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Does Mahayana Buddhism worship the Buddha as a God and, if so, why?
The Buddha always held that he was a simple man, one among us, not a God. In fact, Buddhism is principally an agnostic philosophy. Then why does Mahayana Buddhism practice the worship of the Buddha?

Where does it say, why do you say, what's your source for saying, that "The Buddha always held that he was a simple man?" Perhaps this claim (that "he held that he was a simple man") isn't relevant to the question, but maybe it is.

Okay, I quote from Swami Vivekananda's lecture on"Buddhistic India", delivered at the Shakespeare Club, Pasadena, California, on February 2, 1900. I hope this answers your question:

He was already dying. He found death coming on, and he asked, "Spread for me something under this tree, for I think the end is near." And he was there under the tree, and he laid himself down; he could not sit up any more.

And the first thing he did, he said: "Go to that Chanda and tell him that he has been one of my greatest benefactors; for his meal, I am going to Nirvâna." And then several men came to be instructed, and a disciple said, "Do not go near now, the Master is passing away". And as soon as he heard it, the Lord said, "Let them come in".

And somebody else came and the disciples would not [let them enter]. Again they came, and then the dying Lord said: "And O, thou Ananda, I am passing away. Weep not for me. Think not for me. I am gone. Work out
diligently your own salvation. Each one of you is just what I am. I am nothing but one of you. What I am today is what I made myself. Do you struggle and make yourselves what I am. . . ."

Wikipedia says that Swami Vivekananda was Hindu (not Buddhist), so he may not have a "Buddhist" conception of the Buddha. A statement like "I am a man, like you" does not sound like what I remember of the Buddha's doctrine, from the Pali canon for example. There is a sutta which describes the "death coming on" and so on, Maha-parinibbana Sutta: Last Days of the Buddha, if you'd like to read that (and I think that there's a different, Mahayana version of this sutta).

I quote And the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying: "Behold now, bhikkhus, I exhort you: All compounded things are subject to vanish. Strive with earnestness!" This was the last word of the Tathagata. So, your quote "Work out diligently your own salvation" is a quote, but the bit after that i.e. "Each one of you is just what I am. I am nothing but one of you. etc." would be a mis-quote -- a fabrication -- according to the Pali canon.

The precise English translation of these final words is open to interpretation as it was spoken in Pali and passed on orally, not being written down for some centuries after the Buddha's death.

I'm not disputing "the precise english translation". I'm saying that the canon is explicit that the Pali vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādethā were the last words, and so the subsequent words (which according to your quote were spoken after that) contradict the canon. IMO they contradict the canon in a lot of other ways too -- not the kind of thing that the Buddha says about himself. SFAIK Buddhists more-or-less agree on what the suttas actually say, (even if they don't always agree on every detail of how to interpret or translate them).

For what it's worth I found the quote you referenced:
From Vivekananda as the Turning Point: The rise of a new Spiritual Wave

There is a message in the suttas, that it's possible to attain Awakening by following the Dharma and the Discipline which the Buddha taught.
Also a message that the Buddha is great in many ways (e.g. disciplined, generous, insightful) to have discovered and to have taught as he did.
To say "no Gods" may be an exaggeration but OK, they're relatively unimportant (and I think it's true to say that Siddhārtha Gautama was human).
And I think this quote from Vivekananda should be understood as being a bit of a paraphrase of the entire doctrine (not only of the Maha-parinibbana Sutta), e.g. "believe not because an old book is produced" sounds like a paraphrase of another/different famous sutta, the Kalama Sutta.
It's not quite right to say (may give the wrong impression to say) that the Buddha is "nothing but one of you".
In MN 26 for example he is praised by devas on his awakening; and when people try to disparage him, he contradicts them:

Traveling stage by stage, I arrived at Benares, and went to see the group of five mendicants in the deer park at Isipatana. The group of five mendicants saw me coming off in the distance and stopped each other, saying:

‘Here comes the ascetic Gotama. He’s so indulgent; he strayed from the struggle and returned to indulgence. We shouldn’t bow to him or rise for him or receive his bowl and robe. But we can set out a seat; he can sit if he likes.’

Yet as I drew closer, the group of five mendicants were unable to stop themselves as they had agreed. Some came out to greet me and receive my bowl and robe, some spread out a seat, while others set out water for washing my feet. But they still addressed me by name and as ‘reverend’.
So I said to them:

‘Mendicants, don’t address me by name and as ‘reverend’. The Realized One is perfected, a fully awakened Buddha. Listen, mendicants: I have achieved the Deathless! I shall instruct you, I will teach you the Dhamma. By practicing as instructed you will soon realize the supreme end of the spiritual path in this very life. You will live having achieved with your own insight the goal for which people from good families rightly go forth from the lay life to homelessness.’

Practices which appear to be worship -- e.g. Tradition and purpose of prostration practice -- may have various purposes that aren't quite like worshipping a God, for example:

Expressing gratitude and rememberance
Expression pride (i.e. comparing yourself to the Buddha) and absence of pride (when comparing yourself to the Buddha)

Speaking of prostration, Wikipedia says,

Among Buddhists prostration is believed to be beneficial for practitioners for several reasons, including:

an experience of giving or veneration
an act to purify defilements, especially conceit
a preparatory act for meditation
an act that accumulates merit (see karma)

No, the Buddhas are not Gods and Mahayana does not conceive of them as such. In fact, all forms of Buddhism - not just Mahayana - largely agree with the following:
However, let's be clear on the many ways in which Buddhism does not conceive of the Buddha:

The Buddha did not create the universe.
The Buddha did not create man.
The Buddha is not singular in the sense that many are described as Buddhas.
The Buddha was once an imperfect sentient being just like us.
The Buddha does not pass judgement and enact cosmic justice.
The Buddha does not cause the workings of karma.

Now, let's examine some of the ways Buddhism does conceive of Buddhas that seem to have some similarities with different definitions of "God":

Buddhas are perfected beings.
Buddhas have some forms of omniscience.
Buddhas have what appears to be some forms of supernatural powers.
Buddhas are the greatest of teachers.
Buddhas are worthy objects of refuge.

I think most if not all extant traditions of Buddhism would agree with the above and not just Mahayana.
Now, are Buddhas worthy of "worship?" Well, I don't know about that word, but I would say they are worthy of the highest respect and veneration. They have perfected themselves for the sole benefit of others. They have perfected all virtuous qualities. If you define "worship" as the highest respect and veneration, then I would say they are worthy.

Nicely put. Could you then justify the reason why many sects of Mahayana practice idol worship of the Buddha?

It might all come down to what you define as "worship" or "idol worship" ... i define it as highest respect and veneration. We definitely don't worship Buddhas because Buddhas have demanded it. Buddhas have not even an iota of the "jealous god" mindset. We conceive of Buddhas as like the highest form of a doctor for instance. A supreme doctor is someone who has trained themselves to treat the afflictions of all of sentient beings ailments.

Or perhaps, it might be the case that the human mind needs to attach itself to certain symbols. We have to associate our ideas of infinity
with the image of the blue sky, or of the sea, so we naturally connect our idea of holiness with the image of a church, a mosque, or a cross, for example. I think that might be the philosophy behind it. If a man can realise his divine nature with the help of an image, it is certainly not right to call that a sin.

But I would like to draw your attention towards the Wikipedia link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhist_influences_on_Advaita_Vedanta

Yeah, there might be many superficial similarities between them, but I concur with @ruben2020 that the differences are more illuminating than the similarities :)

Obviously. Otherwise both wouldn't have been separate schools of thought, would they? And by the way, I don't know how to put this- but Hinduism is not a religion. It is actually a collection of several religions which have sprung up from India. Includes Vedanta, Charvaka, Dakshin-Mimansa, Jainism, Sikhism and many others as well.

Any Buddhist of any school of Buddhism, would not consider the Buddha to be God, if they understood his teachings correctly.
In Buddhism, there is no eternal self or eternal God. In Mahayana Buddhism, there is the concept of "Eternal Buddha" based on the concept of the Buddha's Dharmakaya or Dharma Body. This is derived from the Buddha's statement to Vakkali in Vakkali Sutta:

Vakkali: "For a long time, Lord, I have wanted to come and set eyes on
  the Blessed One, but I had not the strength in this body to come and
  see the Blessed One."
Buddha: "Enough, Vakkali! What is there to see in this vile body? He
  who sees Dhamma, Vakkali, sees me; he who sees me sees Dhamma. Truly
  seeing Dhamma, one sees me; seeing me one sees Dhamma."

Dhamma or Dharma in this context, refers to the Buddha's teachings.
Vakkali wanted to see the Buddha's physical form. Why? It's because he thought there is something important and great about the Buddha. The Buddha told him basically that when you truly understood his teachings, you would know what is important and great about him. There is nothing important and great about his physical form.
So, the Eternal Buddha in Mahayana Buddhism, is basically the Buddha's Dharma Body i.e. the Buddha's teachings.
While the Buddha never talked about statues of himself, he did say that a stupa or a burial mound or memorial can be created for the Buddha in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (which is the closest reference that I can find):

And even, Ananda, as with the body of a universal monarch, so should
  it be done with the body of the Tathagata; and at a crossroads also a
  stupa should be raised for the Tathagata. And whosoever shall bring to
  that place garlands or incense or sandalpaste, or pay reverence, and
  whose mind becomes calm there — it will be to his well being and
  happiness for a long time. ...
"And why, Ananda, is a Tathagata, an Arahant, a Fully Enlightened One
  worthy of a stupa? Because, Ananda, at the thought: 'This is the stupa
  of that Blessed One, Arahant, Fully Enlightened One!' the hearts of
  many people will be calmed and made happy; and so calmed and with
  their minds established in faith therein, at the breaking up of the
  body, after death, they will be reborn in a realm of heavenly
  happiness.

So, based on that, I can surmise that the function of a Buddha statue is the same as the function of a Buddha stupa, which is simply to be an inspiration to Buddhists.
This is the same reason why people in India have statues of Mahatma Gandhi, people in South Africa have statues of Nelson Mandela and people in the USA have statues of Martin Luther King or Abraham Lincoln.

That answers my question precisely. Thank you.

Completely agree, but would note that there exist many, many, many, many self-identified Buddhists who have very little or meager understanding of Dharma who worship the Buddhas as gods or very nearly so. That doesn't refute your answer because you very carefully said, "understood his teachings correctly" rather than No True Scotsmanning them into non-existence. Bravo!


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Which case is "I am a professor" with identity view?
According to the Yamaka Sutta quoted below, a run-of-the-mill person thinks one of the following:

the form to be the self
the self as possessing form
the form as in the self
the self as in form

And the same applies to the other aggregates.
If someone says with identity view, that "I am a professor", "I am an American", "I am successful" etc., what would this case be?
Is "professor" a mental fabrication? So, "I am a professor" (with identity view) would be the case of assuming a mental fabrication to be the self?
From the Yamaka Sutta (SN 22.85):

"In the same way, an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no
  regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their
  Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-versed or
  disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form (the body) to be the self,
  or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as
  in form.
"He assumes feeling to be the self...
"He assumes perception to be the self...
"He assumes (mental) fabrications to be the self...
"He assumes consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing
  consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in
  consciousness.

"I am a professor" is conceit not self view. But if self view arises before conceit as "professor is attā", then the conceit, which arises after that, will become misunderstood conceit.
The explanation
There are 3 clauses in tipiṭaka:

"etaṃ  mama-this is mind"  is thought by taṇhā.
"esohamasmi-I am this"  is thought by māna. <<< this is conceit.
"eso me  attā-this is my attā" is thought by diṭṭhi. <<< only this one is compatible with your quoted identity view,  Yamaka Sutta (SN 22.85).

But there are the complicated arising of taṇhā, māna, and diṭṭhi, because taṇhā must co-arises with only one, diṭṭhi or māna, per mind-moment arising. And  diṭṭhi can't co-arises with māna. So:
2 taṇhā = 1. sotāpanna's taṇhā 2. puthujana's taṇhā.
2 diṭṭhi = 1. sotāpanna's diṭṭhi 2. puthujana's diṭṭhi.
3 māna = 1. we are the same 2. I am better 3. I am worse.

There are sotāpanna's taṇhā and 3 māna of sotāpanna, but there are not diṭṭhi of sotāpanna.
There are 2 taṇhā, 9 māna, and 2 diṭṭhi of puthujana.

Therefore, there are just 3 māna of sotāpanna, but there are 9 māna for puthujana, 6 Diṭṭhi-Before&After(misunderstood) and 3 No-Diṭṭhi-Before&After māna's arising (right understood).

"eso me  attā-this is my attā" is thought by diṭṭhi. <<< only this one is compatible with your quote,  Yamaka Sutta (SN 22.85).

There are 20 sakkāya-diṭṭhi which thinking about attā in Yamaka Sutta (SN 22.85).

It doesn't mean arahanta can't call himself "professor", but it means arahanta remember himself and the others as the same value "anicca/dukkha/anatta  aggregates" even though he call himself "I am a professor".

Conventionally, "I am X" is a simple inclusive assertion of a facet of identity. Since professor-ship is acquired post-birth, it would pertain to the delusion/conceit of possessing an earned identity:

the self as possessing form

However, in the context of native citizenship or genetic identity, the situation would be somewhat different if the delusion did not include rebirth. I.e., the delusion would be about inherent identity:

the form as in the self

Generally, the materialistic acquisition of objects or traits serves the delusion of self as super-aggregate of all these possessions.

"I am a professor" belongs to the volitional formations or the sankhara category.
Sankhara defines the behavior(conditioned behavior). As a professor you are expected to be able to teach. But this behavior is Anicca. This behavior is also the cause of suffering. Therefore Professorship is Anatta. To say " I am professor" is unfortunate if you cling to the idea that you will forever be the teacher but if you can say "I am a professor" without clinging to the idea of ever lasting teacher then you have just destroyed the reason to suffer due to such statements which shows attachment. The impermanence of professorship takes away the conceit regarding the job.
Similarly for "I am an American" and "I am successful".

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The Philosophy of Zen
How can the Zen school of thought distinguished from the Chan school of thought? Both spring from Mahayana, true; but what are the basic differences?

Are you looking for differences in terms of history, ethnicity, vinaya, views of doctrine, all of the above?

No, only in terms of philosophy and doctrine.

Both originate from Bodhidharma, the first patriarch of Zen and Chan, as he transferred Indian heritage up north. The difference is that Zen was technically Chan that was imported to Japan by the likes of Dogen Zenji, and because both languages are different, here you go - different word. It is respectively Thiền in Vietnam, and Seon in Korea, all of which refer to the same thing. On the other hand, Chan is more rooted into Chinese philosophy, you could find traces of Taoism and Confucianism there, mostly unlike Zen.
Having said all of the above, Zen is very minimal, Soto Zen for that matter deprioritises chanting and koans and focus on zazen almost entirely. They meditate with their eyes open staring at the wall, posture is very important, due to how Japanese society is disciplined you might even get hit with a stick by your master if your posture is off. The key is in Zazen, it is in between of Samatha and Vipassana in my opinion. Zazen is almost entirely associated with enlightenment, as Dōgen said that practise itself is Enlightenment.
Rinzai school for another example has strong rooting in Japan but not entirely (it’s derived from Chinese Linji) and they, on the other hand utilise koans  to cut through rational, dualistic thinking to make leaps in experiencing enlightenment.
All of the rest is standard Mahayana approach: Bodhicitta, Bodhisattva vow. There is some Amidaba Buddha influence regionally, which is Pure landish, but not omnipresent. Also, Zen/Chan (etc) stresses Yogacara school philosophy that is mind only school.
I generally recommend a classic book on Zen by Philip Kapleau - The Three Pillars of Zen if you are interested in Zen.

The Nikujiku Saitai may have had some effect. This Meiji edict legalized meat and marriage for monastics, which caused quite a stir in the Japanese Zen community and had lasting repercussions. In Japan, some monks maintain the celibacy precept. Others do not. The Japanese culture has assimilated the effects over time, but for travelers unfamiliar with the edict and its repercussions, it can be quite a surprise.

But this does not answer the question.

which is why I originally made it just a comment because the question was a bit general.

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Is this a beginning of anatta? Where to go from here?
After years of abandoning Buddhism and becoming an agnostic, I somehow finally experienced/felt the Four Noble Truths yesterday, or at least the truth of the first three. Then the same thing happened with anatta.
What followed was mostly a relief. Then a sense of calmness, concentration, clarity and energy. But there was an ego struggle. I was scared, that I am giving up, who I am. That I won't care so deeply about things, that used to matter to me anymore. Right now I can kind of feel this... f.e. when I am listening to the music right now, I no longer consider it a part of my identity, nor do I connect so deeply with it in a sense, that its sadness nor joy resonate with my ego. The thing is, I liked being attached to it, I used to be an obsessive person - hobbies, people, music, ideas, beauty, art... Everything.
Today, I feel basically the same way, both a relief and a little fear, even though my ego fear is weaker.
So, I suppose, this is not a 100% realization of anatta. Is it possible to go fully back to my old attachments? :D Or is it possible to live somewhere in between?
Btw, yesterday it also occured to me, that samsara and bhavacakra are just metaphors for person's psychological development both throughout life and day...  Similar with karma. (I remain agnostic regarding taking them literally. Just like with anything else, like God.).
I somehow feel like I will still be me. But without attaching to everything including my identity. Does that make sense?
It is also radically different from a discomfort of depersonalisation, that I had a chance to briefly experience in my life.
Still a little scared though.
Thanks for reading this.

The fear you are having indicates misunderstanding rather than a perception of things as they truly are. Understanding annata in a non-mistaken way would not lead to fear arising. Rather, it would bring the dissipation of fear. That is why the first bhumi is called the Very Joyous.
But there was an ego struggle. I was scared, that I am giving up, who I am. That I won't care so deeply about things, that used to matter to me anymore.
That itself is attachment. That itself is suffering.
The thing is, I liked being attached to it...
That itself is attachment.
So, I suppose, this is not a 100% realization of anatta. Is it possible to go fully back to my old attachments? :D Or is it possible to live somewhere in between?
When you 100% realize things as they really are it is not possible to unlearn this. With understanding comes knowledge. It is kinda like asking if you can believe in Santa Claus again :)
I suspect you might have manifested some doubt as to whether things have essence. Mind you, doubt is not the same thing as conviction and it is far, far, far away from seeing. Still, it is very, very, very good to have manifested this doubt. With that doubt the ego can be shaken. It can react in a frightened manner. That might be what you are experiencing.
Is it possible to turn back from your doubt? I doubt it. (pun intended) I suspect if you keep going you are going to start to feel some exhilaration when your ego complains. If you start to feel joyous at your ego's predicament, then you might know you are on the right path.
Hope this helps!

Hello, Yeshe. Yes, it did help, thanks! Yes, I must feel attached to my identity and it  feels like it is protesting, as if it had its own will. :) I know, that the Self is a mere construct, both intellectually (neuroscience) and from experience too. It is like 30% of me is screaming "nooo"!, while the rest is relieved. Also, i do care more about others right now. I will give it some time and see how long I want to go on in this rat race. :D And be mindful in the process.

Rejoice that you've found something that truly scares your ego! Rejoice that your ego is quaking at the powerful sword of the Dharma! Of course, your ego is just delusion so feel very, very, happy that you've found something that helps you get rid of this delusion that has caused you nothing but unhappiness since beginningless time. Glad to have offered some small measure of help :)

@ShinrinYoku One more comment... if you wish to help solidify your doubt regarding essence reading this might help: https://www.wisdompubs.org/book/insight-emptiness

Thank you!!! I am going to save this link. And then I am going to tremble with fear  for few years and try not to think about it. :D Why is this so hard. Also. I feel like I need to be very careful with my mind. I suffered from severe depression, panic attacks, GAD and social anxiety. I still have to take medication. I never had psychosis. But I could have had it. It haunts me. Maybe that is like 50% of why i resist. I am afraid I might lose it, destroy my psyche after finally putting back together. It is not so uncommon in spiritual seekers to go mad after all.

The number one thing you should look out for is falling into annihilationism or nihilism. Anatta or emptiness emphatically do not mean that nothing exists or that your ego doesn't exist or that you don't exist or that karma doesn't exist. All that does exist!! If you ever begin to doubt whether these things exist, then you should put down your study of emptiness or at least listen to the counsel of the wise that you've misunderstood something. Use this warning as a guide rail or support indicating that your understanding has gone astray. Things do exist. The question is how they exist...

There is very little worse or leading to more serious repercussions than misunderstanding anatta or emptiness to mean that things do not exist. Those who mishandle the snake of emptiness wind up in the avici hell for eons. And those who teach the doctrine of emptiness to those who are not capable of understanding or are not ready for it also put themselves in dire, dire, dire, circumstances.

Fantastic comment. I used to be a nihilist, but in a sense, that I was depressed, that there is no intrinsic purpose in life. And when I look back, i took Buddhism too literally, that the ego does not exist. But I guess I was even more depressed about extinguishion of passions, being very passionate and driven person, till i got sick. I could not even meditate, as it may trigger psychosis. Then I abandoned Buddhism and re-built myself. In a lot of aspects I am completely different person now. And I am aware now, that I can look upon self in terms of provisional and ultimate truth.

Well, it sounds like you've come a long way and again rejoice! And if you find yourself falling into nihilism again maybe strengthen your understanding by reading a Guide to Bodhisattva's Way of Life and nurturing your compassion. It takes both compassion conjoined with wisdom to deliver us to lasting happiness.

You seem very wise. How long did i take you, may I ask? In this lifetime. :) Yes, I have come a long way - atheist till age of 10, then till 20 search for spirituality, answers and bliss - psychedelics included (used only once, the rest of time just obsessively reading about it), new age crap, sleep paralyses, premonitions in dreams... Then scientific training at uni in Religious Studies (I think this was really helpful, as I embraced my skepticism and it brought more clarity into my thinking), interest in psychology... Holy cow, I am lucky I am still sane. :D Makes me appreciate the mundane.

I'm just a Buddhist patzer friend. Whatever meager understanding I have (which is not much) is entirely due to the amazing compassion and effort of my teachers and their endless patience. What you might be seeing is just a very poor imitation or simulacrum of their wisdom.

Good enough to help me. :)

Yes the puthujjanas are obsessed with what they feel and phenomenology. Some even ask what does it feel like to be an arhant.
Anyway, since you care about what you feel, the only experience felt that you should care about is the jhanas, certainly not the sensual experience, and the of course in details it is piti, sukkha, samadhi and so on.
THe way to judge the result of your knowledge of the dhamma is certainly not to spend your energy writing about who you feel music or how you feel the taste of some food, or the scent of rubber . THe first famous step is the lack of doubt in the dhamma and of course the lack of ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi''.
If you want to know what the lack of ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi'' is all about,  you can read
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.089.than.html
and his statements like

"In the same way, friends, it's not that I say 'I am form,' nor do I
say 'I am other than form.' It's not that I say, 'I am feeling...
perception... fabrications... consciousness,' nor do I say, 'I am
something other than consciousness.' With regard to these five
clinging-aggregates, 'I am' has not been overcome, although I don't
assume that 'I am this.'

that's all there is to the lack of ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi'' . the lack of ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi'' is itself a label regrouping all the statements in this quote.
I you want to now what ''''sakkāya-diṭṭhi'''' is all about, since you are a puthujjana, you already naturally regards the ''5 aggregates'' as ''I am this'' and even more stupid from you, you turn that into a ''I am'', typically by regarding as and calling them ''mine''. You have been doing this for many years already, so no need to explain more.
Once you no longer regard any aggregate  as ''mine'' you can claim that you lack ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi''.
So ask yourself

"Concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One — i.e., form as a clinging-aggregate, feeling as a clinging-aggregate, perception as a clinging-aggregate, fabrications as a clinging-aggregate, consciousness as a clinging-aggregate: Do I assume anything with regard to these five clinging-aggregates to be self or belonging to self?"'"

If you reply by yes, then you are a puthujjana.
If you reply by

"Friend, concerning these five clinging-aggregates described by the Blessed One — i.e., form as a clinging-aggregate... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness as a clinging-aggregate: With regard to these five clinging-aggregates, there is nothing I assume to be self or belonging to self."

then you lack of ''sakkāya-diṭṭhi''.
Later on, you can wonder if you have a natural lack craving towards the senses and ill-will to see  if you are at the next stage.
Here is the bad way to relate to the senses:

“While experiencing that same painful feeling, he harbors aversion toward it. When he harbors aversion toward painful feeling, the underlying tendency to aversion toward painful feeling lies behind this. While experiencing painful feeling, he seeks delight in sensual pleasure. For what reason? Because the uninstructed worldling does not know of any escape from painful feeling other than sensual pleasure. When he seeks delight in sensual pleasure, the underlying tendency to lust for pleasant feeling lies behind this. He does not understand as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these feelings. When he does not understand these things, the underlying tendency to ignorance in regard to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling lies behind this.
“If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it attached. If he feels a painful feeling, he feels it attached. If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he feels it attached. This, monks, is called an uninstructed worldling who is attached to birth, aging, and death; who is attached to sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair; who is attached to suffering, I say.

-- From SN 36:6, cited in In the Buddha's Words
here is the proper way to relate to  the ''world''

“Seeing thus, monks, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with the eye, with forms, with eye-consciousness, with eye-contact, with whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant; becomes disenchanted with the ear … with the mind … with whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition…. Becoming disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated.’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the spiritual life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming back to any state of being.’”

-- From SN 35:28, cited in In the Buddha's Words


text:
Vinaya Rule of a Monk saying he's an arahant
Is there a rule where if a monk is an arahant and if he is to tell he is an arahant, he can only say it to a Upasampada monk and not even a samanera monk?
If so, please provide the source of the rule

According to the Patimokkha rules:

Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, claim a superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision, as present in
  himself, saying, "Thus do I know; thus do I see," such that regardless
  of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he — being
  remorseful and desirous of purification — might say, "Friends, not
  knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see — vainly, falsely,
  idly," unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no
  longer in affiliation.
Should any bhikkhu report (his own) superior human state to an unordained person, when it is factual, it is to be confessed.

But above, there are no distinctions made between fully ordained monks and novice monks.

So basically what it means is if an Arahant has attained enlightenment or any other knowledge, they cannot tell it to lay people?

Monks can't tell their own achievements, but they can advise lay people, based on their insights. The lay people wouldn't know who is an Arahant and who isn't.

Haven't there been incidents where arahants have told that they have become enlightened?

Daniel Ingram, the author of the book "Mastering the Core Teachings of the Buddha: An Unusually Hardcore Dharma Book", publicly claims to be an arahant, but then he is not a monk. I am doubtful that a person with interests in dancing, playing and listening to music is an arahant.

Even if an Arahant truthfully reports his attainment to a lay person, that is only a minor offense that requires confession. Furthermore, persons at stream winner level and above, have overcome the fetter of attachment to rituals and rules. So, an Arahant would probably not mind telling his attainment to carefully selected lay persons in private, if he thought that it would be extraordinarily helpful. But he probably will not declare it publicly.

@ruben2020 From what I've heard Daniel retracted his statement later on. Unfortunately, I don't have a source for that.

A monk can only relate his actual attainment of a superior human state to:

another monk (bhikkhu), or
a nun (bhikkhunī).

In other words, he commits an offense if he relates it to, e.g., a novice (samanera).
Since he told the truth, however, he won't be expelled — he's still considered a bhikkhu — but as @ruben2020 mentioned: he should confess the offense to another bhikkhu.

The factors for the full offense here are two:

Effort: One reports one’s actual attainment of a superior human state

Object: to an unordained person, i.e., any human being who is not a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī.

Source


text:
Reference request for "the Buddha takes the Dhamma as his superior"
In what Pali sutta[s] does the Buddha says something approximately like,

Everyone needs someone better than them, who they can revere and who can guide them: who will be their teacher. But there is no-one better than the Buddha: and so I take the Dhamma as my guide/superior/teacher.

From the Garava Sutta (SN 6.2):

I have heard that on one occasion, when the Blessed One was newly
  Self-awakened, he was staying at Uruvela on the bank of the Nerañjara
  River, at the foot of the Goatherd's Banyan Tree. Then, while he was
  alone and in seclusion, this line of thinking arose in his awareness:
  "One suffers if dwelling without reverence or deference. Now on what
  brahman or contemplative can I dwell in dependence, honoring and
  respecting him?"
Then the thought occurred to him: "It would be for the sake of
  perfecting an unperfected aggregate of virtue that I would dwell in
  dependence on another brahman or contemplative, honoring and
  respecting him. However, in this world with its devas, Maras, &
  Brahmas, in this generation with its brahmans and contemplatives, its
  royalty and common-folk, I do not see another brahman or contemplative
  more consummate in virtue than I, on whom I could dwell in dependence,
  honoring and respecting him.
"It would be for the sake of perfecting an unperfected aggregate of
  concentration that I would dwell in dependence on another brahman or
  contemplative, honoring and respecting him. However, in this world
  with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this generation with its brahmans
  and contemplatives, its royalty and common-folk, I do not see another
  brahman or contemplative more consummate in concentration than I, on
  whom I could dwell in dependence, honoring and respecting him.
"It would be for the sake of perfecting an unperfected aggregate of
  discernment that I would dwell in dependence on another brahman or
  contemplative, honoring and respecting him. However, in this world
  with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this generation with its brahmans
  and contemplatives, its royalty and common-folk, I do not see another
  brahman or contemplative more consummate in discernment than I, on
  whom I could dwell in dependence, honoring and respecting him.
"It would be for the sake of perfecting an unperfected aggregate of
  release that I would dwell in dependence on another brahman or
  contemplative, honoring and respecting him. However, in this world
  with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this generation with its brahmans
  and contemplatives, its royalty and common-folk, I do not see another
  brahman or contemplative more consummate in release than I, on whom I
  could dwell in dependence, honoring and respecting him.
"It would be for the sake of perfecting an unperfected aggregate of
  knowledge and vision of release that I would dwell in dependence on
  another brahman or contemplative, honoring and respecting him.
  However, in this world with its devas, Maras, & Brahmas, in this
  generation with its brahmans and contemplatives, its royalty and
  common-folk, I do not see another brahman or contemplative more
  consummate in knowledge and vision of release than I, on whom I could
  dwell in dependence, honoring and respecting him.
"What if I were to dwell in dependence on this very Dhamma to which I
  have fully awakened, honoring and respecting it?"
Then, having known with his own awareness the line of thinking in the
  Blessed One's awareness — just as a strong man might extend his flexed
  arm or flex his extended arm — Brahma Sahampati disappeared from the
  Brahma-world and reappeared in front of the Blessed One. Arranging his
  upper robe over one shoulder, he saluted the Blessed One with his
  hands before his heart and said to him: "So it is, Blessed One! So it
  is, One-Well-Gone! Those who were Arahants, Rightly Self-awakened Ones
  in the past — they, too, dwelled in dependence on the very Dhamma
  itself, honoring and respecting it. Those who will be Arahants,
  Rightly Self-awakened Ones in the future — they, too, will dwell in
  dependence on the very Dhamma itself, honoring and respecting it. And
  let the Blessed One, who is at present the Arahant, the Rightly
  Self-awakened One, dwell in dependence on the very Dhamma itself,
  honoring and respecting it."
That is what Brahma Sahampati said. Having said that, he further said
  this:
Past Buddhas,
  future Buddhas,
  & he who is the Buddha now,
  removing the sorrow of many —
all have dwelt,
  will dwell, he dwells,
revering the true Dhamma.
  This, for Buddhas, is a natural law.
Therefore one who desires his own good,
  aspiring for greatness,
  should respect the true Dhamma,
  recollecting the Buddhas' Teaching.

Thank you. I think there's one (earlier in his life) where the Buddha said that he himself venerates (or something like that) the Dhamma -- takes it as his teacher (or guide or refuge or I don't quite remember what).

If you find this I'd be very interested as the Buddha is one who has no more learning to do. If he said thus, I imagine he was speaking in the past tense of when he was a Bodhisat.

@YesheTenley I don't think it was "learning" -- I think it was more something like "staying within the guidelines of", perhaps even venerating -- "teacher" meaning in the sense of "master"; or perhaps benefactor... I think the sutta I'm talking of exists, I find it difficult to search for though, and I'd like to read again more carefully how it's worded. I remember it as present tense and after his enlightenment.

I found it! It's the Garava Sutta (SN 6.2). Now updated in the answer. I have also removed the others which you aren't looking for.

This is not a complete answer, but there is this Sutta where the Buddha instructs that people should associate with those superior to them (AN 3.26):

“Bhikkhus, there are these three kinds of persons found existing in
  the world. What three? (1) There is a person who is not to be
  associated with, followed, and served; (2) a person who is to be
  associated with, followed, and served; and (3) a person who is to be
  associated with, followed, and served with honor and respect.
...
“These, bhikkhus, are the three kinds of persons found existing in the
  world.”
One who associates with an inferior person declines; one who
  associates with an equal does not decline; attending on a superior
  person one develops quickly; therefore you should follow one superior
  to yourself.

Regarding the relationship between the Buddha and Dhamma there is also this:

"Enough, Vakkali! What is there to see in this vile body? He who sees
  Dhamma, Vakkali, sees me; he who sees me sees Dhamma. Truly seeing
  Dhamma, one sees me; seeing me one sees Dhamma."

I think the Buddha was exhorting such out of great compassion for he said this to a dying man who was expressing regret.

Thank you, yes; but that is missing the second part, about the Buddha's taking the Dhamma as his own, to be his own ... his own "something".


text:
Does any real existent or genuine person end with parinibbana?
Does modern Theravada accept that no real person ends with the break up of the body of a realized one? That the moment after the break up of the body of a realized one is the same as the moment before?
In SN 22.85 With Yamaka (sujato) and alternative translation Sariputta seems to rebut the notion that any substantial change happens during the break up of the body of a realized one:

Now at that time a mendicant called Yamaka had the following harmful
  misconception: “As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who
  has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body
  breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.”
Several mendicants heard about this. They went to Yamaka and exchanged
  greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were
  over, they sat down to one side and said to him:
“Is it really true, Reverend Yamaka, that you have such a harmful
  misconception: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who
  has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body
  breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’” “Yes, reverends, that’s
  how I understand the Buddha’s teaching.”
“Don’t say that, Yamaka! Don’t misrepresent the Buddha, for
  misrepresentation of the Buddha is not good. And the Buddha would not
  say that.” But even though admonished by those mendicants, Yamaka
  obstinately held on to that misconception and insisted on stating it.

After talking with Sariputta it seems Yamaka has a change of heart after this question by Sariputta:

“What do you think, Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as one who
  is without form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness?”
  “No, reverend.” “In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t
  acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life, is
  it appropriate to declare: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a
  mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed
  when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”

Here is the same portion in Venerable Bodhi's translation:

“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real
  and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare:
  ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
  taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
  the body and does not exist after death’?”

So does this mean the break up of the body is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment no person truly ends or changes because a real person doesn't truly exist in the first place?
EDIT:
I'm aware that orthodox Theravada tenet systems posit the selflessness of persons, but are either agnostic or outright reject the selflessness of phenomena. However, most pali canon suttas seem to stop at the coarse level of selflessness, but here Sariputta seems to be speaking about the subtler levels of the selflessness of persons if only in embryonic form. Is this true?
Also, if the body of a person is regarded as a real substantial thing in Theravada how about the consciousness of a person? Is that regarded as a real substantial thing?

In Theravada, all phenomena is empty of a self, including a chair, a tree, Nibbana and empty space. But it doesn't mean that they are not real. Apart from Nibbana, everything else is not constant and not permanent.

I believe you mean that Theravada posits all phenomena is empty of a self of persons. ie., the body of a person is empty of a self of persons. the consciousness of a person is empty of a self of persons. Obviously, a chair is empty of a self of persons too. However, to my understanding Theravada does not posit that a chair is empty of a self of chair. Selflessness of phenomena means chair is empty of a self of chair and this is not found in Theravada, but only in Mahayana tenet systems AFAIK. At least this is what is taught in Mahayana monastic universities.

What is "self of chair"? If a chair had a "self of chair", would it have a mind of its own?

An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some phenomena that can be described as that phenomena's self. The self of chair would be that intrinsic nature, essence or unique characteristic or set of characteristics that imbue chairness on a chair. Western philosophers might describe it as a platonic ideal.

Based on this discussion, I started a new question.

Haha, great minds think alike. Right before I saw this I posted: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena

@ruben2020 are you self-identified Theravada?

Let's say I generally lean more towards the Theravada perspective, but I'm not a hardcore defender of it.

... now Platonic Buddhism....

I think you (the OP) have mistakenly assumed that the Pali Yamaka Sutta supports the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness that nothing is substantially real.
Actually, the Yamaka Sutta quote of the Bodhi translation indeed confirms emptiness, but it's the Theravada emptiness and not the Mahayana emptiness. And what is the Theravada emptiness? It's that all phenomena is empty of a self (see Suñña Sutta). Before parinibbana, there was no self (as in an eternal self or soul at the core of the Buddha's being) that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana.
However, the Pali suttas do not explicitly support the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness. The  Buddha's body was considered to be real but not constant or permanent. It is subject to change, arising and ceasing. But that does not mean that it's not real in Theravada.
To prove this, I'll quote Itivuttaka 44:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have
  heard: "Monks, there are these two forms of the Unbinding property.
  Which two? The Unbinding property with fuel remaining, & the Unbinding
  property with no fuel remaining.
And what is the Unbinding property with fuel remaining? There is the
  case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended, who
  has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden,
  attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released
  through right gnosis. His five sense faculties still remain and, owing
  to their being intact, he is cognizant of the agreeable & the
  disagreeable, and is sensitive to pleasure & pain. His ending of
  passion, aversion, & delusion is termed the Unbinding property with
  fuel remaining. (Note1)
And what is the Unbinding property with no fuel remaining? There is
  the case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended,
  who has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden,
  attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released
  through right gnosis. For him, all that is sensed, being unrelished,
  will grow cold right here. This is termed the Unbinding property with
  no fuel remaining." (Note2)
Note1 and Note2 by Thanissaro Bhikkhu:
  With fuel remaining
  (sa-upadisesa) and with no fuel remaining (anupadisesa): The analogy
  here is to a fire. In the first case, the flames are out, but the
  embers are still glowing. In the second, the fire is so thoroughly out
  that the embers have grown cold. The "fuel" here is the five
  aggregates. While the arahant is still alive,
  he/she still experiences the five aggregates, but they do not burn
  with the fires of passion, aversion, or delusion. When the arahant
  passes away, there is no longer any experience of aggregates here or
  anywhere else.

Next, to answer the question:

OP: So does this mean death is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment nothing truly ends or changes because it
  doesn't truly exist in the first place?

Before and after the Buddha's final passing, all phenomena is empty of a self. The Buddha's five aggregates existed and was subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana existed and does not change, arise or pass away. But the self (in the sense of an eternal self or soul at the core of our being) never existed at any time, in all phenomena, including the five aggregates and Nibbana. This is the interpretation according to Theravada.
Your interpretation appears to be different and based upon the concept of Mahayana emptiness.

Very good answer Ruben, where Mahayana vs Theravada emptiness are distinguished. This is also the essence of my answer.

@ruben2020, see edit. I'm aware of the differences between orthodox Theravada tenet systems and those found in Mahayana schools. That's why this question is posed to Theravada accounts. BTW, I think you should edit your answer to say, "And what is the Theravada emptiness? It's that all phenomena is empty of a self of persons (see Suñña Sutta)." To be clear, Theravada does not posit the selflessness of phenomena only the selflessness of persons in all phenomena. Right?

No. In Theravada, all phenomena is empty of a self, including a chair, a tree, Nibbana and empty space. But it doesn't mean that they are not real. Apart from Nibbana, everything else is not constant and not permanent.

hmm, we disagree. will be interesting to hear what other self-identified Theravada proponents say.

@YesheTenley I agree with Ruben2020. Is it possible that people following Mahayana have a wrong understanding of what people who follow Theravada think of emptiness? Not to start a chat though, I think that's not allowed.

Hi @Medhini, the question: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena was asked to determine that. After the answers and corresponding questions, I think what is taught in Mahayana Buddhist monasteries about Theravada is correct.

With respect, the Theravada generally has a much more coarse understanding of emptiness and anatta and is confused as to the object of negation. In much the way that placing a bag of ice on a gushing head wound has some efficacy, yet is utterly incapable of actually curing the wound the Theravada understanding anatta doctrine is very helpful, but insufficient to provide a genuine antidote to ignorance and hence suffering.

The Theravada adherents here have taken more or less the same view that all these questions about how things exist and whether phenomena are real or have self is part of the thicket of views that Buddha famously warned against. That at best the questions are irrelevant in stopping “I” and “mine” making. The Mahayana tenet systems very strenuously disagree and believe Theravada adherents are not ready to understand, but will understand the selflessness of phenomena eventually as they continue to progress on the path.

@YesheTenley Do you accept that the path laid out in Theravada is sufficient to guide one to Arahantship (but possibly not Buddhahood)?  If yes, then this is in fact the objective of Theravada - to guide the practitioner to Arahantship.

I think what you are after with your question is, "Do you accept that refuting a self of persons as permanent, unitary, and independent and regarding the question the selflessness of phenomena as immaterial to the spiritual aim is sufficient to guide one to Arahantship?" And my answer is no, I do not accept that and think it insufficient. This is true of the Mahayana tenet systems in general. We do not think that refutes enough and cannot possible uproot the root of ignorance for a person to attain arahantship. This is a disagreement between these two schools and I say it with respect.

If you are asking whether I think the Pali Suttas contain the teaching that goes beyond refuting that persons are permanent, unitary and independent and goes beyond refuting the self of persons into refuting the self of phenomena, then yes, I think it does albeit in condensed form compared to the Mahayana sutras. But that is not how at least some Theravada adherents on this site see it :)

@YesheTenley OK. I just posted this question to ask for details on the Mahayana view. You could answer there.

Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.

I think SN 22.86 is very similar but simpler.
I read it as saying:

It is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates
It's inappropriate to say that a Tathagata exists after death, doesn't exist, neither, or both -- IMO that makes it one of The unanswered questions -- instead pay attention to what the doctrine does say (e.g. that it is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates)

See also for example MN 22:

And how is a mendicant a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached? It’s when a mendicant has given up the conceit ‘I am’, cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, exterminated it, so it’s unable to arise in the future. That’s how a mendicant is a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached.
When a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and Pajāpati, search as they may, will not find anything that such a Realized One’s consciousness depends on. Why is that? Because even in the present life the Realized One is undiscoverable, I say. Though I speak and explain like this, certain ascetics and brahmins misrepresent me with the false, baseless, lying, untruthful claim: ‘The ascetic Gotama is an eradicator. He advocates the annihilation, eradication, and extermination of an existing being.’ I have been falsely misrepresented as being what I am not, and saying what I do not say. In the past, as today, what I describe is suffering and the cessation of suffering. This being so, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble the Realized One, he doesn’t get resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated.
Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate him, he doesn’t get thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. He just thinks: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’ So, mendicants, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble you, don’t make yourselves resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated. Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate you, don’t make yourselves thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. Just think: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’
So, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. What do you think, mendicants? Suppose a person was to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and leaves in this Jeta’s Grove, or burn them, or do what they want with them. Would you think: ‘This person is carrying us off, burning us, or doing what they want with us?’” “No, sir. Why is that? Because that’s neither self nor belonging to self.” “In the same way, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness.

I think there's more doctrine about "the support of consciousness" in SN 12.64:

Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?” “On the western wall, sir.” “If there was no western wall, where would it land?” “On the ground, sir.” “If there was no ground, where would it land?” “In water, sir.” “If there was no water, where would it land?” “It wouldn’t land, sir.” “In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …

See also for example Why is the Buddha described as trackless?

I'm not sure of ruben2020's answer, saying, "Before parinibbana, there was no self called Buddha that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana".
I think it's true to say "there was no self that has suddenly ceased to exist".
I'm not sure whether it's true (whether it's Theravada orthodoxy) to say "there was no self called Buddha" -- see How is it wrong to believe that a self exists, or that it doesn't? -- there is doctrine in the suttas including "it's inappropriate to associate the self with the aggregates", and "'I am' is a conceit" and "'am I?' is a result of attending inappropriately" -- but see also e.g. "Buddha never denies the existence of the self" (and that answer's being upvoted and disputed in comments) -- and there's an Abhidhamma answer which I think says it depends on context and convention.

Given @ruben2020's seemingly clear understanding of Middle Way, I think he's saying that, "Before parinibbana, there was no real self called Buddha that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana"

I'm not sure what you mean by "real", "genuine", "substantial", "true", or "subtle", or even "Middle Way". I guess that when you say "no real self that ceases" you mean "any fictional self that ceases is a product of our own imaginations and attachments".

I'm think I'm using the words, "real" and "genuine" in much the same way as Sariputta uses them here and as the Buddha used "substantial" in SN 22.95. As for "true" I'm using that as synonymous with inherent existence. And "subtle" as opposed to coarse. "Middle Way" is used analagous to @ruben2020's explanation here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/28651/13375 which is excellent

The suttas say (I paraphrase) that it's inappropriate to view the aggregates as self -- but I'm not certain everyone agrees that "there is no self", because I think I've seen some people say that "there is no self" may be a step too far. And, regarding the Tathagata, I don't remember anyone saying that "the Tathagata doesn't exist", but only that "the Tathagata is trackless", for example -- questions about "the self of the Buddha" maybe just don't come up, or are avoided as "unanswered" or "that's the wrong question".

Does any real existent or genuine thing end with parinibbana?
Yes. Suffering. Suffering ends with parinibbana. Suffering is real and genuine.
Buddha says now and in the past he had only taught suffering , its origination and its cessation. There are some undeclared or unanswered questions because they do not lead to cessation of suffering but that doesn't mean that they can not be answered. It is just that those questions are not conducive to the cessation of suffering.
In SN 22.85 (the same sutta you quoted ) it is clear that it is the suffering which ends after nibbana:

“Reverend Yamaka, suppose they were to ask you: ‘When their body
  breaks up, after death, what happens to a perfected one, who has ended
  the defilements?’ How would you answer?” “Sir, if they were to ask
  this, I’d answer like this: ‘Reverend, form is impermanent. What’s
  impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended.
  Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness is impermanent. What’s
  impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended.’
  That’s how I’d answer such a question.”

Would you also agree that the body is real and genuine and that it ends at the break up of the body?

@YesheTenley  Body is not absolutely unreal. If you believe in the body as you or your own then it becomes real with real suffering. It is conditional. At the break up of the body if there is craving left for body then rebirth occurs and new body is found.

So we render that which is unreal to be real by craving for it?

@YesheTenley Yes.Unfortunately it is so. However it should be clear what craving is ? Understanding craving is crucial to the cessation of suffering.

Imo, the idea that the idea of "death" ("marana") is applicable to a Realised One is also part of the wrong view of Yamaka.
This being said, the termination of life (not "death") of a Realised One is described as follows (in my correct alternate translation):

‘Friend, form is impermanent; what is impermanent is unsatisfying (unsatisfactory); what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed away. Feeling… Perception…
  formations… consciousness is impermanent; what is
  impermanent is unsatisfying; what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed
  away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.

As for the question, it appears lost in the "spell" of translation and particularly the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" found in  "saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne" ("don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact").
Since Sariputta instructs Yamaka at the beginning about "not-self" and since Sariputta provides an analogy about "not-self" at the end; the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" (which is found in this stock phrase in many suttas) probably needs to be examined deeply before answering this question.
Below is merely a guess but I guess the term māna must be important because it has the connotation of "self".
an +
upalabbhati +
māna
To conclude, I think the core message of the sutta is the Tathagata is not a self, person or being. Not being a "self", "death" does not happen at the termination of life. All that happens is the ending of the impermanent aggregates.

Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall
  be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a
  conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be
  non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be
  neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is
  a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. By overcoming
  all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage
  at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and
  does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might
  be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he
  die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should
  he yearn?
MN 140

Would you agree that the Theravada position is, "The self of persons exist, but is not a real genuine thing?"

Theravada says "self" is a "disease"; a "cancer"; merely the arising of suffering.

@YesheTenley Do you have a source for what you call the Theravada position? I've never seen that one before. And no one I know would agree with that statement. I'm curious and puzzled.

@Medhini, Ruben gives this account here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/28737/13375 and Shariputra attested that the Realized One was not a real and genuine fact in SN 22.85 which is highlighted above in the OP: “since you don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life”


text:
Do the words Sacred, Divine and Spiritual have any context in Buddhism?
Edit: *In our lay following of the path of Dhamma we need an external object of veneration and an external connotation to actions, which gives it a positive meaning, to help us stick to the actions.
Going beyond simple logic, to do good karma and follow the Samma or right way we need something supra-mundane to transcend the mundane as a clear reason to act in that direction.
Such examples can be, experiencing the Sacredness in the Idol of Buddha at an altar in your house.
Having a mental image of the Buddha as a Divine being rather than just another human having achieved Nibbana through life times of practices
Thinking your path as something supra-mundane which is Spiritual in meaning of it...that something having to do with spirit(non-material aggregate).
This gives added meaning to your existance thereby adding flavour to otherwise dry following to the prescribed discipline in its entierity.*
I undersatnd that Sacred is something religious, but as form is emptiness,
Can we call Buddha's statue as Sacred?
Buddha is not the body and body is not to be identified with, if by divine we mean Godly: transcending the  experience of mundane reality....same flower different experience.
Buddha in His body, can we call Him Divine?
As opposed to mundane life of chasing women, money and fame...defining spiritual life as holy life towards Nibbana...knowing that there is no spirit to be found...
Can we call the path of Dhamma as Spiritual path?
OR
Will these terms create mis- understanding about Dhamma?

Remember there are two notions and views within Buddhism itself, one of them is considering Buddha divine being born in miraculous circumstances, and the other is more pragmatic being. Its contextual. Bhikkhu Bodhi describes both in "In Buddha's Words".

Does this depend on how you define (and explain) the English-language word "sacred" (e.g. this definition)? Ditto "spiritual"? Is that even interesting? Is that like asking, "Is Buddhism a religion?"?

@ChrisW let me edit to provide the context.

@ChrisW i edited to give the context in which i was asking...this is different than asking 'does buddhism fit in definition of organised religion'. I am implying the subtalities of human experience.

It does fit in definition of organised religion; monasticism is pretty organised, lineages are pretty organised as well. In Christianity there are Catholics, Protestants, Calvins and Mormons and other spin offs that fit in such definitions also. Both Buddhism and Christianity have doctrine.

@bodhihammer With the edits I think it's meant as a 'personal practice' question.

@bodhihammer no, thats not what I am asking.

@ChrisW i am alson meaning to look for terms in literature if any, i am using english words as i am able to express that ways...so also about terminology.

I don't think we are (nor should we be) looking at sacredness of the idol but rather Buddha's emanation and nature in our own mind. We can find a Buddha in ourselves. That is at least true in context of Mahayana and Vajrayana (emulating Buddha's mind or Deity's mind). In Pure Land however, this gets very Idol-based so sacredness is stressed, on the other hand it's Amidaba Buddha, not Shakyamuni. Zen has tendencies to do the opposite, the story of "cutting off Buddha's head" or famous "kill the Buddha" koan are some examples of desacralisation. With Theravada I do not know but I have seen Thai Theravadins in a temple taking Buddha's sacredness as an idol quite literally, praying and chanting to statue as if to the divine being - at least that was my impression.
Personally, I gravitate towards seeing Buddha as an object of my true self using a specific practise (like certain Sadhana), thus I completely negate sacredness, divinity and refrain from idolising the Buddha in any way. I consider such divine elevation a hinderance and obscuration to be removed in order to realise Selflessness of things and achieve meaningful progress on the path.
Everyone is divine and therefore no one is divine - everyone is the Buddha, we just have to see this capacity.

Is there really a need to add tags such as Sacred, Divine, Spiritual? If these tagging create confusion then it should be dis-regarded. However, it helps you  to convey certain meaning for those who do not know the context, then it may be skillfully used.
To answer your question, in the furthest extent, you can use sacred/divine to describe the Buddha's deeds and actions when he was on earth, not so much to his Statue or Body.
Can we call the path of Dharma as Spiritual path? <-- Gotta be careful with this as the concept of Spirit is not quite the same with conventional public's (non-Buddhists) understanding.


text:
Difference between Theravada's self and Mahayana's intrinsic essence
With reference to this comment:

An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some
  phenomena that can be described as that phenomena's self. The self of
  chair would be that intrinsic nature, essence or unique characteristic
  or set of characteristics that imbue chairness on a chair. Western
  philosophers might describe it as a platonic ideal.

In Theravada Buddhism, "sabbe dhamma anatta", means all phenomena is not self. This can also be rephrased as there is no self in all phenomena, with the understanding of "self" as a permanent and eternal core or soul or self at the center of beings and also non-beings. A chair, a tree, a cat, the mind, empty space and Nibbana all do not have a self, according to Theravada. All things except Nibbana, are subject to change, arising and passing - these are known as "sankhara", or conditioned and/or compounded things. The term "dhamma" refers to phenomena, which includes Nibbana and also all sankharas. Basically everything falls under "dhamma". The emptiness of Theravada refers to the notion that all phenomena is empty of a self. "Sabbe dhamma anatta" is accepted by Mahayana Buddhism too.
Meanwhile, in Mahayana Buddhism, specifically in Madhyamaka, all phenomena is empty of intrinsic essence. Emptiness itself is also empty of intrinsic essence - sometimes called the emptiness of emptiness. intrinsic essence is called "svabhava". I can say that in Madhyamaka, there is an equivalent "sabbe dhamma asvabhava" of sorts.
Generally, the difference between the two is understood as "Mahayana says everything is not ultimately real", but on the other hand, "Theravada says everything is not-self, but are real (even if not constant and not permanent)".
The commentator above now introduced a new set of terminology saying that Theravada's self or atta refers to the "self of persons", while the Mahayana svabhava (or intrinsic essence) of a chair is a "self of chairs".
So my questions would be:

Do other Mahayana Buddhists apart from the commentator above, also call the intrinsic essence (svabhava) of a chair, as the "self of chairs"?
If Theravada states "sabbe dhamma anatta" and Mahayana states "sabbe dhamma asvabhava", does it mean that anatta = asvabhava, and therefore, atta (self) = svabhava (intrinsic essence)?
Depending on your view: if the Theravada atta (self) is different from the Mahayana svabhava (intrinsic essence), then what really is the difference? OR if the Theravada atta (self) is same as the Mahayana svabhava (intrinsic essence), then does that make the Mahayana emptiness a redundant concept?

See very related question here which has quotes from Mahayana monastic textbook: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena

1. Do other Mahayana Buddhists apart from the commentator above, also call the intrinsic essence (svabhava) of a chair, as the "self of chairs"?
Yes, this is a common expression in Mahayana texts on the topic.
2. If Theravada states "sabbe dhamma anatta" and Mahayana states "sabbe dhamma asvabhava", does it mean that anatta = asvabhava, and therefore, atta (self) = svabhava (intrinsic essence)?
I think Mahayana states "sabbe dhamma shunyata" - which can be explained as "sabbe dhamma asvabhavata" and "sabbe dhamma pratityasamutpida". From this it also follows that all dharmas are anicca (ephemeral) and dukkha (here, faulty/unreliable).
If we don't nitpick too much about the meaning of the equal sign, I think I can agree with your statements that "anatta = asvabhava" and "atta = svabhava". More on this in a second.
3. Depending on your view: if the Theravada atta (self) is different from the Mahayana svabhava (intrinsic essence), then what really is the difference? OR if the Theravada atta (self) is same as the Mahayana svabhava (intrinsic essence), then does that make the Mahayana emptiness a redundant concept?
I think svabhava is a broader concept than atman (atta). To me, atman is only one case of reification, or one case of attributing svabhava to abstractions and observations.
Therefore, Mahayana's emptiness is not redundant. True -- it is not something entirely new that was absent in Theravada, but in my opinion it gives proper emphasis to something that is kind of implicit and not explained enough in the Pali Canon (even if ever-present "between the lines").

OK. So, you're saying that "anatta ⊂asvabhava" and "atta ⊂svabhava", where the symbol ⊂ in set theory means, "A⊂B, A is a subset of B, but A is not equal to B."

That is correct.

Here is some more support for the terminology of the "two selves" in Madhyamaka philosophy via Treasury of Precious Qualities:

We can see this in the example of the rope and the snake. When a
  distinction is made between persons and phenomena, a person is the
  subjective individual, such as "Devadatta," imputed upon his own
  collection of aggregates, which are the basis of such a labeling. By
  contrast, phenomena are Devadatta's aggregates, his eyes, for example,
  which act as the ground on which the person "Devadatta" is imputed.
  The term "phenomena" refers to all other things, in addition to the
  personal aggregates.
...
The "personal no-self" is the absence of inherent existence in the
  person. The "phenomenal no-self" is the absence of inherent existence
  in phenomena. This is understood by the "wisdom of realizing no-self."
  Persons and phenomena are, of course, said to exist on the
  conventional level.

This terminology is very common in Mahayana Madhyamaka literature and might have started with Chandrakirti which defines the terms in his Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas":

“Self” is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is
  an intrinsic nature. The nonexistence of that is selflessness. Be-
  cause of the division into objects and persons, it is understood as
  twofold: a “selflessness of objects” and a “selflessness of persons.”

You can also find these two selves referred to as the self of pugdala (pali: puggala) and the self of dharmas (pali: dhammas):

Accordingly, upon finding no given thing of the two selves (pugdala
  and dharma), the nongiven thing of the refuted (two selves) is
  something rightly produced.

An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some phenomena that can be described as that phenomena's self.

I said this in one of my answers but was scored down by the same Mahayana who believe in these ideas.
An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some phenomena CANNOT be described as that phenomena's self.
That a rock is 'hard' by nature is not its "self". That Nibbana is "peaceful" is not its "self". Such ideas are crazy. "Self" is "ego" & "possessiveness" ("I-making" & "mine-making").

“Rāhula, the interior earth element is said to be anything hard, solid, and organic that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This
  includes head hair, body hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews,
  bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs,
  intestines, mesentery, undigested food, feces, or anything else hard,
  solid, and organic that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This
  is called the interior earth element. The interior earth element and
  the exterior earth element are just the earth element. This should be
  truly seen with proper understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I
  am not this, this is not my self.’ When you really see with proper
  understanding, you reject the earth element, detaching the mind from
  the earth element.
MN 62

An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some phenomena CANNOT be described as that phenomena's self But apparently it (the word "self") IS used that way. The Pali word is sabhāva which starts with sa- defined as "own" -- Wikipedia's sabhāva says, literally means "own-being" or "own-becoming". It is the intrinsic nature, essential nature or essence of living beings: which, Andrei says, people translate as a something's "self" or "true self".

If one removes Self grasping from earth as described in MN, and then "reject the earth element, detaching the mind from the earth element" that is earth devoid of Self grasping context and that is what is meant by Selfless of phenomenon. Dr. Alexander Berzin on Self-essence of phenomena "Just because nothing exists in impossible ways does not mean that nothing exists. Voidness refutes merely impossible ways of existing, such as self-established inherent existence. It does not refute the existence of things as “this” or “that” in accordance with the conventions of words and concepts."

Spare us Chris. Thanks. As though Wikipedia understands dhamma. As though Buddhism teaches about a True Self.

No Bodhihammer. MN 62 merely states to not regard the earth element as "mine". Why don't you read the sutta, which states: "earth property are simply earth property".

No one claims otherwise, removing "mine" is ending Self grasping in regard to earth element (both interior and exterior). In Mahayana terms it makes one not perceive it as an intrinsic in essence.

All that is required is required is removing self-grasping. The element of earth can be perceived without self-grasping. What you are posting is irrelevant and mere intellectualism. It shows non-liberation. Its just superstition & philosophy.


text:
Does Theravada posit the selflessness of phenomena?
It is generally taught in Mahayana monastic universities that Theravada does not posit the selflessness of phenomena. There it is taught a dichotomy exists between the tenet systems employed by various Buddhist traditions:

The selflessness of persons
The selflessness of phenomena

In Mahayana texts it is often said that the self of persons and the self of phenomena comprise the "two selves" that are refuted. It is said that Theravada only posits and thus refutes the self of persons.
This is a commentary on a textbook used in Buddhist monastic universities in India/Tibet written by a Geshe Lharampa:

For the, "Vaibashika school, there are 3 divisions and 18 subschools,
  one of which is the Theravadan school)"
...
Selflessness of phenomena is not asserted because the Vaibashikas
  assert that an established base is pervaded by self of phenomena i.e.
  even though the V assert selflessness of person, they do not assert
  the selflessness of phenomena.
Within existence, there are two aspects – person and phenomena. When
  one talks about selflessness of person, one is referring to the
  concept of “I”. When one talks about the selflessness of phenomena,
  one is referring to one’s 5 aggregates, all outer objects and
  everything other than concept of “I”. The V school doesn’t assert the
  selflessness of phenomena because they hold the view that phenomena is
  truly existent from its own side.

Emphasis in the original. The point I think is that a dichotomy is made between persons and external objects. The former is said to lack a self, but external objects are considered to be real or truly existent. Some Mahayana tenet systems say the latter also are unreal and not truly existent.
What do self-identified Theravada proponents think of this? Is this how you'd characterize your school or you understanding? Do you identify with the Vaibashika school?

In my travels through the Theravada world I've never found anyone believing in the self of phenomena. Jokes aside: as far as I'm concerned nothing has a self, nothing has intrinsic value, everything is empty and arises depending on conditions. But, I'm not a scholar. Let's see what others think.

Thank you @Medhini, I'd be very interested in your perspective on the other related questions!

The Vaibashika school doesn’t assert the selflessness of phenomena
  because they hold the view that phenomena is truly existent from its
  own side.

In my opinion, the Theravada view according to the Pali suttas imply that:

The self (of persons) is not truly existent.
Whether non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side or not, is (probably) not important towards the path to the end of suffering. (See the Parable of the Poisoned Arrow, Parable of the Simsapa Leaves and the Discourse on the Unconjecturables)

Of course, there may be a lot of Theravadins out there who dispute my second statement above, and would assert that all non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side.
EDIT: Just to make it clearer:
All sankharas (conditioned and/or compounded things) are subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana is not subject to change, arising and passing. Both sankharas and nibbana are empty of a self. But this does not mean that sankharas and nibbana are not truly existent. The self is definitely an illusion, but the world, transient as it is, may not be an illusion. Whether the world is an illusion or not, is not important to the path to the end of suffering (according to Theravada, in my opinion).

All "things" are dependently originated too, aren't they, and impermanent? Is that the same as their being selfless? What about the parable of the chariot (used to describe the selfless of a person): doesn't that imply that a chariot is selfless like a person is?

All sankharas (conditioned and/or compounded things) are subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana is not subject to change, arising and passing. Both sankharas and nibbana are empty of a self. But this does not mean that sankharas and nibbana are not truly existent. The self is definitely an illusion, but the world, transient as it is, may not be an illusion.

Good answer, Ruben. Well spoken.

I decided that I will add my two cents about things existent or truly existent. The problem of misunderstanding is common in Buddhism among nearly all the writers that write about Eastern ideas. Masters, scholars and spiritual leaders are no different. Writers have tendency to often oversimplify complex systems where they should be giving explicit and elaborate descriptions leaving clarity. This leads to confusion as there are phrases rich in many implicit meanings (oversimplifications) that cannot be understood by neither ordinary person, nor even moderate Buddhist practitioner.
As a result, there is finally the prevalent confusion about whether things exist or don’t exist, and whether things are of Selfless nature or not, and what does it really mean. In truth, those are two separate questions to be addressed, regardless of school context.
The first question is easily discarded by Buddha in Kaccayanagotta Sutra:

Everything exists': That is one extreme. 'Everything doesn't exist': That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle (...)

Here, we can only say that things are somehow real and existent, and that would be accurate. Claiming that things exist or don’t exist is a Metaphysical fool’s play with no end. Unfortunately, some commentators do engage in such unsolvable disputes. Comparing such attempts would be like comparing these to solving Gordian’s knot riddle, or other unsolvable mysteries of life.
Therefore, Theravada could not have had it any different than Mahayana when it comes to existence or non-existence.
And rather than exploring these extremes in futile attempts we should explore the Middle as it is real to be experienced here and now. And this is the second question, question about Selflessness of phenomena: When things appear to us, how do they appear, what is their true nature?
The answer to this question is not elaborated nor directly tackled by Theravada, so here, it might or might not be different - it is up to scholar’s interpretation.
But when Nagarjuna says “Samsara is Nirvana” it means that two truths - conventional and ultimate, are in fact one; concepts and fantasies arise from the touch with the way reality really is (tathata). There isn’t really much more to it.
It doesn’t take a great meditator and enlightened being to expand understanding and come up with such conclusions as Nagarjuna did, this is something we already know by intuition. Emptiness is natural, whether inner or outer, because phenomena are not how we picture them. Why? Because we see through the lens of Self framework, and this Self context coming from subject observer experience that infests the nature of things, contextually velcroing Self onto anything we experience. And that is because we cannot easily unlearn to think in other way and unlearning this habit requires great deal of insight. If validity of such wrong perception wasn’t the case in the first place, the loud noise at night wouldn’t make person afraid of the possible robbery. Why? Because here, we are afraid of losing Self by clinging to our very life and well-being, hence we distort reality of things by Self-centered “I” reference. It is the same for anything else, for instance, the deluded object of desire; the context here is Selfish, achieving the object for our own pleasure and satisfaction due to grasping. Looking at the flower we might consider it beautiful as it arouses pleasure, which is again, Self grasping by isolating pieces of reality, singling elements out to form a pleasurable fantasy.
It does not mean that flower has “ego-Self”, but that we see it through our Self scope and this is how it appears to us. In Yogacara it is described in detail as distortion of direct perception of consciousness by interaction with Manas (Self grasping mind faculty). And that’s it. If one is caught up in semantics about “Self” due to objects not capable of having an ego, it is more correct to say that things don’t have “intrinsic essence” rather than to say that they are Selfless. But it is not saying that things “don’t exist” and it is not this sort of debate here, it doesn’t relate to the second question at all.

Thanks @bodhihammer for this as it clearly shows that not all Mahayana practictioners agree either and that there is a lot of confusion within the Mahayana tenet systems as well. I can say I agree very little with the above :)

Inconsistencies and divergence arisen only from the point of Nagarjuna and commentary on Madhyamaka's pieces. For one, Nagarjuna was no Buddha, thus all that speculative commentary should be taken with a grain of salt. Secondly, the rule of thumb in my opinion is that the closest to the Pali canon synthesis it gets, the more likely it is true. I think we have too many Abhidharmas already.

I marked this answer down because it does not actually answer the question and because it contradicts the question.

I apologise sincerely if this doesn't help anyone in any way.

FWIW, I voted it up

In Theravada, "self" is fabricated ego-ideas of "I", "me", "mine", "you", "us", "them", "ours", "yours", etc.
In addition to the above, Mahayana seems to believe "self" is fabricated concepts such as "rock", "tree", "cloud", "dog", "book", "earth", "water", "aggregates", etc.
Since "phenomena" ("elements"/"dhatu") do not have a "ego-self", the idea of "the selflessness of phenomena" makes no sense at all. "Self" is an idea produced by human thought. Rocks, trees, clouds, feelings, physical bodies, perception, consciousness elements, etc, do not produce any thoughts of "self". Therefore, the question about their "selflessness" is non-sensical. As long as the element of earth is viewed as "earth"; the element of consciousness is viewed as "consciousness"; or the element of thought is viewed as "thought" (rather than viewed as "self", "me", "I", "mine", "you", "us", "them", "ours", "yours", etc) then this itself is the seeing of emptiness (sunnata).
The Lord Buddha, who revealed Buddhism, only taught about the selflessness of persons (anatta; sunnata). The Mahayana idea that the idea of "rock" or "cloud" is a "self" and therefore, in reality, there are no rocks, no clouds, no elements, etc, is unrelated to Buddhism but is a alien ideology.
To read this web page requires at least the element of eye consciousness. To believe there is no such thing as an eye or consciousness (as written in the Chinese Heart Sutra) is not real or true.

So, in emptiness, no form, No feeling, thought, or choice, Nor is there consciousness. No eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; No colour,
  sound, smell, taste, touch, Or what the mind takes hold of, Nor even
  act of sensing.
No ignorance or end of it, Nor all that comes of ignorance;No withering, no death, No end of them. Nor is there pain, or cause of
  pain, Or cease in pain, or noble path To lead from pain; Not even
  wisdom to attain! Attainment too is emptiness.
Heart Sutra

This is wrong. Here, "in reality, there are no rocks, no clouds, no elements, etc" is very wrong again, middle way is between existence and non-existence. Also, again "To believe there is no such thing as an eye or consciousness (as written in the Chinese Heart Sutra) is not real or true" is not what the Sutra says.

Its not wrong. Please do not spam my answers. Thanks.

HH Dalai Lama, Essence of the Heart Sutra: "As we go through this process of negation, it may seem we are in danger of arriving at the specious conclusion that nothing exits. But, if we understand the meaning of emptiness clearly, as I hope we will begin to, we’ll see that this is not what is meant."

This translates the Heart Sutra as saying that the aggregates "are not separate self entities" rather than just "no". Anyway maybe that (i.e. questions or statements about the Heart Sutra) would be better removed from this answer and perhaps posted elsewhere as a separate topic

HH Dalai Lama is simply making excuses for the Heart Sutra. The error of the Heart Sutra is implicit in the question.

It doesn't matter if everyone makes excuses for the Heart Sutra as simply no one dares to interpret Heart Sutra in such crude way. If even everyone makes excuses of Heart Sutra in such way as Dalai Lama or Thich Nhat Hanh do, then there is only goodness and virtue of joy coming out of it.

The Heart Sutra is superstition; not much different to the Bible. It is good noble kamma to criticize the Heart Sutra. Regards

Also I think (I'm not expert) that The Mahayana idea that the idea of "rock" or "cloud" is a "self" is fantastically wrong: I think the Mahayana idea is that rocks etc. DON'T have sabhava ("Svabhāva is by definition the subject of contradictory ascriptions ... Thus the existence of a svabhāva is impossible"), and therefore things are "empty".

DD is an expert. "Svabhāva" is not found in the Pali suttas however, regardless, it obviously does not have the meaning Wikipedia is asserting. "Sabhava" would obviously mean "own nature", as described below in SN 22.79: "And why, bhikkhus, do you call it feeling? ‘It feels,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling".... "And why, bhikkhus, do you call it perception? ‘It perceives,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.". ... etc