text:
Is there a real contradiction between AN 3.47 and SN 15.9?
The setup ...

Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
AN 3.47

Together with ...

Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries. This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.
SN 15.1

Along with the assumption that "transmigration" or "samsara" is a conditioned phenomena ...
Would seem to give rise to a contradiction. On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning.
Questions:

Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?
Do you think this is a real contradiction?
If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated" but I'm curious to know how others resolve it.
Related but distinct questions.
UPDATE:
This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

A circle has no beginning, but we can by convention start at 0 degrees as a beginning and end at 360 degrees, ready for a new cycle. Transmigration is cyclic. But we can let go of chasing the cycles. We can stop treating the circle as a line and just let it be a circle.

SNp3.12:28.1: “Craving is a person’s partner
SNp3.12:28.2: as they transmigrate on this long journey.
SNp3.12:28.3: They go from this state to another,
SNp3.12:28.4: but don’t escape transmigration.

Is a circle not a conditioned phenomena? Was the Buddha wrong that with a circle - being a conditioned phenomena - arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident?

Also, by that same token if a 'circle has no beginning' then in the same way it 'has no end' and if you are comparing transmigration to this circle are you then saying transmigration has no end??

Thank you for your kind answer. I will think on these.

@YesheTenley: I think it can reasonably be argued circles are not conditioned. π is literally a transcendental number, that seems to represent a fundamental quality of our reality. Similarly logical inferences are not conditioned.

There are many many dependent conditions for transcendental numbers, diameters, circumferences, logical inferences etc and all of these are conditioned phenomena. They are all conventions. No matter how useful a convention, conventions are still just conventions

@CriglCragl, as an engineer I agree with you. However, it doesn't help me read the suttas. So for the suttas, I now prefer YesheTenley's explanation (which also works for me as an engineer)

This is an apparent contradiction. All conditioned phenomena are impermanent. All conditions are also conditioned phenomena. Therefore as conditions themselves are conditioned phenomena , we say a conditioned phenomena is built upon another conditioned phenomena. There seems to be no beginning of a conditioned phenomena which can be called father or mother of all phenomena.
However , every phenomena along with its conditionals ,in this infinite cycle,has a beginning as the conditioned phenomena arises ,changes and vanishes.
I was asked :

If arising itself has the characteristic of arising, then it leads to
an unacceptable infinite regress.

I will explain it using an example as follows:
Take an example of eating, we ask , is there a beginning of phenomena of eating ? Answer is Yes. There is an arising of phenomena of eating.Is there any change in Sankhara of eating ? No. Is there is an end of eating? Yes.
Next we ask , what are the conditions for eating ? Answer is craving(hunger). Is hunger a phenomena? Yes. Does it have arising , change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for craving ? Answer is feelings.Does it have beginning and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for feelings ? Answer is contact. Does it have beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for contact ? Six senses. Is six senses a phenomena with beginning, change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for six senses? Name and form. Is name and form a phenomena with arising , change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for name and form ? Consciousness. Is consciousness a phenomena with beginning, change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for consciousness? Volitional formations or mental fabrications. Is volitional formations or mental fabrication a phenomena with beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for volitional formations? Ignorance. Is ignorance a phenomena with beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for ignorance? Answer is craving.
You see we have again reached to craving.
Therefore each phenomena with conditions have beginning, change and end. And also note every phenomena is based on manifestation of other phenomena. We do not regress infinitely because we end up with circle.

Is arising itself a compounded phenomena?

@YesheTenley Yes.

So arising itself has the three characteristics of arising, enduring, and ceasing?

Also, what school(s) of Buddhism do you follow @SacrificialEquation ?

If arising itself has the characteristic of arising, then it leads to an unacceptable infinite regress.

You didn't understand the infinite regress. If arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising of arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising of arising of arising has the characteristic of arising... infinite regress. This is unacceptable.

@YesheTenley Arising is a combination of Sankharas. There is no arising of the arising. For example -Eating. It arises. Eating is conditional. Those conditions also have condition and so on. But arising of eating is a finite process.

You take back saying that arising itself has the three characteristics?

@YesheTenley No. Arising is conditional… dependently originates. But it is finitely realised. There are infinite points between any two distinct points but  we cover the distance finitely…

So you still maintain that arising has the characteristic of arising? If so, you can't avoid the infinite regress

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

Do you agree this is a contradiction?

First, when I read a sutta I look for meaning -- perhaps I assume it has a meaning -- and a context and a purpose. IMO each of these suttas is saying something meaningful, and is 'sensible' by which I mean 'inline with experience/observation'. Give that they're both/each useful statements in context, and saying different things, their being "contradictory" doesn't come to mind.

I'm not sure whether samsara is a sankhara as described in AN 3.47:

You might think it is i.e. that, "Samsara is the set/sum/totality of all sankharas and is therefore an aggregate/sankhara itself", but I'm not sure that's true. In general there can be paradoxes if you assume that's true (see "universal set") which in Maths is considered "proof by contradiction" that it isn't true. Knowing a little of that, I avoid making confident statements on that subject (like I beware, or find unsatisfactory, lay-people's making 'logical' arguments using the word 'infinite').
If a sankhara is a "conditioned thing" with a start and end, I'm not sure that samsara is a thing in the same way, perhaps you're reifying it. It's true that 'samsara' is a noun: but!

By analogy, maybe samsara is like an ocean and sankharas are like the waves. Float a duck on the surface of the ocean, graph its position over time, it goes up and down thus each wave has a top and bottom, like a beginning and an end -- but statements about the properties of "waves" aren't necessarily applicable to the whole ocean.
Similarly a statement about human beings (e.g. "each has a date of birth and date of death") isn't applicable to the human race (the beginning of which is not only 'lost in the mists of time' but also perhaps indefinite i.e. too gradual to identify).

Samsara is like the evolution of an object into another, isn't it. SN 15.9 is about the migration and AN 3.47 is about the objects, they're not mutually-contradictory because they're taking about different subjects/objects.

This answer hasn't mentioned 'emptiness' yet but to an extent sankharas are 'mind-made', based on sense-contact, "Oh hello, there's my friend again!", and to that extent short-lived. AN 3.47 is about any specific, identified thing-cluster-perception. Samsara is more or less saying, "It's in the nature of any things to be short/finite-lived", it's not a contradiction to say that samsara or samsaric nature itself is so, and has been so since who even knows when.

It may be worth mentioning the 'unanswered questions' too, i.e. Buddhism has a purpose/message. Maybe "the origin of samsara" isn't a useful topic, a tractable problem. Logically it seems that it might be a useful thing to know, so it's tempting. But I think SN 15.9 short-circuits that, "No it's not evident".

Yes, the suttas have profound meaning
You seem to be saying that there is not even an apparent contradiction (it doesn't come to mind)
You then try to explain the apparent contradiction you won't even acknowledge
The whole question rests on whether samsara is indeed a conditioned phenomena as I said in my question but you don't even seem to want to grab either horn (yes it is conditioned phenomena or no it isn't)
All conditioned phenomena are put together or compound not just samsara. A chariot is made up of parts, the parts are made up of parts, the parts of the parts are made

of parts. Can the beginning of 'chariot' similarly not be known? * I'm talking about conditioned phenomena... the two suttas in question are talking about conditioned phenomena if you grab the horn and agree that samsara is  saṅkhata * talking about how samsara is made up of parts does not refute that it is saṅkhata and thus subject to AN 3.47 * You again and again go back to the 'unanswered questions' as an escape from the agitation that the apparent contradiction brings to your mind * It is fine to temporarily escape this agitation if you can't resolve the apparent contradiction * But this

does not actually resolve the agitation or dukkha you have to deal with it at some point if the contradiction is in fact apparent to you. * It really does seem that the contradiction is apparent to you, you refuse to believe it is a real contradiction (which is good), but you are unsure how to actually resolve it

It is fine to say - commendable even - that "It is an apparent contradiction, I don't believe it is a real contradiction, but I'm unsure right now how to resolve it."

It wasn't apparent to me, it didn't occur to me, but you posted the question and said you wanted me to answer. I don't think samsara is a thing like a chariot. Consider a fire: it happens under the right conditions (e.g. fuel and air and heat); a fire is a conditioned thing with a start and end, more or less. But when did the "law of flammability" begin, the tendency of things to combust under certain conditions, when was the first fire? That's not knowable, and not answerable.

If there is no apparent contradiction, then nothing needs to be explained. It seems there is no apparent contradiction for you because you reject the part that I clearly marked as an assumption: that samsara is a conditioned phenomena.

The problem with grasping that horn is you are left with samsara is either an unconditioned phenomena (like nirvana) OR samsara is simply not a phenomena at all which is also problematic

Comparing samsara to the 'law of flammability' is problematic: are you saying samsara has no end? you are saying samsara doesn't begin, but it endures and then ends?

"you reject the part that I clearly marked as an assumption" I don't buy it as a given, anyway; it's not how I read the sutta. Another answer could be, I guess, that perhaps another way to escape the dilemma you posit might be to ask "evident to whom?" e.g. perhaps its beginning is not evident to beings caught in samsara in SN 15.1 and yet evident to the author of AN 3.57. It (whether it's evident) varying with the person could be inline with the suttas being spoken in different "contexts". As for flammability, SN 35.28 for example says it can be ended, even if we can't identify when it began.

Anyway you wrote, "I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated"" -- perhaps you'll post an answer.

I've now linked my answer. I can elaborate if someone thinks it would be helpful, but my answer is basically Nagarjuna's answer.

The Finke River in central Australia is said to be the oldest river in the world. It is 750km long and 350-400 million years old.
It's kind of similar to the river of samsara in Buddhism, whose river current is craving:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have
heard: "Suppose a man was being carried along by the flow of a river,
lovely & alluring. And then another man with good eyesight, standing
on the bank, on seeing him would say: 'My good man, even though you
are being carried along by the flow of a river, lovely & alluring,
further down from here is a pool with waves & whirlpools, with
monsters & demons. On reaching that pool you will suffer death or
death-like pain.' Then the first man, on hearing the words of the
second man, would make an effort with his hands & feet to go against
the flow.
"I have given you this simile to illustrate a meaning. The meaning is
this: the flow of the river stands for craving. Lovely & alluring
stands for the six internal sense-media. The pool further down stands
for the five lower fetters. The waves stand for anger & distress.
The whirlpools stand for the five strings of sensuality. The monsters
& demons stand for the opposite sex. Against the flow stands for
renunciation. Making an effort with hands & feet stands for the
arousing of persistence. The man with good eyesight standing on the
bank stands for the Tathagata, worthy & rightly self-awakened."
Iti 109

Is the Finke River persistent and unchanging throughout its lifetime for millions of years?
No. It is constantly changing, with different water molecules, different animals and plants, different sedimentation, different flow rate, changing route etc.
It appears to be persistent and long standing, but the reality is that it is constantly changing. The appearance of being long standing and long lived is merely apparent.
The same applies to the river of samsara. The beings and sankharas arising and ceasing on the river of samsara, is not unlike the water molecules coursing through the Finke River through millions of years. It's constantly changing based on conditions.

“Consider the Ganges river from where it originates to where it meets
the ocean. Between these places it’s not easy to calculate how many
grains of sand there are, how many hundreds or thousands or hundreds
of thousands of grains of sand. The eons that have passed are more
than this. It’s not easy to calculate how many eons have passed, how
many hundreds or thousands or hundreds of thousands of eons.
Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is
found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by
ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have
undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries.
This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate,
and freed regarding all conditions.”
SN 15.8

I see sankharas like samsara, a river or a stream of consciousness as also temporally composite conditional phenomena. That is to say, you can never step into the exact same river twice. The river is changing from moment to moment, in terms of water molecules, temperature, water current speed etc. And so is samsara.
So, in short, there is no contradiction at all.

This does not even attempt to answer the OP questions. I still don't know from this answer whether you would answer yes or no to an apparent contradiction for instance.

@YesheTenley The answer is that there is no contradiction at all. It's constantly changing based on conditions.

The Finke River is sankhata, right? Then according to AN 3.47 its arising is evident, right? Can the same be said of samsara?

@YesheTenley Samsara is merely a convention and conceptual description of the continual arising and ceasing of beings, and the continuity of their suffering. Samsara is not a separate standalone entity that arises and ceases.

In your other answer, you give a very good description of a lap, a fist, that arise and cease but are not standalone entities. Thus we can conclude that samsara - also not a standalone separate entity - can arise and cease just like a lap, a fist, etc, right? right?? :)

Also, I think your answer might also give rise to this question: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/49754/does-an-3-47-refer-to-only-single-standalone-sankhara

@YesheTenley Samsara has the appearance of continuously existing like a river or the stream of consciousness, but in reality it is continuously arising and ceasing, when beings arise and cease. Updated answer to explain what I consider to be temporally composite conditional phenomena.

On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning.

Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?

It appears to be a contradiction when we are not mindful of what is being stated. It is not, on it's own, an apparent contradiction.

Do you think this is a real contradiction?

No. What do you mean by 'real'?

If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

Samsara is not a product beyond being the Dharma that points to the fact that a mental continuum has not yet achieved cessation of suffering: It is still prone to an endless cycle of suffering.
There is the word 'samsara'.  The word, as are all words, is subject to samsara: It is selfless, and subject to momentary change.  Its meaning is selfless, and is subject to momentary change. The word has a beginning, and an end.  Our understanding of what the word is saying has a beginning and an end.  The referent - that which it refers to - has no beginning, but might be ended through continuous, sincere practice. But the referent is a synthetic: 'samsara' is a place-holder for a teaching on the way things are.
There is nothing unique about samsara; think of anicca. Does it end?
Does death die? (or, if you prefer, Does Death die?)

"No. What do you mean by 'real'?" -> I mean that it appears the same way it actually exists.

@YesheTenley, well according to the Madhyamaka of Candrakirti, nothing appears the same way it actually exists. In fact, the entire Buddhist project rests upon the fact that nothing appears the same way it actually exists, right? Otherwise we would not need to develop right view.

Emptiness appears the exact way it exists

"Emptiness appears the exact way it exists" - is true only to a Buddha. If emptiness appeared the way it existed then we would not be subject to self-grasping. As it is, emptiness is completely obscured by ignorance - which, by definition, is the inability to see the way things are. As a Dharma tradition, Buddhism holds that ignorance is the root of samsara.

It is also true to an Arya being in meditative equipoise directly perceiving emptiness. Either way, the statement that Chandrakirti asserted that, “nothing appears the same way it exists” is wrong given this counter example. The definition of “real” is correct and the Buddha himself gave this definition. I can find the sutta if you like.

No, an Arya being has direct access to emptiness, but still does not see it as it is.  This is because it's nature is tathata - indistinguishable from its conventional contexts, which is only available to a Buddha.  Aryas are able to directly perceive emptiness, but they still do not see it as it really is. Needless to say, given a choice between Candrakirti and you, I would go with Candrakirti. Call me annoying, if you will!  Moreover, if you accept that 'things appear as they exist' only to Arya beings you should qualify that in your question.

This is interesting. Can you please cite sutta or explain some logic for why you believe that an Arya being in meditative equipoise with direct perception of emptiness does not apprehend emptiness as it actually is.

If you say you believe this because of someone who you believe to be authoritative other than the Buddha - for instance Chandrakirti - has stated this could you please provide a reference indicative. Thank you.

gate gate paragate parasamgate bodhi.  Each of the five paths reveals more clearly one's understanding of emptiness.  Having a direct perception of a mug does not mean that one knows all there is to know of a mug.  This is the great argument against rang.rig:  our perceptions are not clear.  I can find plenty of sources for all of this - but I do not believe you are interested in being persuaded - instead, you appear merely to be offering a chip on your shoulder for me to knock off, and I have better things to do than to get into a fight.

It is unfortunate that you believe this as I am very interested to learn otherwise. I am being sincere when I say this is interesting and I am also being sincere when I say that my understanding could be wrong. I am asking you, sincerely, to teach me the evidence you have so that I may understand why you believe what you believe.

@YesheTenley, okay, I'll bite this time.  This will move into a chat.  Before we start, we need to know what it is that is the subject of discussion.  I believe it is my rebuttal to your assertion that things (and absences, such as the emptiness of self) "appear the exact way they actually exist", where the word 'actually' indicates that we are specifically not talking about conventional truths, (which allow for multiple ways (or perspectives) of "actually existing"), depending upon the context of such truths).  My position is "only a tathagata is able to perceive tathata as it is".

I do not agree this an apparent contradiction between AN 3.47 & SN 15.9 because:

AN 3.47 says all conditioned things having an arising/uprising (uppāda).

SN 15.9 says moving about (samsara) has no imaginable (mata; pp. of maññati) first point (agga).

If we emphasize arising/uprising (uppāda), SN 15.9 is simply saying the first arising/uprising is not imaginable.

However, SN 15.9 may have a contradiction with MN 64 & MN 38, which do point out the first dependent-co-arising (paticca-sam-uppada) of 'satta' ('beings'), when they say:

For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘beings,’ so how could ill will towards beings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to ill will lies within him. (MN 64)

Then, when the child is born, she nourishes it with her own blood; for the mother’s breast-milk is called blood in the Noble One’s Discipline. When he grows up and his faculties mature, the child plays at such games as toy ploughs, tipcat, somersaults, toy windmills, toy measures, toy carts, and a toy bow and arrow. When he grows up and his faculties mature still further, the youth enjoys himself provided and endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure, with forms cognizable by the eye… sounds cognizable by the ear…odours cognizable by the nose… flavours cognizable by the tongue…tangibles cognizable by the body that are wished for, desired, agreeable and likeable, connected with sensual desire, and provocative of lust. On seeing a form with the eye, he lusts after it if it is pleasing; he dislikes it if it is unpleasing. He abides with mindfulness of the body unestablished, with a limited mind, and he does not understand as it actually is the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder. Engaged as he is in favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—he delights in that feeling, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As he does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feelings is clinging. With his clinging as condition, being comes to be; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. (MN 38).

Note: Bhikkhu Bodhi embellishes the above passage in MN 38 by adding the title: "The Continuation of the Round". However, when we read the above passage objectively, the above appears to be about: "The First Point (Agga) of the Round".

Epilogue: It was asked by Yeshe Tenley:

Hmm, so you would not object to someone that said: "Samsara (saṁsāro),
being a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata), has three characteristics,
Arising (uppādo) is evident, vanishing (vayo) is evident, and change
(aññathatta) while persisting (ṭhita) is evident." Someone could say
the above faultlessly in your estimation?

The term 'samsara' refers to 'moving about continuously'. Therefore, in my opinion, the term 'samara' is not intended to characterise the characteristics of arising, change while continuing & vanishing. The term 'samsara' is intended to characterize moving about without respite & without ending. For example, SN 22.99 says:

"Just as a dog, tied by a leash to a post or stake, keeps running around and circling around that very post or stake; in the same way, an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for people of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form.
"He assumes feeling to be the self...
"He assumes perception to be the self...
"He assumes (mental) fabrications to be the self...
"He assumes consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in
consciousness.
"He keeps running around and circling around that very form... that very feeling... that very perception... those very fabrications...
that very consciousness. He is not set loose from form, not set loose
from feeling... from perception... from fabrications... not set loose
from consciousness. He is not set loose from birth, aging, & death;
from sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, & despairs. He is not
set loose, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

Therefore, it is only at the end of SN 15.9, when the vanishing of samara is mentioned, when it is said: "This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions".
In conclusion, while 'samsara' is obviously a conditioned phenomena because its arising is dependent upon conditions, the word samsara is only intended to describe its conditioned nature of arising (uppādo) & continuance (ṭhita) but not its conditioned nature of vanishing. In other words, samsara is not Nirvana and Nirvana is not samara. Nirvana is known when samara vanishes. Nirvana is cessation. Samsara is continuance.

Hmm, so you would not object to someone that said: "Samsara (saṁsāro), being a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata), has three characteristics, Arising (uppādo) is evident, vanishing (vayo) is evident, and change (aññathatta) while persisting (ṭhita) is evident."
Someone could say the above faultlessly in your estimation?

Also, in MN 64 the Buddha is specifically refuting that he ever taught that way to Mālunkyāputta, right?

Hmm, according to your latest update you say that (saṁsāro) is not a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata)??

I concluded by saying samsara is conditioned. Time to go to the beach. The hour is getting late.

The Buddha said that which is saṅkhata has the three characteristics. You acknowledge samsara is 'conditioned phenomena' but say it does not have the three characteristics. That contradicts AN 3.47 at least apparently or at least I have no idea how you maintain otherwise.

maññati is incorrect here. the word Anamataggoyaṁ has 'agga' as the root. it doesn't mean to believe or imagine.

its means to "imagine/construe a first point". Anamataggoyaṁ. Therefore, the translation you used translates "anamata" as "no known".

Mata1 [pp. of maññati] thought, understood, considered

Anamatagga (adj.) [ana (= a neg = no.) + mata (fr. man= known; thinkable; imaginable) + aggā (pl. = beginning ).

from mil5.2.3

‘There is the non-inclusive expression, O king, whose meaning is
non-inclusive, and the non-inclusive expression whose meaning is
inclusive; there is the inclusive expression whose meaning is
non-inclusive, and the inclusive expression whose meaning is
inclusive. And the meaning, in each case, should be accepted
accordingly. And there are five ways in which the meaning should be
ascertained-by the connection, and by taste, and by the tradition of
the teachers, and by the meaning, and by abundance of reasons. And
herein “connection” means the meaning as seen in the Sutta itself,
“taste” means that it is in accordance with other Suttas, “the
tradition of the teachers” means what they hold, “the meaning” means
what they think, and “abundance of reasons” means all these four
combined.’

This does not even attempt to answer the OP questions.

If we play on the words “no known beginning” to mean there is an “unknown beginning”, this might help clarify the situation. Likewise, the Buddha himself indicated that it is impossible to discover a beginning in SN15.7 simply because it is lost in antiquity. The example given was four monks who spend each day recollecting 100,000 eons and lived for a hundred years but would still not be able to discover how it all begin. If you do a backhand calculation, that would be 3.65 billion eons (100,000 x 365 x 100) i.e. 3.65 billion times that the universe was destroyed and recreated yet this is not even close to the starting point!
Surely, one would not expect the Buddha or any of his monks to spend their precious time doing such an inane task. Therefore, this (unknowable beginning) is extrapolated and inferred by the Buddha and cannot be validated. Thus, we will not be able to come to any conclusion when the Buddha himself did not. The below sections are some of my thoughts.
Suppose we asked when was a school first started, the natural answer would be when the first student(s) and teacher(s) were enrolled. A school is merely a building, it is the students and teachers that makes it special. Similarly, samsara is special because of the beings in it. If we need to know when a school was first started, we would approach the first student(s) or teacher(s). In the same manner, we would need to find the first sentient being(s) who appeared in samsara and they would also need to have the ability to recollect their past lives. But what if the first student(s) had long graduated or the first teacher(s) retired i.e. the first sentient being(s) had attained Nirvana and are no longer in samsara?
Underlying the above is the hypothesis that sentient beings evolved into existence. The critical point is that as long as new sentient beings continue to emerge in samsara, there will be no known ending either. Perhaps what matters most for any student is to finally graduate from this school after eons of retention.

Things can be known from inference. If you accept that samsara is a conditioned phenomena, then by AN 3.47 then an arising can be known (inferred)

@YesheTenley in theory, that is true. There are 3 points to be stressed. 1) It is not possible to verify samsara's arising or cessation. 2) Things that cannot be verified always lead to endless debate. 3) The Buddha was trying to stop this kind of debate.

Debates that lead to no learning are not just pointless, but actually harmful. I do think/hope there is something meaningful to learn in resolving this apparent contradiction. I could be wrong.


text:
Is a circle a form?
Nobody has ever seen a circle. Yet we all say "that is a circle" and nod in agreement. But when we say that the top of a bottle is a circle, we see the bottle top, not really the circle. The recognition of a circle is impermanent. We are taught to recognize a circle in school and are given its name as "circle".
Nobody has ever drawn a circle. We can only draw a rough form that is recognized as a "circle" but is actually not a circle. And it's not a circle because circles are made of points with no width, so a drawing of a circle can never be the circle we recognize.
So then we ask, "What is a circle?"
And in response comes the chorus, "A circle is a form".
Except that the Buddha says:

SN22.55:3.1: They don’t truly understand form—which is impermanent—as impermanent.

So if a circle is a form, it must be impermanent. But wait. How can this be?  Beyond our deaths and the forgetting of the circle, others will be born who will be taught to recognize a circle as "circulo" or "Kreis" or whatever. And our children and their children will agree that these words define the same form.
Is a circle a form and if so, how can we understand what the Buddha means when he says that form is impermanent?

I guess "a circle" is or has a definition (e.g. it's "a line at constant distance/radius from the centre point"). And, specific physical drawings (instances) illustrate or approximate that definition. And I'm posting this as a comment because if I posted it as an answer I don't see how it's related to Buddhism.

Maybe "a circle" is a name, too -- we see lots of things, a teacher says, "look there's a circle" and we look. Stuff in our brain learns language (especially when we're young), and classifies more-or-less circular shapes as being so-called, recognisable circles.

@ChrisW, this question arose in regard to my answer to transmigration having no beginning with the circle analogy.

A circle is a convention.
A circle is like an illusion.
A circle is a useful agreement.
A circle is like a magic trick.
A circle is a conceptual fiction.
A circle is a conditioned phenomena.
There is no circle,
In any place,
At any time,
Known by anyone.

The recognition of a circle is a conditioned phenomenon. And I have never seen, felt, smelled, touched or tasted a circle at any time in any place.  Thank you.

@OyaMist A circle is a mind-object isn't it, i.e. "known" and not [just] "seen" or "touched"?

Yes. It is a thought (the sixth sense)--and even here it is impermanent being conditioned by teaching, genes or whatever.

When the Buddha says that form is impermanent, he's referring to the fact that what we take to be enduring physical structures are actually characterized by their ephemeral nature.  Dogen puts this another way - “The blue mountains are constantly walking. If you doubt mountains walking you do not know your own walking."
Regarding your concept of the circle - the concept only endures so long as there are minds to consider it.  It has no enduring nature of it's own.  It's mutually dependent on person, instantiation, thought, knowledge of geometry, etc.  There is no such thing as a circle outside of these conditions.

And circles are "reborn" when new minds are conditioned to perceive them.

Yeah, I'd say that's a fair way of looking at it

Circle is a concept. Concepts are without function and therefore permanent.
The "form" in the aggregates is less about shape. It translates from rupa, which generally does mean shape but the way it is used to classify the physical aggregate- aggregate of matter as along with 4 aggregates of mind- come to make 5- namarupa.

Where does the Buddha say that concepts are permanent?

Are concepts not conditioned phenomena? Are they not dependent??

AN 3.136 & SN 12.20 says the Laws of Dhamma, including the Law of Impermanence (AN 3.136), are fixed, even when they remain unknown due to the non-appearance of Buddhas (uppādā vā tathāgatānaṁ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṁ, ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā). Therefore, while the visual sight of a circle many be impermanent due to the impermanence of the mind & sense organs perceiving the circle, this is not enough to say the circle is impermanent; just as it is not enough or incorrect to say the Laws of Dhamma are impermanent when the universe only has unenlightened puthujjana.
The circle is impermanent because it is a physical form, i.e., as a planet, a physical structure (such as the circular shape of the ancient city of Atlantis or a wheel of a cart or car), a drawing or another physical projection. Anything physical ('rupa'), such as a planet, Atlantis, a chart wheel, a car tyre, etc, is liable to impermanence, to wearing away and erosion, to breaking up and destruction (AN 9.15).

AN3.136:1.6: Whether Realized Ones arise or not, this law of nature persists, this regularity of natural principles, this invariance of natural principles:  A mathematical circle is a definition, not a law of nature. What we see are things that look like circles. We see "cicular", not circles.

This comment is lost in Brahminism.

I was actually agreeing with you that a circle is impermanent, and that the mathematical notion of a perfect circle persisting thru eternity is simply a convenient illusion taught to us. Thanks for the AN3.136 quote. It was quite helpful.

Yes. Circle is a form.I think you are talking about stationary, 2 dimensional, drawn on paper,drawn with pencil,a full Circle because there are incomplete circles, half circles, part circle part square circles , part circle part hexagon circles , part circle part trapezoid circles , point circles, circle with borders circles , 3 dimensional circles, 2 dimensional circle , 1 dimensional circle , 4 dimensional circle , expanding circle , contracting circle , impermanent circles, circles drawn on water circles , circles drawn on paper circles , circles drawn on soil circle , circles drawn in the imagination circle, circle drawn with pencil circle,circle drawn with pen circle , circle drawn with finger circle.
I think I gave the full list of possible circles.
You are interested in stationary, 2   dimensional, drawn on paper,drawn with pencil ,a full Circle. You want to know whether such a circle is impermanent or not.I think it is impermanent for various reasons.

Circle is a sight. If eyes are impermanent then can circle be permanent? No
Circle is drawn with pencil. Pencil color fades away. If pencil color is impermanent then can the circle be permanent? No.
Circle is drawn on paper. Paper becomes old and decays. If paper is impermanent then can the circle be permanent? No.
Circle is stationary. If wind velocity is impermanent and can shake the paper then can circle remain a circle always ? No.
Circle is 2 dimensional. While drawing circle you etched it on the paper creating a little depression on the paper. Can we call the circle only 2 dimensional?No. Your definition of circle changes.
Circle is a full circle. While drawing circle if the ends do not meet exactly then does it fail to be circle ? No. Your definition of circle changes.

Your Circle clearly is impermanent because it arises in mind and paper, changes due to decay of pencil color and wind velocity  ,and vanishes because paper ages and decays.
Even if you put the paper drawn full circle in a vaccum chamber it will decay, that’s the prediction of science and Buddha. Have Faith. Metta.

I am going blind but I can still feel something as "circular" and I can show you that so that you could see that it is like a circle. But neither one of us has every seen or felt an actual mathematical circle. We have both seen and felt objects that we recognize as "circular", but that drawing of a circle isn't an actual "circle". It's a facsimile of a circle drawn with a pencil or pen or whatever.  The question I needed answered was whether a mathematical circle is a Buddhist form.  And what @YesheTenly answered is essentially "yes", since that definition is conditioned.

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text:
What is the meaning of suchness?
We can contemplate on the suchness , thisness and thusness…(I have seen some members of the site use the word “suchness” often)
What is the meaning of suchness as against the meaning of thisness and thusness?

you know the hindi word for truth is sach?

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text:
Does AN 3.47 refer to only single standalone sankhara?
This question concerns the proper understanding of AN 3.47:

“Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.”
AN 3.47

It might have been suggested in other questions that this sutta is referring only to non-composite sankharas. That is, for composite phenomena - like a chariot - that arising, ceasing, and enduring are not evident.
Is this correct? Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is composite or made up of parts?
If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta would be applicable to? What non-composite conditioned phenomena can rightfully be said to arise, endure and cease? Does anyone have an example?

All conditioned phenomena are a result of conditional combination, and all the constituents are still made up of combination and so on. The law of impermanence of all conditional phenomena applies at all levels, from whole to the parts. There is no infinite regress because smallest parts take smallest time to combine and separate.
There is no example of non-composite phenomena except the unconditioned Nibbana. Nibbana is unborn , uncreated , unconditioned, unoriginated and unbecoming. Nibbana is neither permanent nor impermanent.

The infinite regress comment ruins it for me ;)

Yes, I suppose a being is indeed capable of arising, ceasing, and changing, but that's valid within a certain context.  If one has realized a more decoupled existence, then it wouldn't make sense to adhere to that type of reality.  This is made clear in Nandakovada Sutta via analogy:

"Just as if a skilled butcher or butcher's apprentice, having killed a
cow, were to carve it up with a sharp carving knife so that — without
damaging the substance of the inner flesh, without damaging the
substance of the outer hide — he would cut, sever, & detach only the
skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between. Having
cut, severed, & detached the outer skin, and then covering the cow
again with that very skin, if he were to say that the cow was joined
to the skin just as it had been: would he be speaking rightly?"
"No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because if the skilled butcher or
butcher's apprentice, having killed a cow, were to ... cut, sever, &
detach only the skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in
between; and ... having covered the cow again with that very skin,
then no matter how much he might say that the cow was joined to the
skin just as it had been, the cow would still be disjoined from the
skin."
"This simile, sisters, I have given to convey a message. The message
is this: The substance of the inner flesh stands for the six internal
media; the substance of the outer hide, for the six external media.
The skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between stand
for passion & delight. And the sharp knife stands for noble
discernment — the noble discernment that cuts, severs, & detaches the
defilements, fetters, & bonds in between.

What an amazing sutta. I take it your answer is that AN 3.47 applies equally for composite phenomena like a chariot and is not referring to so-called "standalone sankhara."

To be honest, I don't think there are any standalone sankhara. The Theravada Abhidhamma does list out fundamental elements, upon which other composite elements are made of. The four great elements (earth, water, fire, air) are one of them. But even then, it doesn't really say that these fundamental elements are standalone entities.
A being and a chariot are conventions. They can arise and cease, but they don't arise and cease as standalone entities.
Nun Vajira said a being is just a convention, so how can it arise and cease? It doesn't really exist as a standalone entity in the first place. Its arising and ceasing also happens in a conventional way.
A convention is an agreed concept.
For e.g. I say that the House of Commons of the United Kingdom arises when it is convened after a general election, and ceases, when it is dissolved for new general elections. So, it arises and ceases. It's a sankhara. But it's not a standalone entity, is it?
The chariot, the being and the House of Commons are all structurally composite conditional phenomena.
However, I see other sankharas like samsara, a river or a stream of consciousness as also temporally composite conditional phenomena. That is to say, you can never step into the exact same river twice. The river is changing from moment to moment, in terms of water molecules, temperature, water current speed etc. And so is samsara.

@blue_ego Nibbana is not composite and not conditioned.

Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is a composite or made up of parts?
Isn't the Ship of Theseus meant as a standard example of that?
I think this is an "identity-view", of the sort described as "a thicket of wrong views".
If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta would be applicable to?
Again, "a ship" -- for example -- has a launch date (a beginning), and an end (a date when it is finally no longer usable/recognisable as a ship).
This is more a functional view e.g., "it's recognised as a 'ship' while it's able to carry passengers etc".
Incidentally, as mentioned in the OP, this latter view more-or-less views the ship as a non-composite simple phenomenon -- which can either be used as a ship or it can't -- conversely the "Ship of Theseus" is a view which focuses on its composite composition.
Nevertheless the ship stops being (recognised as and functioning as) "a ship" when it decomposes.

Isn't the Ship of Theseus and the examination thereof closely analogous to what the Buddha teaches his students to do over and over again to look and see if the self can be found in the aggregates in order to gain complete confidence and certainty that the self cannot be found in the aggregates?

Surely when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'a chariot' is known, right?

If so, then it would seem to follow that when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'a being' is known, right? And similarly when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'samsara' is known, right?

There are basic elements (dhatu), when only visible to the ordinary human eye, such as earth & space, the give the impression of being non-composite. For example, a grain of sand on a massive sand dune in the Sahara desert. It may not be obvious how the arising of this grain of sand occurred. This grain of sand may have an impression of permanence. But the grain of sand of obviously a sankhata (conditioned thing). The internet says:

The Sahara Desert formed around 7 million years ago, as a great dust
bowl sitting where the Tethys sea once soaked. This huge body of water
separated the two supercontinents, Laurasia and Gondwana, resulting
from the cleaving of Pangea by tectonic forces.

Similar, the element of space may appear to be a non-composite phenomena. But, in realty, the element of space is conditioned by the absence of the element of form or water in that space. About the element of space, MN 62 says:

And what is the space element? The space element may be interior or
exterior. And what is the interior space element? Anything that’s
space, spacious, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an
individual. This includes: the ear canals, nostrils, and mouth; and
the space for swallowing what is eaten and drunk, the space where it
stays, and the space for excreting it from the nether regions. This is
called the interior space element. The interior space element and the
exterior space element are just the space element. This should be
truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am
not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right
understanding, you reject the space element, detaching the mind from
the space element.
MN 62

For example, if the nostrils are blocked with mucus, the element of space reduces or disappears.
As for 'conventions' - like 'a chariot' - they also are characterized by arising, ceasing and enduring because they are thoughts. In SN 22.59, the Buddha says any type of sankhara aggregate is impermanent. MN 148 literally says 'mind-objects' have been discerned to arise & vanish (dhammānaṁ uppādopi vayopi paññāyati).
If we still remain with doubt about this, the convention of 'a being' in SN 5.10 is exactly the same as 'jati' in Dependent Origination. 'Jati' is the coming forth & production of conventions of 'beings within a class of beings'. About 'jati', SN 12.20 & SN 22.81 say:

Birth is impermanent, conditioned (sankhata), dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.
SN 12.20

Assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now
what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is
the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed,
run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact
with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. And
that fabrication is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen.
That craving... That feeling... That contact... That ignorance is
inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen.
SN 22.81

The idea 'conventions' are not subject to the characteristics of conditioned things appears found in the mass-market commentary Abhidhammattha Sangaha & is wrong.

As Nibbàna is eternal it does not belong to the past, present, or future. It is timeless. So is pannatti, independent of time.
Page 217

I take it your answer is that AN 3.47 applies equally for composite phenomena like a chariot and is not referring to so-called "standalone sankhara."

what is a standalone sankhara?

That’s a good question!


text:
What is a "standalone sankhara" vs " composite phenomena"?
I read the concepts of "standalone sankhara" vs " composite phenomena" on the internet.
Do these two concepts have any basis in any school/s of Buddhism? If so, which one/ones?

So far as I know, "no". I think they come (in recent topics on this site) from Yeshe Tenley's criticising, interpreting, or trying to paraphrase this answer where I answered that (in my opinion) samsara is unlike a sankhara.

Correct. I have no idea what a 'standalone sankhara' would be. I thought @ChrisW was discriminating 'samsara' versus such a hypothetical standalone sankhara, hence the question. If there is no such thing as a standalone sankhara then I am at a loss to understand how he believes that samsara is not sankhara.

@ChrisW rather than trying to say that samsara is not conditioned you are trying to say that samsara is not a "thing" or "phenomena"? But that brings its own extensive set of questions :)

@YesheTenley I never said that there is such a thing as standalone sankhara, although such an idea can be found in the Theravada Abhidhamma, which makes lists of fundamental things, upon which other things are composed of. The four great elements (earth, water, fire, air) is one of them. But even then it does not really say that they are standalone sankhara. I see samsara as a sankhara, similar to a river or the stream of consciousness. It arises and ceases whenever beings arise and cease. It's a temporally composite conditional phenomena i.e. you can't step into the exact same river twice.

Six senses manifests as samsara or the world. Six senses develop contact , feelings , cravings etc through combination. There are no standalone Sankhara.
(My mobile browser chrome is unable to quote so I am copy pasting without quote from MN 18)
“Venerables, dependent on the existence of an eye and a visible object, eye-consciousness arises. The combination of the three is sense-contact. Because of sense-contact, there is feeling. What one feels, one identifies;2 what one identifies, one thinks about; what one thinks about, one proliferates about; what one proliferates about, with that as its source, identification and conceptualization based on proliferation beset a man in regard to visible objects cognizable by the eye in the past, present, and future. Venerables, when there is an ear and a sound… a nose and a fragrance… a tongue and a taste… a body and a tangible object… a mind and a mental object, mind-consciousness arises. The combination of the three is contact. Because of contact, there is feeling. What one feels, one identifies; what one identifies, one thinks about; what one thinks about, one proliferates about; what one proliferates about, with that as its source, identification and conceptualization based on proliferation beset a man in regard to mental objects cognizable by the mind in the past, present, and future.


text:
What is the proper translation of 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā'?
In this excellent answer giving an in depth explanation of the various uses of sankhata in various suttas, the first usage is explained as 'conditioned things' based upon the famous phrase, "sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā" which is translated in various ways by different translators. Observe:

’All conditioned things are impermanent’
I.B. Horner

’All formations are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Bodhi

’All form is impermanent’
Bhikkhu Bodhi

‘All processes are inconstant’
Thanissaro Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’
Suddhāso Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’
Ācāriya Buddharakkhita

’That all conditional things are impermanent’
Peter Feldmeier

‘All conditions are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Sujato

‘All conditions are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Ānandajoti

Questions:

Are the differences in these translations meaningful?
If so, what is the correct translation/meaning?
Is it incorrect to translate sankhara in the context of 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā' as 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'
Is there any other place in the suttas where we can definitely say that sankhara is used to mean 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'

’All form is impermanent’ =  sabbaṁ rūpaṁ aniccaṁ

pubbe ceva rūpaṁ etarahi ca sabbaṁ rūpaṁ aniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhamman = all form, whether past or present, is impermanent, suffering, and perishable

saṅkhāra = noun = essential condition; a thing conditioned, mental coefficients
saṅkhata = past participle of verb saṅkharoti = conditioned; prepared; produced by a cause
All of the translations, except I.B. Horner, have not used the translation of "conditioned thing", probably to ensure saṅkhāra is differentiated from saṅkhata.
The dictionary says:

saṅkhāra one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics

The best translation for 'saṅkhārā' in 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā' will be the broadest translation.
For example, if we consider Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of SN 22.90, it says:

When this was said, the elder bhikkhus said to the Venerable Channa: “Form, friend Channa, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, volitional formations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Form is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself. All formations are impermanent; all phenomena are nonself.”

Above, Bhikkhu Bodhi has translated the 1st use of saṅkhārā as "volitional formations". Similarly, Sujato has translated  the 1st use of saṅkhārā as "choices". The 2nd use of saṅkhārā, Bodhi & Sujato have translated as "formations" & "conditions". The different translations of the 2nd use of saṅkhārā is to highlight the 2nd use of saṅkhārā includes form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations & consciousness as being saṅkhārā. When SN 22.90 says  'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā', it is saying form, feeling, perception, mental formations & consciousness are all saṅkhārā.
To conclude, none of the translations offered are inherently accurate as an explanatory principle because the word 'saṅkhārā' is too broad to be translated using one single English word. However, as already said,  the best translation is the broadest, which is Sujato's & Ānandajoti's "conditions". This said, bear in mind, the word "conditions" here refers to both:

prerequisite/causal agent conditions
resultant conditions

Btw, saṅkhārā is never translated as 'thing' or 'phenomena'. The Pali  for 'thing' or 'phenomena' is 'dhamma' or 'dhatu'.

This is just excellent.

I will say, I still wonder about the translation as volitional formations. I'm researching where and how this meaning of saṅkhāra as 'mental coefficients' or 'volitional formations' came from and what faults arise from considering the second link as just 'conditions'

Hmm, I'm also wondering a bit about 'a thing conditioned' as that seems in tension with your last sentences.

Yes, the dictionary says "a thing conditioned". I think "sankhata" always means "conditioned thing". But sankhara can also refer to "conditioned thing" but not always. In Pali, the work cittasankharo is a noun & refers to "mind conditioner". It is a causal condition. But the word "manosankharam" is always used as an object of the verb "saṅkharoti" and is a resultant condition. Yet manosankharam is a conditioned thing. In other words it appears valid in Pali to say manosankharam is a sankhata (mind formation is a conditioned thing).

Thanks for answering. saṅkhārā is never translated as 'thing' Really? Because I think it is translated that way, sometimes, by some authors: e.g. "all things" here or here. Your saying previously that the word 'saṅkhārā' is too broad to be translated may mean it's not logical to say that, "it doesn't or can't mean 'thing' because there's another more precise word for thing". Maybe you're saying it refers to or includes "things", but "things" isn't the best translation.

Or are you saying it refers only to mental factors, e.g. perceptions of things and never the (more "objective") things themselves?

sabbe sankhara does not mean "all things".

Thanks. This is great. We are taught the prerequisites of seeing circles and conditioned to think of them erroneously as eternal. Circles recur as needs arise.

Sankhara means compounded phenomena (combination of phenomena). “Sabbe Sankhara Anicca” means all combinations of phenomena are impermanent. Impermanent means combinations arise , change and vanish because
all combinations take place conditionally. All conditions are themselves Sanskharas and therefore impermanent.
For example :- Meeting of eye(a Sankhara , a phenomena made up of other phenomena )and sight(a Sankhara , a phenomena)give rise to eye consciousness(a Sankhara, a phenomena). Meeting of eye consciousness and eye and sight give rise to vision contact. Vision contact gives rise to feeling dependent on vision contact. Visual feelings can be good or bad or neutral. Coming together of vision feelings , vision contact give rise to visual cravings. Visual cravings can be lustful or hateful or neutral. Coming together of visual cravings and visual feelings give rise to visual clinging. Clinging can be lustful or hateful or neutral. Clinging and cravings gives rise to visual attachments. Visual attachments can be lustful , hateful or neutral.Attachments and clinging give rise to visual becoming.Visual becoming can be lustful , hateful or neutral. Visual becoming and visual attachments give rise to Sankhara of good , bad or neutral visual birth( for example attachment to awesome scenery ), visual ageing (for example rough scenery)and visual death (for example dilapidated scenery), together giving rise to the Sankhara of visual suffering.
Same applies to all other senses like nose , touch , ear ,taste and mind.
Sense of good (or lustful)or bad (or hateful)or neutral is the Sankhara of mind consciousness.
I think this definition of sanskharas was not given in the list of translations in the posted question.

In the three marks of existence, sankhara refers to conditional things or conditional phenomena, specifically the five aggregates, while dhamma refers to all phenomena.
The term dhamma includes Nibbana, while sankhara does not. Nibbana is not suffering, not impermanent and not self.

“Suppose, mendicants, there was a mountain river that flowed swiftly,
going far, carrying all before it. If wild sugarcane, kusa grass,
reeds, vetiver, or trees grew on either bank, they’d overhang the
river. And if a person who was being swept along by the current
grabbed the wild sugarcane, kusa grass, reeds, vetiver, or trees, it’d
break off, and they’d come to ruin because of that.
In the same way, an unlearned ordinary person has not seen the noble
ones, and is neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the noble
ones. They’ve not seen true persons, and are neither skilled nor
trained in the teaching of the true persons.
They regard form as self, self as having form, form in self, or self
in form. But their form breaks off, and they come to ruin because of
that. They regard feeling … perception … choices … consciousness as
self, self as having consciousness, consciousness in self, or self in
consciousness. But their consciousness breaks off, and they come to
ruin because of that.
What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.” …
“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or
impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“So you should truly see … Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is
no return to any state of existence.’”.
SN22.93

And what do the astute deem as existing, which I too say exists? Form
that is impermanent, suffering, and perishable.
Feeling … Perception … Choices …
Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and perishable. This is
what the astute deem as existing, which I too say exists.
SN22.94

To add, Yeshe Tenley commented:

Hmm, I'm also wondering a bit about 'a thing conditioned' as that
seems in tension with your last sentences.

Dhamma Dhatu then answered to the comment with the example of manosankhara from AN 3.23.
The translation of AN 3.23, whether using Sujato's "choices" or Bodhi's "activities" is not the core matter. The core matters are:

As I already mentioned in my main answer, AN 3.23 contains the phrase: "manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti". Here, saṅkharoti is the verb form of saṅkhara. Also, here saṅkhāraṁ, ending in ṁ, is the accusative case of saṅkhāra, i.e., saṅkhāra is the object of the verb saṅkharoti. In other words, as I already explained, manosaṅkhāraṁ is a resultant condition because it is caused by saṅkharoti. Its like saying: "the creation (accusative case noun) was created/generated (verb); the condition was conditioned/generated". Thus, AN 3.23 says: "some person generates afflictive bodily sankhara". The bodily sankhara is a resultant condition.

Manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti in AN 3.23 can be contrasted with cittasankharo in SN 41.6 & MN 44. "Cittasankharo", ending in "o", is a nominative case noun. Cittasankharo is also a causal or prerequisite condition. Cittasankharo (which is perception & feeling) is the prerequisite condition that causes the mind (citta) to generate/condition greed, hatred & delusion. "Cittasankharo" means "mind conditioner".

In other words, contrary to the Theravada Abhidhamma & Commentary Tradition, the term cittasankharo is not synonymous with the term manosaṅkhāraṁ. This is why Sujato's translation of cittasankharo as "choices by way mind" in SN 12.2 is incorrect, similar to how Bodhi's "mental volitional formation" is also incorrect. This is also why Sujato has translated cittasankharo differently as "mental process" in SN 41.6 & MN 44.

Note: Sujato & Bodhi appear to be translating in a certain way in order to conform to the Three-Life-Model of Dependent Origination taught in the Visuddhimagga (which is not Early Buddhism).

Couldn’t an alternative translation be “depending on the body, bodily activity arises” or “depending on the mind, mental activity arises?” Why do I prefer this construction? Because it is in keeping with the affirmative form of dependent arising.

Yes, I am wondering whether the second link should be more generally translated as “conditions” rather than volitional formations, choices and etc. One reason for this is the second link is not designated as saṅkharoti the verb form which would allow for “intent” or “choice” but rather it is the noun form which in my increasing opinion should only be translated as conditions and not the phenomena or things that are the result of conditions

Hmm, maybe manosaṅkhāraṁ more literally translated would be “with body as condition” instead of “depending on body as condition” but I prefer the latter as it is more in keeping with how dependent arising is presented…

And then saṅkharoti would be “bodily activity arises”

It cannot be "depending on the body" ("kaya-paccayā") because kayasankharam here in ACCUSATIVE case must be the object of the verb saṅkharoti. Therefore, it must be: Idha (here), bhikkhave (monks), ekacco (a certain individual) puggalo (person) sabyābajjhaṁ (a leading to having hurt; accusative case) kāyasaṅkhāraṁ (body condition/body activity; singular accusative case) abhisaṅkharoti (generates/creates)

Wikipedia: The accusative case (abbreviated ACC) of a noun is the grammatical case used to receive the direct object of a transitive verb.

Quick Pali lesson. Consider the English sentence "the car struck & killed the dog". This sentence is "the car (nominative noun) struck (verb) & killed (verb) the dog (accusative noun)". One noun is "accusative" because it is the object of the verb or action. Therefore, in Pali, which has different word endings, the sentence would be "the car-o struck-oti & killed-oti the dog-am".

Hi. It is just Pali  grammar rules, similar to in  English when  spelling "dog" and "dog's". In Pali, dog is  "dogo" and dog's as "dogassa", Therefore, in Pali, dog-o refers to the subject of the sentence. If you see "dog-am", this  indicates there  will be a verb in the  sentence, such as "John fed the dog the dog's food". Fed is a verb.   Verbs end in "ati". Therefore John fed the dog in Pali is John-o fed-ati dog-am dog-assa foodo".


text:
How old were the 500 arhats when they became arhats?
How old were each (or several) of the Buddha's students when they became arhats? I know Buddha was 35. I researched so far by Googling it and also by looking into Sariputra's life and also trying to infer based on what station in life that arhat was at.
My question comes from the thought, "Hey, if a 37 year old can become an arhat, maybe I can too!" As a way to motivate and inspire myself.

There were different age groups and different class and castes of people , who became the followers of Buddha. Buddha’s son Rahula also became his follower and he was I guess around 10 years of age. There were aged people who were on the death bed.They also learned from Buddha. There were kings who revered Buddha. There were fishermen who took his teachings seriously. Both males and females were his followers. Buddha induced the knowledge in them. Buddha lived up to the age of 80 I guess. So , if you take Buddhas teaching seriously then age is no bar. You can achieve significant break through just by believing and understanding him in a very short period of time. If you have no time then you can read Dhamma in brief. That alone is sufficient if you truly understand it.

According to tradition (although possibly their passing is in the Suttas), the Buddha's two chief disciples Sāriputta  & Moggallāna passed away at 84 years old. Note: The Buddha passed away at 80 years old. Wikipedia says:

Buddhist texts all state that Śāriputra died shortly before the
Buddha, with texts generally indicating he died in his
hometown. According to Pāli commentaries, Śāriputra arose from
meditation one day and realized through his meditative insight that
the chief disciples were supposed to achieve parinirvana before the
Buddha, and that he had seven more days to live. Śāriputra
then traveled to his hometown to teach his mother, who was yet to be
converted to Buddhism. After he converted his mother, Śāriputra died
peacefully on the full moon day of Kartika a few months before the
Buddha
According to the Pali tradition, Maudgalyāyana's [Moggallāna's] death comes in
November of the same year as the Buddha's passing, when Maudgalyāyana
is traveling in Magadha. He dies at the age of eighty-four

Since Śāriputta met one of the Buddha's first five arahant disciples (Assaji), I guess Śāriputta & Moggallāna became bhikkhus shortly after the Buddha's full awakening. Therefore they probably attained full awakening at around 40 years old.
Another senior arahant was Maha Kassapa. Wikipedia says Maha Kassapa was much older than the Buddha:

When the Buddha had attained parinirvāṇa (death), and when Mahākāśyapa was reportedly 120 years old

However, the above sounds rather exaggerated, as commented upon:

The commentaries say that Maha Kassapa was 120 years old at the time
of the First Council, but as this chronology would mean that he was
forty years older than the Buddha and thus already an old man of at
least seventy-five when he met the Master, such a statement is hardly
acceptable
Hellmuth Hecker

Ananda was said to be the 1st cousin & around the same age as the Buddha therefore must have been around 80 years old when attaining full awakening. Wikipedia says:

Though no Early Buddhist Text provides a date for Ānanda's death,
according to the Chinese pilgrim monk Faxian (337–422 CE), Ānanda went
on to live 120 years. Following the later timeline, however, Ānanda
may have lived to 75–85 years. Buddhist studies scholar L. S.
Cousins dated Ānanda's death twenty years after the Buddha's


text:
Buddhist attitude(s) towards failures in life
Perhaps for the enlightened ones, those on the path to enlightenment and those aiming for higher goals, worldly pursuits are not issues of concern. But they are important to many ordinary folks.
What is/are the proper Buddhist attitude(s) and actions to be adopted with regards to goals in life that a person had failed to achieve such as sporting excellence, top academic grades, a meaningful relationship, a satisfying career, achieving wealth and fame, marrying the one we loved rather than the one who was there or even just being normal like everyone else. What if the likelihood of achieving these goals is diminished or are no longer there e.g. already out of school, past the prime for sports, too old and so on.
Should a Buddhist adopt one of these thinking:
a) Nevermind, there’s always the next life.
b) We should try other things instead. Maybe we are just not cut out for fill-in-the-blank (e.g. sports, study, corporate, love, family and so on). Who knows? We might find ourselves happier doing other things.
c) No, we must keep trying. We should adopt the Bodhisattva attitude i.e. keep trying and learning from our mistakes in order to perfect the paramitas.
Thanks for sharing any insights.

All of it is dukkha anicca and anatta so striving to attain any of it then feeling shame and disappointment when it doesn't happen is a failure to "see things as they are".  If you do succeed and you cling to the success and status etc it's the same thing.  Its fine to have goals and achieve things in life but I guess the idea is to change ones perspective and see it through the lens of dukkha, anicca and anatta.

@Sati well said indeed!

I've competed in various activities in my life, and for a layperson like me I believe the Middle Way is informative for these situations.
If I were to, for example, enter a chess tournament I would strive to play my best, win/lose humbly, and conduct myself well. Regardless of the outcome I should be mindful and remain aware that my success or lack thereof is not permanent. Some day I won't even be able to participate. And pinning any amount of happiness on my ability to play chess well is a great invitation to suffering! (especially in my case)
Finding a balance between wanting to "do well" in a given activity/sphere of life and not becoming attached is a fine balance indeed.

The hard part is also the middle way. If you are totally bad in the sport, it's like oh well, it's just for fun. If you are the champion, again it's all fine. But when you are runner up then you go....what if? Similarly, if you never had the opportunity (love, career, academic, etc) and watch it slipped away, I guess it would be much easier.

Birth , Ageing and Death is suffering. Separation from the loved ones or beloved ideology is suffering. Combination with the hateful ones or hateful ideology is suffering.
This is true for all realms of existence.
Therefore the only success is the success in cessation of suffering , which is Nibbana.
Having said that and knowing the lay person’s difficulties in life , I would suggest you to be satisfied and be happy in any situation because there are people with much greater misfortunes. Some people do not have legs , some people do not have hands , some are mentally sick and are suffering from bi polar disorder, some are living in extreme poverty and some in extreme ignorance (they suffer like glass which breaks every now and then)… You are so lucky to know the Truth and you have chosen the right direction at least. You should rejoice everyday inspite of failures.

The invitation is to meditate on the possibility that the "misfortunes" you mention may not be misfortunes, but are only part of a belief system of what constitutes a misfortune.

@EndAnti-SemiticHate May be. Failure was considered bad (a misfortune) by the OP. According to you failure is not a failure but part of belief system what constitutes a misfortune.

There is no real failure.  Failure is only a personal perspective based on an arbitrary belief system.  As Thomas Edison wisely quipped, "I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."

Good question.  I've acquired all three philosophies.  However, I think if you are mindful in your living - but who does this?  - the gravity of those philosophies weakens. Then you might ask yourself, what is it that I am really after? What are my real intentions?

Agreed but being mindful also means you recollect, review and understand what happened and went wrong. Our real intention is as usual just to be happy.

True but the four frames are not about cultivating happiness they are about deconstructing experience

But aren't we using the four frames to deconstruct in order to better understand our experience and learn from it? Ultimately, the aim is our long lasting well-being and happiness by seeing through our delusions w.r.t. bodily sensations, feelings, consciousness and mental formations. Is this correct?

yes i think that is correct

Great, thanks for the insights!

“Monks, there are these five kinds of loss. Which five? Loss of relatives, loss of wealth, loss through disease, loss in terms of virtue, loss in terms of views. It’s not by reason of loss of relatives, loss of wealth, or loss through disease that beings—with the break-up of the body, after death—reappear in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. It’s by reason of loss in terms of virtue and loss in terms of views that beings—with the break-up of the body, after death—reappear in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. These are the five kinds of loss.

“There are these five ways of being consummate. Which five? Being consummate in terms of relatives, being consummate in terms of wealth, being consummate in terms of freedom from disease, being consummate in terms of virtue, being consummate in terms of views. It’s not by reason of being consummate in terms of relatives, being consummate in terms of wealth, or being consummate in terms of freedom from disease that beings—with the break-up of the body, after death—reappear in a good destination, a heavenly world. It’s by reason of being consummate in virtue and being consummate in terms of views that beings—with the break-up of the body, after death—reappear in a good destination, a heavenly world. These are the five ways of being consummate.”

~ the Buddha, Anguttara Nikaya 5:130 Sampadā Sutta: Being Consummate, transl. Thanissaro https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN5_130.html


text:
Why is the Buddha called "Kinsman of the Sun"?
In some suttas like SN 22.95 and Snp 4.14, the Buddha is called the Kinsman of the Sun (ādiccabandhu).
Why is he called the Kinsman of the Sun?
What is the origin of the term?

Good question.  I don't have any pali references at the moment, but there is this concept of solar dynasty.

... Buddhist texts include Shuddodhana, Gautama Buddha, and Rahula in
their accounts of the Ikshvaku dynasty


text:
In what way[s] does Buddhist doctrine agree with or contradict Anekāntavāda?
What do Buddhists - modern day and historical - think of Anekāntavāda?  There is this cryptic remark by Dharmakirti:

With the differentiation removed, all things have dual nature. Then,
if somebody is implored to eat curd, then why he does not eat camel?"
The insinuation is obvious; if curd exists from the nature of curd and
does not exist from the nature of a camel, then one is justified in
eating camel, as by eating camel, he is merely eating the negation of
curd.

I could summarize it at such: the truth/reality is complex and many-sided. How does the quote apply to the subject matter?  The truth/reality being complex and many-sided doesn't seem to end suffering, but at least it gives individuals some solace. Am I wrong?

I guess this is off-topic, like "What do Buddhists think of [some aspect of Christian doctrine]"?" would be off-topic. More on-topic would be, "In what way[s] does Buddhist doctrine agree with or contradict  Anekāntavāda?"-- so that the topic then would "Buddhist doctrine" at least as much as it is Anekāntavāda. And even though that might be on-topic it might not be answerable -- a reason for a site-specific "topic" on Stack Exchange is so there's a "community" of people who may know that subject and answer questions on it.

Perhaps Mahavir was more Courageous than Tathagata on this matter!
Let's say we have a bowl of milk. If we expose it to various conditions the milk can change into curd or buttermilk or cheese or butter. Now let me ask you a question, is milk permanent or not ? If it's permanent then it can't change, isn't it? If it is not then what is changing?
Adi Shankaracharya said there's is Brahman which is absolute and permanent, milk is illusion,not permanent, it's just projection on Consciousness hence is changing and is permanent at same time. His philosophy of Vedanta is for permanence. He sees the substance not process.
Siddharth Gautam said there is nothing permanent only change it there, nor is the milk permanent nor it's derivatives nor the absolute. His philosophy is of change. He sees the process not substance.
Mahavir was courageous, he ended this powerful bull (the paradox) by holding it's both horns! His philosophy is of anekantva plurality. He acknowledged both substance and process.
Vardhaman Mahavir said in some way Truth is permanent in some way it is not. In this way He synthesized both point of view, the have jiva to represent permanent aspect of Truth and ajiva to represent non permanent aspect.
They deny God or Brahman but have concept of soul! This and similar things makes their approach slightly complex and hence it is not as popular as Buddhism, which is straight forward and simple, though in some way the jain teaching of anekantva is very powerful and rational.
Dharmakirti was great intellectual and logician but I think he forgot that something which is applicable for part may not be applicable for whole. If his logic fits on given analogy it doesn't mean it is true for Absolute Truth as well. The analogy presented by him requires knowledge of logic and is subject of scholarly investigation, hence saying anything on it by me is not good.
Coming to last question that 'Anekāntavāda doesn't end suffering but gives solace....' on which I think nothing can end suffering. Even Buddha catched disease in his old age, cause of suffering was there but he didn't suffered because he had attained to something which made him immune of suffering. Nirvana, Moksha, kaivalya or Enlightenment is nothing but just a mere understanding that whatever may come we can remain in bliss without getting absorbed in external circumstances.

Reality is that all compounded phenomena are impermanent. Reality is that all compounded phenomena are suffering. And reality is that all phenomena are not-self.
Nibbana is the ultimate Truth. It is unborn , uncreated , unformed , unoriginated, unbecoming. It is the escape from born , created , formed , originated and becoming.
All the above Truths are immutable whether Buddha arises or not.
Jains however believe reality is complex and many sided. Jains do not speak of the suffering or the cessation of suffering. Buddhism is all about the teaching of suffering, cessation of suffering and path leading to the cessation of suffering.
Buddha is superior to Jains.


text:
Is Anatta a phenomenon?
Sabbe Dhamma Anatta. It means all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are not-self.
Is not-self or Anatta a phenomenon?

The meanings of the word 'dhamma' are very broad. The root meaning of the word 'dhamma' is 'that which supports'.

The word dharma has roots in the Sanskrit dhr-, which means to hold or
to support, and is related to Latin firmus (firm, stable). From this,
it takes the meaning of "what is established or firm", and hence
"law". It is derived from an older Vedic Sanskrit n-stem dharman-,
with a literal meaning of "bearer, supporter", in a religious sense
conceived as an aspect of Rta.
In the Rigveda, the word appears as an n-stem, dhárman-, with a range
of meanings encompassing "something established or firm" (in the
literal sense of prods or poles). Figuratively, it means "sustainer"
and "supporter" (of deities). It is semantically similar to the Greek
themis ("fixed decree, statute, law").
Wikipeadia

Therefore, anatta is certainly a 'dhamma'. AN 3.136 says:

Whether Realized Ones arise or not, this law of nature persists, this
regularity of natural principles, this invariance of natural
principles:
Uppādā vā, bhikkhave, tathāgatānaṁ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṁ ṭhitāva sā
dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā.
all things are not-self.
Sabbe dhammā anattā.

While the word 'dhamma' is used AN 3.136 is in relation to 'natural law', it is a 'dhamma' because the wisdom/understanding of anatta as natural law 'supports' liberation from suffering.
Whether the English word 'phenomenon' is relevant here is subject to discussion/debate. Buddhism is not really about English words. Buddhism says anatta is a characteristic (lakkhana) of everything. Whether a 'characteristic' is a 'phenomena' in English I do not know.
In summary, anatta is certainly a dhamma because it supports/upholds liberation.

Sorry I likely misled you with my previous answer (see below). To be honest I'm not sure, but I would consider this:
sabbe dhamma anatta = 'all phenomena are anatta' or 'all phenomena are not atta'
So we can surely say, atta is not phenomena. Then the negation of atta (anatta) is phenomena - anything you would call phenomena is described by anatta.
Personally I think it is a negation of atta, so that is the non-perception of atta, so not phenomena but empty
phenomena

Yes. Seems to be correct.

I think Anatta is Nibbana. Unconditioned phenomena.

i think nibbana is closer to atta - unborn, unmade, unconditioned, etc


text:
History of Mumonkan versus Blue Cliff Record
I've been looking around online for an answer to this question, but have come up empty handed. My understanding of The Blue Cliff Record is that it's a collection of famous cases compiled from the history of Zen. But what I'm wondering is how The Mumonkan differs from it? (I haven't read this one yet).
Is there any overlap in the cases? And what was the purpose of having two different collections of Koans? Is it an entirely new collection? If so, what is the difference in the history of their respective collections?

Yeah, there's a lot of overlap across many of the collections.  Often, I feel that the language of the Mumonkan is more direct.  I actually prefer working with that collection for that reason.  That said, my own Rinzai lineage uses both the Mumonkan and Blue Rock (specifically Sekida's dual volume translation) along with Entangling Vines (which has some real weird sh*t in it).
As far as the history goes, all it really boils down to is what koans a given lineage preferred working with.  Everyone has their favorites.  These tended to get standardized into a curriculum of sorts that got passed down over the years.  Eventually, you end up with the collections we have today.
Here's a bit of zen silliness for your afternoon.  You asked what the purpose of having multiple versions of the same koan would be.  First off, there are several different koans that have similar answers.  Proceeding from the top of the pole and Nansen's cat, for example, are very similar in many respects.  Some koans and versions of koans just a hit student harder than another might. Perhaps more interestingly, a Rinzai teacher might push back and ask what is the purpose of having more than one koan in the first place!  Full liberation can be found in just a single koan.  They all have layers with some being nearly inexhaustible.  My personal favorite, which I'm pretty sure is bottomless, would be three pounds of flax.

I checked the table of contents. There seems to be no overlap of cases. The purpose seems to be to build wisdom. I haven’t read those books of koan but they seem cryptic for example it says- before enlightenment mountains are mountains, rivers are rivers, during enlightenment mountains are not mountains , rivers are not rivers, and after enlightenment mountains are mountains, rivers are rivers.
Another one says -

A monk asked Chao-chou, “Has the dog Buddha nature or not?” Chao-chou
said, “Mu.”

Without being cryptic I can say that anyone who looks upon with the eye of Dhamma has Buddha nature. Eye of Dhamma says all conditioned phenomena which has a beginning must have an end.


text:
Does the process of conditioning affect the conditioners?
We are conditioned beings. Process of conditioning begins at a very early age and continues till we die.
My question is : Does the process of conditioning affect the conditioner ?

In Buddhism, the word "a being" refers to a view that has been conditioned (SN 23.2; SN 5.10). It is not the "being" that engages in conditioning but is the arising of the notion/view of "a being" that is something conditioned.
The doctrine of Dependent Origination (described in SN 12.2) refers to three conditioners:

Body conditioner (kayasankharo; the breathing)
Verbal conditioner (vacisankharo; initial & sustained thought)
Mind conditioner (cittasankharo; perception & feeling).

The above three conditioners can get stirred up/proliferated by ignorance.
Therefore, the process of conditioning certainly affect the conditioners because the process of conditioning causes the conditioners to proliferate (eg. described in SN 12.38)
.
For example, we are sitting calmly then suddenly there is an earthquake. The perception of the earthquake gives rise to a proliferation of other perceptions & feelings, many thoughts and causes the breathing to become flurried. This is an example of how the conditioners proliferate when there is ignorance & conditioning.


text:
If I gift money to somebody then am I doing Adhamma?
Sabbe Dhamma Anatta says
Form is not me , mine or myself.Feeling is not me , mine or myself .Perception is not me , mine or myself.Choices is not me , mine or myself.Consciousness is not me , mine or myself.
Suppose I give one million dollar to somebody then am I doing Adhamma (not Dhamma , not supporting the path of Nibbana)?
Because giving money means
Money is yours.
Feelings resulting from becoming rich is yours.
Perception of rich is you , yours and yourself.
Choices of luxurious living is yours.
Consciousness of richness or luxurious living is yours.
By giving money to somebody am I not propagating a wrong notion of Self(which in my opinion is adhamma)?
Following is link to definition of Dhamma as an answer to “Is Anatta a phenomenon ?”
To quote :

While the word 'dhamma' is used AN 3.136 is in relation to 'natural
law', it is a 'dhamma' because the wisdom/understanding of anatta as
natural law 'supports' liberation from suffering.

I'd guess that it's keeping your money to yourself, not giving, that's more likely to be selfish -- e.g., "this is mine".
Actually in my experience, if you give money to someone less wealthy than you, then they may turn around and re-give it, to someone less wealthy than they are.
In any case all things remain anatta.
Giving "virtuously" may be an opportunity for mudita.
Giving money to an addict, though, or a foolish child, might not be skilful. You can  find more details (about gifting) e.g. by reviewing the topics tagged dana for example Question about Dana

There are many motivations for giving a gift.
Most are selfish, but the best motivation for giving a gift is not selfish.
The best motivation for giving a gift is adornment of the mind, which means making the mind virtuous. It's the best motivation according to AN 7.52.

“Mendicants, there are these eight grounds for giving. What eight? A
person might give a gift out of favoritism or hostility or stupidity
or cowardice. Or they give thinking, ‘Giving was practiced by my
father and my father’s father. It would not be right for me to abandon
this family tradition.’ Or they give thinking, ‘After I’ve given this
gift, when my body breaks up, after death, I’ll be reborn in a good
place, a heavenly realm.’ Or they give thinking, ‘When giving this
gift my mind becomes clear, and I become happy and joyful.’ Or they
give a gift thinking, ‘This is an adornment and requisite for the
mind.’ These are the eight grounds for giving.”
AN 8.33

Even if my intentions are pure , am I not spreading Adhamma ?

@SacrificialEquation Karma is all about intentions in Buddhism.

@SacrificialEquation I think it's doctrine that it's 'better' give to people who are (more) virtuous -- that's part of the doctrine about "merit" -- ideally to monks for example (see also "field of merit") to whom of course you wouldn't give money but only "requisites". Even when Anathapindika gave "a million dollars", those gifts were in the form of requisites, e.g. the land for a forest monastery, and meals.

The enlightened, such as enlightened monks, require gifts. The unenlightened also require gifts. Also, gifts are required to be given when there is a natural obligation. From the viewpoint of an enlightened practitioner, none of this giving is required to be 'personal', even though the giving is required to be performed. As AN 8.33 says: "This is an adornment and requisite for the mind".


text:
Is there anything called as Adhamma in the Suttas?
I asked a question which indirectly asked about Adhamma. However there was no direct refutation of Adhamma.
So , I had to ask this question directly: Is there anything called as Adhamma in the Suttas ? In Sanskrit there is a word Adharma as opposite of dharma.

Adharma (Sanskrit: अधर्म) is derived from combining "a" with "dharma",
which literally implies "not-dharma". It means immoral, sinful, wrong,
wicked, unjust, unbalanced, or unnatural.

Suppose I say forms are you or yours or yourself . Feelings are you or yours or yourself. Perceptions are you or yours or yourself. Choices are you or yours or yourself. Consciousness is you or yours or yourself.
Then can the above observation or teaching be called Dhamma or Adhamma?
I am asking this to clarify the meaning of Dhamma.

Does https://suttacentral.net/define/dhamma?lang=en answer this question? It tries to "clarify the meaning of Dhamma".
And it mentions "adhamma", and references three suttas which include that word, including DN 26.
In DN 26 it's used in these words

adhammakāro (tr. "injustice")
adhammarāgo ("illicit desire")

So it's used there like an adjective to qualify a noun, meaning something like "wrong" or "unrighteous".
I guess saying, "forms are you or yours or yourself", is an example of what might be called "wrong view" -- for which the Pali is micchā-diṭṭhi.

I am not talking about just view.What if I  not only hold the view but also believe it and teach it.

Yes I think the word adhamma is used for that -- in MN 22, in the sentence, "By understanding the simile of the raft, you will even give up the teachings, let alone what is against the teachings".

This is path breaking for me. I will do some more research and get back to you. Thanks.

Adhamma is mentioned in Theragāthā 4.10:

“[The] Dhamma [itself] surely protects one who practices Dhamma;
“Dhammo have rakkhati dhammacāriṁ,
the teaching brings happiness when practiced well.
Dhammo suciṇṇo sukhamāvahati;
This is the benefit of practicing Dhamma:
Esānisaṁso dhamme suciṇṇe,
one doesn’t go to a bad destination.
Na duggatiṁ gacchati dhammacārī.
It’s not the case that Dhamma and what is not Dhamma
Na hi dhammo adhammo ca,
lead to the same results.
ubho samavipākino;
What is not Dhamma leads to hell,
Adhammo nirayaṁ neti,
while Dhamma takes you to a good [happy] place.
dhammo pāpeti suggatiṁ.

Similar to the contextual use above, the word 'adhamma' is found in MN 22:

By understanding the simile of the raft, you will even give up the
teachings, let alone what is against the teachings.
Kullūpamaṁ vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṁ desitaṁ, ājānantehi dhammāpi vo
pahātabbā pageva adhammā.
Footnote by Sujato translator: The pair dhamma and adhamma usually means “the teaching” and “against the teaching” (eg. AN 2.104). The negative form has a stronger sense than simply “not the teaching”; it implies there is something unnatural, in conflict with the way the world is.

Thus again from AN 2.104:

“Mendicants, there are two fools.
“Dveme, bhikkhave, bālā.
What two?
Katame dve?
One who perceives what is not the teaching as the teaching, and one
who perceives the teaching as not the teaching.
Yo ca adhamme dhammasaññī, yo ca dhamme adhammasaññī.
These are the two fools.”
Ime kho, bhikkhave, dve bālā”ti

.

We are already blessed.

Passion and delight is adharma…enchantment is adharma.
This is a damn shame.

Shamefulness is a feeling. Shame arises , changes and fades away.


text:
Does “Sabbe Dhamma Anatta “ exclude Adhamma?
Adhamma word is used at few places in the Suttas. Adhamma is opposite of Dhamma. If Dhamma means Right then Adhamma means Wrong.
There is a characteristic of existence: Sabbe Dhamma Anatta.
Can I say “ Sabbe Adhamma Anatta “?
Does “ Sabbe Dhamma Anatta “ exclude Adhamma? If not then how do we reconcile?

“Sabbe Dhamma Anatta “ incudes adhamma because the word 'adhamma' refers to 'wrong modes of practice/acting' (refer to Thag 4.10) where as the word 'dhamma' in 'sabbe dhamma anatta' does not refer to 'modes of pratice' but refers to 'phenomena' or 'things'.
The word 'dhamma' has multiple meanings dependent upon context. Refer to my old blog here: The word ‘dhamma’ in context
Note: this old blog says for Dhammapada verses 1 & 2, the word 'dhamma' means 'mental states". Currently, I am not sure about this. I now think the word 'dhamma' here means 'modes of practice/acting/living' (which become 'doctrines'; 'teachings').