text:
Was something done by me?
All happenings are phenomenon. Happenings are Anatta. Therefore I am not happening neither happening is myself nor am I the owner of happening.
Give the above fact , is it true that I need to abandon the view that I am doing something or something was done by me or I am the work done or I am happening?
In short , was something ever done by me?

I had once asked a somewhat similar question to a Zen master in  dokusan. He just said, "you do have responsibility".

Also, you have free will and you have a choice, you are accountable for your karma. The Karma is still yours.

Not abandon, but rather realise, those are two different things; first is violent and suffering, second is liberation through peace. The first one doesn't work. Doer is an illusion, but there is doing and there is responsibility like Fredrick wrote. Your question may be generally speaking answered in Emptiness is form, form is Emptiness.

In short , was something ever done by me?

Conventionally speaking, yes.
Ultimately speaking, no.
Be aware that no matter how hard you try to understand this intellectually, it will never happen.
Anatta can only be grasped truly and completely through the practice of Vipassana meditation.

Good answer. I'd say it can be known intellectually though and moreover that it is necessary to arrive at the intellectual understanding to ever go beyond it. Still, intellectual understanding is mistaken and is not a complete knowing nor is it enough to complete our aims just as you said.

Thanks and yes I too think that intellectually speaking it has some importance to it, just not anything profound or life changing.

Here is a quote from a little story I wrote several years ago about Gautama's path to Buddhahood. In my story, this was the Buddha's answer to Kaundinya (Koṇḍañña) asking for the main point of Buddha's teaching:

"It is possible to think that we are merely will-less bodies, aggregates of physical elements, not having the free will, ruled by the laws of nature. It is possible to assume that we are the accumulations of memes, informational viruses, while our bodies are only their physical media. It is possible to consider that we are simply humans - suffering, dying, performing skillful or unskillful acts. It is possible to identify oneself with the eternal and infinite Totality of All. It is possible to believe in life after death, or in complete annihilation, or in perpetual transformation. It is possible to see people's minds controlled by the gods and demons, or by the rumors possessing the crowds. There is no single formula providing the answers to all the questions.
Do not rush to conclusion: "I get it now, the Teaching of Buddha is agnosticism". All I said above is not about that, but here is what it is about:
There exist an infinite variety of perfectly valid, mutually exclusive, but internally consistent, perspectives onto the world. Each of them leads to different decisions, different actions, and different results. You should decide for yourself - what to believe in and how to see the world. Do not let anyone force their perspective on you, however logical and experience-based it would seem. Do not take anything for granted without critical consideration. Because every time you're letting in a thought, you are choosing your path, and not only yours.
You can choose to think such thoughts from which you will suffer yourself and will torture others. Or else, you can choose to look at things such that neither you will suffer, nor the others. But there is no single point of view that would fit all the situations in life. A point of view is like a tool - use the right tool for each job.
Remember: by accepting some point of view you are changing not just your personal future, but also the future of the entire world. It depends on you what it will be. Choose your reality well."

TL;DR version
There is a conditioned and compounded, dependently originated self-doer, which is a discernible endeavouring and initiating being, that is generating the volitions to perform action. But there is no standalone independent eternal entity that is acting as the driver or charioteer.
An example is the autopilot of a self-flying airplane. It's a self-flying airplane, not a Self flying airplane. Several computers together with software, sensors and actuators in the plane work together to calculate, decide, and instruct how the plane flies. There is no human pilot (who is independent of the airplane) who is flying the self-flying plane. The autopilot is very much an integral and inseparable part of the airplane, just like its landing gear, engines and wings.
Similarly, there is no independent Self or Atman working like a "human pilot" performing action. Rather, there is a dependently originated self-doer working like the autopilot which is calculating, deciding and performing the actions. The self-doer is very much an integral and inseparable part of the five aggregates.
If one thinks that nobody is doing anything, this will result in an unwholesome attitude of not doing anything or not taking responsibility, which in turn results in unskillful actions, which in turn results in deepening suffering.  For more info on this, please refer to the commentaries by Nizamis and Piya Tan below on fatalism.
Furthermore, to think there is no self at all, is an annihilationist view, which is a false view, just like the eternalist view.
Long version
The Attakari Sutta (AN 6.38) answers this:

Then a certain brahman approached the Blessed One; having approached
  the Blessed One, he exchanged friendly greetings. After pleasant
  conversation had passed between them, he sat to one side. Having sat
  to one side, the brahman spoke to the Blessed One thus:
“Venerable Gotama, I am one of such a doctrine, of such a view: ‘There
  is no self-doer, there is no other-doer.’” (Note1)
“I have not, brahman, seen or heard such a doctrine, such a view. How,
  indeed, could one — moving forward by himself, moving back by himself (Note2)
  — say: ‘There is no self-doer, there is no other-doer’? What do you
  think, brahmin, is there an element or principle of initiating or
  beginning an action?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“When there is an element of initiating, are initiating beings clearly
  discerned?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“So, brahmin, when there is the element of initiating, initiating
  beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer,
  this, the other-doer.
“What do you think, brahmin, is there an element of exertion ... is
  there an element of effort ... is there an element of steadfastness
  ... is there an element of persistence ... is there an element of
  endeavoring?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“When there is an element of endeavoring, are endeavoring beings
  clearly discerned?”
“Just so, Venerable Sir.”
“So, brahmin, when there is the element of endeavoring, endeavoring
  beings are clearly discerned; of such beings, this is the self-doer,
  this, the other-doer. I have not, brahmin, seen or heard such a
  doctrine, such a view as yours. How, indeed, could one — moving
  forward by himself, moving back by himself — say ‘There is no
  self-doer, there is no other-doer’?”
“Superb, Venerable Gotama! Superb, Venerable Gotama! Venerable Gotama
  has made the Dhamma clear in many ways, as though he were turning
  upright what had been turned upside down, revealing what had been
  concealed, showing the way to one who was lost, or holding up a lamp
  in the dark: ‘Those who have eyes see forms!’ Just so, the Venerable
  Gotama has illuminated the Dhamma in various ways. I go to Venerable
  Gotama as refuge, and to the Dhamma, and to the assembly of monks.
  From this day, for as long as I am endowed with breath, let Venerable
  Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone to him for refuge.”

Commentary by Nizamis:

Note1: “Natthi attakāro, natthi parakāro.” Some people might have expected the Buddha to have approved highly of this naïve negative
  doctrine. The fact that he very succinctly and effectively refutes it
  is extremely instructive and of great significance for gaining a
  better understanding of the depth, subtlety, and holism of the
  Buddha’s actual teaching. Although the Buddha taught that there is no
  permanent, eternal, immutable, independently-existing core “self”
  (attā), he also taught that there is “action” or “doing”, and that it
  is therefore meaningful to speak of one who intends, initiates,
  sustains and completes actions and deeds, and who is therefore an
  ethically responsible and culpable being. It should be quite clear
  from its usage in this sutta, and from the argument of this sutta,
  that kāra in atta-kāra must be an agent noun, “doer, maker”: this is
  strongly entailed, for example, by the Buddha’s statement:
  “ārabbhavanto sattā paññāyanti, ayaṃ sattānaṃ attakāro ayaṃ parakāro”,
  “initiating beings are clearly discerned: of (such) beings, this is
  the self-doer, this, the other-doer” (AN iii.338). (This is perhaps
  even clearer than the term hāra in bhāra-hāra meaning “bearer”
  (“burden-bearer”) in SN 22.22 (Bhāra Sutta: The Burden; PTS SN
  iii.25). SN 22.22, which describes the “bearer” of the “burden” of the
  “five clung-to aggregates” (pañc-upādāna-kkhandhā) as the “person”
  (puggala), is arguably very closely related to AN 6.38 in meaning and
  implications. See SN 22.22 and also SN 12.61, note 1.) Atta-kāra could
  mean that one motivates oneself, or that one acts upon oneself;
  para-kāra could refer to the atta-kāra as seen from a third-person
  perspective, or to one who acts upon another being or thing. In each
  one of these cases, there is necessarily an all-important moment of
  initiation of action. As for the
  form of the term atta-kārī, which occurs in the title of this sutta,
  compare the expression: “yathā-vādī tathā-kārī”, “one who speaks thus,
  one who does thus”; or, in other words, “he does as he says”, “he
  practises what he preaches” (compare, for example, PTS DN iii.135, AN
  ii.24, Sn 359).
Note2: Sayaṃ abhikkamanto: “moving forward by oneself”; sayaṃ paṭikkamanto: “moving backward by oneself”. Sayaṃ means “self; by
  oneself”. The example seems to suggest the action of someone who
  intentionally takes a step forward, and then intentionally takes a
  step back again. This example leads directly to the next statement,
  and thus emphasises the idea of initiating an action:
  when someone takes a step forward or backward, the origin and impetus
  of this action must, so to speak, come from “somewhere” or
  “something”. In other words, it really is an intentionally initiated
  action (kiriya, kriyā), and not merely the arbitrary mechanical
  “effect” of some prior mechanical “cause” in a deterministic chain of
  mechanical push-and-pull. The sense, here, can be better understood if
  one also consults AN 2.33 (Aññataro Brāhmaṇo: A Certain Brahmin; PTS
  AN i.62), where the Buddha describes himself thus: “I am one who
  asserts that which ought to be done... and one who asserts that which
  ought not to be done.” (“Kiriyavādī cāhaṃ... akiriyavādī cā'ti.”)
  There, it is made very clear that doing and non-doing are morally
  significant and morally effective. Similarly, in several other suttas,
  such as in MN 95 (Caṅkī Sutta; PTS MN ii.164), the Buddha is described
  thus: “The venerable recluse Gotama is truly one who asserts the
  doctrine of kamma, one who asserts the doctrine of what ought to be
  done. . .” (“Samaṇo khalu bho gotamo kammavādī kiriyavādī. . .” (MN
  ii.167).) Again, in MN 71 (Tevijjavacchagotta Sutta; PTS MN i.481),
  the Buddha humorously recounts that in the last ninety-one aeons, no
  ājivaka, or “fatalist” who denies the power of volitional acts, has
  ever gone to heaven, except one, who happened to follow the doctrine
  of kamma and of morally effective deeds (“sopāsi kammavādī
  kiriyavādī”, MN i.483).

Part of Piya Tan's commentary on the Attakari Sutta:

2 Causality and agency
2.1 The Attakari Sutta is a short discourse on causality and agency, and is a clear statement on the efficacy of personal effort. Here,
  causality refers to a karmic action we (or anyone) have initiated, and
  such an action has karmic consequences. This is only one “link” in a
  complex karmic network of multiple causes and conditions. For, all
  actions work in concert with other actions, producing a network of
  results. This is called conditionality.
2.2 Agency, on the other hand, refers to how an action or set of actions we do affects others. For example, we hear a Dharma talk
  (action), and inspired by it, we go on to meditate (result). The
  Dharma speaker is an “agent,” so to speak, to our being motivated to
  meditate. A better Buddhist explanation is that the agency here is the
  teaching (not the person) of the Dharma teacher who motivated us. In
  short, it is possible to move others to goodness. It is for this
  reason that the Buddha teaches us the Dharma: we can be moved to act
  in a way that would transform us into awakened beings.5
2.3 The efficacy of action view (kamma,vāda) is that our present condition is partly the result of our deeds in previous lives. Those
  who reject this view, that is, the non-efficacy of action
  (akiriyā,vāda), believe that all deeds, past, present or future, have
  no effect on the condition of beings. “Thus, in its extreme forms the
  [akiriyā,vādi] would say that there is actually no causal connection
  between what a living being does and what he is or becomes, in this or
  in another life” (Gomez 1975:81 f).
2.4 The teaching on the efficacy of action is mentioned in greater detail in the Sonadanda Sutta (D
  4.6), where the Buddha declare himself to be “one who teaches karma, who teaches (the efficacy of) action” (kamma,vādi kiriyā,vādi) (D
  4.6/1:115). Similarly, in the Anna,titthiya Sutta (S 12.24), Sāriputta declares to the wanderers that the Buddha teaches the efficacy of
  action (S 12.14/2:33 ff). A threefold classification of non-action
  (akiriya) in the Titth’āyatana Sutta (A 3.61): our present condition
  is all due to our past actions; that it is the result of a god’s
  creation; or, that it is by sheer chance (A 3.61.1-4).6
2.5 Strictly speaking, the Atta,kārī Sutta is not about free will, but rather about fatalism. Philosophically, free will can only operate in
  a deterministic situation. If we do A, then it always follow that B
  will occur. If the situation is indeterministic, we will have no way
  of knowing how our actions will result. Fatalism, on the other hand,
  is an ethical view that choice is meaningless.
2.6 Makkhali Gosāla’s niyati,vāda is fatalism, which the Buddha rejects because Gosāla claims that purification happens without cause
  or condition within the individual (D 2).7 Furthermore, like the
  brahmin in the Atta,kārī Sutta, he claims that there is neither human
  agency (atta,kāra), nor effort (viriya), nor human exertion
  (purisa,parakkama) (id).8 Here, we are dealing with the ethics of what
  we can or cannot do.
2.7 As scholars of philosophy, like Asaf Federman, have noted, “The Buddhist rejection of this view is not a rejection of deterministic
  theory of causality but a rejection of fatalism.” (2010:13).9 It
  should be noted that the Atta,kārī Sutta is not discussing philosophy,
  but rejecting the view (especially that of Gosāla and of the brahmin
  in this Sutta) purporting or suggesting that we are all fated, so that
  no effort possible for spiritual purification and liberation. The
  Buddha teaches the contrary: we can help ourselves. Indeed, if we do
  not, no one can help us (Dh 160, 380).

Are you saying that it is the Self which does the Action ?

@DheerajVerma There is a conditioned and compounded, dependently originated self-doer, which is an endeavouring and initiating being, that is generating the volitions to perform action. But there is no standalone independent eternal entity that is acting as the driver or charioteer. An example is the autopilot of a self-flying airplane (not Self flying airplane). Several computers together with software, sensors and actuators in the plane work together to calculate, decide, and instruct how the plane flies. There is no human pilot (independent of airplane) who is flying the self-flying plane.

@DheerajVerma Similarly, there is no independent Self or Atman working like a "human pilot" performing action. Rather, there is a dependently originated self-doer working like the autopilot which is calculating, deciding and performing the actions. If one thinks that nobody is doing anything, this will result in an unwholesome attitude of not doing anything or not taking responsibility, which in turn results in unskillful actions.

The permanent, separate self does not exist. If there is no one there, who does the doing?
We can not control our five senses and thought. I do not choose the colors of the trees, the sounds of a guitar, the taste of carrots, or the preferences I have. These are all uninfluencable, yet ever changing. If all the faculties of the mind are beyond our control, how could we have the power to do anything?
Our 5 senses and thought are all manifestations of awareness. Without awareness of our sight, there would be no sight, etc. Therefore, our five senses are made of  nothing but awareness. They aren't even separate from awareness, they are nothing but awareness. Things are not happening. Awareness is being.
Reality is not what you infer from your senses. The universe is not outside of your mind. Reality is the awareness projecting your mind. The universe is the whole of which your mind is derived. There is no doer, only one being that knows nothing of doing.

A lot of it makes sense and does agree with experience. Just the bit of the senses, like "our five senses are made of nothing but awareness". Wouldn't you agree that there is also a rupa necessary? Eye sensitivity, seeing can't happen without a physical eye and a physical form or colour.

Nothing is "physical". All we have ever experienced is the contents of our minds. Our 5 senses and thought. The concept of an "eye" is a series of sights and thoughts. We have experienced thoughts about an eye. We have experienced sights of an eye. But we have not experienced an eye.

Or maybe a better way to phrase it is: "There is no evidence that a physical reality exists."

Back from meditation. And there is yet another thing not matching: the senses as manifestations of awareness. They are experienced as manifestations in awareness. A slight, but maybe important, difference. Would you say that that experience is skewed?

I would say awareness and the senses are one and the same. Awareness pervades the senses. Awareness and the senses are not separate entities. What are the senses made of? Pure knowing/awareness. Without awareness of your senses, you would not experience them. Awareness is the only essential component. Awareness is the universe. Experience (the 5 senses and thought) is nothing more than the act of awareness observing itself. The separate self stems from the belief that a separate awareness is observing something. Awareness is the only thing that exists. That is why you are the universe.

You say: Awareness and the senses are not separate entities. Yet a few sentences later they are: "Without awareness  of  your senses..." Here, awareness is aware of something separate. That would need further explanation. I don't care much about the universe, btw. :) Anyway, this is going to be a longer discussion. So, I think I'm going to mail you. Love your website, btw!

Thank you! I'll be sure to write more soon. And id love to talk! =]


text:
If all things are impermanent, then how can Buddhism make absolute assertions?
I had someone ask me this afternoon:

If Buddhism teaches that all things are impermanent, then how can it
  make absolute assertions such as there are 5 aggregates or there
  are 4 noble truths?

Since I am very new to all of this I had to honestly answer, "I don't know". I would appreciate any insights on this question.

Do you understand the difference between calling a dog a dog and saying that it is ever-living?

You friend has indulged into what is called the logical fallacy of false equivalence.
Buddhism teaches that all things are impermanent which means that there is no static nature to the things or static nature of the basic elements that everything is made up of.
So it means that the 5 aggregates are in a state of constant flux it's changing every moment, and not that it is ceasing to exist.
Now,
Buddhism can make an assertion that there are 5 aggregates because the assertion is 'about' the 5 aggregates. Furthermore, it can tell that there are four noble truths because 'four noble truths is the nature of the process, not the process itself'.
It's something like saying, 'if uncertainity principle is right we should be uncretain about the uncertainty principle'. It is a logically fallacious statement.
So, you should have replied to your friend saying,

If the second law of thermodynamics is true, how would you like your Beer?

A story you might like;

Two monks were watching a flag flapping in the wind. One said to the
  other,
“The flag is moving.” The other replied, “The wind is moving.”
The Zen master overheard this. He said, “Not the flag, not the wind;
  the mind is moving.”
From there comes KungFu Panda he says, "most probably, it's your mouth
  that is moving."

Also, a story for any such further conversation you might have, from a discourse on Dhammapada the way of the Buddha.

There were two temples in Japan, both enemies to each other, as
  temples have always been down the ages. The priests were so
  antagonistic that they had stopped even looking at each other. If they
  came across each other on the road, they would not look at each other.
  If they came across each other on the road they stopped talking; for
  centuries those two temples and their priests had not talked.
But both the priests had two small boys - to serve them, just for
  running errands. Both the priests were afraid that boys, after all,
  will be boys, and they might start becoming friends to each other.
The one priest said to his boy, "Remember, the other temple is our
  enemy. Never talk to the boy of the other temple! They are dangerous
  people - avoid them as one avoids a disease, as one avoids the plague.
  Avoid them!" The boy was always interested, because he used to get
  tired of listening to great sermons - he could not understand them.
Strange scriptures were read, he could not understand the language.
  Great, ultimate problems were discussed. There was nobody to play
  with, nobody even to talk with.
And when he was told, "Don't talk to the boy of the other temple,"
  great temptation arose in him. That's how temptation arises.
That day he could not avoid talking to the other boy. When he saw him
  on the road he asked him, "Where are you going?"
The other boy was a little philosophical; listening to great
  philosophy he had become philosophical. He said, "Going? There is
  nobody who comes and goes! It is happening - wherever the wind takes
  me...." He had heard the master say many times that that's how a
  buddha lives, like a dead leaf: wherever the wind takes it, it goes.
  So the boy said, "I am not! There is no doer. So how can I go? What
  nonsense are you talking? I am a dead leaf. Wherever the wind takes
  me...."
The other boy was struck dumb. He could not even answer. He could not
  find anything to say. He was really embarrassed, ashamed, and felt
  also, "My master was right not to talk with these people - these are
  dangerous people! What kind of talk is this? I had asked a simple
  question: 'Where are you going?' In fact I already knew where he was
  going, because we were both going to purchase vegetables in the
  market. A simple answer would have done."
He went back, told his master, "I am sorry, excuse me. You HAD
  prohibited me, I didn't listen to you. In fact, because of your
  prohibition I was tempted. This is the first time I have talked to
  those dangerous people. I just asked a simple question. 'Where are you
  going?' and he started saying strange things: 'There is no going, no
  coming. Who comes? Who goes? I am utter emptiness,' he was saying,
  'just a dead leaf in the wind.
And wherever the wind takes me....'" The master said, "I told you
  before! Now, tomorrow stand in the same place and when he comes ask
  him again, 'Where are you going?' And when he says these things, you
  simply say, 'That's true. Yes, you are a dead leaf, so am I. But when
  the wind is not blowing, where are you going? Then where can you go?'
  Just say that, and that will embarrass him - and he has to be
  embarrassed, he has to be defeated. We have been constantly
  quarreling, and those people have not been able to defeat us in any
  debate.
So tomorrow it has to be done!"
Early the boy got up, prepared his answer, repeated it many times
  before he went. Then he stood in the place where the boy used to cross
  the road, repeated again and again, prepared himself, and then he saw
  the boy coming. He said, "Okay, now!"
The boy came. He asked, "Where are you going?" And he was hoping that
  now the opportunity would come....
But the boy said, "Wherever the legs will take me...." No mention of
  wind! No talk of nothingness! No question of the nondoer! Now what to
  do? His whole ready-made answer looked absurd. Now to talk about the
  wind would be irrelevant.
Again crestfallen, now REALLY ashamed that he was simply stupid: "And
  this boy certainly knows some strange things - now he says, 'Wherever
  the legs take me....'" He went back to the master. The master said, "I
  have told you NOT to talk with those people - they are dangerous! This
  is our centuries-long experience. But now something has to be done. So
  tomorrow you ask again, 'Where are you going?' and when he says,
  'Wherever my legs take me,' tell him, 'If you had no legs, then...?'
  He has to be silenced one way or other!"
So the next day he asked again, "Where are you going?" and waited.
And the boy said, "I am going to the market to fetch vegetables."

Live Unpredictable, Live Prepared.

"Buddhism teaches that all things are impermanent which means that there is no static nature to the things or basic elements that everything is made up of".
Thank you, this exactly what I was looking for.

@Stanley i do not understand ur comment...are u asking more info on it or u mean that is wrong?

@Stanley I made a small edit, I think that line was confusing... I meant that both things and the elements they are made of are not static.

sorry for the confusion. I meant that I found the comment useful and it made sense to me. Thank you for the edit as well.

It's not exactly that "all things are impermanent", it's that "all compound things are impermanent" -- "compound" meaning "put together". Another way of saying it is that "every thing that's caused or created will cease, everything that's compounded will come apart or unbind".
Whereas I think that the assertions which you mentioned are not called "compound things" -- instead they're called dhamma (meaning something like "law", "natural law", and/or "doctrine").
It's not true to say that all dhammas are impermanent -- only all sankharas (compound things).

Also I suspect that "there are 5 aggregates" or "there are 4 noble truths" are a doctrine of the Buddha, who formulated them as a skilful (e.g. understandable, memorable) way of teaching the Buddhist Dhamma.
Another doctrine is that "there are 12 nidanas" -- but in some suttas there are fewer than 12.
There are many more listed here: Dhamma Lists
It's a bit like saying, "How many parts are there to an elephant?" You might say e.g., "There are four parts, i.e. body, head, legs, and tail" but that division (or "analysis") is a bit artificial -- and maybe (unlike the Buddha's Dhamma) not a useful description or analysis.

Is there a teaching or a quote that you can think of that specifically differentiates between "things" and "compound things"?
The easy quote to remember is the description of the three characteristics, the "three marks of existence":

The three marks are:

sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā — "all saṅkhāras (conditioned things) are impermanent"
sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā — "all saṅkhāras are unsatisfactory"
sabbe dhammā anattā — "all dharmas (conditioned or unconditioned things) are not self"

I think those are most memorably in the Dhammapada, verses 277 though 279:

Here is the Pali

Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā [...]
  Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā [...]
  Sabbe dhammā anattā [...]

Here an English translation

All conditioned things are impermanent [...]
  All conditioned things are unsatisfactory [...]
  All things are not-self [...]

Bizarrely, see also here -- is there a misprint in the Pali? But the English translation there still distinguishes between "conditioned phenomena" versus phenomena in general.
"Conditioned things" are held to be anatta too -- I think it says (more generally) that all dhamma are anatta, rather than only all sankharas, in order to include nibbana in the statement -- nibanna is a dhamma (it's not a compound thing), and is not impermanent nor dukkha, but it is anatta.
The quote appears in some suttas too, e.g. Channasutta (SN 22.90):

All conditions are impermanent
Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā
All things are not-self
sabbe dhammā anattā”ti

Thank you @ChrisW. Is there a teaching or a quote that you can think of that specifically differentiates between "things" and "compound things"? I would like to bookmark that.

@Stanley I added a quote to the answer above.

Another quote: "Anicca Vata Sankhara"

Another quote -- the last words of the Buddha -- "Conditions fall apart. Persist with diligence." -- vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādethā

Those are not absolute assertions. They are made conditionally on the existence of Mind and mental phenomenon (Mental phenomenon like memory).  If you don't have memory then will you be able to make any assertions ? No. Memories are lost.
Memories are anatta. Therefore all the assertions made by mind are anatta i.e lack any absolute existence.

“If Buddhism teaches that all things are impermanent, then how can it make absolute assertions such as there are 5 aggregates or there are 4 noble truths?“
Buddhism can’t make absolute assertions that are inherently true, because nothing exists inherently. The 4NT are conventional truths that are merely labeled. They do not exist inherently because nothing exists inherently. Inherent existence is an impossible mode of existence.
Now, when I say the above inevitably someone will interpret it to mean that the 4NT don’t exist or that they have no meaning. But this is not true. The problem with sentient beings is we always jump from two extremes: eternalism or annihilationism. However, neither of these is how things actually exist. This is our ignorance and it is extremely hard and subtle to realize how things actually exist.
BTW, not all things are impermanent and Buddhism does not teach otherwise. Uncompounded space is an example of a permanent thing. Still, uncompounded space does not exist inherently. Nothing exists inherently. Permanence is not the definition of inherent existence.

Simply reply to that friend of yours with a similar question: if all things are impermanent, then how can you know for sure if s/he has 5 physical sense organs and 4 limbs?

I guess your point is that the question is ridiculous?

No, it's not meant to ridicule, just to point out the illogical

It's usually inappropriate (on this site at least) to answer a question with just another question. Maybe you could connect the dots as well, perhaps explain how your question and the OP's question are analogous.

Why would it be inappropriate? It's one of the 4 ways of answering a question as taught by the Buddha in https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.042.than.html

Yes, I specified that it's usually inappropriate on this site -- not generally/always inappropriate. -- perhaps because this site is for question-and-answer, not question-and-counter-question. For example "Why are you asking?" isn't a satisfying answer. And this answer (of yours) was unclear to people -- could be clarified maybe. See also this topic on Meta (about the Panna sutta) -- Are the kinds of question, and what kinds of answers are good, considered on Buddhism.SE?

Please be very exact here, my answer is unclear to people or unclear to you? Medhini asked me to clarify and I've promptly followed up in the comment section to point out that to me, the counter-question is the best way to point out what's illogical in the OP question.  Sankha Kulathantille's counter-question is another great example of using questions to get the point across.

Unclear to me (or ambiguous -- it caused me to start asking myself, "how do I know I have five sense organs? Could it be only 4, are taste and smell more-or-less the same? Is the skin all one sense organ? Are there other senses -- 'thinking', for example, to sense ideas; or proprioception; or a sense of balance?" -- maybe that provoking that line of thinking wasn't your intention though). Unclear to Medhini (who guessed, but guessed wrong). Unclear to whoever upvoted Medhini's comment/question.

It's not my fault that you're unclear because I've specifically said 5 "physical" sense organs, not "5 sense organs", in which your tongue and your nose should be different, unless you're not human. I'd assume such an experienced Buddhist practitioner like you who knows more about the sense organs than anyone else would've never made such basic mindfulness mistake like this. And then the 4 limbs analogy should be as clear as day and night unless Medhini's friend is an amputee, in which case he should automatically know not to mention it out of basic courtesy and respect.

It took me some time, several attempts, to understand Sankha's comment too, by the way -- and I'm not sure that I ever would have understood it, except that I already knew the answer. Although it is concise I think it risks not being very clear to someone (like the OP obviously) who doesn't already understand the general principle.

I knew exactly what Sankha meant, maybe it's just because his thought pattern is very similar to mine. Anyway, you might have a point there. The fact that I ended up having to give more infos./explanations in the Comments section means that I might as well add all the info. up front in the Post section.  Will take that into consideration next time around...

Hi @santa100, the question you would have me ask this person would not work because he believes that there IS one things that is permanent (God), and he believes that God is the source of all things. He contends that everything comes from God including what we call right, wrong, true, false, real, and imaginary. His point in asking me the question was to prove to me that it was logically impossible to, "make an absolute assertion that there are no absolutes". He maintains that nothing could have originated (including the 5 aggregates) without God.

Also, @santa100, I would appreciate any thoughts or personal experience you have talking to similar individuals. He is very intelligent and he is open to discussion. My desire is to be skillful (not defensive or judgemental) and to approach him with kind curiosity. I want him to feel heard and understood while we challenge each other's point of views. I am only interested in the truth (if it can be known), not in winning arguments.

Hi @Stanley, your friend is an easy case. I've seen much worse. My counter-question is to really try to show his flaw logic. Assuming that we can't make absolute assertion that there are no absolutes, that doesn't automatically translate to making absolute assertion that there are absolutes. To use God as the default answer to everything would be way too easy. Any 4 year-old kid would know how to do that. And if an adult resorts to this approach, then really there's no evidence to prove that s/he's is very intelligent.

source: Stack Exchange

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

sort: votes


text:
Statues I can't find anything about
I picked up these two statues today. I have been searching for an hour or two, to identify them or learn anything at all I can about them.  I've searched through thousands of images, been comparing Buddhas from different countries, etc.
I found this website and saw the statue tag and now feel relieved.  Please someone tell me anything you can about these.
I hope I'm not posting this in the wrong place.  Thanks so much

This is a great source for identifying Buddhist statues by what they are holding.
The Buddha on the right is a representation of the historical Buddha (Shakyamuni). You can tell by the head-pattern, which represent 108 snails that crawled on the Buddha's head. In Japanese Buddhism, a red lotus held in the left hand is called Benikairen (紅開蓮) and symbolizes compassion.
The statue on the left is more difficult to identify. It is crowned and the historical Buddha was generally not depicted with any jewelry (being worldly attachment), which leads me to believe this is a depiction of a Bodhisattva. He is holding a five-storied pagoda (Jap. gojū-no-tō 五重塔) which is identified with the "Medicine Buddha" (who is actually a Bodhisattva):

In Chinese depictions, he is sometimes holding a pagoda, symbolising the ten thousand Buddhas of the three periods of time.

Thank you for your careful consideration of my question and providing as many details as you did.  I'm continuing my own research and will compare/contrast it with all the replies I receive here.  Hopefully I (we) can figure this out.  Thanks so much.

I suppose the one on our right represent Gautama Buddha -- I say that because of the hairstyle, see Why this hair style on statues of the Buddha?
He's holding a lotus (Padma).
The elongated earlobes are also among the physical marks of the Buddha -- Did the Buddha have long ears?
The clothes, bases, heights (and so on) match -- they're a matched set -- I can't identify any other symbols on the clothing or base.
Perhaps they're made as a pair, rather than elements of a once-larger set.
I don't recognise the personally-identifying symbolism of the statue on our left (perhaps someone else will). Assuming that:

They are a pair
The one on our right is Gautama Buddha
The one on our right is not obviously greater, grander, more venerable than the one on our left

... then I presume the one on our left is no less than a Buddha too (and is not e.g. a mere attendant).
Some schools of Buddhism identify more than one Buddha (see e.g. the Medicine Buddha or the Five Wisdom Buddhas).
My guess, based only on the fact that there are only two of them, is that the second one might be Matreya (the Future Buddha) -- that would make sense as a pair, i.e. the previous and the future Buddha -- but I found nothing to confirm that those personal symbols represent Maitreya.
Another possibility, maybe, is that the second statue represent Gautama Buddha too. There's a beehive hair-style again. That appears to be an eight-petalled crown -- a lotus again which, like the Dharmachakra, represents the Noble Eightfold Path.
He's holding what appears to be a stupa. Could it be that the pair represent the Buddha before and after parinibbana? I don't know.
When you display them it may be respectful to put them in the highest place, above other things (see e.g. this answer) -- for example perhaps on top of a bookshelf, or on the top shelf.

all_licenses: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Why the view "I am the owner of my karma" not contradict anatta?
Why did the Buddha advise lay people and monks to think, "I am the owner of my kamma, the heir of my kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my relative, kamma as my resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma, good or bad, that I do" when this seems to contradict anatta?
Isn't thinking "I am X" contradicting the teaching of anatta?
There are suttas where the Buddha advised not to associate the five aggregates with the self e.g. SN 22.93. Aren't these two teachings contradictory? Isn't "owner of kamma, heir of kamma" a mental fabrication (sankhara) that we shouldn't associate our self with?
Why didn't the Buddha advise lay people and monks to think, "there's no self in this body and mind doing anything"? What's the consequence of this view?
From AN 5.57:

“And for the sake of what benefit should a woman or a man, a
  householder or one gone forth, often reflect thus: ‘I am the owner of
  my kamma, the heir of my kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my
  relative, kamma as my resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma,
  good or bad, that I do’? People engage in misconduct by body, speech,
  and mind. But when one often reflects upon this theme, such misconduct
  is either completely abandoned or diminished.

appears contradictory to me too.

Anatta = 'Not-Selt', Anatta != 'No-Self',

Yes. So "owner of kamma, heir of kamma" is not self, isn't it?

You can see how the word “anatta” got translated incorrectly as “no-self”by carefully examining the different usages of the word “atta“. There is “atta” which is different from “attā” (with a “long a at the end). Anatta is the opposite of  “atta” not of “attā“. Anātma (which is a Sanskrit word not used by the Buddha and could be translated as “no-self”), has been misinterpreted as anatta.

Atta is like flour? Atta flour used to make roti...I think atta means “was”, Buddha teaching “was not”

This is how you practice equanimity (upekkha). It's the one of the four divine abodes. Just like in Metta(loving-kindness) meditation where you say "may I/my parents/relatives/friends be happy, well, free from suffering etc.", Upekkha meditation is also practiced at a conceptual level.
The purpose of Upekkha meditation is to cultivate equanimity in the mind. It does not lead to realization of Anatta nor enlightenment unless you turn it into Vipassana at some point.
Anatta is at the level of ultimate reality. That is for advanced practitioners of Buddhism. Trying to teach Anatta to everyone regardless of their mental maturity will not be productive as many will endup being more confused than they already are. That's why there are teachings in Buddhism that help you develop the mind at a conceptual level where you are familiar and comfortable. It is important not to mix up these teachings with the teachings of ultimate reality.

What is 'Vipassana' to you? I can say without any doubt that such kind of “vipassana” as practiced by almost everyone of you cannot lead to Nibbana.

@SapthaVisuddhi who are you referring to when you say "almost everyone of you"? I wouldn't make such gross generalizations. :)

Please do not take it in a personal way Sankha. I said it in the light of  "Nakhasikha Sutta: The Tip of the Fingernail" (SN 13.1). If you and I have got things right, we must be very much in this Noble Eightfold Path. Once in this Path, one knows exactly where one is (eg. a non-returner or not). We are nowhere close to any of the stages b'cos we have got things very wrong.

No I didnt take it personally. Just pointing out that gross generalizations are usually inacurate

It is atta-anuditthi as well for the ordinary people.
But for the noble one it is anatta-anuditthi.
Because it depends on their understood of atta/anatta. It is not depends on words "my/mine/me/I". therefore, in tipitaka, Buddha and the other noble ones still say those words after enlightened.

Because we unenlightened worldlings act, say, and think anything and everything in terms of "I", "mine", and "myself" anyway; regardless of whether He teaches AN 5.57 or not. So He might as well teach and speak in the language that we worldlings can parse while still not attaining enlightenment just yet. And just for kicks, imagine if AN 5.57 said the opposite, how the worldlings would interpret, and the potential consequences? "a householder or one gone forth, often refelct thus: 'I am NOT the owner of my kamma, NOT the heir of my kamma; NOT kamma as my orgin, etc." Now, SN 22.93 is different in that its' strictly for monks, there's no "householders", nor "any man or woman" mentioned like in AN 5.57. Another important point worth noticing is that the 2 statements of the 2 suttas are not contradicting each other: "I am the owner of my kamma" vs. "The Five Aggregates are not the self". It's only contradicting if one automatically equates the "I" in AN 5.57 to be the same as the "self".

Are you saying that SN 22.93 is not applicable to lay people?

Not necessary, because there'll always be lay folks who're way more advanced than monks. But the overrall message should be clear and you know that.

On one hand I feel it is a way to make it easier to be represented and understood by laypeople or beginners.
On the other hand, the concept of Anatta can be interpreted as "no permanent nature of self". This concept needs to be fully understood as part of reaching enlightenment, but at the same time, this doesn't contradict to an individual being an owner of respective Kamma, if Kamma was created.

Let's see what the Buddha has to say :

Now at that moment this line of thinking appeared in the awareness of
a certain monk: "So — form is not-self, feeling is not-self,
perception is not-self, fabrications are not-self, consciousness is
not-self. Then what self will be touched by the actions done by what
is not-self?"
Then the Blessed One, realizing with his awareness the line of
thinking in that monk's awareness, addressed the monks: "It's possible
that a senseless person — immersed in ignorance, overcome with craving
— might think that he could outsmart the Teacher's message in this
way: 'So — form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is
not-self, fabrications are not-self, consciousness is not-self. Then
what self will be touched by the actions done by what is not-self?'
Now, monks, haven't I trained you in counter-questioning with regard
to this & that topic here & there? What do you think — Is form
constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord." "And is that which is
inconstant easeful or stressful?" "Stressful, lord." "And is it
fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as:
'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?" "No, lord."
"... Is feeling constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord"...
"... Is perception constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord"...
"... Are fabrications constant or inconstant?" "Inconstant, lord"...
"What do you think, monks — Is consciousness constant or inconstant?"
"Inconstant, lord." "And is that which is inconstant easeful or
stressful?" "Stressful, lord." "And is it fitting to regard what is
inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my
self. This is what I am'?" "No, lord."
"Thus, monks, any form whatsoever that is past, future, or present;
internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or
near: Every form is to be seen with right discernment as it has come
to be: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'
"Any feeling whatsoever...
"Any perception whatsoever...
"Any fabrications whatsoever...
"Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present;
internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or
near: Every consciousness is to be seen with right discernment as it
has come to be: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not
what I am.'
"Seeing thus, the instructed disciple of the noble ones grows
disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with
perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with
consciousness. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through
dispassion, he is released. With release, there is the knowledge,
'Released.' He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled,
the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, the monks delighted in
the Blessed One's words. And while this explanation was being given,
the minds of sixty monks, through lack of clinging, were fully
released from fermentations. - MN 109

Also, the predicament faced by Ven. Channa is quite similar to what several of us feel, hence Ven. Ananda gives him some advice :

Then the thought occurred to Ven. Channa, "I, too, think that form is
inconstant, feeling is inconstant, perception is inconstant,
fabrications are inconstant, consciousness is inconstant; form is
not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, fabrications
are not-self, consciousness is not-self; all fabrications are
inconstant; all phenomena are not-self. But still my mind does not
leap up, grow confident, steadfast, & released in the resolution of
all fabrications, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the ending of
craving, dispassion, cessation, Unbinding. Instead, agitation &
clinging arise, and my intellect pulls back, thinking, 'But who, then,
is my self?' But this thought doesn't occur to one who sees the
Dhamma. So who might teach me the Dhamma so that I might see the
Dhamma?"
Then the thought occurred to Ven. Channa, "This Ven. Ananda is staying
at Kosambi in Ghosita's Park. He has been praised by the Teacher and
is esteemed by his knowledgeable fellows in the holy life. He is
capable of teaching me the Dhamma so that I might see the Dhamma, and
I have sudden trust in him. Why don't I go to Ven. Ananda?"
So, setting his lodgings in order and carrying his robes & bowl, Ven.
Channa went to Kosambi to where Ven. Ananda was staying in Ghosita's
Park. On arrival, he exchanged courteous greetings with the Ven.
Ananda. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat
to one side. As he was sitting there, he [told Ven. Ananda what had
happened and added], "May Ven. Ananda exhort me, may Ven. Ananda teach
me, may Ven. Ananda give me a Dhamma talk so that I might see the
Dhamma."
"Even this much makes me feel gratified & satisfied with Ven. Channa,
that he opens up & breaks down his stubbornness. So lend ear, friend
Channa. You are capable of understanding the Dhamma."
Then a sudden great rapture & joy welled up in Ven. Channa at the
thought, "So I am capable of understanding the Dhamma!"
"Face-to-face with the Blessed One have I heard this, friend Channa.
Face-to-face with him have I learned the exhortation he gave to the
bhikkhu Kaccayanagotta:[2] 'By & large, Kaccayana, this world is
supported by[3] a polarity, that of existence & non-existence. But
when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with
right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does
not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it
actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the
world does not occur to one.
"'By & large, Kaccayana, this world is in bondage to attachments,
clingings (sustenances), & biases. But one such as this does not get
involved with or cling to these attachments, clingings, fixations of
awareness, biases, or obsessions; nor is he resolved on "my self." He
has no uncertainty or doubt that, when there is arising, only stress
is arising; and that when there is passing away, stress is passing
away. In this, one's knowledge is independent of others. It is to this
extent, Kaccayana, that there is right view.
"'"Everything exists": That is one extreme. "Everything doesn't
exist": That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the
Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle: From ignorance as a
requisite condition come fabrications. From fabrications as a
requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a
requisite condition comes name-&-form. From name-&-form as a requisite
condition come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a
requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite
condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes
craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes
clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition
comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth.
From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the
origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.
"'Now from the remainderless fading & cessation of that very ignorance
comes the cessation of fabrications. From the cessation of
fabrications comes the cessation of consciousness. From the cessation
of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form. From the
cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media.
From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of
contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling.
From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the
cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From
the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming.
From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the
cessation of birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,
distress, & despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire
mass of stress & suffering.'
"That's how it is, friend Ananda, for those who have friends in the
holy life like Ven. Ananda — sympathetic, helpful, exhorting, &
teaching. Just now, for me, listening to Ven. Ananda's
Dhamma-teaching, has the Dhamma been penetrated."

Aren't these two teachings contradictory? Isn't "owner of kamma, heir of kamma" a mental fabrication (sankhara) that we shouldn't
associate our self with?

MN 117 says there are two types of teachings, where kamma is a mundane teaching and the noble eightfold path, per AN 6.63, is a supramundane teaching that ends kamma
so the reflection on 'heir to kamma' is mundane however is also useful for all non-arahants to remind themselves of kamma because all non-arahants can have lapses in mindfulness that can result in doing unpeaceful kamma, such as scolding puthujjana
when a noble non-arahant uses the kamma reflection and is mindful of not-self, the "I" in the kamma reflection is merely a convention. however it remains effective to remind them to maintain good kamma

what exactly is meant by a convention?  ideas are objects of conceptuality whereas the existing i arises with the aggregates specifically the bhavanga,  is the object of nonconceptual awareness, and is the basis for ascertaining the absence of self.

I don’t think there is any contradiction in the sayings, “I am the owner of my kamma…..” with the teaching of anatta (not-self). A lot of us desire good karmic fruits (pleasant experiences) but abhor bad karmic fruits (bad experiences) but we don’t get to choose what (either good or bad), when, where and how our karma comes to fruition.
It’s like a man mistakenly planted lots of bitter gourds in his backyard. When the bitter gourds ripen, he bemoaned, “Oh why do I have so much bitter fruits, I want sweet tasting fruits!”. He can’t snap his fingers and miraculously change the bitter gourds to mangoes. Similarly, we really understand why it is anatta when we are experiencing our bad karmic fruits. In such times, we can’t do anything but just endure. Nor can we transfer some of these bad karmic fruits to another time or place. The same goes with good karmic fruits, we can’t store them or delay their ripening till an appropriate time.
We can plant karmic seeds, that’s about it. The whole process of those seeds germinating, ripening and coming into fruition is anatta or not-self.

The last paragraph.: the process itself is not-self...this is true, karma is not-self


text:
What is (so special) different about Dzogchen?
In relation to the comment in this answer '... regular Buddhism is college - Dzogchen is like a PhD.' Also, Sam Harris seems to endorse Dzogchen.
I am reading online like the wiki page etc. Does not seem to be any massive difference or something out of ordinary.
Can somebody please explain.

Dzogchen is taking mind and mind only as the path. From mind, both Bodhicitta and realisation of Emptiness have to rise naturally. In standard Mahayana you are asked to develop relative Bodhicitta in tandem with developing realisation of Emptiness and then it gives Buddha nature; ultimate Bodhicitta, which is non conceptual realisation of Emptiness. You might achieve one of the other sooner but completion is when you realise both, that is how ultimate Bodhicitta (Rigpa, in Dzogchen terms) arises. In Dzogchen - it is backwards, one is asked to delve deep past conceptual realisation of Emptiness  and Bodhicitta in order to get in touch with ground of all consciousness. From Rigpa, both realisation of Emptiness and relative Bodhicitta will arise without any effort and that supposed to be a lot faster.
Moreover, it might be, a non-gradual approach. For example, all Sutric and Tantric practises can be done in tandem with Dzogchen without a very strict order or progression (but not without any progression). Approach takes every possible technique from Sūtra or Tantra that might help one in a given moment.
Techniques in Dzogchen are different and many, even Shamatha is done differently than the standard way; in Dzogchen, Shamatha is focusing on space around you non conceptually with eyes wide open rather than going for breathing. It is said that from such Shamatha technique, practitioners of greater capacity might develop realisation of Rigpa alone, and they don’t need further techniques, for they went far beyond simply realising three vajras to be of one taste which is the regular goal of Shamatha.

If I were to draw out a simile between another Buddhist tradition in Mahayana, I would choose Soto Zen. Zazen in this tradition is gazing at the space in front without focusing on breath while having eyes wide open. Technique is simply "thinking non-thinking" as what Dogen Zenji said, and so the result is pretty much the same to Dzogchen's gazing - only that Dzogchen has many more techniques coming under Atiyoga. Similarily, in Soto Zen, experience and minimalism is stressed before knowledge or conceptually intellectual approach. Major difference is in Dzogchen's utilising Tantric techniques freely - whenever necessary.

Thank you for your answer. The first part is hard to grasp but I got the overall direction. What is this 'ground of all consciousness'. Also can you recommend a book or a site to just have a look.

Ground of all consciousness is Rigpa, which is also called primordial consciousness or ultimate bodhicitta or suchness. Shortly it’s nonconceptual experience of Emptiness. Dzogchen uses three tiered model of mind; ordinary mind, substrate/storehouse consciousness and ground (Rigpa). Each deeper level is the ground for the level above.

As for the book or explanations, I recommend Alan Wallace's book on Shamatha or Namkhai Norbu's introductory books on Dzogchen. Alan Wallace also has introduction to Dzogchen on wisdom pubs site which is a learning course.

Thank you very much for the recommendations. That helps a lot to give me a head start.

Actually, I have a lot of doubts about your comment on Rigpa but I think that will make for another question. I did better read those books first.

Dzogchen teaches a non-dualistic state of one's own primordial nature, with nothing to reject or accept, that is pure from the beginning in the nature of a light body. -- Khenpo Palden

In simple words:
Original Buddhism introduced many new concepts to describe 1) the unenlightened state of mind, and 2) practice leading to Liberation. Theravada's approach is to preserve these teachings as closely as possible without alterations. From Theravada's perspective it is the student that must adapt to the Teaching - not the other way around. So the student is expected to learn the exact original definitions, ideally in the Pali language. However, for many students this approach makes it difficult to see the forest behind the trees.
Mahayana Buddhism prefers to stay away from repeating the rigid concepts from Pali suttas and instead tries to re-tell the same meaning in its own words. This is why Mahayana often prefered writing new texts instead of quoting original suttas. So Mahayana's approach is more focused on conveying the "point" of the Teaching, rather then the "letter". In Mahayana, the teaching adapts to the spirit of times and places, to explain Dharma in the way the students can relate to. Still, just like Theravada, Mahayana Buddhism is mostly about 1) the unenlightened state of mind, and 2) practice leading to Liberation. But this is not all there is to Dharma, it also has the third part: Result!
In Dzogchen speak, the three parts are called Ground, Path, and Fruition - and Dzogchen focuses 100% on the third. Truth be told, some parts of Mahayana like Madhyamaka do approach Fruition in their teaching about Emptiness - but they mostly try to explain it conceptually, in terms understandable to the unenlightened mind. In contrast to that, Dzogchen directly teaches how the Enlightened mind sees and acts. Dzogchen focuses directly on what it feels like to be Enlightened or to be in Nirvana. After all the teachings of Theravada and Mahayana are learned, and all the practices fulfilled - after the Raft has been used to cross over to the other side and left behind - what remains at that point? That's what Dzogchen is about.
So Dzogchen is even more "to the point" than Mahayana - in its purest form it throws away all those teachings and explanations, and goes: "here is what Enlightened mind is like, now you do it". This is what makes it so radically different from everything else.

Do you think it possible to grok Dzogchen while seemingly being averse to, "how much Buddhist religiosity one will be asked to imbibe along the way" as Sam Harris apparently is?

IMO that depends both on the student's capacity for intuitive understanding and on the teacher ability to establish a rapport with student. The stronger the student's intuition, the better the rapport -- the fewer religious elements are required on the teacher's part to deliver the student across.

I guess what I'm getting at is that this aversion to Buddhist religiosity is predicated on a belief that there is a concrete and real ontological reality that scientific practice illuminates and Buddhist religiosity is contradictory to this objective world that science illuminates. I am pretty sure that this is what Sam Harris thinks. What I'm asking is do you think one can have fully grokked Dzogchen while still holding to the belief in this ontological realism of the default scientific worldview?

Not in its naive (Newtonian) form, no. But perhaps in the true open-minded scientific spirit of inquiry - yes, I think that is possible.

I am referring to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_realism and  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_naturalism To be clear, I'm not talking about science as a practice... I think that is entirely compatible with Dzogchen, but my understanding is that Dzogchen is not compatible with scientific realism or scientific materialism as described in these links and that Sam Harris espouses these. Thus, I doubt Sam Harris really understands what Dzogchen is about.

see here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28970/is-scientific-realism-materialism-and-or-historicity-compatible-with-mahayana as I guess this is a separate question

"Dzogchen focuses directly on what it feels like to be Enlightened or to be in Nirvana" - I don't mean this in a derogatory sense, but this sentence sounds to me very much like the English aphorism "fake it till you make it"

It really raises more questions that it answers. For starters as I understand its not possible for 'mind' to grasp end result of the path. As Lao Tzu said, the real Tao cannot be spoken. But any way can you provide me a link about what it exactly speaks about this end result. The articles I am getting online are giving lot of details.

@ruben2020 - yes, that's a good way to put it. This is called "taking Result as the Path" - acting "from within" the enlightened perspective until it sticks.

@FriedrickNietzsche it wouldn't be "the PhD of Buddhism" if it could be explained in one online link, would it? ;) Dzogchen is not "speaking" about result, it's living it - and this is when the actual live teacher (a former student who got it) is the critical element.

@YesheTenley I would agree that it is unequivocally not possible to have realization of rigpa and still believe that space/time/matter are fundamental (as metaphysical naturalism posits).


text:
Is Scientific Realism/Materialism and/or Historicity compatible with Mahayana?
In my estimation the answer is decidedly no, but I am interested to hear what others think from a Mahayana or Madhyamaka perspective.
First, to try and clarify terms I am using scientific realism/materialism as described here:

Scientific Realism
Scientific Materialism
Historicity

While the above links do a pretty good job of describing these worldviews I don't think they are perfect. In my own imperfect language I'd say these worldviews presuppose an objective world that exists in an independent and inherent manner. I think this is the default worldview of most lowly beings and certainly of western or modern society. The idea is that the practice of science gets us ever closer to the true and fundamental underlying material reality with the presupposition that there is a true and fundamental underlying material reality that exists in the first place.
In this worldview, the laws of physics inherently exist and everything can be reduced to some fundamental building blocks of nature evolving in time according to those laws. That there is a truth of the matter about every historical event that is independent of any subjective consciousness. In short, that things exist inherently and not as mere conventions.
To my mind, anyone who believes in these worldviews has not fully grokked the deep and subtle meaning of Mahayana/Madhyamaka emptiness. To be clear, I am not talking about the practice of science which I see as distinct from the worldviews above.
To define by way of contrast, consider this alternative scientific worldview that does not presuppose an underlying observer independent physical reality. By the way, here is an article written by the author of Relational QM on the comparison of his work to Nagarjuna.
Is this correct? What have I gotten wrong?

I don't know these philosophies. The 2nd link you quoted says, "Non-physical or quasi-physical substance, such as information, ideas, ..." -- doesn't that say that these (including laws) don't exist -- i.e. that really only the material (and energy) exists?

Also I don't understand what the 1st link (about scientific realism) is saying, but it says that it's "as opposed to instrumentalism" -- and Wikipedia's Instrumentalism article says, "instrumentalism is largely the prevailing theory that underpins the practice of physicists today" -- so maybe that contradicts your assertion that it's scientific realism that's "the default worldview of most lowly beings and certainly of western or modern society".

Hi ChrisW, the links are imperfect descriptions of the underlying philosophies. To my mind, the typical western lowly being walks around unknowingly assuming many of the facets of these underlying philosophies. But if you don't grok what this question is about, then I take the blame as it is not a very well crafted question.

What follows is not an "answer", but just some ideas or frames of interpretation from discussions with fellow Buddhists with a Western scientific background. So please don't crucify me :-) but tell me if I'm wrong.
The Scientific Method is Compatible with Mahayana Buddhism
Let's first appreciate the success of the western scientific method to explain certain parts of conventional reality that were previously within the religious domain. There is no need to believe in a god of thunder anymore in order to explain certain meteorological phenomena. I believe that this success was just extrapolated to the metaphysical realm somehow unintentionally or without much thinking, so that "scientific materialism" just formed once there was no need for specific divinities anymore. Scientific models just don't talk about metaphysics (for exceptions see below).
Scientific models used to fail completely to deal with "mind" (as the structure of a perceiving subject), at least until a few years/decades ago. Psychology is either considered "unscientific" (early psychology with Freud, Jung etc.) or doesn't actually talk about the mind anymore (focusing on what is measurable). So I would argue that "science" is actually not talking about the mind or any metaphysical concepts like Karma or Sunyata. So I don't see any hard incompatibility here with early Buddhism. This would also hold for most Buddhists schools, if you'd strip of the mythological elements and/or interpret them as psychological images.
Neuroscience, Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence
A few decades ago things have started to change, and that is where I believe things get interesting with respect to (in-)compatibility with Buddhism. The disciplines start to talk about the mind and the structure of the perceiving subject. However, current models are very basic and typically limited to specific brain functions. For example, there has been quite some progress to model the processing of images from the eyes in the visual cortex, and artificial intelligence (AI) has become successful performing such tasks automatically, as everybody can see first-hand when using the image processing functions of recent mobile phones. We can expect further progress in this area.
The current results imply that "thoughts" and other cognitive states are represented in the brain as patterns of neuronal activity. This is a pure materialist view of the mind. There are philosophical and religious schools that deny this, but given the success record of the scientific method and the amount of resources invested in this research area, I predict important advances in the upcoming years that will make this view more and more popular.
Areas of Conflict
It may be interesting to examine the specific areas or concepts that might conflict with such material view:

Karma: Maybe we could live with "Karma in this one life"? Karma could also be seen as related to neuroplasticity and neural pathways that accumulate/aggregate habitual reactions.
Devas, Nagas and other divinities: I interpret them as personification of states, traits or properties.
Nihilism: Nihilism gets in the way of Sunyata. There is no answer on this one yet.
Mind: See below.
Other areas? Let's discuss.

Materialist View of Mind Preserving Buddhist Properties?
I'm an active researcher in the area of AGI and have published a very technical paper on the subject.
Here is a summary using a simile: The mind relates to the neurons of the brain like a YouTube video on a computer to the silicon logic that only works with 0's and 1's. You can't explain the quality of the video on the level of silicon logic. You will have to talk about applications, libraries, operating systems, programming languages, microprocessors, digital logic and many other "layers" that build on each other in order to produce a video. In a similar way I could imagine that the phenomena of "mind" appear at the highest layer of the "layer cake" of the brain.
Is ... Materialism ... compatible with Mahayana?
To summarize these views: The wealth of mental phenomena in and outside meditation is perfectly compatible with a materialist base of the mind. The physical laws governing the simple neural building blocks don't limit the mind in any way. Nihilism may be a problem. We also may have to "tweak" the interpretation of some concepts in order to avoid conflict. Strict followers of certain Buddhist schools may find this not acceptable.

Hello fraber, your answer is fine for what it is. Unfortunately, with the focus on mind and some of the other perceived conflicts the answer is sidestepping the question. I think it is likely that the question is not phrased well enough or written well enough to get to the heart of what I'm asking. I'll think about it and see if I can edit the question to be clearer.

@Yeshe, thanks for the upvote. Interesting question. I just wanted to point out that neither the Buddhist nor the materialistic sides are "monolithic". Instead, there are "clouds" of variants. Consider the >100 different views on Sunyata / Prajnaparamita by various schools. Some are more compatible with a "pure materialism" than others. The same holds in the materialistic side. I tried to argue that a materialistic substrate may produce phenomena that appear to be non-materialistic.
Maybe also post the question on Daniel Ingram's Dharma Overground.

I agree with you. These are material World views and can’t explain mind or karma. But I am glad that you added that you see these as different to other scientific methods which are compatible with Buddhism.
The basic scientific process of observing cause and effect can be applied to religion, and using logical reasoning to establish phenomena that cannot be directly observed is common to both.


text:
What are the four dharma seals?
I can find various modern English-language translations (and descriptions, explanations) of the four dharma seals (e.g. on Wikipedia or on Lion's Roar); but --

What's the earliest or original reference (scripture) in which the seals are defined?
What's the best and/or the most famous original description (if that's not the same as above)?
In which canonical language[s] are they defined? Are they (also) defined in Pali or Sanskrit?

I'm ideally looking for all four seals together as a formula -- not e.g. the three characteristics as an early version of it, nor a text which only for example describes emptiness.

See also Pure Land Schools' version of the Three (or Four) Marks of Existence -- I think my new question is similar but not an exact duplicate -- also that question was self-answered but the OP was still looking for any other references.

I also see them named as "Four Seals of Mahamudra" -- I gather that Mahamudra is Tibetan, but that the Four Seals are East Asian Mahayana too -- and this reference relates them to the four noble truths.

In Tibetan schools the four seals are usually presented like this:

Everything that is conditioned (or "composite") is impermanent.
Everything that is stained (or "tainted") brings suffering.
All phenomena are empty and devoid of a self (or "of independent entity").
Nirvana or ("The Realization") is peace.

The first three look like paraphrases of the original Three Marks of Existence:

anicca vata sankhara (all assemblies are transitory)
sabbe sankhara dukkha (all assemblies are faulty / entail pain)
sabbe dhamma anatta (all phenomena are no-self or "coreless")

And here is a commentary by H.H. Dalai Lama from "The Gelug/Kagyü Tradition of Mahamudra."
[For non-Mahayana Buddhists]

never separating the actions of their body, speech and mind from the behavior shaped by the vinaya rules of ethical discipline is karmamudra, the seal of their behavior.
The realization of the lack of any true, unimputed identity of a person, specifically the total absence or voidness of a person existing as a substantial entity able to stand on its own – the coarse identitylessness of a person according to the prasangika-madhyamaka presentation – is dharmamudra, the seal of their preventive measures.
The state of separation from disturbing emotions and attitudes, on the basis of the abiding nature of purity, attained through meditation on the identitylessness of a person is samayamudra, the seal of their close bond.
The nirvana or total release that they attain without any remainder of aggregates is mahamudra, their great seal.

[For Mahayana Buddhists having taken the vow of Bodhisattva]

never separating the actions of their body, speech and mind from behavior based on practice of the six far-reaching attitudes is the seal of their behavior.
Based on their practice of the six far-reaching attitudes in general, and particularly of the joint path of shamatha yoked with vipashyana, their meditation on voidness, free from all mental fabrication and fabricating, seeing that all phenomena appear but without true, inherent existence, like illusion, is the seal of their preventive measures.
Through the ethical self-discipline of a bodhisattva, restraining themselves from all selfish thought or action so that they are never tainted by any stain of working for their own purposes is the seal of their close bond.
Having followed a path that has had as its essence the combination
  of compassion and the understanding of voidness, on which they have
  practiced method and discriminating awareness without one having
  ever been missing, but rather with method always apprehended within
  the context of wisdom and wisdom within the context of method, their
  single taste of compassion and voidness is their great seal. At that point, their ultimate combined vision of both the full extent of what exists and how it all exists, being of a single taste of compassion and wisdom, totally pacifies the extreme of remaining passively in a nirvanic state of total release from all suffering.

I do not know the original/earliest source of these.

I think though that "tainted" in the second is a reference to Kleśa or Āsava -- not sankhara.

Yes, that thought has crossed my mind too. And the commentary alludes to that in "state of separation from disturbing emotions and attitudes" and "never tainted by any stain of working for their own purposes".

So this commentary relates that the second of the four noble truths (and not to the three characteristics). Also it switches their order, i.e. its fourth is your third and vice versa. I'm not sure that stands up to close scrutiny though -- perhaps the different formulations are similar, but not quite identical.

Also the sequence in your first ordered list (i.e. 2=tainted and 3=empty) wasn't quite the same as the ordered sequence in H. H.'s commentary.

According to Buddhism: One Teacher, Many Traditions by His Holiness the Dalai Lama:

Cultivating the four establishments of mindfulness and reflecting on
  their specific and common characteristics enables us to understand the
  four seals that determine a teaching to be the Buddha's doctrine.
  These are mentioned in the Samadhiraja Sutra in the Sanskrit
  tradition: (1) all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, (2) all
  polluted phenomena are unsatisfactory, (3) all phenomena are empty and
  selfless, and (4) nirvana is true peace.

Here is the wikipedia article on the mentioned Sutra.
Apparently, this Sutra has been fully translated on http://read.84000.co/, but I haven't found it yet.
Hope this helps!

Thank you. The translation is here: Samādhirājasūtra. It's interesting to read. I didn't find in it the four seals listed as such though. It has bits which imply some of the seals, e.g. that eliminating kleśas is associated with peace, and that seeing that phenomena are empty (or non-existent) is associated with eliminating klesas.

The closest I found I suppose to the four seals as a formula was Chapter 24, which consists of lists of things associated with 4 things -- the 4 "things" being 1) the composite (it doesn't say these are impermanent though), 2) teaching the composite (I guess that should be understood as a reference to the doctrine on emptiness), 3) the kleśas (it doesn't say these are unsatisfactory), and 4) purification.


text:
Linking Madhyamaka emptiness to Theravada emptiness through papanca
From the different answers that I have received on various questions that I've asked, I have come to the following ideas:
According to Mahayana Madhyamaka emptiness (shunyata), all phenomena is empty of intrinsic essence (svabhava), and even this emptiness itself is empty of intrinsic essence. However, this intrinsic essence appears to be the essence given to phenomena by reification or objectification-classification (papanca). So this means that my mental idea of how some phenomena is, is not how it actually is.
Now, Nirvana is not a sankhara (conditioned and/or compounded thing) but it is also empty, in the sense that it is empty of the essence given to it by reification. So this means that my mental idea of how Nirvana is, is not how it actually is.
Even "emptiness is empty" means that my mental idea of how Mahayana emptiness is, is not how it actually is.
This is interesting, because it does not mean that a chair, a dog and Nirvana are mind-independently unreal or non-existent according to Madhyamaka. Rather, the mental idea that I have of a chair, a dog and Nirvana is unreal or non-existent.
Now in Theravada, all suffering is related to clinging. Clinging is always related to the self, as seen in this answer. According to Sutta Nipata 4.14 (below), the root of all reification or objectification-classification (papañca) is "I am the thinker".

Seeing in what way is a monk unbound, clinging to nothing in the world?"
  "He should put an entire stop
  to the root of objectification-classifications (papañca):
  'I am the thinker.'
Commentary (Thanissaro):
  The perception, "I am the thinker" lies at the root of these
  classifications in that it reads into the immediate present a set of
  distinctions — I/not-I; being/not-being; thinker/thought;
  identity/non-identity — that then can proliferate into mental and
  physical conflict. The conceit inherent in this perception thus forms
  a fetter on the mind. To become unbound, one must learn to examine
  these distinctions — which we all take for granted — to see that they
  are simply assumptions that are not inherent in experience, and that
  we would be better off to be able to drop them.

Also from MN 1 (below), an arahant who is fully liberated from suffering would see phenomena as they truly are, without reification where his mental idea of phenomena associates it with his self (of persons). This is apparently also known as tathata.

“Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant with taints destroyed, who has
  lived the holy life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden,
  reached his own goal, destroyed the fetters of being, and is
  completely liberated through final knowledge, he too directly knows
  earth as earth. Having directly known earth as earth, he does not
  conceive himself as earth, he does not conceive himself in earth, he
  does not conceive himself apart from earth, he does not conceive earth
  to be ‘mine,’ he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because he
  has fully understood it, I say.

According to the Suñña Sutta, the five aggregates are empty of a self (of persons), including that they have no association with self (of persons). All reified mental ideas are mental fabrications (sankhara), so they too are empty of a self (of persons).
So, linking the Mahayana Madhyamaka emptiness to the Theravada emptiness, I can say that all phenomena is empty of a mentally reified intrinsic essence, where this reification or objectification-classification is rooted in "I am the thinker". Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains this as "the perception, 'I am the thinker' lies at the root of these classifications in that it reads into the immediate present a set of distinctions — I/not-I; being/not-being; thinker/thought; identity/non-identity — that then can proliferate into mental and physical conflict." I take it here that "I am the thinker" creates a duality between self (of persons) and non-self (of persons) that creates mental and physical conflict.
So, since Mahayana emptiness says that all phenomena is empty of mentally reified essence, and since all reification is rooted in a self (of persons), and Theravada emptiness states that all phenomena is empty of a self (of persons), then these two definitions of emptiness could be logically linked in this way.
Furthermore, the enlightened one who sees the Theravada emptiness of all phenomena through wisdom, will also simultaneously see the Mahayana emptiness of all phenomena, due to having his reification (papanca) ended, due to having his fetters concerning a self (of persons) uprooted. So, the enlightened one sees things as they truly are, which apparently is called tathata.
Both these emptiness seem to be connected together in Bahiya Sutta (Udana 1.10):

"Then, Bāhiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the
  seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the
  heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to
  the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train
  yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the
  seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in
  reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the
  cognized, then, Bāhiya, there is no you in connection with that. When
  there is no you in connection with that, there is no you there. When
  there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the
  two. This, just this, is the end of stress."

I believe my description of the Theravada doctrine above is correct, but I am not sure if my description of the Mahayana Madhyamaka doctrine above is correct or not.
So, my questions are:

Is the Mahayana Madhyamaka doctrine described above correct?
Would this linking of Mahayana Madhyamaka emptiness to Theravada emptiness according to the description above make sense to you, as a Mahayana or Theravada Buddhist? Or am I missing something?

Note that in Mahayana itself there isn't concrete agreement on Emptiness; you have two distinct schools of Madhyamaka: Svatantrika (further divided into Yogacara and Sautrantika) and Prasangika. These draw sharp distinction on bases of many details. If you however, wish to generalise in the overall sense, then maybe you would find some parallels. Hence many people will answer it differently.

@bodhihammer Thanks for the link and hint. I'm not sure whether my definition of Madhyamaka emptiness corresponds to Sautrantika or Prasangika, but it definitely disagrees with Yogachara.

Prasangika is more radical than Yogacara, and generally speaking - rare. What you described would be only moderately having something to do with Sautranika. The progression is: Vaibhashika -> Sautrantika -> Svatantrika -> Prasangika

Yes, your understanding is correct as far as I see. Specifically the point that splitting the phenomena into "I" (the perceiving subject and pursuing agent) and "the other" (the object of pursuit or aversion) is the ultimate root of papanca and the way the two emptinesses are connected.
This is explicitly explained in an early Mahayana work called Madhyāntavibhāga (aka "Maitreya’s Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes") that cross-links Mahayana and Early Buddhism concepts. It's a rather difficult read, but Mario D'Amato's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary and his own commentary on that, makes it pretty readable, if one goes slow enough to appreciate the implications. It's also available on the Internet in other translations, e.g. this commentary by Thrangu Rinpoche.  Another work that covers similar topics is Mipham Rinpoche's Beacon of Certainty.
And no, your definition of Emptiness does not disagree with Yogacara, because Madhyāntavibhāga is specifically a Yogacara work. In Madhyāntavibhāga their definition of Emptiness is exactly: "phenomena are empty of a (mentally reified) intrinsic essence". They also have this notion of "false imagination" - which is what they call the idea that "I" and "objects" are two different things.
Overall, I believe your theoretical understanding is pretty complete. The only point you're missing (I think?) is connection between tathata and cessation of suffering. Why exactly suffering does not arise?

The connection between tathata and cessation of suffering is answered in this answer. Craving is a habit of reification. Cessation of craving leads to cessation of suffering (third noble truth). And so the cessation of reification leads to the cessation of suffering. Based on MN 18, Sn 4.14, MN 1 and Ud 1.10, I would say this concept is present in Theravada contrary to what you wrote in this answer.

This concept is present in Pali Canon and in the original Buddhism, which is where Mahayana drew most of its ideas from - but I don't think it's present as an accepted teaching in Theravada community. Certainly not given as much importance as in Mahayana, where it's considered the key.

Actually, I see Theravada as following Sn 4.14. Cessation of suffering comes through cessation of craving, which comes through cessation of reification, which comes through cessation of "I am the thinker". This comes through vipassana which allows one to gain insight into dependent origination and anatta. I think the realization of Theravada emptiness will automatically lead to the realization of Mahayana emptiness.

Short answer is you seem very close to what I think, however I might quibble with the way you use words. It is very hard to communicate precisely about the doctrine of emptiness so agreeing upon a definite jargon becomes ever more critical to picking out any actual differences vs just apparent differences. This is why the monks and nuns in Gelug monasteries spend years nailing down the jargon and conventions and mutually agreeing to it. Then they spend many more years debating each other in order to more firmly establish the conceptual understanding of emptiness.
"This is interesting, because it does not mean that a chair, a dog and Nirvana are mind-independently unreal or non-existent according to Madhyamaka. Rather, the mental idea that I have of a chair, a dog and Nirvana is unreal or non-existent."
Purported prasangika perspective... all errors or misunderstandings are my own.
This seems the most problematic part of your question to me. A chair, a dog and Nirvana are indeed existent according to Madhyamaka. However, from the ultimate perspective they are indeed unreal just like a dream or illusion is unreal. They have no true existence whatsoever. They only exist conventionally. It is not like, if you take away all the reification and elaboration that there is some real or truly existing thing that 'dog' or 'chair' or 'Nirvana' points to. Thinking otherwise is itself an example of reification or objectification.
This is very hard for us to understand as we hear the above and think, "My god, if it only exists conventionally without being based on any real thing, then it must not really exist at all!" and then fall into nihilism or annihilationism. Yet, this is how things exist. It is the only possible way for things to exist.
To back all this up have a look at Lama Tsongkhapa in his Great Treatise describing the object of negation:

Question: How does ignorance superimpose intrinsic nature?
Reply: In general, there appear in Candrakırti’s texts many usages of
  verbal conventions such as “nature” or “essence” with regard to
  objects that exist only conventionally. However, here in the case of
  reification by ignorance, there is, with regard to objects, be they
  persons or other phenomena, a conception that those phenomena have
  ontological status—a way of existing—in and of themselves, without
  being posited through the force of an awareness. The referent object
  that is thus apprehended by that ignorant conception, the independent
  ontological status of those phenomena, is identified as a hypothetical
  “self” or “intrinsic nature.” For, Aryadeva’s Four Hundred Stanzas
  says:
All of this is without its own power; Therefore there is no self.

Commenting on this, Candrakırti’s Commentary on the “Four Hundred
  Stanzas” says:
It is that which exists essentially, intrinsically, autonomously, and without depending on another....

Thus, he says that those are synonyms. “Without depending on another”
  does not mean not depending on causes and conditions. Instead, “other”
  refers to a subject, i.e., a conventional consciousness, and something
  is said not to depend on another due to not being posited through the
  force of that conventional consciousness.
Therefore, “autonomously” refers to the nature of an object that has
  its own unique ontological status or manner of being. It is just this
  that is called “essence” or “intrinsic nature.”

He goes on to describe the famous snake and rope allegory and says that all things exist just like the snake in that allegory. That there is nothing on the side of the object (a rope) at all that makes it a snake. In other words, take a snake and a rope... both of them equally lack any intrinsic 'snake' nature. To whatever extent you can find a 'snake' nature in a rope, to that exact same extent you can find a 'snake' nature in a snake -> that is not. at. all. To really put an exclamation point on it: there is nothing on the side of the object that makes a snake a snake as opposed to a rope.
So, linking the Mahayana Madhyamaka emptiness to the Theravada emptiness, I can say that all phenomena is empty of a mentally reified intrinsic essence, where this reification or objectification-classification is rooted in "I am the thinker".
I think it is important to talk more about how this rooting in "I am the thinker" takes place. Here is a theory, but mind you I can't support any of this with authoritative sources.
The thing we reify most is ourselves. For all of our lives in cyclic existence we've identified first and foremost with this "I am the thinker." And on that basis we've carved out a piece and objectified it and thought, "this "I" is separate from everything else in a real and intrinsic way." On the basis of this little island of "I" we then carve up the rest and objectify this and that. Put another way, the "I" is at the center of our conventions. We conceive of everything else in relation to this "I" and on that basis it is the root of our objectification.

A dog is a dog because the observer reified it as such. The observer matched what he sensed to his mental concept of a dog. This is also called perception, isn't it? But if we remove all reification, then is it still a dog or not? Well, it simply is what it is.

"But if we remove all reification, then is it still a dog or not? Well, it simply is what it is" -- except "it" is not "it". When you are talking about All, you can say "this is what this is" - but not when talking about individual objects - because drawing the boundaries between objects and then reifying them as something intrinsic is an important part of the objectification process.

"A dog is a dog because the observer reified it as such." -> I'm not sure what this means. "It simply is what it is" -> This is a tautology and thus only trivially true. I don't think it conveys much information.

It is common for Zen to do it this way, for example not to look for specific explanation but say "it is exactly this" or "exactly that", coming from the fact that things are as they are, in order to destroy obsessive, conceptual mind. It is still a good explanation, just as good as any - see what I did there.

What I meant was that an observer looks at something and says "that's a dog". But if there is no observer, then does it matter what anything is or isn't?

Well, that is pretty close to this question isn’t it? https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28897/what-is-buddhist-doctrine-on-the-question-of-counterfactual-definiteness

@bodhihammer maybe the phrase does convey information namely, "further explanation will not be efficacious"

I think "it is what it is" means "it's ontological existence is undeniable, regardless of how we experience it". However, let's consider the example of a bush that looks like a dog. What we thought was "it" was actually a hole between the bush leaves plus the shadow on the bush - the "it" was never a single object to begin with.

Ah, if that is what it means then I would disagree and say that right there is an example of reification to be refuted :)