text:
Does anyone interpret 'karma' this way?
Does anyone interpret karma to mean that the future itself arrives twice, "now" and again in the future?
Is there any reason to think that karma itself is that movement of impermanence, so that it cannot be entirely dissolved?

where did you come across this idea, "karma is the movement of impermanence.."? it sounds odd

it has an anthropomorphic quality to it...

it's just religion who cares @lilredindy

Not stopping, reacting with deluded tendency, will nourish, make experiances repeating, yes. Yet, it works also in the other direction, having heared to good Dhamma, that especially the "now" effort, in stopping unskillful, cuts away furture arising, good householder. No new produces, old running out.
And yes, if not getting 'luckily" meet the good Dhamma while proper attention, it's somehow "impermanent" this wandering on and suffer in Samsara.
More on Kamma: A Study Guide.

Your reference is very long. Did you mean to cite a specific section to address the original question?

Ways to liberation requires sacrifices. Common one is to greedy, to lazy, again and again, seeks ways without letting go of lazzyness, greed, not willing to surrender. Yet right here the kamma could end, good householder. All up to him.

Short answers are available in the sutta, but they can be a bit cryptic:

MN79:7.5: Nevertheless, Udāyī, leave aside the past and the future.
MN79:7.6: I shall teach you the Dhamma:
MN79:7.7: ‘When this exists, that is; due to the arising of this, that arises.
MN79:7.8: When this doesn’t exist, that is not; due to the cessation of this, that ceases.’”

What is important about kamma is intention and its nature. When Identity View exists, much suffering arises. When Identity View doesn't exist, suffering ceases. In this quote, the Buddha is gently directing Udāyī to the present, which is the only place where we can affect our clinging to Identity View.
We're used to thinking about "this desire" and "that suffering" as separate. That artificial separation between "desire" and "suffering" deludes us into madly chasing desires while running away from suffering. Identity view chases desire and runs away from suffering. When identity view exists, suffering arises.

MN1:172-194.26: Because he has understood that relishing is the root of suffering,

It's hard to let go of Identity View. It's hard to let go of relishing.

MN1:172-194.30: That is what the Buddha said.
MN1:172-194.31: But the mendicants were not happy with what the Buddha said.

most people can't be saints

...in this lifetime. But it's quite a relief that there is a way to be rid of suffering. A saint might just be tired of playing wack-a-mole with wishes.
DN34:2.1.151: ‘This teaching is for those of few wishes, not those of many wishes.

yeah true, sorry I took that wrongly

great posting..

Kamma is the law of this universe, its cause are cravings, its nature is dependent origination and its result is samsara or endless impermanent lives.
The cause of it has to be uprooted through non-self view or the Dhamma and to get it the mind needs to have nomore thoughts or even better it has to be directed in the right direction, the one of Virtue.
When the self is uprooted the kamma cannot find anymore the link to the doer, this is called deathless or hiding from Mara, the supervisor of kamma.

yeah. it's the same as asking if the effect is a repetition of e cause. I am pretty sure that's a really useful way of thinking about Nagarjuna's analysis of causation. thanks!

Karma is impermanent, and it depends on causes and conditions. Our actions (in this life and past lives) create positive and negative karma constantly.
Our thoughts and actions also influence the conditions for karma to manifest and function.
So in a way, your interpretation makes sense. If you think of "future" as the results or manifestation of karma, then the "future" arrives once when our actions create positive/negative karma, and it arrives again when our thoughts and actions influence the conditions for karma to manifest.

I'm depleted to up vote just cos you agreed with me, but idk if it's in the spirit of stack exchange ha

@again_insane_buddhist I guess the "spirit of SE" is to ask a question when you have a problem, and to upvote an answer if you find it "useful" i.e. if it helps to address/solve/answer that problem. Or some people up- or downvote depending on whether they think the answer is true or false. Or some people vote depending on whether they think an answer is relatively good, compared to others.

Karma is intentional thoughts, words and deeds (AN 6.63), for which thoughts are the most important component (MN 56) and it originates from the mind (Dhp 1).
There's nothing supernatural or paranormal about karma. When thoughts, words and deeds are intentionally exerted, the results come back in a natural and normal way, for example:

Law breakers get fined or prosecuted by law enforcement.
Those who habitually tell lies or violate the trust given to them, are not trusted by others.
Habitual exertion of evil and angry thoughts bring diseases in the body and remorse to the mind. (MN 135)
Habitual gamblers and alcoholics lose their wealth and are not trusted by others. (DN 31)
Soldiers who kill in battle experience PTSD after completing their tour of duty. (also SN 42.3)
Habitual lying becomes the launchpad for other evil acts. (Iti 25)

Not everything that happens is caused by karma (SN 36.21). Some things are, but there are seven other causes including carelessness, weather, assault by others, wind, bile etc. So, karma is simply a natural and normal consequence of intentional exertion. It's not supernatural.
Result of karma can also come from intentional exertion of thoughts, words and deeds from before physical birth. That's called old karma (SN 12.37), and it has shaped our physical appearance and genetic background.
Don't ask who did it when it (karma) came from the past (SN 12.17). And don't ask how exactly karma works (AN 4.77).
What's more useful is to look towards the future, inculcating a sense of accountability (AN 5.57), and shame and fear of doing evil (Iti 42).
To overcome the result of karma from the past, one needs to develop his virtues and wisdom (AN 3.100) with heedfulness (SN 3.17), and not underestimate the cumulative effect of doing good and bad deeds (Dhp 121 - 122).

if you don't believe in rebirth, then sure. this makes sense. I think it just shows how un-buddhist that is though. killing in war is only bad karma if we suffer ptsd? no

no offence, I just hate the idea of religion as a mental health treatment. there's also something sadistic and unfair about moralising those and only those who suffer due to their bad habits. it's not in the spirit of buddhist ethics, let alone philosophy

@again_insane_buddhist Regarding rebirth, please see this answer. To summarize: rebirth-of-self is a genuinely true phenomena for all those with self-view. Also, karma is based on intentions in Buddhism. It's not a universal system of justice.

@again_insane_buddhist Your comment on mental health treatment reminds me about monk and teacher Ajaan Fuang's comment here: ... but soon after the magazine came out, unusual numbers of people came to the wat under the impression that Ajaan Fuang, like the author of the autobiography, could treat illnesses through meditation. One woman asked him if he treated kidney diseases, and he answered, "I treat only one kind of disease: diseases of the mind."

hm I wouldn't use the word "justice" myself, so thanks for clarifying you wouldn't either. I wonder what the best EL term is for it? maybe 'self fault', but that has issues with closely translated other terms

plus that's only negative karma. all the regular users of this site know that karma is alleged to be a natural law of that generates our conscious experiences (however you want to view their reality) so yea

are you saying karma only occurs in an intentional format? "the results come back in a natural and normal way"....do the results come back in another way - unnatural or odd?

first it depends on your definition of karma.   action, or causality (cause-effect), etc.
i don't know how karma works, but I have my view.
for example, if you go a vacation...there's the actual vacation (result 1) and the lasting impression it leaves (result 2).
that's how I can imagine now and in the future...
the second part of your question makes no sense to me.

I second the gist by @Cesare Uberti. Karma dissolves only when you have attained nibbana / nirvana following dhamma through wisdom (frankly, being an ascetic really helps to concentrate better on the truth). No God/Gods/Goddess/Goddesses (if you are into some Mahayana ideas) can help you attain that; you are on your own.
Last but in no way the least important idea (in terms of execution) is that one does need the right Guru to travel faster through the mist and fog.

I think it's more that kammic effects are unpredictable to people that haven't reached enlightenment. I don't think anyone other than an enlightened one could tell you when or how your kamma from each individual action you take and thought you have will affect you.
My limited understanding of it disagrees with the idea that it affects you "twice." My understanding is that you can't attribute good or bad fortune you're experiencing to any specific things you've done UNTIL you've reached a certain stage of awakening when that kind of insight becomes available to you, and at that point I think you're incapable of generating negative kamma.


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How should a bodhisattva respond to evil?
Not saying I have bodhicitta, one assumes I would know the answer if I did, but we can all emulate enlightening beings.
What is the best way to respond to an nominally (nothing like that is innate) evil person doing evil (whatever you think amounts to that enough to at know not only that they should be stopped but that a lot hinges on it for other people) to get what they want?
We vow to save all sentient beings: can we postpone it for some? Do we say "a Buddha would help you in your next life, but I cannot"?
I suppose the answer is just to offer help to others first: after-all, we are all said to have undergone countless, trillions by trillions of lives, so no one life can be blamed for how it has suffered. But what if the evil doer turns to you for a better rebirth, after or even before their evil actions?

enlightenment is not on a first come first served basis...

I just had a mental image of Clint Eastwood (as Dirty Harry) pointing his 45 magnum revolver down at some bad guy and saying: "Do you feel enlightened, punk?" Weird experience...

weird comment @TedWrigley :D thanks made me chuckle

I think you are under a misapprehension about bodhicitta, as something you can either have or not have. It wells up in all beings, because it is a deep part of the nature of minds to recognise other minds, and as we wish for our own wellbeing, to wish for their wellbeing. It is an intrinsic and spontaneous quality, which only layers of bad experiences or being misled can cause us to ignore. Bodhicitta can be cultivated, practiced, by contemplating this wish for the benefit of all beings, and prioritising it as a motivation for action in life. To put it at the centre of our causes for action, is to walk the bodhisattva path.
The Buddhas teaching is very demanding:

"Monks, even if bandits were to savagely sever you, limb by limb, with
a double-handled saw, even then, whoever of you harbors ill will at
heart would not be upholding my Teaching" -Kakacupama Sutta

First of all, note this is about ill-will, not action and reaction, but how the bandits actions affect your mind. Forgiveness, doesn't mean no consequences. You don't have to help push the saw, you have to attend to your mind, and use it for the benefit of all beings.
Bear in mind also, this is directed at full-time spiritual practicioners, placing attaining awakening above all other priorities. Householders, lay-Buddhists, have other duties and priorities which the teachings are clear they should not shirk - consider how a farmer doing pest-control helps provide grain for monks to eat (but a skillful farmer needs less pest-control).
There is also the Buddhist idea of a 'wheel-turning monarch' or ruler or emperor: someone worldly who must manage an army and deliver justice, but does so in a way that creates opportunities for many more to become awakened. See for example the Cakkavatti sutta. Emperor Ashoka is surely such a one, the first ruler to unify India, although he was said to have given up war & converted to Buddhism after the particularly bloody and brutal military campaign involved. He did bot then abolish that military though, but sought to make violence less likely.
The Angulimalia Sutta concerns the conversion and awakening of a bandit that wore a necklace of human fingers and had murdered likely at least 200 people personally as a religious task (see the 'thuggee cult' for Indian cultural background on how this much earlier practice might have worked). Shown the true nature of things, Angulimalia ceased to cause suffering, and he was protected from families of his victims by the sangha, although he would still have to face the karma his actions had generated.
The koan of Nansen kills the cat generates a lot of controversy, which I think that linked commentary does a good job of picking through. An insightful point I've heard about the cat, is that they are very murderous of mice - yet humans very much need to not allow mice populations to grow unchecked (eg, mouse plagues, where mice also suffer). So a monk asks, should we keep a murdering cat? Nansen acts like the cat: You don't want this pest-cat? There, done. Happy? Having a cat is a choice like this, it's not a perfect choice, but we make a choice. The cat is not a monk. But like a farmer, like a monarch, it can be skillful.
In life we face dilemmas, we must decide who to help and who not. But don't make this a practice of just making endless agonising lists for and against why - that won't 'save the cat'. Put bodhicitta at your centre, know the taste of liberation, and the answer will come, while it can still make a difference, from paying attention to the qualities of this very moment. Make your mind into a diamond sword of wisdom, and you will know whether to kill or save the cat, for the benefit of all beings.
People don't set out to be evil. That word has special baggage because of it's importance in Christian theology, so it's worth thinking about how to interpret it, discussed here: The dark side of philosophy?. There is a saying "We are punished by our sins, not for our sins", that can help us understand evil-doers harm themselves, harm their own minds, and fundamental cure is in showing them the true nature of things, not telling them what to feel (though constraining their capacity to harm is likely a priority). That is recognising their Buddha nature, their intrinsic capacity to awaken to things as they are.

The Bodhisatta usually renounced in cases he could not help harmless. As for general on this topic, may good householder investigate: Wisdom over Justice and Justice vs. Skillfulness. As for householder, being oneself strongly corrup, still attached to sense-pleasure, as the Buddha told, one not free from sensual craving is actually incapable to help anybody. This wisdom even the worldling, the Bodhisatta, already had and therefore went for the place where help needs to start: leaving corruption by oneself.
May person doubts that good householder would really sacrifices any of sensuality himself to help himself and others, right? Help the rat or the snake? Just momentary preferences... They are all just around to help theirs...

A Bodhisattva only has one tool he brings to the table: an awareness of the true nature of the world. On occasion that's enough. People who commit 'bad' acts do so from within a thoroughly encompassing web of illusion in which the act appears necessary, or justified, or righteous, and in which the self is reified and magnified. Merely being exposed to the presence of someone who is aware of the illusory nature of that worldview is sometimes enough to gravitate a change; it's like adding ballast to a ship tossed in a storm.
What we do isn't half as important as bringing that open understanding into whatever we do. We don't want to add to the situation; we want to subtract from it.
Bodhisattvas don't save anyone. Bodhisattvas show people that they can save themselves. A lighthouse cannot keep a ship from wrecking itself on the rocks; all it can do is let it be known that no ship has to wreck itself on the rocks. Anything else it might do cannot interfere with that one purpose.

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Why is continuity like "the light of a lamp"?

Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence  or non-existence of an end is
unreasonable.

https://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center
Is it because the action of the lamp is contained in light, so we cannot conceive of its end, and its end neither exists nor doesn't (same as a four sided triangle: it's a nonsense phrase).

Before his dedication (30), Nagarjuna concludes

And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth?

Does that mean enlightenment is not a view, but the impossibility of a view about an end: rejecting the idea that things either end or do not.
If an end is inconceivable then so is 'permanence', so the opposite of an end is not "permanence" but buddha-nature.

I am baffled because it seems what I've been saying all along may well be on point to everything the Karika says

That's some intellectual babble. Reality is not a linear progression. Just practice meditation and you will see.

No. The light of a lamp is a well-known Buddhist metaphor for continuity of information-causation (what Nagarjuna refers to as "the divine"), since at least The Questions of King Milinda:

--“Can there be any rebirth where there is no transmigration?”
--“Yes there can, just as a man can light one oil-lamp
from another but nothing moves from one lamp to the
other; or as a pupil can learn a verse by heart from a teacher
but the verse does not transmigrate from teacher to pupil.”

and

The king said: ‘He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or become another?’
[Nagasena:] ‘Neither the same nor another.’
[King:] ‘Give me an illustration.’
[N] ‘Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?’
[K] ‘No. That child was one, I am another.’
[N] ‘If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off ?’
[K] ‘Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that? ’
The Elder replied: ‘Neither I am what is now the grown up, nor was I what was the tender tiny baby, flat on its back. But all these are tied in one by means of this body.’
[K] ‘Give me an illustration.’
[N] ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?’
[K] ‘Yes, it might do so.’
[N] ‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, and in the second?’
[K] ‘No.’
[N] ‘Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third?’
[K] ‘No.’
[N] ‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third?’
[K] ‘No Sir. But thanks to that lamp the light shined all the night through.’
[Nagasena:] ‘Just so, O king, does the continuity of dharmas connect. One emerges, another dissolves, connecting as it were without [a clear boundary between] the previous and the next, thus the former-consciousness and the next-consciousness cannot be categorized as either the same nor as different.’

I've heard of that before. do you mean that the teaching of continuity being like a lamp has no end. that's a novel but bad reading imho

In chapter 27 Nagarjuna muses about extreme  views, such as a person existing - or not existing - after death. Please reread the chapter until you understand it.

I think I understand it already! can you clarify what you mean, other than "you're wrong" please?

"Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end [of an "entity" such as "a person"] is unreasonable."

yeah I quoted that too! I read it to mean that its end was inconceivable. what do you think it means?

What we call "entity" is a process of continuous non-discrete causal development, non-separate with the rest of the world. Therefore, the notion of "end" has no ontological referent.

ok that makes sense. I am not separate from the tips of my fingers, but both of us have an end. do you mean that it is not separate from the whole. but then "27. How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish?  Likewise, that is unreasonable"

Nagarjuna talks about temporal termination, not spatial boundaries. When your body dies, it becomes food for worms, nutrition for grass and trees etc. Preservation of energy if you wish.

And many of your thoughts become the thoughts of your children, students, and/or of the readers of your books etc. The non-profits you started still operate after your death. The social movement you launched keeps helping people. Likewise, the river you polluted keeps killing everyone. Continuity of information and causation.

all true, but I feel you didn't convince me of your implied claim. that's fine tho!

I think I answered the question in the title and explained what Nagarjuna meant. Feel free to ask another question if you have more.

what do you mean by "you're wrong"? I don't know if you mean that ends don't exist with svabhava, but do nevertheless exist. if so, what is your argument for it from the Karika?

My "No." in the beginning of my answer referred to your "Is it because the action of the lamp is contained in light, so we cannot conceive of its end" - because that's not what Nagarjuna meant, and I showed what he did.

nowhere does he mention lighting another lamp. in what way does the end of the light not exist? I really don't think Nagarjuna is denying anyone is reborn. is that what you think he means?

He uses a well-known, standard, metaphor that is virtually always used when discussing reincarnation or personhood in Buddhism.

this doesn't seem to be going anywhere. in what way does the end of the light not exist?

The end of light in an infinite series of lamps, lit from one another? Because that's what he refers to (without spelling it out, because that was common knowledge to all Buddhists he was writing it for)

so we are reborn an infinite number of times? is that what you mean? when he says continuity is like light I took him to be making a claim about continuity, not light

I'm saying, rebirth is a crude metaphor for the endless continuity of information-causation.

so he compares it to "light" because light is crude?

No, he compares it to light of a lamp, lit from another lamp, and so on, because it's an image of "passing on" of information/causation.

ok I get it! he compares it to light because it can be passed on to another lamp. I'm not sure why you think that doesn't contain my interpretation tho. that's what confused me, you leading with "no"

The conclusion you reach in your answer is correct, but the way you arrive there from the karika is wrong, this is why as any teacher I cannot give you a passing grade.

well you're not my teacher, we're equals on-line at least, so I'm free to disagree with your claim that anyone can "arrive there... wrong".

That's fine. At least we attained some semblance of understanding for once.

hahah true. so does the abhidharma say that light itself (leave lamps alone for a moment) has no end?

It's not the same light nor is it different. It doesn't have end nor is it endless.

I was just referring to something I half remember reading in Va. adbhidhrama about the nature of light compared to sound or taste. maybe I'll find some notes. thanks

To add to Andrei's answer, I quote this passage written by Thich Nhat Hanh, the Vietnamese Zen master who recently passed away:

This body of mine will disintegrate, but my actions will continue me…
If you think I am only this body, then you have not truly seen me.
When you look at my friends, you see my continuation. When you see
someone walking with mindfulness and compassion, you know he is my
continuation. I don’t see why we have to say “I will die,” because I
can already see myself in you, in other people, and in future
generations.
Even when the cloud is not there, it continues as snow or rain. It is
impossible for the cloud to die. It can become rain or ice, but it
cannot become nothing. The cloud does not need to have a soul in order
to continue. There’s no beginning and no end. I will never die. There
will be a dissolution of this body, but that does not mean my death.
I will continue, always.

I think any disagreement centres on how it's not clear what the relation of the conventional self to the world is. no-one thinks the world itself ends when we die except solipsists.

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What is the best thing in life, according to the Buddha, excluding nirvana?
What is the best thing in life, according to a Buddha, excluding nirvana?
I have no idea. As a goal, things to fill your life with. And why?

@User23491. I really like your answer. Very good.

Apart from Nirvana, Dhp 178 tells us that stream entry is an achievement superior to anything else in the world or the heavens.

Far better than sovereignty over the earth, or far better than going
to the abodes of the devas, or far better than ruling supreme over the
entire universe, is (the attainment of) Sotapatti Fruition.
Dhp 178

But I guess in this question, you're looking for other more worldly things.
There are many blessings in life indeed, according to the Mangala Sutta.
The Mangala Sutta:

"Many deities and men longing for happiness have pondered on (the question of) blessings. Pray tell me what the highest blessings are.

"Not to associate with the foolish, but to associate with the wise, and to honor those worthy of honor — this is the highest blessing.

"To reside in a suitable locality, to have performed meritorious actions in the past, and to set oneself in the right direction — this
is the highest blessing.

"Vast learning, skill in handicrafts, well grounded in discipline, and pleasant speech — this is the highest blessing.

"To support one's father and mother; to cherish one's wife and children, and to be engaged in peaceful occupations — this is the
highest blessing.

"Liberality, righteous conduct, rendering assistance to relatives, and performance of blameless deeds — this is the highest blessing.

"To cease and abstain from evil, to abstain from intoxicating drinks, and diligent in performing righteous acts — this is the
highest blessing.

"Reverence, humility, contentment, gratitude, and the timely hearing of the Dhamma, the teaching of the Buddha — this is the
highest blessing.

"Patience, obedience, meeting the Samanas (holy men), and timely discussions on the Dhamma — this is the highest blessing.

"Self-control, chastity, comprehension of the Noble Truths, and the realization of Nibbana — this is the highest blessing.

"The mind that is not touched by the vicissitudes of life, the mind that is free from sorrow, stainless, and secure — this is the
highest blessing.

"Those who have fulfilled the conditions (for such blessings) are victorious everywhere, and attain happiness everywhere — To them these
are the highest blessings.

nice list, thanks

Conventionally speaking, the samādhis of the Āryas are "not suffering." I would like to cite a few texts here, one of them is a Pāli sutta, another is a commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā, and the last is an ancient Dhyānasūtra of unknown sectarian affliation.
That being said, all these citations being present, these (referring to the samādhis of the Āryas) are only "not suffering" conventionally speaking. All of the concentrations of the Āryas, unless they have Nirvāṇa, are "suffering" ultimately. It is only "compared to the saṃsāra of the worldling" that they are "not suffering." Evidence of this comes from the Buddha himself in the EBTs and beyond, then he recounts that he mastered such-and-such dhyāna or such-and-such formless samāpatti and found it to be still impermanent, still impure, still suffering. That is why he did not achieve Bodhi under the tutelage of his foremost gurus, Rudrakarāmaputra and Āḷārakālāma. He found their samādhis to come short of what he was looking for. Because of his profound faculties, he was not led astray by the sweetness of the samādhis, and he did not take subsequent rebirth via the fruits of said samādhis (i.e. "as a formless deva" or "as a deva with form").
From the Santatarasutta at Iti 73 as translated by John D. Ireland:

“Bhikkhus, the formless is more peaceful than the form realm, and
cessation is more peaceful than the formless.”

This refers to 1) the peacefulness of existences in the heavens of form, 2) the peacefulness of existences in the heavens that are formless, and 3) the peacefulness of the cessation of existence ("bhavanirodha"). Furthermore, it also refers to 1) the peacefulness of the yogic equipoise of the dhyānas, 2) the peacefulness of the yogic equipoise of the samāpattis, and 3) the peacefulness of the yogic equipoise of Nirvāṇa. Whether we take it to refer to one of these three or both of these three, the general principle holds. The formless samāpatti is more peaceful than the rūpadhyāna, and Nirvāṇa is more peaceful than either.
From the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa as translated by Venerable Migme Chödrön (she translates "samādhis" as "concentrations"):

[...] the yogin pursues his reflections and asks himself why beings
are attached to this body. It is because of pleasant feeling. How?
From the meeting between the six internal organs and the six outer
objects the six kinds of consciousnesses arise. From these six
consciousnesses arise the three kinds of feelings, unpleasant feeling,
pleasant feeling, neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling. Pleasant
feelings are loved by all beings; unpleasant feelings are hated by all
beings; as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings, people
neither reject them nor cling to them. Thus it is said: Evil-doers and
monks, Gods, humans and small worms: Amongst these beings divided
among the five destinies in the ten directions, There is not one that
does not love happiness and hate suffering. Out of error, mistake and
ignorance, They do not know nirvāṇa, the abode of eternal bliss.
Considering pleasant feeling, the yogin truly knows that it contains
no happiness but only suffering. Why? Happiness, i.e., ‘true
happiness’ is free of errors. And yet all the pleasant feelings of the
world come from mistakes and contain no reality. Furthermore, while
greedily seeking the happiness of pleasant feeling, one will encounter
great suffering. Thus it is said:
Those who go to sea encounter heavy winds. The waves rise up as high as the Kālaparvata. Those who go into the army to fight across very dangerous paths and perilous gorges. These many great sufferings all come from attachment to happiness and to cupidity."
This is why we
know that pleasant feeling can give rise to all sorts of suffering.
Furthermore, although the Buddha spoke of the three kinds of
suffering, one of them, that of pleasant feeling, merits the name of
suffering because in it happiness is rare. It is like a bushel of
honey which, when thrown into a big river, loses its smell and its
taste.
Question. – Happiness such as it is conceived in the world, having error as cause and condition, is suffering. But the concentrations practiced by the saints give rise to a pure happiness which itself is real happiness. Why? Because this happiness is not derived from delusion or mistake. How then could it be suffering?
Answer. – It is not suffering. [...]

The bolded section identifies the relevant point. The preceding material establishes how, according to the treatise, even "happiness" is suffering.
From a Dhyānasūtra quoted in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa:

Avoiding desires and bad dharmas, a person enters into the first dhyāna furnished with examination and judgment, coming from detachment, which is joy and happiness. Avoiding the flames of lust, he is endowed with clear cool absorption. Happy like a person who, tormented by the heat, enters into a cold pool. As in the case of the poor man who has found a treasure, vitarka of a great joyfulness moves his mind. He analyzes it: this is vicāra. This is how he enters the first dhyāna. He knows that vitarka and vicāra disturb his mind. Although good, he
must separate himself from them, for it is only on a calm sea that the movement of the waves is not seen. When a very weary man lies down to sleep in peace, any call to him strongly disturbs his mind. In the same way, for the absorbed man in dhyāna, vitarka and vicāra are a torment. That is why, avoiding vitarka and vicāra, he succeeds in entering the sphere of unified consciousness. As a result of his inner purity, he finds joy and happiness in absorption. Penetrating into the second dhyāna, his joy is lively and his mind is very happy. An absorption where concentration is very strong is calm and free of smṛti. Annoyed by prīti, the ascetic wants to get rid of it in the same way that he has already eliminated vitarka and vicāra. It is because of feeling that there is joy. If joy is lost, sadness is experienced. Renouncing pleasant bodily feeling, The ascetic abandons memory and methods. The saint is able to reach this renunciation; for other people, this renunciation is difficult. When one knows the torments of happiness, one sees the grand immobile peace. When daurmanasya and prīti are eliminated, duḥkha and sukha still remain to be cut. Purified by equanimity and reflection, the mind penetrates into the fourth dhyāna. The sukha present in the third dhyāna, transitory and changing, is suffering. In kāmadhātu, the ascetic has cut the daurmanasya; in the second dhyāna he has eliminated the prīti. This is why the Buddha Bhagavat said, in the fourth dhyāna, having cut the daurmanasya and the prīti, it is necessary now to cut duḥkha and sukha.

(Dhyānasūtra T216 as translated by Venerable Migme Chödrön)
The samādhis of the Āryas are happiness, but they are not Nirvāṇa.
It would only be appropriate to conclude with the gāthā that was omitted in the initial quoting of the Santatarasutta in this post:

Those beings who reach the form realm and those established in the formless, if they do not know cessation, come back to renewal of being. Those who fully understand forms without getting stuck in the formless are released into cessation and leave death far behind them. Having touched with his own person the deathless element free from clinging, having realized the relinquishment of clinging, his taints all gone, the Fully-Enlightened One proclaims the sorrowless state that is void of stain.

(same as first quotation, translation from John D. Ireland)

thanks for the answer. sorry for the question maybe, but are these hedonisms?

Are you asking if the samādhis of the Āryas are "hedonisms?"

Yeah, a sort of moral hedonism.

Well, strict adherence to the precepts are a prerequisite for any of the samādhis of the Āryans, be it the dhyānas or samāpattis. So they cannot be "moral hedonism." I associate "hedonism" with worldly pleasures, like food, sex, drugs, etc., not with the concentrations of the Āryas.

adherence to the precepts is arguably necessary for moral enjoyment of sex. I definitely don't mean the "supramundane" path of enlightenment and bodhicitta.

From a Dhyānasūtra quoted in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa , that passage you quote is the actual sutta passage, or the sutta passage along with commentary from Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa ?

It's a gāthā quoted in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. Venerable Migme Chödrön's footnotes identify it as being from T216 (大魚事經). How she arrives at this conclusion, I do not know, because the extant version of 大魚事經 passed down in the libraries that inform the Taishō Tripiṭaka doesn't have this gāthā. AFAIK, it's an untraced gāthā of unknown textual origin. Ven Migme Chödrön thinks that the text is citing T216 precisely. She passed away in 2016, so all we have is this attribution in the footnote to go by.

A final clarification of the above: even in her own footnote, she admits that the gāthā is absent from T216. I don't know what the grounds for the attribution are precisely.

Not to associate with fools, maintaining relation with the wise, sacrificing toward what's worthy to sacrifices, is the root of all best things, the foundation of a blessed life here, the next, and bliss beyond, good householder. Feel blessed?

at times, thanks!

Everyone has great suggestions, so far.  I'd like to present a wholesome alternative, found in the Upaḍḍha Sutta  (SN 45:2).

...Admirable friendship, admirable companionship, admirable camaraderie is actually the whole of the holy life. When a monk has admirable people as friends, companions, & comrades, he can be expected to develop & pursue the noble eightfold path.

The whole text can be found here, as translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.


text:
Does the relinquishing of views prohibit belief in the permanence of buddha nature?
Does the relinquishing of views prohibit belief in the permanence of buddha nature?

I prostrate to Gautama, who, out of loving compassion, taught the
excellent Dharma in order to relinquish all views.

The dedication to Nagarjuna'a MMK

In the opening of the Buddha nature book of Sbobogenzo, Dogen quotes
the following passage from the Nirvana Sutra: — H > Qnai no sbujo wa
kotogotoku bussbdoyusu; Nyorai v>ajdjuniibite benyaku arukoto natbi),
“All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha nature:
Tatbdgata (Buddha) is permanent with no change at all.”8 This well
expresses the fundamental standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. In the
passage two important themes are emphasized: “All sentient beings have
the Buddha nature,” and “Tathagata abides forever without change.”
These two themes are inseparable from one another. Against this
traditional reading, Dogen dares to read as follows...

Masao Abe, Dogen on Buddha Nature.

Seems like a pretty bad question. Why don't you elaborate on it? You even answer it yourself.

no i didn't. what? @DivineSwordIrelia i just explained why i was asking.

You answer the question yourself: "I think perhaps not."

i was trying to explain my bemusement, not answer my question @DivineSwordIrelia i'll add some quotes at a later time

Looks better now, thank you for the edit, +1.

In the famous parable of the raft, the Buddha says that his Dharma is, ultimately, to be abandoned.

"You, myriad monks, should know that my expounding of the Dharma is like in the parable of the raft. Even the Dharma will be abandoned. How much more so that which is not the Dharma?"

(Diamond Sūtra T235.749b7)
There is another time when the Buddha describes a teaching that is to be abandoned, namely when he outlines "right view with effluents" as opposed to "right view that is noble" and contrasts these both with "wrong view." From the Pāli suttas:

"And what is right view? Right view, I tell you, is of two sorts:
There is right view with effluents, siding with merit, resulting in
acquisitions [of becoming]; there is right view that is noble, without
effluents, transcendent, a factor of the path.
"And what is the right view with effluents, siding with merit,
resulting in acquisitions? 'There is what is given, what is offered,
what is sacrificed. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions.
There is this world & the next world. There is mother & father. There
are spontaneously reborn beings; there are contemplatives & brahmans
who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the
next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.' This
is the right view with effluents, siding with merit, resulting in
acquisitions.
"And what is the right view that is noble, without effluents,
transcendent, a factor of the path? The discernment, the faculty of
discernment, the strength of discernment, analysis of qualities as a
factor for awakening, the path factor of right view in one
developing the noble path whose mind is noble, whose mind is without
effluents, who is fully possessed of the noble path. This is the right
view that is noble, without effluents, transcendent, a factor of the
path.
"One makes an effort for the abandoning of wrong view & for entering
into right view: This is one's right effort. One is mindful to abandon
wrong view & to enter & remain in right view: This is one's right
mindfulness. Thus these three qualities — right view, right effort,
& right mindfulness — run & circle around right view.

(Mahācattārīsakasutta MN 117 translated by Venerable Ṭhānissaro)
So we have established that what is not the Dharma is to be abandoned, just as wrong views are abandoned for right views in the Mahācattārīsakasutta. But what does it mean now for "the Dharma" to be abandoned (including, presumably, the teachings on "buddha-nature" alluded to by the OP)?
Does this mean we have to abandon all right views?
My answer to this is a cautious "No" that I hope I can satisfactorily contextualize.
In the parable of the raft, the raft of the Dharma is abandoned at the far shore. It is not abandoned amidst the sea, leaving the seafarer to die swimming in the treacherous waters of saṃsāra. If we are to abandon "right view" at all, be that right view toward the aggregates, toward the dharmas, or toward the Buddha's nature, it is not "amidst the sea," so to speak. By the time that it comes for "us" to abandon even the Dharma, there is no more "us" to abandon it. "We're" at that far shore, with no "we" present.

“Then, when he had got across and had arrived at the far shore, he
might think thus: ‘This raft has been very helpful to me, since
supported by it and making an effort with my hands and feet, I got
safely across to the far shore. Suppose I were to hoist it on my head
or load it on my shoulder, and then go wherever I want.’ Now,
bhikkhus, what do you think? By doing so, would that man be doing what
should be done with that raft?”
“No, venerable sir.”

(Alagaddūpamasutta MN 22 translated by Venerable Bodhi)
So why, when we know that the Dharma is for crossing and not for grasping, might some people be moved to say things to effect of "The sea cannot be crossed while grasping a raft?" Why do some reduce the Dharma to "a collection of views?"
IMO, one of the sources of this misunderstanding is a misreading of the Abyākatasutta at AN 7.54. There, we read:

“Because of the cessation of views, monk, uncertainty doesn’t arise in
an instructed disciple of the noble ones over the undeclared issues.
The view-standpoint, ‘The Tathagata exists after death,’ the
view-standpoint, ‘The Tathagata doesn’t exist after death,’ the
view-standpoint, ‘The Tathagata both does and doesn’t exist after
death,’ the view-standpoint, ‘The Tathagata neither does nor doesn’t
exist after death’: The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn’t
discern view, doesn’t discern the origination of view, doesn’t discern
the cessation of view, doesn’t discern the path of practice leading to
the cessation of view, and so for him that view grows. He is not freed
from birth, aging, & death; from sorrows, lamentations, pains,
distresses, and despairs. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering
& stress. But the instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns view,
discerns the origination of view, discerns the cessation of view,
discerns the path of practice leading to the cessation of view, and so
for him that view ceases. He is freed from birth, aging, & death; from
sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs. He is freed, I
tell you, from suffering & stress.

(Abyākatasutta AN 7.54 translated by Venerable Ṭhānissaro)
I think that among some people who are more familiar with the suttas than the Dhamma, there is a tendency to just read the first sentence of the Buddha's response and ignore the vital context of the sutta.
For instance, when we read a Pāli sutta, we have the opening question of the sutta (generally posed by someone other than the Buddha) and the opening elaboration by the Buddha. After these two, the rest of the sutta will necessarily follow this exposition. Not only suttas, but sūtras also do this. Sūtras like the Flower Garland, the Lotus, and Prajñāpāramitā open with a question that the entire sūtra wishes to answer -- and these are compendious Mahayana vaipulyas, not short EBT suttas. If the vaipulya in question does not begin with such a question, the question that it does begin with will be treated as if it contains within it the seed for all of the material presented in the sūtra.
What is our "central question" that informs the exegesis of AN 7.54? It is

“Lord, what is the cause, what is the reason, why uncertainty doesn’t arise in an instructed disciple of the noble ones over the undeclared issues?”

This sutta, complete with its section on the cessation of view, etc., is dealing with particular views. In particular, it deals with four views that it outlines in the body of the sutta. 1) That ‘The Tathagata exists after death,’ 2) that ‘The Tathagata doesn’t exist after death,’ 3) ‘The Tathagata both does and doesn’t exist after death,’ and 4) ‘The Tathagata neither does nor doesn’t exist after death.’ It is due to the cessation of these views that "uncertainty doesn't arise," to use the language from the sutta directly. So we can see that the Abyākatasutta does not actually instruct the followers of the Buddha to abandon all views in toto, including the right ones. This is, however, a common way to read the sutta. It is, IMO, misconceived in how it is presented when it is presented like that.
This still doesn't address the issue of the eventual abandonment of right view, "buddha-nature" potentially along with it, once we are at the far shore. To address this, there is a quotation from Grandmaster Zhìzhě that has always been close to my heart. This is from his magnum opus, Mahāśamathavipaśyanā, and to this day it greatly informs the meditative curriculum of seminarians of the Japanese Tendai priesthood (as well as being a greatly influential meditation treatise in China, Korea, Vietnam, etc., among monastics and laity alike):

In order to enter into emptiness, you must contemplate conventional
existence; emptiness is realized through this encounter. This
realization is as when the clouds are scattered and vanquished, and
above is made manifest and below is clear [...] The conventional is
that which is to be destroyed; the real is that which is used to
destroy [...] If you enter emptiness, you realize that emptiness
itself has no being, and re-enter the conventional with that insight,
knowing that this contemplation is done for the sake of saving
sentient beings, and knowing that the real is not reality but a
utility that appears conventionally. Therefore we say "entering from
emptiness" [從空入], and one who attains this contemplation
differentiates the proper medicine according to the disease without
mistaken discriminations.

(Mahāśamathavipaśyanā T1911.23c12, translated by Paul Swanson and published as "Clear Serenity, Quiet Insight," p. 452)
What the worldling knows as "reality" is in fact delusion. "Reality," to the Buddhas, is a utility, a utility used for the saving of sentient beings. To save sentient beings, sometimes they say "the Buddha's nature" or sometimes they say "no nature." Sometimes they say, "All beings have the buddhadhātu," and sometimes they say, "The buddhadhātu is limited to a gotra of certain persons." In the Mahāyāna, the ekayāna teachings are like the Buddhas who teach of the universal buddhadhātu. The pañcagotra teachings are like the Buddhas who say that "Buddhahood" is a specific gotra.
In crossing over to the far shore, in becoming a Buddha, in order to say "no nature" when the utility is required, you must be able to abandon "the Buddha's nature." This is easy because, after all, the Buddha's nature is "no nature."

The many Buddhas have immeasurable implementations of appropriate
methodologies, and the many phenomena have no fixed natures. To
liberate beings, they say "All is real," or they say "All is unreal,"
or they say "All is real and unreal," or they say "All is neither real
nor unreal." "All is real," because, inquiring into the true aspect of
all phenomena, each and every enters into the highest truth of
equality and oneness of characteristic, which is to say with no
characteristic. It is like the many rivers of different colours and
different tastes entering into the great ocean of the same colour and
the same taste.

(Madhyamakaśāstra T1654)
At the end of the day, "the Buddha's nature," just like the notion of and appearance of "the Buddha," is a pointer signifying the Dharma and is not the Dharma itself. Were it the Dharma itself, you could enlighten someone simply by saying "You have the Buddha's nature." Certainly, for some people, they might have such an extraordinary experience. The pointer was good for them. But most people will just say, "That's awfully nice, but what does it mean for me to have the Buddha's nature?" "Buddha-nature" signifies something external to what it is as "a word" or "a name," and that signified thing is arrived at outside of the paths of body, speech, and mind. As such, it is not discarded like a view, nor is it adopted like a view. IMO.

you don't mention permanence anywhere in this answer!

I don't think that specific word needs to be said to answer the question. That being said, you don't have to like the answer I gave.

true. thanks for the asnwer

The idea of 'permanence' is future-bound. Permanence carries the  thought: "That which now is will be so at every point in the future, without exception." That is an illusion: an act of imagining the world as we would like it to be, ignoring that the world will inevitably disappoint us. It generates dukkha.
Buddha nature is not time-bound. It only exists in the present, can only be experienced in the present, and only understands past and future as aspects of the present. People often mistakenly call it 'eternal' or 'permanent', but what they mean to imply is that it is timeless.
When we relinquish all views we give up the worry that it might be better to be somewhere else or somewhen else. It might be, but we are here and now (in Buddha nature) and all movement starts from there.

thank you for your contribution. it wasn't especially helpful, because i didn't mention the future tense, only 'permanence', and if you want to answer the question as you did, i would suggest showing how 'buddha nature is permanent' means 'buddha nature exists in the future'

@again_insane_buddhist: What makes you think Buddha-nature exists in the future? Does the present exist in the future? I think you've misread what I wrote.

i don't think i did, and i didn't mention the future tense. you seemed to be refuting the belief that buddha nature is in the future if it is permanent. that's what i meant in my comment

@again_insane_buddhist: I think you did misread my answer, particularly the first couple of lines, but that's not a big deal. The point is that we cannot talk about 'permanence' without talking about the future. If you consider a moment you'll see the truth in that.


text:
Mereology: does being inside something mean it is inside?

When we speak of an individual having a property we nominalize the
predicate expressing the property we take to be constitutive and
ascribe the instantiating properties to the individual thus created.
There is, however, no deep ontological reason why we could not change
our view of what the constitutive and what the instantiating
properties are, and thereby describe the very same situation in terms
of different individuals and properties. But if we accept this picture
of ontology it is evident that we are not obliged to infer the
existence of a substratum or underlying individual from the existence
of a quality.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/
I take this to mean that the subject and predicate are reversible. So a round apple is both an apple that is round, and a round shape that is an apple. Does it mean then the relation of being "in" another thing is also symmetrical? If a patch of red is in my visual field, then my visual field is inside that red.

Surely an effect is in the action of a cause: then the action of a cause is in its effect. This sounds like 'no causation', and how I read Nagarjuna.
Whatever is essentially in the world can only end if the world does, because the world is also essentially in it. This seems to me to be the meaning of 'rebirth'.

I think it's a mereological question, about parts and wholes: whether or not everything is - in reality - a part of everything else.

Concerning the antisymmetry postulate (18) [Two distinct things cannot be part of each other], the picture is even more complex. For one thing, some authors maintain that the relationship between an object and the stuff it is made of provides a perfectly ordinary counterexample of the antisymmetry of parthood... Sanford (1993: 222) refers to Borges's Aleph as a case in point: “I
saw the earth in the Aleph and in the earth the Aleph once more and
the earth in the Aleph …”. In this case, a plausible reply is simply
that fiction delivers no guidance to conceptual investigations:
conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary
fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability (van Inwagen 1993:
229). Perhaps the same could be said of Fazang's Jeweled Net of Indra,
in which each jewel has every other jewel as part (Jones 2012).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/

thanks for any helpful answers!

But if we accept this picture of ontology it is evident that we are
not obliged to infer the existence of a substratum or underlying
individual from the existence of a quality.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/
I take this to mean that the subject and predicate are reversible.

I believe you are reading the quoted conclusion wrong. Not inferring an individual, which means a subject, from the existence of a quality, doesn’t mean the subject and quality are reversible, it means that there doesn’t have to be a  subject. Or more precisely, it means that the quality’s existence isn’t necessarily proof that there is a subject entity that has that quality.  This logic is based upon a change from the extant paradigmatic understanding of reality as a material dualism to something different:

There is, however, no deep ontological reason why we could not change
our view of what the constitutive and what the instantiating
properties are…

Here it is being explained that a logical analysis is ultimately framed by our paradigm, and paradigms can be switched.

But if we accept this picture of ontology it is evident that we are
not obliged to infer the existence of a substratum or underlying
individual from the existence of a quality.

The quote above is saying that there is no ontological reason why we can’t have a paradigmatic understanding in which there are no entities — subjects —  though there are qualities that can be experienced.
Saying that because I see the color red, there is an entity that is ‘redness’ works in one paradigm, but there is this other paradigm that Nagarjuna was alluding to (Emptiness) in which redness is not an entity, and the appearance of red does not require, nor is proof of, an entity that is red.
I hope this helps.

I was only 60% sure they meant what I said, but your answer didn't change my mind at all. thanks for replying tho

generally speaking, a thing "instantiates" all the properties it has, but only some properties are "constitutive" of an individual. having read the paragraph yet again, I am not pretty sure it means what I said. thanks for helping me rethink

Sounds like some useless, intellectual gymnastics - just apply mindfulness to the thinking process or the doubt that arises instead of getting caught up in concepts.


text:
Making a true promise "on the dharma"
Is making a true promise, on the dharma, good karma?
Not asking about the precepts per se, but it was about precept centred behaviour (a lack of infidelity etc. from me): and now I feel blissed out, independent of how it was perceived etc.. Just curious.

Oh yeah? So, you made a comitment in your mind and then you got all blessed out?

Very good, very good, when in accordance with the Dhamma, and even liberating if kept, good householder. It's like it act-ually works, this way of guided self-blessing and honesty toward one self. And it's not at all bad kamma to break low and harmful earlier promises, for going in contract with more sublime. Such asn for today on, I will abstain from any taking of life, and give up all previous promises requiring such... taking what isn't given... fleshly misconduct... wrong speech... taking intoxicants causing shamelessness...and give up all previous promises requiring such.
mudita
more on it: Is changing your mind same as lying? Breaking promises

haha. it was a promise about the past, not the future!

The is no promise not related to the past, good householder. Every promise happened only in the past. "Will promise..." is also already a past one.


text:
How do Buddhists who believe in a non momentary conventional self during life account for karma without enlightenment?
How do Buddhists who believe in a non momentary conventional self during life account for karma without enlightenment? Specifically, what happens to "my" karma when I die, if I am not enlightened and my karma has not been exhausted?
I'm not asking how to think of cause and result if the lack of self identity extends from moment to moment in this life, because then "my" karma would face a similar obstacle in this life (there being no personal identity from moment to moment means it cannot be "my" karma at all).
Clearly most historical Buddhists believed that karma did not just exist in the suffering I cause others, but that what comes around goes around. So if my life does not, automatically without enlightenment, generate a new one, why doesn't "my" death cut off that cycle?

Buddhism is not a belief system. I never believed in a single thing that was said or written, and thank goodness I didn't! Thank goodness I came to know for myself! :-)

presumably you had to believe in some thing you were taught, unless you are what they call a "solitary buddha" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratyekabuddhay%C4%81na which could make sense but anyway, it's useful to work out what to believe from others, also, even if that amounts to nothing more than stuff about who if anyone is misusing language @Max

Specifically, what happens to "my" karma when I die, if I am not enlightened and my karma has not been exhausted?

If one is not enlightened when death occurs, rebirth will take place. That process cannot be stopped as long as there exists greed, hatred and delusion in the mind.

So if my life does not, automatically without enlightenment, generate a new one, why doesn't "my" death cut off that cycle?

Merely dying is not enough to cut off the defilements that cause beings to be reborn. It takes hard work, effort, right view and persistence in training of the Noble Eightfold Path. As long as there exists defilements (greed, hatred and delusion) in the mind death and rebirth will continue to happen. That's a process have been going on for countless of aeons - even the Buddha said that he couldn't see a discernable beginning of the wandering in Samsara.
This process of death and rebirth can only be stopped when a being becomes enlightened. Why is that? Because enlightenment is what destroys and cuts off the root defilements that bind us to Samsara.

How do Buddhists who believe in a non momentary conventional self

I doubt many Buddhists would believe in a "non momentary" conventional self. I imagine most studied Buddhists would believe there can be a "momentary" conventional self.

during life account for karma without enlightenment?

Karma depends on the delusion of self. There cannot be ordinary (black &/or white) karma without self-belief.

Specifically, what happens to "my" karma when I die, if I am not enlightened and my karma has not been exhausted?

Karma will continue to reap results when the view of "I", "my" & "self" continue to exist. In the Buddha's teaching, only the false view of "I" dies. For example, MN 140 says "death" ("marana") does not occur when "I" is not conceived.

I'm not asking how to think of cause and result if the lack of self
identity extends from moment to moment in this life, because then "my"
karma would face a similar obstacle in this life (there being no
personal identity from moment to moment means it cannot be "my" karma
at all).

Sorry but the above sounds merely intellectual. If strong vexatious thoughts of "I" & "mine" continue to arise, these are personal identity.

Clearly most historical Buddhists

Buddhism became extinct in India and nearly twice became extinct in Sri Lanka. Clearly most historical Buddhists had terrible understanding of Buddhism.

believed that karma did not just exist in the suffering I cause
others, but that what comes around goes around. So if my life does
not, automatically without enlightenment, generate a new one, why
doesn't "my" death cut off that cycle?

Sorry but SN 12.2 defines "death" as the death of "a being" ("satta"). SN 23.2 & SN 5.10 define a "satta" ("being") as merely "strong attachment", "a view", "a convention". Many many suttas say the Arahants do not "die" ("marana"). That is why a synonyn for Nibbana is The Deathless. Buddhists who believe in "rebirth" merely spin around & around in speculative views & questioning forever.

this is a good answer, thank you. i only disagree with the tenor that disbelief is rebirth is beneficial. and you didn't answer my question directly enough to accept the answer


text:
How is Buddhism structured (in Japan)?
How is Buddhism structured? All I really know if you have lay people, priests, monks, and in some places masters or grand masters (I don't know if these are the same), and there are various different variants of the religion, each with their own clergy etc..
So, by analogy, Britain has the arch bishop of Canterbury, and he's the principle "head of the Church" of England. What equivalent formal positions exist in Japanese Buddhism?
Google wasn't much help! All I found out was that e.g. Soto zen has two principle temples, Eihei-ji and Sōji-ji. Do they have heads? Soto's - democratic - head is the "Shūmusōchō"; where can I read about this position?
Are the other subsets of Buddhism structured similarly?

The word 'Buddhism' encompasses an extremely wide and varied set of disciplines. As such, their structures also differ - some not even having a structure, like in some Zen traditions. I wonder if your question is too broad?

yeah i was wondering that, but perhaps not @Max

It is broad, but could be answered shallowly (i.e. without much detail), or in part.

i narrowed focus down to one nation @ChrisW

Good question +1.

My Zen teacher was Tanouye Rotaishi of Chozen-ji. In Japanese Buddhism, lineage is paramount. Tanouye Rotaishi's lineage teacher was Omori Sogen Rotaishi. That lineage continues back to China and ultimately via Ananda to the Buddha. Wikipedia explains the lineage principles of Dharma transmission that guide Japanese Buddhism. As you can see, lineage defines formal relationships.  Major lineages of Zen include Soto and Rinzai.  Informally, as a Rinzai Zen student, I would feel welcome and comfortable in any Zen lineage center. Formally, one relies on the guidance of one's own lineage teacher.
The formal system of lineages is common to Japanese Buddhism as explained in Wikipedia: Buddhism in Japan. Over years the traditions of each lineage have evolved in different ways. The differences are simply accepted and respected as they are: they are independent and different formal ways to teach Buddhism. The  hierarchy of the Church of England is quite different.

how does this relate to temples, the laity, ordination, etc,? i didn't bring up catholicism haha

People often mistake High Church Anglicanism for Catholicism. It's often even called "Anglo-Catholicism." Because you said "Archbishop," OyaMist assumed you meant Catholic. That word is much more common in Catholicism than Protestantism. All in all, other than that tiny inconsequential mistake, it's a good response.

Maybe you don't know that "ji" means "temple" in Japanese. The answer mentioned a temple, and it also mentioned lineage trees, something that was very important in establishing legitimacy in Medieval Japan.

Apologies. I had forgotten that the Church of England is not Catholic (and I went to British schools). Updated answer.

@Caoimhghin it's fine. i tend to not understand it when people answer with stuff i already know, that's all.

By qualification
Discriminator, Supernatural Knoledge Attainer, General Noble One, whole Tipitaka Memorizer, Whole Sutta Memorizer, Nikaya Memorizer, Sutta Memorizer, Vinaya Memorizer
See VN Commentary https://5000y.men/?rm.r.63.55
and Path of Purification https://5000y.men/?rm.r.150.94.visuddhimagga
By ordaining
Later ordained monk must prostrate oneself to the earlier ordained monk if the earlier monk is good in virtue, even the later monk has higher qualification.
See VN https://suttacentral.net/pli-tv-kd16/en/horner-brahmali?reference=none&highlight=false#Kd.16.6

i am interested not in historical answers  but in the contemporary / modern world, so stuff like "the archbishop of canterbury". i imagine the info exists in e.g. japanese language wikipedia

not asking about spiritual attainments, but formal positions. you seem to have listed obscure spiritual possessions we can label ourselves as enjoying. that's not really what i had in mind

It's depending on each country. However, we still use same as what I answered above  in  strictly theravada nowaday.

ok well i kinda believe you, so i apologise for the hasty vote if necessary

@Bonn. I think your answer is great so I upvoted it +1.


text:
How does annihilationism posit a self?

According to the Brahmajala Sutta, Ajita propounded Ucchedavada (the
Doctrine of Annihilation after death) and Tam-Jivam-tam-sariram-vada
(the doctrine of identity of the soul and body), which denied the
separate existence of an eternal soul.

Annihilationism is usually thought of as one extreme, which assumes an atman. But if atman is permanent, I don't easily see the error here.

Why is it a self view?
Can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman?
If not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching, and is it still Ucchedavada?

I don't understand the last sentence. I guess that if "atman" means "self" then "positing an atman" means "positing a self", whether that atman is assumed to be permanent ("eternalist") or finite ("annihilationist").

NOTE: "atman" is not used in the DN, MN, KN, SN, AN Pali Nikayas. Atman is a Hindu term.

that's interesting thanks. do you understand the question @OyaMist

Yes. Ruben2020's answer makes total sense to me. DN1 is the reference to study. DN1 explores all the variations of your question and explains the issues thoroughly.

it may "make sense" but it doesn't answer the question very well (as i tried to explain in my comments to it) @OyaMist oh forget it

specifically: why is it a self view? can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman? if not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching? is it still Ucchedavada? @OyaMist

Annihilationism is like saying Santa Claus exists now but would cease to exist later. Anatta is like saying there's really no Santa Claus, although it may appear at times to exist, albeit falsely. Eternalism and annihilationism are two variant views that are like asserting the truth of Santa Claus, while anatta denies it.

There's a very detailed description in DN 1.
Eternalism is the view that the self, atta or atman, is different from the body, and is eternal. When the body is destroyed, the self moves on to another body. But the self is never destroyed, is permanent and eternal.
Annihilation is the view where the self is identical with the body, and so it exists while the body exists and it is destroyed when the body is destroyed.
Or if someone holds the view that the self is a subtler body that exists when the physical body exists and will be destroyed with the destruction of the physical body, then that's also annihilationism.
Partial-eternalism is the view that either some beings are eternal (like God) while others are not, or some beings are eternal but could lose their immortality by corruption, or that consciousness or mind is eternal while body is not.
The above are all variants of self-view.
The Buddha taught that the self is a dependently originated emergent phenomena, a mental idea, that changes from time to time, depending on conditions. It's neither permanent nor standalone. Other things like body, mind, consciousness are all dependently originated conditioned phenomena.

yes but why does Ajita posit an atman? i'm not saying he doesn't. i'm confused why he is meant to

@again_insane_buddhist atman here just means "self". The self can be imposed on anything. For e.g. if I hit you, you may say "why do you hit me?" instead of "why do you hit my body?" You could make body identical with self. When body is destroyed, self is destroyed. A person could think that he will cease to exist when he dies. The Buddha did not want to confuse Vacchagotta in SN 44.10: "And if I  were to answer that there is no self, (he) would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"

so annihiltionism etc. need not posit a self?

@again_insane_buddhist Annihilationism posits a self that exists now and will cease to exist in the future.

what is it about the annihilationist belief which must posit the self?

@again_insane_buddhist Annihilationist view is just one of the variants of self-view.

why is it a self view? can you support Ucchedavada as well as anatman? if not why not? if it's because Ucchedavada explicitly posits a self, what happens when you remove that from the teaching? is it still Ucchedavada?

all you've really said is "annihilationism posits a self because it posits it self" and then added some basic context.

@again_insane_buddhist Saying eternalism and annihilationism are two variants of self view, is just like saying a pigeon and a penguin are two types of birds. You cannot ask, "if I remove bird, is penguin still a penguin?"

no that's not the case it's a poor analogy. any belief can be altered, including views about a self. think about it. what is buddhism without anatman makes sense, though it may be difficult to swallow. beliefs, living beliefs etc., don't follow the logic of biological phylums

Can you please change my username to "Order of the Lotus Irelia"? I can't change it for 30 days. Thank you.

In the context of Buddhist teachings, however, what matters is not the
permanence or impermanence of the object of self-identification but
the very fact of self-identification. Thus Buddhists view both
sassatavada and ucchedavada as two varieties of atmavada... due to craving for non-being (vibhava-tanha), the desire to be completely annihilated at death. From the Buddhist point of view the reasoning for this may be conjectured as follows: because ucchedavada rejects survival, it tends to encourage man to lead a life without being burdened by a sense of moral responsibility or tormented by moral inhibitions. Therefore it abhors any prospect of after-death existence, as it implies the possibility of moral retribution

https://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha263.htm
Seems fair. I don't become nothing when I die, because I cannot identify it as "my" death.
Whether we can conventionally believe in self annihilation is not clear to me.

This is a better answer

I should just google these things. This source adds that annihilationists believe in a self now, and the eternalists one in the future.

nb i have not read this book, and it may go on at some length about the difference with madhyamaka etc.

It's because they hold that something existed for some time, 'a person'. The body is not the same now as what the body was when one was an infant but they say it's the same 'person'.
They posit an annihilation of the existent self only, the body they say will break up, heat will dissipate and consciousness is but a conditional property of matter which begins when person begins and ends when person ends.
They use the idea of self or 'person' to tie mind & body together in a messed up way where they treat mentality as if it is like smoke produced of rubbing two sticks but they don't conserve this property in any way unlike conservation of other material properties such as heat, mass, motion & etc and it apparently is made out of nothing and becomes nothing.
Of course it's philosophically impossible to somehow conserve or transform what only you could observe to something measurable by another person when you no longer exist...
Therefore they are called 'annihilationists, those who posit annihilation of an existent being', they make body & mind personable but won't be able to pin down the being as a truth & reality.
Without the idea of self they will have to admit that body & mind change as they persist and that cessation of mind is not evident and that it ought to be assumed to change as it persists even through the breakup of the body.


text:
Acts of evil by "aryans": how can you explain them?
It is well known that there are periodic crises in Buddhism, usually - it seems - involving sexual misconduct.
I also know that e.g. Vasubandhu claimed that aryans - even if they could still have sexual desire - were incapable of sexual misconduct.
Does that mean that everyone involved in these crises are complete fakes or have retrogressed? Quite famously, an important Tibetan llama was even convicted of child rape: can anyone defend the claim any a "tulku" of this sort is a Buddha behind bars?

Related: How would one recognise if a Buddhist group is a cult?

Ariyans cannot perform acts of evil. That is why they are called 'Ariyans'. The suttas say:

"And which are the four factors of stream-entry with which he is
endowed?
"There is the case where the disciple of the noble ones is endowed
with verified confidence in the Awakened One: 'Indeed, the Blessed One
is worthy & rightly self-awakened, consummate in knowledge & conduct,
well-gone, an expert with regard to the world, unexcelled as a trainer
for those people fit to be tamed, the Teacher of divine & human
beings, awakened, blessed.'
"He is endowed with verified confidence in the Dhamma: 'The Dhamma is
well-expounded by the Blessed One, to be seen here & now, timeless,
inviting verification, pertinent, to be realized by the wise for
themselves.'
"He is endowed with verified confidence in the Sangha: 'The Sangha of
the Blessed One's disciples who have practiced well... who have
practiced straight-forwardly... who have practiced methodically... who
have practiced masterfully — in other words, the four pairs, the eight
individuals — they are the Sangha of the Blessed One's disciples:
worthy of gifts, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of
respect, the incomparable field of merit for the world.'
"He is endowed with virtues that are appealing to the noble ones:
untorn, unbroken, unspotted, unsplattered, liberating, praised by the
wise, untarnished, leading to concentration.
"These are the four factors of stream-entry with which he is endowed.
AN 10.92

Yes, it does mean that everyone involved in these crises are complete fakes or have retrogressed.

I was under the assumption, or at least from what i have read that the qualities of a sotapanna, specifically the quality of never falling to lower rebirth is only because of the cessation of the first of the 3 fetters and the inability to perform the 5 heinous actions that would cause such lower rebirth. I have never read anywhere that a sotapanna automatically has pure stainless sila. Meaning a sotapanna may still be able to lie or commit adultery or even kill, just that they would not be controlled by kleshas to do such actions and especially not the 5 heinous actions.

sorry your ideas are unsubstantiated despite being very common among intellectual buddhists

When the Buddha talks about an arhat (or aryan in the Tibetan), he is referring to an inner state: an attitude that someone naturally develops as they walk further and further down the path.
When lay people talk about an arhat (or aryan) they usually mean it in terms of an outer status: a label acquired by someone due to long practice and broad respect in the community. The label becomes a sigil or a fetish; it is ascribed to someone without foundation in the person's actual (inner) attainment.
Most people rise to the ascription, because even if they haven't yet attained realization, that is their earnest desire. They take care in their use of the label. Some people lose their way under the ascription, becoming attached to their own importance and the rewards they feel they should receive for the status.
The Tibetan tradition has been particularly vulnerable to the latter problem because the Tibetan religious culture has been so thoroughly uprooted from its ancestral home. The combination of disrupted lineages and broad sympathy and support from Western lay communities created a fertile ground for egoism and misappropriation. That will settle itself out over time, I imagine...

Arya means noble person, one of the stages of  progress to liberation. Sotapanna onward to arhant.

@Remyla: Ah, thanks. Not a word I've seen before (in this context) and the web seemed to imply equivalence. I"ll have to think about whether that affects my answer.

One of the downfalls of labelling so-called spiritual attainments - like aryan - is that it seems to define a particular set of parameters regarding human behaviour or that certain behaviours are lost or given-up in some way. This is where orthodoxy should get real with itself. It is true that certain behaviours can fall away, but such is the complexity of the human mind that those behaviours don't's always disappear in-line with a set of religious ideas or models; karmic formations can be very complex.
The simplest explanation for evil behaviour is always the best: we consider ourselves to be made-up of the body. Having given ourselves to that consideration, we feel separated from everything and everybody else. In this state of separation, we feel vulnerable and afraid. It is this insecurity that gives rise to all sorts of unwholesome behaviours in the world, regardless of whether you claim to be an aryan or not.
Therefore, the stream-entrant - while a moderately significant understanding - has only realized very little.


text:
Is belief in eternalism completely useless?
Is belief in karma due to eternalism completely useless?
I do not know why those without self view believe in karma, but belief in karma is said to be useful, so does it matter if your metaphysics turns out to be mistaken? In which case, is eternalism a skilful means?
More generally, I don't understand why lack of self view on paper, as an abstract belief you assent to, is very interesting or helpful. After-all, few people today believe in a soul, even a spirit.

Is belief in eternalism completely useless?

Yes, it's completely useless. It will only keep the mind in delusion and away from clarity, wakefulness and the realization of wisdom.

"In his effort to master kamma in such a way as to bring kamma to an end, the Buddha discovered that he had to abandon the contexts of personal narrative and cosmology in which the issue of kamma first presented itself. Both these forms of understanding deal in categories of being and non-being, self and others, but the Buddha found that it was impossible to bring kamma to an end if one thought in such terms. For example, narrative and cosmological modes of thinking would lead one to ask whether the agent who performed an act of kamma was the same as the person experiencing the result, someone else, both, or neither. If one answered that it was the same person, then the person experiencing the result would have to identify not only with the actor, but also with the mode of action, and thus would not be able to gain release from it. If one answered that it was another person, both oneself and another, or neither, then the person experiencing the result would see no need to heighten the skill or understanding of his/her own kamma in the present, for the experience of pleasure and pain was not his or her own full responsibility. In either case, the development of the fourth type of kamma would be aborted [SN12:67, Udana6.6]."

~ Thanissaro Bhikkhu "Kamma & the Ending of Kamma" https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Wings/Section0009.html

The false view of eternalism is not skillful and not good, however, a belief in a permanent self can be repurposed for good.
A view of a continuously existing self can be used to generate the path to liberation, using the contemplation below. Therefore, it's skillful means. It's typically targeted at those with self view.

(1) “This noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am not the only one who is
subject to old age, not exempt from old age. All beings that come and
go, that pass away and undergo rebirth, are subject to old age; none
are exempt from old age.’ As he often reflects on this theme, the path
is generated. He pursues this path, develops it, and cultivates it. As
he does so, the fetters are entirely abandoned and the underlying
tendencies are uprooted.
(2) “This noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am not the only one who is
subject to illness, not exempt from illness. All beings that come and
go, that pass away and undergo rebirth, are subject to illness; none
are exempt from illness.’ As he often reflects on this theme, the path
is generated. He pursues this path, develops it, and cultivates it. As
he does so, the fetters are entirely abandoned and the underlying
tendencies are uprooted.
(3) “This noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am not the only one who is
subject to death, not exempt from death. All beings that come and go,
that pass away and undergo rebirth, are subject to death; none are
exempt from death.’ As he often reflects on this theme, the path is
generated. He pursues this path, develops it, and cultivates it. As he
does so, the fetters are entirely abandoned and the underlying
tendencies are uprooted.
(4) “This noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am not the only one who
must be parted and separated from everyone and everything dear and
agreeable. All beings that come and go, that pass away and undergo
rebirth, must be parted and separated from everyone and everything
dear and agreeable.’ As he often reflects on this theme, the path is
generated. He pursues this path, develops it, and cultivates it. As he
does so, the fetters are entirely abandoned and the underlying
tendencies are uprooted.
(5) “This noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am not the only one who is
the owner of one’s kamma, the heir of one’s kamma; who has kamma as
one’s origin, kamma as one’s relative, kamma as one’s resort; who will
be the heir of whatever kamma, good or bad, that one does. All beings
that come and go, that pass away and undergo rebirth, are owners of
their kamma, heirs of their kamma; all have kamma as their origin,
kamma as their relative, kamma as their resort; all will be heirs of
whatever kamma, good or bad, that they do.’ As he often reflects on
this theme, the path is generated. He pursues this path, develops it,
and cultivates it. As he does so, the fetters are entirely abandoned
and the underlying tendencies are uprooted.
AN 5.57

how does this answer relate to the topic of "eternalism"?

There is definitely a sutta that says annihilationism is the most beneficial of outsider wrong views because at least annihilationists are expected to have developed some dispassion.
Where as I have never read a sutta praising eternalism.


text:
Unwholesome Sankharas Emerging From Dhamma Practice
What unwholesome sankharas can be created from too much focus on dhamma concepts, reading and intellectual pursuits, and practice?
What kind of results do those sankharas produce?
What blockades are created?
What are the common associative thinking patterns and behaviours that emerge out of persistent preoccupation with dhamma concepts?
In the Mahayana tradition, Japanese Zen Master Hakuin, has this to say:

“People see it as if it is far away. What a pity! They are like a man
who, standing in water, complains of thirst”

In the Theravada tradition, they have a similar outlook, gesturing their practitioners to not become fixated on the signs and features of their perceptions, which should include dhamma concepts. Although helpful at the outset, a hindrance may develop, and this is Theravada's recognition of that hindrance alongside many others.
In my own understanding, I have this to say about it:

The Plateau of Diminishing Returns
It is only when all effort has been exhausted that the seeker lays down their ordinance and armaments amounting to their spiritual techniques, their religious paraphernalia, and their pride. This might happen to be rather elongated and messy affair, but never mind.
From here onwards, one becomes strikingly honest with oneself and receives absolutely nothing in return.

I think that one of the problems, or at least one of the symptoms, may be people arguing.

Māna
Māna (Sanskrit, Pali; Tibetan: nga rgyal) is a Buddhist term that may be translated as "pride", "arrogance", or "conceit". It is defined as an inflated mind that makes whatever is suitable, such as wealth or learning, to be the foundation of pride. It creates the basis for disrespecting others and for the occurrence of suffering

Some people learn the Dhamma to use it to criticize others or argue with others.

“Here, bhikkhus, some misguided men learn the Dhamma—discourses,
stanzas, expositions, verses, exclamations, sayings, birth stories,
marvels, and answers to questions—but having learned the Dhamma, they
do not examine the meaning of those teachings with wisdom. Not
examining the meaning of those teachings with wisdom, they do not gain
a reflective acceptance of them. Instead they learn the Dhamma only
for the sake of criticising others and for winning in debates, and
they do not experience the good for the sake of which they learned the
Dhamma. Those teachings, being wrongly grasped by them, conduce to
their harm and suffering for a long time. Why is that? Because of the
wrong grasp of those teachings.
MN 22

Or some may learn the Dhamma to teach it for worldly gain.

They assemble the community
for business rather than Dhamma.
They teach the Dhamma to others
for gain, not for the goal.
Thag 16.10

And what are the six kinds of renunciation distress? The distress coming from the longing that arises in one who is filled with longing for the unexcelled liberations when — experiencing the inconstancy of those very forms, their change, fading, & cessation — he sees with right discernment as it actually is that all forms, past or present, are inconstant, stressful, subject to change and he is filled with this longing: 'O when will I enter & remain in the dimension that the noble ones now enter & remain in?' This is called renunciation distress. (Similarly with sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, & ideas.) Salayatana vibhanga

There are also states where one would neglect practicing in favor of thinking about the training.
Conceit, doubt & restlessness in regards to the training...
Things like this i guess

The following teachings create sankharas:

And what is the right view with effluents, siding with merit, resulting in acquisitions? 'There is what is given, what is offered, what is sacrificed. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions. There is this world & the next world. There is mother & father. There are spontaneously reborn beings; there are contemplatives & brahmans who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.' This is the right view with effluents, siding with merit, resulting in acquisitions.
MN 117


text:
Namarupa as 'mentality & materiality', why or why not?
I see some teachers express 'namarupam' as 'mentality & materiality' and want to hear what you have to say on this matter.

I think we had some answers on this topic. Please use the search.

Related or perhaps duplicate of: How to reconcile Mahayana ideas of "nama-rupa" with the Pali definition?

Id keep this because it is more precise of a question

Also, https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/31048/comparing-chinese-agama-the-bundles-of-reeds-simile-with-pali-nalakalapiyo-sut

Namarupa is literally translated as name-and-form.
Based on the definition from SN 12.2, name is mind and form is body. Together, name-and-form refers to, what I would call, the mind-body system.

“And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition,
contact, attention: this is called name. The four great elements and
the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form.
Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form.
SN 12.2

Consciousness is the mind-body connection or mind-body interface.

“Name, reverends, is one end. Form is the second end. Consciousness is
the middle. And craving is the seamstress … That’s how a mendicant
directly knows … an end of suffering in this very life.”
AN 6.61

That's further supported by the following.

“And what, bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are these six classes of
consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness,
nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness,
mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness.
SN 12.2

“The six interior sense fields, reverends, are one end. The six
exterior sense fields are the second end. Consciousness is the middle.
And craving is the seamstress … That’s how a mendicant directly knows
… an end of suffering in this very life.”
AN 6.61

Name-and-form (mind-body) has a mutually dependent relationship with the six types of consciousness according to SN 12.67, like two sheaves of reed leaning on each other.
To put it another way, the mind-body system (name-and-form) depends on the mind-body connection (consciousness) and the mind-body connection (consciousness) depends on the mind-body system (name-and-form).

I think materiality-mentality is very wrong.

It's not the literal translation
Nama doesn't include consciousness/intellect/mind per sutta definitions.
How is 'contact' mentality same as attention?
If materiality is one end, mentality the other end and consciousness is in the middle then is consciousness apart from mentality as much as it is apart from materiality?

It's certainly wrong as i see it


text:
An example of Papañca?
Is the following anyhow related to 'Papañca' in the apparent 'proliferation' as you understand it?

And which are the 18 craving-verbalizations dependent on what is internal? There being 'I am,' there comes to be 'I am here,' there comes to be 'I am like this' ... 'I am otherwise' ... 'I am bad' ... 'I am good' ... 'I might be' ... 'I might be here' ... 'I might be like this' ... 'I might be otherwise' ... 'May I be' ... 'May I be here' ... 'May I be like this' ... 'May I be otherwise' ... 'I will be' ... 'I will be here' ... 'I will be like this' ... 'I will be otherwise.' These are the 18 craving-verbalizations dependent on what is internal.

Could you otherwise point out what is Papañca as you think of it?

Is the following anyhow related to 'Papañca' in the apparent 'proliferation' as you understand it?

Yes, Papanca and self-identity always go hand in hand. Ven. Thanissaro in his MN 18 translation gave a pretty good elaboration on what Papanca means:

As one writer has noted, the word papañca has had a wide variety of meanings in Indian thought, with only one constant: in Buddhist philosophical discourse it carries negative connotations, usually of falsification and distortion. The word itself is derived from a root that means diffuseness, spreading, proliferating. The Pali Commentaries define papañca as covering three types of thought: craving, conceit, and views. They also note that it functions to slow the mind down in its escape from samsara. Because its categories begin with the objectifying thought, "I am the thinker," I have chosen to render the word as "objectification," although some of the following alternatives might be acceptable as well: self-reflexive thinking, reification, proliferation, complication, elaboration, distortion. The word offers some interesting parallels to the postmodern notion of logocentric thinking, but it's important to note that the Buddha's program of deconstructing this process differs sharply from that of postmodern thought. ~~ MN 18 ~~

I answered a very similar question to this a while ago here. That answer quoted a treatise that is very influential in East Asian Buddhism, namely the Madhyamakaśāstra. In the Madhyamakaśāstra, the author, Venerable Vimalākṣa, defines "prapañca" (translated here as "frivolous pondering") in two ways. From the linked post, abridged:

Because [Nirvāṇa] is characterized by quiet tranquility, it cannot be frivolously pondered as a frivolous pondering. Those are of two kinds. First is the argument from emotion, and the second is the argument from opinion. Via the middle, there are none of these two frivolous ponderings. Two frivolous ponderings (being) naught, there is neither agreement with nor dissent from. "Not another" and undifferentiated from itself, it is described as "reality."

I comment in the linked post:

The "argument from emotion" refers to argumentation rooted,
ultimately, in ignorance and suffering, as well as craving and greed.
We want to live forever. An "argument from emotion" to this effect
would be "Isn't it awful to believe that people just die? Surely it's
better (and makes me feel better) if ordinary persons, or maybe just
the Buddhas, were immortal." An "argument from opinion" refers to
personal theories as well as to secondary theses derived from primary
doctrines. An argument of this sort would be "The Buddha must exist
after death, because it is said that he doesn't not exist after
death."

I hope this is useful to you.

Here, and example:

Is the following anyhow related to 'Papañca' in the apparent 'proliferation' as you understand it?
Could you otherwise point out what is Papañca as you think of it?

Or what ever undertaking wishing to nail something down, doing it real (lobha, dosa, moha connected), under ones control.