text:
Does any real existent or genuine person end with parinibbana?
Does modern Theravada accept that no real person ends with the break up of the body of a realized one? That the moment after the break up of the body of a realized one is the same as the moment before?
In SN 22.85 With Yamaka (sujato) and alternative translation Sariputta seems to rebut the notion that any substantial change happens during the break up of the body of a realized one:

Now at that time a mendicant called Yamaka had the following harmful
  misconception: “As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who
  has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body
  breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.”
Several mendicants heard about this. They went to Yamaka and exchanged
  greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were
  over, they sat down to one side and said to him:
“Is it really true, Reverend Yamaka, that you have such a harmful
  misconception: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a mendicant who
  has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed when their body
  breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’” “Yes, reverends, that’s
  how I understand the Buddha’s teaching.”
“Don’t say that, Yamaka! Don’t misrepresent the Buddha, for
  misrepresentation of the Buddha is not good. And the Buddha would not
  say that.” But even though admonished by those mendicants, Yamaka
  obstinately held on to that misconception and insisted on stating it.

After talking with Sariputta it seems Yamaka has a change of heart after this question by Sariputta:

“What do you think, Yamaka? Do you regard the Realized One as one who
  is without form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness?”
  “No, reverend.” “In that case, Reverend Yamaka, since you don’t
  acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life, is
  it appropriate to declare: ‘As I understand the Buddha’s teaching, a
  mendicant who has ended the defilements is annihilated and destroyed
  when their body breaks up, and doesn’t exist after death.’?”

Here is the same portion in Venerable Bodhi's translation:

“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real
  and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare:
  ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose
  taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of
  the body and does not exist after death’?”

So does this mean the break up of the body is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment no person truly ends or changes because a real person doesn't truly exist in the first place?
EDIT:
I'm aware that orthodox Theravada tenet systems posit the selflessness of persons, but are either agnostic or outright reject the selflessness of phenomena. However, most pali canon suttas seem to stop at the coarse level of selflessness, but here Sariputta seems to be speaking about the subtler levels of the selflessness of persons if only in embryonic form. Is this true?
Also, if the body of a person is regarded as a real substantial thing in Theravada how about the consciousness of a person? Is that regarded as a real substantial thing?

In Theravada, all phenomena is empty of a self, including a chair, a tree, Nibbana and empty space. But it doesn't mean that they are not real. Apart from Nibbana, everything else is not constant and not permanent.

I believe you mean that Theravada posits all phenomena is empty of a self of persons. ie., the body of a person is empty of a self of persons. the consciousness of a person is empty of a self of persons. Obviously, a chair is empty of a self of persons too. However, to my understanding Theravada does not posit that a chair is empty of a self of chair. Selflessness of phenomena means chair is empty of a self of chair and this is not found in Theravada, but only in Mahayana tenet systems AFAIK. At least this is what is taught in Mahayana monastic universities.

What is "self of chair"? If a chair had a "self of chair", would it have a mind of its own?

An intrinsic nature, essence or characteristic that is unique to some phenomena that can be described as that phenomena's self. The self of chair would be that intrinsic nature, essence or unique characteristic or set of characteristics that imbue chairness on a chair. Western philosophers might describe it as a platonic ideal.

Based on this discussion, I started a new question.

Haha, great minds think alike. Right before I saw this I posted: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena

@ruben2020 are you self-identified Theravada?

Let's say I generally lean more towards the Theravada perspective, but I'm not a hardcore defender of it.

... now Platonic Buddhism....

I think you (the OP) have mistakenly assumed that the Pali Yamaka Sutta supports the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness that nothing is substantially real.
Actually, the Yamaka Sutta quote of the Bodhi translation indeed confirms emptiness, but it's the Theravada emptiness and not the Mahayana emptiness. And what is the Theravada emptiness? It's that all phenomena is empty of a self (see Suñña Sutta). Before parinibbana, there was no self (as in an eternal self or soul at the core of the Buddha's being) that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana.
However, the Pali suttas do not explicitly support the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness. The  Buddha's body was considered to be real but not constant or permanent. It is subject to change, arising and ceasing. But that does not mean that it's not real in Theravada.
To prove this, I'll quote Itivuttaka 44:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have
  heard: "Monks, there are these two forms of the Unbinding property.
  Which two? The Unbinding property with fuel remaining, & the Unbinding
  property with no fuel remaining.
And what is the Unbinding property with fuel remaining? There is the
  case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended, who
  has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden,
  attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released
  through right gnosis. His five sense faculties still remain and, owing
  to their being intact, he is cognizant of the agreeable & the
  disagreeable, and is sensitive to pleasure & pain. His ending of
  passion, aversion, & delusion is termed the Unbinding property with
  fuel remaining. (Note1)
And what is the Unbinding property with no fuel remaining? There is
  the case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended,
  who has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden,
  attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released
  through right gnosis. For him, all that is sensed, being unrelished,
  will grow cold right here. This is termed the Unbinding property with
  no fuel remaining." (Note2)
Note1 and Note2 by Thanissaro Bhikkhu:
  With fuel remaining
  (sa-upadisesa) and with no fuel remaining (anupadisesa): The analogy
  here is to a fire. In the first case, the flames are out, but the
  embers are still glowing. In the second, the fire is so thoroughly out
  that the embers have grown cold. The "fuel" here is the five
  aggregates. While the arahant is still alive,
  he/she still experiences the five aggregates, but they do not burn
  with the fires of passion, aversion, or delusion. When the arahant
  passes away, there is no longer any experience of aggregates here or
  anywhere else.

Next, to answer the question:

OP: So does this mean death is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment nothing truly ends or changes because it
  doesn't truly exist in the first place?

Before and after the Buddha's final passing, all phenomena is empty of a self. The Buddha's five aggregates existed and was subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana existed and does not change, arise or pass away. But the self (in the sense of an eternal self or soul at the core of our being) never existed at any time, in all phenomena, including the five aggregates and Nibbana. This is the interpretation according to Theravada.
Your interpretation appears to be different and based upon the concept of Mahayana emptiness.

Very good answer Ruben, where Mahayana vs Theravada emptiness are distinguished. This is also the essence of my answer.

@ruben2020, see edit. I'm aware of the differences between orthodox Theravada tenet systems and those found in Mahayana schools. That's why this question is posed to Theravada accounts. BTW, I think you should edit your answer to say, "And what is the Theravada emptiness? It's that all phenomena is empty of a self of persons (see Suñña Sutta)." To be clear, Theravada does not posit the selflessness of phenomena only the selflessness of persons in all phenomena. Right?

No. In Theravada, all phenomena is empty of a self, including a chair, a tree, Nibbana and empty space. But it doesn't mean that they are not real. Apart from Nibbana, everything else is not constant and not permanent.

hmm, we disagree. will be interesting to hear what other self-identified Theravada proponents say.

@YesheTenley I agree with Ruben2020. Is it possible that people following Mahayana have a wrong understanding of what people who follow Theravada think of emptiness? Not to start a chat though, I think that's not allowed.

Hi @Medhini, the question: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/28708/does-theravada-posit-the-selflessness-of-phenomena was asked to determine that. After the answers and corresponding questions, I think what is taught in Mahayana Buddhist monasteries about Theravada is correct.

With respect, the Theravada generally has a much more coarse understanding of emptiness and anatta and is confused as to the object of negation. In much the way that placing a bag of ice on a gushing head wound has some efficacy, yet is utterly incapable of actually curing the wound the Theravada understanding anatta doctrine is very helpful, but insufficient to provide a genuine antidote to ignorance and hence suffering.

The Theravada adherents here have taken more or less the same view that all these questions about how things exist and whether phenomena are real or have self is part of the thicket of views that Buddha famously warned against. That at best the questions are irrelevant in stopping “I” and “mine” making. The Mahayana tenet systems very strenuously disagree and believe Theravada adherents are not ready to understand, but will understand the selflessness of phenomena eventually as they continue to progress on the path.

@YesheTenley Do you accept that the path laid out in Theravada is sufficient to guide one to Arahantship (but possibly not Buddhahood)?  If yes, then this is in fact the objective of Theravada - to guide the practitioner to Arahantship.

I think what you are after with your question is, "Do you accept that refuting a self of persons as permanent, unitary, and independent and regarding the question the selflessness of phenomena as immaterial to the spiritual aim is sufficient to guide one to Arahantship?" And my answer is no, I do not accept that and think it insufficient. This is true of the Mahayana tenet systems in general. We do not think that refutes enough and cannot possible uproot the root of ignorance for a person to attain arahantship. This is a disagreement between these two schools and I say it with respect.

If you are asking whether I think the Pali Suttas contain the teaching that goes beyond refuting that persons are permanent, unitary and independent and goes beyond refuting the self of persons into refuting the self of phenomena, then yes, I think it does albeit in condensed form compared to the Mahayana sutras. But that is not how at least some Theravada adherents on this site see it :)

@YesheTenley OK. I just posted this question to ask for details on the Mahayana view. You could answer there.

Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.

I think SN 22.86 is very similar but simpler.
I read it as saying:

It is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates
It's inappropriate to say that a Tathagata exists after death, doesn't exist, neither, or both -- IMO that makes it one of The unanswered questions -- instead pay attention to what the doctrine does say (e.g. that it is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates)

See also for example MN 22:

And how is a mendicant a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached? It’s when a mendicant has given up the conceit ‘I am’, cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, exterminated it, so it’s unable to arise in the future. That’s how a mendicant is a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached.
When a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and Pajāpati, search as they may, will not find anything that such a Realized One’s consciousness depends on. Why is that? Because even in the present life the Realized One is undiscoverable, I say. Though I speak and explain like this, certain ascetics and brahmins misrepresent me with the false, baseless, lying, untruthful claim: ‘The ascetic Gotama is an eradicator. He advocates the annihilation, eradication, and extermination of an existing being.’ I have been falsely misrepresented as being what I am not, and saying what I do not say. In the past, as today, what I describe is suffering and the cessation of suffering. This being so, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble the Realized One, he doesn’t get resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated.
Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate him, he doesn’t get thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. He just thinks: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’ So, mendicants, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble you, don’t make yourselves resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated. Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate you, don’t make yourselves thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. Just think: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’
So, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. What do you think, mendicants? Suppose a person was to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and leaves in this Jeta’s Grove, or burn them, or do what they want with them. Would you think: ‘This person is carrying us off, burning us, or doing what they want with us?’” “No, sir. Why is that? Because that’s neither self nor belonging to self.” “In the same way, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness.

I think there's more doctrine about "the support of consciousness" in SN 12.64:

Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?” “On the western wall, sir.” “If there was no western wall, where would it land?” “On the ground, sir.” “If there was no ground, where would it land?” “In water, sir.” “If there was no water, where would it land?” “It wouldn’t land, sir.” “In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …

See also for example Why is the Buddha described as trackless?

I'm not sure of ruben2020's answer, saying, "Before parinibbana, there was no self called Buddha that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana".
I think it's true to say "there was no self that has suddenly ceased to exist".
I'm not sure whether it's true (whether it's Theravada orthodoxy) to say "there was no self called Buddha" -- see How is it wrong to believe that a self exists, or that it doesn't? -- there is doctrine in the suttas including "it's inappropriate to associate the self with the aggregates", and "'I am' is a conceit" and "'am I?' is a result of attending inappropriately" -- but see also e.g. "Buddha never denies the existence of the self" (and that answer's being upvoted and disputed in comments) -- and there's an Abhidhamma answer which I think says it depends on context and convention.

Given @ruben2020's seemingly clear understanding of Middle Way, I think he's saying that, "Before parinibbana, there was no real self called Buddha that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana"

I'm not sure what you mean by "real", "genuine", "substantial", "true", or "subtle", or even "Middle Way". I guess that when you say "no real self that ceases" you mean "any fictional self that ceases is a product of our own imaginations and attachments".

I'm think I'm using the words, "real" and "genuine" in much the same way as Sariputta uses them here and as the Buddha used "substantial" in SN 22.95. As for "true" I'm using that as synonymous with inherent existence. And "subtle" as opposed to coarse. "Middle Way" is used analagous to @ruben2020's explanation here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/28651/13375 which is excellent

The suttas say (I paraphrase) that it's inappropriate to view the aggregates as self -- but I'm not certain everyone agrees that "there is no self", because I think I've seen some people say that "there is no self" may be a step too far. And, regarding the Tathagata, I don't remember anyone saying that "the Tathagata doesn't exist", but only that "the Tathagata is trackless", for example -- questions about "the self of the Buddha" maybe just don't come up, or are avoided as "unanswered" or "that's the wrong question".

Does any real existent or genuine thing end with parinibbana?
Yes. Suffering. Suffering ends with parinibbana. Suffering is real and genuine.
Buddha says now and in the past he had only taught suffering , its origination and its cessation. There are some undeclared or unanswered questions because they do not lead to cessation of suffering but that doesn't mean that they can not be answered. It is just that those questions are not conducive to the cessation of suffering.
In SN 22.85 (the same sutta you quoted ) it is clear that it is the suffering which ends after nibbana:

“Reverend Yamaka, suppose they were to ask you: ‘When their body
  breaks up, after death, what happens to a perfected one, who has ended
  the defilements?’ How would you answer?” “Sir, if they were to ask
  this, I’d answer like this: ‘Reverend, form is impermanent. What’s
  impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended.
  Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness is impermanent. What’s
  impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended.’
  That’s how I’d answer such a question.”

Would you also agree that the body is real and genuine and that it ends at the break up of the body?

@YesheTenley  Body is not absolutely unreal. If you believe in the body as you or your own then it becomes real with real suffering. It is conditional. At the break up of the body if there is craving left for body then rebirth occurs and new body is found.

So we render that which is unreal to be real by craving for it?

@YesheTenley Yes.Unfortunately it is so. However it should be clear what craving is ? Understanding craving is crucial to the cessation of suffering.

Imo, the idea that the idea of "death" ("marana") is applicable to a Realised One is also part of the wrong view of Yamaka.
This being said, the termination of life (not "death") of a Realised One is described as follows (in my correct alternate translation):

‘Friend, form is impermanent; what is impermanent is unsatisfying (unsatisfactory); what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed away. Feeling… Perception…
  formations… consciousness is impermanent; what is
  impermanent is unsatisfying; what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed
  away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.

As for the question, it appears lost in the "spell" of translation and particularly the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" found in  "saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne" ("don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact").
Since Sariputta instructs Yamaka at the beginning about "not-self" and since Sariputta provides an analogy about "not-self" at the end; the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" (which is found in this stock phrase in many suttas) probably needs to be examined deeply before answering this question.
Below is merely a guess but I guess the term māna must be important because it has the connotation of "self".
an +
upalabbhati +
māna
To conclude, I think the core message of the sutta is the Tathagata is not a self, person or being. Not being a "self", "death" does not happen at the termination of life. All that happens is the ending of the impermanent aggregates.

Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall
  be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a
  conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be
  non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be
  neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is
  a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. By overcoming
  all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage
  at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and
  does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might
  be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he
  die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should
  he yearn?
MN 140

Would you agree that the Theravada position is, "The self of persons exist, but is not a real genuine thing?"

Theravada says "self" is a "disease"; a "cancer"; merely the arising of suffering.

@YesheTenley Do you have a source for what you call the Theravada position? I've never seen that one before. And no one I know would agree with that statement. I'm curious and puzzled.

@Medhini, Ruben gives this account here: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/28737/13375 and Shariputra attested that the Realized One was not a real and genuine fact in SN 22.85 which is highlighted above in the OP: “since you don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact in the present life”


text:
Do the words Sacred, Divine and Spiritual have any context in Buddhism?
Edit: *In our lay following of the path of Dhamma we need an external object of veneration and an external connotation to actions, which gives it a positive meaning, to help us stick to the actions.
Going beyond simple logic, to do good karma and follow the Samma or right way we need something supra-mundane to transcend the mundane as a clear reason to act in that direction.
Such examples can be, experiencing the Sacredness in the Idol of Buddha at an altar in your house.
Having a mental image of the Buddha as a Divine being rather than just another human having achieved Nibbana through life times of practices
Thinking your path as something supra-mundane which is Spiritual in meaning of it...that something having to do with spirit(non-material aggregate).
This gives added meaning to your existance thereby adding flavour to otherwise dry following to the prescribed discipline in its entierity.*
I undersatnd that Sacred is something religious, but as form is emptiness,
Can we call Buddha's statue as Sacred?
Buddha is not the body and body is not to be identified with, if by divine we mean Godly: transcending the  experience of mundane reality....same flower different experience.
Buddha in His body, can we call Him Divine?
As opposed to mundane life of chasing women, money and fame...defining spiritual life as holy life towards Nibbana...knowing that there is no spirit to be found...
Can we call the path of Dhamma as Spiritual path?
OR
Will these terms create mis- understanding about Dhamma?

Remember there are two notions and views within Buddhism itself, one of them is considering Buddha divine being born in miraculous circumstances, and the other is more pragmatic being. Its contextual. Bhikkhu Bodhi describes both in "In Buddha's Words".

Does this depend on how you define (and explain) the English-language word "sacred" (e.g. this definition)? Ditto "spiritual"? Is that even interesting? Is that like asking, "Is Buddhism a religion?"?

@ChrisW let me edit to provide the context.

@ChrisW i edited to give the context in which i was asking...this is different than asking 'does buddhism fit in definition of organised religion'. I am implying the subtalities of human experience.

It does fit in definition of organised religion; monasticism is pretty organised, lineages are pretty organised as well. In Christianity there are Catholics, Protestants, Calvins and Mormons and other spin offs that fit in such definitions also. Both Buddhism and Christianity have doctrine.

@bodhihammer With the edits I think it's meant as a 'personal practice' question.

@bodhihammer no, thats not what I am asking.

@ChrisW i am alson meaning to look for terms in literature if any, i am using english words as i am able to express that ways...so also about terminology.

I don't think we are (nor should we be) looking at sacredness of the idol but rather Buddha's emanation and nature in our own mind. We can find a Buddha in ourselves. That is at least true in context of Mahayana and Vajrayana (emulating Buddha's mind or Deity's mind). In Pure Land however, this gets very Idol-based so sacredness is stressed, on the other hand it's Amidaba Buddha, not Shakyamuni. Zen has tendencies to do the opposite, the story of "cutting off Buddha's head" or famous "kill the Buddha" koan are some examples of desacralisation. With Theravada I do not know but I have seen Thai Theravadins in a temple taking Buddha's sacredness as an idol quite literally, praying and chanting to statue as if to the divine being - at least that was my impression.
Personally, I gravitate towards seeing Buddha as an object of my true self using a specific practise (like certain Sadhana), thus I completely negate sacredness, divinity and refrain from idolising the Buddha in any way. I consider such divine elevation a hinderance and obscuration to be removed in order to realise Selflessness of things and achieve meaningful progress on the path.
Everyone is divine and therefore no one is divine - everyone is the Buddha, we just have to see this capacity.

Is there really a need to add tags such as Sacred, Divine, Spiritual? If these tagging create confusion then it should be dis-regarded. However, it helps you  to convey certain meaning for those who do not know the context, then it may be skillfully used.
To answer your question, in the furthest extent, you can use sacred/divine to describe the Buddha's deeds and actions when he was on earth, not so much to his Statue or Body.
Can we call the path of Dharma as Spiritual path? <-- Gotta be careful with this as the concept of Spirit is not quite the same with conventional public's (non-Buddhists) understanding.

source: Stack Exchange

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

sort: votes


text:
Does Theravada posit the selflessness of phenomena?
It is generally taught in Mahayana monastic universities that Theravada does not posit the selflessness of phenomena. There it is taught a dichotomy exists between the tenet systems employed by various Buddhist traditions:

The selflessness of persons
The selflessness of phenomena

In Mahayana texts it is often said that the self of persons and the self of phenomena comprise the "two selves" that are refuted. It is said that Theravada only posits and thus refutes the self of persons.
This is a commentary on a textbook used in Buddhist monastic universities in India/Tibet written by a Geshe Lharampa:

For the, "Vaibashika school, there are 3 divisions and 18 subschools,
  one of which is the Theravadan school)"
...
Selflessness of phenomena is not asserted because the Vaibashikas
  assert that an established base is pervaded by self of phenomena i.e.
  even though the V assert selflessness of person, they do not assert
  the selflessness of phenomena.
Within existence, there are two aspects – person and phenomena. When
  one talks about selflessness of person, one is referring to the
  concept of “I”. When one talks about the selflessness of phenomena,
  one is referring to one’s 5 aggregates, all outer objects and
  everything other than concept of “I”. The V school doesn’t assert the
  selflessness of phenomena because they hold the view that phenomena is
  truly existent from its own side.

Emphasis in the original. The point I think is that a dichotomy is made between persons and external objects. The former is said to lack a self, but external objects are considered to be real or truly existent. Some Mahayana tenet systems say the latter also are unreal and not truly existent.
What do self-identified Theravada proponents think of this? Is this how you'd characterize your school or you understanding? Do you identify with the Vaibashika school?

In my travels through the Theravada world I've never found anyone believing in the self of phenomena. Jokes aside: as far as I'm concerned nothing has a self, nothing has intrinsic value, everything is empty and arises depending on conditions. But, I'm not a scholar. Let's see what others think.

Thank you @Medhini, I'd be very interested in your perspective on the other related questions!

The Vaibashika school doesn’t assert the selflessness of phenomena
  because they hold the view that phenomena is truly existent from its
  own side.

In my opinion, the Theravada view according to the Pali suttas imply that:

The self (of persons) is not truly existent.
Whether non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side or not, is (probably) not important towards the path to the end of suffering. (See the Parable of the Poisoned Arrow, Parable of the Simsapa Leaves and the Discourse on the Unconjecturables)

Of course, there may be a lot of Theravadins out there who dispute my second statement above, and would assert that all non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side.
EDIT: Just to make it clearer:
All sankharas (conditioned and/or compounded things) are subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana is not subject to change, arising and passing. Both sankharas and nibbana are empty of a self. But this does not mean that sankharas and nibbana are not truly existent. The self is definitely an illusion, but the world, transient as it is, may not be an illusion. Whether the world is an illusion or not, is not important to the path to the end of suffering (according to Theravada, in my opinion).

All "things" are dependently originated too, aren't they, and impermanent? Is that the same as their being selfless? What about the parable of the chariot (used to describe the selfless of a person): doesn't that imply that a chariot is selfless like a person is?

All sankharas (conditioned and/or compounded things) are subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana is not subject to change, arising and passing. Both sankharas and nibbana are empty of a self. But this does not mean that sankharas and nibbana are not truly existent. The self is definitely an illusion, but the world, transient as it is, may not be an illusion.

Good answer, Ruben. Well spoken.

I decided that I will add my two cents about things existent or truly existent. The problem of misunderstanding is common in Buddhism among nearly all the writers that write about Eastern ideas. Masters, scholars and spiritual leaders are no different. Writers have tendency to often oversimplify complex systems where they should be giving explicit and elaborate descriptions leaving clarity. This leads to confusion as there are phrases rich in many implicit meanings (oversimplifications) that cannot be understood by neither ordinary person, nor even moderate Buddhist practitioner.
As a result, there is finally the prevalent confusion about whether things exist or don’t exist, and whether things are of Selfless nature or not, and what does it really mean. In truth, those are two separate questions to be addressed, regardless of school context.
The first question is easily discarded by Buddha in Kaccayanagotta Sutra:

Everything exists': That is one extreme. 'Everything doesn't exist': That is a second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle (...)

Here, we can only say that things are somehow real and existent, and that would be accurate. Claiming that things exist or don’t exist is a Metaphysical fool’s play with no end. Unfortunately, some commentators do engage in such unsolvable disputes. Comparing such attempts would be like comparing these to solving Gordian’s knot riddle, or other unsolvable mysteries of life.
Therefore, Theravada could not have had it any different than Mahayana when it comes to existence or non-existence.
And rather than exploring these extremes in futile attempts we should explore the Middle as it is real to be experienced here and now. And this is the second question, question about Selflessness of phenomena: When things appear to us, how do they appear, what is their true nature?
The answer to this question is not elaborated nor directly tackled by Theravada, so here, it might or might not be different - it is up to scholar’s interpretation.
But when Nagarjuna says “Samsara is Nirvana” it means that two truths - conventional and ultimate, are in fact one; concepts and fantasies arise from the touch with the way reality really is (tathata). There isn’t really much more to it.
It doesn’t take a great meditator and enlightened being to expand understanding and come up with such conclusions as Nagarjuna did, this is something we already know by intuition. Emptiness is natural, whether inner or outer, because phenomena are not how we picture them. Why? Because we see through the lens of Self framework, and this Self context coming from subject observer experience that infests the nature of things, contextually velcroing Self onto anything we experience. And that is because we cannot easily unlearn to think in other way and unlearning this habit requires great deal of insight. If validity of such wrong perception wasn’t the case in the first place, the loud noise at night wouldn’t make person afraid of the possible robbery. Why? Because here, we are afraid of losing Self by clinging to our very life and well-being, hence we distort reality of things by Self-centered “I” reference. It is the same for anything else, for instance, the deluded object of desire; the context here is Selfish, achieving the object for our own pleasure and satisfaction due to grasping. Looking at the flower we might consider it beautiful as it arouses pleasure, which is again, Self grasping by isolating pieces of reality, singling elements out to form a pleasurable fantasy.
It does not mean that flower has “ego-Self”, but that we see it through our Self scope and this is how it appears to us. In Yogacara it is described in detail as distortion of direct perception of consciousness by interaction with Manas (Self grasping mind faculty). And that’s it. If one is caught up in semantics about “Self” due to objects not capable of having an ego, it is more correct to say that things don’t have “intrinsic essence” rather than to say that they are Selfless. But it is not saying that things “don’t exist” and it is not this sort of debate here, it doesn’t relate to the second question at all.

Thanks @bodhihammer for this as it clearly shows that not all Mahayana practictioners agree either and that there is a lot of confusion within the Mahayana tenet systems as well. I can say I agree very little with the above :)

Inconsistencies and divergence arisen only from the point of Nagarjuna and commentary on Madhyamaka's pieces. For one, Nagarjuna was no Buddha, thus all that speculative commentary should be taken with a grain of salt. Secondly, the rule of thumb in my opinion is that the closest to the Pali canon synthesis it gets, the more likely it is true. I think we have too many Abhidharmas already.

I marked this answer down because it does not actually answer the question and because it contradicts the question.

I apologise sincerely if this doesn't help anyone in any way.

FWIW, I voted it up

In Theravada, "self" is fabricated ego-ideas of "I", "me", "mine", "you", "us", "them", "ours", "yours", etc.
In addition to the above, Mahayana seems to believe "self" is fabricated concepts such as "rock", "tree", "cloud", "dog", "book", "earth", "water", "aggregates", etc.
Since "phenomena" ("elements"/"dhatu") do not have a "ego-self", the idea of "the selflessness of phenomena" makes no sense at all. "Self" is an idea produced by human thought. Rocks, trees, clouds, feelings, physical bodies, perception, consciousness elements, etc, do not produce any thoughts of "self". Therefore, the question about their "selflessness" is non-sensical. As long as the element of earth is viewed as "earth"; the element of consciousness is viewed as "consciousness"; or the element of thought is viewed as "thought" (rather than viewed as "self", "me", "I", "mine", "you", "us", "them", "ours", "yours", etc) then this itself is the seeing of emptiness (sunnata).
The Lord Buddha, who revealed Buddhism, only taught about the selflessness of persons (anatta; sunnata). The Mahayana idea that the idea of "rock" or "cloud" is a "self" and therefore, in reality, there are no rocks, no clouds, no elements, etc, is unrelated to Buddhism but is a alien ideology.
To read this web page requires at least the element of eye consciousness. To believe there is no such thing as an eye or consciousness (as written in the Chinese Heart Sutra) is not real or true.

So, in emptiness, no form, No feeling, thought, or choice, Nor is there consciousness. No eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind; No colour,
  sound, smell, taste, touch, Or what the mind takes hold of, Nor even
  act of sensing.
No ignorance or end of it, Nor all that comes of ignorance;No withering, no death, No end of them. Nor is there pain, or cause of
  pain, Or cease in pain, or noble path To lead from pain; Not even
  wisdom to attain! Attainment too is emptiness.
Heart Sutra

This is wrong. Here, "in reality, there are no rocks, no clouds, no elements, etc" is very wrong again, middle way is between existence and non-existence. Also, again "To believe there is no such thing as an eye or consciousness (as written in the Chinese Heart Sutra) is not real or true" is not what the Sutra says.

Its not wrong. Please do not spam my answers. Thanks.

HH Dalai Lama, Essence of the Heart Sutra: "As we go through this process of negation, it may seem we are in danger of arriving at the specious conclusion that nothing exits. But, if we understand the meaning of emptiness clearly, as I hope we will begin to, we’ll see that this is not what is meant."

This translates the Heart Sutra as saying that the aggregates "are not separate self entities" rather than just "no". Anyway maybe that (i.e. questions or statements about the Heart Sutra) would be better removed from this answer and perhaps posted elsewhere as a separate topic

HH Dalai Lama is simply making excuses for the Heart Sutra. The error of the Heart Sutra is implicit in the question.

It doesn't matter if everyone makes excuses for the Heart Sutra as simply no one dares to interpret Heart Sutra in such crude way. If even everyone makes excuses of Heart Sutra in such way as Dalai Lama or Thich Nhat Hanh do, then there is only goodness and virtue of joy coming out of it.

The Heart Sutra is superstition; not much different to the Bible. It is good noble kamma to criticize the Heart Sutra. Regards

Also I think (I'm not expert) that The Mahayana idea that the idea of "rock" or "cloud" is a "self" is fantastically wrong: I think the Mahayana idea is that rocks etc. DON'T have sabhava ("Svabhāva is by definition the subject of contradictory ascriptions ... Thus the existence of a svabhāva is impossible"), and therefore things are "empty".

DD is an expert. "Svabhāva" is not found in the Pali suttas however, regardless, it obviously does not have the meaning Wikipedia is asserting. "Sabhava" would obviously mean "own nature", as described below in SN 22.79: "And why, bhikkhus, do you call it feeling? ‘It feels,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling".... "And why, bhikkhus, do you call it perception? ‘It perceives,’ bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.". ... etc

all_licenses: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
If Theravada doesn't posit the selflessness of phenomena, then how to interpret SN 22.95?
This question is closely related to this question and this question and this question.
There is a Sutta in the Pali Canon that seems to explicitly reject that any of the aggregates is real or substantially existent, but instead likening them to a lump of foam, a water bubble, a mirage, a plantain trunk, or an illusion:

“Form is like a lump of foam, Feeling like a water bubble; Perception
  is like a mirage, Volitions like a plantain trunk, And consciousness
  like an illusion, So explained the Kinsman of the Sun.
“However one may ponder it And carefully investigate it, It appears
  but hollow and void When one views it carefully.
“With reference to this body The One of Broad Wisdom has taught That
  with the abandoning of three things One sees this form discarded.
“When vitality, heat, and consciousness Depart from this physical
  body, Then it lies there cast away: Food for others, without volition.
“Such is this continuum, This illusion, beguiler of fools. It is
  taught to be a murderer; Here no substance can be found.
“A bhikkhu with energy aroused Should look upon the aggregates thus,
  Whether by day or at night, Comprehending, ever mindful.
“He should discard all the fetters And make a refuge for himself; Let
  him fare as with head ablaze, Yearning for the imperishable state.”

Depending upon the answers to the previous questions I'd be very interested in how Theravada interprets this Sutta. Generally, I'm confused how Theravada interprets these Suttas into a coherent and non-contradictory whole:

SN 22.85 seems to say that regarding a Realized One as real or genuine is incorrect.
Itivuttaka 44 seems to say that (as per Ruben2020's answer here) the body is real and genuine.
SN 22.95 seems to reject that and say the body is to be considered like foam as "void, hollow, insubstantial."

Finally, Mahayana monastics train believing that the substantial difference between Theravada views of anatta and Mahayana views of shunyata is that Theravada regards the aggregates and all external phenomena as real and possessing intrinsic nature or essence.
How do Theravada proponents reconcile all of this?

You previously listened to the wrong answer. This question here is irrelevant. The Tathagata is real & true but the reality & truth of the Tathagata is wisdom. The suttas say "Seeing the Dhamma, Sees the Buddha".

Sariputra attests that the Realized One is not a real and true and genuine fact in SN 22.85

the Realized One is real and true. But that the Realized One is a SELF-ENTITY is not real and true

Piya Tan in his commentary on the lump of foam sutta, quoted Bhikkhu Bodhi's commentary below:

This sutta is one of the most radical discourses on the empty nature
  of conditioned phenomena; its imagery (especially the similes of the
  mirage and the magical illusion) has been taken up by later Buddhist
  thinkers, most persistently by the Madhyamikas. Some of the images are
  found  elsewhere in the Pali Canon, eg at Dh 46, 170. In the context
  of early Buddhist thought, these similes have to be handled with care.
  They are not intended to suggest an illusionist view of the world but
  to show that our conceptions of the world, and of our own existence,
  are largely distorted by the processes of cognition. Just as the
  mirage and magical illusion are based on real existents — the sand of
  the desert, the magician’s appurtenances — so these false conceptions
  arise from a base that objectively exists, namely, the five
  aggregates; but when seen through a mind subject to conceptual
  distortion, the aggregates appear in a way that deviates from their
  actual nature. Instead of being seen as transient and selfless, they
  appear as substantial and as a self. (Bodhi S:B 1085 n188)

I think the above commentary discusses the Theravada view accurately. The sutta does not talk of an illusionist view of the world. It does not imply that the five aggregates are not real. It simply points towards the five aggregates as being transient and without a self.
Also, please see the Suñña Sutta, which explains this more literally, as the five aggregates being empty of a self.

Ok, I think then this is in keeping with what is taught in the Mahayana monastic textbook about Theravada. That persons are not real and have no objective existence - only conventional -, but external phenomena including the aggregates have objective real existence not just conventional existence.

It's kinda funny how Piya Tan's comment correctly explains Mahayana's understanding of emptiness while at the same time contrasting it with an incorrect understanding which he then (wrongly) attributes to Mahayana.

Hmm, are you sure you are referring to Piya Tan's comment or his quote of Venerable Bodhi? Also, do you think this part, "so these false conceptions arise from a base that objectively exists" is correct understanding according to Mahayana Prasangika?

@YesheTenley thanks for your corrections, yes - I meant Bhikkhu Bodhi's comment that "our conceptions of the world, and of our own existence, are largely distorted by the processes of cognition". As for "a base that objectively exists" - this part is often a point of debate (mostly because it's at the limit of words) but as we all know Mahayana is neither metaphysical nihilism (stating that nothing whatsoever exists) nor ontological idealism (stating that everything is literally an illusion). Even Yogacara was shown as of late to not be an idealistic heresy it was once assumed to be.

The Pali Canon Mulapariyaya Sutta may help in discussing different perspectives on the perception of "real". Note the subtle wording change:
Case 1: Take an uneducated ordinary person...They perceive earth as earth
Case 2:  A mendicant who is perfected...directly knows earth as earth.
In case 1, the earth is perceived as having a potential relationship with self (i.e., "my earth", "his earth", "in earth", etc.). In SN22.85, Reverend Yamaka was initially asserting the total annhiliation of the mendicant (i.e., self) upon death (i.e., dissolution of earth).
In case 2, the earth is directly known as earth. Earth is not self. Yamaka's revised his own answer about death:

What’s suffering has ceased and ended

I see this sutta not as an objective or ontological statement (e.g. form is "real" or "unreal", "true" or untrue) but rather as subjective and prescriptive -- e.g. I see it as saying that "form, and feelings etc., are fragile and unreliable -- so don't crave them, don't attach to them, and don't depend on them."
I guess the interesting or most relevant bit (for the purpose of this question) is found here:

for no substance is found here.
sāro ettha na vijjati.

And see here for a definition of sāra.
I (personally) don't interpret this word as meaning "substance", in what I imagine is a philosophical sense (e.g. ontology) -- instead I interpret it as kind of subjective or pragmatic, e.g. as meaning "the bit that's useful to us, the part that proves to be reliable or everlasting, the valuable/worthwhile bit".
Part of the "true Scotsman" argument wanders into defining what a Scotsman "is", what it even means to "be" a Scotsman -- what's the "essential characteristic" (or "sign") of a Scotsman -- and who knows what a "real", "genuine", or "true" Scotsman is?
Conversely I think that according to Theravada the "characteristic" of everything is simple -- i.e. it's:

Impermanent
Not self (not "me" and not "mine")
Dukkha

Discussing whether the arrow is "real" (and what it's made of) is a bit of a distraction -- this commentary claims that Gautama Buddha's views were "anti-metaphysical".

Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta (MN 63)
And why are they undeclared by me? Because they are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are undeclared by me.
"And what is declared by me? 'This is stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the origination of stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the cessation of stress,' is declared by me. 'This is the path of practice leading to the cessation of stress,' is declared by me. And why are they declared by me? Because they are connected with the goal, are fundamental to the holy life. They lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are declared by me.
"So, Malunkyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me as undeclared, and what is declared by me as declared."

I'm not saying that your question is useless or unanswerable -- this one is not one of the canonical 14 unanswered questions -- just that it seems metaphysical to me, and asking questions that aren't answered n the text.
I guess if you analyse everything using a Mahayana-orthodox "analytic knife" then it will end up looking like a primitive/incomplete simulacrum of Mahayana doctrine -- but I think that the "posits" you're making maybe aren't present in the text -- furthermore the Simsapa Sutta (Handful of Leaves) is meant to assure us that what is in the text is sufficient (or "self-sufficient" if you will).

Thanks @ChrisW, I think you are right there is a distinct strain of Theravada adherents who view delving too deep into these questions as inappropriate or at least not important. They ascribe some of this to the "thicket of views" that Buddha famously redirected confused people from.

@ChrisW I agree with your assessment that the spirit of the teaching as preserved in the Pali Canon is extremely pragmatic. Even its flavor of "emptiness" that can be read between the lines is always pragmatic, no-nonsense, don't-be-a-fool style. This is in stark contrast with both Theravada as well as Mahayana schools with their speculative analysis and obsessive nitpicking. In fact, it was a no-nonsense approach that had drawn me to Kagyu -- the most pragmatic of Tibetan schools whose teaching styles often correlate with their historical origins and political agendas.

FWIW, I view all traditions of Buddhism as focused on the pragmatic as an empirical discipline. IOW, I don't think the question in this OP is divorced from the pragmatic or that Mahayana is less pragmatic because it takes these questions seriously. It is precisely because of our ignorance of how things really are that causes all this mass of suffering and so we have to dispel this ignorance by discovering how things really are.

BTW, I love your reference to the No True Scotsman :) And yes, part of the fallacy is believing there is any such thing as a "True Scotsman" in the first place outside of mere convention.

A marked this answer down because of its unnecessary and wrong discussion of ontology vs subjectivity. That the aggregates are worthless, without value and have no substantive value is their inherent nature. Its "ontological" if that word must be used.

@Dhammadhatu The OP's question seems to me a question of or about ontology, asking how to "reconcile" what suttas say about whether the existence of various things is real and genuine -- my answer is that, IMO, that is not the focus of this sutta -- and that if he's asking for the Theravada viewpoint, it's that Theravada identifies the "three characteristics" etc.

I agree with @AndreiVolkov that the Sutta Pitaka is extremely pragmatic compared to Mahayana and also Theravada. The original Pali suttas do away with unnecessary speculation and intellectual gymnastics. Even in Theravada, the complexity comes from the Abhidhamma and commentaries. While the Abhidhamma is said to be the Buddha's own teachings, I feel that it's derived from his teachings, making it a secondary text. A long time ago, I used to hold the Advaita Vedanta view, but now I have had enough of unnecessary philosophical speculations, intellectual gymnastics and ontological hamster wheels.

This answer is wrong. The characteristics of the aggregates are inherent or ontological.

@ChrisW Pragmatically speaking, is it a distraction OR an example of craving and grasping? Isn't the urge to insist upon the ontological status of the aggregates a form of grasping at them? If so, then from a purely pragmatic perspective doesn't it have to be given up?

The sutta does not explicitly reject that any of the aggregates is real or substantially existent (atthi vs natthi). The sutta does not deny there is a lump of foam, bubbles, mirages, hollow thoughts & the magical quality of consciousness. The sutta merely says the aggregates have no intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality. The relevant Pali adjectives are ritta, tuccha and asāra. The sutta is unrelated to existent Mahayana obsessions about existence & non-existence.

Thanks @Dhammadhatu, but feel free to ignore my questions/obsessions since they are clearly irrelevant for you. Probably best to leave them alone.

You wanted me to answer this one as well.
[Note: I didn't read all the suttas you've linked to, nor did I read all comments already posted.]

“Form is like a lump of foam, Feeling like a water bubble; Perception is like a mirage, Volitions like a plantain trunk, And consciousness like an illusion, So explained the Kinsman of the Sun.

Are the 5 aggregates substantial or not?
Imho, it's important to know from what point of view someone looks at things. Is it from the normal, everyday-of-life or intellectual, scholar point of view or the experiential point of view. That makes a huge difference.
From an experiential point of view things have only a momentary existence. They arise, leave an impression and cease again. They come and go.
Is there a body? No, experientially speaking there is, so now and then, a feeling of pressure, cold or warm, soft or hard in different locations (wind, fire, earth). At the moment of contact we can know those sensations. At the moment of contact there is something there. And then it's gone. Outside the knowing and the sense impression that can be known, there is nothing.
Are those sense impressions real? Well, yes. For that short moment there was contact, there was something to be known, and that something had an effect.
Are they substantial? No.
Same goes for all other aggregates.
I'm sure that from an intellectual point of view much more could be said. But, as you know, I'm not a scholar. So, it's not my place to get into that.

Do not forget that there is the parallel in chinese translated into english
https://suttacentral.net/sa265/en/analayo
you find the parallels under the little down arrow with the number four, after you click on the down arrow right to the wheel.
it is the usual sequence  Anicca->dukkha->Anatta applied to the usual 5 aggregates, which is  of course the beginning of the sequence Anicca->dukkha->Anatta->dispassion->nibanna
Puthujjanas are obsessed with what they call ''what is real'' and '' what is not real'', but the word real is utterly useless. SOme of them even manage to mix the word true with that, because they claim that there is the ''apparent real'' and the ''true real'' and of course, the true real is really better than the apparent real.
It's like asking if anger is real or cold is real or a number e^\pi in ZFC is real. That's a question which is just as natural for a Puthujjana to ask as it is dumb. The question is not whether it is worth it to qualify something as real, but how do you relate to it, how do you see it as worthy for basing your care, your intention and your actions and spend your energy on it.

If the word 'real' is utterly useless, then why does it exist and why is it so important to people whether things are real or not? ie., why does it bother people or perplex people to say that all those things are unreal? Thanks for the other translation btw!

Why do we teach kids that dreams aren't real and they therefore shouldn't be afraid of nightmares? That TV is not real and so we don't need to be afraid of disturbing stories?

The Agama are terrible and Analayo's translation is terrible because it does not have the meaning of the Pali words ritta, tuccha and asāra found in the Pali version.


text:
If you cannot can save others then why is your practice more worthy than anything else?
If you have doubts on whether your practice (i.e. of the Eightfold Path) will free anyone from saṁsāra in your lifetime, then what reasons can you give for why your practice should take precedence over anything else, namely, alleviating the suffering of others in whatever mundane way you can (even if it does not free anyone from saṁsāra, (e.g. ordinary acts of charity, career in public service, etc.))?

Related: Selfless charity to poor and needy

Related: are mundane acts of compassion meaningful?

Related: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/10878/hypocrisy-of-buddhism

Because outer peace begins with inner peace. The Buddha said,

“Monks, there are these four kinds of persons found existing in the world. What four? (1) One who is practicing neither for his own welfare nor for the welfare of others; (2) one who is practicing for the welfare of others but not for his own welfare; (3) one who is practicing for his own welfare but not for the welfare of others; and (4) one who is practicing both for his own welfare and for the welfare of others.
...
The person practicing for his own welfare but not for the welfare of
  others is the more excellent and sublime of the [first] three persons.
  The person practicing both for his own welfare and for the welfare of
  others is the foremost, the best, the preeminent, the supreme, and the
  finest of these four persons...” (AN 4:95, NDB 476–77)

Hence, the Buddha ordered (3) > (2).

I found the following quote useful in seeing this another way,

We are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of mutuality. And whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly. For some strange reason I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be. And you can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be.
King, Martin Luther, Jr.

and I thought this final quote helped to further see this,

I will protect others,’ bhikkhus: thus should the establishments of mindfulness be practised. Protecting oneself, bhikkhus, one protects others; protecting others, one protects oneself.
“And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.
“And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, lovingkindness, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
SN 47.19

Generosity, kind words and helpfulness are all meaningful in Buddhism, however small. Every Buddhist and non-Buddhist should practise it. See the next 3 quotes from the suttas.
From Vaccha Sutta:

"I tell you, Vaccha, even if a person throws the rinsings of a bowl or
  a cup into a village pool or pond, thinking, 'May whatever animals
  live here feed on this,' that would be a source of merit, to say
  nothing of what is given to human beings. But I do say that what is
  given to a virtuous person is of great fruit, and not so much what is
  given to an unvirtuous person.

From Itivuttaka 26:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have
  heard: "If beings knew, as I know, the results of giving & sharing,
  they would not eat without having given, nor would the stain of
  selfishness overcome their minds. Even if it were their last bite,
  their last mouthful, they would not eat without having shared, if
  there were someone to receive their gift. But because beings do not
  know, as I know, the results of giving & sharing, they eat without
  having given. The stain of selfishness overcomes their minds."

From Itivuttaka 75:

"And how is a person one who rains everywhere? There is the case where
  a person gives food, drink, clothing, vehicles, garlands, scents,
  ointments, beds, dwellings, & lights to all brahmans & contemplatives,
  to all of the miserable, the homeless, & beggars. This is how a person
  one who rains everywhere.
A person responsive to requests,
  sympathetic to all beings,
  delighting in distributing alms:
  "Give to them! Give!" he says.
  As a cloud — resounding, thundering — rains,
  filling with water, drenching
  the plateaus & gullies:
  a person like this is like that.
  Having rightly amassed wealth
  attained through initiative,
  he satisfies fully with food & drink
  those fallen into the homeless state.

The next quote from Iti 100 however shows something different. It says that the gift of the Dhamma (Buddha's teachings) is superior to all other types of gifts.
From Itivuttaka 100:

"There are these two kinds of gifts: a gift of material things & a
  gift of the Dhamma. Of the two, this is supreme: a gift of the Dhamma.
"There are these two kinds of sharing: sharing of material things &
  sharing of the Dhamma. Of the two, this is supreme: sharing of the
  Dhamma.
"There are these two kinds of assistance: assistance with material
  things & assistance with the Dhamma. Of the two, this is supreme: help
  with the Dhamma.
"There are these two kinds of mass-donations: a mass-donation of
  material things & a mass-donation of the Dhamma. Of the two, this is
  supreme: a mass-donation of the Dhamma."

Why is this the case? Other types of gifts relieve one's sufferings temporarily. But with the Dhamma, even if one would not become free from samsara in this lifetime, it would still guide them (and us) to cleanse our mind, and at least bring us to happy destinations both in this lifetime and the next.
For according to Dhammapada 1:

"All mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner; they have mind as
  their chief; they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with an evil
  mind, suffering follows him just as the wheel follows the hoofprint of
  the ox that draws the cart."

So, even if learning the Dhamma does not free one from samsara in this lifetime, at least it will guide them to be more skillful mentally. Since the mind is the forerunner to all types of sufferings (see MN 135), becoming skillful in mind, will reduce all sufferings in future.
And according to AN 3.99:

'Now, a trifling evil act done by what sort of individual is
  experienced in the here & now, and for the most part barely appears
  for a moment? There is the case where a certain individual is
  developed in the body, developed in virtue, developed in mind
  [i.e., painful feelings cannot invade the mind and stay there],
  developed in discernment: unrestricted, large-hearted, dwelling with
  the immeasurable. A trifling evil act done by this sort of individual
  is experienced in the here & now, and for the most part barely appears
  for a moment.

This shows how one could reduce his or her suffering by becoming developed in body, virtue and mind.

If you have doubts on whether your practice will free anyone from saṁsāra in your lifetime
Is this an example of an aphorism "the perfect is the enemy of the good" -- which, Wikipedia says, is related to a "Nirvana fallacy" -- i.e. "if you can't be perfect, then no point trying to be good"?
what reasons can you give for why your practice should take precedence over anything else
You probably didn't mean it this way, but "precedence over anything else" may be an exaggeration -- for example it's also important (fundamental) to be harmless.
An example (of your being "harmless") is keeping the four or five precepts.
But perhaps this is part of your practice already.
I think it's generally a mistake to assume that dhamma is only one thing (see also here) -- to assume that you can summarise it as one thing, and ignore everything else.
I think that a generosity too is beneficial, not (or not only) for the sake of "helping others" but (perhaps more importantly for "your practice") for the sake of reducing attachment --  or practising non-attachment -- e.g. a material gift may be a small antidote to a self-view that "this is mine".
Personally I think that a great (or greatest) "gift" (that you can give) is not only dhamma (doctrine) but liberation or liberty -- or at least, help provide an environment in which someone can discover/experience (live) liberty. Perhaps you might read the Therigathas -- many of which praise mutti (in comparison to the life they had previously). Some (many) people feel they must seek seclusion, perhaps the homeless life, to be free -- which I think includes being free of evil or unwise company, free of other people's unreasonable demands and expectations, etc. IMO you might extend this gift towards monastics (by helping to support them materially) and towards laypeople (by being undemanding).
So if "your own practice" results in your own behaviour being a bit less "needy"; skilfully abandoning cravings and attachments; maybe having a better of identity (and so for example not, "he is mine" and "she is mine", and "they owe me") -- maybe that helps to answer your question.
In other words I suppose I'd answer that any of your practice is also important towards liberating others, partly because it's (only) because you practice that you're able to help free others.
Also I find it hard to blame the behaviour described in e.g. A messiah for India's abandoned sick -- that (although not explicitly Buddhist) seems to me a practice for cessation of suffering -- for example as described in the Bikkhuni sutta:

There is the case, sister, where a monk, considering it thoughtfully, takes food — not playfully, nor for intoxication, nor for putting on bulk, nor for beautification — but simply for the survival & continuance of this body, for ending its afflictions, for the support of the holy life, [thinking,] 'Thus will I destroy old feelings [of hunger] and not create new feelings [from overeating]. I will maintain myself, be blameless, & live in comfort.

Perhaps you shouldn't assume it's an "either/or" decision (i.e., 'either' your practice 'or' alleviating the suffering of others in whatever mundane way you can) -- perhaps an ideal is 'both', a middle way, a doing one by (or while) doing the other -- or one and the other at different times, like walking with the left foot and the right foot.
Also I think that a Buddhist doctrine which says that you don't give material/mundane aid, and/or that immaterial aid is superior, is intended for monks -- who (by their poverty) have a limit to the type of aid that they're able to give (e.g. they can't give money because they don't possess any) -- but who nevertheless ought to know that what they do have (i.e. Dhamma) and can give is important, worthwhile, worth offering, and superior. I think that the expectations or advice (re. generosity) for lay people is slightly different.

Looking again at your quote from the Bikkhuni sutta, maybe we can blame the case of an arahant of practices simply for his own peace, and whose compassion does not take the form of any engagement with the world: how does his taking of food, for the survival & continuance of [his] body, benefit the world moreso than he just letting his body pass away? Even if he abides harmlessly for the rest of his life, how would the world be any worse off without his existence?

@avatarKorra I think the suttas talk about being able to "live the holy life" as if that's good. And I suppose there are forms of Buddhism -- perhaps especially but perhaps not only Mahayana -- which see it as worthwhile to be engaged.

‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’

"If there were no potential for enlightenment, there would not really be such a special point made about living a longer life

First, the correct wording isn't "helping others": the correct wording is "helping somebody to achieve something (which means you have the faculty to help, and more importantly to discriminate between a successful result and a failure of the guy you try to help)".
Everybody knows about the "Four Brahmaviharas" (metta, karuna, mudita, upekkha); and indeed they good practices -- but if and only if the person exercising them follows the path in the first place.
For instance, if you practice "metta" without being a noble disciple, that would gets you to a good realm but then get you to a bad realm:

Paṭhamamettāsutta (AN 4.125
“Mendicants, these four people are found in the world. What four? Firstly, a person meditates spreading a heart full of love to one direction, and to the second, and to the third, and to the fourth. In the same way above, below, across, everywhere, all around, they spread a heart full of love to the whole world—abundant, expansive, limitless, free of enmity and ill will. They enjoy this and like it and find it satisfying. If they abide in that, are committed to it, and meditate on it often without losing it, when they die they’re reborn in the company of the gods of Brahmā’s Group. The lifespan of the gods of Brahma’s Group is one eon. An ordinary person stays there until the lifespan of those gods is over, then they go to hell or the animal realm or the ghost realm. But a disciple of the Buddha stays there until the lifespan of those gods is over, then they’re extinguished in that very life. This is the difference between an educated noble disciple and an uneducated ordinary person, that is, when there is a place of rebirth.

Toxic puthujjanas do not worry about the bad realm: they focus on the good realm, and even tell other people to do metta and karuna etc., without even telling them that they will become miserable.
Now on giving: it is the same situation as with metta etc. The sutta on Giving (AN 7.52) explains what is the appropriate way to give to somebody.
There are plenty of bad ways to give to somebody: giving because of tradition or lineage, giving because of "egoism", and of course giving because of "selflessness".
Some puthujjanas dislike reading this, since it goes against their faith in their fantasy that loving people and feeling good about themselves for giving stuff makes them good people!
So what is the right way to give a gift to somebody?
First the right way to give a gift is to give it to a contemplative. Second point is what is the citta and mano doing while giving the stuff to the contemplative':

“Or, instead of thinking, ‘When this gift of mine is given, it makes the mind serene. Gratification & joy arise,’ he gives a gift with the thought, ‘This is an ornament for the mind, a support for the mind.’ He gives his gift—food, drink, clothing, a vehicle; a garland, perfume, & ointment; bedding, shelter, & a lamp—to a brahman or a contemplative. What do you think, Sariputta? Might a person give such a gift as this?”
“Yes, lord.”
“Having given this, not seeking his own profit, not with a mind attached [to the reward], not seeking to store up for himself, nor [with the thought], ‘I’ll enjoy this after death,’
“—nor with the thought, ‘Giving is good,’
“—nor with the thought, ‘This was given in the past, done in the past, by my father & grandfather. It would not be right for me to let this old family custom be discontinued,’
“—nor with the thought, ‘I am well-off. These are not well-off. It would not be right for me, being well-off, not to give a gift to those who are not well-off,’ nor with the thought, ‘Just as there were the great sacrifices of the sages of the past—Atthaka, Vamaka, Vamadeva, Vessamitta, Yamataggi, Angirasa, Bharadvaja, Vasettha, Kassapa, & Bhagu—in the same way this will be my distribution of gifts,’
“—nor with the thought, ‘When this gift of mine is given, it makes the mind serene. Gratification & joy arise,’
“—but with the thought, ‘This is an ornament for the mind, a support for the mind’—on the break-up of the body, after death, he reappears in the company of Brahma’s Retinue. Then, having exhausted that action, that power, that status, that sovereignty, he is a non-returner. He does not come back to this world.
“This, Sariputta, is the cause, this is the reason, why a person gives a gift of a certain sort and it does not bear great fruit or great benefit, whereas another person gives a gift of the same sort and it bears great fruit and great benefit.”

You see the situation is exactly like doing metta, karuna mudita and upekkha without being on the path first (which means at least "doing sense restraint").
Puthujjanas love to claim that it is a good conduct, because it is the actions they already do, and because the person doing them is reborn in some realm qualified as good ... before falling back to a less good realm. The most toxic puthujjanas love to cling to short term "solutions", where they will feel bliss, and they do not care that one day they will be miserable again. What matters for a toxic puthujjanas is to have the good stuff right away even though it will lead to afflictions later on.

'those puthujjanas called humanists and other christians or Mahayanists or vajrayanists', why did you include last two as puthujjanans?

Christians claim that charity is an expression of "loving our neighbor as ourselves" according to the "Great Commandment" (read more about that e.g. here, if you like: Catechism of the Catholic Church - The virtues) but this isn't the right site to discuss (nor to misrepresent) Christian doctrine. Similarly I don't want to read, on this site, your denouncing other schools of Buddhism -- so (instead of deleting this answer completely) I'm going to edit it heavily.


text:
How to understand a second order Karma?
If a person B does an intentional harmful action on person A, and so B does a bad karma.
As a result of that karma, it happens that a person C ends up hurting person B, intentionally or unintentionally.
So what is the result of the action of person C?
Does her action account for Karma?
Does she even have any choice to hurt B or not hurt B?
If C hurts B intentionally does that account for bad karma, but C did in because she had to as it was B's karma?
If this continues, this whole sequence will never ever end.

This question would be interesting on Hinduism.SE too.

@ruben2020 hindus believe that gods have power to wipe out karma. That if you worship and please deities your karma can be nullified. This is basically bhakti yog for them. Also taking bath in Ganges wipes out karma. Kind of beliefs I have abandoned.

The Buddha dispelled the superstition of purification by water in SN 7.21 and put a new spin on it, saying, "The teaching (Dhamma) is a lake with shores of ethics (or virtue), unclouded, praised by the fine to the good. There the knowledge-masters go to bathe, and cross to the far shore (Nibbana) without getting wet."

So what is the result of the action of person C?
I think it would be unusual, a supernatural ability (e.g. of the Buddha's), to be able to see/know/explain the result of kamma.
I think it's called,

"Divine eye" (dibba-cakkhu), that is, knowing others' karmic destinations

For this reason (i.e. that few people have this supernatural ability), all questions of the form "what's the precise karmic result of such-and-such action" asked on this site are pointless or unanswerable.
People can explain a little more about the doctrine of karma-in-general (e.g. here), but I think we can only give some fairly general statements from the suttas, for example that "karma is intention".
Does she even have any choice to hurt B or not hurt B?
I think people debate (or question) whether or to what extent "free will" exists -- whether people are able to choose or whether choices are predetermined -- see e.g. Predetermined future vs. Free will in Buddhism
I think the doctrine says though that if you are person C then you are heir to your own kamma.
If this continues, this whole sequence will never ever end.
I think the doctrine allows for kammic seeds which never come to fruition (which is how it can end):

Kamma and its Fruit (by Nyanaponika Thera)
Most writings on the doctrine of kamma emphasize the strict lawfulness governing kammic action, ensuring a close correspondence between our deeds and their fruits. While this emphasis is perfectly in place, there is another side to the working of kamma — a side rarely noted, but highly important. This is the modifiability of kamma, the fact that the lawfulness which governs kamma does not operate with mechanical rigidity but allows for a considerably wide range of modifications in the ripening of the fruit.
If kammic action were always to bear fruits of invariably the same magnitude, and if modification or annulment of kamma-result were excluded, liberation from the samsaric cycle of suffering would be impossible; for an inexhaustible past would ever throw up new obstructive results of unwholesome kamma.

Also I think that the doctrine tells us to the kammic principle intentionally and skilfully, e.g.:

Intending good for good to ripen (and/or to make any small evil relatively negligible, like a lump of salt dissolved in a river)
Intending cessation for cessation to ripen (I think, more specifically -- abandoning greed, ignorance, and aversion; abandoning self-view; and the noble eightfold path).

In Buddhism, kamma and its fruits is not a system of universal justice. It simply is cause and effect. An individual's intention is the most important thing in kamma.
If a person has evil intentions and commits evil acts, then he may end up in unhappy destinations. Even if he comes back as a human being, he may be sickly or short-lived or ugly or poor etc. Please read the rest of MN 135 for details. If based on his intentions, he harmed others, then in future, he becomes sickly. If based on his intentions, he was miserly and did not donate to others, then he may become poor in future.
According to MN 135:

The Blessed One said: "There is the case, student, where a woman or
  man is a killer of living beings, brutal, bloody-handed, given to
  killing & slaying, showing no mercy to living beings. Through having
  adopted & carried out such actions, on the break-up of the body, after
  death, he/she reappears in the plane of deprivation, the bad
  destination, the lower realms, hell. If, on the break-up of the body,
  after death — instead of reappearing in the plane of deprivation, the
  bad destination, the lower realms, hell — he/she comes to the human
  state, then he/she is short-lived wherever reborn. This is the way
  leading to a short life: to be a killer of living beings, brutal,
  bloody-handed, given to killing & slaying, showing no mercy to living
  beings.
"But then there is the case where a woman or man, having abandoned the
  killing of living beings, abstains from killing living beings, and
  dwells with the rod laid down, the knife laid down, scrupulous,
  merciful, & sympathetic for the welfare of all living beings. Through
  having adopted & carried out such actions, on the break-up of the
  body, after death, he/she reappears in a good destination, in the
  heavenly world. If, on the break-up of the body, after death — instead
  of reappearing in a good destination, in the heavenly world — he/she
  comes to the human state, then he/she is long-lived wherever reborn.
  This is the way leading to a long life: to have abandoned the killing
  of living beings, to abstain from killing living beings, to dwell with
  one's rod laid down, one's knife laid down, scrupulous, merciful, &
  sympathetic for the welfare of all living beings.
"There is the case where a woman or man is one who harms beings with
  his/her fists, with clods, with sticks, or with knives. Through having
  adopted & carried out such actions, on the break-up of the body, after
  death, he/she reappears in the plane of deprivation... If instead
  he/she comes to the human state, then he/she is sickly wherever
  reborn. This is the way leading to sickliness: to be one who harms
  beings with one's fists, with clods, with sticks, or with knives.
"But then there is the case where a woman or man is not one who harms
  beings with his/her fists, with clods, with sticks, or with knives.
  Through having adopted & carried out such actions, on the break-up of
  the body, after death, he/she reappears in a good destination... If
  instead he/she comes to the human state, then he/she is healthy
  wherever reborn. This is the way leading to health: not to be one who
  harms beings with one's fists, with clods, with sticks, or with
  knives.

However, not everything we experience is caused by kamma according to SN36.21:

"There are cases where some feelings arise based on bile... phlegm...
  based on internal winds... based on a combination of bodily humors...
  from the change of the seasons... from uneven care of the body... from
  harsh treatment... from the result of kamma. You yourself should know
  how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. Even the world is
  agreed on how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. So any
  brahmans & contemplatives who are of the doctrine & view that whatever
  an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither pleasure-nor-pain — is
  entirely caused by what was done before — slip past what they
  themselves know, slip past what is agreed on by the world. Therefore I
  say that those brahmans & contemplatives are wrong."

So it is pointless to assume that if somebody hit you, it must be caused by you hitting someone else in the past. It may not have any kamma-related cause. In the quote above, "harsh treatment" is separated from "result of kamma". So, they are separate causes. "Uneven care of the body" and "change of seasons" are also other separate causes. So, if somebody hit you and it caused pain, then it may well be just "harsh treatment" from someone else.
How to alleviate one's karma is explained in the Lonaphala Sutta or the Discourse of the Salt Crystal.

Thank you for the answer. You answered it in kind of reverse way. How do you understand this statement,'You yourself should know how some feelings arise from the result of kamma'. Given your answer, how can I myself know? That is what I am struggling really, to understand my suffering...

It's a shortened excerpt. Every person has experienced some suffering due to bile and know how that feels like. Similarly for phlegm, harsh treatment, karma etc.  For e.g. if you get allergies when seasons change then you know how that is like. If you eat heavy meals before sleeping, you get acid reflux. If you don't wash your hair, it may become itchy. When someone hits you, you feel pain. But what about karma? Where you were born, in what kind of body, to what kind of family, rich or poor background etc.  - this is due to karma. Your previous mental states conditioned your current situation.

O! Bhikkhu monks, it is volition - cetana that I call Kamma,
  -cetanaham bhikkhave kammam vadami

If A, B or C has an unwholesome thought or speech/action caused by an unwholesome thought, it is bad Karma. It's that simple.
An intention to harm a person is always unwholesome whether that person deserves it or not.

If this continues, this whole sequence will never ever end.

That is why the sanasara is endless loop till we understand it and break it.
B hurt A intentionaly and for that karma B get hurt by C intentionally or not, if C didn't someone else will, till the end of B bad karma. Another thing only the Lord Buddha is able to understand the way of karma works, all behind the scence are only understandable to Buddhas only.

As a result of that karma, it happens that a person C ends up hurting person B, intentionally or unintentionally.
So what is the result of the action of person C?

If the action is done intentionally, the result for person C is future unwholesome resultants.
If the action is done unintentionally, the result for person C is no unwholesome kamma. See the Twin verses in Dhp. v1-2.

Does she even have any choice to hurt B or not hurt B?

We always have a choice whether or not to act on an intention. Person C does not have to act on the intention to harm person B. She can choose to observe that intention with mindfulness and instead cultivate insights from it.

If C hurts B intentionally does that account for bad karma, but C did in because she had to as it was B's karma?

Every action that originates in the Three Unwholesome Roots (greed, hatred and delusion) will result in future unwholesome resultants.

If this continues, this whole sequence will never ever end.

It can end. It will end if one works out ones own liberation. The Buddha did it. Many of his disciples and followers did it too. Every person has within himself or herself, the potentiality to become free from suffering, to achieve Nibbana, to become a Buddha.