the artist was visualizing to begin with.
It is like that for concepts as well. People begin to think of a concept-- say, self-- and they see some very zoomed in details. They learn these details from different people, and when you ask people, "what is the self" they mentally create something like the previously mentioned vague visual image- they might zoom in on details, they may create a vague shape. Much like the abstract visuals people made previously, when they must act on this, they might find that it's impossible and self contradictory. Usually, like the artists, an uninstructed person just patches it up and makes something different as they go.
The doctrine of not-self is the Buddha taking all those zoomed in details of what people often try to put into the 'self' concept and saying that they don't fit together into this true concept of 'self'. He was responding to how other people used words, and he was specifically saying that these patched together collages of details did not work together like they should.

There is not a "true concept" of "self"-- the details people try to put into it don't work with it the way they expect it to. They have a vague and internally inconsistent idea of it, but they think it is a true concept or that it is at least something that has a true concept, even if they haven't yet understood it. The Buddha teaches otherwise.

If I changed "they don't fit together into this true concept of 'self'" to "they don't fit together into some 'true' concept of 'self" would that be clearer?

My understanding has been that he saw people taking these things as those details and trying to fit them into this 'collage' which wouldn't work. Then people would try to live their lives by following this 'collage' and they would stumble and experience all the things related to dependent origination. To stop trying to put these details together is a necessary but not sufficient step towards getting enlightened. To keep this collage of meshed together beliefs is to try to live your life by a map which is incorrect. Does that address your question, or have I missed what you meant?

I get the impression that you have a specific meaning in mind more specific than how I am understanding it when you ask about why he said to regard things as not-self. Is it about the phrasing? Why he didn't say "this is not what the self is"?

So I see the issue, you and I fundamentally disagree about one detail. "It implies that there is something called "self" that exists in some sense." I disagree. I can argue with you that a horse is a unicorn, and you can point to it and say "that is not a unicorn, that is a horse" and you have not in any way validated that unicorns are real things that exist. You have simply given me correct information which will better serve me if I need to learn what to feed the horse, for example, while searching for info about unicorns would not serve me. Does that make more sense to you?

To say that the horse isn't a unicorn is merely to tell me that I will be better served to look for information about horses. I could argue with you that a unicorn is the same thing as a horse, and you could get pulled into that argument. But it does not change the facts, which are that I am better served learning about equine care by searching by info about horses. It is like the Buddha is telling you to stop googling about unicorns in order to learn what to feed your animal.

It looks like according to the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta one aspect that is considered "self" by the Buddha is power or control.

In my reading, the Buddha here was commenting on the subject of "self" rather than the subject of "control". He was not saying "control" is "self". He was saying if there was a "real self", this self could control itself.

If the claim of "self" being an illusion is made, one needs to at least know and preferably define **what "self" is.**

"Self" is defined in SN 22.81 is an "assumption", "mental formation" & "ignorant misunderstanding".

There is some other explanation to this that I am currently unaware of.

"Self" is an underlying tendency (anusaya). Using scientific terminology, it can be said "self" is a survival instinct (i.e., a form of craving called craving to be). When the mind becomes anxious or lustful, these energies of anxiety & lust create ideas or thoughts in the mind of 'self' or 'identity'.
Thus Buddha taught the arising of 'self-view' is the 'arising of suffering' (SN 12.15; SN 5.10).

Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found.
Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.'
It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering
  ceases.
SN 5.10

Self is a wrong view. Aggregates are aggregates.

Yes, it is certainly "conceptual thing" but this concept is born of ignorance, as described in SN 22.81. It is an ignorant concept, similar to say believing in "god". The mind sees the mysterious wonder and complexity of the universe then imagines a "god" created it. The concept of "self" is similar.

How do you define a "conceptual thing"? Thanks (I will read your answer in the morning. Its late here!!) Regards

No Buddha didn't.
Self and soul are common words. If Buddha didn't use social norms to explain Nirvana he'll say "attain Nirvana". But would we understand the whole of Dhamma with just those words?

I have asked a somewhat similar question before here.. Following the giant greek philosopher Parmenides. He said

The only roads of inquiry there are to think of: one, that it is and
  that it is not possible for it not to be, this is the path of
  persuasion (for truth is its companion); the other, that it is not and
  that it must not be — this I say to you is a path wholly unknowable.

So, it does seem futile to even think about no-self if it is not... in short, when we say the five aggregates are not-self it seems that we are saying the five aggregates are not unicorns.
But it is not so, Please read the comparative Analysis of Parmenides and Naagaarjuna here.
Naagaarjuna's response to your questions or to Parmenides objection of learning what is not is as follow:

Impurity cannot exist without depending on purity so that we explain
  purity by impurity. Therefore purity by itself cannot be attained.
  Purity cannot exist without depending on impurity, so that we explain
  impurity by purity. Therefore impurity cannot exist by itself.
  (Nakamura 61)


text:
SN 12.51 Why are meritorious formations rooted in ignorance?
SN 12.51 says:

Bhikkhus, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on to the meritorious; if he
  generates a demeritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on
  to the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional
  formation, consciousness fares on to the imperturbable. But when a
  bhikkhu has abandoned ignorance and aroused true knowledge, then, with
  the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, he
  does not generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a
  demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional
  formation. Since he does not generate or fashion volitional
  formations, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging,
  he is not agitated. Not being agitated, he personally attains Nibbāna.
  He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived,
  what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of
  being.’

Why are meritorious formations rooted in ignorance?
Also, since MN 117 says the Noble Eighfold Path and its Two Noble Fruits are "kusala", are meritorious formations "wholesome" or "skilful" ("kusala"? Or is there a difference between the words "meritorious" ("puññā") and "skilful" ("kusala")?

So there are twenty on the side of the skillful, and twenty on the side of the unskillful.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, vīsati kusalapakkhā, vīsati akusalapakkhā—
MN 117

It seems to me that meritorious formations would be rooted in ignorance because wisdom would see the emptiness of such formations. If ignorance is abandoned then such formations and their karmic functions cease to play a role. They have been transcended.
Perhaps one could see this as progressing from the teachings of the first 'Turning' to the fundamental teachings of the third.
EDIT: In the third Turning of the Wheel of Dharma the Buddha "taught about the Buddha nature, the enlightened essence of luminous clarity that is the true nature of the mind of every sentient being."
This is the stage of thorough analysis in which, "in order to help his disciples abandon their clinging to non-existence, the Buddha taught that genuine reality transcends the conceptual fabrications of existence and non-existence, appearance and emptiness, and any other notion of what it might be."
Quotes are from The Sun of Wisdom by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamptso

Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.

Being blameless like an arahant is not like being meritorious like a non-arahant. Merit is for people who are not blameless. Only non-good people can do meritorious deeds or non-meritorious deeds.
Fermentations can be meritorious or not, vedana can be meritorious or not, the fruit for lust for kama can be meritorious or not
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an06/an06.063.than.html#part-4
typically meritorious refers to the realms where there is pleasant vedana
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an05/an05.043.than.html
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.235.than.html

Thank you for your answer however I have decided to not open the links you provided because i think you should copy & paste whatever parts of the links you believe are relevant to your answer. Thanks


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Does the mental process of assigning subjective qualities to any phenomenon have a name in the suttas?
This question is related to this one (and its comments) I made before:
In the Dependent Origination formula, shouldn't perception precede craving instead of feeling?
According to the Khajjaniya Sutta, sañña is perception "because it perceives yellow... blue... red... white". So, it seems that it allows the mind to give a concept or label to whatever it's contacting and feeling.
(https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.079.than.html)
To label and to recognize "such as such", one has to process enough contextual information to know that any object is that object and not other object.
In the gestalt psychological theory of processing of stimuli, one identifies phenomena not because the perception of a single trait but rather the perception of a set of characteristics in a context.
In between those perceived features, one may find even subjective labels, such as "good", "bad", "better", "worst", "beautiful", "ugly", etc. The nature of such concepts is that their criterion for definition is not at face value, but defined by every individual person. Those labels are ambiguous until specified by the speaker. But despite their subjective nature, they're may be included in a person's definitions of an object and its features.
As an example, one might think that in the definition of an X race is the concept of inferiority in Y activity of life, such as intelectual learning.
Understood under this perspective, subjective qualities may fall under the definition of perception (at least as understood in modern psychology).
Is this also valid for Buddhism? Or do they have their own specific category?
What is the perspective on this point in the myriad of traditions and sects?
What do the suttas say?
What is your personal opinion?
Thank you in beforehand for your time and patience!

According to the Khajjaniya Sutta, sañña is perception "because it perceives yellow... blue... red... white". So, it seems that it allows
  the mind to give a concept or label to whatever it's contacting and
  feeling.

Is perception giving a concept or label? Or is it more primitively discerning differences between shapes, colors, contrast, etc?

In between those perceived features, one may find even subjective labels, such as "good", "bad", "better", "worst", "beautiful", "ugly",
  etc.

These labels are definitely not perception. They are sankhara or themes (nimitta). The suttas say:

Avoid the sign/theme (nimitta) of the beautiful connected with passion
Sn 2.11
Passion is a making of themes. Aversion is a making of themes. Delusion is a making of themes.
MN 43

The nature of such concepts is that their criterion for definition
  is not at face value, but defined by every individual person.

Yes & no. For example, all arahants will view good & bad the same.

Those labels are ambiguous until specified by the speaker. But despite their subjective nature

They are often but not always subjective. Suffering is the same for everyone thus it is "bad" for everyone.

Understood under this perspective, subjective qualities may fall under the definition of perception (at least as understood in modern
  psychology).

I would focus on 'sankhara' as subjective (rather than perception).
For example, unless a person is colorblind, "blue", "green", "yellow", "white", "red", etc, is the same for everyone. The quote itself from the Khajjaniya Sutta appears to show that perception is not "subjective" because colours are not subjective.

I understand and agree with most of your answer. However, I'm not so sure with that about colors being subjective. Colors don't exist outside our brains; they are just the way our brain interpret some part of the electromagnetic spectrum. And that can be said about almost every experience of the outside world. Are brains are not wired the same for all of us. And even if they were, there's no way to know whether we all see and understand colors the same way. That's exactly why the line between subjective and objective labels seems so blurry to me.

I think this is what you call Sankara. This is a very complex word with different meaning but you can learn about this in Abhidhamma.
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Saṅkhārā is a collective term for the other fifty cetasikas. These fall into four groups:
1) Universal mental factors (sabba citta sādhāranā).
2) Particular mental factors (pakiṇṇakā).
3) Unwholesome mental factors (akusalā).
4) Beautiful mental factors (sobhanā).
http://103.242.110.22/theravadins/English-articles/abhidhamma-in-practice.pdf

Thank you for your answer! I will read the link posted, but to narrow and focus my learning, which of those cetasikas fulfills specifically the role of my description?

Another word used is papañca. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_proliferation