text:
Is this noble right view? - "There is no mother or father, without the self"
The right view of the Noble Ones is described here as:
"There is no mother and father, without the self."
Buddha describes wrong view here:

“And what, bhikkhus, is wrong view? ‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ This is wrong view.
MN 117

Is it possible to turn this wrong view into the right view of the Noble Ones by adding "without the self?"

“And what, bhikkhus, is right view of the Noble Ones? ‘There is nothing given without the self, nothing offered without the self, nothing sacrificed without the self; no fruit or result of good and bad actions without the self; no this world without the self, no other world without the self; no mother, no father without the self; no beings who are reborn spontaneously without the self; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have realised for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world without the self.’ This is right view of the Noble Ones."

Is this an accurate description of the right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path?

I updated it to:

There is no "my" mother and "my" father, without the self ("me"). Whose mother
and father are they? They are mother and father relative to a self.

We can understand this through the following sutta:

Seeing in what way is a monk unbound,
clinging to nothing in the world?"
"He should put an entire stop
to the root of objectification-classifications:
'I am the thinker.'
Snp 4.14
With footnote from Ven. Thanissaro:

On objectification-classifications and their role in leading to
conflict, see Sn 4.11 and the introduction to MN 18. The perception,
"I am the thinker" lies at the root of these classifications in that
it reads into the immediate present a set of distinctions — I/not-I;
being/not-being; thinker/thought; identity/non-identity — that then
can proliferate into mental and physical conflict. The conceit
inherent in this perception thus forms a fetter on the mind. To become
unbound, one must learn to examine these distinctions — which we all
take for granted — to see that they are simply assumptions that are
not inherent in experience, and that we would be better off to be able
to drop them.

Every father and mother are father and mother to someone. They are "my" father and "my" mother.

The Zen story titled "Is That So?" (I suppose you know it) suggests that it's possible to 'function' as a parent, filling the needs of the child, without especial attachment to that child nor to the role of parent.
If I look at the world (society) then I see many mothers and fathers, sometimes.
Recognizing the bond or relationship between children and parents may be important for the avoidance of suffering (and so denying it is wrong)? The Buddha set a rule for example that people need their parents' permission before ordaining, I'm pretty sure
that's an example of the Buddha's not denying that 'parents exist'.

I'm not sure about the phrase you quoted and perhaps you're misusing it if you use it out of context. I can't presume to know what was meant in context but I read as something like,

There is no "my" mother and father, without "me" (i.e. the self).

Extending the phrase to add "without the self" to every sentence sounds like a word-game (and it seems to me that a lot of recent questions on this site have been based on "logic").
If you're asking what "right view" is, perhaps that's better defined in another sutta than in MN 117 -- i.e. in SN 12.15 -- I'll quote it all because it's quite short, it contains several famous phrases:

Kaccānagotta (SN 12.15)
At Sāvatthī.
Then Venerable Kaccānagotta went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and said to him:
“Sir, they speak of this thing called ‘right view’. How is right view defined?”
“Kaccāna, this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence.
But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won’t have the notion of existence regarding the world.
The world is for the most part shackled by attraction, grasping, and insisting.
But if—when it comes to this attraction, grasping, mental fixation, insistence, and underlying tendency—you don’t get attracted, grasp, and commit to the notion ‘my self’, you’ll have no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is just suffering arising, and what ceases is just suffering ceasing. Your knowledge about this is independent of others.
This is how right view is defined.
‘All exists’: this is one extreme.
‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme.
Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:
‘Ignorance is a condition for choices. Choices are a condition for consciousness. … That is how this entire mass of suffering originates.
When ignorance fades away and ceases with nothing left over, choices cease. When choices cease, consciousness ceases. … That is how this entire mass of suffering ceases.’”

This is echoed in the Vajira Sutta (SN 5.10).

Thanks @ChrisW for helping to sort out the misunderstanding. Also wanted to note about your critique of "logic" that when I use this phrase I'm not talking about mathematical or western formal logic. Just mean nomal inferential logic such as what Vaijra uses in SN 5.10 or the Buddha uses throughout the suttas.

Hi @YesheTenley perhaps I don't know what "normal inferential logic" is when it not "mathematical or western formal logic" -- e.g. Wikipedia's Inference gives syllogisms as an example, which are mathematical and western are they not. But anyway when I said "logic" I was thinking of or meant to imply logos i.e. "word" -- there have been topics about the meanings of words (which is fine in context), but then IMO using them in an algebraic, symbol-substitution kind of way.

The logic employed in every day colloquial language by one or more people describing their reasoning which is usually not formal and with varied levels of rigor.


text:
Is there a real contradiction between AN 3.47 and SN 15.9?
The setup ...

Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.
AN 3.47

Together with ...

Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries. This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.
SN 15.1

Along with the assumption that "transmigration" or "samsara" is a conditioned phenomena ...
Would seem to give rise to a contradiction. On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning.
Questions:

Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?
Do you think this is a real contradiction?
If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated" but I'm curious to know how others resolve it.
Related but distinct questions.
UPDATE:
This was too close to a seeded question. Although it was asked sincerely in that I was curious to know others responses (particular users on this site who I respect and admire) I do have my own idea of how I would answer this question so I should not have opened it out of mere curiosity. I was going to delete it given it goes against the site moderation guidelines, but then there are good answers and we are discouraged to delete questions where people have attempted to give good and thoughtful answers so I will leave it, but I do regret opening it in the first place.

A circle has no beginning, but we can by convention start at 0 degrees as a beginning and end at 360 degrees, ready for a new cycle. Transmigration is cyclic. But we can let go of chasing the cycles. We can stop treating the circle as a line and just let it be a circle.

SNp3.12:28.1: “Craving is a person’s partner
SNp3.12:28.2: as they transmigrate on this long journey.
SNp3.12:28.3: They go from this state to another,
SNp3.12:28.4: but don’t escape transmigration.

Is a circle not a conditioned phenomena? Was the Buddha wrong that with a circle - being a conditioned phenomena - arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident?

Also, by that same token if a 'circle has no beginning' then in the same way it 'has no end' and if you are comparing transmigration to this circle are you then saying transmigration has no end??

Thank you for your kind answer. I will think on these.

@YesheTenley: I think it can reasonably be argued circles are not conditioned. π is literally a transcendental number, that seems to represent a fundamental quality of our reality. Similarly logical inferences are not conditioned.

There are many many dependent conditions for transcendental numbers, diameters, circumferences, logical inferences etc and all of these are conditioned phenomena. They are all conventions. No matter how useful a convention, conventions are still just conventions

@CriglCragl, as an engineer I agree with you. However, it doesn't help me read the suttas. So for the suttas, I now prefer YesheTenley's explanation (which also works for me as an engineer)

This is an apparent contradiction. All conditioned phenomena are impermanent. All conditions are also conditioned phenomena. Therefore as conditions themselves are conditioned phenomena , we say a conditioned phenomena is built upon another conditioned phenomena. There seems to be no beginning of a conditioned phenomena which can be called father or mother of all phenomena.
However , every phenomena along with its conditionals ,in this infinite cycle,has a beginning as the conditioned phenomena arises ,changes and vanishes.
I was asked :

If arising itself has the characteristic of arising, then it leads to
an unacceptable infinite regress.

I will explain it using an example as follows:
Take an example of eating, we ask , is there a beginning of phenomena of eating ? Answer is Yes. There is an arising of phenomena of eating.Is there any change in Sankhara of eating ? No. Is there is an end of eating? Yes.
Next we ask , what are the conditions for eating ? Answer is craving(hunger). Is hunger a phenomena? Yes. Does it have arising , change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for craving ? Answer is feelings.Does it have beginning and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for feelings ? Answer is contact. Does it have beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for contact ? Six senses. Is six senses a phenomena with beginning, change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for six senses? Name and form. Is name and form a phenomena with arising , change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for name and form ? Consciousness. Is consciousness a phenomena with beginning, change and end ? Yes. What are the conditions for consciousness? Volitional formations or mental fabrications. Is volitional formations or mental fabrication a phenomena with beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for volitional formations? Ignorance. Is ignorance a phenomena with beginning, change and end? Yes. What are the conditions for ignorance? Answer is craving.
You see we have again reached to craving.
Therefore each phenomena with conditions have beginning, change and end. And also note every phenomena is based on manifestation of other phenomena. We do not regress infinitely because we end up with circle.

Is arising itself a compounded phenomena?

@YesheTenley Yes.

So arising itself has the three characteristics of arising, enduring, and ceasing?

Also, what school(s) of Buddhism do you follow @SacrificialEquation ?

If arising itself has the characteristic of arising, then it leads to an unacceptable infinite regress.

You didn't understand the infinite regress. If arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising of arising has the characteristic of arising, then the arising of arising of arising of arising has the characteristic of arising... infinite regress. This is unacceptable.

@YesheTenley Arising is a combination of Sankharas. There is no arising of the arising. For example -Eating. It arises. Eating is conditional. Those conditions also have condition and so on. But arising of eating is a finite process.

You take back saying that arising itself has the three characteristics?

@YesheTenley No. Arising is conditional… dependently originates. But it is finitely realised. There are infinite points between any two distinct points but  we cover the distance finitely…

So you still maintain that arising has the characteristic of arising? If so, you can't avoid the infinite regress

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

Do you agree this is a contradiction?

First, when I read a sutta I look for meaning -- perhaps I assume it has a meaning -- and a context and a purpose. IMO each of these suttas is saying something meaningful, and is 'sensible' by which I mean 'inline with experience/observation'. Give that they're both/each useful statements in context, and saying different things, their being "contradictory" doesn't come to mind.

I'm not sure whether samsara is a sankhara as described in AN 3.47:

You might think it is i.e. that, "Samsara is the set/sum/totality of all sankharas and is therefore an aggregate/sankhara itself", but I'm not sure that's true. In general there can be paradoxes if you assume that's true (see "universal set") which in Maths is considered "proof by contradiction" that it isn't true. Knowing a little of that, I avoid making confident statements on that subject (like I beware, or find unsatisfactory, lay-people's making 'logical' arguments using the word 'infinite').
If a sankhara is a "conditioned thing" with a start and end, I'm not sure that samsara is a thing in the same way, perhaps you're reifying it. It's true that 'samsara' is a noun: but!

By analogy, maybe samsara is like an ocean and sankharas are like the waves. Float a duck on the surface of the ocean, graph its position over time, it goes up and down thus each wave has a top and bottom, like a beginning and an end -- but statements about the properties of "waves" aren't necessarily applicable to the whole ocean.
Similarly a statement about human beings (e.g. "each has a date of birth and date of death") isn't applicable to the human race (the beginning of which is not only 'lost in the mists of time' but also perhaps indefinite i.e. too gradual to identify).

Samsara is like the evolution of an object into another, isn't it. SN 15.9 is about the migration and AN 3.47 is about the objects, they're not mutually-contradictory because they're taking about different subjects/objects.

This answer hasn't mentioned 'emptiness' yet but to an extent sankharas are 'mind-made', based on sense-contact, "Oh hello, there's my friend again!", and to that extent short-lived. AN 3.47 is about any specific, identified thing-cluster-perception. Samsara is more or less saying, "It's in the nature of any things to be short/finite-lived", it's not a contradiction to say that samsara or samsaric nature itself is so, and has been so since who even knows when.

It may be worth mentioning the 'unanswered questions' too, i.e. Buddhism has a purpose/message. Maybe "the origin of samsara" isn't a useful topic, a tractable problem. Logically it seems that it might be a useful thing to know, so it's tempting. But I think SN 15.9 short-circuits that, "No it's not evident".

Yes, the suttas have profound meaning
You seem to be saying that there is not even an apparent contradiction (it doesn't come to mind)
You then try to explain the apparent contradiction you won't even acknowledge
The whole question rests on whether samsara is indeed a conditioned phenomena as I said in my question but you don't even seem to want to grab either horn (yes it is conditioned phenomena or no it isn't)
All conditioned phenomena are put together or compound not just samsara. A chariot is made up of parts, the parts are made up of parts, the parts of the parts are made

of parts. Can the beginning of 'chariot' similarly not be known? * I'm talking about conditioned phenomena... the two suttas in question are talking about conditioned phenomena if you grab the horn and agree that samsara is  saṅkhata * talking about how samsara is made up of parts does not refute that it is saṅkhata and thus subject to AN 3.47 * You again and again go back to the 'unanswered questions' as an escape from the agitation that the apparent contradiction brings to your mind * It is fine to temporarily escape this agitation if you can't resolve the apparent contradiction * But this

does not actually resolve the agitation or dukkha you have to deal with it at some point if the contradiction is in fact apparent to you. * It really does seem that the contradiction is apparent to you, you refuse to believe it is a real contradiction (which is good), but you are unsure how to actually resolve it

It is fine to say - commendable even - that "It is an apparent contradiction, I don't believe it is a real contradiction, but I'm unsure right now how to resolve it."

It wasn't apparent to me, it didn't occur to me, but you posted the question and said you wanted me to answer. I don't think samsara is a thing like a chariot. Consider a fire: it happens under the right conditions (e.g. fuel and air and heat); a fire is a conditioned thing with a start and end, more or less. But when did the "law of flammability" begin, the tendency of things to combust under certain conditions, when was the first fire? That's not knowable, and not answerable.

If there is no apparent contradiction, then nothing needs to be explained. It seems there is no apparent contradiction for you because you reject the part that I clearly marked as an assumption: that samsara is a conditioned phenomena.

The problem with grasping that horn is you are left with samsara is either an unconditioned phenomena (like nirvana) OR samsara is simply not a phenomena at all which is also problematic

Comparing samsara to the 'law of flammability' is problematic: are you saying samsara has no end? you are saying samsara doesn't begin, but it endures and then ends?

"you reject the part that I clearly marked as an assumption" I don't buy it as a given, anyway; it's not how I read the sutta. Another answer could be, I guess, that perhaps another way to escape the dilemma you posit might be to ask "evident to whom?" e.g. perhaps its beginning is not evident to beings caught in samsara in SN 15.1 and yet evident to the author of AN 3.57. It (whether it's evident) varying with the person could be inline with the suttas being spoken in different "contexts". As for flammability, SN 35.28 for example says it can be ended, even if we can't identify when it began.

Anyway you wrote, "I would say, "yes, no, and it is complicated"" -- perhaps you'll post an answer.

I've now linked my answer. I can elaborate if someone thinks it would be helpful, but my answer is basically Nagarjuna's answer.

The Finke River in central Australia is said to be the oldest river in the world. It is 750km long and 350-400 million years old.
It's kind of similar to the river of samsara in Buddhism, whose river current is craving:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have
heard: "Suppose a man was being carried along by the flow of a river,
lovely & alluring. And then another man with good eyesight, standing
on the bank, on seeing him would say: 'My good man, even though you
are being carried along by the flow of a river, lovely & alluring,
further down from here is a pool with waves & whirlpools, with
monsters & demons. On reaching that pool you will suffer death or
death-like pain.' Then the first man, on hearing the words of the
second man, would make an effort with his hands & feet to go against
the flow.
"I have given you this simile to illustrate a meaning. The meaning is
this: the flow of the river stands for craving. Lovely & alluring
stands for the six internal sense-media. The pool further down stands
for the five lower fetters. The waves stand for anger & distress.
The whirlpools stand for the five strings of sensuality. The monsters
& demons stand for the opposite sex. Against the flow stands for
renunciation. Making an effort with hands & feet stands for the
arousing of persistence. The man with good eyesight standing on the
bank stands for the Tathagata, worthy & rightly self-awakened."
Iti 109

Is the Finke River persistent and unchanging throughout its lifetime for millions of years?
No. It is constantly changing, with different water molecules, different animals and plants, different sedimentation, different flow rate, changing route etc.
It appears to be persistent and long standing, but the reality is that it is constantly changing. The appearance of being long standing and long lived is merely apparent.
The same applies to the river of samsara. The beings and sankharas arising and ceasing on the river of samsara, is not unlike the water molecules coursing through the Finke River through millions of years. It's constantly changing based on conditions.

“Consider the Ganges river from where it originates to where it meets
the ocean. Between these places it’s not easy to calculate how many
grains of sand there are, how many hundreds or thousands or hundreds
of thousands of grains of sand. The eons that have passed are more
than this. It’s not easy to calculate how many eons have passed, how
many hundreds or thousands or hundreds of thousands of eons.
Why is that? Transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is
found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by
ignorance and fettered by craving. For such a long time you have
undergone suffering, agony, and disaster, swelling the cemeteries.
This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate,
and freed regarding all conditions.”
SN 15.8

I see sankharas like samsara, a river or a stream of consciousness as also temporally composite conditional phenomena. That is to say, you can never step into the exact same river twice. The river is changing from moment to moment, in terms of water molecules, temperature, water current speed etc. And so is samsara.
So, in short, there is no contradiction at all.

This does not even attempt to answer the OP questions. I still don't know from this answer whether you would answer yes or no to an apparent contradiction for instance.

@YesheTenley The answer is that there is no contradiction at all. It's constantly changing based on conditions.

The Finke River is sankhata, right? Then according to AN 3.47 its arising is evident, right? Can the same be said of samsara?

@YesheTenley Samsara is merely a convention and conceptual description of the continual arising and ceasing of beings, and the continuity of their suffering. Samsara is not a separate standalone entity that arises and ceases.

In your other answer, you give a very good description of a lap, a fist, that arise and cease but are not standalone entities. Thus we can conclude that samsara - also not a standalone separate entity - can arise and cease just like a lap, a fist, etc, right? right?? :)

Also, I think your answer might also give rise to this question: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/49754/does-an-3-47-refer-to-only-single-standalone-sankhara

@YesheTenley Samsara has the appearance of continuously existing like a river or the stream of consciousness, but in reality it is continuously arising and ceasing, when beings arise and cease. Updated answer to explain what I consider to be temporally composite conditional phenomena.

On the one hand, the Buddha said quite unambiguously that conditioned phenomena have a beginning, middle and an end, but on the other hand the Buddha said that "transmigration" or "samsara" has no known beginning.

Do you agree this is an apparent contradiction?

It appears to be a contradiction when we are not mindful of what is being stated. It is not, on it's own, an apparent contradiction.

Do you think this is a real contradiction?

No. What do you mean by 'real'?

If it is apparent but not real, then how would you resolve it?

Samsara is not a product beyond being the Dharma that points to the fact that a mental continuum has not yet achieved cessation of suffering: It is still prone to an endless cycle of suffering.
There is the word 'samsara'.  The word, as are all words, is subject to samsara: It is selfless, and subject to momentary change.  Its meaning is selfless, and is subject to momentary change. The word has a beginning, and an end.  Our understanding of what the word is saying has a beginning and an end.  The referent - that which it refers to - has no beginning, but might be ended through continuous, sincere practice. But the referent is a synthetic: 'samsara' is a place-holder for a teaching on the way things are.
There is nothing unique about samsara; think of anicca. Does it end?
Does death die? (or, if you prefer, Does Death die?)

"No. What do you mean by 'real'?" -> I mean that it appears the same way it actually exists.

@YesheTenley, well according to the Madhyamaka of Candrakirti, nothing appears the same way it actually exists. In fact, the entire Buddhist project rests upon the fact that nothing appears the same way it actually exists, right? Otherwise we would not need to develop right view.

Emptiness appears the exact way it exists

"Emptiness appears the exact way it exists" - is true only to a Buddha. If emptiness appeared the way it existed then we would not be subject to self-grasping. As it is, emptiness is completely obscured by ignorance - which, by definition, is the inability to see the way things are. As a Dharma tradition, Buddhism holds that ignorance is the root of samsara.

It is also true to an Arya being in meditative equipoise directly perceiving emptiness. Either way, the statement that Chandrakirti asserted that, “nothing appears the same way it exists” is wrong given this counter example. The definition of “real” is correct and the Buddha himself gave this definition. I can find the sutta if you like.

No, an Arya being has direct access to emptiness, but still does not see it as it is.  This is because it's nature is tathata - indistinguishable from its conventional contexts, which is only available to a Buddha.  Aryas are able to directly perceive emptiness, but they still do not see it as it really is. Needless to say, given a choice between Candrakirti and you, I would go with Candrakirti. Call me annoying, if you will!  Moreover, if you accept that 'things appear as they exist' only to Arya beings you should qualify that in your question.

This is interesting. Can you please cite sutta or explain some logic for why you believe that an Arya being in meditative equipoise with direct perception of emptiness does not apprehend emptiness as it actually is.

If you say you believe this because of someone who you believe to be authoritative other than the Buddha - for instance Chandrakirti - has stated this could you please provide a reference indicative. Thank you.

gate gate paragate parasamgate bodhi.  Each of the five paths reveals more clearly one's understanding of emptiness.  Having a direct perception of a mug does not mean that one knows all there is to know of a mug.  This is the great argument against rang.rig:  our perceptions are not clear.  I can find plenty of sources for all of this - but I do not believe you are interested in being persuaded - instead, you appear merely to be offering a chip on your shoulder for me to knock off, and I have better things to do than to get into a fight.

It is unfortunate that you believe this as I am very interested to learn otherwise. I am being sincere when I say this is interesting and I am also being sincere when I say that my understanding could be wrong. I am asking you, sincerely, to teach me the evidence you have so that I may understand why you believe what you believe.

@YesheTenley, okay, I'll bite this time.  This will move into a chat.  Before we start, we need to know what it is that is the subject of discussion.  I believe it is my rebuttal to your assertion that things (and absences, such as the emptiness of self) "appear the exact way they actually exist", where the word 'actually' indicates that we are specifically not talking about conventional truths, (which allow for multiple ways (or perspectives) of "actually existing"), depending upon the context of such truths).  My position is "only a tathagata is able to perceive tathata as it is".

I do not agree this an apparent contradiction between AN 3.47 & SN 15.9 because:

AN 3.47 says all conditioned things having an arising/uprising (uppāda).

SN 15.9 says moving about (samsara) has no imaginable (mata; pp. of maññati) first point (agga).

If we emphasize arising/uprising (uppāda), SN 15.9 is simply saying the first arising/uprising is not imaginable.

However, SN 15.9 may have a contradiction with MN 64 & MN 38, which do point out the first dependent-co-arising (paticca-sam-uppada) of 'satta' ('beings'), when they say:

For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘beings,’ so how could ill will towards beings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to ill will lies within him. (MN 64)

Then, when the child is born, she nourishes it with her own blood; for the mother’s breast-milk is called blood in the Noble One’s Discipline. When he grows up and his faculties mature, the child plays at such games as toy ploughs, tipcat, somersaults, toy windmills, toy measures, toy carts, and a toy bow and arrow. When he grows up and his faculties mature still further, the youth enjoys himself provided and endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure, with forms cognizable by the eye… sounds cognizable by the ear…odours cognizable by the nose… flavours cognizable by the tongue…tangibles cognizable by the body that are wished for, desired, agreeable and likeable, connected with sensual desire, and provocative of lust. On seeing a form with the eye, he lusts after it if it is pleasing; he dislikes it if it is unpleasing. He abides with mindfulness of the body unestablished, with a limited mind, and he does not understand as it actually is the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder. Engaged as he is in favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—he delights in that feeling, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As he does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feelings is clinging. With his clinging as condition, being comes to be; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. (MN 38).

Note: Bhikkhu Bodhi embellishes the above passage in MN 38 by adding the title: "The Continuation of the Round". However, when we read the above passage objectively, the above appears to be about: "The First Point (Agga) of the Round".

Epilogue: It was asked by Yeshe Tenley:

Hmm, so you would not object to someone that said: "Samsara (saṁsāro),
being a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata), has three characteristics,
Arising (uppādo) is evident, vanishing (vayo) is evident, and change
(aññathatta) while persisting (ṭhita) is evident." Someone could say
the above faultlessly in your estimation?

The term 'samsara' refers to 'moving about continuously'. Therefore, in my opinion, the term 'samara' is not intended to characterise the characteristics of arising, change while continuing & vanishing. The term 'samsara' is intended to characterize moving about without respite & without ending. For example, SN 22.99 says:

"Just as a dog, tied by a leash to a post or stake, keeps running around and circling around that very post or stake; in the same way, an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for people of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form.
"He assumes feeling to be the self...
"He assumes perception to be the self...
"He assumes (mental) fabrications to be the self...
"He assumes consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in
consciousness.
"He keeps running around and circling around that very form... that very feeling... that very perception... those very fabrications...
that very consciousness. He is not set loose from form, not set loose
from feeling... from perception... from fabrications... not set loose
from consciousness. He is not set loose from birth, aging, & death;
from sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, & despairs. He is not
set loose, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

Therefore, it is only at the end of SN 15.9, when the vanishing of samara is mentioned, when it is said: "This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions".
In conclusion, while 'samsara' is obviously a conditioned phenomena because its arising is dependent upon conditions, the word samsara is only intended to describe its conditioned nature of arising (uppādo) & continuance (ṭhita) but not its conditioned nature of vanishing. In other words, samsara is not Nirvana and Nirvana is not samara. Nirvana is known when samara vanishes. Nirvana is cessation. Samsara is continuance.

Hmm, so you would not object to someone that said: "Samsara (saṁsāro), being a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata), has three characteristics, Arising (uppādo) is evident, vanishing (vayo) is evident, and change (aññathatta) while persisting (ṭhita) is evident."
Someone could say the above faultlessly in your estimation?

Also, in MN 64 the Buddha is specifically refuting that he ever taught that way to Mālunkyāputta, right?

Hmm, according to your latest update you say that (saṁsāro) is not a conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata)??

I concluded by saying samsara is conditioned. Time to go to the beach. The hour is getting late.

The Buddha said that which is saṅkhata has the three characteristics. You acknowledge samsara is 'conditioned phenomena' but say it does not have the three characteristics. That contradicts AN 3.47 at least apparently or at least I have no idea how you maintain otherwise.

maññati is incorrect here. the word Anamataggoyaṁ has 'agga' as the root. it doesn't mean to believe or imagine.

its means to "imagine/construe a first point". Anamataggoyaṁ. Therefore, the translation you used translates "anamata" as "no known".

Mata1 [pp. of maññati] thought, understood, considered

Anamatagga (adj.) [ana (= a neg = no.) + mata (fr. man= known; thinkable; imaginable) + aggā (pl. = beginning ).

from mil5.2.3

‘There is the non-inclusive expression, O king, whose meaning is
non-inclusive, and the non-inclusive expression whose meaning is
inclusive; there is the inclusive expression whose meaning is
non-inclusive, and the inclusive expression whose meaning is
inclusive. And the meaning, in each case, should be accepted
accordingly. And there are five ways in which the meaning should be
ascertained-by the connection, and by taste, and by the tradition of
the teachers, and by the meaning, and by abundance of reasons. And
herein “connection” means the meaning as seen in the Sutta itself,
“taste” means that it is in accordance with other Suttas, “the
tradition of the teachers” means what they hold, “the meaning” means
what they think, and “abundance of reasons” means all these four
combined.’

This does not even attempt to answer the OP questions.

If we play on the words “no known beginning” to mean there is an “unknown beginning”, this might help clarify the situation. Likewise, the Buddha himself indicated that it is impossible to discover a beginning in SN15.7 simply because it is lost in antiquity. The example given was four monks who spend each day recollecting 100,000 eons and lived for a hundred years but would still not be able to discover how it all begin. If you do a backhand calculation, that would be 3.65 billion eons (100,000 x 365 x 100) i.e. 3.65 billion times that the universe was destroyed and recreated yet this is not even close to the starting point!
Surely, one would not expect the Buddha or any of his monks to spend their precious time doing such an inane task. Therefore, this (unknowable beginning) is extrapolated and inferred by the Buddha and cannot be validated. Thus, we will not be able to come to any conclusion when the Buddha himself did not. The below sections are some of my thoughts.
Suppose we asked when was a school first started, the natural answer would be when the first student(s) and teacher(s) were enrolled. A school is merely a building, it is the students and teachers that makes it special. Similarly, samsara is special because of the beings in it. If we need to know when a school was first started, we would approach the first student(s) or teacher(s). In the same manner, we would need to find the first sentient being(s) who appeared in samsara and they would also need to have the ability to recollect their past lives. But what if the first student(s) had long graduated or the first teacher(s) retired i.e. the first sentient being(s) had attained Nirvana and are no longer in samsara?
Underlying the above is the hypothesis that sentient beings evolved into existence. The critical point is that as long as new sentient beings continue to emerge in samsara, there will be no known ending either. Perhaps what matters most for any student is to finally graduate from this school after eons of retention.

Things can be known from inference. If you accept that samsara is a conditioned phenomena, then by AN 3.47 then an arising can be known (inferred)

@YesheTenley in theory, that is true. There are 3 points to be stressed. 1) It is not possible to verify samsara's arising or cessation. 2) Things that cannot be verified always lead to endless debate. 3) The Buddha was trying to stop this kind of debate.

Debates that lead to no learning are not just pointless, but actually harmful. I do think/hope there is something meaningful to learn in resolving this apparent contradiction. I could be wrong.

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text:
What is the meaning of suchness?
We can contemplate on the suchness , thisness and thusness…(I have seen some members of the site use the word “suchness” often)
What is the meaning of suchness as against the meaning of thisness and thusness?

you know the hindi word for truth is sach?

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text:
Does AN 3.47 refer to only single standalone sankhara?
This question concerns the proper understanding of AN 3.47:

“Mendicants, conditioned phenomena have these three characteristics. What three? Arising is evident, vanishing is evident, and change while persisting is evident. These are the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena.”
AN 3.47

It might have been suggested in other questions that this sutta is referring only to non-composite sankharas. That is, for composite phenomena - like a chariot - that arising, ceasing, and enduring are not evident.
Is this correct? Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is composite or made up of parts?
If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta would be applicable to? What non-composite conditioned phenomena can rightfully be said to arise, endure and cease? Does anyone have an example?

All conditioned phenomena are a result of conditional combination, and all the constituents are still made up of combination and so on. The law of impermanence of all conditional phenomena applies at all levels, from whole to the parts. There is no infinite regress because smallest parts take smallest time to combine and separate.
There is no example of non-composite phenomena except the unconditioned Nibbana. Nibbana is unborn , uncreated , unconditioned, unoriginated and unbecoming. Nibbana is neither permanent nor impermanent.

The infinite regress comment ruins it for me ;)

Yes, I suppose a being is indeed capable of arising, ceasing, and changing, but that's valid within a certain context.  If one has realized a more decoupled existence, then it wouldn't make sense to adhere to that type of reality.  This is made clear in Nandakovada Sutta via analogy:

"Just as if a skilled butcher or butcher's apprentice, having killed a
cow, were to carve it up with a sharp carving knife so that — without
damaging the substance of the inner flesh, without damaging the
substance of the outer hide — he would cut, sever, & detach only the
skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between. Having
cut, severed, & detached the outer skin, and then covering the cow
again with that very skin, if he were to say that the cow was joined
to the skin just as it had been: would he be speaking rightly?"
"No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because if the skilled butcher or
butcher's apprentice, having killed a cow, were to ... cut, sever, &
detach only the skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in
between; and ... having covered the cow again with that very skin,
then no matter how much he might say that the cow was joined to the
skin just as it had been, the cow would still be disjoined from the
skin."
"This simile, sisters, I have given to convey a message. The message
is this: The substance of the inner flesh stands for the six internal
media; the substance of the outer hide, for the six external media.
The skin muscles, connective tissues, & attachments in between stand
for passion & delight. And the sharp knife stands for noble
discernment — the noble discernment that cuts, severs, & detaches the
defilements, fetters, & bonds in between.

What an amazing sutta. I take it your answer is that AN 3.47 applies equally for composite phenomena like a chariot and is not referring to so-called "standalone sankhara."

To be honest, I don't think there are any standalone sankhara. The Theravada Abhidhamma does list out fundamental elements, upon which other composite elements are made of. The four great elements (earth, water, fire, air) are one of them. But even then, it doesn't really say that these fundamental elements are standalone entities.
A being and a chariot are conventions. They can arise and cease, but they don't arise and cease as standalone entities.
Nun Vajira said a being is just a convention, so how can it arise and cease? It doesn't really exist as a standalone entity in the first place. Its arising and ceasing also happens in a conventional way.
A convention is an agreed concept.
For e.g. I say that the House of Commons of the United Kingdom arises when it is convened after a general election, and ceases, when it is dissolved for new general elections. So, it arises and ceases. It's a sankhara. But it's not a standalone entity, is it?
The chariot, the being and the House of Commons are all structurally composite conditional phenomena.
However, I see other sankharas like samsara, a river or a stream of consciousness as also temporally composite conditional phenomena. That is to say, you can never step into the exact same river twice. The river is changing from moment to moment, in terms of water molecules, temperature, water current speed etc. And so is samsara.

@blue_ego Nibbana is not composite and not conditioned.

Can the arising, enduring and ceasing of a chariot not be known because it is a composite or made up of parts?
Isn't the Ship of Theseus meant as a standard example of that?
I think this is an "identity-view", of the sort described as "a thicket of wrong views".
If so, what would be a good example of a non-composite sankhara that this sutta would be applicable to?
Again, "a ship" -- for example -- has a launch date (a beginning), and an end (a date when it is finally no longer usable/recognisable as a ship).
This is more a functional view e.g., "it's recognised as a 'ship' while it's able to carry passengers etc".
Incidentally, as mentioned in the OP, this latter view more-or-less views the ship as a non-composite simple phenomenon -- which can either be used as a ship or it can't -- conversely the "Ship of Theseus" is a view which focuses on its composite composition.
Nevertheless the ship stops being (recognised as and functioning as) "a ship" when it decomposes.

Isn't the Ship of Theseus and the examination thereof closely analogous to what the Buddha teaches his students to do over and over again to look and see if the self can be found in the aggregates in order to gain complete confidence and certainty that the self cannot be found in the aggregates?

Surely when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'a chariot' is known, right?

If so, then it would seem to follow that when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'a being' is known, right? And similarly when the pile of conditions are present the arising of 'samsara' is known, right?

There are basic elements (dhatu), when only visible to the ordinary human eye, such as earth & space, the give the impression of being non-composite. For example, a grain of sand on a massive sand dune in the Sahara desert. It may not be obvious how the arising of this grain of sand occurred. This grain of sand may have an impression of permanence. But the grain of sand of obviously a sankhata (conditioned thing). The internet says:

The Sahara Desert formed around 7 million years ago, as a great dust
bowl sitting where the Tethys sea once soaked. This huge body of water
separated the two supercontinents, Laurasia and Gondwana, resulting
from the cleaving of Pangea by tectonic forces.

Similar, the element of space may appear to be a non-composite phenomena. But, in realty, the element of space is conditioned by the absence of the element of form or water in that space. About the element of space, MN 62 says:

And what is the space element? The space element may be interior or
exterior. And what is the interior space element? Anything that’s
space, spacious, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an
individual. This includes: the ear canals, nostrils, and mouth; and
the space for swallowing what is eaten and drunk, the space where it
stays, and the space for excreting it from the nether regions. This is
called the interior space element. The interior space element and the
exterior space element are just the space element. This should be
truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am
not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right
understanding, you reject the space element, detaching the mind from
the space element.
MN 62

For example, if the nostrils are blocked with mucus, the element of space reduces or disappears.
As for 'conventions' - like 'a chariot' - they also are characterized by arising, ceasing and enduring because they are thoughts. In SN 22.59, the Buddha says any type of sankhara aggregate is impermanent. MN 148 literally says 'mind-objects' have been discerned to arise & vanish (dhammānaṁ uppādopi vayopi paññāyati).
If we still remain with doubt about this, the convention of 'a being' in SN 5.10 is exactly the same as 'jati' in Dependent Origination. 'Jati' is the coming forth & production of conventions of 'beings within a class of beings'. About 'jati', SN 12.20 & SN 22.81 say:

Birth is impermanent, conditioned (sankhata), dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.
SN 12.20

Assumes form to be the self. That assumption is a fabrication. Now
what is the cause, what is the origination, what is the birth, what is
the coming-into-existence of that fabrication? To an uninstructed,
run-of-the-mill person, touched by that which is felt born of contact
with ignorance, craving arises. That fabrication is born of that. And
that fabrication is inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen.
That craving... That feeling... That contact... That ignorance is
inconstant, fabricated, dependently co-arisen.
SN 22.81

The idea 'conventions' are not subject to the characteristics of conditioned things appears found in the mass-market commentary Abhidhammattha Sangaha & is wrong.

As Nibbàna is eternal it does not belong to the past, present, or future. It is timeless. So is pannatti, independent of time.
Page 217

I take it your answer is that AN 3.47 applies equally for composite phenomena like a chariot and is not referring to so-called "standalone sankhara."

what is a standalone sankhara?

That’s a good question!


text:
What is the proper translation of 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā'?
In this excellent answer giving an in depth explanation of the various uses of sankhata in various suttas, the first usage is explained as 'conditioned things' based upon the famous phrase, "sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā" which is translated in various ways by different translators. Observe:

’All conditioned things are impermanent’
I.B. Horner

’All formations are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Bodhi

’All form is impermanent’
Bhikkhu Bodhi

‘All processes are inconstant’
Thanissaro Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’
Suddhāso Bhikkhu

’All conditional things are impermanent’
Ācāriya Buddharakkhita

’That all conditional things are impermanent’
Peter Feldmeier

‘All conditions are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Sujato

‘All conditions are impermanent’
Bhikkhu Ānandajoti

Questions:

Are the differences in these translations meaningful?
If so, what is the correct translation/meaning?
Is it incorrect to translate sankhara in the context of 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā' as 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'
Is there any other place in the suttas where we can definitely say that sankhara is used to mean 'a thing' or 'a phenomena?'

’All form is impermanent’ =  sabbaṁ rūpaṁ aniccaṁ

pubbe ceva rūpaṁ etarahi ca sabbaṁ rūpaṁ aniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhamman = all form, whether past or present, is impermanent, suffering, and perishable

saṅkhāra = noun = essential condition; a thing conditioned, mental coefficients
saṅkhata = past participle of verb saṅkharoti = conditioned; prepared; produced by a cause
All of the translations, except I.B. Horner, have not used the translation of "conditioned thing", probably to ensure saṅkhāra is differentiated from saṅkhata.
The dictionary says:

saṅkhāra one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics

The best translation for 'saṅkhārā' in 'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā' will be the broadest translation.
For example, if we consider Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of SN 22.90, it says:

When this was said, the elder bhikkhus said to the Venerable Channa: “Form, friend Channa, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, volitional formations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Form is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself. All formations are impermanent; all phenomena are nonself.”

Above, Bhikkhu Bodhi has translated the 1st use of saṅkhārā as "volitional formations". Similarly, Sujato has translated  the 1st use of saṅkhārā as "choices". The 2nd use of saṅkhārā, Bodhi & Sujato have translated as "formations" & "conditions". The different translations of the 2nd use of saṅkhārā is to highlight the 2nd use of saṅkhārā includes form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations & consciousness as being saṅkhārā. When SN 22.90 says  'sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā', it is saying form, feeling, perception, mental formations & consciousness are all saṅkhārā.
To conclude, none of the translations offered are inherently accurate as an explanatory principle because the word 'saṅkhārā' is too broad to be translated using one single English word. However, as already said,  the best translation is the broadest, which is Sujato's & Ānandajoti's "conditions". This said, bear in mind, the word "conditions" here refers to both:

prerequisite/causal agent conditions
resultant conditions

Btw, saṅkhārā is never translated as 'thing' or 'phenomena'. The Pali  for 'thing' or 'phenomena' is 'dhamma' or 'dhatu'.

This is just excellent.

I will say, I still wonder about the translation as volitional formations. I'm researching where and how this meaning of saṅkhāra as 'mental coefficients' or 'volitional formations' came from and what faults arise from considering the second link as just 'conditions'

Hmm, I'm also wondering a bit about 'a thing conditioned' as that seems in tension with your last sentences.

Yes, the dictionary says "a thing conditioned". I think "sankhata" always means "conditioned thing". But sankhara can also refer to "conditioned thing" but not always. In Pali, the work cittasankharo is a noun & refers to "mind conditioner". It is a causal condition. But the word "manosankharam" is always used as an object of the verb "saṅkharoti" and is a resultant condition. Yet manosankharam is a conditioned thing. In other words it appears valid in Pali to say manosankharam is a sankhata (mind formation is a conditioned thing).

Thanks for answering. saṅkhārā is never translated as 'thing' Really? Because I think it is translated that way, sometimes, by some authors: e.g. "all things" here or here. Your saying previously that the word 'saṅkhārā' is too broad to be translated may mean it's not logical to say that, "it doesn't or can't mean 'thing' because there's another more precise word for thing". Maybe you're saying it refers to or includes "things", but "things" isn't the best translation.

Or are you saying it refers only to mental factors, e.g. perceptions of things and never the (more "objective") things themselves?

sabbe sankhara does not mean "all things".

Thanks. This is great. We are taught the prerequisites of seeing circles and conditioned to think of them erroneously as eternal. Circles recur as needs arise.

Sankhara means compounded phenomena (combination of phenomena). “Sabbe Sankhara Anicca” means all combinations of phenomena are impermanent. Impermanent means combinations arise , change and vanish because
all combinations take place conditionally. All conditions are themselves Sanskharas and therefore impermanent.
For example :- Meeting of eye(a Sankhara , a phenomena made up of other phenomena )and sight(a Sankhara , a phenomena)give rise to eye consciousness(a Sankhara, a phenomena). Meeting of eye consciousness and eye and sight give rise to vision contact. Vision contact gives rise to feeling dependent on vision contact. Visual feelings can be good or bad or neutral. Coming together of vision feelings , vision contact give rise to visual cravings. Visual cravings can be lustful or hateful or neutral. Coming together of visual cravings and visual feelings give rise to visual clinging. Clinging can be lustful or hateful or neutral. Clinging and cravings gives rise to visual attachments. Visual attachments can be lustful , hateful or neutral.Attachments and clinging give rise to visual becoming.Visual becoming can be lustful , hateful or neutral. Visual becoming and visual attachments give rise to Sankhara of good , bad or neutral visual birth( for example attachment to awesome scenery ), visual ageing (for example rough scenery)and visual death (for example dilapidated scenery), together giving rise to the Sankhara of visual suffering.
Same applies to all other senses like nose , touch , ear ,taste and mind.
Sense of good (or lustful)or bad (or hateful)or neutral is the Sankhara of mind consciousness.
I think this definition of sanskharas was not given in the list of translations in the posted question.

In the three marks of existence, sankhara refers to conditional things or conditional phenomena, specifically the five aggregates, while dhamma refers to all phenomena.
The term dhamma includes Nibbana, while sankhara does not. Nibbana is not suffering, not impermanent and not self.

“Suppose, mendicants, there was a mountain river that flowed swiftly,
going far, carrying all before it. If wild sugarcane, kusa grass,
reeds, vetiver, or trees grew on either bank, they’d overhang the
river. And if a person who was being swept along by the current
grabbed the wild sugarcane, kusa grass, reeds, vetiver, or trees, it’d
break off, and they’d come to ruin because of that.
In the same way, an unlearned ordinary person has not seen the noble
ones, and is neither skilled nor trained in the teaching of the noble
ones. They’ve not seen true persons, and are neither skilled nor
trained in the teaching of the true persons.
They regard form as self, self as having form, form in self, or self
in form. But their form breaks off, and they come to ruin because of
that. They regard feeling … perception … choices … consciousness as
self, self as having consciousness, consciousness in self, or self in
consciousness. But their consciousness breaks off, and they come to
ruin because of that.
What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.” …
“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or
impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“So you should truly see … Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is
no return to any state of existence.’”.
SN22.93

And what do the astute deem as existing, which I too say exists? Form
that is impermanent, suffering, and perishable.
Feeling … Perception … Choices …
Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and perishable. This is
what the astute deem as existing, which I too say exists.
SN22.94

To add, Yeshe Tenley commented:

Hmm, I'm also wondering a bit about 'a thing conditioned' as that
seems in tension with your last sentences.

Dhamma Dhatu then answered to the comment with the example of manosankhara from AN 3.23.
The translation of AN 3.23, whether using Sujato's "choices" or Bodhi's "activities" is not the core matter. The core matters are:

As I already mentioned in my main answer, AN 3.23 contains the phrase: "manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti". Here, saṅkharoti is the verb form of saṅkhara. Also, here saṅkhāraṁ, ending in ṁ, is the accusative case of saṅkhāra, i.e., saṅkhāra is the object of the verb saṅkharoti. In other words, as I already explained, manosaṅkhāraṁ is a resultant condition because it is caused by saṅkharoti. Its like saying: "the creation (accusative case noun) was created/generated (verb); the condition was conditioned/generated". Thus, AN 3.23 says: "some person generates afflictive bodily sankhara". The bodily sankhara is a resultant condition.

Manosaṅkhāraṁ abhisaṅkharoti in AN 3.23 can be contrasted with cittasankharo in SN 41.6 & MN 44. "Cittasankharo", ending in "o", is a nominative case noun. Cittasankharo is also a causal or prerequisite condition. Cittasankharo (which is perception & feeling) is the prerequisite condition that causes the mind (citta) to generate/condition greed, hatred & delusion. "Cittasankharo" means "mind conditioner".

In other words, contrary to the Theravada Abhidhamma & Commentary Tradition, the term cittasankharo is not synonymous with the term manosaṅkhāraṁ. This is why Sujato's translation of cittasankharo as "choices by way mind" in SN 12.2 is incorrect, similar to how Bodhi's "mental volitional formation" is also incorrect. This is also why Sujato has translated cittasankharo differently as "mental process" in SN 41.6 & MN 44.

Note: Sujato & Bodhi appear to be translating in a certain way in order to conform to the Three-Life-Model of Dependent Origination taught in the Visuddhimagga (which is not Early Buddhism).

Couldn’t an alternative translation be “depending on the body, bodily activity arises” or “depending on the mind, mental activity arises?” Why do I prefer this construction? Because it is in keeping with the affirmative form of dependent arising.

Yes, I am wondering whether the second link should be more generally translated as “conditions” rather than volitional formations, choices and etc. One reason for this is the second link is not designated as saṅkharoti the verb form which would allow for “intent” or “choice” but rather it is the noun form which in my increasing opinion should only be translated as conditions and not the phenomena or things that are the result of conditions

Hmm, maybe manosaṅkhāraṁ more literally translated would be “with body as condition” instead of “depending on body as condition” but I prefer the latter as it is more in keeping with how dependent arising is presented…

And then saṅkharoti would be “bodily activity arises”

It cannot be "depending on the body" ("kaya-paccayā") because kayasankharam here in ACCUSATIVE case must be the object of the verb saṅkharoti. Therefore, it must be: Idha (here), bhikkhave (monks), ekacco (a certain individual) puggalo (person) sabyābajjhaṁ (a leading to having hurt; accusative case) kāyasaṅkhāraṁ (body condition/body activity; singular accusative case) abhisaṅkharoti (generates/creates)

Wikipedia: The accusative case (abbreviated ACC) of a noun is the grammatical case used to receive the direct object of a transitive verb.

Quick Pali lesson. Consider the English sentence "the car struck & killed the dog". This sentence is "the car (nominative noun) struck (verb) & killed (verb) the dog (accusative noun)". One noun is "accusative" because it is the object of the verb or action. Therefore, in Pali, which has different word endings, the sentence would be "the car-o struck-oti & killed-oti the dog-am".

Hi. It is just Pali  grammar rules, similar to in  English when  spelling "dog" and "dog's". In Pali, dog is  "dogo" and dog's as "dogassa", Therefore, in Pali, dog-o refers to the subject of the sentence. If you see "dog-am", this  indicates there  will be a verb in the  sentence, such as "John fed the dog the dog's food". Fed is a verb.   Verbs end in "ati". Therefore John fed the dog in Pali is John-o fed-ati dog-am dog-assa foodo".


text:
Is it ever said in the Pali Canon that Nirvana cannot be attained?
Is there any sutta in the Pali Canon which describes the supramundane view that Nibbana cannot be attained?
I'm looking for a verse or quote from the Pali Canon which describes Nibbana as unattainable or unrelinquished based on the fact that is unconditioned. Ie, not from the ordinary conventional sense of attaining a possession or attainment of a goal, but rather from the supramundane where Nibbana is unconditioned.
Does such a sutta, passage, or verse exist?

Related: https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/39194/is-it-even-possible-to-attain-nirvana

i swear i read something in the pali canon that made it seem like the answer to your question is yes, but I won't be able to find it. also the idea i recall was more like a realization rather than unattainable

The closest I've seen in the Pali canon to what you're describing is in the Mulapariyaya sutta. I am not sure if it constitutes the idea of "cannot be attained," but the Buddha here describes Unbinding as this:

A monk who is a Worthy One, devoid of mental fermentations... directly knows earth as earth. Directly knowing earth as earth, he does not conceive things about earth, does not conceive things in earth, does not conceive things coming out of earth, does not conceive earth as 'mine,' does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because, with the ending of delusion, he is devoid of delusion, I tell you.

He directly knows water as water... the All as the All...

He directly knows Unbinding as Unbinding. Directly knowing Unbinding as Unbinding, he does not conceive things about Unbinding, does not conceive things in Unbinding, does not conceive things coming out of Unbinding, does not conceive Unbinding as 'mine,' does not delight in Unbinding. Why is that? Because, with the ending of delusion, he is devoid of delusion, I tell you.

My limited understanding of this is that an Arahant may be aware that they have come to an end of suffering, but nevertheless they do not have a positive (or any) feeling towards being an Arahant, and they also do not feel ownership over this quality. It might depend on what "supramundane" refers to, but these seem to at least be unconventional aspects of an attainment listed in the sutta above.

Nibbana is attained (ajjhagā, ajjhagamaṁ, adhigacchati).

Visaṅkhāragataṁ cittaṁ,
My mind has reached the Unconditioned
taṇhānaṁ khayamajjhagā.
Attained the destruction of craving.
Dhp 154

Then, monks, being subject myself to birth, seeing the drawbacks of birth, seeking the unborn, unexcelled rest from the yoke, Nibbana, I reached [attained; ajjhagamaṁ] the unborn, unexcelled rest from the yoke: Nibbana.
MN 26

I think the question is asking, "Nibbana can be obtained or taained in the mundane sense of the word -- but is there anywhere which says to the contrary in a supramundane sense.?" So I think this doesn't address what the question is asking.


text:
What are four types of authoritative cognition according to Chandrakirti?
wiki says this:
Therefore we assert that mundane objects are known through the four kinds of authoritative cognition. They are mutually dependent: when there is authoritative cognition, there are objects of knowledge; when there are objects of knowledge, there is authoritative cognition. But neither authoritative cognition nor objects of knowledge exist inherently.[69]
same page says this:
Buddhism accepts only two pramana (tshad ma) as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha (mngon sum tshad ma, perception) and Anumāṇa (rjes dpag tshad ma, inference).
Regardless, what are those four kinds of authoritative cognition according to Chandrakirti?

https://studybuddhism.com/en/advanced-studies/science-of-mind/ways-of-knowing/lorig-ways-of-knowing


text:
Which sankhya scriptures were taught to buddha?
From wikipedia :
Alara Kalama (Pāḷi & Sanskrit Āḷāra Kālāma/ Arāḍa Kālāma]), was a hermit and a teacher of SamkhyaHe was the first teacher of Gautama Buddha.
I want to know  which scriptures of samkhya philosophy were taught to buddha?
Also was Buddha told characters of mahabharat /ramayan . Is it mentioned anywhere?

Historically I don't think this can be known, but it's reasonable to assume that he was well versed in the Hindu ideas of his day.

@Cdn_Dev Is it mentioned in any buddhist scriptures? History stack exchange suggested to ask me here

Ramayana is estimated to have been written around 400 BC-200 BC while Mahabharata is estimated to be written between 400 BC-400 AD. From this it can be argued that both were written at least centuries after Buddha's Mahaparinirvana. Therefore, it does not seem possible that Buddha could be told of characters from the two epics.

@HomagetoManjushri first of all datings has problems because panini of 5 th century BC in asthadhyayi sutra 6.2.38 mentions mahabharat and mahabharat has many references from Ramayana. Also they have oral transmissions all over India. So, maybe buddha could know them by oral transmissions. Jataka tales also have few references

The dates I have mentioned are taken from UNESCO website. If dating has many problems, then why believe Panini's 5th Century to be an accurate date? Why is that not a problem too? The point that must be highlighted is the following- there is a brazen attempt to fabricate history which doesnt exist. Every date which researchers inform us is contested when those dates dismiss the fabricated assumptions. And in the garb of difficulty of dating, imaginative history (a result of political propaganda) is then created, appropriating anything which Buddha or Buddhism does as part of Hindutva history.

Ruben's answer below perfectly brings out the small point I am making in more detail. Let us critically raise questions and investigate difficulties. But at the same time, let us not fall prey to political propaganda.

@HomagetoManjushri two things :1) if you are political about hindutva and history , then remember buddhism have many state sponsored religion at first and sri Lankan buddhists genocided hindus and have reservation, 2) you can't change my religious views (manu 12.95 , 12.96) still you couldn't answer the panini's astadhayyi part?

Yes I am aware of state sponsoring in Sri Lanka, the genocide of Indian Tamils, genocide conducted in Myanmar against Muslims, genocides in India in past against Buddhists and genocide being orchestrated currently in Gaza. All genocide is evil and we must put all efforts in preventing such atrocious acts done by people who claim to belong to this religion or that religion (or even no religion). Violence has no place in the world, especially in spirituality. And those who do it must be called out.

Also, factually you are incorrect. Buddhists are not given reservations anywhere. Further, I have no interest in changing your views, I merely wished to elucidate them. That helps to set the context of your question to all viewers. Regarding that I couldnt answer about Panini- I already did. I do it again-any date which does not agree with the Hindutva world view is deemed to be full of errors on account of difficulty of dating. However, any date given by the Hindutva ideology is beyond this difficulty of dating. WHY? This is not reason- this is agenda.

According to Palikanon's page on Alara Kalama:

One of the two teachers to whom Gotama, after his renunciation, first
attached himself, the other being Uddaka Rāmaputta. In the
Milindapañha (p.236) Ālāra is mentioned as Gotama's fourth teacher.
....
In the Ariyaparivesāna Sutta (M.i.163-5; also 240ff; ii.94ff, 212ff)
the Buddha describes his visit to Ālāra. Gotama quickly mastered his
doctrine and was able to repeat it by heart; but feeling sure that
Ālāra not only knew the doctrine but had realised it, he approached
him and questioned him about it. Ālāra then proclaimed the
ākiñcaññāyatana (sphere of nothingness, see jhāna 7), and Gotama,
putting forth energy and concentration greater than Ālāra's, made
himself master of that state. Ālāra recognised his pupil's eminence
and treated him as an equal, but Gotama, not having succeeded in his
quest, took leave of Ālāra to go elsewhere (VibhA.432). When, after
having practised austerities for six years, the Buddha attained
Enlightenment and granted Sahampati's request to preach the doctrine,
it was of Ālāra he thought first as being the fittest to hear the
teaching. But Ālāra had died seven days earlier (Vin.i.7).
As already stated above, the aim of Ālāra’s practices is stated to
have been the attainment of Akiñcaññayatana, the stage of nothingness.
Whether this statement is handed down with any real knowledge of the
facts of his teaching, it is not now possible to say. Asvaghosa, in
his Buddhacarita (xii.17ff), puts into the mouth of Ārāda or Ālāra, a
brief account of his philosophy. It has some resemblance - though this
is slight - to the Sānkhya philosophy, but in Ālāra’s teaching some of
the salient characteristics of the Sānkhya system are absent. In
reply to Gotama's questions about the religious life and the obtaining
of final release, Ālāra describes a system of spiritual development
which is identical with the methods of the Buddhist monk up to the
last attainment but one. The monk reaches the four jhānas and then
attains successively to the states of space, infinity and nothingness.
The last three stages are described in the terms of the first three of
the four Attainments.

From the above, we see that it was Asvaghosa who alleged, in his Buddhacarita (written a few centuries after the Buddha), that Alara Kalama taught something with some slight similarity to Samkhya. However, most of the salient characteristics of Samkhya is missing from Alara Kalama's teachings.
The Palikanon has this statement regarding Sage Kapila, the founder of Samkhya:

Kapila.-An ancient teacher of philosophy, mentioned together with
Kanāda as having taught that the soul was limitless (na antavā)
(UdA.339; see also Svetasvatara Upanisad v.2, and Rāmāyana i.40). He
is probably identical with the founder of the Sānkhya system.

So, neither Sage Kapila nor Samkhya are mentioned in the Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon), although he is mentioned in the Udana commentaries, along with Sage Kanada, as having taught that the soul was limitless, which is contradictory to what was taught by the Buddha. Udana is part of the Pali Canon in Khuddaka Nikaya, but the Udana commentaries are not.
It is interesting that suffering (dukkha), soteriological theories and some atheistic ideas are similar between Samkhya and Buddhism. However, the key ideas of Purusha and Prakrti of Samkhya is not at all found in Buddhism.
The wikipedia page on Samkhya talks of mutual influence between the earliest Samkhya ideas and, Buddhism and Jainism. However, Samkhya Karika definitely comes after the Buddha. The ideas of suffering and atheism in later Samkhya are said to come about due to influence by Buddhism, according to scholars.

Buddhism and Jainism had developed in eastern India by the 5th century
BCE. It is probable that these schools of thought and the earliest
schools of Samkhya influenced each other. According to Burley, there
is no evidence that a systematic samkhya-philosophy existed prior to
the founding of Buddhism and Jainism, sometime in the 5th or 4th
century BCE. A prominent similarity between Buddhism and Samkhya is
the greater emphasis on suffering (dukkha) as the foundation for their
respective soteriological theories, than other Indian
philosophies. However, suffering appears central to Samkhya in its
later literature, which likely suggests a Buddhist influence. Eliade,
however, presents the alternate theory that Samkhya and Buddhism
developed their soteriological theories over time, benefiting from
their mutual influence.
Larson, Bhattacharya and Potter state it to be likely that early
Samkhya doctrines found in oldest Upanishads (~700-800 BCE) provided
the contextual foundations and influenced Buddhist and Jaina
doctrines, and these became contemporaneous, sibling intellectual
movements with Samkhya and other schools of Hindu philosophy. This is
evidenced, for example, by the references to Samkhya in ancient and
medieval era Jaina literature.

And also:

Chandradhar Sharma in 1960 affirmed that Samkhya in the beginning was
based on the theistic absolute of Upanishads, but later on, under the
influence of Jaina and Buddhist thought, it rejected theistic monism
and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism.
This also explains why some of the later Samkhya commentators, e.g.
Vijnanabhiksu in the sixteenth century, tried to revive the earlier
theism in Samkhya.

According to various  Wikipedia pages:

The bulk of the Mahābhārata was probably compiled between the 3rd century BCE and the 3rd century CE, with the oldest preserved parts not much older than around 400 BCE.

The Hinduism scholar Jeaneane Fowler, in her commentary on the (Bhagavad) Gita, considers second century BCE to be the probable date of composition. J. A. B. van Buitenen also states that the Gita was likely composed about 200 BCE. According to the Indologist Arvind Sharma, the Gita is generally accepted to be a 2nd-century-BCE text.

Samkhya karika was probably composed sometime in the Gupta Empire period, between 320-540 CE

The (Jataka) tales are dated between 300 BCE and 400 CE

(Aṣṭādhyāyī) Authored by Sanskrit philologist and scholar Pāṇini and dated to around 500 BCE,

(The historical Buddha's lifetime:) Most historians in the early 20th century use the earlier dates of 563 – 483 BCE

So, based on these, you can see that the Buddha lived centuries before Mahabharata, Bhagavad Gita, Samkhya Karika and Jataka Tales.
Meanwhile, Panini authored the Astadhyayi around the Buddha's lifetime. So, all texts composed in Classical Sanskrit obviously came after the Buddha's lifetime.
The only Hindu texts referenced in the Pali Canon are three of the Vedas.
The only other Hindu texts that existed before the Buddha's time are the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad and Chandogya Upanishad, although both are not named in the Pali Canon. All other Upanishads come after the Buddha. So, the only Hindu scriptures that could have influenced the Buddha are the three oldest Vedas and the two oldest Upanishads.

According to Bhikhu sujato udaka ramaputta is rishi udalaks liniage.
https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/a-ara-kalama-uddaka-ramaputta-what-tradition/6210/6
This liniage compiled chandogya upanishad. dialog with his son/swetaketu. he gave concept of atman, brahman.
They also compiled Brihadaranyaka . ( his name is aruni too.)
in DN 29, buddha explains why he was not satisfied with Udaka Ramaputtas teaching. Here he quotes famous non-duality teaching. "knowing one after which you dont need to know". by passaṃ na passatī’ti.
And in that sutta ,Buddhas argument against this philosophy is that, his teaching is only about path and not about the destination.
Teachers of that time were overly discussing about nibbana(the destination) and less about path. and hence he focused more on 8fold path and less on what is nibbana.


text:
Difference between Hindu Yoga and Buddhist meditation
What are difference between the Yoga practiced in Hinduism and Meditation practiced by Buddhism? Does they differ by principles and practice, or they are same?

We may all be travelling on roads (and cross each other’s paths) but our goals determine where we will end up eventually. I believe it is the same for meditation practices whether it is Hindu, Taoist, Native American Indian, Catholic, Shinto or Buddhist.
So, what is the goal of Yoga practice? Is it Kaivalya or Moksha? Are they the same? Even Moksha seems to have slightly different meanings in various schools of Hinduism. Is it union with Brahman? Liberation from life and death i.e. rebirth? A state of perfection?
I am not a Hindu so I am not familiar with the concept of Moksha other than what I had read on the Internet. For Buddhists, the goal of meditation can be answered by following the Buddha’s own struggles and experiences in meditation. He started by learning meditation from Alara Kalama then Uddaka Rāmaputta but left both teachers because he could not find what he was searching for. Eventually, he came upon the meditation practice that would allow him to attain liberation from suffering i.e. Nirvana.

I recall once, when my father the Sakyan was working, and I was sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, then—quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities—I entered & remained in the first jhāna: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. Could that be the path to awakening?

So, if your goal as a yogi is the same as the Buddha, then the meditation principle and practice would be the same.

We could try to find a new road that leads to the same place where the Buddha discovered. Alternatively, we could simply follow the path taken by the Buddha. ;-)

There are many kinds of Hindu meditation methods and many kinds of Buddhist meditations too.
Tibetan Buddhism has tantric meditation with a lot of similarity to Hindu Yoga meditation, and perhaps it even borrowed from it.
So, let me restrict myself to meditation in the Theravada tradition, based on the Pali Canon.
There are two main types of techniques. One is samatha or tranquility meditation. The other is vipassana or insight. Of course, there are also other minor meditation techniques like metta bhavana and body scanning.
For samatha, it's either based on breath or kasinas. The objective is to develop deep concentration and reach jhana levels. This would be quite similar to techniques found in Hinduism. Hindu yogis have achieved this.
For vipassana, this is said to be the unique method discovered by the Buddha for understanding the relationship between mind and body, as well as understanding the nature of the mind, without the need for atman. The four noble truths and dependent origination can be realized this way. This is not in Hinduism, as far as I know.
Both samatha and vipassana are required to achieve the Buddhist liberation of Nirvana.
If you want to look at distant planets and stars, you need to adjust the telescope settings and parameters, and point it at the right direction in the sky. Samatha is like the adjustment of the telescope settings, to calibrate its zoom, focus and to make it steady. Vipassana is like the pointing of the telescope to the right subject of observation. Both are needed.
On the other hand, Hindu yoga meditation has more tantric elements like meditation on the chakras and kundalini awakening. These are not found in Theravada, but it may be found in Tibetan Buddhism/ Vajrayana.
That said, you should keep in mind that liberation in Hinduism and Buddhism mean different things.

I am surprised to your answer. You have given a clear insight to others. It's cool to see answers like this. Thanks. As a theravada buddhist, I think this should be the accepted answer.


text:
How is koan study going to change, if at all, from LLM?
How is koan study going to change, if at all, from LLM? I am aware that koan answer books do exist, though I wouldn't where to find them. Will someone train LLM on them, making both koan study and new recorded sayings readily available to all, similar to the democratisation of art that we are promised?

what is LLM?...

@DhammaDhatu Large Language Model (LLM) - the AI technology behind ChatGPT

I'm inclined to close this question as opinion-based.