text:
What is the difference between Theravada "papanca" with regard to objects and Mahayana "selflessness of phenomena"?
In a previous question I asked whether the Theravada posits the selflessness of phenomena?
Where the best answer I understood to essentially state that it does not. At least, it did sound like there was an important difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. That is, Theravada regards the self of persons as not truly existent while the self of phenomena may or may not be. Further, the latter is not deemed an important question. This is not in agreement with the Mahayana madhyamaka schools AFAIK who I think near uniformly disagree.

In my opinion, the Theravada view according to the Pali suttas imply
that:

The self (of persons) is not truly existent.

Whether non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side or
not, is (probably) not important towards the path to the end of
suffering. (See the Parable of the Poisoned Arrow, Parable of the
Simsapa Leaves and the Discourse on the Unconjecturables)

However, in a comment to this recent answer it was asserted by the same that 'papanca' of objects is essentially equivalent to what the Mahayana schools call the selflessness of persons. I'm confused as this seems to be in tension with the previous. What is the solution or is it just my misunderstanding?
Is there any crucial difference between the emptiness of persons and emptiness of objects where the former is to be regarded as definitely non-truly existent while the latter question is not important? Is there some Pali suttas which will illustrate this difference in emptiness between the two selves? Is the 'papanca' of the self of persons different from the 'papanca' of the self of phenomena? What am I missing?
Isn't it the case that SN 22.95 is talking about this 'papanca' of phenomena? Doesn't it compare it to an illusion? If so, then on what basis is it concluded that whether phenomena are truly existent is immaterial in Theravada?

As i understand it papanca refers to the activity of applying mind to some object and then exploring whatever is related to the theme of the object by association, so it's kind of like thinking about one thing and leaping on to the next thing associated with the former, there is a continuation where one is ie reminded of something and dwells reminiscing the memories. One makes more of what is similar, like having 'pa' one gets 'pan' and there activity is papancazing.

I don't know the etymology but pañca means five

@Letsbuddhism PTS dictionary says -- (in its P. meaning uncertain whether identical with Sk. prapañca (pra+pañc to spread out; meaning “expansion, diffuseness, manifoldedness”; cp. papañceti & papañca 3) more likely, as suggested by etym. & meaning of Lat. im-ped-iment-um, connected with pada, thus perhaps originally “pa-pad-ya, ” i.e. what is in front of (i.e. in the way of) the feet (as an obstacle)

Sounds loosely close to how i understand it, i like the term 'conceptual proliferation' for english and i think it fits the discourses well. I conceived it as literally 'fi-fiving' so one make five out of 'fi', idk, definitely difficult to translate but not difficult to understand i think. What one sees that one papancizes about.

That's easy.
I take "self of phenomena" as being the same as "intrinsic essence" (svabhava) of Madhyamaka, confirmed by this answer.
In this answer (written 15 Aug 2018), I thought that the Madhyamaka
"everything is empty of intrinsic essence" meant that everything does not truly exist on its own. A chair is a convention, yes, but whether a chair really exists or not, is not of interest in Theravada.  A chair is of course compounded and conditioned (sankhara). The concept of a chair is of course constructed by papanca (reification or conceptualization or objectification-classification).
On that same day, I was exploring the topic of whether Theravada self and Mahayana svabhava are related in this question.
Then a few days later on 21 Aug 2018, I figured out the connection and asked a question, to which Andrei wrote this answer which I quote:

Shunyata refers to the fact that everything is an abstraction,
simplification, subjective observation, and that in fact everything
appears from interaction of a bunch of processes (known in this
context as "causes and conditions") - including the process of
perception. Shunyata and Sankhara are closely related.
While Papanca refers to the process by which we take that empty stuff,
those appearances, and because of ignorance assign to them the status
of real, objective, clearly delineated things.

Uhuh! Then I got it. "Everything is empty of intrinsic essence" does not mean that a chair doesn't exist at all, ontologically speaking. It simply means that a chair doesn't exist the way the mind thinks it does.
Then on 28 Aug 2018, I connected the emptiness of Theravada to the emptiness of Mahayana through Snp 4.14 in this question.
So, now my understanding is that they are related.
Fast forward, this answer from 23 May 2020 would answer this question too:

But how does this relate to Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka? According to
Madhyamaka, all things are empty of intrinsic essence (svabhava).
The beautiful form of a human being, is such a thing, which is empty
of intrinsic essence i.e. it is empty of the essence given to it by
your mind. If papanca is like baking, then svabhava seems to be the
cake.
In other words, Nagarjuna is talking about the mental concept of
things, and further, he generalizes to cover everything, even physical
objects and Nirvana. If you see that Nagarjuna is talking about the
mental concept of things, then you would find that he is not
contradicting the Buddha.
To my understanding, Nagarjuna is not saying that the world is an
illusion, rather he is saying that your mental model of the world is
an illusion. To think about anything in the world, you actually need
to have a mental model of it.
This can be further linked to anatta. Objectification-classification
(papanca) assigns intrinsic essence (svabhava) to things, relative to
its relationship to the mental idea of the self (atta), which itself
has intrinsic essence (svabhava), given to it by
objectification-classification (papanca). According to Snp 4.14, when
you put an end to "I am the thinker", the root of
objectification-classification (papanca), you will end craving and
clinging. And by this, you end suffering.

And then I wrote this answer on 1 Apr 2021 which also discusses this in detail.
Also interesting is that mental models are called "the world" (see this question) in some Pali suttas. Andrei explained the difference between "The World" and "The All" there.
I summarized in this answer:

So, the "world" of SN 12.44 corresponds to the world of mental
formations (sankhara loka) arising from mental proliferations
(papanca), that is derived from the feelings (vedana) coming from
the contact of consciousness with the six sense media and their sense
objects (The All).

So, in this sense, Theravada does say that everything in "the world" doesn't truly exist at all. So, the chair in "the world" doesn't exist too.

Ok, from all I can tell this looks pretty much how I understand things as well. I still think your answer from 15 Aug 2018 doesn't "sound" correct, but it could be just mere words getting in the way. Like, for me I'd say it is both true that "everything does not truly exist on its own" AND that "Everything is empty of intrinsic essence" does not mean that a chair doesn't exist at all, ontologically speaking.

It seems it is getting harder and harder for me to decipher any real disagreements about doctrine with either you or Andrei once we put aside clumsy words :)

Perhaps you misunderstood the comment in question,

The mental idea of the self is a type of papanca and non-self objects are also papanca.

I don't read it as saying that, "papanca is selflessness of phenomena".
I read it as saying that, "papanca is (somehow selfish) mental ideas" -- about (any and all) objects, including both the so-called "self" and/or about any other ("non-self") object.

In case it matters I think it's not making an assertion about things -- i.e. an assertion like, "Everything has no self", meaning not just anatta (not my-self) but also even sunyata (not it-self)" -- and is instead commenting on how people tend to think about things/everything.
I think it's used to imply that thoughts are not only self-centered but also "diffuse" or abstract -- I guess like, going from perception of a specific "rock" or "stone" to theories about rock in general.
And it seems to be used colloquially to criticise people's theorizing about experiences.

Perhaps you are right, but he also says this: " What you call "selflessness of phenomena" is called papanca (reification or conceptualization or objectification-classification) in Theravada."

@YesheTenley I have corrected it now in my answer. "Self of phenomena" = "intrinsic essence" (svabhava). If papanca (reification or conceptualization or objectification-classification) is the process of baking, then svabhava is the cake.

I can't answer as to the Mahayana comparison, but afaik the pali discourses never say that the self is like this or like that.
The method states that everything is not self and that a self can not be established to be a truth or reality.
The discourses also speak of a doctrine of self with which beings are yoked.
This is analogical to people holding in mind knowledge or a doctrine of names, surnames & first names, etc
These names are designations for people & things but the things which are named aren't the name and a name of a person cannot be pinned down as a truth or reality as a body can be, a person can live without a name not without a body.
In regards to that one can say that all things are not their name seeing how they exist whether they are named & however they are named.
It doesn't mean that the name of things is something apart from things that are named because we are naming the naming as well as doing it, so there is a truth of naming but that truth is likewise not the name you give it.
This is similar to the difference between a true statement and a lie, both are a statement and exist in as far as the statement exists but the truthful statement refers to something that is existent independently of the statement whereas the false statement can not be said to be referring to truth or reality. This doesn't mean that lies are not included in reality because there is certainly the truth of lying but all reality is not lies and lies can not be pinned down as truth & reality.
In Theravada, there are elements that can be known to be a truth & reality and they are all not a self, incl the word 'self'. It's like the word Buddha is not a Buddha.
The word has an expression, a meaning, and a referent but the referent for this word 'self' will always be a convention as Ruben puts it, I call it abstraction, the abstraction isn't nothing but it is certainly not what we think it is, ie the fist/lap or a fan spinning so that you see a disc where there is no disc if the fan stops spinning you see blades where was a disc.
If a person was to think that all territory which isn't his kingdom was his kingdom, that would be grasping with the wrong view on his account and we could demonstrate that all the territories are not his kingdom to smart ppl.
Likewise, it is with elements which smart people can agree upon as truth & reality, these too can be demonstrably shown to be not personal & not a self.
In Theravada, it is closer to the truth if one says 'what feels is 'feeling', rather than 'a self feels' or that 'a person' feels', although one can speak in conventional terms as well and it is necessary because elements tied to delusion depend on that grasping with the wrong view, so we have to understand what lines of reasoning prompt those.
Technically there is no need for the term person to describe what is there because feeling feels, consciousness cognizes, discernment discerns, the intellect knows, thinking thinks, contact is of the three, body disintegrates &, etc
However one can also think about what is there having grasped with the wrong view and thus abstract what is there in terms of elements being personal.
If one does this then it's called 'being taken in', being taken in a cause for being shook, therefore one shouldn't be taken in and remain unshaken, discerning qualities present right there.
One can entertain this idea of grasping with the wrong view without agreeing with it in order to understand it's coming into play & the effects of papancizing based on it.


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Why did Sakka steal the Visuddhimagga three times?
Why did Sakka steal the Visuddhimagga three times according to the legend -- was it because Visuddhimagga erroneously stated that it couldn't be done by a sotapanna??
Quoting from the Introduction to the English translation:

The reply
was: 'I have come to translate the Buddha's Dispensation into Magadhan'. The senior
elder told him, 'If so, then construe the Three Pitakas upon the text beginning "When a
wise man, established well in virtue ..."'. He began the work that day, the stars being
favourable, and wrote very quickly. When finished, he put it aside and went to sleep.
Meanwhile Sakka Ruler of Gods abstracted the book. The elder awoke, and missing it,
he wrote another copy very fast by lamplight; then he put it aside and slept. Sakka
abstracted that too. The elder awoke, and not seeing his book, he wrote a third copy very
fast by lamplight and wrapped it in his robe. Then he slept again. While he was asleep
Sakka put the other two books beside him, and when he awoke he found all three copies.
He took them to the senior elder and told him what had happened. When they were read
over there was no difference even in a single letter. Thereupon the senior elder gave
permission for the translating of the Buddha's Dispensation. From then on the elder was
known to the people of Ceylon by the name of Buddhaghosa.

the reference is probably in the intro  of vism. somewhere.  The obvious reason is the fabricated legendary origin is to show how supposedly awesome Buddhaghosa was.

To be sure of something, we often double-check. And to be extra sure we triple-check. For example, consider solving a math problem. If we only solve the problem once, we are not quite sure we did it correctly. There are many steps in a math problem and they ALL have to be correct. What should we do?
Well, if we start with a clean slate and solve the problem again in its entirety and arrive at the same answer, then our confidence increases. Double checking improves confidence. And triple-checking from a clean slate provides us even more assurance of correctness, especially if all three answers agree exactly.
Note that for thorough checking we don't merely glance at our first answer. Instead, we start from a clean slate and do the entire problem once again. Such care and caution is commonly exercised when we, for example, build rockets that should not blow up. When a single O-ring fails, a rocket can destroy lives. We have to be mindful of every single part of our answer.
So it can be understood that Sakka here is simply helping out by "stealing" the thrice-written book to give Buddhaghosa a "clean slate". And by writing the exactly same thing three times over from a blank slate, Sakka has helped prove Buddhaghosa's deep and clear knowledge. In fact, the books are returned for that very same verification. By "stealing" the books, Sakka proved that Buddhaghosa was relying on mindful memory instead of simply copying what he had already written.

FYI it's not clear to me that the objects were stolen (i.e. that the act was "stealing"):

It might be arguable that the items didn't "belong to" Buddhaghosa -- not that I want to argue that, but there have been previous discussions on this site about whether the Buddha-Dhamma "belongs to" anyone in particular.

According to the Vinaya (quoting from here),

The act of taking what is not given, even when one perceives it as not given, counts as theft only if one’s intention is to steal it. Thus, as the non-offense clauses say, a bhikkhu incurs no offense if he takes an object temporarily or on trust.

According to the quote in the OP this wasn't exactly "on trust" but it was, clearly, only "temporarily".

According to Mahavamsa, It it because the god wanted to show others that the venerable Buddhaghosa was competent enough to translate the ancient Sinhala commentary.
Ven. Buddhaghosa was said to had re-written it again three times without even a spelling mistake, so that the Sangha in Mahavihara could be able to conclude that he was competent enough.

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How difficult is it to be a foreign monk in Asia?
I wonder about the practicalities of being a foreign monk in Asia, especially Theravada-majority countries.
In particular;
About the Visa arrangements, can this at all be handled without much stress by one who doesn't use money?
What about the rule of not driving a car or using vehicles, is this a rule that can be kept by one in such a predicament?
Anything relevant is of interest.

Asia is a very big continent with 48 countries. You may want to narrow the question down to one country or a few countries.

Related: What is the visa process for ordaining foreigner monks in Sri Lanka?

Well it's not like one can ordain as Theravadin in China or Kazakhstan etc. South East i guess. I don't have a particular country in mind at this point.

Other topics with some mention of visas: Myanmar -- Nepal -- Sri Lanka

Good householder,
one who went forth under the Gem is everywhere outside the Buddhaparisa a foreigner. One who went forth does not relay on 'rights' or demands, but has just the Gems as refuge and receives what is given without strings toward world. One who has gone forth abstains from using vehicles, dwells in the Vihara of metta for all. One who has gone forth does not desire to (be)come and arrive anywhere in this world, does not seek protection where non can be found. Less are those ready and in firm faith of going forth, for deals for another home usually seems more secure to them.
Nothing faster as one barefooted on the right track.
Does one seeks another home or go for leaving it behind?
It would be everywhere difficult living the Brahmacaria to it's end if staying in the world if not in the Brahmadwellings or beyond any borderland.

It is difficult everywhere but i should choose what is least difficult right? I am not about to make things harder for myself by going to foreign lands if i can train better here as a layman or ordaining elsewhere. Laymen can be Arahnts you know, 7 days, it's not like monks have a monopoly on going forth.

Your answer isn't really making clear what is obscure

Foreign Monks in Sri Lanka
There are a few foreign monks in Sri Lanka.
There are usually not many monks that speak English in the temples.
Visa rules have recently changed allowing visa beyond three months:

See section 3. Religious Category of Residence Visa
See also General Information

Residence Visa for clergy is Free.
Are you an ordained Monk? If so your home temple should be able to arrange your stay in Sri Lanka.
Are you currently a novice? The folks at the Canadian vihara I belong to should be willing to advise you on your journey: https://www.bvs.org/ There are many Sri Lankan members.
I have never seen a monk here needing to pay for local transportation. Dana is provided in the temple by the community. I have not seen monks begging for food door to door as in Cambodia.
It would be best to have everything arranged before you depart.

Good householder,

I wonder about the practicalities of being a foreign monk in Asia, especially Theravada-majority countries.

It's more difficult to become a foreigner, than to stay at home in one's homeland. One could easily just stay at home.

About the Visa arrangements, can this at all be handled without much stress by one who doesn't use money?

How could one handle something requiring money, if not accepting, using or telling others to use and abstains from trade with householders?
In other words, if you need to get something done that requires money, then you need to deal with money, whether directly or indirectly.

What about the rule of not driving a car or using vehicles, is this a rule that can be kept by one in such a predicament?

It would be not wrong if sick and not able to walk to accept a male ride (cyclo, bike, cart, man-powered). It's also not wrong to give a fellow a hand cart ride, if given to use one and desire to 'drive'.

Anything relevant is of interest.

DN 2: Samaññaphala Sutta — The Fruits of the Contemplative Life

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Which meditation is less likely to have negative effects or be practiced wrong?
I've heard a meditation teacher mention that samatha is less likely to be done wrong while using a visual object. I've also read about how mindfulness meditation may sometimes lead to negative effects in the practitioner.
What is the type of meditation that is least likely to cause such possible negative effects, or to be practised incorrectly? Am I right in thinking compassion meditation is more accessible and less likely to cause harm?

Right immersion is preceded by right mindfulness, right effort, right livelihood, right action, right speech, right thought and right view. These prerequisites are critical and should be investigated and practiced first. For example, before meditating on compassion, shouldn't we ask, "what is the right view for compassion?". Without right view, how could we even get to right immersion?
Prerequisites are important. And seven right steps preceding right immersion is a lot to consider. Is there then one simple thing to consider as a prerequisite for immersion? Fortunately, the Buddha instructs that the spectrum of ethics is a single prerequisite for exploring immersion:

DN34:1.6.102: Five spectrums of the teaching:
DN34:1.6.103: ethics, immersion, wisdom, freedom, and knowledge and vision of freedom.

Indeed, in MN8, the Buddha gently scolds Cunda for diving in too readily to immersion without considering proper prerequisites. Immersion without ethics is just peaceful meditations:

MN8:11.4: But in the training of the Noble One these are not called ‘self-effacement’;
MN8:11.5: they’re called ‘peaceful meditations’.

Living ethically, we build a strong base for right immersion:

MN8:12.2: ‘Others will be cruel, but here we will not be cruel.’
MN8:12.3: ‘Others will kill living creatures, but here we will not kill living creatures.’
MN8:12.4: ‘Others will steal, but here we will not steal.’
MN8:12.5: ‘Others will be unchaste, but here we will not be unchaste.’
MN8:12.6: ‘Others will lie, but here we will not lie.’
MN8:12.7: ‘Others will speak divisively, but here we will not speak divisively.’
MN8:12.8: ‘Others will speak harshly, but here we will not speak harshly.’
MN8:12.9: ‘Others will talk nonsense, but here we will not talk nonsense.’
MN8:12.10: ‘Others will be covetous, but here we will not be covetous.’
(omitted for brevity...)

Living each moment with a heart open to love, compassion, rejoicing and equanimity requires skill. And guarding that heart with right mindfulness also requires skill. Living each moment ethically is the skillful practice that allows us to meditate well. That's why the spectrum of ethics precedes immersion. And only after a long discourse on ethics does the Buddha encourage Cunda to meditate:

MN8:17.3: Here are these roots of trees, and here are these empty huts. Practice absorption, Cunda! Don’t be negligent! Don’t regret it later! This is my instruction.”

Living with love allows us to meditate with love. Living with compassion allows us to meditate with compassion. Living with rejoicing allows us to meditate with rejoicing. Living with equanimity allows us to meditate with equanimity.
And in return, meditation gives us the insights to fully live without the limits of greed, hate and delusion.

MN43:35.2: Greed, hate, and delusion are makers of limits.
MN43:35.3: A mendicant who has ended the defilements has given these up, cut them off at the root, made them like a palm stump, and obliterated them, so they are unable to arise in the future.
MN43:35.4: The unshakable release of the heart is said to be the best kind of limitless release of the heart.
MN43:35.5: That unshakable release of the heart is empty of greed, hate, and delusion.


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Compulsion to repeat afflictions and Buddhism
I've noticed in myself a tendency to pursue situations that cause a certain stress, in a somewhat compulsive way. This is a bit like people who are drawn to people who are bad for them. I have heard Thich Nhat Hanh saying teens drawn to spending all their time on computers feel empty inside.
How are such "addictions" conceptualized in Buddhism? In other words, what would be the cause and nature of a behaviour that is bad for one, that depends on a kind of meaninglessness and self-sabotage?
Lastly, what would remedy such internal afflictions? Are they forms of a kind of avoidance of suffering?

I believe the term you're looking for is 'tanhā', which translates roughly as 'craving. The essential idea, as I see it, is that discontentment (dukkha) arises from a clash or disparity between how the world actually is and one's expectations of how the world ought to be. In some cases that disparity becomes so painfully acute that one decides something in the world must change to conform more to one's expectations. This is craving (tanhā). Craving — if left unfulfilled and unaddressed — can turn into an obstinate fixation, or eventually even a flight from reality into a fantasy world where (perhaps) the expectation is met, or mysterious and nefarious forces are conspiring to prevent the expectation from being met.
Some people believe that drugs or alcohol create the person they wish to be. Other people imagine themselves as metaphysical 'winners' and are drawn to gambling because it's something that ought to come out in their favor. Others think they should be with this person or that person, and lean towards stalking or obsession. Still others imagine that sensual pleasures (food, sex, excitement) are the height of existence, and pursue them with reckless abandon. The list is endless, really: anything where one might say "that would fulfill me" can turn into an addiction, as one constantly seeks to fulfill one's identity in a world that does not naturally lend itself to such constancy.

It's all greed, anger and delusion.
Self-sabotage is an obvious expression of cruelty towards oneself, it is due to a lack of compassion, a lack of sympathy and of course ignorance.
Greed, delusion, lack of concentration, laziness and all this lack of development is also there, right there for all with eyes to see.
The remedy is of course the development of the five strengths, the five faculties, the four satipatthana, the seven factors and the eightfold path.

Destruction with intention is a manifestation of anger. And if the behavior is personally destructive, then there may be anger directed inwards. Anger is very tricky and slippery. Anger justifies itself and seeks to destroy either directly or indirectly. So we must proceed with extreme care.

SN1.71:2.3: What’s the one thing, Gotama,
SN1.71:2.4: whose killing you approve?”
SN1.71:3.1: “When anger’s incinerated you sleep at ease.
SN1.71:3.2: When anger’s incinerated there is no sorrow.
SN1.71:3.3: O deity, anger has a poisoned root
SN1.71:3.4: and a honey tip.
SN1.71:3.5: The noble ones praise its killing,
SN1.71:3.6: for when it’s incinerated there is no sorrow.”

In the Buddha's description of anger there is an eye-catching phrase anger has a poisoned root and an honey tip.  When we see or hear this phrase, we have to think carefully, "what is the poisoned root and what is the honey tip?"
Anger arises from expectations thwarted. It arises from desires frustrated and denied. Wanting kindness, we might be surrounded by cruelty. And out of hopelessness and sorrow, anger and resentment might arise from craving that gentlest of touch, a simple kindness from others. That is the poisoned root of anger.
We cannot control the others, but we can control what happens here. We can offer kindness to others and be content with that. There will at least be kindness in the world.
But if the thought arises that one is "unworthy and undeserving" of kindness one has stepped on a land mine that will explode and main or kill us. One might be tempted to punish oneself for an imaginary transgression. And that temptation to exercise control through self-harm is quite dangerous. It is the siren call of destruction. It is the honey tip that keeps anger and resentment alive.
The Buddha teaches us to step away from anger and resentment. Unsupported, they will fade and cease on their own.
And in their place the Buddha teaches us the limitless releases of the heart through love, compassion, rejoicing and equanimity.
Please be kind to yourself and allow that kindness within to grow and embrace others so that we all might suffer a little less. Let kindness, let metta guide you.

MN127:4.2: ‘Householder, develop the limitless release of heart.’


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Mention of Saraswathi river in Buddhist scriptures
Does any authentic Buddhist scripture mentions the Saraswathi River? If yes where and what does it say?
Saraswathi river is an ancient Indian river mentioned widely across all Indian scriptures but it's dating is debated. We know that Buddha lived around 6th century BC, if Saraswathi river is mentioned then we can be of some certainty that the river flowed, however sparsely around 6th century BC.
Refer

I could find the following references to the Sarasvati River in the Pali Canon:

Now at that time the brahmin Sundarika Bhāradvāja was sitting not far
from the Buddha. He said to the Buddha, “But does Master Gotama go to
the river Bāhuka to bathe?”
“Brahmin, why go to the river Bāhuka? What can the river Bāhuka do?”
“Many people agree that the river Bāhuka bestows cleanliness and
merit. And many people wash off their bad deeds in the river Bāhuka.”
Then the Buddha addressed Sundarika in verse:
The Bāhuka and the Adhikakka,
the Gaya and the Sundarika too,
Sarasvatī and Payāga,
and the river Bāhumati:
a fool can constantly plunge into them
but it won’t purify their dark deeds.
What can the Sundarika do?
What the Payāga or the Bāhuka?
They can’t cleanse a cruel and criminal person
from their bad deeds.
For the pure in heart it’s always
the spring festival or the sabbath.
For the pure in heart and clean of deed,
their vows will always be fulfilled.
It’s here alone that you should bathe, brahmin,
making yourself a sanctuary for all creatures.
And if you speak no lies,
nor harm any living creature,
nor steal anything not given,
and you’re faithful and not stingy:
what’s the point of going to Gaya?
For any well may be your Gaya!”
Majjhima Nikaya 7

Oh, when will I cross the Ganges, Yamunā,
and Sarasvatī rivers, the Pātāla country,
and the dangerous Baḷavāmukha sea,
by psychic power unimpeded? When will it be?
Theragatha 19.1

And again, O king, just as there are five hundred rivers which flow
down from the Himālayas, but of these ten only are reckoned in
enumerations of rivers—the Ganges, the Jumna, the Aciravatī, the
Sarabhū, the Mahī, the Indus, the Sarasvatī, the Vetravatī, the
Vītaṁsā, and the Candabhāgā—the others not being included in the
catalogue because of their intermittent flow of water.
Milindapanha 5.1.4

The Indus, and the Sarasvatī
are rivers, like the Candabhāgā,
the Ganges and the Yamuna
the Sarabhu and the Mahī too.
Thera Apadana 3

There's another mention of this river in this Chinese Mahayana Sutra:

Nāgasena asked the king, “Would those who have never seen the great
ocean, know that the ocean is great? There are five great rivers, and
to each of them, there are also five hundred small tributaries. The
five great rivers are: (1) the Ganges, (2) the Sindhu, (3) the Sita,
(4) the Oxus and (5) the Sarasvati. The waters of these five great
rivers flow to the ocean day and night, but the water in the ocean
neither increases nor decreases.”
T 1670B Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra 2.46


text:
Regarding Zodiac signs in authentic and classic Buddhist scriptures
There is still considerable amount of controversy regarding Lord Buddha's dating and the dating of incorporation of Zodiac signs of Mesha, Vrishaba etc into Indian and Asian culture. Their mentioning in ancient Buddhist scriptures may help in dating both the events.
Are there any mentions of Aries, Taurus resembling Mesha and Vrishabha in ancient and classical Buddhist scriptures?

What exactly is the controversy about the dating of the Buddha's lifetime? And what is the relationship between the Buddha and the zodiac signs? Can you cite sources for the claim of the relationship between Buddhism and zodiac signs? It's unclear to me how this question is related to Buddhism.

@ruben2020 It's relavant to Buddhism because it is asking for Zodiac signs in Buddhist scriptures

@ruben2020 https://youtu.be/PaFnsOSTBnc

@ruben2020 https://youtu.be/9UFfQJWOsNo

@ruben2020 https://www.pgurus.com/dr-manish-pandit-dates-when-gautam-buddha-attained-nirvana-and-it-is-a-shocker-p1/

There is no mention of specific zodiac signs in the Pali Canon, as far as I know. Stars, galaxies or constellations are only mentioned generically.
Mainstream historians say the Buddha lived around 563 BCE to 483 BCE, as you can see on Wikipedia.
The traditional chronology of Theravada Buddhism can be found on this page. It says in the footnote:

Year 1 of the Buddhist Era calendar is the year of the Buddha's
Parinibbana (death and final release), which occurred in the Buddha's
eightieth year (480 BCE according to the "historical" timeline; 544
BCE by tradition).
The actual date of the Buddha's birth is unknown. According to
Buddhist tradition, the Buddha's birth took place in 624 BCE, although
some recent estimates place the Buddha's birth much later — perhaps as
late as 448 BCE. 560 BCE is one commonly accepted date for the
Buddha's birth, and the "historical" date for that event that I adopt
here.

According to National Geographic's article "Oldest Buddhist Shrine Uncovered In Nepal May Push Back the Buddha's Birth Date" (Nov 27, 2013) by Dan Vergano:

Time to push back the Buddha's birth date a century or so?
Archaeologists may have uncovered evidence of the oldest Buddhist
shrine yet discovered, dating to around 550 B.C. ....
The exact date of the Buddha's birth is disputed, with Nepalese
authorities favoring 623 B.C., and other traditions favoring more
recent dates, around 400 B.C. ....
Digging beneath a central shrine, the researchers uncovered postholes
pointing to a wooden railing surrounding a tree shrine and dating to
around 550 B.C., says Coningham. They also found an older brick
structure.

The videos the OP linked proposes dates which are not supported by mainstream historians. 1800 BCE is completely nonsensical for the Buddha's lifetime.
It's obvious that the Buddha lived before Adi Shankara, based on the writings of the latter. The date of 1800 BCE for the Buddha's life was fabricated so that Adi Shankara's birth date can be placed at 509 BCE based on tradition. However, mainstream historians agree that Adi Shankara was born around 700 CE or 788 CE, as you can see on Wikipedia.
I noticed a trend that certain religious scholars like to push dates far back in time, than it really is, because to them, the older something is, seems to lend credibility to it.
However, in the case of Buddhism, the dates do not matter at all. Buddhists seem to be more than happy to accept dates given by mainstream historians and archaeologists, because it doesn't change the credibility of the Buddha's teachings in their view.
In fact, accurate historical and geographical information is helpful, in understanding the context behind some of the teachings and stories told in the Pali Canon and other texts.

Thanks for the answer. This question was mainly asked for dating of Mahabharata and Ramayana.


text:
Most efficient practices you will quickly do to recover/re-generate Bodhicitta and/or right view of Śūnyatā if realizing losing mindfulness of?
In daily (secular) life, if you realize that you are being or have been losing (or forgetting) mindfulness of Bodhicitta and/or right view of Śūnyatā, what (most efficient practices) you will quickly do to recover/re-generate Bodhicitta and/or right view of Śūnyatā in you?
Thanks in advance for any possible answer and/or instruction for the question in this post you can and will give.
P.S. I am unsure having figure out a good title for this post so everyone is welcome to help.

The distraction probably needs more emphasis than sunyata. What is the distraction?

@Max Hi thanks for begin discussion! So using "distracted" causes unclear meaning? Then, maybe that "distracted from" should be replaced by "losing/forgetting mindfulness of". I try edit it now.

If I understand your question correctly, you don't need a new or special practice for this; just take a moment and do a light version of regular practice. For instance, you might stop and focus your attention on your breathing for a minute, just watching it come and go without changing it. You don't need to sit on a cushion, find a 'clear' space, or do any of the other things you would do for a normal meditation session; you don't even need to put down anything you might be holding. Just pause, pay attention to six or seven breaths, and go back to whatever you were doing.
You'll sometimes hear people talk about 'centering' or 'grounding'. That is essentially what I'm suggesting, and you might find some other practical techniques if you google around. Full meditation sessions establish and deepen the practice, but in between such sessions we still want to bring ourselves back to center, just a touch of practice on the fly to remind ourselves.


text:
If the chain of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) ends, then isn't the last part independent?
Dependent Origin or Pratītyasamutpāda is defined as

It states that all dharmas (phenomena) arise in dependence upon other
dharmas

And then there are these 12 causes one after another, each depending on the next one starting from Aging or decay, and death (Jarāmaraṇa) which depends on Birth, Rebirth (Jāti) and so on, which finally ends in Ignorance, nescience (Avidyā).
But notice Avidya seems to be not depending on anything. But as a rule all dharmas should be dependent on another dharma. How is this contradiction reconciled?
Source

This is a very good question. What does ignorance depend on? What is the condition for ignorance?

There is a cyclic dependency between ignorance and defilements (also called taints or fermentation).

Ignorance originates from defilement. Ignorance ceases when defilement
ceases.
Āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo, āsavanirodhā avijjānirodho
Defilement originates from ignorance. Defilement ceases when ignorance
ceases.
Avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo, avijjānirodhā āsavanirodho
MN 9

Why is there such a cyclic dependency? This is amply discussed in "Does MN9 imply a cyclic causation? How does it work?"
I quote from the best answer there:

It is like being born in a poor uneducated family: because you are
poor, you can't get education, and because you can't get education you
are poor.

Excellent, just some small clarifications. Why is Defilement not present in the 12 dharmas listed in the chain. Is it the same as Sankhara or Samskara. What is the Sanskrit equivalent of Asava.

@MrGreenGold In Sanskrit, it's Āsrava.

thanks, but is Āsava same as Sankhara or equivalent to it, as Āsava is not present in the traditional chain of 12 causes.


text:
Is the whole of reality what is being denied by some Buddhists?

Is the whole of reality what is being denied by some Buddhists?

So, for as long as the sensation of pleasure or an atom or visual consciousness or apple is thought to belong to everything that exists, we are confused about them; and everyone is. If so:

can we add that everything absent from the whole of reality exists?

I know you can literally couple the fire sermon (the Buddha goes nowhere after death) with the unanswered questions (does the Buddha exist after death, in unanswerable). But maybe they're saying that in his no longer existing in the world, he is beyond every concept except existence? So the question is unanswerable because of the assumption that he has somewhere to go.

noumenon does exist as something in addition to phenomena, but not all phenomena?

The statement in the 3rd paragraph -- "Anything which exists" etc. -- what (reference)  is that based on? Or what are you trying to say there and how is it connected to the (title of the) question?

I'll explain sorry @ChrisW

The whole first question would be clearer with a reference -- could you quote or link to what you're asking about? I mean, the first question is, "Some Buddhists are denying something -- is that 'something' the whole of reality?" ... but you don't specify which Buddhists you're asking about, nor what they said or wrote, nor even which school of Buddhism, so I think it's hard to be sure of what you're asking about.

all of them @ChrisW do you have a favourite I can namecheck (lol)?

The question seems to suppose or presuppose that Buddhists believe that, "Anything which exists, exists outside the whole (of 'reality', not 'the entire apple')." But I'm finding it hard to make sense of that assertion, i.e. to relate it to any Buddhist doctrine that I know of.

ah dwai @ChrisW I'd delete but unfortunately am unable to

If you pick up a bowl of water and carry it across the room to a table, the water will splash against the sides of the bowl and develop eddies and waves  as you move. If you come back an hour later, The splashing and eddies and waves are gone. So where did they go?
When pure consciousness is disturbed it develops its own splashes and eddies and wavs. Some of these we alienate as 'karma' or 'phenomena'; others we identify with as 'self'. If we don't let them still, they perpetuate, constantly recreating themselves. If we do still them they fade to nothing, and yet we lose nothing in the fading.
A man we call Gautama awakened to the stillness of pure consciousness. The man died; the stillness didn't.

The question only made sense to me after I read your answer. Thank you. :D

Even brain-mastubating can be taken on as if it would be real, right?
Why not simply take on ways of thinking the Liberal pointed out to go beyond desire of all kind?
In that way, of which he tries, good householder wouln't stop go after the refrigerator or are there first signs?

I like puzzles. I guess it's sad no-one else likes mine, but whatever.

it's not like every one of my questions are the same (or even that any of them are sufficiently answered). They may spring from the same motivation, broadly speaking, but again: whatever

brainmastubating. Or public farting. Right?

what are you doing, shitting in my mouth?

@user22169 On this site, if you're going to post an answer, then you should usually try to answer the question without saying "that's the wrong question to be asking". If you don't want to answer then don't, but maybe usually try and do it without appearing to criticize the user for asking.

What does the TOS say on "that's not the answer" in comments, criticize answers? How does on appear to "criticize" a user for answering? Thoughts, links?


text:
What other meditation techniques are attributed to Buddha apart from Anapanasati?
Anapanasati is a meditation technique attributed to Buddha himself and it is from Tripitaka.
What other meditation techniques are present in Tripitaka and are attribited authoritatively to Buddha himself other than Anapanasati?

The Buddha taught 40 meditation subjects. The visudimagga states that Mindfullness occupied with the body(kayagatasati) is taught only in the Buddha's dispensation, not in any other sect.

Now comes the description of the development of mindfulness occupied
with the body as a meditation subject, which is never promulgated except after
an Enlightened One’s arising, and is outside the province of any sectarians.
(Visudimagga, page 236)

Mindfulness occupied with the body is also mentioned in many suttas.
https://suttacentral.net/an1.575-615/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=undefined&script=latin
https://suttacentral.net/mn119/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=undefined&script=latin
https://suttacentral.net/sn43.1/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=undefined&script=latin
https://suttacentral.net/dn22/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=undefined&script=latin
https://suttacentral.net/mn10/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=undefined&script=latin
Overall, there are 40 meditation subjects/objects/methods

Earth Kasina

Water Kasina

Wind/Air Kasina

Fire Kasina

White Kasina

Red Kasina

Yellow Kasina

Blue/Black/Brown Kasina

Light Kasina

Space Kasina

Recollection of the Buddha

Recollection of the Dhamma

Recollection of the Sangha

Recollection of Sila(virtue)

Recollection of Dana(Generosity)

Recollection of Devas

Recollection of Death

Mindfulness occupied with the Body

Mindfulness of Breath

Recollectionof peace(qualities of Nibanna)

Perception of a skeleton

Perception of the bloated

Perception of a livid corpse

Perception of the festering corpse

Perception of the cut up corpse

Perception of the scattered corpse

Perception of the hacked and scattered corpse

Perception of the Bleeding corpse

Perception of the worm-infested corpse

Metta(commonly translated as loving-kindness)

Karuna(commonly translated as compassion)

Mudita(commonly translated as sympathetic joy or gladness)

Upekkha(commonly translated as equanimity)

Perception of Repulsiveness in nutriment

Four elements(MN 62, MN 28 and AN 4.177). This meditation subject is mentioned in detail in the visudimagga. If it is hard for you to understand, I recommend reading this book. http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/know-see.pdf
The four elements meditation is mentioned there in a simplified way.

Boundless space(1st immaterial jhana)

Boundless consciousness(2nd immaterial jhana)

Nothingness(3rd immaterial jhana)

Neither perception nor non perception(4th immaterial jhana)

https://suttacentral.net/an10.29/en/bodhi You can find info about kasinas here. Note:The consciousness kasina mentioned in the sutta is light kasina. The visudimagga explains in detail on how to practice all of the meditation subjects/objects. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf

20 meditation topics in bojjhanga samyutta, starting at SN 46.57
https://lucid24.org/sn/sn46/index.html
Using 7sb awakening factors as the basic meditation steps, jhana factors, and framework.
Those twenty meditation objects are "dhammas" that sati remembers, that dhamma-vicaya sambojjhanga takes as the meditation topic to investigate, then passaddhi and viriya use to enter into 4 jhanas with, and that upekkha does insight (equanimous-observation).


text:
The commonly acceptable hypotheses/theories among scholars to explain how come Prajñāpāramitā sutra have existed so early as about 75 CE?

In 2012, Harry Falk and Seishi Karashima published a damaged and partial Kharoṣṭhī manuscript of the Mahāyāna Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. It is carbon dated to ca. 75 CE, making it one of the oldest Buddhist texts in existence.
Wikipedia: Gandhāran Buddhist texts - The "Split" Collection

Here's a copy of that paper by Harry Falk and Seishi Karashima: A first-century Prajñāpāramitā manuscript from Gandhāra
Question (1): What are the commonly acceptable hypotheses/theories among Buddhist-studies scholars in order to explain how come Prajñāpāramitā sutra (which belongs to the so-called 'Mahayana') have existed since so early (no later than 75 CE)?
Question (2): Is it sensible to hypothesize/theorize (or even accept) that, Prajñāpāramitā thoughts, in fact, have developed early parallel with thoughts in Āgama and Nikāya (which belongs to the so-called 'Hinayana')?

I see you deleted a previous version of this question -- I don't know why -- and reposted it here. Instead of delete-and-repost it's usually preferable to edit the existing question. Sorry but I'm not sure how to answer it though.

I quote all of these from the book "A History of Indian Buddhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana" (1990) by Hirakawa Akira (professor and widely respected academic authority in Buddhist Studies), and translated by Paul Groner. The whole book in PDF format can be downloaded here and here.
Firstly, the lifetime of the Buddha:

One of the most widely accepted theories is based on the Sri Lankan
historical chronicles, the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa. On the basis
of these sources, Wilhelm Geiger calculated that the Buddha died in
483 B.C.E. and consequently had been born in 563 B.C.E. Hermann
Jacobi, using the same method and sources, maintained that the Buddha
died in 484 B.C.E. The Japanese scholar Kanakura Ensho has arrived
at the same date. The "dotted record" transmitted along with the
Chinese translation of the Theravada commentary on the Vinaya, the
Samantapasadika (T 1462), also indicates a similar date.

So, the period called Early Buddhism started on 484 B.C.E. after the death of the historical Buddha.
What are the other periods?

Indian Buddhism may be divided into the following five periods: (1)
Early Buddhism, (2) Nikaya or Sectarian (often called Hinayana)
Buddhism, (3) early Mahayana Buddhism, (4) later Mahayana Buddhism, and
(5) Esoteric Buddhism. Although the five periods are arranged in the
chronological order in which the traditions arose, they are also based
on a categorization of types of Buddhism as much as historical
criteria.

When did Nikaya or Sectarian Buddhism start? According to the statement below, it started around 384 B.C.E. i.e. one century after the Buddha's death.

Approximately one century after the Buddha's death, the early order
split into the Mahasanghika and Sthaviravada schools. Later, further
schisms occurred, resulting in a number of additional schools. The
second period of Buddhist history is concerned with the development
of Sectarian (Nikaya) Buddhism. ....
The term "Nikaya Buddhism" refers to monastic Buddhism after the
initial schism into the Mahasanghika and Sthavira schools had occurred.

Mahasanghika was basically a liberal school and Sthaviravada was a conservative school. And this first schism was more related to the monastic rules (vinaya) rather than doctrines. Doctrinal differences developed later. This split begins the period of Nikaya or Sectarian Buddhism.

The schism, often called the basic schism ...,
resulted in the formation of two schools: the Mahasanghika, whose
monks refused to accept the conservative ruling of the committee of
eight monks, and the Sthaviravada (P. Theravada), whose monks agreed
with the conservative ruling. ....
At this time, the controversy over the ten points of vinaya arose, and
the elders met in Vaisali to deliberate over the disputes and resolve
them. Many monks did not submit to the council's decision, however,
and the dispute later became a cause for the schism that resulted in
the Sthavira and Mahasanghika schools.

It must be made clear that Mahayana is not Mahasanghika.

On the basis of such evidence, some scholars have argued that Mahayana
Buddhism might have developed out of the Mahasanghika School. In
fact, some connection seems to have existed between the two forms of
Buddhism. However, since the doctrines of the Mahasanghika School
and the schools that split off from it (such as the Purvasaila,
Uttarasaila, and Caitika) are not clearly known, the similarities
between Mahayana Buddhism and the schools in the Mahasanghika lineage
cannot be determined with precision.

When did early Mahayana Buddhism begin? It began when the first Mahayana texts started appearing.
Mahayana texts originated 500 years after the Buddha's death, and therefore, 400 years after the beginning of Nikaya or Sectarian Buddhism. This was around first century B.C.E.

The thousand years following the Buddha's death are often divided into
two five-hundred-year periods in Buddhist texts. Statements about the
decline of the true teaching during the latter five hundred years
occur frequently in Mahayana texts. The phrase "latter five hundred
years" is contrasted with the "former five hundred years," the first
five hundred years after the Buddha's death. ....
Mahayana texts stress that the true teaching had to be carefully
guarded and maintained during the latter five hundred years .. The
presence of such words in Mahayana texts suggests that these texts
were composed sometime later than five hundred years after the
Buddha's death.
Early Mahayana texts date from the first century B.C.E. If the Buddha
died in 484 B.C.E., then "the former five hundred years" would have
elapsed in the first century C.E. ... These dates must be reconciled
with the evidence suggesting that Mahayana texts began appearing in
the first century B.C.E.

What is the source of the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism? It basically derived from multiple schools of Nikaya or Sectarian Buddhism. And again, Mahayana is not Mahasanghika.

Many
modern scholars have maintained the view that Mahayana Buddhism
developed out of the Mahasanghika School. But since the Mahasanghika
School continued to exist long after Mahayana Buddhism arose, the rise
of Mahayana cannot be explained simply as the transformation of the
Mahasanghika into Mahayanists. While it is true that the many
similarities between Mahasanghika and Mahayana doctrines prove that the
Mahasanghika School did influence Mahayana Buddhism, teachings from
the Sarvastivadin, Mahisasaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Theravada schools
were also incorporated into Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrines of the
Sarvastivada School in particular were often mentioned in Mahayana
texts, and Sammatiya teachings also were influential. The relation
between Nikaya Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism clearly is not a simple
one.

However, Mahayana concepts have a strong connection to Mahasanghika.

According to the Samaya, Mahasanghika doctrine included certain views
on the bodies of the Buddha and the concept of the bodhsattva that
might have drawn opposition from more conservative monks. However,
these doctrines were probably developed by later Mahasanghika monks
and do not represent Mahasanghika doctrine at the time of the basic
schism. ....
In one of the sections of his work, Vasumitra grouped together the
doctrines of four schools (the Mahasanghika, Lokottaravadin,
Ekavyavaharika, and Kaukutika) of Mahasanghika lineage and noted
that the four taught that "the Buddhas; the World-honored Ones, are
all supermundane. All the Tathagatas are without impure (sasrava)
dharmas" (T49:15b). This position differs from that of the
Sarvastivadin School, but is close to Mahayana teachings.
These teachings are close to Mahayana ideas about the sambhogakaya
(body of bliss) of the Buddha and are evidence of the close
relationship of these schools to Mahayana Buddhism.

When did the first Mahayana text appear?
Apparently it was called Satparamita (six perfections), but it is no longer extant. And it appeared before the earliest extant Mahayana texts, which is the perfection of wisdom sutras, the Mahaprajnaparamitasutra. Satparamita was most probably compiled in the first century B.C.E.

The very earliest Mahayana scriptures such as the Satparamita are no
longer extant. Consequently, the date of their composition cannot be
determined from the texts themselves. However, approximate dates can
be determined indirectly. Early versions of texts such as the Kasyapa-
parivarta ... were probably compiled in the first century of the
common era. Since the Satparamita was quoted in these texts, the
Satparamita and the other earliest Mahayana texts were probably
compiled in the first century B.C.E. .... Perfection of wisdom sutras
probably first appeared after the Satparamita was compiled.

Now let's look at the perfection of wisdom sutras, which is dated to earliest first century C.E.

The largest perfection of wisdom text is the Tcr. pan-jo po-lo-mi-to
ching (T 220, Mahaprajnaparamitasutra) translated into Chinese by
Hsuan-tsang. It is six hundred fascicles long and divided into sixteen
assemblies (or parts). Perfection of wisdom sutras were not always
such large works. At first a number of separate texts circulated
independently. Later they were collected together to make larger works
such as the one mentioned above.
The oldest sutra in this group is the Tao-hsing pan-jo ching (T 224)
translated by Lokaksema. Since the translation was completed around
179, the original text probably dates back to the first century
C.E.

Now for the OP's questions:

OP: Question (1): What are the commonly acceptable hypotheses/theories
among Buddhist-studies scholars in order to explain how come
Prajñāpāramitā sutra (which belongs to the so-called 'Mahayana') have
existed since so early (no later than 75 CE)?

I think it's well explained above and in the book.

OP: Question (2): Is it sensible to hypothesize/theorize
(or even accept)
that, Prajñāpāramitā thoughts, in fact, have developed early parallel
with thoughts in Āgama and Nikāya (which belongs to the so-called
'Hinayana')?

Based on the quoted texts above and further details in the book, Mahayana doctrines definitely derived from multiple schools of Nikaya Buddhism, including Mahasanghika, Sarvastivadin, Mahisasaka, Dharmaguptaka, Theravada and Sammatiya (Pudgalavada). However, there are definitely extra strong links to schools which came out of Mahasanghika.
In conclusion, Mahayana and Prajnaparamita thoughts did not develop in parallel with Nikaya Buddhism, but was rather derived from it, and then developed further.
It's also interesting to note that the OP's dating of the perfection of wisdom sutras manuscript by Harry Falk and Seishi Karashima from 2012, and ChrisW's Stanford Buddhist scholar Paul Harrison's chronology comments from 2018, all match up nicely to Prof. Akira Hirakawa's chronology comments from 1990.

A scholarly overview.

A dated and inaccurate text.

I'm not sure I understand the question.
What are some theories?
There are some theories about the origins of Mahayana introduced here on Wikipedia: Mahayana -- History
so early (no later than 75 CE)?
As for dates, maybe the dating is inline with what scholars expect -- for example Stanford scholar discusses Buddhism and its origins says,

As far as we know, Mahayana Buddhism began to take shape in the first century BCE. This religious movement then rapidly developed in a number of different places in and around what is now India, the birthplace of Buddhism.
Buddhism itself started sometime in the fifth century BCE. We now think that the Buddha, who founded the religion, died sometime toward the year 400 BCE. As Buddhism developed, it spread beyond India. A number of different schools emerged. And out of that already complicated situation, we had the rise of a number of currents, or ways of thinking, which eventually started being labeled as Mahayana.


text:
Is "no arising" a thing?
Is "no arising" a thing or just something we may be taught? If it's a teaching only, I guess it's used to show that something else is not the case (showing e.g. that series do end).
If it's a dharma in the other sense, then does it exist relative to things arising, so that something arises whenever another thing fails to (showing that series do not end)?
More generally speaking, can we fully conceive of the mark of arising without 'no arising', and / or vice versa?

My apologies if that comes off garbled, I did my best.

I recommend this answer -- perhaps it's related to your question, it's about non-arising.

No, this came across pretty clearly. I think your question perfectly captures the essence of the debate that happened several centuries after Buddha's death.
Back then there was a lot of work done by Sarvastivada followers and other early schools trying to enumerate the dharmas as one final exhaustive list, sort of like the table of chemical elements these days.
As they were doing that, one dharma that kept standing out was "nirodha", defined as "not arising". This was supposed to be referring to Nirvana/Nibbana, not-arising of the chain of dependent origination (and suffering) due to the absence of passion and grasping, due to the absence of wrong views, due to the absence of ignorance. (Some said nirodha was unconditioned/asamskrta because it owed its existence to absence of necessary conditions, rather than presence - a philosophical sleight of hand.
While I would not personally equate nirodha with nirvana and idolize all kinds of not-arising, the point that Nirvana is effected by liberation from wrong view -- and from the "right view with asava" -- does make it look like a kind of nirodha. That said, the unconditionality of Nirvana comes from it being immune to all imputations that serve as the bases of conditions, so Nirvana is seen through nirodha of imputations, Nirvana is not nirodha itself. In other words Nirvana is tathata, the unity of Two Truths, while nirodha of Ignorance is just a way to see the Absolute.)
The same questions as the ones you asked, whether not-arising was a thing, and can it be said to truly exist other than relative to arising, were undoubtedly brought up and led to a debate about the notion of existence and not existence, and the concept of svabhava (existing by itself or from its own side). Well, it wasn't just about this dharma, there were other controversial dharmas like akasa (space, defined as "no resistance to movement"), and even simpler dharmas like heaviness, but non-arising was likely at the top of the list.
This debate, in turn, is what (probably) led to the emergence of the notion of Emptiness and the tradition of Madhyamaka as we know it today.
The exact details of that development are still not clear to me, i.e. whether it was directly inspired by the prajnaparamita movement or just happened to come to the same conclusion from another side, but the point that Madhyamaka was born in or close to Gandhara from polemics around Sarvastivada Abhidharma is pretty much settled for me.
To answer your question directly: the Buddhism split at this very question. Mahayana says all dharmas (~"things") are relative and are delineated approximately by an observer. Mahayana says the very notion of "existence" or "being a thing" is, too, an approximated delineation. According to this view, arguing about something being or not being really real is foolish and betrays fundamental confusion on one's part about the nature of reality and the Buddha's teaching. The non-Mahayana (so-called "Hinayana") schools stand by their conviction that some dharmas are really real and not mere relative delineations/imputations - though they don't all agree on the exact list, especially when it comes to the asamskrta/unconditioned dharmas. But yeah, at least in some of the "Hinayana" schools nirodha (~not-arising) is considered a real dharma, something that actually exists.

You may well be right, and your answer is fairly clearly engaged with my question. But I'm a bit confused about how unequivocal you make it seem. Without any references, I am led to ask but isn't nirvana empty? Cheers for any further elaboration

The notion of nirvana being empty is a Madhyamaka invention born in the said debate. Before that no one even asked such question, whether it's empty or not.

I'm sorry I don't have references. It would take me exponentially more time to provide these answers with references. I agree it would be nice but it is how it is and I don't see that changing any time soon. My apologies.

Consider a pool of water. If there is an 'arising' — something bubbling up from the depths — the surface of the pool ripples and glimmers in the light.  If there is no 'arising' the surface of the pool is still and calm.
It's the nature of the pool to be still and calm. An arising is a disturbance.
The mistake all of us make (early on) is to presume that the pool is identical to the ripples and glimmers that we see on the surface. We see the effects of arisings and convince ourselves that arisings are the essence of the thing on which we see the effects. We cannot see the pool for the ripples.
'No arising' isn't a thing. It's the absence of a thing that the mind expects: the proverbial waiting for the other shoe to drop.

Two fail in liberation from suffering, not arising of it: those after becoming/being/arising, and those after not-becoming, not-being, not-arising, good householder.


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The Problem of Evil/Suffering modified into Buddhism
I have a question about Buddhism, which is similar to or modified from the Problem of Evil or the Problem of Suffering in western religion philosophy:
If [ by definition from ordinary intuition ] the Buddha Sakyamuni really had achieved perfect altruistic "merit" or "abilities", then, contradictorily, why when the Buddha Sakyamuni was presenting in the world, the hell is NOT "empty"? --- there were still sentient beings in the situations, such as in the hell, that they cannot meet the Buddha Sakyamuni? Doesn't the NON-emptiness of the hell means there are still rooms yet for achieving perfect altruistic "merit" or "abilities"?
Hello everyone. I am from Taiwan. Thank you in advance for everyone who may or does give any constructive/helping information.
P.S. Actually I have flagged this my question post as "in need of moderator intervention". Explanation: (1) I was indeed surprised by myself that thoughts questioning the Buddha via the way of reductio ad absurdum came out in my mind (and also written in my question post). (2) I don't have confidence that such reductio ad absurdum is no misleading/misguiding to every kind/level of Buddhism learners.

I really have some kind of concern that such way of thinking in my question post may be danger.

Why did you post this comment about "danger"? Would you like to explain at greater length e.g.  in a Chat room? And/or is there something you might like a moderator to do, perhaps to edit, about what's posted in this topic? How can we help?

You are asking, if the Buddha is perfect and omniscient, why didn't he save everyone already by now?
And you are worried that asking this question is a sin, as if you are stepping on a dangerous path by questioning the Buddha, did I understand that right?

If you're concerned that your question is "dangerous," ask to have it deleted or modified so that it is no longer "dangerous." That seems reasonable, no?

@Caoimhghin I've thought better of my question; can I delete it? suggests we avoid deleting the topic -- because it has two "good" answers -- so I was trying to find another solution, or to even understand what the problem seems to be.

Actually I have flagged this my question post as "in need of moderator intervention".
Explanation: (1) I was indeed surprised by myself that thoughts questioning the Buddha via the way of reductio ad absurdum came out in my mind (and also written in my question post). (2) I don't have confidence that such reductio ad absurdum is no misleading/misguiding to every kind/level of Buddhism learners.

There are no dangerous questions; there are only dangerous answers.

A somewhat hand-waving answer would be "Hell is both empty and not empty". This excerpt from Khyentse Norbu's book What Makes You Not A Buddhist would probably make things clearer:

Let's say there is a cowardly man named Jack who has a phobia about
snakes. Jack walks into a dimly lit room, sees a snake coiled up in
the corner, and panics. In fact he is looking at a striped Giorgio
Armani tie, but in his terror he has misinterpreted what he sees to
the point that he could even die of fright—death caused by a snake
that does not truly exist. While he is under the impression that it is
a snake, the pain and anxiety that he experiences is what Buddhists
call "samsara," which is a kind of mental trap. Fortunately for Jack,
his friend Jill walks into the room. Jill is calm and sane and knows
that Jack thinks he sees a snake. She can switch on the light and
explain that there is no snake, that it is actually a tie.
[...] It's important to understand that by switching on the light and
demonstrating that there is no snake, Jill is also saying that there
is no absence of the snake. In other words, she cannot say, "The snake
is gone now," because the snake was never there. She didn't make the
snake disappear, just as Siddhartha didn't make emptiness. This is why
Siddhartha insisted that he could not sweep away the suffering of
others by waving his hand. Nor could his own liberation be granted or
shared piecemeal, like some sort of award. All he could do was explain
from his experience that there was no suffering in the first place,
which is like switching on the light for us.
When Jill finds Jack frozen in terror, she has some choices about what
to do. She can directly point out that there is no snake, or she can
use a skillful method such as escorting the "snake" from the room. But
if Jack is so terrified that he is unable to differentiate the snake
from the tie, even with the light on, and if Jill is not skillful,
then she could actually make things worse. If she dangles the necktie
in Jack's face, he could die of a heart attack. But if Jill is
skillful and sees that Jack is delusional, she can say, "Yes, I see
the snake," and carefully take the tie out of the room so that Jack
feels safe for the time being.

In short, the Buddha could see that hell is empty - a.k.a conditioned and lacking inherent existence - and he could also see that others might not see it that way. For some of them, saying "hell is empty" might not help them advance on the path to enlightenment as much as "there is hell".

I really have some kind of concern that such way of thinking in my question post may be danger.

Actually I have flagged this my question post as "in need of moderator intervention".
Explanation: (1) I was indeed surprised by myself that thoughts questioning the Buddha via the way of reductio ad absurdum came out in my mind (and also written in my question post). (2) I don't have confidence that such reductio ad absurdum is no misleading/misguiding to every kind/level of Buddhism learners.

Great answer. Will check out Norbu's book.

In Western traditions, evil is typically seen as personified into a being with a power similar to the power of good, locked in eternal battle over the souls of humans. However, this concept did not exist in early Judaism, which held Yahweh responsible for both good and evil. One of the oldest Hebrew texts, Isaiah states in 45:7:

I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.

Evil as a separate concept & entity became prevalent in Western religion based on the dualistic Zoroastrian model, where Good was represented by Ahura Mazda and Evil by Angra Mainyu. This was integrated into Judaism during the Persian occupation. It is from this period and its writings that we get Satan as the personification of evil, which found its way into Christianity and Islam: a powerful being working against the creator deity by tempting human souls into sin.
There are some similar myths in Buddhism, like Mara tempting the Buddha to prevent him achieving attainment, but by large the Karmic principle is not based on the forces of evil conspiring against humans, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Evil, both as a human characteristic and as an external force, is a foreign concept to Buddhism. Instead, each individual's choices and actions are the determinating factor in his/her Karmic destiny.
Which brings us to "The Problem of Evil": the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God.
In Theravada and some Mahayana schools, deities are irrelevant to Buddhism. It is personal practice and adherence to the path that results in attainment, not divine intervention. In Mahayana, this principle is known as 自力 (Jap: Jiriki), "one's own strength".
And yes, there are Mahayana schools that subscribe to 他力 (Jap: Tariki) meaning "other power", "outside help". Some believers of Pure Land Buddhism, for example, believe Amitabha Buddha will lead them to enlightenment, similar to Christians believing that Jesus takes away their sins to allow them into paradise. But even in Tariki schools, evil is not personified into an external, personalized force, but it does identify evil as part of our human nature that one must come to term with - in fact, this "negative thinking" is essential in Tariki schools to realize that one needs the help of a Buddha to reach attainment.
As for beings in hell, many Mahayana schools teach that every one of the Samsara realms has a Bodhisattva to assist those dwelling in that realm. For example, Ksitigarbha: Bodhisattva of the Hell Realm.

"Christians believing that Jesus takes away their sins" Maybe off-topic here but I think the doctrine is that Jesus and baptism removed Original sin; perhaps that Man is justified by Faith (schools differ on that subject); and, so far as I know, that God is benevolent but problems arise from Man choosing other than God.

@Chrisw I referred to "sin", not "original sin".

Yes and I thought that might be misleading or oversimplifying and so I commented, but never mind, it's off-topic. I thought the bits of the answer about Buddhist doctrine were just right.

I really have some kind of concern that such way of thinking in my question post may be danger.

Actually I have flagged this my question post as "in need of moderator intervention".
Explanation: (1) I was indeed surprised by myself that thoughts questioning the Buddha via the way of reductio ad absurdum came out in my mind (and also written in my question post). (2) I don't have confidence that such reductio ad absurdum is no misleading/misguiding to every kind/level of Buddhism learners.

Lord Budhdha nor anyone can deliver others to Nirvana. Your deliverance is in your hands. Lord Budhdha can only show you the path. Walking on it is your responsibility. Lord Budhdha clearly teaches that the Apaya and even planes of existence like Arupaloka are unsuitable places because in these planes you cannot hear Dhamma. If you are in them, you first have to get out of them in order to listen to Dhamma. Lord Budhdha explains that sansara (the endless cycle of birth and death) is an extremely dangerous place due to this reason. Yes there are places you can enjoy for a little while, but there are planes worse than your wildest nightmares. Only you and you alone can end your sansara.


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Is the emptiness of final nirvana an illusion?
Is the emptiness of final nirvana an illusion?
When we misplace a box with nothing at all inside we haven't really lost its contents. I am convinced, based on this, nothingness is only really inside things that exist.
Meaning at final nirvana, the conventional self, which really no longer consists of anything at all, is really composed of absolutely nothing, must exist and have no parts.
Final nirvana does still arise, but the Buddha continues to exist, so emptiness, partite lack of substance, is an illusion. I'd like a Buddhist wide quote with sound reasoning.

are you referring to parinirvana?  maybe an infinity of emptiness? but that's just conceptual..

I'm not saying I have experienced it first hand, no-one ever could, could they @lilredindy

Forgive me for asking, but what made you think that Nirvana and emptiness are the same?

This perspective on emptiness is a bit turned around. Instead of standing as an outsider looking at a supposedly empty box, imagine being inside that box.  It's (perhaps) a somewhat claustrophobic experience (though we might not recognize that feeling for what it is); we are in this small, confined space that is filled with 'us'. Then follow this progression:

The box disappears and we find ourselves in a larger room, filled with 'our stuff'
The walls of the room disappear, and we find ourselves in a larger house, intermingling with those we know and care about
The house disappears and we find ourselves in a town or city, with all sorts of activity and distractions
The town/city disappears and we find ourselves in an open field, with far horizons
The field and sky disappear, and we are left in the vast expanses of space

We experience 'fullness' when we are bound by the attachments produced by the egoic mind, because we have placed ourselves in a mental container formed of our thoughts, attitudes, feelings, desires, etc. It's like wrapping ourselves in a blanket of mind; warm and familiar, but constrained. When we begin to quiet and still the egoic mind, those constraints loosen, and we start to feel the expanse around us. The more expansive that feeling becomes, the smaller and more intermittent the products of the egoic mind seem, and we start to experience that same sense of emptiness that we might have standing in a field under the wide blue sky. It isn't an objective emptiness in which nothing exists; it's the subjective emptiness of perspective and freedom.

Perception isn't real, lasting, a refuge, proper to regard as me, myself and I. So, form, not to speak of any perception of form.

I sorta see where you're coming form, but I didn't mention perception! Only emptiness, nirvana, conditioning, etc

And those are perceptions or not? Or form? huhh huhh!

To be clear, even the perception of Nibbana has the Sublime Buddha his disciples to be abound, but that's far from householders current task, which is penetrating form at first place. Mind is far to slippery for uninstructed and untrained mind. And where does good householder think that my person's coming from, hmm? Go on work and finish brain mastubating is of much benefit. Having done the task (=nibbana) will be real then, yet of cause it's not.

The Four Noble Truths are about suffering, not boxes.
So let's talk about loved ones. When a parent loses or misplaces a loved one, sorrow arises. Was the sorrow inside the loved one? The sorrow was not there before, so where did the sorrow come from? Trapped in suffering, what is the escape?

DN34:1.4.27: Renunciation is the escape from sensual pleasures. The formless is the escape from form. Cessation is the escape from whatever is created, conditioned, and dependently originated.

Looking for the end of suffering, we may become dissatisfied with form and eventually explore the formless, perceiving nothingness and emptiness:

MN121:8.7: There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of nothingness.’
MN121:8.8: And so they regard it as empty of what is not there, but as to what remains they understand that it is present.
MN121:8.9: That’s how emptiness is born in them—genuine, undistorted, and pure.

The truth to be found in boxes does not end sorrow, so we have to look beyond boxes to find the root of suffering. Going beyond boxes we might find a certain emptiness:

MN121:13.4: So, Ānanda, you should train like this: ‘We will enter and remain in the pure, ultimate, supreme emptiness.’
MN121:13.5: That’s how you should train.”
MN121:13.6: That is what the Buddha said.
MN121:13.7: Satisfied, Venerable Ānanda was happy with what the Buddha said.

nothingness is only really inside things that exist

Is surely the mistake.
Does everything exist that is composed of some but not all possible parts? Whether or not it is Buddhist, it is not trivially false, inconceivable, that the whole of reality exists, or that some parts do not combine.
It would be an unusual reading of interpenetration, and seems to amount to the claim that only and all absences exist. Which doesn't mean absences exist independent of anything, or that no theory is true of the possible whole - rather than actual, which does not exist.
Put another way (again): things that have arisen do not exist; things that cease do. An unusual way of looking at 'emptiness'

perhaps sabba sutta is also of interest:  https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.023.than.html. the negation of this 'All' concept may also lead to the perception of empty or nothing.

We have problems in our society, particularly when it comes to words, with the idea of "one". Concepts are bound up with this idea of duality as, for example, with your thoughts on existence and  non-existenxe. The only alternative to this duality which we can conceive of seems to be nothing, nihilism. We bounce between "two" and "zero". Somehow "one" is a hot coal which we can only jump over without standing upon it. In some ways the idea of the self and the other are the root of this,  the underlying duality, to the extent that has meaning. Ted Wrigley's excellent and creative answer, more worthy of votes than this one, illustrates this in a more useful way than the kind of conceptual thinking in this answer and in your question. But maybe this answer could serve as a bridge for you?

I'm not sure why you think of Nirvana as Nothingness.
I'm coming from a Theravada Background and Nothingness and Nirvana are not the same. There is no material plane, or place as Nirvana (Nibbana). The word Nibbana literally means severing the link or attachment (to sansara).
Nirvana is an understanding. That is why an Arahath is known as an 'Awakened one'. The understanding you attain in Arahath state allows you to stop forming attachments (lobha or dwesha) towards the world. You no longer have a reason to be born again, thus you have broken the cycle of birth and death. When an Arahath passes away there is no reason to form another link to the world, thus ending the birth and death cycle of sansara. It is not nothingness. If it helps you understand, you can think of it as ending of a process.


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Did Lord Buddha teach a meditation technique called Shunya to close disciples?
I recently heard from an Indian Guru that Lord Buddha taught a meditation technique called Shoonya to his closest disciples.
Is there any technique like that or resembling it which is mentioned in the Buddhist scripture?
Related question

Edit: What was meant by close disciples was not that there was some kind of secrecy, but as Lord Buddha was a travelling monk, and this meditation technique takes time to teach, he could only teach it to the close disciples who were travelling with him.

Ven. Ananda was the Buddha's attendant and literally very close to him. In MN121, the Buddha teaches:

MN121:3.3: ‘Ānanda, these days I usually practice the meditation on emptiness.’

MN121 is a beautiful sutta and very inspiring. MN121 is the Cūḷasuññatasutta, the Shorter Discourse on Emptiness.
MN121 is not secret or hidden, but it can be confusing given that the Buddha teaches about and distinguishes between space, nothingness and emptiness.

MN121:6.7: There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of infinite space.’

MN121:8.7: There is only this that is not emptiness, namely the oneness dependent on the perception of the dimension of nothingness.’

Yet this sutta can be read by all who seek peace. MN121 is not only an inspiring read but is also an actual instruction for meditation. And as an instruction to meditation, it refers to many concepts taught in other suttas.
In general, the more suttas we read, the better informed we are about which practice will provide a particular benefit for a particular person or situation.

It is possible that the guru is explaining something called "suññatā cetovimutti" (空心三昧 kōng xīnsānmèi). You can read about it in the Godattasutta (SN 41.7). This sort of meditation is only practiced by the Arhats (i.e. the Buddha's "closest disciples"). From Pali Kanon: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, the entry on "cetovimutti:"

'deliverance of mind'. In the highest sense it signifies the fruition
of Arahatship (s. ariya-puggala), and in particular, the concentration
associated with it. It is often linked with the 'deliverance through
wisdom' (paññā-vimutti [...]

Don't you think that the idea of teaching a technique to his closest disciples seems to contradict the statement in DN 16 about The Closed Fist:

I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine: for in respect of the truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher, who keeps some things back.

But "Shunya" or "Shoonya" meditation is presumably "meditation on emptiness" -- the Pali word for emptiness is suññatā -- which is mentioned in MN 121: What is the "meditation on emptiness" in MN 121?

What was meant by close disciples was not that there was some kind of secrecy, but as Lord Buddha was a travelling monk, and this meditation technique takes time to teach, he could only teach it to the close disciples who were travelling with him


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Why does "not existing from its own side" make something a "conceptual construction"?
Why does "not existing from its own side" make something a "conceptual construction"?
I believe, from memory, the former phrase in quotes is Tibetan, but that all Buddhists think every empty thing is a "conceptual construction": but am unsure what that last phrase means, so don't know why anyone would believe it. Can you help?

Imagine you're looking at a mountain peak that looks like an eagle's head. This eagle head "does not exist from its own side" - it is you, the observer, that delineates the head from the rest of the mountain range and imputes the features such as the eyes, the feathers, the beak etc. to construct the image of an eagle. That imputation or projection from observer's memory onto external stimuli and resulting delineation, designation, and recognition of a subset of that stimuli as a certain known entity - is what's simply referred to as "a mere conceptual construct".
The same process is behind recognizing images in the morphing clouds, on the starry night sky, in the tree canopies.
The same process is behind production of dreams from the random noise our sense organ circuitry generates during sleep.
It takes only a little more effort to understand that the same exact process is also behind a one year old infant parsing it's sensory input into distinct entities such as "mother", "dog" and "ball". None of these exist as separate distinct immutable entities over long time, but are delineated and designated by the infant brain based on the sensory impressions accumulated during the first year of life.
Even us, adults, live in the subjective world of objects that don't exist from their own sides but are conceptual constructs we were taught to delineate and designate.
Hope this helps.
See this inspired answer for better examples and a clearer connection to the concept of Emptiness.

I quite like that. like looking at some stars as an an archer... it's not that the stars aren't there, it's that the archer isn't

It does as a "conceptual construction" and not taught in such way by the Buddha, good householder. All Phenomenas, aside the deathless, have causes. Would one say that this or tgat arises by oneself or by others, would lead to extreme. Actually touch (of avijja) does the case of phenomenas arise. May good householder be touched.
The prove, toward liberation even, can be made by everyone, right here and now.


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Sutras are in which Tripitaka
I have one query. All the Sutra's ( lotus Sutra, heart Sutra) belongs to which Tripitaka (first second or third)?

The Tripitaka is one and it is divided in  three collections of texts (pitaka) and the first one contains the sutras (sutra pitaka).
The heart sutra and the lotus sutra are not in the Tripitaka though, they are part of the prajnaparamita sutras that is a different collection of sutras, studied in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

According to Wikipedia's Tripiṭaka article,

Tripiṭaka has become a term used for many schools' collections, although their general divisions do not match a strict division into three piṭakas.

The "three baskets" to not correspond to the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma which is I think what the question is suggesting.
At least in the Wikipedia article, the different (versions of the) Tripiṭakas are referred to or named as "Pali", "Chinese", and "Tibetan".
The Lotus Sutra is not in the Pali Tripiṭaka -- apparently it was Indian originally, and translated into Chinese and Tibetan (and other languages).
And the Heart Sutra is apparently originally Chinese.

TL;DR: the Mahayana sutras like Heart Sutra, Lotus Sutra are not part of the Tripitaka.
For the Theravada school, the main scripture is the Pali Canon or the Tipitaka, in the Pali language.
Tipitaka or Tripitaka means the three baskets. The three are the Sutta Pitaka which is the basket on the teachings of the Buddha and his disciples, the Vinaya Pitaka which is the basket on the monastic rules, and the Abhidhamma Pitaka which is the basket of philosophical analysis.
Here's one view of it below. You can find it online at AccessToInsight or SuttaCentral.
Other Buddhist scripture for Mahayana Buddhism are either in Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan. The Vajrayana school is part of Mahayana.
The Mahayana Agamas are equivalent to the Pali suttas.
However, the Mahayana sutras like Heart Sutra, Lotus Sutra are not part of the Tripitaka.


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How closely aligned are Buddhist ethics and Nietzschean values?
How closely aligned are Buddhist ethics and Nietzschean values? I know a little about both, and may even have read a comparative study (some time ago). Was hoping to harmonise them via 'karma': the agent experiences the result. But there seems no linguistic or rational reason which is strong enough to believe in rebirth, so it seems to me that Nietzsche's analysis (only the success of the superman matters) cannot be reconciled with Buddhism. If so, I'll probably side with Buddhist ethics (I think we need art, not individuals, and Buddhism doesn't make only for worthless aesthetics), but it's a blow, because in the process we may have to sacrifice what is - it is sometimes claimed - is the very highest type of well being possible.
This question is just from someone who has read a small bit of Nietzsche studies (I'm not philosopher), but I take claims about morality quite seriously, that's all.

They aren't aligned at all.  Nietzsche's critique of Christianity could just as easily be levied against Buddhism. The only reason I think that he tepidly praised Buddhism is because he only understood it as a philosophy, not the soteriological religion that it undoubtably is.
For instance - "The Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit, it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation."
Buddhism, at its core, is a religion of self sacrifice.  The first paramita is dana.  We give not just alms or service but make a wholehearted offering of our very being.  In Zen, we celebrate dying on the cushion.  In the tantras, you give over everything to your guru.  In the Theravada, there is the model of leaving home and everything behind.  All of these are examples of self subjugation.  Nietzsche's philosophy, on the contrary, is ultimately self serving, even aggrandizing.

There is a big difference in dana paramitha and sacrifice. If you see Dhamma, understand it and as a result of that understanding, practice it, dana paramitha is not a sacrifice for such a practicing Buddhist. It may look like so, for the rest of the world, but it does not feel so, to the practicing Buddhist. For such practicing Buddhist, the dana paramitha is an effect of understanding, its not caused by any teaching. Same goes for leaving home and everything behind in Theravada Tradition. Its an effect of seeing beyond the material world which loses value in the search for truth.

I have to disagree with that. In order to practice, there are obstacles that we have to push through. Sitting is hard at first.  We rather not do it. We sacrifice our comfort to do it. Practicing sila means we can't act like we have in the past. We have to consciously fight our karmic tendencies. It's easier to just go on as we always have.  That too is sacrifice.  Sacrifice is showing loving kindness to our enemies. We much rather give them the gift of our anger. It's a sacrifice to give them the gift of compassion. In Zen, we'd call this walking Kempo's One Road. Every sacrifice is a gate.

The reason that paramitha does not become a sacrifice for a practicing Buddhist is because, when practicing Dhamma, you try to see the reality of the world you have built for yourself. When you see the truth, dana, siila, and meditation will become a natural part of life. Paramitha becomes an effect of your understanding. Practicing Paramitha with effort will definitely help but, practicing Dhamma is not practicing Paramitha with effort, to practice Dhamma is to see your wold through Dhamma,which will lead to Nibbana. Sacrifices will not lead you to Nibbana.

hey @Sampath both. good answer, but I think you're overplaying the attitude to self and underplaying 'morality' - which, for Nietzsche, is a trick: and a highly poisonous one

@again_insane_buddhist: I'm sorry I know nothing about Nietzsche. My comment does not cover Nietzsche. It is simply comparing paramitha and sacrifice in the viewpoint of a Practicing Buddhist (how paramitha feels to a Practicing Buddhist). The term 'Practicing Buddhist' was used just to differentiate them from the different pursuers of Dhamma with different intentions or purposes in mind. I'm not talking about me either. Even though I had the good fortune of meeting a few such wonderful human beings.; I cannot be categorized as a Practicing Buddhist.

I was mostly talking to @000 and just including you to be firendly. sorry for confusion

@again_insane_buddhist: Apologies if I misunderstood your comment. I just wanted to clarify my comment.

Nietzsche's philosophy, on the contrary, is ultimately self serving,
even aggrandizing

I tend to agree.
One thing I notice is that Buddhist licentiousness seems to breed a similar sort of arrogance (nb Buddhists accuse each other of this at times), the same sense that the suffering of others is their obligation to us. We are free to choose our values in both of these philosophies, just as some individuals are better set to do so (even authentic milk is different to authentic butter).
It may be that the Buddha meant that all ethical judgments are in error, and it may be that Nietzsche merely meant that all moral judgments are fictional. But, either way, you should surely take it on a case by case basis, either in the abstract (Nietzsche belittles Mitleid) or in the concrete (the Buddha suggested his followers completely abstain from intoxicants).
So, apples and oranges: at least they're not vegetables.
Most philosophies seek greatness in someone.

Nietsche does agree with the Buddha on some things. They both point out the problem of self:

Nietsche: One must not eye oneself while having an experience; else the eye becomes "an evil eye."
MN62:3.2: “Rāhula, you should truly see any kind of form at all—past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or fine; inferior or superior; far or near: all form—with right understanding: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’”

However, there is profound disagreement on immersion. Nietsche's "frenzy" corresponds to wrong immersion for Buddhists.

Nietsche: in this state one enriches everything out of one's own fullness: whatever one sees, whatever one wills, is seen swelled, taut, strong, overloaded with strength. A man in this state transforms things until they mirror his power--until they are reflections of his perfection. This having to transform into perfection is--art. Even everything that he is not yet, becomes for him an occasion of joy in himself; in art man enjoys himself as perfection.”

The Buddha declares right immersion as:

AN5.28:2.1: “And how do you develop noble right immersion with five factors?
AN5.28:2.2: Firstly, a mendicant, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and remains in the first absorption. It has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected.

I've tried both ways. The Buddha's way leads to less suffering. YMMV.

Not closely aligned at all. Nietzsche believes in "the will to power." The Buddha teaches the path to the relinquishment of "will" and "power," so that the endless march to attain these two things, "what one wants" (will) and "the pursued ability to get what one wants" (power) are utterly pacified. The Arhat is happy even in the nastiest of circumstances. He has no desire to change his material circumstances. Why? He has the secret happiness available to him that all Buddhas have, the ability to dwell in Nirvana, the "highest happiness."

As much as Zen is related in aim and way: not at all, aside of a prove that defilement have endless arguments to hold on wrong at the base, good householder.
Yet even former wanderers under either Zen or Nietsche, hardly ever arrive at the Dhamma and will still relay on wrong view, making "I have a right" to their incapacity's. into a virtue... blessed who never nourished in this sink of dung, to be smelled from far by wise.