execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid

While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from
a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.

clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads.  This
support includes two features.

One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the
TID value.

One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created
thread dies.

The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone()
time.

kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.

At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user
provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.

As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and
CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user
memory in forked processes.

Following sequence could happen:

1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that
   glibc maps to a clone( ...  CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID
   ...) syscall

2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a
   location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context
   (&THREAD_SELF->tid)

3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program.
   current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)

4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits,
   kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by
   current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :

        if (tsk->clear_child_tid
            && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
            && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
                u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
                tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;

                /*
                 * We don't check the error code - if userspace has
                 * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
                 */
<< here >>      put_user(0, tidptr);
                sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
        }

5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid
   users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program
   could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped
   file)

If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the
new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with
unexpected effects.

Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.

Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <21e2afd93d5ce53123476032b5dca8a79b546094@mcbone.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <69652caca27c8b940640ad396ab71f93cacec34f@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <a0baddf32b28d2f9429941ed4af2fe636e210591@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <20b70f0af00562e63758b9ee42012ecc96c58590@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <3fddac958924aef220f202ca567388ddab3f14a8@infradead.org>
Cc: Sonny Rao <d867fc987a366be56684d1145622524a3ba1efbf@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <9dbbbf0688fedc85ad4da37637f1a64b8c718ee2@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <00e4cf8f46a57000a44449bf9dd8cbbcc209fd2a@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <ffcb23910bebd32aac570c6edd538eb421f88dbe@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <20b70f0af00562e63758b9ee42012ecc96c58590@redhat.com>
Cc: <4fbacc2fa0ffdbb11bf1ad6925b886ebd08dd15f@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <5c1e68b099950c134891f0b6e179498a8ebe9cf9@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <69652caca27c8b940640ad396ab71f93cacec34f@linux-foundation.org>

KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,TeamVee-Kanas/android_kernel_samsung_kanas,TeamVee-Kanas/android_kernel_samsung_kanas,KristFoundation/Programs,TeamVee-Kanas/android_kernel_samsung_kanas,KristFoundation/Programs,TeamVee-Kanas/android_kernel_samsung_kanas,TeamVee-Kanas/android_kernel_samsung_kanas