text:
What is bodhisattvahood in personal practice?
I've read a lot of english language scholarship on the mahayana, probably about 150 books thoroughly, with notes, though not always with very good notes. I wanted an opinion from a broadly Mahayana perspective, so here's my story.
I was a sensitive youth, and had a number of religious like epiphanies while backpacking, before a more intense near visionary one with a basic Buddhist textbook.
But this was truncated by a frank insanity: there is schizophrenia in my family. Anyway, my psychosis is doing a good job of shrivelling up with medication and therapy. But before all that, and before I clawed back some sense of Buddhism from my relatively committed reading habits, did I have an authentic religious (or Mahayana) moment? Or was it a religious delusion and / or escapism?
How do I tell? I had taken a couple of Thai meditation classes, and since then have sat with a couple of zen groups, and attended a 7 day ch'an retreat. No-one took much interest, but then I am near broken now. I'm not asking for authentication from a web community, only:

What is bodhisattvahood in personal practice: is it OK to believe one (has or) did have that quality?
Does anyone here suppose they are a bodhisattva, without any group accreditation and with little engagement - outside their own personal striving / story / narrative?

More esoteric or indeed polemical answers, are of course weclome.

I've edited the title to better reflect the content of the question. Please roll back if the title isn't suitable. Metta

You might like to compare your story with that of Sally Clay. Many years ago I discovered her essay The Wounded Prophet and found it very inspiring. She has written a number of other reflections on madness, visionary experiences, and Buddhism.
In the literature on madness there is a similar pattern: beautiful visions which give way to a more disordered and frightening state of confusion and delusion. I'm thinking of, for example, The Faber Book of Madness, and Roy Porter's book Madness.
Clay argues for the validity of her initial visions, and she was led to this conclusion by interacting with a Tibetan Lama (I think they compared visions). While I do not practice Tibetan Buddhism, it seems to me that it might suit you better than Thai or Zen Buddhism. It is more at home with visions and unusual experiences, closer to the Shamanic roots of Tantra.
The ironic thing about a bodhisatva is that traditionally they don't think "I am a bodhisatva" or worry about if they might be one. So perhaps you are not one. But many people have transformative visions of one kind of another without becoming "special".
Sally Clay's way forward was helping other people, or in other words the bodhisatva way.

Bodhisattvahood, is not really a quality, at least not in the sense you are saying. A Bodhisattva is a being striving to reach enlightenment as quickly as possible, for the benefit of all beings.
They have a set of vows that they must take and keep. They are similar to monks, except their vows are of a different variety.
I think you are thinking of the term Ahrat, or someone who has obtained nirvana. Yet the two terms are related in a way.
The thing about a realization of Śūnyatā, at least in the teachings I have heard, is that you know, there is no doubt. This is of course a direct understanding I refer to, not an intellectual theoretical understanding. Those who experience it directly do not have to ask for a clarification.
As for your personal experience, don't get me wrong, it is your experience. What value it has is not for others to determine. You must decide what impact to let it have on you. I spent years chasing after answers after an experience I had in my teenage years, and though I learned a ton about myself, and many other things, ultimately I came to the conclusion that the experience was a dead end, and not to pursue it further.
One Rinpoche who I went to talk to about the experience advised me to just passively watch and observe if it were to happen again. He explained to me about how when he was a boy he had to reach out and touch objects to ensure that they were really there.
Now just because my experience was a dead end does not necessarily mean yours was. There are two possibilities, it was a genuine experience, or it was somehow related to your condition.
Either way, it is your mind, and you can analyze it as an aspect of yourself. Where you go from here, and what you decide to do with the experience and the memory of it though, is completely up to you.

passive is good, thanks. btw there is no doubt in delusion !!

@user3293056 sure, but after the delusion fades, is there doubt then?

i think more likely it's faded to escapism.
thanks.

Ah, well don't let escapism win. Meditation and setting out on the development of the paramitas can help to stabalize yourself until you find direction again. Also if you are interested in the Bodhisattva way of life, you can look into the vows, and try practicing them informally.
Also if you have not read it, you could read Shantideva's Guide to the Bodhisattva's way of life.

A link to a marked up version of the text in case you are interested.
http://hoavouu.com/images/file/AkMNdk9R0QgQAAoD/shantideva-bodhicaryavatara-wallace.pdf

i've looked at it before. it may seem very cynical, but i can't get my head around the perfections anymore. i lack confidence in it. i have an interest in buddhist practice and discourse, but little more. which isn't to say that what has happened hasn't helped in any way, as you said.
it's probably a gradual loss of faith, likely due to the struggle with psychosis, and however technical "faith" is

Let us continue this discussion in chat.

As a clarification- "Bodhisattva are courageous beings who have generated bodhicitta to become buddhas for the benefit of all sentient beings through engaging in a host of bodhisattva deeds, such as the Ten perfections".
If you identify yourself as a Mahayana practitioner, it implies you want to achieve nirvana not just for yourself but for the benefit of all sentient beings.
We are NOT Bodhisattva when we start out. Bodhisattva is a title given to meditators who are quite frankly at a very advanced stage.
As to any group accreditation, please be extremely vary of any such group which claims to confer such things. There are texts, especially text like Lama Tsing Khapa's Lamrim which help you to identify where you are on the path. There are clear identifiers to find out where one is on the path.
As for books I suggest, with all due respect, to read from authentic sources and good translations of acharyas' and lamas' works. The realisations in the path are not mere epiphanies. It is a transformation of the mind- GRADUAL- from a state of ignorance to state of knowledge infused with bodhicitta and wisdom. Having visions here or there is not indicative of anything. The entire path and teaching of the Buddha is to see things as they are, not as they appear to be. I again suggest very strongly to read from authentic sources and traditions.

One general tip is that Enlightenment is about understanding. It's a deep understanding that changes your outlook and reduces suffering. It is not a psychedelic drug trip like experience.
You can reflect on your experiences, analyze them, and think about them. By doing so you can conclude if they had genuine wisdom, or were simply a mystical experience.
To answer 1. A key practice in Tibetan bodhisattva is to cultivate bodhicitta. Bodhicitta is the desire to fully Awaken for the benefit of others.


text:
Words of the Buddha
This question is motivated by a comment from another user. Highlights in the quote are made by me. It's written:

"You have no reason to believe that any words of the Buddha are preserved except uncritical acceptance of traditional narratives. There are some Buddhist words, but to attribute them to the Buddha is simple, blind religious faith. If your criteria is practical application, then your question is meaningless in any case. You can verify the truth of the quotations by putting them into practice. Why have you not done so?".

My questions are:

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?
What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?
Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

Perhaps to avoid asking a 'leading question', I suggest rewording this to ask three questions: 1) What reasons are there, for believing (that some words of the historical Buddha are preserved)? 2) What reasons are there for not believing ...? 3) Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

Thanks Chris. I have reworded the question using your examples.

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

I can think of three reasons:

blind faith - believing it to be true without any rational reason to believe.
argument from authority - believing it to be true because of the authority of the tradition that has preserved the teachings
argument from the nature of the teachings - believing it to be true because the teachings accord with expectations of the calibre to be expected from a Buddha

I think only the third argument holds much weight in this instance. It can be divided into two categories as well:

that the teachings are so ostensibly profound as to convince one who reads/listens to them that only an enlightened being could have being their author;
that the teachings, when practiced, lead one to enlightenment, thereby providing evidence to the practitioner of the enlightenment of their author.

Either of these seems a reasonable argument for claiming that Buddhist teachings come from the Buddha himself.

What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

It's easy to find reasons for doubting if you're looking for them... even if they are not actually there.
Of course, all of this ignores that fact that historical authenticity isn't really of any intrinsic value. What is important is the quality of the teachings; that is what should really be up for debate. As the Buddha said, "Come! See!"

Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some suttas more than others?

I don't think the jataka commentaries claim to be the words of the Buddha; they are retellings of the stories that the verses (which are claimed to be the words of the Buddha) are supposed to be based upon. Same goes for the dhammapada stories.

It seems to me that this answer is unbalanced. You say "It's easy to find reasons for doubting if you're looking for them" but you don't engage with any of them. Thus your answer gives the appearance of suggesting there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the Buddhist texts, when in fact there are many quite valid reasons. If the historical authenticity of the texts had no "intrinsic value" the question would come up repeatedly, but of course it does. People ehipassiko, but apparently none become arahants. Hence the questions.

The goal of the Buddhist councils is to preserve the word of the Buddha and to remove alien elements. They are headed by enlightened monks. So the faith in the scriptures isn't blind.

I summarised the problems with Buddhist history in an essay entitled The Very Idea of Buddhist History.

There is only one reason to believe that Buddhist text are the words of the Buddha. It is because the Buddhist tradition says they are. There is no other reason.

Reasons for not believing are more numerous.

When we talk about the historical Buddha for example there is no corroborating evidence from another tradition that he existed. Buddhist texts mention the Jain leader, Mahāvīra, or at least we think they do. They never use the name Mahāvīra but do refer to a person called Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta whose views are very similar to the early Jains. See The Dictionary of Pali Names sv Nigantha. However Jain texts don't return the favour. Nor do the late Vedic texts record anyone called "Buddha". They do record many Gautamas, since the original Gotama was one of the ṛṣis who wrote the Ṛgveda, but not our Gautama. This is particularly surprising since Brahmins were frequently mentioned in Buddhist texts and they were actively composing new texts at the time. The first solid evidence for Buddhism is a brief mention in one of the inscriptions left by Asoka, ca. 250 BCE.
As far as the name Siddhartha Gautama is concerned, the Pāḷi version of the first name Siddhattha is never used of the Buddha in the Pāḷi Suttas. The name is a later invention. Indeed it had competition in the early Sanskrit Buddhist texts like the Mahāvāstu and Lalitavistara which tended to call him Sarvarthasiddha instead. What's more, as mentioned, Gautama is a high status Brahmin gotra (roughly "clan") name. Gotra names were used to mediate exogamous marriages. There is no obvious way that a non-Brahmin of that time, and of that culture which was not even part of the Vedic milieu, could have had a name like Gautama. If the name was adopted by the family, then it is strange that neither the Buddha's father nor any of his male relatives are ever called Gautama. It is even more strange that the Buddha's mother and maternal aunt were called Gautamī. Māyā wouldn't have changed her name at marriage. So it's possible that she as Prajāpatī were called Gautama and married into the Śākya family. Both Māyā and Prajāpatī are also distinctively Brahmanical names. The suttas have nothing to say on these matters. But the upshot is that we do not know with any certainty what the name of the historical Buddha was. I discuss this at length in an as yet unpublished article: Siddhārtha Gautama: What's in a Name?
What's more there are at least two biographical traditions about the early life of the Buddha. The standard narrative says that he is a prince, married with a child, his mother is dead, and leaves home in the middle of the night. And the alternative in the Ariyapariyesanā Sutta tells us he is a youth, does not mention any wife of child, and his parents are both still alive and present when he leaves. Since it is less familiar here is the Paḷi, with my translation.

So kho ahaṃ, bhikkhave, aparena samayena daharova samāno susukāḷakeso, bhadrena yobbanena samannāgato paṭhamena vayasā akāmakānaṃ mātāpitūnaṃ assumukhānaṃ rudantānaṃ kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajiṃ. [M i.163]
At a later time, though still only a boy, with much black hair, in the first stage of life, and endowed with youth and good fortune; with my mother and father unwilling, tearful and wailing, I cut off my hair and beard, donned brown robes, and went forth from home, into homelessness.

The contraction cannot be easily revolved. I've discussed the contradiction and it's implications in an essay called: The Buddha's Biography.
A minor point is that the Pāḷi Canon is almost certainly a translation. No one spoke Pāli as a mother tongue, it was a lingua franca created for the purpose of recording the Buddhist texts. Of course it was probably very like the Prakrit or vernacular languages spoken in the region at the time. The Canon has quite clearly been edited and added to at different periods. Another problem is that by their own admission the texts were preserved orally for something like three centuries before being written down in Sri Lanka, ca. 100 BC. In other words the texts were preserved as stories told and retold. The dynamics of this kind of transmission are explored by Bhikkhu Anālayo in a paper called: Oral Dimensions of Pāli Discourses: Pericopes, other Mnemonic Techniques and the Oral Performance Context. It's clear when one reads the suttas that they are made up of modules - a bit like lego bricks. One meets the same bricks again and again in different contexts. This is typical of a story telling tradition. But it does not guarantee verbal fidelity. The best we could hope with three centuries of oral tradition, is that the suttas contain the gist of the what the Buddha, if he existed, might have said.
Another problem is that the Pāḷi Canon is inconsistent in some respects that make it unlikely to have been composed by one philosophical genius. For example dependent arising says

imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti... imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.
when this exists, that exist... when this ceases, that ceases.

This means that when the condition ceases the effect must cease at the same time or immediately afterwards (this is implied by the grammatical form of the statement - a locative absolute using present participles). However for karma to work the effect (vipāka) must manifest long after the action (kamma)
has ceased. This problem was noticed by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd Century (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 17.6). Another (topical) inconsistency is that between metaphysics and morality. The metaphysical insistence on the impossibility of personal continuity because there is no substantial entity to persist (anattā) contracts with the explicit personal continuity in the Jātakas and some suttas. These inconsistencies undermine the idea of the historical Buddha was we read about him in the texts.
Most of the innovations in Buddhist theory and practice have been because Buddhists have found the earlier accounts intellectually flawed and practically unworkable. The question of authenticity comes up constantly. Modern day Buddhists still compose apologetics for the authenticity of the suttas.
Over all what we see when we look with an open mind is a series of not entirely consistent stories about a traditional, legendary figure. His name is unknown, nor the language he spoke. Details of his biography are sketchy and contradictory. The literature which we take to be authoritative are characteristic of an oral, story telling body of traditional stories. The doctrines that we take to be the unifying factor of Buddhism on closer inspection turn out to be internally inconsistent (according to Nāgāruna anyway). We note that the Buddha was protagonist in our stories performed magic and miracles at times and that such stories are not distinguished from historical facts. And there is no external corroborations for any of the facts (which ever version of events we think are the authentic version).
If we are intellectually honest we have to admit that we know nothing at all about the Buddha for certain. There is doubt about every detail, about every word.
There are those who claim that we can trust the word of the Buddha because when put into practice the techniques work, for example Bhikkhu Yuttadhammo makes this claim in his answer to this question. In fact this is also rather doubtful. After 2500 years of practising what purport to be the very techniques employed by the Buddha, places like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand ought to be overflowing with arahants and every other person ought to be a stream entrant. But in fact there are at present no confirmed arahants in the world (I'm reliably informed that Daniel Ingram has recanted his claim). In which case the techniques in the suttas clearly do not work. Or at best they work rather partially to make people more relaxed about being unenlightened. If the suttas "worked" then many people would be arahants presently. So this argument from experience fails.
In the final analysis those people - both lay and scholars - who argue for the authenticity of the Buddhist texts either have to redefine "authenticity" to mean something less than 100% authentic; or admit that they are not willing to accept the facts and simply believe it to be so. In which case they are the same as religious people everywhere who just happen to believe that their teachings are the God's Honest Truth.
Which is not to say that the methods of Buddhism are not valuable. They are valuable. Extremely so. Just not in the way that the tradition or Traditionalists claim they are.

There are several references to the Buddha in Hinduism. In the Ariyapariyesana sutta, the Buddha was referring to his step mother Mahapajapati Gotami who breastfed and raised prince Siddhartha as her own child.
It is said that during the Anuradhapura era, there were many Arahants in Sri Lanka. But as time went by, those who can understand the Dhamma quickly and easily have already attained enlightenment.
Also, there's no scientific way to prove enlightenment. So even if you meet an Arahant face to face, you wouldn't know

Hinduism is the invention of the British in the 19th century. The word Hindu before that simply meant "Indian". And these references are all in late texts. They are mostly talking about Viṣṇu, as the Vaiṣṇava cult has assimilated Buddhism, and this happened very late. In the Ariyapariyesana the Buddha is clearly not refering to his "aunt", but to mātāpitā 'mother & father' - there's a word for stepmother and he doesn't use it. Indeed Pajapati is not mentioned. Explaining away the apparent absence of Arahants just proves my point.

Pali was the mother tongue of people of Magadha kingdom and nearby kingdoms around Magadha at the time of Buddha. It was not created later. The point is historically incorrect and misleading. The comment that we know nothing at all is also extremely misleading. There is undeniable archeological and historical evidence about Buddha and his teachings. In fact, there is more evidence about Buddha and his teachings than almost any other tradition (philosophical and religious) of that time period.

Lies don't help, @HomagetoManjushri, please stop spreading them.

The question placed an unrealistic burden on the answerer. It is couched in the context of modern society where it is possible to have high fidelity/authenticity with regards to what’s been said and done. To insist that one can only trust a body of knowledge when it is captured verbatim or written down by the original founder/discoverer/inventor do a great deal of injustice to all the knowledge accumulated throughout history.
Similarly, our concepts of authenticity and fidelity by modern standards would be strange and bewildering to the people who lived during the Buddha’s time. If I go back in time to confront a villager who claimed to have heard the Buddha’s sermons and insisted that he guaranteed what he heard is word for word from the Buddha, he’ll probably think I’m mad.
Much of Greek philosophy survived in part due to Arabic translations. Even algebra would not be acceptable if one insists on believing this knowledge if, and only if, we can verify the original sources. As we know that the Arabs got much of their inspirations on algebra from different civilizations like Greek, Egyptian and Indian.
Nonetheless, why are ancient Greek philosophy and algebra important and why can they be trusted? They are important because of their contributions to modern civilisation (science, philosophy, arts and politics). They can be trusted because they can be validated.
To establish authenticity in a dogmatic manner requires either a time machine or technology that captured audio-video recordings of the Buddha and is passed on till modern days (you can replace the Buddha in this statement with Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras and so on). Above all, authenticity is not the most important concern, a knowledge should also be evaluated on its contribution to humanity. We should borrow the examples of philosophy and algebra above by asking a) what is the Dharma’s contributions to modern civilization and b) can it be validated?
I leave the above questions to those who think they are the final authority on the matter. Lastly, I believe to know if a student understand algebra, you should be able to solve algebraic questions yourself in order to test the student. Would a skeptic to a particular body of knowledge fall under this category? I have my doubts.

Beautifully highlighting a problem with a question like this via precise counter/mirror questioning.

OP asked:

What reasons are there for believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

What reasons are there for not believing that the words of the historical Buddha are preserved?

Do these reasons apply equally to all "words" or, for example, is it more believable of the suttas than of the Jataka tales, or of some
suttas more than others?

The first good news is that a whole book has been written to answer these questions.
It's The Authenticity of the Early Buddhist Texts by Venerables Ajahn Sujato and Ajahn Brahmali.
The second good news is that the whole book is available for download, for free, in the PDF format.
The Abstract states:

This work articulates and defends a single thesis: that the Early
Buddhist Texts originated in the lifetime of the Buddha or a little
later, because they were, in the main, spoken by the Buddha and his
contemporary disciples. This is the most simple, natural, and
reasonable explanation for the evidence.
Our argument covers two main areas:

The grounds for distinguishing the Early Buddhist Texts (EBTs) from later Buddhist literature;

The evidence that the EBTs stem from close to the Buddha’s lifetime, and that they were generally spoken by the historical
Buddha.

Most academic scholars of Early Buddhism cautiously affirm that it is
possible that the EBTs contain some authentic sayings of the Buddha.
We contend that this drastically understates the evidence. A
sympathetic assessment of relevant evidence shows that it is very
likely that the bulk of the sayings in the EBTs that are attributed to
the Buddha were actually spoken by him. It is very unlikely that most
of these sayings are inauthentic.

A book written by a couple of Buddhist monks which, miraculously, "proves" that their faith is True, is not worth the paper it is written on. What else were they going to say?
They, for example, assume that "the historical Buddha" is a meaningful phrase. In what sense is the Buddha "historical" when we cannot link him to any historical event or fact. Rather, the Buddha is the protagonist in a series of religious stories, written by generations of religious fanatics who give up sex, family, work, eating after midday, and wearing trousers.

Its always interesting to observe how few internet Buddhists have taken formal refuge in the Dhamma. If a person has taken refuge in the Dhamma, they understand the following Refuge verse is all that matters.

‘svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opaneyyiko paccattaṁ veditabbo viññūhī’ti;
‘The teaching is well explained by the Buddha — visible in the here & now, immediately effective, inviting inspection, leading onwards, to be  experienced individually by the wise for themselves.’
AN 10.92

Pali morning chanting here
Again, from MN 38

Inappropriate Questions Avoided
"Knowing thus and seeing thus, would you say, 'The Teacher is our
respected mentor. We speak thus out of respect for the Teacher'?"
"No, lord."
"Knowing thus and seeing thus, would you say, 'The Contemplative says
this. We speak thus in line with the Contemplative's words'?"
"No, lord."
"Is it the case that you speak simply in line with what you have
known, seen & understood for yourselves?"
"Yes, lord."
"Good, monks. You have been guided by me in this Dhamma which is to be
seen here & now, timeless, inviting verification, pertinent, to be
realized by the observant for themselves. For it has been said, 'This
Dhamma is to be seen here & now, timeless, inviting verification,
pertinent, to be by the observant for themselves,' and it was in
reference to this that it was said.

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text:
Doing evil knowingly and unknowingly
In the Milindapanha, Nagasena points out to king Milinda that doing evil knowingly accrues lesser demerit than doing evil unknowingly. Does the Buddha make the same statement anywhere in the Suttas?

The king asked: "Venerable Nagasena, for whom is the greater demerit, one who knowingly does evil, or one who does evil unknowingly?"
The elder replied: "Indeed, your majesty, for him who does evil not knowing is the greater demerit."
"In that case, venerable Nagasena, would we doubly punish one who is our prince or king's chief minister who not knowing does evil?"
"What do you think, your majesty, who would get burned more, one who knowing picks up a hot iron ball, ablaze and glowing, or one who not knowing picks it up?"
"Indeed, venerable sir, he who not knowing picks it up would get burned more."
"Indeed, your majesty, in the same way the greater demerit is for him who does evil not knowing."
"You are clever, venerable Nagasena."

Milindapanha - Access to Insight
My interpretation of this is not about unintended action vs intended action as one of the answers suggests. Instead I see it as comparing intended action with the view that the action is unwholesome vs intended action with the view that the action is wholesome. It's not about intending harm vs not intending harm, instead it's about intending harm knowing that causing harm is bad vs intending harm not knowing that causing harm is bad.

Can you add a reference (e.g. add a hyperlink, or say which chapter number you are talking about) or a quote from the Milinda Panha?

Also do you only want an answer from the Suttas: what about from the Dhammapada for example, or the Vinaya?

@ChrisW added a reference and a quote. I guess any source attributed to the Buddha is acceptable.

Ahhh I see. The one doing evil at least "knows" or sees that they are doing evil, they know they can turn the other way and go in higher directions - they are awakened to the fact of the "evil". But the person who does evil not knowing, is still unawakened, half asleep - they are blind. Coyote

The source is Miln III,7,8 [84].
The other day, I happened to read a discussion of this passage in "Development in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma" by James Paul McDermott (page 113-114).
Based on what I have read, I do not believe that there is any specific quote in the Suttas / Vinaya that specifically supports this passage. The Suttas (AN 6.63) equate kamma with volition / intention and as McDermott explains, this was developed in the Abhidhamma (particularly the Kathāvatthu), further developed in Milindapañha and even further developed in the Abhidharmakośa. Of course, the commentaries developed the concept of kamma to a new level again (this was beyond the scope of McDermott's book).
One has to be careful with interpreting this parable of getting burned by the hot iron. The point is that a unskillful act done with wrong view will generate more weighty kamma... somebody who knows that the unskillful act is wrong will have less volition / intention when performing the unskillful act as compared to another person who sees absolutely nothing wrong with the unskillful act (i.e. accompanied by wrong view).
@Jayarava, I have admired some of your writings / posts. Thanks for prompting me to look deeper at this passage (I love to learn). Here is the passage in Pāḷi:

Rājā āha ‘‘bhante nāgasena, yo jānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, yo ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, kassa bahutaraṃ apuñña’’nti? Thero āha ‘‘yo kho, mahārāja, ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, tassa bahutaraṃ apuñña’’nti. ‘‘Tena hi, bhante nāgasena, yo amhākaṃ rājaputto vā rājamahāmatto vā ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, taṃ mayaṃ diguṇaṃ daṇḍemā’’ti? ‘‘Taṃ kiṃ maññasi, mahārāja, tattaṃ ayoguḷaṃ ādittaṃ sampajjalitaṃ sajotibhūtaṃ eko jānanto gaṇheyya, eko ajānanto gaṇheyya, katamo [kassa (ka.)] balavataraṃ ḍayheyyā’’ti. ‘‘Yo kho, bhante, ajānanto gaṇheyya, so [tassa (pī. ka.)] balavataraṃ ḍayheyyā’’ti. ‘‘Evameva kho, mahārāja, yo ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, tassa bahutaraṃ apuñña’’nti.

I believe that the key word is "ajānanto". In the translation above, it is rendered as "unknowingly". T.W. Rhys Davids translates this as "inadvertently". Bhikkhu Pesala translates this as "unconsciously". PED uses translations such as "unaware" and "unsuspecting".
I do not think "ajānanto" is equivalent to "ignorance" (delusion / moha). "Ajānanto" seems to be closer to "unwise attention", not seeing things as they truly are. For this reason, I think wrong view is a better handling, even though "micchādiṭṭhi" is not used in the text. @Jayarava, your knowledge of Pāḷi is far superior to mine, so I would be very willing to be corrected.
Oops, I just read your answer below, so let me add more...
I am an Abhidhamma teacher and this certainly colours my world view :-) Let me put an Abhidhamma spin on this to see if it helps. The Milindapañha was written after the Abhidhamma, so it is possible that in this passage, Nāgasena is attempting to clarify a doubt from the Abhidhamma.
Kamma comes from intention. The ethical quality of the kamma created comes from the roots (attachment / aversion / delusion for unwholesome, non-attachment / non-aversion / understanding for wholesome).
I do not believe that this passage from the Milindapañha is talking about the ethical quality of the kamma created.
I do believe that this passage from the Milindapañha is talking about the weightiness / intensity of the kamma created... and this is a different issue. The weightiness / intensity of the kamma created is a question of strength of volition.
In the case of unwholesome kamma-creating mental states, the strength of volition can depend on pleasant / neutral feeling (pleasant feeling contributes to stronger volition), prompted / spontaneous (spontaneous contributes to stronger volition) and associated / disassociated with wrong view (associated with wrong view contributes to stronger volition). I believe that this passage from the Milindapañha is talking about the third factor; "associated / disassociated with wrong view".

indeed. also someone who doesn't know that their actions are wrong will continue to keep doing the same in the future whereas someone who knowingly makes a mistake is much more likely to change how they act in the future.

For example on the subject of not making a habit of it, there's this quote from a monk, who claims that he would tell a lie in order to save a life (but also not "whenever it is convenient" and only "in extreme cases").

I think the lesser demerit in the second case may have more to do with the fact that the person is significantly more likely to change their future behavior knowing that what they are doing is unwholesome instead of having to do with less volition/intention. Many criminals believe that their actions are justified, for example Al Capone apparently saw himself as a public benefactor instead of a criminal. This ability people have to rationalize away their actions is where the danger lies (papañca).

The impact of wrong view on the weightiness of unwholesome kamma produced (or alternatively the impact of understanding on the weightiness of wholesome kamma produced) is a bit different topic than habits. A few minutes ago, I submitted a long answer regarding habits to a question, "Are good deeds superficial".

@RobM Is it talking about wrong view? It's perfectly straight forward to say "micchādiṭṭhi" in Pāḷi. Do you know of other passages where ajānanto is used to mean micchādiṭṭhi that might back up this assertion? An unwholesome deed performed with understanding (that it is unwholesome) ought to produce the weightier karma than a deed performed without that understanding (since the intention is not to cause harm), but here the text is saying the opposite of that!

I have added a note at the end of my answer.

With regard to karma one of the most cited Pāli passages is:

Cetanāhaṃ bhakkhave kammaṃ vadāmi - AN 6.63
Intention, monks, is what I call action.

In other words, only intentional actions are karma. On the other hand Jains considered that all actions whatever were karmic. They developed the idea that inactivity was the best religious practice, taking it as far as starving themselves to death.
This passage from Miln seems to contradict this important principle. It is very curious. I will have to give this a good deal more thought.
And I think it's fair to say that just because someone can come up with the plausible reading of this text by changing the meaning of the words somewhat, doesn't mean that this is what was intended. A more sound procedure is to exhaust the possibilities of the text itself, then look for a traditional commentary, before starting to make ad hoc assumptions that simply fit a desired interpretation. One always has to allow that the text simply does not make sense.
~
In checking the Pāḷi passage (Miln 84) (in the Burmese 6th council Ed.) I had to translate it anyway, So I'll include my translation for reference. If there are any supplementary questions about the translation, leave a comment, and I'll edit this answer to try to explain.

Jānantājānantapāpakaraṇapañho
The question on doing evil knowingly or unknowingly.
Rājā āha "bhante nāgasena, yo jānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, yo ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, kassa bahutaraṃ apuññan" ti?
  The King said, "Bhante Nāgasena, he who does an evil action (pāpakamma) knowingly (jānanto), he who does an evil action unknowingly (ajānanto); which has the greater demerit (apuñña)."
Thero āha "yo kho, mahārāja, ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, tassa bahutaraṃ apuññan" ti.
  The Elder said, "Majesty, he who does an evil action unknowingly, he has the greater demerit"
"Tena hi, bhante nāgasena, yo amhākaṃ rājaputto vā rājamahāmatto vā ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, taṃ mayaṃ diguṇaṃ daṇḍemā" ti?
  "By this [reasoning], Bhante Nāgasena, should we punish our royal son or royal minister twofold (diguṇa) for doing an evil action unknowingly?"
"Taṃ kiṃ maññasi, mahārāja, tattaṃ ayoguḷaṃ ādittaṃ sampajjalitaṃ sajotibhūtaṃ eko jānanto gaṇheyya, eko ajānanto gaṇheyya, katamo balavataraṃ ḍayheyyā" ti.
  "What do you think, Majesty, if someone were to knowingly grasp a glowing iron ball, aflame, burning, or to unknowingly grasp it, who would receive the worse burn?"
Yo kho, bhante, ajānanto gaṇheyya, so [tassa] balavataraṃ ḍayheyyā" ti.
  "Bhante, the one who grasped it unknowingly, he would receive the worst burn."
"Evameva kho, mahārāja, yo ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti, tassa bahutaraṃ apuññan" ti.
  "Just so, Majesty. he who does an evil action unknowingly, makes the most demerit."
"Kallosi, bhante nāgasenā" ti.
  "You are skilled, Bhante Nāgasena".

There is a lot here to digest. If Nāgasena is correct, why does Milinda say he should punish members of the royal court twofold (diguṇa)? I don't see the logic of this.
Does the analogy even work? Is it true that grasping a burning iron ball on purpose would mean one would be burned less? Who would grasp a burning hot iron ball on purpose anyway?
This is one of the most bizarre pieces of Pāḷi prose I've ever looked at!
I don't see how one can separate intention and understanding. Jānanto is just a very broad word for "knowing". So we must interpret yo ajānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti as "does an evil action without knowing that he does evil" and yo jānanto pāpakammaṃ karoti "does an evil action knowing that he does evil". The one who acts with knowing clearly must incur the greater consequences, but this text reverses the natural order. On face value it simply does not make sense.
It has been suggested by @RobM that this passage is referring not to the ethical quality of the action (and therefore of the vipāka it will generate), but to weightiness of the kamma. In fact I do not see any meaningful separation of these, since it is the ethical quality of an action that determines how weighty it is. Furthermore the passage itself is talking about who accrues the most apuñña or demerit. How can one separate puñña/apuñña from the "ethical quality of the action that generates it? An action generates puñña/apuñña in precise proportion to the kusala/akusala of the intention (cetanā) behind it. What's more the passage does not contain any word implying weightiness (garu, garutara, garutā etc). So although @RobM has produced a reading that is consistent with his understanding (and therefore pleasing), it is unrelated to the words he is attempting to interpret. This is an unsound exegetical methodology.
The exegetical strategy of all those answers so far which claim to understand this passage (which I do not) is that the words jānanto/ajānanto mean something other than what they mean. Either ajānanto means micchādiṭṭhi or it means garutā (weightiness) or something else that makes the passage make simple sense. In order to establish such a reading the person proposing it would need to show that this esoteric substitution was a regular feature of either the Milindapañha or the Pāḷi literature as a whole. One of the attractions of the Pāḷi literature is that on the whole it is quite straightforward. Metaphors and similes are occasionally reified by later tradition, but they stand out in the texts. So, on the face of it, an esoteric reading, where the text says one thing but means another would require some strong evidential support in the form of many quotations of similar substitutions. I don't see any evidence to date. So far I have not understood this text, but I don't believe that anyone else has either. "Don't know" must always be a possible, if unsatisfactory solution to any problem. And if one does not know then there is no shame in saying so. To over-ride unknowing and superimpose something familiar on a text to force it into a familiar pattern is not a good practice. At best it is a form of self-deception.

There is no contradiction. Let's consider killing someone as an example. (1) There is the case where someone kills another accidentally (intention to kill is absent). (2) There is the case where someone kills another (intention to kill is present) believing that killing is not evil/unwholesome. (3) There is the case where someone kills another (intention to kill is present) believing that killing is evil/unwholesome. This passage from Miln has nothing to do with (1), it's only comparing (2) and (3) but the word "unknowing" that the translator has chosen makes this somewhat ambiguous.

Whereas "Cetanāhaṃ bhakkhave kammaṃ vadāmi" is concerned with (1) vs (2)/(3).

does evil unknowingly sounds like (1) to me. The word is ajānanto a present participle from √jñā which must mean exactly "unknowingly" - or perhaps "without understanding". So the problem is certainly not with the translation. Nor can the Pāḷi be interpreted in the way you suggest.

doesn't "without understanding" support my interpretation? as in acting intentionally but without understanding the immorality of the action?

I've edited my answer at the end to respond to this.

I agree the analogy is not the best which is why I was looking for an alternative analogy / supporting reference from the Suttas. Perhaps the person who knows that the iron ball is hot would take some precautions when picking it up maybe like wearing gloves that would lessen the burn haha

I have edited my answer to hopefully clarify my understanding

For more than 15 years, I have been using analogies very similar to this (though I have never quoted this passage from Milindapañha) to explain why a mental state associated with wrong view creates weightier kamma than a mental state disassociated from wrong view. When I read this passage in Milindapañha, I immediately jumped to the conclusion that it was making the same point. I did not check the Pāḷi to see if this assumption was supported by the actual words used. @Jayarava, I would be keen to explore this together with you (I have never learned anything from a person who agreed with me).

@Jayarava, I think that the first topic of discussion could be the translation of the word, "ajānanto". Various translators have used terms such as "unknowingly", "inadvertently", "unconsciously", "unaware" and "unsuspecting". Each of these English words carries some baggage, but if we consider them as a set, I feel comfortable that we have an acceptable understanding of "ajānanto". Are you comfortable with this?

As I understand it, comments on an article are not designed for extensive discussions of answers. So I'm reluctant to begin what will almost certainly be a protracted discussion in this format.

You're right about comments but fyi you are allowed to discuss whatever and as much as you want to, in the chat rooms (e.g. use the existing general chat room, or create a new one for a specific conversation). There are virtually no rules about the format or content of what's in chat rooms (except, you know, a modicum of politeness).

@ChrisW Rob and I did something similar - an offline discussion. But thanks.

Ven. Pesala's translation has a footnote to clarify the meaning:

"All wrong-doing is rooted in ignorance, so one who does wrong knowingly will feel remorse and correct himself sooner than one who is deluded (Editor’s Note)."

So based on his note, "knowingly" here means knowing that the unwholesome deed does create unwholesome results.

What is Pesala's authority for this interpretation?

"authority" might not be the word to use. But insight from a venerable monk who has written many books on Buddhism (ref: http://www.softerviews.org/AIM/pesala.html ) is worth paying attention to..

I judge all scholarship on it's merits, not on the reputation of its author. Plenty of rubbish books are published about Buddhism! And I certainly do not venerate bhikkhus as a matter of course.  In my experience bhikkhus, with one or two notable exceptions (e.g. Anālayo) make poor scholars as their work is almost inevitably tainted by strong confirmation bias. They are far too committed to the articles of Buddhist faith to be objective. So my question stands. What is his authority for this interpretation?

Again, I don't think "authority" is the word to use since there're many interpretations for the story. But if you insist on using this word, then what is YOUR authority to this interpretation, and more specifically, why do people have to listen to yours instead of Ven. Pesala's?

AuthorityI have not offered an interpretation so I'm sure I don't know what you mean.

Authority is exactly the word. I have not offered an interpretation so I'm sure I don't know what you mean. Also I don't expect people to take my opinions on face value, I expect them to evaluate my words critically. I am not an authority, to back up my assertions (if I make any) I generally refer people to a traditional interpretation, a respected journal article, or a book that is generally acknowledged to be accurate - an authority.

You did offer a lengthy interpretation in the post of yours above. And I simply provided an alternative interpretation from Ven. Pesala as another interpretation. Since you like the word authority so much, I repeat the question: what authority do you have over Ven. Pesala to make people listen to you instead of him?

See Dhammapada 5.69:

So long as evil deed has yet to ripen, the fool mistakes it for honey. But [only] when that deed ripens, the fool comes to grief.

-- the implied contrast here is that the wise recognizes his own misconduct as misconduct before it ripens and "drops the iron ball" before it burns.
My commentary: the wise may not know, and can make mistakes - but he understands the limits of his knowledge and acts cautiously, in little steps, verifying his theory from received feedback and adjusting his model accordingly. The fool is assured of his (incorrect) knowledge and is attached to it. He does not actively look out for feedback and does not adjust his understanding and action. The fool is attached to his incorrect understanding.
This is how the fool is setup for suffering: because of his attachment to incorrect understanding which mismatches the reality and provides an incorrect basis for decision-making. The wise adjusts his model all the time to better match the reality, even as reality changes:
Imagine two Roombas (robotic vacuum cleaners), both with incorrect map of the house. One Roomba updates its internal map as it goes around and bumps into things. Another Roomba keeps going based on a wrong map. Which Roomba will clean the house better and which will likely get stuck? "For whom is the greater demerit?"

People at large think that not knowing is an excuse and lightens the effects of wrongs. Causing killing by "accident" or thought it would not matter? How about this?
The teaching does not talk about the whole vipaka (by of kamma) but of direct suffering from an action. Of course doing bad knowingly is a heavier bad kamma, good householder. "Knowing" the danger of stealing (in frames of orginary expectations) , one does not get easy caught in this existance, but the effect, kammic, is heavier. So good to devide it, and that suffering is caused by not knowing (ignorance, avijja), is present in 50 % of the Suttas, and core teaching.
Maybe the reflection as support helps good householder to understand the matter better: Unwholesome done knowingly and unknowingly.
Ignoring this, knowingly, is sure not so hot assumed, without knowing (yet) sure painful, when touched.
(Note: this is not given for trade, exchange, stacks that binds to the world, either knowingly or unknowingly, but for liberation from this wheel)

Here is the previous section

The king said: 'Which, Nâgasena, is there more of, merit or demerit?'
'Merit.'
'But why?'
'He who does wrong, O king, comes to feel remorse, and acknowledges his evil-doing. So demerit does not increase. But he who does well feels no remorse, and feeling no remorse gladness will
  spring up within him, and joy will arise to him thus gladdened, and so rejoicing all his frame will be at peace, and being thus at peace he will experience a blissful feeling of content, and in that bliss his heart will be at rest, and he whose heart is thus at rest knows things as they really are 1. For that reason merit increases. A man, for example, though his hands and feet are cut off, if he gave to the Blessed One merely a handful of lotuses, would not enter purgatory for ninety-one Kalpas. That is why I said, O king, that there is more merit than demerit.'
'Very good, Nâgasena!'

I think that confirms Andrei's explanation -- i.e. that the context is that when you know you've done evil then you feel remorse and stop doing it.

all_licenses: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/


text:
Why are "Fear and Shame" listed among the beautiful cetasikas?
I was wondering how the mental factors of Fear and Shame should be understood. Normally I would understand them both as being unwholesome but I guess in Abhidhamma-perspective they have a different meaning.
How should they be understood according to the Abhidhamma?
They are both listed as belonging to the group of Beautiful or Moral cetasikas.

It's a translation issue. The Pali terms are Hiri and Ottappa, and they are hard to translate into English because they have no one-word equivalents.
Hiri refers to the feeling of not wanting to do a bad deed because you know the deed itself is bad, and Ottappa refers to the feeling of not wanting to do an evil deed because you know that the consequences of it are bad.
They definitely do not mean what is normally meant by the English words fear and shame. Many suttas speak of fear as unwholesome, and shame in the sense of remorse is mentioned as unwholesome in other Buddhist writings.
For this reason, the translator Ajahn Thanissaro prefers to translate these terms as conscience and concern.
The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi wrote a good article on these two terms called The Guardians of the World. Here's a very good excerpt:

While moral shame and fear of wrongdoing are united in the common task
of protecting the mind from moral defilement, they differ in their
individual characteristics and modes of operation. Hiri, the sense of
shame, has an internal reference; it is rooted in self-respect and
induces us to shrink from wrongdoing out of a feeling of personal
honor. Ottappa, fear of wrongdoing, has an external orientation. It is
the voice of conscience that warns us of the dire consequences of
moral transgression: blame and punishment by others, the painful
kammic results of evil deeds, the impediment to our desire for
liberation from suffering. Acariya Buddhaghosa illustrates the
difference between the two with the simile of an iron rod smeared with
excrement at one end and heated to a glow at the other end: hiri is
like one's disgust at grabbing the rod in the place where it is
smeared with excrement, ottappa is like one's fear of grabbing it in
the place where it is red hot.

Fear and shame I believe are referring to the words hiri and ottappa. Hiri-ottappa is not fear and shame in the ordinary sense of these words but it refers to something like the self-correcting concern that a stream enterer has even for making minor transgressions that could hinder progress towards Nibbana. This concern comes through understanding that these actions really are unskillful and having seen a glimpse of Nibbana and having unshakable confidence in the Buddha makes this individual shameful of committing even minor acts that are unskillful. Similar to how a minor blemish on an otherwise dirty piece of cloth doesn't really make a difference, a stream enterer on the other hand sees his/her weaknesses as a blemish on a pure white cloth that needs to be erased. Hiri-otappa is one of the reasons why a stream enterer is on a path of continual improvement that inevitably leads to Nibbana.

In addition to the answers above it might help to reflect on the opposites of Hiri and Ottappa (Ahirika and Anottappa). Just as Hiri and Ottappa arise in all wholesome mental states, Ahirika and Anottappa arise in all unwholesome states of mind.
Ahirika (shamelessness / immodesty) has a characteristic of “no disgust over misconduct”, a function of “doing evil without shame”, a manifestation of “not shrinking away from evil” and a proximate cause of “lack of respect for self”. Just as a pig is not ashamed to roll in sewage, the mind is not disgusted with unwholesome actions, speech or thought. The Buddha said to his son, “Of anyone for whom there is no shame at intentional lying; of him I say that there is no evil he cannot do. ‘I will not speak a lie, even for fun’ – this is how you must train yourself”. In other words, there is no room for “white lies”. To check if there is Shamelessness in the mind, ask yourself, “Is this the kind of Mental State that could arise in an Arahat?” or ask yourself, “Would I be proud if my thought were reported as a headline in tomorrow’s newspaper?”
Anottappa (recklessness / lack of moral dread) has a characteristic of “no dread over misconduct”, a function of “doing evil without dread”, a manifestation of “not shrinking away from evil” and a proximate cause of “lack of respect for others”. Just as a moth gets attracted by fire and is burned, Recklessness is unaware of consequences, gets attracted by the unwholesome and plunges into the danger zone. To check if there is Recklessness in the mind, ask yourself, “Is this Mental State going to be the wind under my wings to lift me up, or the weight around my neck to drag me down?” or ask yourself, “What kind of kamma is this Mental State creating?”

In the Abhidhamma, regret and remorse over the past is considered an unwholesome mental factor.

Worry (kukkucca) is remorse, brooding, and repenting over evil acts
done in the past or good acts left undone.

The following theme for reflection from AN 5.57 (quoted below) can prevent the arising of unarisen unwholesome states. It encourages shame of evil (hiri) and fear of evil (otappa), which are mentioned as beautiful mental factors in the Abhidhamma.
So, remorse and regret over the past is unwholesome. But shame of evil and fear of evil, or basically moral shame (hiri) and fear of wrongdoing (otappa), for the future, is wholesome.

“And for the sake of what benefit should a woman or a man, a
householder or one gone forth, often reflect thus: ‘I am the owner of
my kamma, the heir of my kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my
relative, kamma as my resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma,
good or bad, that I do’? People engage in misconduct by body, speech,
and mind. But when one often reflects upon this theme, such misconduct
is either completely abandoned or diminished. It is for the sake of
this benefit that a woman or a man, a householder or one gone forth,
should often reflect thus: ‘I am the owner of my kamma, the heir of my
kamma; I have kamma as my origin, kamma as my relative, kamma as my
resort; I will be the heir of whatever kamma, good or bad, that I do.’
AN 5.57

And from Iti 42:

"Bhikkhus, these two bright principles protect the world. What are the
two? Shame and fear of wrongdoing. If, bhikkhus, these two bright
principles did not protect the world, there would not be discerned
respect for mother or maternal aunt or maternal uncle's wife or a
teacher's wife or the wives of other honored persons, and the world
would have fallen into promiscuity, as with goats, sheep, chickens,
pigs, dogs, and jackals. But as these two bright principles protect
the world, there is discerned respect for mother... and the wives of
other honored persons."
Those in whom shame and fear of wrong
Are not consistently found
Have deviated from the bright root
And are led back to birth and death.
But those in whom shame and fear of wrong
Are consistently ever present,
Peaceful, mature in the holy life,
They put an end to renewal of being.
Iti 42


text:
What sutta refers to 'emptiness in small space'?
I remember reading about one sutta  "emptiness in small gap". Since consciousness (Vijñāna) raises and falls all the time, between each consciousness there is a very small and briefest gap where Vijñāna doesn't take place. If i remember correctly, Buddha might have said about this emptiness as FYI. Anyone could help me find sutta about "emptiness in small gap" or "emptiness in small space", or "void in tight space".  i want to study this sutta again to see if buddha ralated this emptiness to vimutti or maha-sunyata.    thanks

In my studies I have not come across such a use of the term emptiness, but in many zen materials the "gap between thoughts" is pointed at.  Acclimation into that mode is Calm-abiding.  Meditation is often taught as Calm-abiding and Insight as two overlapping but differing kinds.  May you find helpful materials.

I have never read a Sutta talking about emptiness in terms of a gap or a small space, and to my knowledge the Suttas don't explicitly talk about what happens between individual consciousnesses (although the commentaries on the Suttas do interpret certain passages as referring to it).
Within the Theravada Abhidhamma, this issue is taken up more explicitly. According to the Abhidhamma, between individual consciousnesses there is another type of mind-state called the Bhavanga-citta. The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi in his book A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma explains the Bhavanga quite succinctly as follows on page 106:

(2) Life-continuum (bhavanga):  The word bhavanga means “factor (anga)
  of  existence (bhava),” that is, “the indispensable condition of
  existence.”  Bhavanga is the  function of consciousness by which the
  continuity of the individual is preserved through  the duration of any
  single existence, from conception to death.  After the paṭisandhicitta
  has arisen and fallen away, it is then followed by the bhavangacitta,
  which is a resultant  consciousness  of  the  same  type  as  the
  paṭisandhicitta  but  which  performs  a  different  function,
  namely,  the  function  of  preserving  the  continuity  of
  individual  existence.
Bhavangacittas  arise  and  pass  away  every  moment  during  life  whenever  there  is  no  active cognitive process taking place.  This
  type of consciousness is most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but
  it also occurs momentarily during waking life countless times  between
  occasions of active cognition.  When an object impinges on a sense
  door, the bhavanga is arrested, and an active  cognitive process
  ensues for the purpose of cognizing the object.  Immediately after the
  cognitive process is completed, again the bhavanga supervenes and
  continues until the  next cognitive process arises.  Arising and
  perishing at every moment during this passive  phase of consciousness,
  the bhavanga flows on like a stream (sota), without remaining  static
  for two consecutive moments.

(Emphasis added)


text:
What kind of births are recognized in Buddhism?
There are different kinds of birth in Buddhism, depending on what realm one is reborn in.
What are these kinds of birth?

See also the answers to Can one take rebirth as an insect? and Is there any explanation on why only humans and animals do not remember previous life?

To an enlightened Buddha, everything is merely elements (dhatu), sense phenomena (ayatana) & aggregates (khandha). 'Birth' ('jati') means to impute the idea or worldly convention of 'selves', 'persons' or 'beings' ('satta') onto the mere elements, sense spheres & aggregates (refer to SN 12.2; SN 5.10; & SN 23.2). All 'births' ('jati') are mere thought conceptions or sankhara (refer to SN 22.81). Ajahn Buddhadasa said:

The word "birth" refers to the arising of the mistaken idea "I,"
  "myself". It does not refer to physical birth, as generally supposed.
  The mistaken assumption that this word "birth" refers to physical
  birth is a major obstacle to comprehending the Buddha's teaching.
  Whenever there arises the mistaken idea "I," the "I" has been born;
  its parents are ignorance and craving. The kind of birth that
  constitutes a problem for us is mental birth. Anyone who fails to
  grasp this point will never succeed in understanding anything of the
  Buddha teaching.
Another Kind of Birth

Jati (Jeat) in Thailand, Cambodia... in South Asia, is always a synonym for Birth, Stand, State also Nation. While it actually means "identification", it's not good to deny all other with a categorical answer (bias). Slave of Buddha and some others, aren't to be suspected to be smarter then generations of wise and use of words for tousands of years by continents. If just meaning that suggested, aside of usual, the Buddha would have told. Look at his definition of jati, birth, you know well, which does not, of course, exclude this focus, as well.

In the Theravada Abhidhamma, four different kinds of birth are recognized1, namely:

egg-born beings (Aṇḍaja), such as birds, fish and reptiles.
womb-born beings (Jalābuja), such as mammals. Egg-born beings are also included in this category.
moisture-born beings (Saṃsedaja), includes certain lowly forms of animals, such as worms.
spontaneously-born beings (Opapatika), such as petas and devas. These beings are generally invisible to the physical eye.

1 Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, Ch. 5: "Compendium of Matter", p. 256, by Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi

The four kinds of birth are also found in the suttas. But they do not appear to be closely related to the realms. Is there a quote which shows that they are in fact related?

There is this quote by Ven. Bhikku Bodhi from the section on births in the sensuous realm: "The present section deals with the manner in which these material groups come into being at the moment of conception, during the course of existence, and in different realms", p. 256.

Also he lists the entire section on different kinds of birth under the chapter: "In the Sensous World", p. 255. There is not much else written about it.

If you have some sutta references to the different kinds of birth, then feel free to add them - post is now community wiki.

This teaching is from MN 12; about the 4 kinds of generation (rather than birth). 32. "Catasso kho imā, sāriputta, yoniyo. Katamā catasso? Aṇḍajā yoni, jalābujā yoni, saṃsedajā yoni, opapātikā yoniSariputta, there are these four kinds of generation. What are the four? Egg-born generation, womb-born generation, moisture-born generation and spontaneous generation..... What is spontaneous generation? There are gods and denizens of hell and certain human beings and some beings in the lower worlds; this is called spontaneous generation.

opapātikā is not invisible.


text:
Textual reference vs. Direct insight
Somewhat loaded question... According to Buddha, what is more reliable -- textual reference or one's own direct insight that came from experience?
If one's own insight is in conflict with a text, should one trust the text or one's own insight? Is there anything Buddha said about this?

My personal preference is always for direct insight - but if a text contradicts, I make it my next object of contemplation to see how that view could also be right. Often truth can look vastly different when viewed from different angles, that's often the only difference since the text too was someone's direct insight. Sorry, don't have a sutta for you, hence a comment, not an answer. NB: I am speaking of direct insight arising from beyond intellectual thought. Mere intellectual thinking can often be flat out wrong, much better to go with the text in those cases.

I realized this is one of those "debate" type questions that seek opinions and not real answers. I would like to close this as to set a good example for others.

The Kalama Sutta says that you should "know for yourselves".
It also suggests that one should consider the opinion of "the wise". Elsewhere too it's said to be important to have admirable people as friends.
Something like the Sarakaani Sutta suggests that faith (faith in the "text", perhaps) is beneficial; but that it's also possible to "destroy three fetters". The commentary says,

These are the first three of the five lower fetters, i.e., sakkaaya-ditthi "personality-view" or belief in a permanent, really existing self; vicikicchaa "doubt" (once the "personality-view" has been shattered, there can be no further fundamental doubt about the Dhamma); and siilabbata-paraamaasa "attachment to rites and rituals" (siila + vata).

If you reach the state of "lack of doubt" I think that implies you trust your own insight.
There's a long definition of Vicikiccha (perhaps several definitions).
Some of the things you shouldn't doubt include the Buddha, Sangha, and Dhamma (which might mean, "you shouldn't doubt the text", i.e. "insight confirms the accuracy of the Buddha’s teaching"). But then the last paragraph i.e. ...

Why, Mahaanaama, if these great sal trees could distinguish what is well spoken from what is ill spoken, I would proclaim these great sal trees to be Stream-Winners...

... implies that a stream-winner is defined by the ability to "distinguish what is well spoken from what is ill spoken".
Also the Kaccayanagotta Sutta says that right view is a knowledge that is independent of others

By & large, Kaccayana, this world is in bondage to attachments, clingings (sustenances), & biases. But one such as this does not get involved with or cling to these attachments, clingings, fixations of awareness, biases, or obsessions; nor is he resolved on 'my self.' He has no uncertainty or doubt that just stress, when arising, is arising; stress, when passing away, is passing away. In this, his knowledge is independent of others. It's to this extent, Kaccayana, that there is right view.

Indeed, knowledge of what is and what isn't the path is explained in further detail in the visuddhimagga : http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf
page 631

@ChrisW I feel your answer is quite apt. But I could also be wrong :)

@Ryan I deleted various comments. If you want to post about Jayarava's interpretation of the Kalama sutta, you might be able to do that either by asking a new question, or perhaps by posting an answer to his question here about that sutta.

Whenever there's a conflict between the text and your personal experience, several things could go wrong.

What you think as direct insight could easily be a misjudgement on your part.
ex: 500 years ago, if an average person read in a book that the earth goes around the sun or the earth is round, he would've felt such teachings go against what he took to be his direct experience. A meditator can sit for an hour and feel pain in his legs the whole time and think that pain doesn't go away until he does something about it. And when he moves his legs, the pain goes away. So he could take that view as insight.
Same text can be interpreted in different ways by different teachers. So it could be that you or your teacher is interpreting the text wrong. This is one place where the commentaries are useful. Cross check your understanding of the text with the commentaries to see if it deviates a lot. If it does, most probably you got it wrong. Reevaluate your understanding to see whether it leads you to detachment.
Compilers of the text heard it wrong or understood it wrong. This is highly unlikely as the text(Tipitaka) has survived several Buddhist councils which were headed by many enlightened monks. So this is the last thing one should be worried about.

The Buddha never relied on text even to record his teachings but he did rely on direct insight to get his students to Nirvana. One can't reach liberation without direct insight. Text is very conceptual and of course the Buddha taught to transcend conceptual reality because it can't be relied on to give %100 truth but direct experience can be relied on as perfect truth.

Exerpts from Mahaparinibbana sutta DN 16:

The Four Great References
  7. And there the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying: "Now, bhikkhus, I shall make known to you the four great references. Listen and pay heed to my words." And those bhikkhus answered, saying:

  "So be it, Lord."

  8-11. Then the Blessed One said: "In this fashion, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu might speak: 'Face to face with the Blessed One, brethren, I have heard and learned thus: This is the Dhamma and the Discipline, the Master's Dispensation'; or: 'In an abode of such and such a name lives a community with elders and a chief. Face to face with that community, I have heard and learned thus: This is the Dhamma and the Discipline, the Master's Dispensation'; or: 'In an abode of such and such a name live several bhikkhus who are elders, who are learned, who have accomplished their course, who are preservers of the Dhamma, the Discipline, and the Summaries. Face to face with those elders, I have heard and learned thus: This is the Dhamma and the Discipline, the Master's Dispensation'; or: 'In an abode of such and such a name lives a single bhikkhu who is an elder, who is learned, who has accomplished his course, who is a preserver of the Dhamma, the Discipline, and the Summaries. Face to face with that elder, I have heard and learned thus: This is the Dhamma and the Discipline, the Master's Dispensation.'

  "In such a case, bhikkhus, the declaration of such a bhikkhu is neither to be received with approval nor with scorn. Without approval and without scorn, but carefully studying the sentences word by word, one should trace them in the Discourses and verify them by the Discipline. If they are neither traceable in the Discourses nor verifiable by the Discipline, one must conclude thus: 'Certainly, this is not the Blessed One's utterance; this has been misunderstood by that bhikkhu — or by that community, or by those elders, or by that elder.' In that way, bhikkhus, you should reject it. But if the sentences concerned are traceable in the Discourses and verifiable by the Discipline, then one must conclude thus: 'Certainly, this is the Blessed One's utterance; this has been well understood by that bhikkhu — or by that community, or by those elders, or by that elder.' And in that way, bhikkhus, you may accept it on the first, second, third, or fourth reference. These, bhikkhus, are the four great references for you to preserve."

From MN 70, the Buddha taught about the Gradual Training:

Monks, I do not say that the attainment of gnosis is all at once. Rather, the attainment of gnosis is after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice. And how is there the attainment of gnosis after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice? There is the case where, when conviction has arisen, one visits [a teacher]. Having visited, one grows close. Having grown close, one lends ear. Having lent ear, one hears the Dhamma. Having heard the Dhamma, one remembers it. Remembering, one penetrates the meaning of the teachings. Penetrating the meaning, one comes to an agreement through pondering the teachings. There being an agreement through pondering the teachings, desire arises. When desire has arisen, one is willing. When one is willing, one contemplates. Having contemplated, one makes an exertion. Having made an exertion, one realizes with the body the ultimate truth and, having penetrated it with discernment, sees it."

Since in the Buddha's time there were no Buddhist texts this is indeed a loaded question. And the second unanswerable is unanswerable from a putative Buddha's point of view, because there were no texts for him to have a view of.
On the other hand Prof.s Richard Gombrich, K R Norman and, to lesser extent,  Johannes Bronkhorst pointed out the the Buddha of the Pāḷi Canon seems to have known some Brahmanical texts. Some he cited as an example of wrong view (texts relating to ātman) and some he cited as a parody (Agañña Sutta). Later the parodies were often taken seriously (the joke was forgotten and the Agañña becomes official cosmology).
The question is badly formed. It ought to be "What is the role of texts in Buddhism?" Texts play many roles in Buddhism.

Recipes for lifestyles and practices
Inspiring stories
Corporate memory - a record of what Buddhists have thought over centuries
Maintaining group identity

These days we also tend to mistake method for doctrine and specific doctrine for universal doctrine. The classic case of this is the 12 Nidānas. They were originally a list for reflection on experience. But they became reified into a doctrine of what experience is. And then further degraded into a universal theory of conditionality, and again to be a universal theory of causality.
The texts we have inherited are a ragtag collection of bits and pieces, ostensibly preserved orally for some centuries before being written down. They are full of internal contradictions and often philosophically incoherent. But of course Buddhists do not like to talk about this much.
One must always take the texts with a grain of salt. They are literary products; tall stories, legends, and myths; full of miracles, magic, and supernatural beings. They represent the imagination of Iron Age religieux in North India.


text:
Perception (saṃjñā) and discrimination
How do perception and discrimination relate?
I remember thinking (when reading) that they were near synonyms

Discernment (wisdom; panna) & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not disjoined. It's not possible, having separated them one from the other, to delineate the difference between them. For what one discerns, that one cognizes. What one cognizes, that one discerns.
Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not disjoined. It is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them. For what one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one cognizes.

Mahavedalla Sutta

Discriminant is wisdom. You try to see things clearly or as they are, especially uncluttered by perception. (See introduction of Discernment: The Buddha’s Strategies for Happiness II)
Perception is your outlook of the world or mind map of the world.
Perception clouds seeing things as they are hence the relationship.

This question tagged as five-skandas. So the words perception and  discrimination may relate to it.
In pali  (Thipitaka - language) 'five-skandas' are "aggregates" (Pali: khandha; Skt.: skandha) are material "form" (rupa), "feeling" or "sensation" (vedana), "perception" (Saṃjñā), "volitional formations" or "fabrications" (sankhara) and consciousness (viññāṇa).
So the word "discrimination" is meen by (viññāṇa) consciousness.
taking two examples A) seeing Flower, and b) seeing leaf.
The action of separating (recognition) flower and leaf is perception (Saṃjñā).
The action of separating flower and I, leaf and I is discrimination (viññāṇa).
Quote from Maha Thera Nyanatiloka. Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, Buddhist Publication Society, first edition 1952.

Viññāna: 'consciousness', is one of the 5 groups of existence
  aggregates or clusters;khandha, one of the 4 nutriments āhāra, the 3rd
  link of the dependent origination paticcasamuppāda, the 5th in the
  sixfold division of elements; dhatu.
Viewed as one of the 5 groups; khandha it is inseparably linked with
  the 3 other mental groups feeling, perception and constructions and
  furnishes the bare cognition of the object, while the other 3
  contribute more specific functions. Its ethical and kammic character,
  and its greater or lesser degree of intensity and clarity, are chiefly
  determined by the mental constructions associated with it.

Quote from Andarei

Nothing is solid, everything is made of pieces or depends on
  conditions. This includes "I" which cannot possibly be a
  solid/independent entity. Since "I" is really just a compound
  phenomena, it is not independent and too is subject to conditions.
  What we call "consciousness" is too an interplay of conditions and not
  a substance or entity.


text:
Is pain comprised of the four great elements?
Is pain comprised of the four great elements. I believe it is because  it has hardness/softness, coolness/hotness, etc.

Pain is part of the Feeling(vedana) aggregate, while the 4 great elements are part of the Form(rupa) aggregate. More details about the Five Aggregates on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skandha

I think it is better to use awareness or sensation than pain. Brain get information from sense devises. Mind is macro level than bio-chemistry(Micro level) signals . So mind feels hardness/softness, coolness/hotness, etc.
This is how maps reality with experience. without physical contact no real sensations create. But in dreams an in trance mind can imagine anything as real.
How it works telepathy and extra sensations are beyond this topic.  They may be lower level communications.
Buddhism's  main aim is not scientific analyses of physical body. But how to create, process and continuous mind(consciousness) and  effect of actions('kamma') to it. Studying using meditation as a tool.
as shown in MahaSathipattana Sutta.

“This is a one-way path, monks, for the purification of beings, for
  the overcoming of grief and lamentation, for the extinction of pain
  and sorrow, for attaining the right way, for the direct realisation of
  Nibbāna, that is to say, the four ways of attending to mindfulness.
Which four?
Here, monks, a monk dwells contemplating (the nature of) the body in
  the body, ardent, fully aware, and mindful, after removing avarice and
  sorrow regarding the world.
He dwells contemplating (the nature of) feelings in feelings, ardent,
  fully aware, and mindful, after removing avarice and sorrow regarding
  the world.
He dwells contemplating (the nature of) the mind in the mind, ardent,
  fully aware, and mindful, after removing avarice and sorrow regarding
  the world.
He dwells contemplating (the nature of) things in (various) things,
  ardent, fully aware, and mindful, after removing avarice and sorrow
  regarding the world.

In this context all physical things are consider as 'Rupa' and assume they consists with 4 'Maha Butha'('Datu') Patavi, Apo, Tejo, Vayo.
The main advantage of this method is reduce complexity to identify "The Body" exactly not more not less. ("Body as body")

Thus he dwells contemplating (the nature of) the body in the body in
  regard to himself, or he dwells contemplating (the nature of) the body
  in the body in regard to others, or he dwells contemplating (the
  nature of) the body in the body in regard to himself and in regard to
  others, or he dwells contemplating the nature of origination in the
  body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of dissolution in the
  body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of origination and
  dissolution in the body, or else mindfulness that “there is a body” is
  established in him just as far as (is necessary for) a full measure of
  knowledge and a full measure of mindfulness, and he dwells
  independent, and without being attached to anything in the world.
In this way, monks, a monk dwells contemplating (the nature of) the
  body in the body.

In meditation the pain is assume as mind object or experience. this can be consider a single object, (as 'vedana' or 'chiththa') or complex object (5 aggrigate).
As shown In The Section on the Constituents (of Mind & Matter)

Moreover, monks, a monk dwells contemplating (the nature of) things in
  (various) things, in the five constituents (of mind and body) that
  provide fuel for attachment.
And how, monks, does a monk dwell contemplating (the nature of) things
  in (various) things, in the five constituents (of mind and body) that
  provide fuel for attachment?
Here, monks, a monk (knows): “such is form , such is the origination
  of form, such is the passing away of form; such is feeling , such is
  the origination of feeling, such is the passing away of feeling; such
  is perception , such is the origination of perception, such is the
  passing away of perception; such are (mental) processes , such is the
  origination of (mental) processes, such is the passing away of
  (mental) processes; such is consciousness , such is the origination of
  consciousness, such is the passing away of consciousness”.

No! Patavi, Apo, Tejo, Vayo are elements of Rupa. Pain is a sensation caused by those elements coming into contact with the sense doors while the the mind is present.

The 4 elements can only be sensed through the scene doors, hence in the stand point of a mediator the 4 elements are sensations too. Without a living observer there cannot be any scene of the elements, hence consciousness, faculty, contact, sensation are essential and any experience of the elements is always through sensations or the characteristics of the elements which are felt.
As a side note, in case this question was motivated by trying to reconcile Pa Auk and U Ba Khin methods. This is one of the potential perceived differences between the Goenka/U Ba Khin meditation method and Pa Auk 4 elements meditation methods but at essence they are the same through 4 elements based method is slightly more granularity by further sub dividing the sensation based experiences based on the characteristics of the elements. Also see: The Dynamics of Theravāda Insight Meditation, The Ancient Roots of the U Ba Khin Vipassanā Meditation, The Development of Insight – A Study of the U Ba Khin Vipassanā Meditation Tradition as Taught by S.N. Goenka in Comparison with Insight Teachings in the Early Discourses for Bhikkhu Anālayo's perspective on the matter.

I was wondering about this after reading about namarupa. Nama that is feeling,perception,contact, intention and attention and Rupa which are the 4 elements. And I was trying to disassemble pain into these two parts, nama and rupa because it seems possible to see pain as an object like a piece of metal or a piece of wood or some substance with different degrees of hardness,hotness,cohesiveness and movement. But I don't know if this attempt doesn't misrepresents the Dhamma.

Feeling and the elements are 2 sides of the same coin. If you analyse feeling closely they can be classified by the properties according to the elements. The analysis of the elements is also non other than the 4 elements.

@UrsulRosu Titth’ayatana Sutta might be an interesting read for you.

This question makes no sense. The four elements are material & not related to pain.
Pain is vedana kdhanda rather than rupa khandha.

Venerable sir, might there be another way in which a bhikkhu can be called skilled in the elements?”
There might be, Ānanda. There are, Ānanda, these six elements: the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the air element,
  the space element, and the consciousness element. When he knows and
  sees these six elements, a bhikkhu can be called skilled in the
  elements.
But, venerable sir, might there be another way in which a bhikkhu can be called skilled in the elements?”
There might be, Ānanda. There are, Ānanda, these six elements: the pleasure element, the pain element, the joy element, the grief
  element, the equanimity element, and the ignorance element. When he
  knows and sees these six elements, a bhikkhu can be called skilled in
  the elements.

http://www.yellowrobe.com/component/content/article/120-majjhima-nikaya/321-bahudhtuka-sutta-the-many-kinds-of-elements.html


text:
What are some good sources to know more about the Buddha and his teachings
When I was going through difficult face my life, I read little bit about the Buddha's thoughts and it really changed my life. When I started to think from his perspective, I explored a new way of looking at Life which was amazing.
I want to know more about his philosophy towards LIFE. I tried Wiki and other article over the internet, But it doesn't satisfies me. Can anybody suggest me any good source like any book English or Hindi.

http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/ritepath.pdf

http://www.wisebrain.org/HouseholderPractice.pdf

There are some meta-topics tagged book-of-the-month in some of which people suggest various books they'd like to read or recommend reading:

Choosing a book for book of the month club?
Choosing a book for Book of the Month [June]
Choosing a book for Book of the Month [July]

Some introductory online resources are listed in the Useful resources section at the top of the Help page.


text:
Is there awareness of impermanence during the formless meditations
Is there awareness of impermanence during the formless meditations?

Experience of the formless-ness has no attributes, words or expectations.

so is that a no? i'm not trying to identify anything

formless - lack of space or physical attributes to describe
impermanence - lack of time - timeless-ness
How are you to first become aware of them?
How will you or anyone communicate such an experience to another.
If you have tasted 10 kinds of fruits, I can describe to you possibly an 11th if it has some attributes that I can associate with those 10.
Guna- Attributes - Nir-Guna - Without Attributes. :)

If you choose to see things as they are or investigate the Dhamma. Since in the 8th Jhana there is a residue of Perception and Feeling hence you should direct your observation to understand the impermanence of feeling or impermanence of what is felt if you what to develop insight into the 3 marks of existance.
A person taking the Arupa Jhana route attains the final goal by going though Nirodha Samapathi (cessation of perception and feeling)
See: Raho,gata Sutta for further details.

In summary, to perceive the following:

Taste: Tongue
Sound: Ears
Sight: Eyes
Object: Touch
(cant remember the 5th sense.. need some sleep.. will add later )

That which is formless & beyond all attributes cannot be 'sensed' or perceive using a Sense of the Body (or even an Xray or Infra red vision).
That which has no form, is infinite & all pervasive cannot be measured like an physical object with 'defined' dimensions.
It 'comes' as an experience. :) It's not something you can switch on, on demand; Unless you are enlightened - Then you already know that everything is infinite. At that point your senses & your body and everything else is just a virtual construct.

what is an experience without form tho? i was wondering if it was (like) waking up from a deep sleep with some important new understanding, rather than an experience at that moment with a duration beginning and end

You will know it when you experience it. Please read the link you posted - the infinite cannot have measure and measured by the framework of your mind, it is beyond mind - When you go beyond mind, form, beginning, end, attributes within & experience it, you will not have to ask this on a forum.
Meditation is very personal experiential you can read all you want about it and it will not help an ounce. And if/ when you experience it, you will know but be hard pressed to describe.

More for you to read about the same in different words - http://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/5309/when-during-meditation-we-forget-where-we-are?rq=1

I thought this might be relevant:
The formless meditations are part of the imageless realm arupa-bhava. According to Stefan Anacker in his book on Vasubandhu

formless meditation is still one pointedness of citta toward an examined range of events... the imageless realm comprises any state where all senses except the
  mental consciousness are suspended... the first five consciousnesses
  no longer perceive their object

Emphasis mine. I find the idea of citta without any sense consciousness at all completely baffling! I think that unless your canon explicitly says, probably best to make up your own mind.


text:
Why did Mahayana leave out the Pali Canon?
I'm quite familiar with Theravada and Zen but I can't understand the historical reasons for not keeping the original Buddha's teaching as a core.
The schools do not contradict each other, so why reinvent a wheel?
And also the Pali Canon feels more explicit. For example Heart Sutra of Avalokiteśvara is beautiful but it will not make as much sense to a newcomer as reading a Nikaya or two.

It did not. The Canon is an integral part of Mahayana, has always been.
In Chinese Mahayana, the Canon is included in the form of Agamas (translated to Chinese). In Tibetan Mahayana, the Canon is a part of Kangyur (translated from Chinese or Sanskrit to Tibetan). Most of those are the same sutras as in Pali, just with slightly different wording. Some are rather different, and shed new light on the teaching. Some are even more "explicit" (clear, straightforward):

"It was a dark night, raining lightly, with flashes of lightning. The Buddha said to Ananda: "You can come out with the umbrella over the lamp." Ananda listened, and walked behind the Buddha, with an umbrella over the lamp. When they reached a place, the Buddha smiled. Ananda said: "The Buddha doesn’t smile without a reason. What brings the smile today?" The Buddha said: "That’s right! That’s right! The Buddha doesn’t smile without a reason. Now you are following me with an umbrella over a lamp. I look around, and see everyone doing the same thing."

...

"At that time, Mahakasyapa stayed for a long time in a deserted meditation place, he came to visit Buddha, with long hair and beard, wearing old torn clothes. At that time, the Buddha was explaining dharma, surrounded by many people. The monks saw Mahakasyapa coming from afar, and were contemptuous of his appearance: "What kind of monk is this? Dressed in such ragged clothes, looking so uncouth." The Buddha knew what was on their minds, and he said to Mahakasyapa: "Welcome! Come share my seat. Now I am going to find out who became a monk first, you or me?" Those monks were shocked, their body hair stood up, wondering among themselves. "How strange! This respectable monk
  was offered to share Buddha’s seat."
Then, Mahakasyapa put his palms together: "Most respectable one, the Buddha is my master. I am the disciple."
The Buddha said: "True, true. I am the master. You are the disciple. Why don’t you sit down and make yourself comfortable?"
Mahakasyapa touched his head to the Buddha’s feet and sat aside…"

...

"Listen carefully and think. I will explain it to you. When the eye meets the matter, and you become aware that the matter is desirable, then practice detachment. If, on the other hand, the matter is undesirable, then practice non-avoidance… In this way, you will know that your desire arises from your eye meeting the matter, and this realization will make it cease…like a drop of water on an extremely hot iron ball, it will evaporate in an instant…"

These were extracts from Samyukta Agama. According to the sutra commentaries in the Yogacara-bhumi Shastra, the Samyukta Agama was the earliest agama collection. See my answer here for links to the full sutras.
Now, you have to understand that Mahayana sees itself as a living tradition, concerned first and foremost with the spirit of Dharma, not its letter. So from Mahayana's perspective to understand the point, the taste, and the style of teaching is much more important than to memorize the matrika-s. So in Mahayana making up new texts to convey the point in a new way suitable to the new generation of students in the new country is totally acceptable and even desirable. The Chinese and Tibetan people are very different in character from Indian - and so the outer wrapping on the medicine of Dharma had to be adapted to make it more attractive to them. The medicine itself is the same, just a different wrapping.
I suspect that modern Western people (Americans and Europeans) are more like ancient Indians than like ancient Tibetans or Chinese. So naturally the agama-sutra-style teaching is more appealing to us than the long-mahayana-sutra-style or the tantra-style. But whatever style teaching we take, it is critically important to understand that the point of Dharma applies to our immediate living experience, not to some far-fetched fantasy.
As one translation of Heart Sutra says:

Far beyond mistaken fantasy, at last there is Nirvana.

"I suspect that modern Western people (Americans and Europeans) are more like ancient Indians than like ancient Tibetans or Chinese.."
This is far from the case, both Mahayana and Tantra were originally developed within India. In fact all three type of schools early Buddhism, Mahayana, and Tantric Buddhism arrived in China, with the Mahayana winning out in China. It's clear that even in India the rather technical aspect of early Buddhism was not appealing to the mass, hence Mahayana and Tantra developed to fulfill this need.

True, but doesn't change my point. Proto-Abhidharma was mainstream at about same time as other analytical schools of Indian thought, while Tantra got mainstream in an entirely different historical period, when analysis was no longer the main obsession. Chinese Chan and Nyingma were a lot less analytical by definition. Western discourse is very much rooted in Greek-style rationality, the likeness of which might have influenced North Indian schools for centuries  following Buddha's parinirvana.


text:
Has any Buddhist meditator claimed that the mano-vijnana has a base to differentiate it from the other consciousnesses?
Has any Buddhist meditator claimed that the mano-vijnana has a base (I don't mean that in any technical sense) to differentiate it from the other consciousnesses?
If so, what is it called, and when is its action suspended?

Could you edit the question to increase clarity regarding what kind of base we are talking about and what you mean when writing "I don't mean that in any technical sense"? Thank you.

According to the Theravada Abhidhamma Mental Consciousness (mano-vijnana) is heart based. This is what Buddha realised through his meditation. Other consciousness arise with the respective faculties and the base, e.g. eye-consciousness with the eye.
It is suspended when you are in Nirodha Samapathi and in Bavanga consciousness. Also perhaps in Pala Samanapathi if this result in a momentarily entering Nirodha Samapathi but not very sure on this as there are different view on this.

In my limited and paltry understanding, the mano-vijnana or the "sixth sense according to the Buddha"  is [just] another sense-consciousness linked with a sense-gate.
That sense-gate is gateless.  Just like all your senses.
The gateless gate.
Streams.
Mind is the hub of these six streams -- the hub of a wheel is Mind and the six spokes are the different sense-consciousnesses.
All sense-consciousnesses can become "suspended" in penetrative insight and samadhi.  Your sense-consciousnesses get suspended when you sneeze or when you have an orgasm.  Even the "thinking" sense consciousness.
I hope that helps.
Anyway, these words, upon your realizing their meaning, will not be an accurate reflection of your understanding (they do not accord with the Ultimate truth) but perhaps they may be helpful in getting you closer to a breakthrough.


text:
Diminished volition
This article titled The Theory of Kama says,

Volition, or Will (tetana), is itself the doer, Feeling (vedana) is
  itself the reaper of the fruits of actions.

So feelings are the fruit of will and of actions.
Is the the converse also true: does diminished volition and not-acting create karma that will have a neutral sensation?

i'm thinking of dreams tbh, but the question seemed of general interest

Can someone explain the down vote on this?

The sensations are decided by the motivation of volition behind "non action" which on its own is an action.
Diminished volition can occur in a Vipassana partitioner who is seeing sensations arising and passing with no clinging or aversion hence not creating Fabrications / Formations / Sankara. This on its own right is wholesome hence this produces Piti followed by Passaddhi which is generally initially pleasant (Piti) and then more neutral (Passaddhi).