The Laws of Physics and Cryptographic Security
  This paper consists of musings that originate mainly from conversations with other physicists, as together we've tried to learn some cryptography, but also from conversations with a couple of classical cryptographers. The main thrust of the paper is an attempt to explore the ramifications for cryptographic security of incorporating physics into our thinking at every level. I begin by discussing two fundamental cryptographic principles, namely that security must not rely on secrecy of the protocol and that our local environment must be secure, from a physical perspective. I go on to explain why by definition a particular cryptographic task, oblivious transfer, is inconsistent with a belief in the validity of quantum mechanics. More precisely, oblivious transfer defines states and operations that do not exist in any (complex) Hilbert space. I go on to argue the fallaciousness of a "black box" approach to quantum cryptography, in which classical cryptographers just trust physicists to provide them with secure quantum cryptographic sub-protocols, which they then attempt to incorporate into larger cryptographic systems. Lest quantum cryptographers begin to feel too smug, I discuss the fact that current implementations of quantum key distribution are only technologically secure, and not "unconditionally" secure as is sometimes claimed. I next examine the concept of a secure lab from a physical perspective, and end by making some observations about the cryptographic significance of the (often overlooked) necessity for parties who wish to communicate having established physical reference frames. 
Terry Rudolph