USB: usbfs: don't leak kernel data in siginfo
USB: usbfs: don't leak kernel data in siginfo

When a signal is delivered, the information in the siginfo structure
is copied to userspace.  Good security practice dicatates that the
unused fields in this structure should be initialized to 0 so that
random kernel stack data isn't exposed to the user.  This patch adds
such an initialization to the two places where usbfs raises signals.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <75ea6bb7bfc1186f92d26164de5f9268c9a45b59@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Dave Mielke <bfcdf3e6ca6cef45543bfbb57509c92aec9a39fb@mielke.cc>
CC: <4fbacc2fa0ffdbb11bf1ad6925b886ebd08dd15f@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <4645f7897fd33786a2ee1264d590b3c400559d85@linuxfoundation.org>

KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs,KristFoundation/Programs