text:
What did the Buddha mean in AN 5.38 with the fifth benefit to a person of faith?
What did the Buddha mean in AN 5.38. when he said:

“Mendicants, a faithful gentleman gets five benefits. What five?
The good persons in the world show compassion first to the faithful, not so much to the unfaithful. They first approach the
faithful, not so much the unfaithful. They first receive alms from
the faithful, not so much the unfaithful. They first teach Dhamma
to the faithful, not so much the unfaithful. When their body breaks
up, after death, the faithful are reborn in a good place, a heavenly
realm. A faithful gentleman gets these five benefits.

Emphasis mine.
I am trying to discern what this means with reference to the answers for the word upapajjati in this question which discussed the meaning of the word which is being translated here. Also, what did the Buddha mean when referring to the "break up of the body, after death" and has that been correctly translated?

I note that your question is tagged "theravada" and Gabe's answer is appropriate to that point of view. But as you no doubt know, the Theravadan view isn't the only way of looking at what the Buddha taught. More specifically, since Sanskrit scholar Joanna Jurewicz has been working to decode early teachings in Vedism, a fresh look at the way the Buddha taught, as derived from the early Vedic style, makes for a slightly different understanding of what he taught. If your interest is only in the Theravadan take on his teachings, this may not be of any interest to you.

Hello Linda, I am happy to have informed answers even if they do not come from an active Theravada practitioner, but I am mostly interested in answers from practicing Buddhists of some tradition. That said, if there is an interesting academic answer here that would inform Buddhist practice that would be welcome.

Traditions start somewhere. Do you consider Secular Buddhism to have enough gravitas to provide an answer? I've been a practicing Buddhist for over 30 years, and the answer I'd offer has had aspects published in the Journal of Oxford Buddhist Studies under the editorship of Professor Gombrich.

By all means go ahead :)

Thanks, Yeshe Tenley, I will. My first attempt first became a detailed short story, then a novella, then a novel, and was heading for trilogy when I thought better of it. I am now working on a different take that should be shorter.

You can find the Pali words on Sutta Central:

...  saddho kāyassa bhedā paraṁ maraṇā sugatiṁ saggaṁ lokaṁ upapajjati ...

To answer your question, I think the text has been correctly translated. The translated word “breaks”  corresponds to "bhedā". For this context see notes from the PTS:

"Abl. bhedā after the destruction or dissolution in phrase kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā, i.e. after the breaking up of the body & after death: see kāya I. e. & cp. D. III, 52, 146 sq. , 258; Dh. 140; Pug. 51"

The other words roughly correspond to paraṁ=after, maraṇā=death, sugatiṃ=good (destination), saggaṃ and lokaṃ can be taken indepently but together they roughly translation to "heavenly region", upapajjati=reborn.
Again see notes for uppajjati in relation to saggaṁ and lokaṁ:

Upapajjati, (doubtful whether a legitimate form as upa + pad or a diaeretic form of uppajjati = ud + pad. In this case all passages ought to go under the latter. Trenckner however (Notes 77) defends upa° & considers in many cases upp° a substitution for upa. The diaeresis may be due to metre, as nearly all forms are found in poetry. The v. l. upp° is apparently frequent; but it is almost impossible to distinguish between upap° and upp° in the Sinhalese writing, and either the scribe or the reader may mistake one for the other) to get to, be reborn in (Acc.); to originate, rise Vin. III, 20 (nirayaṃ); A. III, 415; V, 292 sq.; Sn. 584; It. 13 (nirayaṃ), 14 (sugatiṃ; v. l. upp°), 67 (saggaṃ lokaṃ; v. l. upp°); ...
PTS

A similar verse occurs in the Dhammapada:

atha vassa agarani aggi dahati pavako
kayassa bheda duppabbo nirayaj so 'papajjati
(DhP 140)
...
bheda: bheda-, N.m.: breaking, disunion. Abl.Sg. = bheda.
The phrase kayassa bheda- ("disunion of the body") means "death" in the Pali texts.
source

Your question has two parts: What did the Buddha mean, and is the phrase "breakup of the body, after death" correctly translated. It seems clear that the latter is correct, and a defense of a positive answer has already been given by Gabe, so I won't address that.
"What did the Buddha mean" can only be a matter of opinion, since none of us is able to directly hear his thinking or ask him, but it is possible to look at the sutta for some answers, and consider the larger context of his talks in other suttas, to try to understand why he says what he says in AN 5.38.
What I notice about AN 5.38 is that

We aren't told who is speaking, but we might well assume it's the
Buddha.
The talk is not a deep one as would be given to long-time monastics,
and it is not being given to the clansmen (using Bodhi's translation
of kulaputta).
Four of the five points address what benefits accrue to the
clansmen.
The point that doesn't follow the main pattern seems to be
addressing a benefit to the monastics, not to the "clansmen endowed
with faith". It is that the monastics get alms from a person of
faith.

Assuming it's the Buddha speaking, it's worth noting that it's not a deep dharma talk illuminating the finer points of his teaching. It appears to be a talk about why regular folk ("clansmen") who have faith are wise to have faith, and as such it would be addressed to new monastics, not long-time, experienced monks. One needs to question why the Buddha would be instructing inexperienced monks on the reasons the faith of clansmen is beneficial. That one of the five points he lists is of benefit to the monks might then give us a clue -- why should the monastics be kind to faithful clansmen? for alms!
Why then are these monks being told what benefit faith has for the clansmen? What do monastics do to gain alms from clansmen? They offer teachings. What teaching might novice monastics give to clansmen? How about a talk on why their faith is of benefit to them: It's because, dear clansmen, you'll get compassion from others, you'll get such a good reputation people will come to you, you'll get taught dhamma before anyone without faith does, you'll get a good rebirth, and (monastic holds out his bowl), you're known to be generous.
It is worth noting that when the Buddha speaks to individuals he encounters (not speaking of his devoted monastics here), he speaks to them addressing their concerns and without making dogmatic statements about what they should believe. He often enough points out the obvious consequences of what they believe, but he doesn't, for example, go around telling people they are just wrong to think that behaving like a dog will get them reborn as a dog in dog heaven, or even that there is no "self" -- he never says that. But he does point out the ways the behavior their thinking inspires in them leads to trouble, or that there is no discernible self to be found that matches what determined a "self" in their times -- that it was a separate thing, eternal, changeless. What he does do is address an individual's concern from within that individual's own worldview, pointing out any obvious flaws in the consequences of their thinking. He takes pains not to argue. He even says this.
In MN 18.4 he says, "Friend, I assert and proclaim [my teaching] in such a way that one does not quarrel with anyone in the world with its gods, its Maras, and its Brahmas, in this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its princes and its people; in such a way that perceptions no more underlie that brahmin who abides detached from sensual pleasures, without perplexity, shorn of worry, free from craving for any kind of being." SN 22.94 opens with "Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather it is the world that disputes with me."
It seems apparent, to me at least, that in this sutta he is giving his monastics directions to go out and do what he does: give a teaching that fits within their worldview as to the reasons faith is worthwhile. Their worldview includes the belief that good behavior in this life leads to a better rebirth. If the world works the way they think it does, then this, too, would be a benefit of their faith. That doesn't mean the Buddha is sure that rebirth is the cosmic order. Even if he did, he would not say so because he'd be quoted on that and that would lead to 'proclaiming his teaching in such a way that he quarrels with the world'.
I do note that there are places in the suttas where he does seem to suggest that he has had direct experiences of his past lives. Why he does that would be part of a much larger, longer discussion. I further note that he sometimes tells people where their loved ones will be reborn after death. He himself answers why he does this, in MN 68.8-9.

"What do you think, Anuruddha? What purpose does the Tathagata see
that when a disciple has died, he declares his reappearance thus:
'So-and-so has reappeared in such-and-such a place...'?"
"Anuruddha, it is not for the purpose of scheming to deceive people or
for the purpose of flattering people or for the purpose of gain,
honour, or renown, or with the thought, 'Let people know me to be
thus,' that when a disciple has died, the Tathagata declares his
reappearance... Rather, it is because there are faithful clansmen
inspired and gladdened by what is lofty, who when they hear that,
direct their minds to such a state, and that leads to their welfare
and happiness for a long time."

"That doesn't mean the Buddha is sure that rebirth is the cosmic order."  If you read MN 60, you'll see that he was actually sure of it.

@Danilo: Two noteworthy points about it: 1. it is the only place in all the suttas that the Buddha makes such a dogmatic statement, which makes it suspect on that point alone. 2. As Thanissaro Bhikkhu notes in his own subtle way in his translation of that sutta, the statement I'm calling the lone dogmatic one breaks the logic of the sutta by not being safe bet arguments. He says "It is noteworthy that the arguments in A2 and B2 are not safe-bet arguments, for they assume that A is wrong and B is right. Whether these arguments date from the Buddha or were added at a later date, no one knows."

I would argue that one lone dogmatic statement is not to be trusted as the Buddha's words, especially when it breaks the logic of the sutta -- he is much better at constructing arguments than that. It shows the fingerprints of a less-bright, later interloper.

That reads as very special pleading. Regarding sutta that contradict your position as inauthentic - simply because it contradicts your position - is not convincing.

@Yeshe Tenley. I didn't judge it as inauthentic "simply because it contradicts my position." I did so for the two reasons listed.

@YesheTenley Those arguments (i.e. "this is the only sutta where that's said", and, "that doesn't fit within the logic of this sutta") were among the arguments detailed in the paper which was referenced in this answer. That was a different topic entirely, but it shows that is a kind of argument which some modern scholars make, or a kind of argument available to scholars, to assess whether a element of doctrine might be original or perhaps added at some later date.

Ok. However, I think we should be humble and hesitant to deem suttas as inauthentic because it doesn't fit with our pre-conceived narratives. The western world often comes at the Dharma with biases and in a very arrogant way tries to retrofit the Dharma and the Buddha into storylines that make it easier for the westerner to digest.  They like to hold on to the conceit that they know better about how the world works than some thousands of year old Indian ascetics. BTW, I am a westerner and I recognize this in myself as well.

I remember vividly arguing with my Teacher (who is from Tibet) trying to explain Einstein's special theory of relativity while he gently laughed at me. I insisted that Einstein had made a great advance and showed how time and the speed of light are intimately related. He replied and pointed out that if that is true, is is very good but only conventionally true and I shouldn't get hung up on it. This made me annoyed thinking that this simple monk just couldn't understand a sophisticated western idea and appreciate it. Only much later did I realize how wrong I was.

FWIW, I do think this answer is the best one after Gabe's. This one is at least honest in admission about what the Buddha did teach and not a completely tortured reading of words, but it still reminds me of my own arrogance towards my Teacher.

@Linda Blanchard, Iti 70-71, MN 130 and MN 143 are a few other examples where you can see that he was actually sure of it. I also see another major misconception in your post when you assume that the monks were instructed to be kind in order to gain almsfood (check AN 5:159 and Ud 6:2)

@Danillo. Sorry, my rather dry humor often gets taken as me being literal -- I was partially kidding about the monks. As for the Buddha's many, many references to having seen beings rearising and passing on according to their actions, note my comment under the OP about writing a trilogy. The understanding I am working with has so much evidence for it that when I just discuss one aspect folks think I'm ignorant of the whole of the Buddha's work, or I'm cherry-picking. I am not.

Summary of  Trilogy: The Buddha uses the structure he built in Dependent Arising (DA) to create a lesson he could use throughout his teachings and interactions with others to describe via metaphor -- or something like a metaphor but too huge to fit in that word -- how and why we end up causing ourselves to suffer. On the surface DA looks like it is about the cycle of rebirth. It is not. When he talks about "rising and passing away" he is talking about DA.

@LindaBlanchard , These are some other important suttas: Iti 24 and SN 15:3

@Yeshe Tenley, re your comment about arrogance: duly noted. It is understandable, given that you don't know me, that you would assume I had pre-conceived ideas of what the Buddha taught,  that I would cherry-pick to make what I read fit those ideas. But the actual case is that I came to reading the suttas with only questions, no fixed expectations. I began from wanting there to be perfect support for the Theravadan view of the teachings. I was surprised that wasn't what I found.

@Yeshe Tenley: As for arrogance, I wonder if it is not arrogant to assume that any of the traditions have an undistorted understanding of what the Buddha taught. It seems to me a humble-enough approach, to come to the texts with an open and empty mind, to let them reveal what they say, and to test it with personal practice. My teacher is the Buddha of the oldest texts, and I am certainly humble before him. In fact, in awe.

Not sure if that would be arrogant, but I think it wouldn't be cautious. However, rebirth has been a prominent feature of discussion since the earliest records we have of what the Buddha taught. See Questions of (King) Milinda and such. In addition, every extent tradition agrees that the Buddha did in fact acknowledge rebirth. He did not rebut it.  I'd also note that the sutta in question in this OP and your answer to it does not have anything to do with DA by your own account.

As I've stated before, I was initially very skeptical about rebirth and had a very hard time understanding how to fit it to my earlier understanding of emptiness and anatman. Nevertheless, I was hesitant enough to not write it off but keep working at it as my teacher suggested. I'm very grateful and profoundly happy that I did so, because far from contradicting rebirth my now understanding of emptiness requires rebirth or at least requires the non-aggressive denial of it as a conventional truth. IOW, finally understanding rebirth helped inform my understanding of emptiness.

Denying the conventional truth of rebirth to me is akin to an illusory dreamer vehemently asserting that upon waking from the dream nothing whatsoever can subsequently be experienced. That the dreamer waking from the dream is tantamount to a complete annihilation of the world and all experience foreclosing any future world or experience.

Denying rebirth is akin to Ven. Yamaka saying "As I understand the Teaching explained by the Blessed One, a monk with no more (mental) effluents, on the break-up of the body, is annihilated, perishes, & does not exist after death." and this was rebuked precisely because it presupposes the true and reliable existence of the monk in the here and now where no such true reliable existence can be found.

To deny rebirth is to reify the self in the here and now.

I don't deny rebirth.

"Death" ("marana") does not happen to a Buddha (SN 22.85; MN 140; Dhp 21; etc ). The suttas say:

Heedfulness is the path to the Deathless. Heedlessness is the path to
death. The heedful die not. The heedless are as if dead already.
Dhp 21

Therefore, the word "death" ("marana") does not mean "physical death" or the "ending of life". In the suttas, the Noble Ones refer to the ending of life as "kālakiriyā" ('completion of time'). "Death" means the death of "a being" (SN 12.2). "A being" is a "self-view" (SN 5.10) or "strong attachment" (SN 23.2).
The word "body" ("kaya") means "collection" of "five aggregates" forming a "self-identity" ("sakkaya") that is the composition of an act of kamma or becoming - refer to MN 44.
The words "sugati" and "sagga" mean "a happy state" in a "happy place". It may not literally mean a heaven in the clouds or on another planet. For example, in SN 35.135, it is said:

You’re fortunate, mendicants, so very fortunate, to have the
opportunity to lead the spiritual life.
I’ve seen the heaven (saggā) called ‘the six fields of contact’.
There, whatever you experience is likable, not unlikable; desirable,
not undesirable; pleasant, not unpleasant.
SN 35.135

Therefore, the  meaning of AN 5.38 is: "When the collection of aggregates immersed in faith breaks up, after the death of the self-view of the faithful mind (which can have a temporary fear arise, which is why it is called 'death'), the faithful are reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm, such as in a state of clear light mind samadhi".
But they are not yet an Arahant, which is why "after death" occurs. Therefore, AN 5.38 later says:

They teach them the Dhamma, that dispels all suffering.  Understanding this teaching, they’re extinguished without defilements.”

AN 5.38 does not say they teach them "rebirth" because "rebirth" cannot dispel all suffering.

In the Western, Christian world we teach young children that 'Santa Claus' watches over everyone, rewarding good children with presents on Christmas day, and punishing bad children with lumps of coal (and interestingly, no child ever seems to be punished; there are always presents under the tree in the morning...). Say what you like about it, good or bad, but it is what children can understand at their level. Children must grow into more sophisticated moral understandings.
If we read the remainder of the discourse, we find that the faithful person (the good person) becomes a refuge for 'monks, nuns, laywomen, and laymen', the way a great banyan tree at a crossroads becomes a refuge for birds and animals. What each needs it receives: those that need shade find shade; those that need fruit find fruit. And most importantly, these faithful people draw in the liberated, the wise, the undefiled: people who find in their faith and goodness a ripe field for planting the dharma. And then when the faithful person learns the dharma — grows and understands — she is "extinguished without defilements".
What happens to a tree when it falls and breaks apart? It has spread its seed; it has prepared the ground with its own life; a new tree rises in its place to fill its place. Is there more to ask than that? People need more reassurance than a tree, though, at least until they understand.

Are you equating this sutta to the Buddha instructing monks to preach the equivalent of Santa Claus? That poor Indian people are like children in their understanding?

@YesheTenley: Every person is like a child in the greater world: caught in fantasies and beliefs, asking endless curious questions, strutting over every success and crying over every failure.... Dukkha and tanhā are child's games that we've forgotten belong in the world of children. When we realize that, we can start to put them aside.

I agree for the most part. It's just that denying the conventional truth of rebirth - the western conceit - is the more childish and acknowledging it as the Buddha attested the more mature.

@YesheTenley: It isn't my intent to confirm or deny the facticity of rebirth, and I don't believe I did that in what I wrote. But the concept of rebirth... Well, that's a mental construct as subject to attachments and misperceptions as any other mental construct. If we grant that the Buddha attested to it, must we also grant that we (much less novices and laity) understand precisely what he was pointing at?

@YesheTenley: Whatever the facts of the matter — and whatever we choose to hold as true — the path is the same. All that changes is our expectations.

All very true and wise words @Ted Wrigley


text:
Are there any stories dealing with stalkers or people who violate boundaries in seeking to grow close in the texts?
Have you come accross anything that deals with stalking behavior in the texts?
Looking for something where one is stalked by another but anything close to the theme is good enough.

Is the Bikkhuni Sutta an example of stalking behaviour?

I am thinking more of people obsessively bothering others thinking they have some sort of relstionship or seeking to have a relationship. The Buddha says there is no fellowship with fools but what if a fool is not letting it go and is using intimidation & is acting crazy.

There is a place where the Buddha says that one ought not leave a person who is beneficial to one's training even if being chased away with a stick but i am interested in how to deal with a person who is ought to be chased away with a stick basically.

I recall reading a section in Thanissaro Bhikkhu's book The Buddha Smiles, in which a monk sought out a nun in the forest. He was delirious with sensual passion for her. The nun remedied the situation through a compassionate understanding, pulled out her eyeball and gave it to him, which drained away his desires. Not sure if that's close enough. I think the Buddha was involved in the story and that it was more of a symbolic gesture to paṭikkūlamanasikāra. I can provide an answer it appeals to you?

This story of a Zen nun -- https://itstheliar.wordpress.com/2020/09/17/love-openly/ -- is slightly similar ("She even bruised her face with a hot poker so as to diminish her beauty"). And https://ashidakim.com/zenkoans/6noloving-kindness.html from the same collection. "Intimidation" though -- there are are all those stories featuring Mara. And I guess a homeless monk might walk away himself, and so needn't chase away.

@Neuromax I am familiar with the story of Ven. Subha poking out her eye, an answer would be good.

@Chrisw cheers will take a look at these

Subha is a nun who has gone forth to the holy life. She seems to make it quite obvious that she has completely cut-off all fetters. As she wonders the mango grove, a rogue taunts her with various seductions expressed through a ridiculous procession of flowery, poetic language and overly exuberant and flamboyant promises; forthright and persistent in his endeavours, he is like a duckling following its mother. I think this might define stalking.
NOTE: I recommend reading this from the link because what I pasted here does not follow the right formatting rules. In short, it reads better from the link.

Khuddaka Nikāya - Thig 14
As Subhā the nun was going through Jīvaka’s delightful mango grove, a
libertine (a goldsmith’s son) blocked her path, so she said to him:
‘What wrong have I done you
that you stand in my way?
It’s not proper, my friend,
that a man should touch
a woman gone forth.
I respect the Master’s message,
the training pointed out by the One Well-Gone.
I am pure, without blemish:
Why do you stand in my way?
You—your mind agitated, impassioned;
I—unagitated, unimpassioned,
with a mind entirely freed:
Why do you stand in my way?’
‘You are young & not bad-looking,
what need do you have for going forth?
Throw off your ochre robe—
Come, let’s delight in the flowering grove.
A sweetness they exude everywhere,
the trees risen-up with their pollen.
The beginning of spring is a pleasant season—
Come, let’s delight in the flowering grove.
The trees with their blossoming tips
moan, as it were, in the breeze:
What delight will you have
if you plunge into the grove alone?
Frequented by herds of wild beasts,
disturbed by elephants rutting & aroused:
You want to go
unaccompanied
into the great, lonely, frightening grove?
Like a doll made of gold, you will go about,
like a goddess in the gardens of heaven.
With delicate, smooth Kāsī fabrics,
you will shine, O beauty without compare.
I would gladly do your every bidding
if we were to dwell in the glade.
For there is no creature dearer to me
than you, O nymph with the languid regard.
If you do as I ask, happy, come live in my house.
Dwelling in the calm of a palace,
have women wait on you,
wear delicate Kāsī fabrics,
adorn yourself with garlands & creams.
I will make you many & varied ornaments
of gold, jewels, & pearls.
Climb onto a costly bed,
scented with sandalwood carvings,
with a well-washed coverlet, beautiful,
spread with a woolen quilt, brand new.
Like a blue lotus rising from the water
where no human beings dwell,
you will go to old age with your limbs unseen,
if you stay as you are in the holy life.’
‘What do you assume of any essence,
here in this cemetery grower, filled with corpses,
this body destined to break up?
What do you see when you look at me,
you who are out of your mind?’
‘Your eyes are like those of a fawn,
like those of a sprite in the mountains.
Seeing your eyes, my sensual delight
grows all the more.
Like tips they are, of blue lotuses,
in your golden face
—spotless:
Seeing your eyes, my sensual delight
grows all the more.
Even if you should go far away,
I will think only of your pure,
long-lashed gaze,
for there is nothing dearer to me
than your eyes, O nymph with the languid regard.’
‘You want to stray from the road,
you want the moon as a plaything,
you want to jump over Mount Sineru,
you who have designs on one born of the Buddha.
For there is nothing anywhere at all
in the cosmos with its devas,
that would be an object of passion for me.
I don’t even know what that passion would be,
for it’s been killed, root & all, by the path.
Like embers from a pit—scattered,
like a bowl of poison—evaporated,
I don’t even see what that passion would be,
for it’s been killed, root & all, by the path.
Try to seduce one who hasn’t reflected on this,
or who has not followed the Master’s teaching.
But try it with this one who knows
and you suffer.
For in the midst of praise & blame,
pleasure & pain,
my mindfulness stands firm.
Knowing the unattractiveness
of things compounded,
my mind cleaves to nothing at all.
I am a follower of the One Well-Gone,
riding the vehicle of the eightfold way:
My arrow removed, effluent-free,
I delight, having gone to an empty dwelling.
For I have seen well-painted puppets,
hitched up with sticks & strings,
made to dance in various ways.
When the sticks & strings are removed,
thrown away, scattered, shredded,
smashed into pieces, not to be found,
in what will the mind there make its home?
This body of mine, which is just like that,
when devoid of dhammas doesn’t function.
When, devoid of dhammas, it doesn’t function,
in what will the mind there make its home?
Like a mural you’ve seen, painted on a wall,
smeared with yellow orpiment,
there your vision has been distorted,
your perception1 of a human being—pointless.
Like an evaporated mirage,
like a tree of gold in a dream,
like a magic show in the midst of a crowd—
you run blind after what is unreal.
Resembling a ball of sealing wax,
set in a hollow,
with a bubble in the middle
and bathed with tears,
eye secretions are born there too:
The parts of the eye
are rolled all together
in various ways.’
Plucking out her lovely eye,
with mind unattached
she felt no regret.
‘Here, take this eye. It’s yours.’
Straightaway she gave it to him.
Straightaway his passion faded right there,
and he begged her forgiveness:
‘Be well, follower of the holy life.
This sort of thing
won’t happen again.
Harming a person like you
is like embracing a blazing fire.
It’s as if I have seized a poisonous snake.
So may you be well. Forgive me.’
And released from there, the nun
went to the excellent Buddha’s presence.
When she saw the mark of his excellent merit,
her eye became
as it was before.

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text:
Can a lay person observe the ten precepts on uposatha days?
Can a lay person observe the ten precepts on uposatha days? I ask this because I want to observe the eight precepts on uposatha days and I don’t need to use money on those days anyway so I might as well observe the ten precepts instead of eight. So is it ok for me to observe the ten precepts or should the ten precepts be only observed by novices and nun?

The recommendation is for lay persons to observe the Eight Precepts on Uposatha Days.
The Eight Precepts are included in the Ten Precepts, thus the Ten Precepts conform to the above recommendation.
So, there's no problem observing the Ten Precepts on Uposatha Days.
It's just like the case where monks need not do more than what is required by the Vinaya. But if they want to, they can optionally choose to observe the stricter Dhutanga rules.
In any case, it is useful to remember that the Buddha taught the Middle Way between excessive indulgence and excessive austerity.
The analogy from the Sona Sutta is applicable here to illustrate that energy and effort applied to the practice should not be too much or too little:

“What do you think, Soṇa? When you were still a layman, weren’t you a
good harp player?”
“Yes, sir.”
“When your harp’s strings were tuned too tight, was it resonant and
playable?”
“No, sir.”
“When your harp’s strings were tuned too slack, was it resonant and
playable?”
“No, sir.”
“But when your harp’s strings were tuned neither too tight nor too
slack, but fixed at an even tension, was it resonant and playable?”
“Yes, sir.”
“In the same way, Soṇa, when energy is too forceful it leads to
restlessness. When energy is too slack it leads to laziness. So, Soṇa,
you should apply yourself to energy and serenity, find a balance of
the faculties, and learn the pattern of this situation.”

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text:
Resistance to Loving-Kindness
I have been continuing my meditation practice, and I feel there would be a great benefit from switching to a metta practice instead of breath. Yet, with metta, a strange phenomenon occurs.
I am usually very good during metta bhavana and  generate the feelings. However, it is incredibly hard for me to begin the metta session, and I seem to avoid this type of meditation before and afterwards. Only during the practice do I feel great emotion and compassion.
How can this be explained?
Thank you.

How can this be explained?

That's aversion towards the meditation practice. Just note it as "disliking" and be mindful about it until it passes away. Be very vigilant in observing this aversion when it arises as it can sabotage ones practice if left by itself.
Eventually, as one gains more and more clarity of mind, this aversion will subside due to the mind understanding the benefits and freedom that comes from consistent meditation practice.

I would think of this as generalized aversion.
Aversion is a hindrance, one if the five hindrances. Whenever one notices a hindrance one should direct the mind accordingly.
If thinking about doing a certain contemplation seems tedious then one should resolve that aversion before doing anything else. One does this by recognizing the circumstances, properly reflecting and secluding oneself from the triggers mentally & physically. When a stilling of unwholesome thoughts has occured one can just enjoy that and not worry about whether one used metta or whatnot to attain it.
There is nothing repulsive about metta contemplation but contemplation or meditation in general can become repetitive & a chore. It is especially boring if one is putting in a lot of work but get's neither special rapture nor lights & visions.
How one deals with aversion is a matter of trial & investigation. One should learn many skillful means such as redirecting the mind to the body and the themes of appriciation & etc. One might think that metta counters aversion but if one is averse to doing it, as one has been doing it, then it isn't at that time suitable and one can choose to investigate the aversion or choose another gladdening theme such as ie compassion, appreciation, equanimity, virtue, The Buddha and whatnot. One can also do breath work to shut out distracting thoughts and thus create distance & attain seclusion in order to perceive the grand distinctions such as lights & visions.
Forcing oneself to meditate with an aversive mind is not a good idea but the stilling of aversion is a meditation and a good idea.
You can also try mixing things up to avoid monotony in contemplation, try different ways of rousing the mind and develop wholesome themes by giving of attention as you see fit.

Mindfulness meditation is four-fold:

MN10:2.1: “Mendicants, the four kinds of mindfulness meditation are the path to convergence. They are in order to purify sentient beings, to get past sorrow and crying, to make an end of pain and sadness, to end the cycle of suffering, and to realize extinguishment.
MN10:3.1: What four?
MN10:3.2: It’s when a mendicant meditates by observing an aspect of the body—keen, aware, and mindful, rid of desire and aversion for the world.
MN10:3.3: They meditate observing an aspect of feelings—keen, aware, and mindful, rid of desire and aversion for the world.
MN10:3.4: They meditate observing an aspect of the mind—keen, aware, and mindful, rid of desire and aversion for the world.
MN10:3.5: They meditate observing an aspect of principles—keen, aware, and mindful, rid of desire and aversion for the world.

Rather than skipping directly to the fourth step for metta meditation, proceed through all the steps in order, passing from one to the other at the right time. Your aversion might simply be to doing things out of order.
Please also note that right immersion is not forced:

DN34:1.6.69: Right immersion with five knowledges.
DN34:1.6.70: The following knowledges arise for you personally: ‘This immersion is blissful now, and results in bliss in the future.’
DN34:1.6.71: ‘This immersion is noble and spiritual.’
DN34:1.6.72: ‘This immersion is not cultivated by sinners.’
DN34:1.6.73: ‘This immersion is peaceful and sublime and tranquil and unified, not held in place by forceful suppression.’
DN34:1.6.74: ‘I mindfully enter into and emerge from this immersion.’

I have done breath meditation or many decades. I still do it. The other meditations come naturally--after breath is settled.

You can also be active like helping and teaching kids in buddhist monasteries, doing donations for food, shelter, reforestation, volunteer work...
If you aren't comfortable with a technique would should go very slowly maybe 1-5min a day. Maybe Tonglen or Mantras(Chenrezig) would be more fit for you.
https://www.lionsroar.com/how-to-practice-tonglen/
You should ask a Guru a Lama or Monk he would know.


text:
Studying the subject "the four Buddhist schools/systems of tenets" (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, Mādhyamika) in English
I am one of the (Taiwanese) fans of the Dalai Lama for a long time. Currently I am studying the subject "the four Buddhist schools/systems of tenets (of mainly Indian Buddhism before its decline)" both in Chinese (but actually translations from Tibetan) and in English, wishing to learn and to grow like the Dalai Lama.
"The four Buddhist schools/systems of tenets" are standardly named: Vaibhashika (Skt. Vaibhāṣika), Sautrantika (Skt. Sautrāntika), Chittamatra (Skt. Cittamātra), Madhyamika (Skt. Mādhyamika).
I am having the following questions and looking for guidance and/or instruction.

What English book(s) or document or study material on the subject is(/are) the most easily-learnable or learner-friendly?

What English book(s) or document or study material on the subject is(/are) the most rigorously- and detailedly- and thoroughly- written?

What English book(s) or document or study material on the subject is(/are) the most faithful and accurate and precise presentation(s) of real historical facts?

Thank you in advance.

I would recommend Insight into Emptiness by by Khensur Jampa Tegchok and Thubten Chodron. This book discusses the tenets of all four of these schools and compares and contrasts them. Further, the authors are of the same branch of Tibetan Buddhism as His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the latter author also works very closely with the Dalai Lama and is a co-author with him on many books for the western audience.
Here are images of some handy charts you can find in this book that talk about the four schools views:

If you want a short free resource, please read the 13-page "The Four Buddhist Tenet Systems: Variations on a Theme of Wholeness" by David Paul Boaz.
On Youtube, there's a summary in the video "Elucidating The Tenet Systems of Buddhist Philosophy" by H.E. Abhaya Rinpoche.


text:
How does an enlightened mind distinguish itself from all other phenomena?
How does an enlightened mind distinguish itself from all other phenomena?
There is one such person amidst a crowd of other people. Somebody shouts their name, and they say, "yes, that is I. I am here. What do you want?"
After hearing his name, how does he make the connection between the hearing of his name and referencing that name to himself, so that he then responds thus, "yes, that is I. I am here. What do you want?"

An "enlightened mind" could be referring to different things... do you intend to refer to the mind of a fully enightened Buddha or that of an Arya being in meditative equipoise with the non-conceptual perception of emptiness or do you mean an Arya being not in meditative equipoise? The answer depends upon what you are referring to by "an enlightened mind."

@Yesha Tenley - I would rather not define that term, but instead encourage you to approach the question in whatever way is suits to you. :-)

If I tell you: "Your future is in your hands."
Would you look at your physical hands and reply, "but where is it? I can't see it!" I don't think so.
"In your hands" is a mere conventional figure of speech, not to be taken literally.
Similarly, the terms "I", "my", "mine", "you", "your" etc. are simply conventional terms when used verbally by the enlightened ones. They don't literally think that "I" refers to their body or consciousness or mental fabrications or feeling or perception.
And similarly in the Buddha's time, they looked at him and referred to him as "Bhante" or "Venerable Sir" in the second person or as "Bhagava" or "Blessed One" in the third person. The Buddha referred to himself as "Tathagata" (or "the one who has thus gone").
These are just conventions.
From SN 1.25:

“When a mendicant is perfected, proficient,
with defilements ended, bearing the final body:
would they say, ‘I speak’,
or even ‘they speak to me’?”
“When a mendicant is perfected, proficient,
with defilements ended, bearing the final body:
they would say, ‘I speak’,
and also ‘they speak to me’.
Skillful, understanding the world’s conventions,
they’d use these terms as no more than expressions.”
“When a mendicant is perfected, proficient,
with defilements ended, bearing the final body:
is such a mendicant drawing close to conceit
if they’d say, ‘I speak’,
or even ‘they speak to me’?”
“Someone who has given up conceit has no ties,
the ties of conceit are all cleared away.
Though that clever person has transcended identity,
they’d still say, ‘I speak’,
and also ‘they speak to me’.
Skillful, understanding the world’s conventions,
they’d use these terms as no more than expressions.”

The mind of a fully enlightened one is completely empty of discursive thoughts. It does not conceptualize at all. In fact, this has already occurred to an Arya being at the 7th Bhumi let alone a fully enlightened Buddha. So the answer to your question is that an enlightened mind DOES NOT distinguish itself from all other phenomena.
For references I draw from this commentary by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche on Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara.
Here is a screenshot and highlight of the table of contents of the pertinent sections:

When we turn to page 369 we see a verse describing the way in which an Arya being achieving the 11th Bhumi (full Buddhahood) knows suchness and associated commentary:

Right after this passage the next verse is an objection. I think the objection is coming from someone espousing the Cittamatra tenet system as this is the last labeled objector in the text. Anyway, here is the objection:

A little further down we see a verse by Chandrakirti himself giving a simile of how it can be that a Buddha's mind can be totally free from discursive thought all the while being of benefit to other sentient beings. This seems to be the thrust of the OP's question if I'm not mistaken:

Here's the really dispositive part. A little bit later in the text Rinpoche affirms that the standard interpretation of the text and of Tibetan Buddhist schools is that a Fully Enlightened Buddha is entirely free of discursive thought and elaborates a bit. He says the answer to your question is basically that an enlightened mind DOES NOT distinguish itself from all other phenomena:

There is so much more in this commentary and I encourage you to read all of it as it is an absolute treasure. Of course, this commentary and root text are from the masters of the Prasangika Madhyamaka and so keep in mind this as the basis for understanding the text.

Interesting. Yes, I agree the Buddha's primary mode of cognition is as described above, but I still stand by my opinion (or rather, certainty) that Buddha can understand the dualistic perspectives of others, as in my Santa analogy. +1 for the effort!

If I'm honest, this has thrown me a little... (in a good way!).

As explained in Maitreya’s "Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes" (Madhyāntavibhāga), Enlightenment is not going back to the primal state of ignorance and nondifferentiation, nor does it mean to abandon the relative to only dwell in the absolute, no.
The relative and the absolute are two descriptions of the same ground. Enlightenment superimposes and harmonizes all the various descriptions, even contradictory ones, and can juggle the limited perspectives with ease.
It's the same process as with adult playing a Santa. When children call "Santa, Santa, I have a question", how do you know they are addressing you? Because you know for them you are Santa. For your wife you are her husband etc.
Buddha is not the body nor the mind, it doesn't have boundaries nor is it the universe, it's beyond all definitions. But for the sake of sentient beings that childishly think "that is the Buddha" when they address the Buddha they get an answer "I'm here, what do you want?"

Can you recommend a resource for Madhyāntavibhāga, or pull out any excerpts that would help me understand your answer more?

@NeuroMax that would be me doing your homework for you :)

Ah, straight-up homework 'n' stuff! ;-)

Lol :^) seriously though, when it comes to buddhahood you can't just point to a line and say here is how it works, it's written between the lines and you have to get it by yourself.

Yes, I understand. Thanks for your input. ;-)

MN121:12.3: There is only this modicum of stress, namely that associated with the six sense fields dependent on this body and conditioned by life.’

Communication does not require identity view.
Calling out "Tom" in a room full of people named "Tom" will generate multiple contacts via all the sense fields in the room. Multiple faces will turn. Yet "Tom" is a common name, so there will not be a perception of self. Additional sense field contacts will be required to generate a perception of recognition requiring response. Eventually, communication will be established.
Communication does not require identity view. Our individual phones answer when called. And phones do not have identity view. A phone number is a name. Phones answer in response to a cascade of contacts through the sense fields of the phone network.

Communication is just phenomena then? - Apparently over 2,000 Kupreški Kosci's gathered in one location in 2017. I'm not sure if one of those Kupreški Kosci's was an enlightened being, but Tom doesn't seem to care about that. ;-)

Tom is not mine. Tom is not this. Tom is not myself. :D

I see. Using ruben2020's answer, Tom is at best just a figure of speech, and cannot really be found. Would you agree?

Yes. I have upvoted reuben2020's answer. The MN121 quote helps clarify what exactly remains for arahants.


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Word that refers to a "second chance" or redemption?
Is there a specific word in Buddhism that refers to a "second chance" or perhaps redemption?

Yes Vajrasattva 100 syllable mantra to purify karma, to regret, confess wrong doings ... (:

If you mean "redemption" as used in the Christian sense, then no, there would be no comparable concept as gods are irrelevant to the goal of Buddhism, which is liberation through personal experience. Otherwise, you could consider attaining Nirvana as the ultimate redemption. See Concept of Redemption in the World Religions:

Skill in offenses and skill in rehabilitation from offenses.
Āpattikusalatā ca āpattivuṭṭhānakusalatā ca dn33

I think this is close to redemption from wrongness.
As i understand it, the semantics are close to 'rising up & emerging' as a recovery from wrong-doing.
https://www.wisdomlib.org/definition/vutthana

Perhaps it's words including nirodha (cessation, disappearance, extinction) ...

Now this is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering.
Idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṁ ariyasaccaṁ

... and vimutti (freedom, release, deliverance) ...

The ocean has just one taste, the taste of salt.
Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso;
In the same way, this teaching and training has one taste, the taste of freedom.
evamevaṁ kho, bhikkhave, ayaṁ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttiraso.

I think that the word "redemption" is too explicitly Christian. Its ordinary meaning is "gaining possession of something in exchange for payment, or clearing a debt", and theologically it refers to the Christ's "paying for people's sins in order to liberate them from hell", which I think has no direct equivalent in Buddhism.
A Buddhist equivalent is simply cessation -- which, I understand as including "cessation" of being harmful, so being and becoming harmless, and cessation of remorse, and so on.
One example is in the Angulimala Sutta (MN 86) -- maybe not a relatable example because it's an extreme, but it shows that even in this extreme case what's required is cessation:

... There is a bandit in my realm, lord, named Angulimala: brutal, bloody-handed, devoted to killing & slaying, showing no mercy to living beings. He has turned villages into non-villages, towns into non-towns, settled countryside into unsettled countryside. Having repeatedly killed human beings, he wears a garland made of fingers. I am going to stamp him out."
"Great king, suppose you were to see Angulimala with his hair & beard shaved off, wearing the ochre robe, having gone forth from the home life into homelessness, refraining from killing living beings, refraining from taking what is not given, refraining from telling lies, living the holy life on one meal a day, virtuous & of fine character: what would you do to him?"
"We would bow down to him, lord, or rise up to greet him, or offer him a seat, or offer him robes, almsfood, lodgings, or medicinal requisites for curing illness; or we would arrange a lawful guard, protection, & defense. But how could there be such virtue & restraint in an unvirtuous, evil character?"
Now at that time Ven. Angulimala was sitting not far from the Blessed One. ...


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What is meant by "divorcing the view and the action" and why is it considered so dangerous?
In Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara, there is a debate with the Charvakas (ancient materialists) about the existence or non-existence of past and future lives. In the commentary, Rinpoche compares and contrasts the Charvakas tenets with modern day scientists who would deny the conventional existence of past or future lives.
Rinpoche accuses modern scientists with the phrase "divorcing the view and the action" and advises that this is a saying among masters to describe something considered very dangerous:

As Rinpoche implies that this phrase is commonly used by masters to describe something very dangerous I am wondering if there are other examples of masters using this phrase and why it is considered so dangerous. Can anyone find Sutra/Treatise/Commentary/Anecdote of other masters using this phrase?
I'm also wondering if it is appropriate to describe modern Secular Buddhists who also deny the conventional existence of past or future lives as holding the same view as modern scientists and subject to this same phrase? If so, why is this so dangerous and what is meant by "divorcing the view and the action?"
What is the translation of this phrase in Pali, Sanskrit, or Tibetan to the extent that there are examples of masters using this phrase in a similar way in any of these languages?

...we should at least hope for additional evidence, better controlled
experimentation, showing that it is possible to recover memories that
are not encoded in neural tissue, that it is possible to sustain
consciousness in organisms that lack nervous systems, that it is
possible for mental causation to cross time and space and alter
physical substrates.
Negative experiments along these lines are legion, though they rarely
find their way to the front page of your local newspaper, since nobody
has any reason to promote them. One can find mention of them in places
like Skeptical Inquirer magazine, or outlined at websites like the
Skeptic’s Dictionary or Quackwatch.
It is for reasons such as these that any contemporary, scientifically
informed Buddhist practice should reject belief in rebirth and its
associated kammic causation.

Quoted above is from the link you attached with regards to Secular Buddhists. In short, the set of arguments is... because we can't experimentally recover memories that are not encoded in neural tissue, etc.. it follows that rebirth is false. That right there is a pure materialist view, similar to the Charvakas idea which the Rinpoche said has no place in Dharma.
Following the same analogy, the Secular Buddhist will not find a different neural tissue memory imprint representing intention between the monk approaching a certain nun and the lover.
So the danger in the materialistic view is that the modifiability of Kamma (intention) is denied and without that, there is no liberation from the samsaric cycle of suffering.
Quoted below is from Kamma and its Fruit by Nyanaponika TheraNyanaponika.
However, a scientist's view is not finalized, a scientist doesn't start with a premise that everything is material or that the equipment he/she has can recover everything knowable thus will not reject the unproved rebirth idea or any unproven idea for that matter. That is why I think Rinpoche says a scientist could be a vessel for the Dharma.

Most writings on the doctrine of kamma emphasize the strict lawfulness
governing kammic action, ensuring a close correspondence between our
deeds and their fruits. While this emphasis is perfectly in place,
there is another side to the working of kamma — a side rarely noted,
but highly important. This is the modifiability of kamma, the fact
that the lawfulness which governs kamma does not operate with
mechanical rigidity but allows for a considerably wide range of
modifications in the ripening of the fruit.
If kammic action were always to bear fruits of invariably the same
magnitude, and if modification or annulment of kamma-result were
excluded, liberation from the samsaric cycle of suffering would be
impossible; for an inexhaustible past would ever throw up new
obstructive results of unwholesome kamma. Hence the Buddha said:
"If one says that in whatever way a person performs a kammic action,
in that very same way he will experience the result — in that case
there will be no (possibility for a) religious life and no opportunity
would appear for the complete ending of suffering.
"But if one says that a person who performs a kammic action (with a
result) that is variably experienceable, will reap its results
accordingly — in that case there will be (a possibility for) a
religious life and an opportunity for making a complete end of
suffering."
— AN 3.110

Thank you for the answer. I'm specifically looking for an answer for the meaning and usage of the phrase "divorcing the view and the action" and Rinpoche's mentioning that this seems a common or known diagnosis for a view that is deemed very dangerous.


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What is (re)born? Did the Buddha explicitly state that it is "the mental idea of the self" that is reborn?
It's been asserted by some knowledgeable individuals that the Buddha explicitly identified "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara and has done so in suttas spelling out the doctrine of dependent origination.
Is it true that the Buddha explicitly identified "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara?
If not, is it true that the Buddha implicitly intended to identify "the mental idea of the self" as what is (re)born in samsara?
Please provide sutta references.
In the Prasangika Madhyamaka we say it is the "mere I" that is reborn and not the "mental idea of the self" and we say how it is reborn is through the doctrine of dependent origination which involves the mental idea of the self. I think this is a significant difference.

I agree with the answer by Andrei.
Whatever ignorance is left in the mind continues to arise. So not only the self idea but all the ignorance not removed by following the right path will arise.
That said, I would like to add that these higher teachings could be risky if parroted to everyone without regard to the person's stage of development. Some people who don't have a well-developed virtue and a thick attachment to self-love, like myself, could fall into confusion and/or abandon virtuous acts. So, if anyone is tied in that loop I urge you to read this question that I asked a while back; there are some good answers given there for the benefit of the Dhamma here and now.
I also think that is the reason why in some of the teachings the idea of Kamma is presented crudely as quoted below, to sound as if you are reborn of your own actions. It may sound wrong, but saying you are reborn, and that another 'mind and matter' are reborn, is the same, because you are a mind and matter with the same ignorance that gets reborn. So it is all semantic.

"'I am the owner of my actions (Kamma), heir to my actions, born of my
actions, related through my actions, and have my actions as my
arbitrator. Whatever I do, for good or for evil, to that will I fall
heir'..

When you mention 'risk' I want to avoid misunderstanding you... what do you believe entails the highest risk to the lowest risk for someone not versed in "these higher teachings?" 1) teaching that what is reborn is the person 2) teaching that it is mind+matter that is reborn 3) teaching that it is the mental idea of the self that is reborn?

In my opinion, the second teaching is the riskiest. The 3 could also be risky if the learner thinks just an idea is reborn and concluded by saying 'why care it's just an idea'. I think the risk is clear if you read the question I noted above.

I think at the very least the idea of self ( i mean the illusory I) should not be quickly attacked. This answer by @Mishu 米殊 to one of my questions highlight why the illusory self is very important...[link] https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/20819/12931

Interesting perspective, thank you, although I personally fall into the "too much upaya is equally harmful" gang. +1 for the insight.

FWIW @user21048 I think even the "highest teachings" acknowledge the conventional existence of rebirth of the person. That sentient beings are reborn cyclically in samsara. That Yeshe, Andrei, and user21048 are reborn. There is no contradiction at all from the lowest teachings to the highest teachings about this.

It is not the case that "the mental idea of the self" is reborn or at least it is the case that the person is reborn as well and not just the mental idea. And it is only the case that "mind + matter" is reborn in that "mind + matter" is the illustration of the person in a conventional sense.

Generally, the suttas say "a being" is "reborn", as follows:

When the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished,
rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, & attained to
imperturbability, I directed it to the knowledge of the passing away &
reappearance of beings. I saw — by means of the divine eye, purified &
surpassing the human — beings passing away & re-appearing, and I
discerned how they are inferior & superior, beautiful & ugly,
fortunate & unfortunate in accordance with their kamma: 'These beings
— who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech & mind, who
reviled noble ones, held wrong views and undertook actions under the
influence of wrong views — with the break-up of the body, after death,
have re-appeared in the plane of deprivation, the bad destination, the
lower realms, in hell. But these beings — who were endowed with good
conduct of body, speech, & mind, who did not revile noble ones, who
held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right
views — with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared
in the good destinations, in the heavenly world.' Thus — by means of
the divine eye, purified & surpassing the human — I saw beings passing
away & re-appearing, and I discerned how they are inferior & superior,
beautiful & ugly, fortunate & unfortunate in accordance with their
kamma.
MN 4

The suttas say "a being" is merely a "view" of "attachment":

Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This
is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found.
SN 5.10

'A being,' lord. 'A being,' it's said. To what extent is one said to
be 'a being'?"
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is
caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being.'
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception...
fabrications...
"Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha:
when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a
being.'
"Just as when boys or girls are playing with little sand castles:
as long as they are not free from passion, desire, love, thirst,
fever, & craving for those little sand castles, that's how long they
have fun with those sand castles, enjoy them, treasure them, feel
possessive of them.
SN 23.2

From Milindapanha:

-- “What is it, Nàgasena, that is reborn?”
-- “Mind and matter (namarupa).”
-- “Is it this very mind and matter that is reborn?”
-- “No, it is not, but by this mind and matter deeds are done and because of those deeds another mind and matter is reborn; but that mind and matter is not thereby released from the results of its previous deeds.

Just like an adult "inherits" results of the choices made by the child - even though most of the original body cells are gone, similarly future existence "inherits" karma from the past existence.

--“Can there be any rebirth where there is no transmigration?”
--“Yes there can, just as a man can light one oil-lamp
from another but nothing moves from one lamp to the
other; or as a pupil can learn a verse by heart from a teacher
but the verse does not transmigrate from teacher to pupil.”

It is information and causation that is reborn, or is re-embodied. Or, as Chogyam Trungpa said, it is our neuroses that are reborn.

Do you see a significant difference between saying that the "mere I" is reborn due to neuroses or saying that the "mere I" is reborn due to information and causation? VS saying that it is neuroses that is reborn or that it is information and causation that is reborn? If you don't agree that with "mere I" substitute a conventionally existing person. Like say Andrei or Yeshe :)

@AndreiVolkov When read together with the sutta that says that mind and body comes from "old kamma" without mentioning whose old kamma, this could also imply that we inherit "old kamma" from our parents, family, community, surroundings, media, books etc.

@Yeshe Call me rad, but I think rebirth is an outdated metaphor for what is going on and I think it somewhat discredits Buddhism in the modern world.

@ruben2020 don't we? (or if that's what you're saying, then: yeah!)

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

I don't know Yeshe (:
But I think you don't exist as an identity, if you are always changing as a ''person'' and in body then you don't exist or you wouldn't change. What you really are is beneath what you believe and think. And because you aren't an identity that doesn't accompany you. Only your karma which is your pure essence I think.
Is like you are a buddha but as you may not still see it you just go trough life as actions direct you trough. And Karma.

From Snp 4.14 (translated by Ven. Thanissaro):

"I ask the kinsman of the Sun, the great seer, about seclusion & the
state of peace. Seeing in what way is a monk unbound, clinging to
nothing in the world?".
"He should put an entire stop to the root of
objectification-classifications:  'I am the thinker.'

From the translator's commentary:

On objectification-classifications and their role in leading to
conflict, see Sn 4.11 and the introduction to MN 18. The perception,
"I am the thinker" lies at the root of these classifications in that
it reads into the immediate present a set of distinctions — I/not-I;
being/not-being; thinker/thought; identity/non-identity — that then
can proliferate into mental and physical conflict. The conceit
inherent in this perception thus forms a fetter on the mind. To become
unbound, one must learn to examine these distinctions — which we all
take for granted — to see that they are simply assumptions that are
not inherent in experience, and that we would be better off to be able
to drop them.

Do you believe this is the Buddha explicitly equating the mental idea of the self with what is reborn when he talked about the rebirth of persons? Do you believe this is the Buddha implicitly equating the mental idea of the self with what is reborn when he talked about the rebirth of persons?

Is 'I am the thinker' what is reborn or is it the monk that is reborn due to not putting a stop to 'I am the thinker'
or do you believe these are equivalent ways of saying the same thing?


text:
Semi-consistent Long Sessions Versus Regular Short Sessions
I've noticed it's really difficult for me to be consistent, even with short meditation. I'm thus hesitating between:

10 min sessions every day
40 min sessions every 2 or 3 days

Which of these seems more beneficial?

Tried doing at least 10 and more on days when you feel like it?

Long sits everyday is the most optimal.  As I've written you time and time again, you have to do the work.  There are no shortcuts.  There is only the hard way.  Stop looking for excuses.

Based on my personal experience, and also on some of the research on habits, short but consistent sessions might be better to help ease you into longer sessions. If your brain gradually transfers the act of starting your meditation from the willpower-related regions to the habit-related regions, and you start observing the benefits and pleasure derived from short sits done consistently over time, my hope is you'll find less and less resistance to longer sessions.
In my experience, I've obtained the best results if I sit at approximately the same time, in the same place in my routine during the day (e.g. right after waking up and hearing a short Dhamma talk, or at the end of my work day, to help me process the events of the day).
I hope this is helpful. Metta.


text:
Is this the same nun in these sutta references?
From sutta SA 2.218:

The renunciant Gotama is staying at Sāvatthī at the Jeta Grove in the
Anāthapiṇḍika Park. And there is the nun Selā who took her robes and
her begging bowl and entered Sāvatthī to beg for food. Having finished
her meal, she cleaned her bowl, gathered her seat and has gone to the
Andhavana forest. I shall disturb her!” Having thought this he changed
into a young man, approached her and spoke a verse:
“Who is it that created beings,
by whom were they made?
Why are they called beings,
from where do they arise?”

That time the nun Selā, having heard the verse thought: “Who is this?
What a cheat! Is he a human or a non-human being?” She entered
concentration and recognized he was King Māra. She answered with a
verse:
“Māra, you have a wrong view of ‘beings’,
saying and believing they actually exist as substantial entities.
Conventional, empty they are but compounded entities
there are in fact no ‘beings.’
Like when causes and various conditions
converge and yield the use of a ‘chariot’.

From sutta SN 5.10:

Then Māra the Wicked, wanting to make the nun Vajirā feel fear,
terror, and goosebumps, wanting to make her fall away from immersion,
went up to her and addressed her in verse:
“Who created this sentient being?
Where is its maker?
Where has the being arisen?
And where does it cease?”

Then the nun Vajirā thought, “Who’s speaking this verse, a human or a
non-human?”
Then she thought, “This is Māra the Wicked, wanting to make me feel
fear, terror, and goosebumps, wanting to make me fall away from
immersion!”
Then Vajirā, knowing that this was Māra the Wicked, replied to him in
verse:
“Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?
Māra, is this your theory?
This is just a pile of conditions,
you won’t find a sentient being here.

When the parts are assembled
we use the word ‘chariot’.
So too, when the aggregates are present
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.

And from Mil 3.1.1:

Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of “chariot.”
And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned
me about— The thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and
the five constituent elements of being—that I come under the generally
understood term, the designation in common use, of “Nāgasena.” For it
was said, Sire, by our Sister Vajirā in the presence of the Blessed
One:
“Just as it is by the condition precedent
Of the co-existence of its various parts
That the word ‘chariot’ is used,
Just so is it that when the Skandhas
Are there we talk of a ‘being.’”

Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put
to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha
himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done,
Nāgasena!

Are these verses about the same nun? Is there anything more known about her?

They seem to be two different persons.
Info on Vajira Theri:

Vajirā Therī. The Samyutta Nikāya (S.i.134f) relates that one day, when she was taking her siesta in Adhavana at Sāvatthi, Mārā
questioned her as to the origin of “being" (satta), its creator, its
origin, its destiny. Vajirā answers that there is no such thing as
“being," apart from certain conditioned factors, like a chariot, which
exists only because of its parts. Māra retires discomfited.
Vajirā's verses are often quoted (E.g Kvu. 240, 626; Mil. p.28;
Vsm.ii.593) both in the Canon and in later works, but they are not
included in the Therīgāthā, nor do we know anything else about her.

Info on Sela Theri:

Selā Therī. She was born in Alavi as daughter of the king: therefore
she was also called Alavikā. When she was still unmarried the Buddha
visited Alavī with Alavaka, whom he had converted, carrying his
begging bowl and robe. On that occasion Sela went with her father to
hear the Buddha preach. She became a lay disciple, but later, agitated
in mind, she joined the Order and became an arahant. After that she
lived in Sāvatthi. One day, as she was enjoying her siesta in the
Andhavana under a tree, Māra, in the guise of a stranger, approached
her and tried to tempt her. But she refuted his statements regarding
the attractions of lay life, and Māra had to retire discomfited
(S.i.134; Thig.vss.57-9).
In the time of Padumuttara Buddha Selā was born in the family of a
clansman of Hamsavatī and was given in marriage. After her husband's
death she devoted herself to the quest of good, and went from ārāma to
ārāma and vihāra to vihāra, teaching the Dhamma to followers of the
religion. One day she came to the Bodhi tree of the Buddha and sat
down there thinking, "If a Buddha be peerless among men, may this tree
show the miracle of Enlightenment." Immediately the tree blazed forth,
the branches appeared golden, and the sky was all shining. Inspired by
the sight, she fell down and worshipped the tree, and sat there for
seven days. On the seventh day she performed a great feast of offering
and worship to the Buddha (ThigA.61f). Her Apadāna verses, quoted in
the Therīgāthā Commentary, are, in the Apadāna itself, attributed to a
Therī called Pañcadīpikā, and are twice repeated in these verses
(Ap.ii.519, repeated at 527f), however, she is mentioned as having
attained arahantship at the age of seven, and there is no reference to
her life as daughter of the king of Alavī.

Scriptures contain many repeated teachings and also repeated persons in contradictory contexts. It is likely many suttas are mere compositions rather than real events.
The above said, Selā is found in SN 5.9, which is the prior sutta to SN 5.10 with Vajirā.
In summary, the Agama appear to have mixed up these two suttas.
The Pali SN 5.9 with Sela becomes the Agama SA 2.219  with Vīrā.
The Pali SN 5.10 with Vajirā becomes the Agama SA 2.218 with Sela.


text:
A summary explaining those ancient Indian philosophies of those non-Buddhist schools that had debated with Buddhist, especially Nalanda, masters?
Can anyone share or tell: where can I find a summary explaining those ancient Indian philosophies of those non-Buddhist schools that had debated with Buddhist, especially Nalanda, masters? For example, those philosophies of those opponents in Indian Buddhism Śāstras (i.e. treaties).
I ask because I am studying some texts on and also pondering on the tenets system/theory of Indian Buddhism, and I would like to be rigorous in understanding what non-Buddhist philosophies are refuted grounding in reasoning by Indian Buddhism (Nalanda) masters.

You might be looking for a scholarly paper which lists the non-Buddhist schools and their philosophies (for which I don't have an answer).
The sutta which comes to mind as likely relevant to your question is Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1) -- which I think lists sixty or so wrong or non-Buddhist views.
Piya Tan as a more detailed (highly referenced) translation and commentary of this sutta (and of many other suttas too). The URLs on his site aren't quite stable but they're currently:

Brahma,jāla Sutta -- The Discourse on the Perfect Net -- D 1
A Commentarial Guide to the Brahma,jāla Sutta

I am not aware of any sources claiming actual debates taking place at Nalanda with non-Buddhists, but I do believe the curriculum was such that debates took place with students trying to accurately and faithfully take the place of non-Buddhist Indian schools of thought, in order to show that Buddhist systems were superior and would overcome them.

"Besides Theology and Philosophy, frequent debates and discussions necessitated competence in Logic. A student at the Mahavihara had to be well-versed in the systems of
Logic associated with all the different schools of thought of the time
as he was expected to defend Buddhist systems against the others."

I think this was achieved through internal debates where students of Nalanda would try to faithfully represent the other schools of thought.
Perhaps the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha would also be of help for a non-Buddhist compendium of various extent philosophical schools of India in the author's extent period.

DN 2 has descriptions of various shramanic teachings at the time of the Buddha including by the following teachers: Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sanjaya Belatthiputta and Mahavira (Jainism). Also MN 101 further compares Jainism and Buddhism.
These suttas contrast the Buddha's teachings with these other teachings.
A good comparison between Hindu Vedanta and Buddhism can be found in Vedanta and Buddhism: A Comparative Study by Helmuth von Glasenapp.
Please also see "Have any Buddhist thinkers responded to the critique of the Brahma Sutras?".


text:
How did ancient Indian Buddhists describe causation vs correlation? Why were they concerned with this?
An important compendium of the ancient Indian philosophical schools - called Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha - was written in India in 14th century CE by Madhvacharya (a non-Buddhist Indian Philosopher) who gives an intriguing account of the debate between ancient Indian materialists (the Charvaka) and the extent Buddhist schools of thought in India at that time. He describes the Charvaka thus:

Chárváka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the
doctrine of Bṛihaspati. The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be
eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
refrain—
While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and
enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for
that school is Lokáyata,—a name well accordant with the thing
signified.

This characterization would appear quite in accordance with descriptions in sutta of the Charvaka school and its tenets:

"When this was said, Ajita Kesakambalin said to me, 'Great king, there
is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no
fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no
next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no
brahmans or contemplatives who, faring rightly and practicing rightly,
proclaim this world and the next after having directly known and
realized it for themselves. A person is a composite of four primary
elements. At death, the earth (in the body) returns to and merges with
the (external) earth-substance. The fire returns to and merges with
the external fire-substance. The liquid returns to and merges with the
external liquid-substance. The wind returns to and merges with the
external wind-substance. The sense-faculties scatter into space. Four
men, with the bier as the fifth, carry the corpse. Its eulogies are
sounded only as far as the charnel ground. The bones turn
pigeon-colored. The offerings end in ashes. Generosity is taught by
idiots. The words of those who speak of existence after death are
false, empty chatter. With the break-up of the body, the wise and the
foolish alike are annihilated, destroyed. They do not exist after
death.'

This compendium describes the Buddhist response to the Charvaka school as a direct attack on their understanding of causation vs correlation. Succinctly put, it would appear the Charvaka did not believe in causation, but rather only believed in correlation:

"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"
All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.
...
Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.
The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
drugs, &c.
From this it follows that fate, &c., do not exist, since these can
only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become
destitute of any cause.
But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
Thus it has been said—
The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.

The author of the work then gives the known Buddhist reply at the time in ancient India. This can be succinctly summarized as denial of causation leads to practical absurdities. NOTE: invariable concomitance is a term of art in ancient Indian debate that is described here.

At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid
down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
accordingly been said—
"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a
determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the
mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through
the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases."

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and
non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that
determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of
the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that
uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
terminates where there is a practical absurdity."

Which seems in accordance with the ancient Indian Nagarjuna's opening verse of his famous treatise:

Based on this my questions are:

Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Charvaka views and tenets at the time?
Does the non-Buddhist author of this work accurately describe Buddhist replies at the time?
Why was it deemed important to the ancient Indian schools (Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike) this debate over causation vs correlation?
If you accept the Buddhist view in this debate as superior, then how does it undermine the views and tenets of the Charvaka?
Is it true that the Charvaka school was the most popular in ancient India at the time this compendium was written?
What do we know of how prevalent was the Charvaka school in the time of the Buddha?
If the Charvaka school was very prevalent in the time of the Buddha and granting the supposition that some hold - that the Buddha only taught rebirth as a fictional contrivance to appeal to the people of his time and age - then why did the Buddha also teach rebirth to the people who steadfastly rejected it? (please only answer this if you actually believe this supposition as that's all I'm interested in...)

This is out of scope for Buddhism SE. This is more like a history question. The Buddhist texts describe Charvaka as being materialist. Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha describes Charvaka as being both materialist and hedonist, but some scholars (especially Bhattacharya) say there's insufficient evidence to claim that Charvaka was hedonist.

The explanation of the Buddhist position given in the Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha doesn't match what's in the Pali Canon, but rather appears to expand on it. So, I guess this may describe the position of Indian Buddhist scholars who lived long after the Buddha's time.

I will skip #3 and #4.

From my understanding, Charvaka was not the most popular school at the time. Brahmanism (the Vedic religion) was the most popular orthodox religious view of the era. Charvaka was a minority heterodox school.

We don't know.

And lastly question 7 will be answered below.
First mark of existence
Sabbe sankhara anicca - All conditioned things/phenomena are impermanent.
Apart from Nibbana, everything else is conditioned. Something conditioned depends on something else, is influenced by something else, and is caused by something else. And all such things are impermanent, changing, unreliable, unstable.
So, from this, you can see that causation is quite important.
Everything that exists and happens is caused by something else. Events that happen to us and our existence, may not all be caused by karma, but they are definitely caused by something, be it weather, the actions of others, bile, etc. according to the Sivaka Sutta.
Conditioned phenomena are essentially chains of dependent processes.
Second mark of existence
Sabbe sankhara dukkha - All conditioned things/phenomena are suffering.
Now, the term "conditioned things" is focused on mind-body phenomena. Wherever there's mind-body phenomena occurring, craving arises, and that's the cause of suffering (second noble truth).
Also, take note that it is suffering that is occurring due to craving. It's not your suffering or my suffering. It's not your craving or my craving. It's just suffering caused by craving.
Third mark of existence
Sabbe dhamma anatta - All things/phenomena are not self.
"All things" include Nibbana.
This is the teaching that truly differentiates what the Buddha taught from what everybody else taught, including Charvaka.
The view of Charvaka is that there is a self. It's associated with the physical body. When the physical body is destroyed, the self would be destroyed too.
The Buddhist view is that the self and being are just emergent phenomena. A being is a term applied conventionally when the five aggregates occur together and when there is the clinging of the mind to the idea of "I am".
The self is just the mental idea of "I am". The self idea arises from moment to moment, from the mind-body phenomena, depending on conditions. It's always changing, just as the five aggregates are always changing.
If you step into a flowing river then step out then later step in again, would you be stepping into the same river twice? It may appear so, but in reality, the molecules, flow speed, temperature, pressure etc. of the river would have changed. So, it's not the exact same river.
Similarly, the mental idea of the self keeps changing throughout one's life, and even throughout a single day. Also consciousness, the mind, the body, is also changing. The mind changes more rapidly than the body.
Thinking that there is a concrete self, a specific individual identity, a core entity, that is born, lives, grows old, dies, and then is reborn or perhaps not reborn, are all self-views. The Charvaka view is called annihilationism because they believed that there was a self (associated with the physical body) and then it will become destroyed (along with the physical body).
According to the Vina Sutta, when you break down the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, consciousness and mental formations down to their constituent parts, you cannot find the self anywhere. This is explained using the analogy of the lute. When you break the lute down to its constituent parts, you cannot find music anywhere.
So, all phenomena is not self. All phenomena is empty of a self (Sunna Sutta).
Karma
The Charvaka view is that if you will become destroyed at death, why bother with good behavior and charity? This is typical of a self-view. If suffering will end at death, why bother trying to end suffering? Just endure it till it's gone.
The Buddhist view is that firstly there's causation, as described above. Karma is one of the causes of suffering but is not the only cause, according to Sivaka Sutta.
The Buddhist goal is to end suffering, not in the future, but in the here-and-now. If we talk about ending suffering in the future, then that future is described relative to the self. That's a self-view.
Here's an example of self-view related to the future. A person thinks he will probably live for another 50 years hopefully, if he has good health. And he thinks, "perhaps it's good if I can attain Nibbana within my natural life, before death comes, otherwise I may be reborn somewhere else and not fortunate enough to encounter the Dhamma in another life". That's self-view.
Ending of suffering in Buddhism is through the purification of the mind.
Hereafter and Rebirth
Charvaka says there's no rebirth and no hereafter. Everything ends at death. What ends? The self ends. This is a self-view. That there was a self, and it got destroyed at death with no continuity.
What does Buddhism say?
According to Buddhism, there is causation. Every event and every object is caused by something else. It is influenced by something else. It depends on something else.
According to Buddhism, there is continuity. Everywhere the mind-body phenomena occurs, you have individuality or the mental idea of the self reappearing, and with that, suffering also reappears. Individuality is (re)born. The self idea is (re)born. Suffering is (re)born.
But this causation, continuity, individuality, suffering, craving etc. are all not self. They represent chains of dependent processes.
And what is "not self"? It means there is no core entity, no concrete self, no specific individual identity that is born, lives, dies and is reborn or not reborn. That's just a temporary emergent phenomena that arises from the mind and body.
Also please see MN 38 (story of monk Sati), SN 22.85 (what happens to the Tathagata after death?), SN 12.20 (have I existed in the past? will I exist in future?), SN 12.17 (is suffering self-made or others-made, or both or neither?).
Fictional contrivance? Or skillful means?
The teaching given to people that they would be reborn depending on their karma, is skillful means (upaya) on the part of the Buddha, given in AN 5.57. In fact, there are multiple self-views given in that sutta like "I will grow old" etc. As explained in AN 5.57, the Buddha taught these reflections for a reason.
From AN 5.57:

“And for the sake of what benefit should a woman or a man, a
householder or one gone forth, often reflect thus: ‘I am the owner of
my kamma, the heir of my kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my
relative, kamma as my resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma,
good or bad, that I do’? People engage in misconduct by body, speech,
and mind. But when one often reflects upon this theme, such misconduct
is either completely abandoned or diminished. It is for the sake of
this benefit that a woman or a man, a householder or one gone forth,
should often reflect thus: ‘I am the owner of my kamma, the heir of my
kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my relative, kamma as my
resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma, good or bad, that I do.’

If people who have self-view reflect that their actions will result in their future condition, then misconduct will be completely abandoned or diminished.
This is not a fictional contrivance. It's skillful means (upaya). Perhaps you can call it a "mind trick".
Remember that everything conditioned are chains of dependent processes? The Buddha used this reflection to change the conduct of people with self-view in order to reduce suffering and lead towards the complete elimination of suffering.
Skillful means occurs elsewhere too like in AN 7.52. Giving in charity with expectation of future good results in return is the lesser purpose, while adorning the mind or purifying the mind is the highest purpose. For someone with self-view, charity with the lesser purpose is better than no charity at all, and is a step in the right direction.

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

Questions 1 thru 6 would take an historical scholar to answer. However, I want to contribute to an answer to both questions 6 and 7. First question 6, in my experience and understanding, cause and effect are important to understand because it leads one to the understanding of the four noble truths, and specifically, to the understanding of dukkha. I'm not trying to be cryptic here, only that to fully explain this would take a very long explanation. Now question 7, the Buddha taught rebirth because that is true whereas reincarnation is not true. There is nothing that continues into another incarnation. Rebirth is the re-entry by the deathless (that's what the Buddha called it in his first teaching of the five ascetics) into another living experience. So it's a fresh start, not a reincarnation. The karma brought into the new experience is simply the accompanying ignorance. As one awakens, karma vanishes, in exact accordance to the self-awareness (which, of course, is not a "self").

"Rebirth is the re-entry by the deathless (that's what the Buddha called it in his first teaching of the five ascetics) into another living experience." This sounds like "the deathless" is what continues and thus this sentence appears contradictory to, "There is nothing that continues..."

It's the difference between rebirth and reincarnation.

Correction: I meant #3 not #6 above.


text:
About svasaṃvedana (reflexive awareness) and having bodhicitta

What is your view regarding svasaṃvedana? Do you accept or deny (the
existence of) svasaṃvedana?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svasaṃvedana
https://encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Svasaṃvedana

Can a Buddhist know whether or not he/she have really genuine and
firm bodhicitta by him-/her- self? If yes, then how? (Does this
question have to do with svasaṃvedana?)

I hold the Prasangika Madhyamaka as the highest and definitive of the Buddhist tenet systems. The prasangika refute the notion of inherently existing reflexive self-awareness. Here you can see Chandrakirti refuting the notion of Svasaṃvedana or rangrig of the Cittamatran school:

The above is taken from a commentary on Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche. Rinpoche is a highly accomplished master of the Rime movement and has studied under all major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. It should also be noted that he is quite sympathetic to the Cittamatran school:

I won't highlight the actual rebuttal arguments that Chandrakirti invokes as you can click on the link above and read them and draw your own conclusions whether they are strong arguments or not. However, this is the conclusion that Chandrakirti draws:

As for your second question... Yes, it is possible to be aware of your own genuine realization of Bodhicitta. However, most ordinary people fool themselves into believing overinflated self-conceptions of their own achievements. Regardless, this self-awareness - whether mistaken or unmistaken - is only conventionally true and does not have one iota of true existence. That's because nothing whatsoever has one iota of true existence.

PS: If you would like to verify with another commentary on the Madhyamakavatara you can look at Ju Mipham's commentary here. If you do you'll find that it is in complete accord with the above.


text:
Did Nagarjuna want to become a Buddha?
Did Nagarjuna aspire to Buddhahood in a way that he wouldn't be a 'ariyasavaka' type of disciple who attains awakening to the truth during a Buddha's sasana?

Does this answer your question? Does Mahayana Buddhism discourage attaining enlightenment under the Gautama Buddha Sasana?

I guess it does but as i understand your answers, the answer is yes, Nagarjuna too would advocate foregoing the awakening to the truth in that very life under Buddha Gotama and supposedly did not attain to any Ariya stage but instead aspired to become a Buddha in some future existence. He was neither a faith-follower, nor a dhamma-follower and certainly not Sotapanna or higher.

No, my answer is the exact opposite. Nagarjuna - like all Bodhisattva's in the Mahayana path - make a vow to reach full and complete enlightenment as fast as they possibly can. That means if a Buddha was alive right now on this earth and they could possibly reach full and complete enlightenment in the next millisecond, they would do so without question forthwith.

I was confused.  By enlightenment above what do you mean exactly? Canki Sutta says, 1st there is a learning, pondering & coming to agreement, then exertion and an awakening to the truth before a final attainment of the truth by development of the same qualities. Vinnana Sutta & Cakka Sutta say, a person who has faith in anatta or a modicum understanding is ensured sotapatti latest at moment of death. Why would one take a Bodhisatta vow if one is a ariyasavaka, ariyasavaka do not become Buddha as they are disciples. I like some of the things you write therefore i became curious about this.

I always write mahayana off because these kind of things but you seem to think Nagarjuna was basically a Vibbhajavadin of Mahayana and aligned with the pali texts?

I am also curious if the way you use the word Bodhisatta is a bit different than i use it. I hold that a Bodhisatta is one who actually becomes a Buddha or a Private Buddha without a teacher expounding the DO and it's implications in that life.

Cakkhu Sutta* not Cakka. Vibbhajavadin of Mahayana would be one who analyzes A contemporary tradition,  generally approving of canon but also rejecting a lot of later developments like comy

I also hold that a person becomes a Bodhisatta by making the determination to forego discipleship in order to develop the perfections required to sustain Buddhahood. His determination is then known to the Buddha that had at that time opened the door to Deathless, he somehow also makes a determination in approval or whatnot and it being determined by a Buddha it becomes inevitable. As i understand it the Bodhisatta adheres to the doctrine of self until the very last birth & due development.

I think each sasana produces one Bodhisatta and there is only 1 Buddha in the world at a time; sometimes there is also a Bodhisatta; when there is no Buddha then there is always a Bodhisatta.

If my answer causes confusion perhaps open a new question to address it? The Mahayana definitely teaches that there can be more than one Bodhisattva in the world at a time and in fact each Bodhisattva in the world makes a vow to reach enlightenment as fast as possible.

Yes, for sure Nagarjuna saw zero contradiction between what he wrote and believed and the Pali canon. There is a lot of misunderstanding of Mahayana in the world.

By what law or principal do you believe there can be only one Bodhisattva in the world at a time? And what do you mean by world... a single planet? A single solar system? A single galaxy? A single universe? What would preclude two beings from being in the same world at the same time holding the Bodhisattva vow? How do you think Bodhisattva's arise?

Can you answer if you think a Mahayanin Bodhisatta can also be 'a faith-follower', 'dhamma-follower', 'one attained to view', 'a bodily witness', 'one liberated by wisdom', 'one liberated by faith' or 'one liberated in both ways' under Gotama's Dispensation? It would be sufficient to clarify the above answer for me.

Can you provide sutta(s) or reference(s) which would give def. of the above terms for what you have in mind?

I don't mind moving further discussion into chat, happy to discuss & clarify this.

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

In brief, the Mahayana has a specific Bodhisattva vow not to wait:

To abandon: Believing and saying that followers of the Mahayana should
remain in cyclic existence and not try to attain liberation from
afflictions.

Those authoritative texts in the Mahayana which seem to contradict this are only for purposes of training the mind. This is not a subject of controversy in the Mahayana as every tradition acknowledges the above.
Again, with emphasis so this is absolutely clear: All Bodhisattva's in the Mahayana path make a vow to reach full and complete enlightenment as fast as they possibly can. That means if a Buddha was alive right now on this earth and they could possibly reach full and complete enlightenment in the next millisecond, they would do so without question forthwith.
See here for the long answer.